nyx/examples/cfg_analysis/example.rs
Eli Peter f96a89e7c1
Feat/full cfg (#30)
* feat: Enhance control flow analysis with function summaries and taint analysis

* feat: Update taint analysis to utilize function summaries for enhanced tracking

* Refactor `walk.rs` batch processing and override handling:

- Renamed `Batcher` to `BatchSender` for clarity.
- Added `BatchSender::new` constructor for cleaner initialization.
- Simplified batch size management in `BatchSender`.
- Extracted `build_overrides` function for reusable override construction.
- Improved error handling and validation in override building.
- Enhanced performance with directory and file type filtering in `walk`.

* Improve logging and streamline directory walk process:

- Added detailed `tracing` logs for debugging batch flushes, override construction, and walk initialization/completion.
- Optimized and simplified `filter_entry` logic for directory and file type filters.
- Improved metadata checks and max file size enforcement during the scan.

* Refactor and optimize taint tracking, label rules, and directory walk process:

- Replaced `DefaultHasher` with `blake3::Hasher` for improved taint hashing.
- Enhanced sorting and hashing logic in `taint.rs` for consistency and efficiency.
- Removed unused `set_hash` function and redundant imports across files.
- Improved batch sender logic in `walk.rs`, renaming key components for clarity.
- Unified `spawn_senders` and `spawn_file_walker` with thread handling and channel tuple return.
- Expanded label rules with additional matchers for sources, sanitizers, and sinks.
- Deprecated `dump_cfg` and specific logging utilities in `cfg.rs` for code cleanup.

* fix: fixed let chains error in walk.rs

* fix: updated dependencies

* fix: updated dependencies

* chore: Remove standard error in scan.rs

* feat: Introduce function summaries for enhanced taint and control flow analysis

* feat: Enhance taint analysis with interop support and function summaries

* feat: Add configuration analysis module and enhance matcher rules

* feat: Add arity column to function_summaries and handle schema migration

* fix: fixed clippy &PathBuf warnings

* chore: Update dependencies and versioning in Cargo files

* docs: Update README to enhance clarity and detail on features and analysis modes

* chore: Update CHANGELOG for version 0.2.0 with new features, changes, and fixes

* docs: Update SECURITY.md to clarify version support status

---------

Co-authored-by: elipeter <eli.peter@es.fcm.travel>
2026-02-24 23:44:07 -05:00

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3.3 KiB
Rust

/*!
EXPECTED OUTPUT (high-level):
1) cfg-unguarded-sink (High / High confidence)
- In handle_request(): user input from std::env::var("INPUT") flows to std::process::Command::new("sh").arg(&input)
- No dominating SHELL_ESCAPE sanitizer or validation guard for that value.
- This should rank very high in scoring (entry-point-ish name + close to entry + shell sink).
2) cfg-auth-gap (High / Medium confidence)
- handle_request() looks like an entry-point (name matches handle_*)
- Contains a shell sink without an auth guard (require_auth / is_authenticated / is_admin etc.)
3) cfg-resource-leak (Medium / High or Medium confidence)
- alloc_then_return_leak(): malloc without free on an early return path.
4) cfg-unreachable-sanitizer or cfg-unreachable-guard (Medium/Low)
- unreachable_sanitizer(): sanitizer call in unreachable block.
5) taint / dataflow (existing BFS taint engine):
- should detect at least one taint finding for:
env::var source -> Command sink
- should NOT flag safe_shell() because it uses shell_escape::unix::escape(&input) and passes `safe`.
Notes:
- This fixture intentionally contains both vulnerable and safe patterns, plus unreachable code and resource misuse,
to exercise cfg_analysis::{unreachable, guards, auth, resources, scoring}.
*/
use std::process::Command;
// ─── CFG: Entry-point-ish + unguarded sink + auth gap ─────────────────────────────
pub fn handle_request() {
// Source (Cap::all)
let input = std::env::var("INPUT").unwrap();
// Vulnerable sink (Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE)
Command::new("sh").arg(&input).status().unwrap();
}
// ─── CFG: Guarded sink (should NOT produce cfg-unguarded-sink) ────────────────────
pub fn safe_shell() {
let input = std::env::var("INPUT").unwrap();
// Sanitizer (Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE)
let safe = shell_escape::unix::escape(&input);
// Sink, but guarded by dominating sanitizer
Command::new("sh").arg(&safe).status().unwrap();
}
// ─── CFG: Unreachable sanitizer (should report unreachable sanitizer/guard) ───────
pub fn unreachable_sanitizer() {
let input = std::env::var("INPUT").unwrap();
return;
// This block is unreachable; should produce an unreachable finding for sanitizer call.
let _safe = shell_escape::unix::escape(&input);
}
// ─── CFG: Resource misuse (malloc without free on some exit path) ─────────────────
extern "C" {
fn malloc(size: usize) -> *mut u8;
fn free(ptr: *mut u8);
}
pub fn alloc_then_return_leak(flag: bool) {
unsafe {
let p = malloc(128);
// Early return leaks `p` on this path.
if flag {
return;
}
free(p);
}
}
// ─── Extra: HTML sink labeling sanity (optional) ──────────────────────────────────
// `sink_html` is a test marker recognized as Sink(HTML_ESCAPE) by the label rules.
// In real code this would be something like response.body(), template.render(), etc.
fn sink_html(_s: &str) {}
pub fn html_print() {
let raw = std::env::var("HTML").unwrap();
sink_html(&raw);
}
pub fn html_print_sanitized() {
let raw = std::env::var("HTML").unwrap();
let safe = html_escape::encode_safe(&raw);
sink_html(&safe);
}