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Added Cap::DATA_EXFIL and taint fp and fn fixes on real repos (#59)
* feat: Enhance data exfiltration detection with source sensitivity gating for cookies and headers * feat: Implement cross-file data exfiltration detection with parameter-specific gate filters * feat: Add calibration tests and refine DATA_EXFIL severity scoring logic * feat: Introduce per-detector configuration for data exfiltration suppression * feat: Enhance DATA_EXFIL findings with destination field tracking in diagnostics and SARIF output * feat: Add tainted body and URL handling for data exfiltration detection * feat: Add integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL and SSRF detection in Go * feat: Add Java integration tests and fixtures for DATA_EXFIL detection across multiple HTTP clients * feat: Add synthetic externals handling for closure-captured variables in SSA * feat: Implement closure-based suppression for resource leak findings * feat: Add regression guards for shell-injection and taint propagation in for-of destructure patterns * feat: Implement constructor cap narrowing for data exfiltration detection in HTTP request builders * feat: Add gated sinks for data exfiltration detection in C and C++ using curl_easy_setopt * feat: Implement DATA_EXFIL cap parity for backwards analysis and add integration tests * feat: Add data exfiltration sinks for various languages and enhance documentation * refactor: Simplify formatting and improve readability in various files * refactor: Improve readability by simplifying conditional statements and adding clippy linting * docs: Update CHANGELOG and comments for data exfiltration features and configuration * docs: Clarify configuration instructions for data exfiltration trusted destinations * docs: Enhance comments for evidence routing logic in data exfiltration
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189 changed files with 8421 additions and 383 deletions
16
tests/fixtures/cross_file_data_exfil_split/caller_body_tainted.js
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tests/fixtures/cross_file_data_exfil_split/caller_body_tainted.js
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var express = require('express');
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var { forward } = require('./helper');
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var app = express();
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// Tainted body, fixed URL: DATA_EXFIL must fire on the body flow. The
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// session cookie is a Sensitive-tier source, so taint carries the
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// DATA_EXFIL bit through to the wrapper's body-gate. SSRF must NOT
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// fire — the URL is a hardcoded literal and the cap-vs-position split
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// keeps the body's taint from leaking onto the URL's gate.
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app.get('/sync', function(req, res) {
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var sid = req.cookies.session;
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var payload = JSON.stringify({ session: sid });
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forward('https://analytics.internal/track', payload);
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res.status(204).end();
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});
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14
tests/fixtures/cross_file_data_exfil_split/caller_url_tainted.js
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tests/fixtures/cross_file_data_exfil_split/caller_url_tainted.js
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var express = require('express');
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var { forward } = require('./helper');
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var app = express();
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// Tainted URL, fixed body: SSRF must fire on the URL flow. DATA_EXFIL
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// must NOT fire — the body is a literal string, not a sensitive source,
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// and the cap-vs-position split through the wrapper's summary keeps the
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// URL's taint from leaking onto the body's gate.
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app.get('/proxy', function(req, res) {
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var taintedUrl = req.query.url;
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forward(taintedUrl, '{"ok":true}');
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res.status(204).end();
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});
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22
tests/fixtures/cross_file_data_exfil_split/expectations.json
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tests/fixtures/cross_file_data_exfil_split/expectations.json
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{
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"required_findings": [
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{ "id_prefix": "taint-unsanitised-flow", "min_count": 1 },
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{ "id_prefix": "taint-data-exfiltration", "min_count": 1 }
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],
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"forbidden_findings": [
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{
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"id_prefix": "taint-data-exfiltration",
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"file_glob": "**/caller_url_tainted.js"
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},
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{
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"id_prefix": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
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"file_glob": "**/caller_body_tainted.js"
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}
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],
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"performance_expectations": {
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"max_ms_no_index": 1500,
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"max_ms_index_cold": 2000,
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"max_ms_index_warm": 800,
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"ci_mode": "lenient"
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}
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}
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10
tests/fixtures/cross_file_data_exfil_split/helper.js
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tests/fixtures/cross_file_data_exfil_split/helper.js
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// Wrapper around `fetch` whose two parameters target distinct gated-sink
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// classes on the inner call: `url` is the SSRF gate's destination; `body`
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// is the DATA_EXFIL gate's payload. Pass-1 SSA summary extraction lifts
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// the per-position cap split into `param_to_gate_filters` so cross-file
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// callers can attribute SSRF vs DATA_EXFIL per argument.
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function forward(url, body) {
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fetch(url, { method: 'POST', body: body });
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}
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module.exports = { forward };
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