nyx/examples/cfg_analysis/example.js
Eli Peter f96a89e7c1
Feat/full cfg (#30)
* feat: Enhance control flow analysis with function summaries and taint analysis

* feat: Update taint analysis to utilize function summaries for enhanced tracking

* Refactor `walk.rs` batch processing and override handling:

- Renamed `Batcher` to `BatchSender` for clarity.
- Added `BatchSender::new` constructor for cleaner initialization.
- Simplified batch size management in `BatchSender`.
- Extracted `build_overrides` function for reusable override construction.
- Improved error handling and validation in override building.
- Enhanced performance with directory and file type filtering in `walk`.

* Improve logging and streamline directory walk process:

- Added detailed `tracing` logs for debugging batch flushes, override construction, and walk initialization/completion.
- Optimized and simplified `filter_entry` logic for directory and file type filters.
- Improved metadata checks and max file size enforcement during the scan.

* Refactor and optimize taint tracking, label rules, and directory walk process:

- Replaced `DefaultHasher` with `blake3::Hasher` for improved taint hashing.
- Enhanced sorting and hashing logic in `taint.rs` for consistency and efficiency.
- Removed unused `set_hash` function and redundant imports across files.
- Improved batch sender logic in `walk.rs`, renaming key components for clarity.
- Unified `spawn_senders` and `spawn_file_walker` with thread handling and channel tuple return.
- Expanded label rules with additional matchers for sources, sanitizers, and sinks.
- Deprecated `dump_cfg` and specific logging utilities in `cfg.rs` for code cleanup.

* fix: fixed let chains error in walk.rs

* fix: updated dependencies

* fix: updated dependencies

* chore: Remove standard error in scan.rs

* feat: Introduce function summaries for enhanced taint and control flow analysis

* feat: Enhance taint analysis with interop support and function summaries

* feat: Add configuration analysis module and enhance matcher rules

* feat: Add arity column to function_summaries and handle schema migration

* fix: fixed clippy &PathBuf warnings

* chore: Update dependencies and versioning in Cargo files

* docs: Update README to enhance clarity and detail on features and analysis modes

* chore: Update CHANGELOG for version 0.2.0 with new features, changes, and fixes

* docs: Update SECURITY.md to clarify version support status

---------

Co-authored-by: elipeter <eli.peter@es.fcm.travel>
2026-02-24 23:44:07 -05:00

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JavaScript

/**
EXPECTED OUTPUT (high-level):
1) cfg-unguarded-sink (High / High confidence)
- handler(req,res): source req.body.cmd flows to child_process.exec(cmd) without sanitizer/guard.
- Should rank high (entry-point-ish function name 'handler', close to entry).
2) cfg-auth-gap (High / Medium)
- handler is entry-point-ish (name matches handler/route/api conventions).
- No auth guard dominates sink (require_auth / is_authenticated / is_admin / authorize).
3) cfg-error-fallthrough (Medium / Medium)
- Example: if (err) { console.log(err); } then exec(...) still runs.
- This is the JS analogue of your Go heuristic. If your implementation only targets Go, this should be NO finding.
If you later generalize, this file includes a pattern you can test against.
4) cfg-unguarded-sink (HTML) (Medium/High)
- req.query.html is written into innerHTML without DOMPurify.sanitize
5) No findings for safe paths:
- safeHandler uses encodeURIComponent before exec (URL_ENCODE sanitizer) OR uses a dedicated sanitizer you map to SHELL_ESCAPE.
NOTE: encodeURIComponent is URL_ENCODE, not SHELL_ESCAPE — so for SHELL_ESCAPE sinks, it may still be flagged depending on your caps logic.
The “definitely safe” case here uses a dummy sanitize_shell() wrapper to match your Rust-style naming if you add it for JS later.
- safeHtml uses DOMPurify.sanitize before innerHTML (HTML_ESCAPE).
Taint / dataflow:
- should find taint from req.body / req.query / process.env sources to exec/eval/innerHTML sinks.
*/
const child_process = require("child_process");
// ─── Entry-point-ish + unguarded shell sink + auth gap ────────────────────────────
function handler(req, res) {
// Source (Cap::all): req.body
const cmd = req.body.cmd;
// Vulnerable sink (Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE): child_process.exec
child_process.exec(cmd);
res.end("ok");
}
// ─── Guarded HTML sink (should NOT be flagged) ────────────────────────────────────
function safeHtml(req, res, DOMPurify) {
const html = req.query.html; // Source
const cleaned = DOMPurify.sanitize(html); // Sanitizer(HTML_ESCAPE)
document.getElementById("app").innerHTML = cleaned; // Sink(HTML_ESCAPE)
res.end("ok");
}
// ─── Unguarded HTML sink (should be flagged) ─────────────────────────────────────
function unsafeHtml(req, res) {
const html = req.query.html; // Source
document.getElementById("app").innerHTML = html; // Sink(HTML_ESCAPE) without sanitizer
res.end("ok");
}
// ─── Heuristic error fallthrough pattern (JS analogue) ───────────────────────────
// If your error-handling analysis is Go-only, ignore this for now.
// If generalized later, it should be flagged.
function errFallthrough(req, res) {
const err = req.query.err;
if (err) {
console.log(err);
}
child_process.exec(req.body.cmd);
res.end("ok");
}
// ─── Optional: eval sink (should be flagged) ─────────────────────────────────────
function evalSink(req) {
const payload = process.env.PAYLOAD; // Source
eval(payload); // Sink(SHELL_ESCAPE) per your rules
}