diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 93d21329..36a0c1f4 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 All notable changes to Nyx are documented here. The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/) and the project follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html). For where Nyx is going, see the [Roadmap](ROADMAP.md).
 
-## [0.8.0] - 2026-06-06
+## [0.8.0] - 2026-06-12
 
 The dynamic-verification release. An attack-surface map, a sandboxed dynamic verifier, a framework adapter registry that grounds both, the per-language build infrastructure that makes per-finding verification affordable at corpus scale, and the first real-corpus acceptance gates.
 
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@ The attack-surface map and chain composer turn the flat finding list into a rout
 - **`nyx surface` subcommand.** Prints the project's entry points, datastores, external services, and dangerous local sinks as text, JSON, Graphviz `dot`, or rendered SVG. Loads the persisted `SurfaceMap` from the most recent indexed scan when available, or rebuilds inline from source. `--build` forces a full pass-1 + call-graph walk so DataStore / ExternalService / DangerousLocal nodes populate on an unscanned project.
 - **Surface page in `nyx serve`.** New `SurfacePage` renders the same graph in the browser UI, with ELK layout, sidebar navigation, and a wide-canvas SVG viewer. Persists alongside the index so the frontend reloads without a rescan.
 - **Chain findings.** `ChainFinding` records connect a route entry point to a downstream sink via the call graph + surface map. The composer scores `(impact × evidence)` per chain, queues the top-N for composite reverification, and wires the result into `findings.json` / SARIF / the dashboard. Chains rank above isolated findings.
+- **Per-finding exposure.** Every finding now carries the worst-case externally reachable route that drives it, surfaced as an `Exposure` record (route, method, framework, auth state, and whether the reach is direct or transitive through the call graph). Unauthenticated routes win over auth-gated ones and direct file matches win over transitive ones. The annotation shows up as an `Exposure:` evidence line in console output and on `findings.json`, SARIF `properties.exposure`, and the server finding view. Ranking adds a bonus for it, so a finding reachable from an unauthenticated route sorts above an otherwise-equal internal one.
+- **Entry-point risk scoring.** `nyx surface` opens with a risk-sorted "Top risk entry-points" banner and tags each route with a `low` / `medium` / `high` / `critical` tier. The score is explainable: the worst reachable sink class dominates, writing a store outranks reading it, talking to an external service and mutating HTTP methods add, and missing auth multiplies the whole exposure. The `/api/surface` response carries the same `entry_risks` array so the browser UI renders the ranking without re-deriving it.
+- **Function-level reachability with typed edges.** Reachability now matches a destination to an entry point when the owning function is on the call-graph frontier, not merely when they share a file, so two unrelated handlers in one file no longer both claim a co-located `eval()`. Edges are typed by destination: `ReadsFrom` / `WritesTo` for a datastore (split by the access direction inferred from the call verb, so a route that writes SQL reads differently from one that only queries), `TalksTo` for an external service, `Reaches` for a dangerous local sink. The pass falls back to the same-file heuristic only when the handler seed cannot be resolved.
+- **Richer surface nodes.** `DangerousLocal` carries a decoded sink-class label (`code-exec`, `deserialize`, `ssti`, ...) and a real sink span instead of a raw cap bitfield at line 0. `DataStore` and `ExternalService` carry the qualified name of the owning function. The dangerous-local sink set widened from four classes to ten, adding LDAP injection, XPath injection, header injection, open redirect, XXE, and prototype pollution, and datastore / external detection gained cap-driven fallbacks (`SQL_QUERY` / `FILE_IO` and `SSRF` / `DATA_EXFIL`) so a custom DAO wrapper or proxy helper still surfaces when no named driver matched.
+- **Entry-point and auth recall.** Handlers the framework probes miss but pass-1 already tagged as entry points are synthesised into the surface map so the entry set is a superset of what the taint engine treats as adversary-driven. `auth_required` upgrades when a handler's own body calls a known auth guard, complementing the router-level decorator / annotation / middleware detection.
+- **Coverage telemetry.** A fresh `nyx surface` build prints a coverage line (files seen, files in a supported language, files parsed, files with routes, plus unparsed / unreadable counts) so a small map can be told apart from "the probes did not understand this project". A loaded persisted map reports node and edge counts and points at `--build` for a source rebuild.
 
 ### Framework adapter registry
 
diff --git a/src/surface/exposure.rs b/src/surface/exposure.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a3031834
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/surface/exposure.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+//! Finding-level exposure: which surface entry-point can drive a given
+//! source location, and is it auth-gated?
+//!
+//! This is the bridge that makes the attack surface participate in the
+//! core finding pipeline instead of living off to the side in `nyx
+//! surface`: every [`Diag`](crate::commands::scan::Diag) gets an
+//! optional [`Exposure`] annotation describing the *worst-case* route
+//! that reaches it (unauthenticated preferred over auth-gated, direct
+//! file match preferred over transitive call-graph reach), and the
+//! ranking layer turns that into a score component so externally
+//! reachable findings sort above internal ones.
+//!
+//! Matching granularity is file-level, same as the chain composer's
+//! [`Reach`](crate::chain::Reach): a finding in `views.py` is exposed
+//! when an entry-point's handler lives in `views.py`, or — when a
+//! [`FileReachMap`] is supplied — when some handler's file transitively
+//! reaches `views.py` through the call graph.
+
+use super::{EntryPoint, Framework, SurfaceMap, SurfaceNode};
+use crate::callgraph::FileReachMap;
+use crate::commands::scan::Diag;
+use crate::entry_points::HttpMethod;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+/// Worst-case route exposure for one finding.  Serialised into the
+/// finding JSON / SARIF properties so downstream consumers (CI gates,
+/// the web UI) can filter on "externally reachable" without re-running
+/// the surface build.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Exposure {
+    pub route: String,
+    pub method: HttpMethod,
+    pub framework: Framework,
+    /// True when the matched entry-point is behind an auth guard the
+    /// surface layer recognised.  An unauthenticated match is always
+    /// preferred when both kinds reach the finding.
+    pub auth_required: bool,
+    /// Entry-point declaration site.
+    pub entry_file: String,
+    pub entry_line: u32,
+    /// `false` when the finding sits in the handler's own file,
+    /// `true` when it is only reached through the call graph.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
+    pub transitive: bool,
+}
+
+impl Exposure {
+    /// One-line human-readable form, used as a console evidence label:
+    /// `"GET /search (unauthenticated)"`,
+    /// `"POST /admin/import (auth-gated, via call graph)"`.
+    pub fn display(&self) -> String {
+        let auth = if self.auth_required {
+            "auth-gated"
+        } else {
+            "unauthenticated"
+        };
+        let via = if self.transitive {
+            ", via call graph"
+        } else {
+            ""
+        };
+        format!("{:?} {} ({auth}{via})", self.method, self.route)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Snapshot of one entry-point, decoupled from the map's lifetime.
+struct EntryRef {
+    handler_file: String,
+    route: String,
+    method: HttpMethod,
+    framework: Framework,
+    auth_required: bool,
+    entry_file: String,
+    entry_line: u32,
+}
+
+impl EntryRef {
+    fn exposure(&self, transitive: bool) -> Exposure {
+        Exposure {
+            route: self.route.clone(),
+            method: self.method,
+            framework: self.framework,
+            auth_required: self.auth_required,
+            entry_file: self.entry_file.clone(),
+            entry_line: self.entry_line,
+            transitive,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Pre-indexed surface entry-points plus an optional call-graph file
+/// reach map.  Build once per scan, query per finding.
+pub struct ExposureIndex<'r> {
+    entries: Vec<EntryRef>,
+    reach: Option<&'r FileReachMap>,
+}
+
+impl<'r> ExposureIndex<'r> {
+    pub fn build(map: &SurfaceMap, reach: Option<&'r FileReachMap>) -> Self {
+        let entries = map
+            .nodes
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|n| match n {
+                SurfaceNode::EntryPoint(ep) => Some(entry_ref(ep)),
+                _ => None,
+            })
+            .collect();
+        Self { entries, reach }
+    }
+
+    /// True when the surface has no entry-points at all — exposure
+    /// annotation would mark everything unreachable, which is noise
+    /// rather than signal (probes may simply not cover the project's
+    /// framework), so callers skip annotation entirely.
+    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+        self.entries.is_empty()
+    }
+
+    /// Worst-case exposure for a finding in `file`.  Preference order:
+    /// 1. unauthenticated over auth-gated,
+    /// 2. direct (same file as the handler) over transitive,
+    /// 3. first in surface-canonical order (deterministic).
+    ///
+    /// Returns `None` when no entry-point reaches the file.
+    pub fn exposure_for_file(&self, file: &str) -> Option<Exposure> {
+        let mut best: Option<(u8, &EntryRef, bool)> = None;
+        for e in &self.entries {
+            let transitive = if e.handler_file == file {
+                false
+            } else if self.reach.is_some_and(|r| r.reaches(&e.handler_file, file)) {
+                true
+            } else {
+                continue;
+            };
+            // Lower rank wins; canonical order breaks ties via `<`.
+            let rank = (e.auth_required as u8) << 1 | (transitive as u8);
+            if best.as_ref().is_none_or(|(r, _, _)| rank < *r) {
+                let done = rank == 0;
+                best = Some((rank, e, transitive));
+                if done {
+                    break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        best.map(|(_, e, transitive)| e.exposure(transitive))
+    }
+}
+
+fn entry_ref(ep: &EntryPoint) -> EntryRef {
+    EntryRef {
+        handler_file: ep.handler_location.file.clone(),
+        route: ep.route.clone(),
+        method: ep.method,
+        framework: ep.framework,
+        auth_required: ep.auth_required,
+        entry_file: ep.location.file.clone(),
+        entry_line: ep.location.line,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Annotate `diags` in place with their worst-case [`Exposure`].
+///
+/// Skips entirely when the surface has no entry-points (see
+/// [`ExposureIndex::is_empty`]).  For each annotated finding a console
+/// evidence label (`Exposure: GET /x (unauthenticated)`) is appended so
+/// the text renderer shows the route without any renderer change.
+/// Idempotent per scan: callers invoke it once, before ranking.
+///
+/// `scan_root` relativises `Diag::path` (absolute on most scan paths)
+/// to the project-relative POSIX convention the surface map uses;
+/// without it the direct same-file match never fires and every
+/// exposure degrades to (or misses) the transitive path.
+pub fn annotate_exposure(
+    diags: &mut [Diag],
+    map: &SurfaceMap,
+    reach: Option<&FileReachMap>,
+    scan_root: Option<&std::path::Path>,
+) {
+    let index = ExposureIndex::build(map, reach);
+    if index.is_empty() {
+        return;
+    }
+    // Findings cluster heavily by file; memoise per-file lookups.
+    let mut cache: HashMap<String, Option<Exposure>> = HashMap::new();
+    for d in diags.iter_mut() {
+        let rel = crate::surface::relative_path_string(std::path::Path::new(&d.path), scan_root);
+        let exp = cache
+            .entry(rel)
+            .or_insert_with_key(|k| index.exposure_for_file(k))
+            .clone();
+        if let Some(exp) = exp {
+            d.labels.push(("Exposure".to_string(), exp.display()));
+            d.exposure = Some(exp);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::surface::SourceLocation;
+
+    fn ep(file: &str, route: &str, auth: bool) -> SurfaceNode {
+        SurfaceNode::EntryPoint(EntryPoint {
+            location: SourceLocation::new(file, 1, 1),
+            framework: Framework::Flask,
+            method: HttpMethod::GET,
+            route: route.into(),
+            handler_name: "h".into(),
+            handler_location: SourceLocation::new(file, 2, 1),
+            auth_required: auth,
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn direct_match_yields_exposure() {
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep("app.py", "/a", false));
+        let idx = ExposureIndex::build(&map, None);
+        let exp = idx.exposure_for_file("app.py").expect("exposed");
+        assert_eq!(exp.route, "/a");
+        assert!(!exp.transitive);
+        assert!(!exp.auth_required);
+        assert_eq!(idx.exposure_for_file("other.py"), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unauthenticated_entry_preferred_over_auth_gated() {
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep("app.py", "/locked", true));
+        map.nodes.push(ep("app.py", "/open", false));
+        let idx = ExposureIndex::build(&map, None);
+        let exp = idx.exposure_for_file("app.py").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(exp.route, "/open");
+        assert!(!exp.auth_required);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn transitive_reach_via_call_graph() {
+        use crate::callgraph::build_call_graph;
+        use crate::summary::{FuncSummary, merge_summaries};
+        // routes.py::handle -> helper.py::sink
+        let handle = FuncSummary {
+            name: "handle".into(),
+            file_path: "routes.py".into(),
+            lang: "python".into(),
+            callees: vec![crate::summary::CalleeSite::bare("sink")],
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let sink = FuncSummary {
+            name: "sink".into(),
+            file_path: "helper.py".into(),
+            lang: "python".into(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let gs = merge_summaries(vec![handle, sink], None);
+        let cg = build_call_graph(&gs, &[]);
+        let reach = FileReachMap::build(&cg);
+
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep("routes.py", "/r", false));
+        let idx = ExposureIndex::build(&map, Some(&reach));
+        let exp = idx.exposure_for_file("helper.py").expect("transitive");
+        assert!(exp.transitive);
+        assert_eq!(exp.route, "/r");
+        // Direct match still preferred for the handler's own file.
+        assert!(!idx.exposure_for_file("routes.py").unwrap().transitive);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unauth_transitive_beats_auth_direct() {
+        use crate::callgraph::build_call_graph;
+        use crate::summary::{FuncSummary, merge_summaries};
+        let handle = FuncSummary {
+            name: "open_handle".into(),
+            file_path: "open.py".into(),
+            lang: "python".into(),
+            callees: vec![crate::summary::CalleeSite::bare("shared")],
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let shared = FuncSummary {
+            name: "shared".into(),
+            file_path: "shared.py".into(),
+            lang: "python".into(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let gs = merge_summaries(vec![handle, shared], None);
+        let cg = build_call_graph(&gs, &[]);
+        let reach = FileReachMap::build(&cg);
+
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep("shared.py", "/locked", true)); // direct, auth
+        map.nodes.push(ep("open.py", "/open", false)); // transitive, unauth
+        let idx = ExposureIndex::build(&map, Some(&reach));
+        let exp = idx.exposure_for_file("shared.py").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(exp.route, "/open", "unauth transitive should win");
+        assert!(exp.transitive);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn annotate_sets_field_and_label() {
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep("app.py", "/a", false));
+        let mut diags = vec![crate::commands::scan::Diag {
+            path: "app.py".into(),
+            line: 9,
+            col: 1,
+            id: "x".into(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        }];
+        annotate_exposure(&mut diags, &map, None, None);
+        let exp = diags[0].exposure.as_ref().expect("annotated");
+        assert_eq!(exp.route, "/a");
+        assert!(
+            diags[0]
+                .labels
+                .iter()
+                .any(|(k, v)| k == "Exposure" && v.contains("/a"))
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_surface_skips_annotation() {
+        let map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        let mut diags = vec![crate::commands::scan::Diag {
+            path: "app.py".into(),
+            ..Default::default()
+        }];
+        annotate_exposure(&mut diags, &map, None, None);
+        assert!(diags[0].exposure.is_none());
+        assert!(diags[0].labels.is_empty());
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/surface/risk.rs b/src/surface/risk.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..82306c5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/surface/risk.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+//! Per-entry-point risk assessment over the [`SurfaceMap`].
+//!
+//! Computed on demand from the canonicalised node + edge lists, never
+//! persisted: the same map always yields the same risks, and keeping
+//! the scoring out of the schema means a tuning change does not need a
+//! SQLite migration.  Consumed by the `nyx surface` CLI (risk-sorted
+//! tree + "top risks" banner) and available to the HTTP API.
+//!
+//! The model is deliberately simple and explainable: each entry point
+//! accumulates points from the sink classes it can reach (worst class
+//! dominates, additional classes contribute a small spread bonus), the
+//! stores it can write, and the services it talks to; missing auth
+//! multiplies the whole thing.  Every contribution is recorded as a
+//! human-readable factor so the CLI can print *why* a route is rated
+//! `critical` instead of an opaque number.
+
+use super::{DataStoreKind, EdgeKind, EntryPoint, SurfaceMap, SurfaceNode, cap_labels};
+use crate::labels::Cap;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+/// Coarse risk tier derived from the numeric score.  Thresholds are
+/// documented on [`RiskTier::from_score`].
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum RiskTier {
+    Low,
+    Medium,
+    High,
+    Critical,
+}
+
+impl RiskTier {
+    /// Tier thresholds.  Calibrated so that:
+    /// * an unauthenticated route reaching a code-exec sink is
+    ///   `Critical` (40 × 1.5 + 5 ≥ 60);
+    /// * the same route behind auth is `High` (40 ≥ 35);
+    /// * an unauthenticated route writing a SQL store is `High`
+    ///   ((15 + 5) × 1.5 + 5 = 35 ≥ 35);
+    /// * a route that only reads a store or talks to one service is
+    ///   `Medium`;
+    /// * a route with no reachable destination at all is `Low`.
+    pub fn from_score(score: f64) -> Self {
+        if score >= 60.0 {
+            RiskTier::Critical
+        } else if score >= 35.0 {
+            RiskTier::High
+        } else if score >= 12.0 {
+            RiskTier::Medium
+        } else {
+            RiskTier::Low
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Lowercase display tag (`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low`).
+    pub fn tag(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            RiskTier::Critical => "critical",
+            RiskTier::High => "high",
+            RiskTier::Medium => "medium",
+            RiskTier::Low => "low",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Risk assessment for one entry point.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct EntryRisk {
+    /// Index of the [`SurfaceNode::EntryPoint`] in the canonicalised
+    /// `SurfaceMap::nodes` vector.
+    pub entry_idx: usize,
+    pub score: f64,
+    pub tier: RiskTier,
+    /// Human-readable contributions, worst first (e.g.
+    /// `["unauthenticated", "reaches code-exec sink", "writes sql store"]`).
+    pub factors: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+/// Points for the worst dangerous-local sink class reachable from an
+/// entry.  Cap order mirrors exploit impact: full code execution
+/// dominates, then deserialisation (usually RCE-equivalent), SSTI,
+/// the injection family, format strings.
+fn dangerous_points(bits: u32) -> f64 {
+    let caps = Cap::from_bits_truncate(bits);
+    if caps.contains(Cap::CODE_EXEC) {
+        40.0
+    } else if caps.contains(Cap::DESERIALIZE) {
+        35.0
+    } else if caps.contains(Cap::SSTI) {
+        30.0
+    } else if caps.intersects(Cap::XXE | Cap::LDAP_INJECTION | Cap::XPATH_INJECTION) {
+        22.0
+    } else if caps.intersects(Cap::PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION | Cap::HEADER_INJECTION) {
+        18.0
+    } else if caps.contains(Cap::FMT_STRING) {
+        15.0
+    } else if caps.contains(Cap::OPEN_REDIRECT) {
+        10.0
+    } else {
+        8.0
+    }
+}
+
+/// Assess every entry point in `map`.  Returns one [`EntryRisk`] per
+/// entry-point node, sorted by score descending (ties broken by node
+/// index so the output is deterministic).
+pub fn assess_entry_risks(map: &SurfaceMap) -> Vec<EntryRisk> {
+    let mut out: Vec<EntryRisk> = Vec::new();
+    for (idx, node) in map.nodes.iter().enumerate() {
+        let SurfaceNode::EntryPoint(ep) = node else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        out.push(assess_one(map, idx, ep));
+    }
+    out.sort_by(|a, b| {
+        b.score
+            .partial_cmp(&a.score)
+            .unwrap_or(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal)
+            .then(a.entry_idx.cmp(&b.entry_idx))
+    });
+    out
+}
+
+fn assess_one(map: &SurfaceMap, entry_idx: usize, ep: &EntryPoint) -> EntryRisk {
+    let mut factors: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+    let mut score = 0.0_f64;
+
+    // Worst reachable dangerous-local class dominates; each *additional*
+    // dangerous destination adds a small spread bonus so a route that
+    // reaches eval *and* pickle.loads outranks one that only reaches eval.
+    let mut worst_dangerous: Option<(f64, u32)> = None;
+    let mut extra_dangerous = 0usize;
+    let mut writes_store: Option<DataStoreKind> = None;
+    let mut reads_store: Option<DataStoreKind> = None;
+    let mut talks_external = 0usize;
+
+    for edge in &map.edges {
+        if edge.from != entry_idx as u32 || !edge.kind.is_reach_like() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        match map.nodes.get(edge.to as usize) {
+            Some(SurfaceNode::DangerousLocal(dl)) => {
+                let pts = dangerous_points(dl.cap_bits);
+                match &mut worst_dangerous {
+                    Some((best, best_bits)) => {
+                        extra_dangerous += 1;
+                        if pts > *best {
+                            *best = pts;
+                            *best_bits = dl.cap_bits;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    None => worst_dangerous = Some((pts, dl.cap_bits)),
+                }
+            }
+            Some(SurfaceNode::DataStore(ds)) => {
+                if matches!(edge.kind, EdgeKind::WritesTo) {
+                    // Keep the most severe store kind: SQL > filesystem > rest.
+                    writes_store = Some(worse_store(writes_store, ds.kind));
+                } else {
+                    reads_store = Some(worse_store(reads_store, ds.kind));
+                }
+            }
+            Some(SurfaceNode::ExternalService(_)) => talks_external += 1,
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+
+    if let Some((pts, bits)) = worst_dangerous {
+        score += pts;
+        factors.push(format!(
+            "reaches {} sink",
+            cap_labels(bits).first().copied().unwrap_or("dangerous")
+        ));
+        if extra_dangerous > 0 {
+            let spread = (extra_dangerous as f64 * 2.0).min(10.0);
+            score += spread;
+            factors.push(format!("{extra_dangerous} more dangerous sink(s)"));
+        }
+    }
+    if let Some(kind) = writes_store {
+        let pts = store_points(kind) + 5.0;
+        score += pts;
+        factors.push(format!("writes {} store", store_tag(kind)));
+    } else if let Some(kind) = reads_store {
+        let pts = store_points(kind);
+        score += pts;
+        factors.push(format!("reads {} store", store_tag(kind)));
+    }
+    if talks_external > 0 {
+        score += 8.0;
+        factors.push(format!("talks to {talks_external} external service(s)"));
+    }
+    if mutating_method(ep) {
+        score += 3.0;
+        factors.push(format!("mutating method ({:?})", ep.method));
+    }
+
+    // Auth multiplier last: missing auth scales the whole exposure, it
+    // does not merely add a constant.  An unauthenticated route with
+    // nothing reachable lands at 5 and stays Low.
+    if ep.auth_required {
+        factors.push("auth-gated".into());
+    } else {
+        score = score * 1.5 + 5.0;
+        factors.insert(0, "unauthenticated".into());
+    }
+
+    EntryRisk {
+        entry_idx,
+        score,
+        tier: RiskTier::from_score(score),
+        factors,
+    }
+}
+
+fn store_points(kind: DataStoreKind) -> f64 {
+    match kind {
+        DataStoreKind::Sql => 15.0,
+        DataStoreKind::Filesystem => 12.0,
+        DataStoreKind::Document | DataStoreKind::KeyValue | DataStoreKind::BlobStore => 10.0,
+        DataStoreKind::Unknown => 8.0,
+    }
+}
+
+fn store_tag(kind: DataStoreKind) -> &'static str {
+    match kind {
+        DataStoreKind::Sql => "sql",
+        DataStoreKind::Filesystem => "filesystem",
+        DataStoreKind::Document => "document",
+        DataStoreKind::KeyValue => "key-value",
+        DataStoreKind::BlobStore => "blob",
+        DataStoreKind::Unknown => "unknown",
+    }
+}
+
+/// Keep the more severe of two store kinds (SQL > filesystem > rest).
+fn worse_store(current: Option<DataStoreKind>, new: DataStoreKind) -> DataStoreKind {
+    match current {
+        None => new,
+        Some(cur) => {
+            if store_points(new) > store_points(cur) {
+                new
+            } else {
+                cur
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn mutating_method(ep: &EntryPoint) -> bool {
+    use crate::entry_points::HttpMethod;
+    matches!(
+        ep.method,
+        HttpMethod::POST | HttpMethod::PUT | HttpMethod::PATCH | HttpMethod::DELETE
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::entry_points::HttpMethod;
+    use crate::surface::{
+        DangerousLocal, DataStore, EntryPoint, Framework, SourceLocation, SurfaceEdge,
+    };
+
+    fn ep(auth: bool, method: HttpMethod) -> SurfaceNode {
+        SurfaceNode::EntryPoint(EntryPoint {
+            location: SourceLocation::new("app.py", 1, 1),
+            framework: Framework::Flask,
+            method,
+            route: "/x".into(),
+            handler_name: "h".into(),
+            handler_location: SourceLocation::new("app.py", 2, 1),
+            auth_required: auth,
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn dangerous(cap: Cap) -> SurfaceNode {
+        SurfaceNode::DangerousLocal(DangerousLocal {
+            location: SourceLocation::new("app.py", 9, 1),
+            function_name: "danger".into(),
+            cap_bits: cap.bits(),
+            label: String::new(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unauth_code_exec_is_critical() {
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep(false, HttpMethod::GET));
+        map.nodes.push(dangerous(Cap::CODE_EXEC));
+        map.edges.push(SurfaceEdge {
+            from: 0,
+            to: 1,
+            kind: EdgeKind::Reaches,
+        });
+        let risks = assess_entry_risks(&map);
+        assert_eq!(risks.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(risks[0].tier, RiskTier::Critical);
+        assert!(risks[0].factors.iter().any(|f| f == "unauthenticated"));
+        assert!(
+            risks[0].factors.iter().any(|f| f.contains("code-exec")),
+            "factors: {:?}",
+            risks[0].factors
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn auth_gating_downgrades_tier() {
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep(true, HttpMethod::GET));
+        map.nodes.push(dangerous(Cap::CODE_EXEC));
+        map.edges.push(SurfaceEdge {
+            from: 0,
+            to: 1,
+            kind: EdgeKind::Reaches,
+        });
+        let risks = assess_entry_risks(&map);
+        assert_eq!(risks[0].tier, RiskTier::High);
+        assert!(risks[0].factors.iter().any(|f| f == "auth-gated"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unreached_entry_is_low() {
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep(false, HttpMethod::GET));
+        let risks = assess_entry_risks(&map);
+        assert_eq!(risks[0].tier, RiskTier::Low);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sql_write_outranks_sql_read() {
+        let store = |access| {
+            SurfaceNode::DataStore(DataStore {
+                location: SourceLocation::new("app.py", 5, 1),
+                kind: DataStoreKind::Sql,
+                label: "pg".into(),
+                owner: "h".into(),
+                access,
+            })
+        };
+        let build = |kind: EdgeKind, access| {
+            let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+            map.nodes.push(ep(false, HttpMethod::GET));
+            map.nodes.push(store(access));
+            map.edges.push(SurfaceEdge {
+                from: 0,
+                to: 1,
+                kind,
+            });
+            assess_entry_risks(&map)[0].score
+        };
+        let write = build(EdgeKind::WritesTo, crate::surface::AccessMode::Write);
+        let read = build(EdgeKind::ReadsFrom, crate::surface::AccessMode::Read);
+        assert!(write > read, "write {write} should outrank read {read}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn risks_sorted_descending() {
+        let mut map = SurfaceMap::new();
+        map.nodes.push(ep(true, HttpMethod::GET)); // 0: low
+        map.nodes.push(ep(false, HttpMethod::POST)); // 1: reaches sink
+        map.nodes.push(dangerous(Cap::CODE_EXEC)); // 2
+        map.edges.push(SurfaceEdge {
+            from: 1,
+            to: 2,
+            kind: EdgeKind::Reaches,
+        });
+        let risks = assess_entry_risks(&map);
+        assert_eq!(risks[0].entry_idx, 1);
+        assert!(risks[0].score > risks[1].score);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/tests/dynamic_layering.rs b/tests/dynamic_layering.rs
index 33453d28..6ef8a542 100644
--- a/tests/dynamic_layering.rs
+++ b/tests/dynamic_layering.rs
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 //! | `src/server/` (any file)     | server start_scan verify wiring           |
 //! | `src/rank.rs`                | dynamic-verdict rank scoring              |
 //! | `src/chain/reverify.rs`      | composite chain re-verification           |
+//! | `src/commands/repro.rs`      | `nyx repro` subcommand; `#[cfg(feature="dynamic")]`|
 
 use std::fs;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
@@ -34,6 +35,10 @@ const ALLOWED: &[&str] = &[
     // Composite chain re-verification is the public bridge between the chain
     // composer and the dynamic verifier.
     "chain/reverify.rs",
+    // The `nyx repro` subcommand replays dynamic verification bundles. The
+    // whole module is `#[cfg(feature = "dynamic")]` in commands/mod.rs, so it
+    // never compiles into the feature-agnostic static path.
+    "commands/repro.rs",
     // The dynamic module itself is obviously allowed.
     "dynamic/",
 ];