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* feat: Enhance control flow analysis with function summaries and taint analysis * feat: Update taint analysis to utilize function summaries for enhanced tracking * Refactor `walk.rs` batch processing and override handling: - Renamed `Batcher` to `BatchSender` for clarity. - Added `BatchSender::new` constructor for cleaner initialization. - Simplified batch size management in `BatchSender`. - Extracted `build_overrides` function for reusable override construction. - Improved error handling and validation in override building. - Enhanced performance with directory and file type filtering in `walk`. * Improve logging and streamline directory walk process: - Added detailed `tracing` logs for debugging batch flushes, override construction, and walk initialization/completion. - Optimized and simplified `filter_entry` logic for directory and file type filters. - Improved metadata checks and max file size enforcement during the scan. * Refactor and optimize taint tracking, label rules, and directory walk process: - Replaced `DefaultHasher` with `blake3::Hasher` for improved taint hashing. - Enhanced sorting and hashing logic in `taint.rs` for consistency and efficiency. - Removed unused `set_hash` function and redundant imports across files. - Improved batch sender logic in `walk.rs`, renaming key components for clarity. - Unified `spawn_senders` and `spawn_file_walker` with thread handling and channel tuple return. - Expanded label rules with additional matchers for sources, sanitizers, and sinks. - Deprecated `dump_cfg` and specific logging utilities in `cfg.rs` for code cleanup. * fix: fixed let chains error in walk.rs * fix: updated dependencies * fix: updated dependencies * chore: Remove standard error in scan.rs * feat: Introduce function summaries for enhanced taint and control flow analysis * feat: Enhance taint analysis with interop support and function summaries * feat: Add configuration analysis module and enhance matcher rules * feat: Add arity column to function_summaries and handle schema migration * fix: fixed clippy &PathBuf warnings * chore: Update dependencies and versioning in Cargo files * docs: Update README to enhance clarity and detail on features and analysis modes * chore: Update CHANGELOG for version 0.2.0 with new features, changes, and fixes * docs: Update SECURITY.md to clarify version support status --------- Co-authored-by: elipeter <eli.peter@es.fcm.travel>
74 lines
No EOL
3.3 KiB
JavaScript
74 lines
No EOL
3.3 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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EXPECTED OUTPUT (high-level):
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1) cfg-unguarded-sink (High / High confidence)
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- handler(req,res): source req.body.cmd flows to child_process.exec(cmd) without sanitizer/guard.
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- Should rank high (entry-point-ish function name 'handler', close to entry).
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2) cfg-auth-gap (High / Medium)
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- handler is entry-point-ish (name matches handler/route/api conventions).
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- No auth guard dominates sink (require_auth / is_authenticated / is_admin / authorize).
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3) cfg-error-fallthrough (Medium / Medium)
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- Example: if (err) { console.log(err); } then exec(...) still runs.
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- This is the JS analogue of your Go heuristic. If your implementation only targets Go, this should be NO finding.
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If you later generalize, this file includes a pattern you can test against.
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4) cfg-unguarded-sink (HTML) (Medium/High)
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- req.query.html is written into innerHTML without DOMPurify.sanitize
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5) No findings for safe paths:
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- safeHandler uses encodeURIComponent before exec (URL_ENCODE sanitizer) OR uses a dedicated sanitizer you map to SHELL_ESCAPE.
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NOTE: encodeURIComponent is URL_ENCODE, not SHELL_ESCAPE — so for SHELL_ESCAPE sinks, it may still be flagged depending on your caps logic.
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The “definitely safe” case here uses a dummy sanitize_shell() wrapper to match your Rust-style naming if you add it for JS later.
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- safeHtml uses DOMPurify.sanitize before innerHTML (HTML_ESCAPE).
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Taint / dataflow:
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- should find taint from req.body / req.query / process.env sources to exec/eval/innerHTML sinks.
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*/
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const child_process = require("child_process");
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// ─── Entry-point-ish + unguarded shell sink + auth gap ────────────────────────────
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function handler(req, res) {
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// Source (Cap::all): req.body
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const cmd = req.body.cmd;
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// Vulnerable sink (Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE): child_process.exec
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child_process.exec(cmd);
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res.end("ok");
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}
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// ─── Guarded HTML sink (should NOT be flagged) ────────────────────────────────────
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function safeHtml(req, res, DOMPurify) {
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const html = req.query.html; // Source
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const cleaned = DOMPurify.sanitize(html); // Sanitizer(HTML_ESCAPE)
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document.getElementById("app").innerHTML = cleaned; // Sink(HTML_ESCAPE)
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res.end("ok");
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}
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// ─── Unguarded HTML sink (should be flagged) ─────────────────────────────────────
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function unsafeHtml(req, res) {
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const html = req.query.html; // Source
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document.getElementById("app").innerHTML = html; // Sink(HTML_ESCAPE) without sanitizer
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res.end("ok");
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}
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// ─── Heuristic error fallthrough pattern (JS analogue) ───────────────────────────
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// If your error-handling analysis is Go-only, ignore this for now.
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// If generalized later, it should be flagged.
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function errFallthrough(req, res) {
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const err = req.query.err;
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if (err) {
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console.log(err);
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}
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child_process.exec(req.body.cmd);
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res.end("ok");
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}
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// ─── Optional: eval sink (should be flagged) ─────────────────────────────────────
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function evalSink(req) {
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const payload = process.env.PAYLOAD; // Source
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eval(payload); // Sink(SHELL_ESCAPE) per your rules
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} |