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* feat: Enhance control flow analysis with function summaries and taint analysis * feat: Update taint analysis to utilize function summaries for enhanced tracking * Refactor `walk.rs` batch processing and override handling: - Renamed `Batcher` to `BatchSender` for clarity. - Added `BatchSender::new` constructor for cleaner initialization. - Simplified batch size management in `BatchSender`. - Extracted `build_overrides` function for reusable override construction. - Improved error handling and validation in override building. - Enhanced performance with directory and file type filtering in `walk`. * Improve logging and streamline directory walk process: - Added detailed `tracing` logs for debugging batch flushes, override construction, and walk initialization/completion. - Optimized and simplified `filter_entry` logic for directory and file type filters. - Improved metadata checks and max file size enforcement during the scan. * Refactor and optimize taint tracking, label rules, and directory walk process: - Replaced `DefaultHasher` with `blake3::Hasher` for improved taint hashing. - Enhanced sorting and hashing logic in `taint.rs` for consistency and efficiency. - Removed unused `set_hash` function and redundant imports across files. - Improved batch sender logic in `walk.rs`, renaming key components for clarity. - Unified `spawn_senders` and `spawn_file_walker` with thread handling and channel tuple return. - Expanded label rules with additional matchers for sources, sanitizers, and sinks. - Deprecated `dump_cfg` and specific logging utilities in `cfg.rs` for code cleanup. * fix: fixed let chains error in walk.rs * fix: updated dependencies * fix: updated dependencies * chore: Remove standard error in scan.rs * feat: Introduce function summaries for enhanced taint and control flow analysis * feat: Enhance taint analysis with interop support and function summaries * feat: Add configuration analysis module and enhance matcher rules * feat: Add arity column to function_summaries and handle schema migration * fix: fixed clippy &PathBuf warnings * chore: Update dependencies and versioning in Cargo files * docs: Update README to enhance clarity and detail on features and analysis modes * chore: Update CHANGELOG for version 0.2.0 with new features, changes, and fixes * docs: Update SECURITY.md to clarify version support status --------- Co-authored-by: elipeter <eli.peter@es.fcm.travel>
99 lines
No EOL
3.3 KiB
Rust
99 lines
No EOL
3.3 KiB
Rust
/*!
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EXPECTED OUTPUT (high-level):
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1) cfg-unguarded-sink (High / High confidence)
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- In handle_request(): user input from std::env::var("INPUT") flows to std::process::Command::new("sh").arg(&input)
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- No dominating SHELL_ESCAPE sanitizer or validation guard for that value.
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- This should rank very high in scoring (entry-point-ish name + close to entry + shell sink).
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2) cfg-auth-gap (High / Medium confidence)
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- handle_request() looks like an entry-point (name matches handle_*)
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- Contains a shell sink without an auth guard (require_auth / is_authenticated / is_admin etc.)
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3) cfg-resource-leak (Medium / High or Medium confidence)
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- alloc_then_return_leak(): malloc without free on an early return path.
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4) cfg-unreachable-sanitizer or cfg-unreachable-guard (Medium/Low)
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- unreachable_sanitizer(): sanitizer call in unreachable block.
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5) taint / dataflow (existing BFS taint engine):
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- should detect at least one taint finding for:
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env::var source -> Command sink
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- should NOT flag safe_shell() because it uses shell_escape::unix::escape(&input) and passes `safe`.
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Notes:
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- This fixture intentionally contains both vulnerable and safe patterns, plus unreachable code and resource misuse,
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to exercise cfg_analysis::{unreachable, guards, auth, resources, scoring}.
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*/
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use std::process::Command;
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// ─── CFG: Entry-point-ish + unguarded sink + auth gap ─────────────────────────────
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pub fn handle_request() {
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// Source (Cap::all)
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let input = std::env::var("INPUT").unwrap();
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// Vulnerable sink (Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE)
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Command::new("sh").arg(&input).status().unwrap();
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}
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// ─── CFG: Guarded sink (should NOT produce cfg-unguarded-sink) ────────────────────
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pub fn safe_shell() {
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let input = std::env::var("INPUT").unwrap();
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// Sanitizer (Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE)
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let safe = shell_escape::unix::escape(&input);
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// Sink, but guarded by dominating sanitizer
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Command::new("sh").arg(&safe).status().unwrap();
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}
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// ─── CFG: Unreachable sanitizer (should report unreachable sanitizer/guard) ───────
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pub fn unreachable_sanitizer() {
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let input = std::env::var("INPUT").unwrap();
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return;
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// This block is unreachable; should produce an unreachable finding for sanitizer call.
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let _safe = shell_escape::unix::escape(&input);
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}
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// ─── CFG: Resource misuse (malloc without free on some exit path) ─────────────────
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extern "C" {
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fn malloc(size: usize) -> *mut u8;
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fn free(ptr: *mut u8);
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}
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pub fn alloc_then_return_leak(flag: bool) {
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unsafe {
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let p = malloc(128);
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// Early return leaks `p` on this path.
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if flag {
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return;
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}
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free(p);
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}
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}
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// ─── Extra: HTML sink labeling sanity (optional) ──────────────────────────────────
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// `sink_html` is a test marker recognized as Sink(HTML_ESCAPE) by the label rules.
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// In real code this would be something like response.body(), template.render(), etc.
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fn sink_html(_s: &str) {}
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pub fn html_print() {
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let raw = std::env::var("HTML").unwrap();
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sink_html(&raw);
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}
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pub fn html_print_sanitized() {
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let raw = std::env::var("HTML").unwrap();
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let safe = html_escape::encode_safe(&raw);
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sink_html(&safe);
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} |