# Detectors Nyx ships four independent detector families. They run together in `--mode full`, the default. Findings are merged, deduplicated, ranked, and printed in one result set. | Family | Rule prefix | Looks at | What it finds | |---|---|---|---| | [Taint analysis](detectors/taint.md) | `taint-*` | Cross-file dataflow | Unsanitized data flowing source to sink | | [CFG structural](detectors/cfg.md) | `cfg-*` | Per-function control flow | Auth gaps, unguarded sinks, error fallthrough, resource release on all paths | | [State model](detectors/state.md) | `state-*` | Per-function state lattice | Use-after-close, double-close, leaks, unauthenticated access | | [AST patterns](detectors/patterns.md) | `..` | Tree-sitter structural match | Banned APIs, weak crypto, dangerous constructs | For Rust auth-specific rules (`rs.auth.*`), see [auth.md](auth.md). ## How they combine In `--mode full`: 1. **Taint and AST can both fire on one line.** If `eval(userInput)` triggers both `js.code_exec.eval` (AST) and `taint-unsanitised-flow` (taint), both are kept with distinct rule IDs. The taint finding ranks higher because of the analysis-kind bonus. 2. **State supersedes CFG on resource leaks.** When `state-resource-leak` and `cfg-resource-leak` fire at the same location, the CFG one is dropped. 3. **Exact duplicates are removed.** Same line, column, rule ID, severity → one finding. ## Modes | Mode | Active detectors | |---|---| | `full` (default) | All four | | `ast` | AST patterns only | | `cfg` | Taint + CFG + State (no AST patterns) | | `taint` | Taint + State | ## Attack-surface ranking Every finding gets a deterministic score. Findings are sorted by descending score by default. Disable with `--no-rank` or `output.attack_surface_ranking = false`. ``` score = severity_base + analysis_kind + evidence_strength + state_bonus - validation_penalty ``` | Component | Values | |---|---| | Severity base | High=60, Medium=30, Low=10 | | Analysis kind | taint=+10, state=+8, cfg with evidence=+5, cfg without evidence=+3, ast=+0 | | Evidence strength | +1 per evidence item up to 4; +2 to +6 for source kind | | State bonus | use-after-close / unauthed=+6, double-close=+3, must-leak=+2, may-leak=+1 | | Validation penalty | -5 if path-validated | Source-kind contributions (taint only): | Source | Bonus | |---|---| | User input (`req.body`, `argv`, `stdin`, `form`, `query`, `params`) | +6 | | Environment (`env::var`, `getenv`, `process.env`) | +5 | | Unknown | +4 | | File system | +3 | | Database | +2 | Approximate score ranges: | Finding type | Score | |---|---| | High taint with user input | 76 to 81 | | High state (use-after-close) | ~74 | | High CFG structural | 63 to 68 | | Medium taint with env source | 45 to 50 | | Medium state (resource leak) | ~40 | | Low AST-only pattern | ~10 | For the engine's runtime model (passes, summaries, SCC fixed-point), see [how-it-works.md](how-it-works.md).