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Python fp and docs updtes (#58)
* refactor: Update comments for clarity and add expectations.json files for performance metrics * feat: Implement FP guard for JS/TS local-collection receivers to suppress missing ownership checks * feat: Enhance Rust parameter handling to classify local collections and prevent false ownership checks * refactor: Simplify code formatting for better readability in multiple files * refactor: Improve UTF-8 sequence length handling and enhance clarity in loop iteration * feat: Update Java and Python patterns to include new security rules * refactor: Improve comment clarity and consistency across multiple Rust files * refactor: Simplify code formatting for improved readability in integration tests and module files * refactor: Improve comment formatting and enhance clarity in assertions across multiple files
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Eli Peter
GitHub
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291 changed files with 9485 additions and 3851 deletions
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ pub static RULES: &[LabelRule] = &[
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case_sensitive: false,
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},
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// `encodeURIComponent` percent-encodes every character outside the
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// ASCII identifier alphabet, including `<`, `>`, `&`, `"`, `'` — so
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// ASCII identifier alphabet, including `<`, `>`, `&`, `"`, `'`, so
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// the result is safe to embed in HTML text content and HTML
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// attribute values, not just URL components. Treating it as
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// covering both URL_ENCODE and HTML_ESCAPE caps avoids FPs when a
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@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ pub static RULES: &[LabelRule] = &[
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label: DataLabel::Sanitizer(Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE),
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case_sensitive: false,
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},
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// he library — HTML entity encoding
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// he library, HTML entity encoding
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LabelRule {
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matchers: &["he.encode", "he.escape"],
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label: DataLabel::Sanitizer(Cap::HTML_ESCAPE),
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@ -148,16 +148,16 @@ pub static RULES: &[LabelRule] = &[
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label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE),
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case_sensitive: true,
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},
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// ── Outbound HTTP clients — modeled as destination-aware gated sinks ──
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// ── Outbound HTTP clients, modeled as destination-aware gated sinks ──
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// Flat-Sink modeling of fetch/axios/got/undici/http.request was producing
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// a dominant FP class where any tainted body/payload arg appeared as SSRF
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// (e.g. `fetch("/api/telemetry", { body: navigator.userAgent })`). SSRF
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// semantics require attacker control over the *destination*, not the
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// payload. The gated entries in `GATED_SINKS` below narrow activation to
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// URL / host / path / origin arguments or object fields. Taint flowing
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// only to body / data / json / headers is no longer flagged as SSRF —
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// cross-boundary data-exfiltration detection is a separate future
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// capability (`Cap::DATA_EXFIL`, not yet introduced).
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// payload. The gated entries in `GATED_SINKS` below narrow SSRF
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// activation to URL / host / path / origin arguments or object fields.
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// Taint flowing only to body / data / json / headers is captured by a
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// *separate* gate class (`Cap::DATA_EXFIL`) so the two can coexist on
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// the same callee without one over-flagging the other.
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// Express response sinks
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LabelRule {
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matchers: &["res.send", "res.json"],
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@ -222,6 +222,21 @@ pub static RULES: &[LabelRule] = &[
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label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::SSRF),
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case_sensitive: false,
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},
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// ── Cross-boundary data exfiltration (DATA_EXFIL) ─────────────────────
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//
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// `XMLHttpRequest.prototype.send(body)`, when the receiver type is
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// tracked back to `new XMLHttpRequest()`, the SSA engine's type-qualified
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// resolver converts `xhr.send` to `HttpClient.send`; matching that form
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// fires DATA_EXFIL on tainted body flow. The explicit
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// `XMLHttpRequest.prototype.send.apply(...)` form is also covered. The
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// `fetch` body / headers / json case is covered by the gated entry in
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// `GATED_SINKS` (so SSRF on the URL and DATA_EXFIL on the payload can
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// coexist on a single call site).
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LabelRule {
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matchers: &["HttpClient.send", "XMLHttpRequest.prototype.send"],
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label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::DATA_EXFIL),
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case_sensitive: false,
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},
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// ─────────── SQL injection sinks ─────────────
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// Database drivers: mysql, mysql2, pg, better-sqlite3
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LabelRule {
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@ -314,7 +329,7 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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// only to body / data / json / headers / payload is silenced. See the
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// commentary at the top of RULES for the rationale.
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//
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// `fetch(input, init)` — arg 0 can be a URL string OR a Request/config
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// `fetch(input, init)`, arg 0 can be a URL string OR a Request/config
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// object with `url`. Per WHATWG Fetch, when `input` is a dictionary, the
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// URL field is canonically `url`. Init-object body/headers at arg 1 are
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// *not* destination-bearing.
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@ -332,7 +347,7 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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object_destination_fields: &["url"],
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},
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},
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// `axios(config)` / `axios.request(config)` — config object exposes
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// `axios(config)` / `axios.request(config)`, config object exposes
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// `url` and `baseURL`. Body-ish fields (`data`, `params`, `headers`)
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// are excluded.
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SinkGate {
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@ -363,7 +378,7 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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object_destination_fields: &["url", "baseURL"],
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},
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},
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// `axios.get(url[, config])` — arg 0 is URL; arg 1 is config.
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// `axios.get(url[, config])`, arg 0 is URL; arg 1 is config.
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SinkGate {
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callee_matcher: "axios.get",
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arg_index: 0,
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@ -378,7 +393,7 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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object_destination_fields: &[],
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},
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},
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// `axios.post(url, data[, config])` — arg 0 is URL; `data` at arg 1 is
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// `axios.post(url, data[, config])`, arg 0 is URL; `data` at arg 1 is
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// the request body and must NOT activate SSRF.
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SinkGate {
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callee_matcher: "axios.post",
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@ -394,7 +409,7 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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object_destination_fields: &[],
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},
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},
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// `axios.put / axios.patch / axios.delete` follow the same shape —
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// `axios.put / axios.patch / axios.delete` follow the same shape ,
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// (url, data?, config?). Keep the model consistent across verbs.
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SinkGate {
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callee_matcher: "axios.put",
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@ -438,7 +453,7 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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object_destination_fields: &[],
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},
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},
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// `got(url[, options])` / `got(options)` — options exposes `url` and
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// `got(url[, options])` / `got(options)`, options exposes `url` and
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// `prefixUrl`. Body-ish fields (`body`, `json`, `form`, `searchParams`,
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// `headers`) are excluded.
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SinkGate {
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@ -455,7 +470,7 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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object_destination_fields: &["url", "prefixUrl"],
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},
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},
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// `undici.request(url | opts[, opts])` — opts exposes `origin` and
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// `undici.request(url | opts[, opts])`, opts exposes `origin` and
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// `path`. Body-ish fields (`body`, `headers`) are excluded.
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SinkGate {
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callee_matcher: "undici.request",
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@ -471,11 +486,11 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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object_destination_fields: &["origin", "path"],
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},
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},
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// Node `http.request(options[, cb])` / `https.request(options[, cb])` —
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// Node `http.request(options[, cb])` / `https.request(options[, cb])` ,
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// options exposes `host`, `hostname`, `path`, `protocol`, `port`,
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// `origin`. Body is sent via `.write()`/`.end()` on the returned
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// ClientRequest, so it never appears as a positional arg here.
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// Arg 0 may also be a URL string — the "whole arg is destination"
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// Arg 0 may also be a URL string, the "whole arg is destination"
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// fallback (triggered when arg 0 is not an object literal) covers that.
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SinkGate {
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callee_matcher: "http.request",
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@ -505,7 +520,7 @@ pub static GATED_SINKS: &[SinkGate] = &[
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object_destination_fields: &["host", "hostname", "path", "protocol", "port", "origin"],
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},
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},
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// Node `http.get(options[, cb])` / `https.get(options[, cb])` —
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// Node `http.get(options[, cb])` / `https.get(options[, cb])` ,
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// convenience wrappers around `.request()` that auto-call `.end()`.
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// Same destination semantics as `.request`. Motivated by
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// CVE-2025-64430 (Parse Server SSRF via http.get(uri)).
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object_destination_fields: &["host", "hostname", "path", "protocol", "port", "origin"],
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},
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},
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// ── Cross-boundary data exfiltration ──────────────────────────────────
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//
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// Sensitive data flowing into the *payload* of an outbound request is a
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// distinct vulnerability class from SSRF: the destination is fixed but
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// attacker-influenced bytes leave the process via the request body /
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// headers / json field. These gates fire on the body-bearing positions
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// and emit `Cap::DATA_EXFIL`, which is intentionally separate from
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// `Cap::SSRF` so a `fetch(taintedUrl, {body: tainted})` site reports
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// both classes independently.
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//
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// `fetch(input, init)`, `init` at arg 1 carries body / headers / json.
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SinkGate {
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callee_matcher: "fetch",
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arg_index: 1,
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dangerous_values: &[],
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dangerous_prefixes: &[],
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label: DataLabel::Sink(Cap::DATA_EXFIL),
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case_sensitive: false,
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payload_args: &[1],
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keyword_name: None,
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dangerous_kwargs: &[],
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activation: GateActivation::Destination {
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object_destination_fields: &["body", "headers", "json"],
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},
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},
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];
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pub static KINDS: Map<&'static str, Kind> = phf_map! {
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