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* chore: Exclude CLAUDE.md from Cargo.toml * feat: add callgraph module and integrate into main analysis flow * feat: enhance CLI with new severity filtering and analysis modes * feat: update CHANGELOG with recent enhancements and fixes to severity filtering and output handling * feat: implement state-model dataflow analysis for resource lifecycle and auth state * feat: enhance diagnostic output formatting and add evidence structure * feat: implement attack surface ranking for diagnostics with scoring and sorting * feat: add comprehensive documentation for installation, usage, and rules reference * feat: add multiple language support for command execution and evaluation endpoints * feat: implement inline suppression for findings using `nyx:ignore` comments * feat: add confidence levels to AST patterns and update output structure * feat: implement low-noise prioritization system with category filtering, rollup grouping, and configurable budgets * feat: bump version to 0.4.0 and update changelog with new features and improvements * feat: add dead code allowances to various functions in mod.rs and real_world_tests.rs
4.2 KiB
4.2 KiB
JavaScript Rules
JavaScript has the most complete taint label coverage alongside Rust. Nyx detects code execution, XSS, prototype pollution, command injection, and weak crypto.
Taint Sources
| Function | Capability | Source Kind |
|---|---|---|
document.location, window.location |
all |
UserInput |
req.body, req.query, req.params |
all |
UserInput |
req.headers, req.cookies |
all |
UserInput |
process.env |
all |
EnvironmentConfig |
Taint Sinks
| Function | Required Capability |
|---|---|
eval |
SHELL_ESCAPE |
innerHTML |
HTML_ESCAPE |
location.href, window.location.href |
URL_ENCODE |
child_process.exec, child_process.execSync |
SHELL_ESCAPE |
child_process.spawn |
SHELL_ESCAPE |
Taint Sanitizers
| Function | Strips Capability |
|---|---|
JSON.parse |
JSON_PARSE |
encodeURIComponent, encodeURI |
URL_ENCODE |
DOMPurify.sanitize |
HTML_ESCAPE |
Note: Anonymous function expressions and arrow functions passed as callback arguments (e.g., Express
app.get('/path', function(req, res) { ... })) are automatically walked as separate function scopes for taint analysis. Each anonymous function gets a unique scope identifier to prevent cross-function taint leakage.
AST Pattern Rules
Code Execution
| Rule ID | Severity | Tier | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
js.code_exec.eval |
High | A | eval() — dynamic code execution |
js.code_exec.new_function |
High | A | new Function() — eval equivalent |
js.code_exec.settimeout_string |
Medium | A | setTimeout/setInterval with string argument |
XSS Sinks
| Rule ID | Severity | Tier | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
js.xss.document_write |
Medium | A | document.write() / document.writeln() |
js.xss.outer_html |
Medium | A | Assignment to .outerHTML |
js.xss.insert_adjacent_html |
Medium | A | insertAdjacentHTML() |
js.xss.location_assign |
Medium | A | Assignment to location/location.href — open redirect |
js.xss.cookie_write |
Medium | A | Write to document.cookie |
Prototype Pollution
| Rule ID | Severity | Tier | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
js.prototype.proto_assignment |
Medium | A | Assignment to __proto__ |
js.prototype.extend_object |
Medium | A | Assignment to Object.prototype.* |
Weak Crypto
| Rule ID | Severity | Tier | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
js.crypto.weak_hash |
Low | A | crypto.createHash("md5"/"sha1") |
js.crypto.math_random |
Low | A | Math.random() — not cryptographically secure |
Insecure Transport
| Rule ID | Severity | Tier | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
js.transport.fetch_http |
Low | A | fetch("http://...") — plaintext HTTP |
Examples
js.code_exec.eval — Dynamic code execution
Vulnerable:
const code = req.query.code;
eval(code); // Remote code execution
Safe alternative:
// Use a sandboxed interpreter or avoid eval entirely
const allowed = { add: (a, b) => a + b };
const result = allowed[req.query.operation]?.(req.query.a, req.query.b);
js.xss.document_write — XSS sink
Vulnerable:
document.write("<h1>" + userName + "</h1>");
Safe alternative:
const el = document.createElement("h1");
el.textContent = userName;
document.body.appendChild(el);
js.prototype.proto_assignment — Prototype pollution
Vulnerable:
function merge(target, source) {
for (let key in source) {
target[key] = source[key]; // If key is "__proto__", pollutes prototype
}
}
Safe alternative:
function merge(target, source) {
for (let key in source) {
if (key === "__proto__" || key === "constructor") continue;
target[key] = source[key];
}
}
Taint: req.body → eval()
Finding:
[HIGH] taint-unsanitised-flow (source 2:18) src/handler.js:3:5
Source: req.body at 2:18
Sink: eval()
Score: 78