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58f1794a4e
* feat: Enhance data exfiltration detection with source sensitivity gating for cookies and headers * feat: Implement cross-file data exfiltration detection with parameter-specific gate filters * feat: Add calibration tests and refine DATA_EXFIL severity scoring logic * feat: Introduce per-detector configuration for data exfiltration suppression * feat: Enhance DATA_EXFIL findings with destination field tracking in diagnostics and SARIF output * feat: Add tainted body and URL handling for data exfiltration detection * feat: Add integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL and SSRF detection in Go * feat: Add Java integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL detection across multiple HTTP clients * feat: Add synthetic externals handling for closure-captured variables in SSA * feat: Implement closure-based suppression for resource leak findings * feat: Add regression guards for shell-injection and taint propagation in for-of destructure patterns * feat: Implement constructor cap narrowing for data exfiltration detection in HTTP request builders * feat: Add gated sinks for data exfiltration detection in C and C++ using curl_easy_setopt * feat: Implement DATA_EXFIL cap parity for backwards analysis and add integration tests * feat: Add data exfiltration sinks for various languages and enhance documentation * refactor: Simplify formatting and improve readability in various files * refactor: Improve readability by simplifying conditional statements and adding clippy linting * docs: Update CHANGELOG and comments for data exfiltration features and configuration * docs: Clarify configuration instructions for data exfiltration trusted destinations * docs: Enhance comments for evidence routing logic in data exfiltration
19 lines
629 B
Go
19 lines
629 B
Go
// DATA_EXFIL silenced regression fixture: plain user input echoed into
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// the body of an outbound `http.Post` to a fixed URL must NOT fire
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// `Cap::DATA_EXFIL`. The user already controls `r.FormValue("msg")`, so
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// surfacing it back into the request payload is not a cross-boundary
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// disclosure. Source-sensitivity gating in `ast.rs` strips the cap.
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//
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// Driven by `data_exfil_go_integration_tests.rs`.
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package fixture
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import (
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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)
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func forwardUserInput(r *http.Request) {
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msg := r.FormValue("msg")
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body := strings.NewReader(msg)
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http.Post("https://analytics.internal/track", "text/plain", body)
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}
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