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58f1794a4e
* feat: Enhance data exfiltration detection with source sensitivity gating for cookies and headers * feat: Implement cross-file data exfiltration detection with parameter-specific gate filters * feat: Add calibration tests and refine DATA_EXFIL severity scoring logic * feat: Introduce per-detector configuration for data exfiltration suppression * feat: Enhance DATA_EXFIL findings with destination field tracking in diagnostics and SARIF output * feat: Add tainted body and URL handling for data exfiltration detection * feat: Add integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL and SSRF detection in Go * feat: Add Java integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL detection across multiple HTTP clients * feat: Add synthetic externals handling for closure-captured variables in SSA * feat: Implement closure-based suppression for resource leak findings * feat: Add regression guards for shell-injection and taint propagation in for-of destructure patterns * feat: Implement constructor cap narrowing for data exfiltration detection in HTTP request builders * feat: Add gated sinks for data exfiltration detection in C and C++ using curl_easy_setopt * feat: Implement DATA_EXFIL cap parity for backwards analysis and add integration tests * feat: Add data exfiltration sinks for various languages and enhance documentation * refactor: Simplify formatting and improve readability in various files * refactor: Improve readability by simplifying conditional statements and adding clippy linting * docs: Update CHANGELOG and comments for data exfiltration features and configuration * docs: Clarify configuration instructions for data exfiltration trusted destinations * docs: Enhance comments for evidence routing logic in data exfiltration
17 lines
691 B
JavaScript
17 lines
691 B
JavaScript
// DATA_EXFIL fixture: a fixed destination URL and a sensitive (cookie /
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// session) source flowing into the outbound body. SSRF must NOT fire
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// (destination is hardcoded) but `Cap::DATA_EXFIL` must fire because the
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// source is Sensitive (`req.cookies.session` carries auth material) — exactly
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// the cross-boundary leak the cap targets.
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//
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// Plain user input echoed back into a body is intentionally not classified
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// as data exfiltration, see `fetch_body_user_input_silenced.js`.
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//
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// Driven by `fetch_data_exfil_integration_tests.rs`.
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function leakBody(req) {
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var payload = req.cookies.session;
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fetch('/endpoint', {
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method: 'POST',
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body: payload,
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});
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}
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