Python fp and docs updtes (#58)

* refactor: Update comments for clarity and add expectations.json files for performance metrics

* feat: Implement FP guard for JS/TS local-collection receivers to suppress missing ownership checks

* feat: Enhance Rust parameter handling to classify local collections and prevent false ownership checks

* refactor: Simplify code formatting for better readability in multiple files

* refactor: Improve UTF-8 sequence length handling and enhance clarity in loop iteration

* feat: Update Java and Python patterns to include new security rules

* refactor: Improve comment clarity and consistency across multiple Rust files

* refactor: Simplify code formatting for improved readability in integration tests and module files

* refactor: Improve comment formatting and enhance clarity in assertions across multiple files

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/cross_file_helper_authz.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Target: authorization happens inside `require_owner`, which
 // delegates to `require_group_member` (a configured authorization
 // check name).  The handler in `cross_file_helper_handler.rs`
-// delegates ownership validation to this helper — cross-file helper
+// delegates ownership validation to this helper, cross-file helper
 // lifting should recognise the call as an auth check covering the
 // supplied `row`.
 struct Db;

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/db_connection_type_inferred.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // produces a `DatabaseConnection` via SSA `constructor_type` (through
 // `peel_identity_suffix`, which strips `.unwrap()` before matching).  The
 // handler then calls `conn.execute(..)`, a callee name that appears in
-// neither `mutation_indicator_names` nor `read_indicator_names` for Rust —
+// neither `mutation_indicator_names` nor `read_indicator_names` for Rust ,
 // name-based classification returns `None`, so the ownership gate
 // already cannot flag the call.  The type-map refinement should *still*
 // leave the call unflagged (the type map produces `DbMutation`, but

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/hashmap_local_noise.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ pub async fn handle_list_peer_docs(req: Req, ctx: Ctx) -> Result<String, ()> {
     let user = auth::require_auth(&req, &ctx).await?;
     let doc_ids: Vec<i64> = vec![1, 2, 3];
 
-    // Pure in-memory bookkeeping — no authorization decision here.
+    // Pure in-memory bookkeeping, no authorization decision here.
     let mut counts: HashMap<i64, usize> = HashMap::new();
     let mut seen: HashSet<i64> = HashSet::new();
     for doc_id in &doc_ids {

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/helper_no_auth_lift.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // B4 regression guard: `format_target` does NOT auth-check
-// `group_id` — it just constructs a string from it. The helper-lift
+// `group_id`, it just constructs a string from it. The helper-lift
 // pass must not synthesise a covering AuthCheck on the handler's call
 // site, so the subsequent `db.exec("INSERT INTO comments …", &[group_id])`
 // MUST still flag.
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ mod auth {
 }
 
 fn format_target(group_id: i64, suffix: &str) -> String {
-    // No auth check here — pure formatting.
+    // No auth check here, pure formatting.
     format!("group:{}{}", group_id, suffix)
 }
 

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/row_ownership_equality.rs

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ pub async fn handle_delete_doc(req: Req, ctx: Ctx, doc_id: i64) -> Result<String
         return json_err("cannot delete another user's doc", 403);
     }
 
-    // By construction, the row belongs to `user` — so any id read from it is authorized.
+    // By construction, the row belongs to `user`, so any id read from it is authorized.
     let group_id = existing.get_i64("group_id");
     realtime::publish_to_group(group_id, "doc_deleted");
     Ok("ok".into())

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/row_ownership_no_early_exit.rs

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ pub async fn handle_update_doc(req: Req, ctx: Ctx, doc_id: i64) -> Result<String
     );
     let owner_id = existing.get_i64("user_id");
 
-    // Equality compared but no early exit — the check has no effect.
+    // Equality compared but no early exit, the check has no effect.
     if owner_id != user.id {
         // missing return
         println!("not your doc (but proceeding anyway)");

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/self_scoped_user.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ mod auth { pub async fn require_auth(_r: &super::Req, _c: &super::Ctx) -> Result
 
 // The handler's `get_peer_ids(&db, user.id)` call below must not be
 // flagged. `user` is bound from `auth::require_auth(..)` so `user.id`
-// is the caller's own id — the call is self-referential, not a foreign
+// is the caller's own id, the call is self-referential, not a foreign
 // scoped id. The library-style helper below is a pass-through so its
 // body contains no DB sinks (the internal `user_id` → DB flow is a
 // separate pattern covered by helper-summary lifting).

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/sql_join_acl.rs

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // against an ACL table (`group_members`) with a WHERE clause that pins
 // the row to the current user (`gm.user_id = ?1` bound to `user.id`).
 // Every returned row is membership-gated by construction, so downstream
-// uses of the row's columns (`group_id` here) are authorized — the
+// uses of the row's columns (`group_id` here) are authorized, the
 // `realtime::publish_to_group` call MUST NOT be flagged as missing an
 // ownership check after B3.
 struct Ctx;

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/sql_no_acl_join_flags.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // B3 regression guard: the SELECT JOINs through `audit_log` (NOT in
 // the configured ACL list) and the WHERE clause pins on
 // `al.user_id = ?1`. The audit-log row's user is the audit subject,
-// not the doc owner — so this query does NOT prove caller ownership
+// not the doc owner, so this query does NOT prove caller ownership
 // of the returned `doc_id`. The downstream realtime publish MUST
 // still flag for a missing ownership check after B3.
 struct Ctx;

tests/fixtures/auth_analysis/transitive_helper.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // target: authorization happens inside `validate_target`, which
 // internally calls `authz::require_membership` against the same
 // `group_id` the handler subsequently mutates. The current rule cannot
-// see this transitively — B4 lifts per-function auth-check summaries
+// see this transitively, B4 lifts per-function auth-check summaries
 // (which positional params are auth-checked) so the handler-level call
 // to `validate_target(&db, group_id, user.id)` is recognised as an
 // auth check covering `group_id`. Result: `db.exec(..)` MUST NOT flag
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ pub async fn handle_create_comment(
     let user = auth::require_auth(&req, &ctx).await?;
     let db = Db;
 
-    // Authorization happens inside validate_target — helper-summary
+    // Authorization happens inside validate_target, helper-summary
     // lifting propagates the per-param auth check so this covers
     // `group_id`.
     validate_target(&db, group_id, user.id).await?;