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58f1794a4e
* feat: Enhance data exfiltration detection with source sensitivity gating for cookies and headers * feat: Implement cross-file data exfiltration detection with parameter-specific gate filters * feat: Add calibration tests and refine DATA_EXFIL severity scoring logic * feat: Introduce per-detector configuration for data exfiltration suppression * feat: Enhance DATA_EXFIL findings with destination field tracking in diagnostics and SARIF output * feat: Add tainted body and URL handling for data exfiltration detection * feat: Add integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL and SSRF detection in Go * feat: Add Java integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL detection across multiple HTTP clients * feat: Add synthetic externals handling for closure-captured variables in SSA * feat: Implement closure-based suppression for resource leak findings * feat: Add regression guards for shell-injection and taint propagation in for-of destructure patterns * feat: Implement constructor cap narrowing for data exfiltration detection in HTTP request builders * feat: Add gated sinks for data exfiltration detection in C and C++ using curl_easy_setopt * feat: Implement DATA_EXFIL cap parity for backwards analysis and add integration tests * feat: Add data exfiltration sinks for various languages and enhance documentation * refactor: Simplify formatting and improve readability in various files * refactor: Improve readability by simplifying conditional statements and adding clippy linting * docs: Update CHANGELOG and comments for data exfiltration features and configuration * docs: Clarify configuration instructions for data exfiltration trusted destinations * docs: Enhance comments for evidence routing logic in data exfiltration
18 lines
545 B
Go
18 lines
545 B
Go
// SSRF regression fixture: attacker-controlled destination URL flows
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// into `http.NewRequest`'s URL position (arg 1). SSRF must fire on the
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// URL flow; DATA_EXFIL must NOT fire (the body is hardcoded `nil`).
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// Cap attribution is per-position so a tainted URL never surfaces as
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// data exfiltration.
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//
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// Driven by `data_exfil_go_integration_tests.rs`.
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package fixture
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import (
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"net/http"
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)
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func proxy(r *http.Request) {
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target := r.URL.Query().Get("target")
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req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", target, nil)
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http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
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}
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