[pitboss/grind] deferred session-0002 (20260517T044708Z-e058)

src/cli.rs

@@ -513,6 +513,24 @@ pub enum Commands {
         #[arg(long, help_heading = "Dynamic", value_name = "BACKEND")]
         backend: Option<String>,
 
+        /// Process-backend hardening profile applied to every verified finding.
+        ///
+        /// `standard` (default): baseline only. Linux runs no-new-privs +
+        /// memory rlimit; macOS skips the sandbox-exec wrap.
+        /// `strict`: full lockdown. Linux layers namespaces, chroot to
+        /// workdir, and a default-deny seccomp filter; macOS wraps the
+        /// harness with `sandbox-exec -f <cap>.sb`. Opt-in because
+        /// interpreted Linux harnesses may SIGSYS until the per-language
+        /// seccomp allowlists are expanded.
+        #[cfg_attr(not(feature = "dynamic"), arg(hide = true))]
+        #[arg(
+            long,
+            help_heading = "Dynamic",
+            value_name = "PROFILE",
+            value_parser = ["standard", "strict"],
+        )]
+        harden: Option<String>,
+
         // ── Baseline / patch-validation (§M6.5) ────────────────────────
         /// Read a previous scan's JSON output (or a stripped .nyx/baseline.json)
         /// and diff it against the current scan on stable_hash.

src/commands/mod.rs

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ pub fn handle_command(
             verify_all_confidence,
             unsafe_sandbox,
             backend,
+            harden,
             baseline,
             baseline_write,
             gate,
@@ -346,9 +347,13 @@ pub fn handle_command(
                     config.scanner.verify_all_confidence = true;
                 }
                 config.scanner.verify_backend = resolved_backend.to_owned();
+                // --harden=<standard|strict> overrides the config default.
+                if let Some(ref profile) = harden {
+                    config.scanner.harden_profile = profile.to_owned();
+                }
             }
             // Without the dynamic feature, --verify / --no-verify / --unsafe-sandbox /
-            // --backend are silently accepted (no-op).
+            // --backend / --harden are silently accepted (no-op).
             #[cfg(not(feature = "dynamic"))]
             {
                 let _ = verify;
@@ -356,6 +361,7 @@ pub fn handle_command(
                 let _ = verify_all_confidence;
                 let _ = unsafe_sandbox;
                 let _ = backend;
+                let _ = harden;
             }
 
             // ── --explain-engine: print resolved config and exit ────────

src/dynamic/verify.rs

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ impl VerifyOptions {
     /// (`src/dynamic/runner.rs` `oob_nonce_slot` branch) while non-OOB
     /// payloads continue to run against their existing oracle.
     pub fn from_config(config: &Config) -> Self {
-        use crate::dynamic::sandbox::{NetworkPolicy, SandboxBackend};
+        use crate::dynamic::sandbox::{NetworkPolicy, ProcessHardeningProfile, SandboxBackend};
         let backend = match config.scanner.verify_backend.as_str() {
             "docker" => SandboxBackend::Docker,
             "process" => SandboxBackend::Process,
@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@ impl VerifyOptions {
             Some(listener) => NetworkPolicy::OobOutbound { listener },
             None => NetworkPolicy::None,
         };
+        // Phase 17/18 (Track E.1/E.2): `--harden=strict` (or
+        // `harden_profile = "strict"` in nyx.toml) opts the verifier into
+        // the full process-backend lockdown.  Linux engages namespace
+        // unshare + chroot + default-deny seccomp on top of the baseline;
+        // macOS wraps the harness with `sandbox-exec -f <cap>.sb` keyed
+        // off the per-finding expected cap (set later in `verify_finding`
+        // because the cap is only known once spec derivation runs).
+        let process_hardening = match config.scanner.harden_profile.as_str() {
+            "strict" => ProcessHardeningProfile::Strict,
+            _ => ProcessHardeningProfile::Standard,
+        };
         // Phase 18 (Track E.2): the macOS process backend depends on
         // `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec` to confine filesystem reach.  When the
         // binary is absent, surface that up-front so filesystem oracles
@@ -135,6 +146,7 @@ impl VerifyOptions {
             sandbox: SandboxOptions {
                 backend,
                 network_policy,
+                process_hardening,
                 ..SandboxOptions::default()
             },
             project_root: None,
@@ -661,6 +673,18 @@ pub fn verify_finding(diag: &Diag, opts: &VerifyOptions) -> VerifyResult {
     if !stub_harness.is_empty() {
         sandbox_opts.stub_harness = Some(Arc::clone(&stub_harness));
     }
+    // Phase 17/18: when the operator opted into Strict hardening, seed
+    // `seccomp_caps` from the spec's expected cap so the Linux process
+    // backend installs the cap-minimal syscall allowlist and the macOS
+    // backend picks the matching `.sb` profile (`FILE_IO →
+    // path_traversal`, `CODE_EXEC → cmdi`, …).  Standard runs leave the
+    // field at 0 (base allowlist / no wrap) for back-compat.
+    if matches!(
+        sandbox_opts.process_hardening,
+        crate::dynamic::sandbox::ProcessHardeningProfile::Strict,
+    ) {
+        sandbox_opts.seccomp_caps = spec.expected_cap.bits();
+    }
     // Phase 30: hand the runner an `Arc` clone so it can append
     // `build_*` / `sandbox_started` / `oracle_*` stages from inside
     // `run_spec`.  The verifier still owns the trace for verdict-stage
@@ -1211,6 +1235,46 @@ mod tests {
         unsafe { std::env::remove_var("NYX_VERIFY_REPLAY_STABLE") };
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn from_config_defaults_process_hardening_to_standard() {
+        use crate::dynamic::sandbox::ProcessHardeningProfile;
+        let opts = VerifyOptions::from_config(&Config::default());
+        assert!(
+            matches!(opts.sandbox.process_hardening, ProcessHardeningProfile::Standard),
+            "back-compat: missing harden_profile must keep the Standard baseline so \
+             existing call sites (process backend without `--harden=strict`) keep \
+             their pre-Phase-17 hardening matrix"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_config_picks_up_strict_harden_profile() {
+        use crate::dynamic::sandbox::ProcessHardeningProfile;
+        let mut config = Config::default();
+        config.scanner.harden_profile = "strict".to_owned();
+        let opts = VerifyOptions::from_config(&config);
+        assert!(
+            matches!(opts.sandbox.process_hardening, ProcessHardeningProfile::Strict),
+            "harden_profile=strict must engage the full Phase-17/18 lockdown so \
+             `--harden=strict` actually wraps the harness with sandbox-exec on macOS \
+             and layers chroot + seccomp on Linux"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn from_config_unknown_harden_profile_falls_back_to_standard() {
+        use crate::dynamic::sandbox::ProcessHardeningProfile;
+        let mut config = Config::default();
+        config.scanner.harden_profile = "lockdown".to_owned();
+        let opts = VerifyOptions::from_config(&config);
+        assert!(
+            matches!(opts.sandbox.process_hardening, ProcessHardeningProfile::Standard),
+            "unknown harden_profile values must degrade to Standard so a typo in \
+             nyx.toml does not silently leave the operator without the baseline \
+             hardening they were already paying for"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn verdict_cache_round_trip() {
         let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();

src/utils/config.rs

@@ -281,6 +281,24 @@ pub struct ScannerConfig {
     /// `"process"`: in-process runner (same as `--unsafe-sandbox`).
     #[serde(default = "default_verify_backend")]
     pub verify_backend: String,
+
+    /// Process-backend hardening profile applied during dynamic verification.
+    ///
+    /// `"standard"` (default): the historical baseline. On Linux this
+    /// engages `prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS)` plus `setrlimit(RLIMIT_AS)`;
+    /// on macOS the harness runs without a `sandbox-exec` wrap.
+    /// `"strict"`: opts into the full Phase 17/18 lockdown. On Linux the
+    /// process backend layers the namespace unshare, chroot to workdir,
+    /// and default-deny seccomp filter on top of the baseline. On macOS
+    /// the harness is wrapped with `sandbox-exec -f <profile>.sb` keyed
+    /// off the finding's expected cap (FILE_IO → `path_traversal.sb`,
+    /// CODE_EXEC → `cmdi.sb`, SSRF → `ssrf.sb`, …).
+    ///
+    /// Opt-in. Interpreted Linux harnesses (python3, node, java) may
+    /// SIGSYS under strict seccomp until the per-language allowlists are
+    /// expanded; static native harnesses run unaffected.
+    #[serde(default = "default_harden_profile")]
+    pub harden_profile: String,
 }
 fn default_verify() -> bool {
     true
@@ -288,6 +306,9 @@ fn default_verify() -> bool {
 fn default_verify_backend() -> String {
     "auto".to_owned()
 }
+fn default_harden_profile() -> String {
+    "standard".to_owned()
+}
 impl Default for ScannerConfig {
     fn default() -> Self {
         Self {
@@ -327,6 +348,7 @@ impl Default for ScannerConfig {
             verify: true,
             verify_all_confidence: false,
             verify_backend: "auto".to_owned(),
+            harden_profile: "standard".to_owned(),
         }
     }
 }