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Release/0.5.0 (#35)

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* feat: Introduce function-scoped variable interning for state analysis with new tests and fixtures

* feat: Add Phase 26 symbolic execution enhancements with bitwise operator support, abstract interpretation refinements, and new taint analysis tests

* feat: Refine state analysis to handle factory-pattern resource returns with mixed-path tests and leak detection enhancements

* feat: Add Phase 27 debug views with symbolic execution, abstract interpretation, SSA, and call graph viewers; integrate with debug layout and styles

* feat: Add Phase 31 type-qualified symbolic resolution with receiver-based callee disambiguation and testing

* feat: Extend symbolic execution with state iteration, enhanced debug views, and debounced input handling

* feat: Add Phase 13 resource and auth pattern extensions with new tests and fixtures

* feat: Introduce CFG debug graph renderer with compact mode, toolbar, and DAG layout integration

* feat: Add Phase 28 encoding and decoding transform modeling with structural symex enhancements and new taint analysis tests

* feat: Extend abstract interpretation with type facts and constant value tracking in debug views and server logic

* feat: Add linear path handling and witness extraction to symbolic execution with Phase 28 transform mismatch detection

* feat: Refine Go auth and sanitizer handling with enhanced rules, state updates, and benchmark improvements

* feat: Enable auth-state analysis by default and update relevant tests in benchmark config

* test: Update state_tests to reflect default enablement of auth-state analysis and add auth suppression test

* docs: update CHANGELOG.md

* feat: Introduce per-index taint tracking in `HeapState` with `HeapSlot`, overflow handling, and revised SSA transfers

* feat: Introduce C/C++ language labels and refine heap state tracking in SSA transfers

* feat: Implement per-index array slot tracking in symbolic heap with overflow collapse

* feat: Add implicit definition handling for uninitialized declarations in SSA value allocation

* feat: Refactor function parameters and constants for improved clarity and maintainability

* refactor: Reorder module imports and improve formatting for consistency

* refactor: Fix formatting erorrs

* refactor: Fix clippy warnings

* refactor: Fix fmt warnings (again)

* chore: Update dependencies and improve feature configuration

* Add comprehensive tests for undertested modules (#36) (COPILOT)

* Add comprehensive tests for undertested modules

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* Add comprehensive tests for ext, project, walk, and errors modules

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* chore: Update dependencies and improve feature configuration

* fix: formatting errors in new tests

* chore: Update license list in about.toml

* chore: made functions input inline

* chore: updated cfg graph to take up the full page

* chore: add Prettier configuration and update code formatting

* Add frontend test suite with Vitest (111 tests) (#37)

* Add Vitest test suite for frontend - 111 tests across utils, components, hooks, and graph utilities

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* ci: add frontend test step to CI workflow

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* chore: simplify array initialization in test files for consistency

* ran typecheck

* feat: add AnalysisWorkspace component and integrate it into CfgViewerPage

* feat: update routing in AppLayout and improve empty state message in ExplorerPage

* feat: enhance scan progress tracking with additional metrics and stages

* feat: update license information and add license check script

* feat: implement cross-file symbolic execution with callee body persistence

* feat: replace dagre graphs with Graphology + ELK + Sigma for more advanced call stack and cfg rendering

* feat: ensure CFG function view is scoped to the selected function, preventing bleed into sibling functions

* feat: enhance resource tracking with proxy method summaries and improve finding extraction

* feat: add terminal function exit detection for accurate resource leak analysis

* feat: add warnings for loops and functions without bodies to improve error recovery

* feat: update lambda expression handling to ensure proper function classification and control flow

* feat: remove bounded formatting/string ops and add JSON.parse sanitizer for improved data handling

* feat: add inline return taint analysis and regression tests for improved security checks

* feat: add engine version management and migration handling for database schema updates

* feat: enhance first_call_ident to skip nested function bodies and add regression tests

* feat: enhance callee name resolution with two-segment normalization and disambiguation

* feat: add cross-file context flags and debug assertions for taint analysis

* feat: refactor taint analysis structure to unify context handling and improve clarity

* feat: enhance dead code elimination to preserve Sink, Source, and Sanitizer labels with new tests

* docs: updated CHANGELOG.md

* fmt: formatting fixes

* fix: fixed frontend formatting and lint warnings

* fix: optimized ci

* fix: optimized ci

* Add comprehensive multi-file test coverage to Nyx (#38)

* Initial checklist for multi-file test suite expansion

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* Add 12 new multi-file test fixtures with TP/TN/near-miss coverage

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* deleted root repo

* rebuilt to test for regressions

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* feat: enhance import alias resolution and taint tracking

* feat: implement security hardening with CSRF protection and path validation

* feat: add support for import alias bindings in Python, PHP, and Rust

* feat: enhance CFG analysis modes and improve code readability

* feat: add detection for parameterized SQL queries to enhance security

* feat: add safe internal redirect handling and enhance session destroy validation

* feat: implement security improvements by addressing vulnerabilities in execAsync, session management, and file downloads

* feat: enhance taint detection by adding support for inline source member expressions in call arguments

* feat: implement pre-emission of Source nodes for inline source member expressions in call arguments

* feat: add support for Throw statement in control flow and error handling

* feat: add debug and echo endpoints with potential information leakage

* feat: implement internal redirect suppression and enhance taint detection

* feat: implement module alias tracking for dynamic dispatch in JS/TS

* feat: add authorization analysis module with Express support

* feat: add authorization analysis module with Express support

* feat: add tests for admin guard requirements and clean checks in authorization analysis

* feat: integrate Koa and Fastify frameworks into authorization analysis

* feat: add Flask and Django support to authorization analysis module

* feat: add support for Rails and Sinatra frameworks in authorization analysis

* feat: add support for Axum, ActixWeb, and Rocket frameworks in authorization analysis

* feat: add support for ActixWeb, Axum, and Rocket frameworks in authorization analysis

* feat: add support for Rails and Sinatra in authorization analysis

* chore: add .DS_Store to .gitignore

* refactor: simplify conditional checks and improve readability in multiple files

* refactor: update usage of Option methods for improved clarity and consistency

* refactor: improve code readability by simplifying conditional checks and formatting

* refactor: improve code formatting and readability by simplifying conditional checks

* refactor: simplify conditional checks and improve readability in multiple files

* refactor: simplify conditional checks in axum.rs for improved readability

* feat: add CodeQL analysis configuration for enhanced security scanning

* test: add comprehensive tests for `src/output.rs` SARIF builder (#39)

* chore: start test coverage improvement work

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* test: add comprehensive tests for src/output.rs SARIF builder

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* refactor: improve code formatting and readability in output.rs

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* refactor: improve code formatting and readability in output.rs

* Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 210: Uncontrolled data used in path expression

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* Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 211: Uncontrolled data used in path expression

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* refactor: enhance triage file path handling with improved error management and validation

* refactor: updated func summaries for richer detail

* refactor: update SSA summary extraction to use canonical FuncKey for distinct entries

* refactor: enhance callee metadata structure to support arity, receiver, and qualifier for better overload resolution

* refactor: add support for keyword arguments in function calls and enhance receiver extraction for method-style calls

* refactor: implement new Flask routes for safe and unsafe shell command execution

* refactor: separate receiver handling in SSA operations and enhance taint propagation

* refactor: improve arity handling by using arg_uses for positional argument count and enhance witness scoring for tainted arguments

* refactor: implement auth decorator extraction and classification for multiple languages

* refactor: enhance Rust module path resolution and use map handling for cross-file disambiguation

* refactor: introduce CalleeQuery struct for structured callee resolution and enhance resolver logic

* refactor: implement same-file identity collision handling for `runTask` to ensure correct resolver behavior

* refactor: standardize default struct initialization across multiple files

* feat: add scripts for formatting checks and auto-fixes with test summaries

* refactor: simplify character splitting and enhance namespace qualifier handling

* refactor: improve documentation clarity and enhance code readability in resolver logic

* refactor: replace default struct initialization with explicit field assignments for clarity

* feat: enhance anonymous function naming by deriving context-based bindings

* refactor: streamline match expressions for improved readability and performance

* refactor: streamline match expressions for improved readability and performance

* refactor: replace loop with while let for improved clarity and performance

* feat: add SSA constant propagation support to analysis context for improved accuracy

* feat: add SSA constant propagation support to analysis context for improved accuracy

* feat: implement shell metacharacter validation and bounded-length checks in Rust analysis

* feat: add static map analysis for command injection suppression and type safety

* refactor: simplify match statements and reduce line breaks for improved readability

* feat(summary): phase 1/5 SinkSite data model for primary sink-location attribution

Introduce SinkSite (file_rel, line, col, snippet, cap) carrying the
primary sink source-location through function summaries. Swap
SsaFuncSummary.param_to_sink and FuncSummary.param_to_sink from a coarse
Cap map to a deduped SmallVec<[SinkSite; 1]> per parameter, with a
backward-compatible cap_sites() helper and serde defaults so pre-phase-1
on-disk rows continue to deserialise cleanly.

Extraction: SinkSiteLocator bundles the tree/bytes/file_rel needed by
extract_ssa_func_summary; ParsedFile::extract_ssa_artifacts wires the
locator in for the persisted pass-1 path, while pass-2 intra-file
transient summaries fall back to cap-only sites (behavior unchanged).
Merge: GlobalSummaries::insert now unions sink sites with
(file_rel, line, col, cap) dedup via shared union_param_sink_sites
helper.

Database: JSON-serialised summary columns carry the new shape
automatically; no schema change needed.

Phase 2 will consume SinkSite in build_taint_diag() to overwrite the
caller-site Finding.line with the callee's sink line when resolved via
summary. Phase 1 keeps behavior unchanged: scanning
tests/benchmark/corpus/rust/cmdi/cmdi_indirect.rs still produces the
same (wrong) line 10 finding.

Adds round-trip tests covering SinkSite solo, SsaFuncSummary with sink
sites, legacy-JSON default handling for both summary types, and merge
dedup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(taint): phase 2/5 thread SinkSite into SsaTaintEvent and Finding

Plumb Phase 1's SinkSite through the event pipeline into Findings,
no output change yet.  SsaTaintEvent gains `primary_sink_site:
Option<SinkSite>`; when the main or callback sink-emission path has
non-empty `param_to_sink_sites`, filter to sites whose
`(line != 0) && (cap ∩ sink_caps != ∅)` and emit one event per
distinct site — the multi-primary collapse keeps each downstream
Finding single-primary.

Resolution: ResolvedSummary and SinkInfo gain mirror
`param_to_sink_sites` fields, populated from `SsaFuncSummary.param_to_sink`
(SSA + callback paths) and `FuncSummary.param_to_sink` (global paths).
Label, local-summary, and interop resolution paths leave the field
empty — they only ever had cap-level info to begin with.

Finding: new `primary_location: Option<SinkLocation>` with
`file_rel/line/col`.  `ssa_events_to_findings` maps
`event.primary_sink_site` → `Finding.primary_location`, filtering
cap-only sites (`line == 0`) to `None` so the (0,0) sentinel never
leaks to formatters.  Dedup key extended with the primary location
so multi-site events aren't collapsed back together.

Invariants (debug_assert!):
* every SinkSite reaching emission has `line != 0 && cap ∩ sink_caps
  != ∅` — enforced by the pick_primary_sink_sites* filters;
* every populated Finding.primary_location has `line != 0` AND
  non-empty `file_rel` — the cap-only → None translation upstream
  guarantees this.

Deliberately independent of `uses_summary`: that flag tracks whether
the *taint chain* used a summary, whereas primary attribution
requires only that the *sink* itself was summary-resolved.  A local
source reaching a cross-file sink produces `uses_summary=false`
alongside a populated primary_location — documented on
Finding.primary_location, covered by
`cross_file_sink_finding_carries_primary_location`.

build_taint_diag, SARIF/JSON/explanation formatters, and the
benchmark scorer remain untouched: finding.line still comes from
`cfg_graph[finding.sink]`, so cmdi_indirect.rs still reports line 10
and the benchmark's rs-cmdi-003 row still shows FN in the LOC column.

Tests: `cross_file_sink_finding_carries_primary_location` (proves
plumbing via a synthetic FuncSummary carrying a SinkSite at 42:5) and
`cross_file_sink_cap_only_site_leaves_primary_location_none`
(regression guard against cap-only sites surfacing).  All 1566 lib
tests + integration tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(output): phase 3/5 consume primary sink location in diag + SARIF

When a finding's primary_location (populated in phase 2 from a callee
summary's SinkSite) names the dangerous instruction inside a callee
body, attribute the diagnostic line to that location instead of the
caller's call site. The call site is demoted to a Call step in
flow_steps, and a synthetic Sink step at the primary location is
appended so analysts still see the full trace.

Changes:
- Add scan_root parameter to build_taint_diag so file_rel can be
  resolved back to an absolute path via a shared resolve_file_rel
  helper. Empty file_rel (single-file scans where namespace == "")
  resolves to the file under analysis.
- Extend SinkLocation with snippet, carried from the upstream
  SinkSite so the formatter needs no second file read.
- Relax the ssa_events_to_findings debug_assert to allow empty
  file_rel, which is valid when scan root equals the file itself.
- SARIF: emit data-flow as codeFlows[0].threadFlows[0].locations[];
  locations[0] already reflects the primary sink position via the
  updated diag line/col.

Acceptance: scan on tests/benchmark/corpus/rust/cmdi/cmdi_indirect.rs
now reports line 5 (Command::new) as the primary sink, with the call
site at line 10 visible in flow_steps.

Two expect.json fixtures updated (must_match line_range widened):
- javascript/taint/context_sensitive_call: 12-14 -> 7-14 (line 8 is
  the real sink inside run()).
- rust/cfg/closure_async: 10-10 -> 10-11 (line 11 is Command::new
  inside the closure).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(bench): phase 4/5 validate primary sink attribution across corpus

Extend the benchmark scorer and ground truth to lock in phase 3's
primary-location behavior, and add fixtures that exercise the new
capability end-to-end.

Scorer (tests/benchmark_test.rs):
- Add optional `expected_call_site_lines: Option<Vec<[usize; 2]>>` on
  Case. When present, score_location_level additionally requires at
  least one flow_step in the finding's evidence trace to fall within
  ±2 of the call-site range. When absent, the check is skipped —
  fully forward-compatible with existing fixtures.
- Retain ±2 tolerance on expected_sink_lines (compared against the
  now-primary Diag.line post-phase-3).

Ground truth edits:
- rs-cmdi-cross-001: expected_sink_lines [8,8] -> [9,9]. Line 8 is the
  transform::wrap call site (a cross-file propagator, not a sink);
  line 9 is Command::new, the real sink. The ±2 tolerance happened to
  mask this stale attribution but it was semantically wrong — phase 4
  is the right time to correct it. Also adds expected_call_site_lines
  [8,8] so the new field is exercised on an existing cross-file case.
- rs-cmdi-003: adds expected_call_site_lines [10,10] (run_cmd call).
  This fixture's sink (Command::new inside run_cmd at line 5) was the
  motivating case for phases 1-3; adding the call-site assertion
  guards against regression to caller-line attribution.

New fixtures:
- rust/cmdi/cmdi_indirect_multisink.rs (rs-cmdi-009): helper run_both
  takes two tainted params and invokes two Command sinks on
  consecutive lines. Locks in that primary line lands inside the
  helper (lines 5-6), not at the caller (line 12). Notes document
  that SinkSite is currently one-per-callee so both findings today
  collapse onto the first sink; expected_sink_lines=[5,6] and
  expected_call_site_lines=[12,12] stay valid either way.
- python/cmdi/cross_indirect_sink/{app.py,helper.py} (py-cmdi-cross-
  004): sink os.system lives in helper.py (cross-file), caller in
  app.py reads env source and calls run_cmd. Verifies phase 3's
  cross-file primary attribution: Diag.path = helper.py, Diag.line =
  5, with app.py:7 recorded in flow_steps as a Call step.

Acceptance:
- `cargo test --test benchmark_test -- --ignored --nocapture` passes.
- rs-cmdi-003 is TP/TP/TP (the target flip FN->TP at LOC). All
  pre-existing TP/TP/TP fixtures remain TP/TP/TP; 2 new fixtures are
  TP/TP/TP.
- Aggregate rule-level: TP=158 FP=10 FN=1 TN=97, P=0.940 R=0.994
  F1=0.966 on the 266-case corpus (was TP=156 FP=10 FN=1 TN=97 on
  264 pre-phase-4, delta is the +2 new cases both resolving TP).
- Full `cargo test` green (1566 lib tests + all integration tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(taint): phase 5/5 lock Finding.primary_location contract via regression test

Add a regression test in src/taint/ssa_transfer.rs that wires up a synthetic
SsaFuncSummary with a SinkSite at other.rs:42:10 and drives the three
emission stages (pick_primary_sink_sites → emit_ssa_taint_events →
ssa_events_to_findings) against a minimal caller SSA body.  Asserts the
resulting Finding.primary_location is exactly that triple.

The existing integration tests in src/taint/tests.rs cover the coarse
FuncSummary path end-to-end through analyse_file.  This test locks in the
lower-level SSA-side plumbing so a future refactor that silently drops the
site between pick → emit → findings fails here rather than only at the
benchmark layer.

Also refreshes tests/benchmark/results/latest.json (timestamp only; rs-cmdi-003
remains TP/TP/TP and the aggregate P/R/F1 are unchanged from phase 4).

Closes the primary sink-location attribution feature (phases 1-5/5):
* Phase 1 — SinkSite data model on summaries.
* Phase 2 — SinkSite threaded into SsaTaintEvent and Finding.
* Phase 3 — diag + SARIF consume primary_location.
* Phase 4 — benchmark validates primary_call_site_lines across corpus.
* Phase 5 — regression test locks the event→finding contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: clean up formatting and improve readability in multiple files

* refactor: simplify type definition for deduplication key in findings

* test(harness): add must_not_match expectation for FP regression guards

Extends ExpectedFinding with must_not_match field that asserts a
diagnostic must NOT fire — presence is a hard failure. Non-consuming
scan so it coexists with must_match entries on the same rule_id.
Adds forbidden_violations accumulator and updates summary line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(regression): update expectations to ensure must_not_match for various taint and resource leak rules

* feat: implement auto-seeding for JS/TS handler parameters to enhance taint tracking

* feat: update switch statement handling to improve control flow analysis

* feat: implement promisify alias handling for JS/TS to enhance taint tracking

* feat: enhance taint tracking by refining expectation handling and adding mode filtering

* feat: refine SQL handling in stream processing and enhance auto-seeding for handler parameters

* feat: update taint tracking rules to enforce full mode matching and improve flow analysis

* feat: enhance Ruby subshell handling to improve taint tracking and flow analysis

* feat: update xss_response expectations to refine taint flow analysis and enhance regression guarding

* feat: refine framework detection and update expectation handling for Echo and Sinatra

* feat: implement max_count for taint tracking expectations and deduplicate findings

* feat: add strict_unexpected handling for taint-unsanitised-flow in expectation files

* feat: enhance deduplication of taint-unsanitised-flow findings by collapsing based on line and severity

* feat: add strict_unexpected handling for taint-unsanitised-flow in multiple expectation files

* feat: add structural invariant checks for SSA bodies

* feat: ensure deterministic phi emission order using BTreeSet

* feat: enhance handling of terminators to ensure authoritative flow through successor edges

* feat: enhance Goto terminator handling to ensure all successors are marked executable

* feat: refactor code for improved readability and organization

* feat: simplify predicate checks and enhance readability in SSA handling

* feat: implement per-file parse timeout and enhance file size handling

* feat: migrate analysis engine toggles from environment variables to configuration file

* feat: remove unnecessary whitespace in hostile_input_tests.rs

* feat: remove unnecessary whitespace in hostile_input_tests.rs

* feat: update dependencies and enhance documentation on language maturity

* feat: enhance security headers and improve request body limits

* feat: implement sink capability bits for deduplication and enhance evidence tagging

* feat: implement dynamic activation handling for gated sinks and enhance validation logic

* feat: enhance configuration documentation and clarify inline analysis cache behavior

* feat: implement panic recovery during analysis to continue scans past errors

* feat: add expectations configuration for taint analysis and performance metrics

* feat: enhance error handling and logging during file reading and mutex locking

* feat: add cross-file body loading tests and plumbing for CF-1 phase

* feat: implement cross-file k=1 context-sensitive inline taint analysis with new tests and fixtures

* feat: implement indexed-scan parity in cross-file inline analysis with new dropdown and copy functionality

* feat: enhance classification span handling in CFG and AST for improved source attribution

* feat: add new Express routes for handling user input and telemetry data

* feat: implement ternary expression handling in CFG with diamond structure for JS/TS

* feat: implement Phase CF-3 abstract-domain transfer channels in summaries

* feat: add support for string-prefix transfer in cross-file calls and update tests

* docs: reduce RESULTS.md doc size

* feat: implement Phase CF-4 per-return-path summary decomposition with tests

* feat: update parameter handling in pass1 and refactor SsaFuncSummary initialization

* feat: implement Phase CF-5 for cross-file SCC joint fixed-point convergence with new flags and tests

* feat: implement Phase CF-6 with parameter-granularity points-to summaries and associated tests

* refactor: update comments and documentation for clarity and consistency

* style: format code for consistency and readability

* refactor: simplify verdict handling and improve edge checking logic

* refactor: optimize path and identifier collection by avoiding unnecessary cloning

* chore: update Cargo.toml for Rust version 1.85 and add ignored files; modify CHANGELOG and README for clarity on state analysis defaults

* refactor: update documentation and improve clarity in configuration files

* refactor: update documentation and improve clarity in configuration files

* feat: add JS/TS pass-2 convergence tests and expectations configuration

* feat: add Phase 5 regression tests for inline cache origin attribution and update related logic

* feat: implement Phase 7 deduplication and alternative path linking for taint findings

* feat: implement structural DFS index for anonymous functions and update naming conventions

* feat: add Phase 8 regression tests for container-element taint in JS and Python

* feat: add engine-depth profiles and explain-engine option for CLI

* feat: update expectations and add new README fixtures for multi-file scan regression

* feat: implement Phase 11 callback-alias and factory patterns with regression tests

* feat: implement Terminator::Switch for multi-way dispatch and add regression tests

* feat: add real-CVE benchmark fixtures for CVE-2023-48022, CVE-2019-14939, and CVE-2023-26159 with corresponding patched variants

* refactor: extract cfg and ssa_transfer to submodules

* refactor: cargo fmt

* refactor: remove unnecessary blank line in cfg_tests.rs

* refactor: remove unnecessary planning file

* chore: update Rust version to 1.88 and bump dependencies in Cargo files

* feat: enhance triage UI with new layout and controls, update README for clarity

* feat: enhance triage UI with new layout and controls, update README for clarity

* chore: remove outdated section from README for version 0.5.0

* docs: improve clarity and consistency in README content

* chore: add "GPL-3.0-or-later" to license options in about.toml

* chore: update license handling in about.toml and check-licenses.mjs

* style: format code for improved readability in TriagePage component

* style: format code for improved readability in TriagePage component

* chore: enhance license handling and improve body_id scoping in seed lookup

* feat: introduce owner and parent body IDs for enhanced seed scoping

* feat: implement direction-aware engine provenance with new CLI flag for strict CI gating

* feat: add Undef SSA operation for improved control-flow handling

* style: improve code formatting for consistency and readability in multiple files

* feat: add 16-function chain SCC across multiple files for enhanced analysis

* style: simplify code formatting for improved readability in multiple files

* fix: update CapHitReason default implementation and improve README clarity

* docs: enhance README with detailed explanations of taint analysis and limitations

* docs: refine README for clarity and consistency in taint analysis section

* style: improve code formatting for better readability in NewScanModal and scans

* fix: update cargo-about command to use --offline for deterministic license generation

* fix: update cargo-about command to use --offline for deterministic license generation

* ci: add step to prime cargo registry cache for deterministic license generation

* feat: add support for non-sink collections in authorization analysis

* feat: enhance authorization checks with row-level ownership equality and binding tracking

* feat: implement self-scoped user handling and enhance ownership checks

* refactor: simplify assertions and formatting in authorization analysis tests

* fix: normalize line endings in THIRDPARTY-LICENSES.html generation and update README with AI disclosure

* docs: update AI disclosure section for clarity and conciseness

* feat: add AI Contribution Policy and update contributing guidelines for AI assistance disclosure

* feat: enhance authorization analysis with SSA-derived variable type classification

* feat: implement auth_finding_to_diag function for enhanced security diagnostics

* feat: add args_value_refs to CallSite struct for enhanced argument tracking

* feat: add args_value_refs to CallSite struct for enhanced argument tracking

* feat: add direction-aware engine provenance with LossDirection classification and new CLI flag

* feat: simplify strip_cap_from_call_args call by removing unnecessary line breaks

* feat: enhance error message handling in cli_validation_tests for better Windows compatibility

* feat: optimize release profile settings in Cargo.toml and update CodeQL configuration

* feat: enhance release build process with SBOM generation and SLSA provenance

* feat: update actions/checkout and actions/setup-node to v6, enhance CLI options, and improve auth-check summaries

* feat: introduce PathFact handling for path safety checks and rejection logic

* feat: introduce PathFact handling for path safety checks and rejection logic

* feat: update benchmark data and enhance path sanitization logic with new safety checks

* feat: document AI assistance in frontend UI development and human review process

* feat: add return path facts for enhanced path safety checks and update documentation

* chore: update release date for version 0.5.0 in CHANGELOG.md

* chore: clean up ci.yml by removing outdated comments and clarifying steps

* feat: implement cross-language path sanitizers and validators for enhanced security

* feat: enhance SSA value usage tracking by including block terminators and improve path safety checks

* feat: enhance switch statement handling by adding per-case path constraints and support for exclusive cases

* refactor: simplify conditional formatting and improve code readability in executor and lower modules

* feat: add vulnerable examples for various languages demonstrating authentication and sanitization issues

* feat: enhance actor context recognition for self-actor identifiers and add support for global non-sink receivers

* feat: enhance actor context recognition for self-actor identifiers and add support for global non-sink receivers

* feat: add transform classifiers for Java, Go, and Ruby with corresponding tests

* refactor: clarify comments on reassign-to-constant idiom and sink behavior in guards.rs

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Eli Peter 2026-04-25 17:59:11 -04:00 • committed by GitHub
parent c4ce08b452
commit 41128177d2
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GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
2144 changed files with 201812 additions and 8927 deletions
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41
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/cfg/context_manager.expect.json vendored
View file

@ -20,6 +20,47 @@
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "read_file_unsafe opens file handle but never closes it"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
2,
2
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: state-resource-leak on open() in read_file_unsafe \u2014 real leak but already covered by cfg-resource-leak above"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
8,
8
],
"notes": "open() inside with statement — context manager auto-closes; must NOT fire (regression guard for with-block recognition)"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
13,
13
],
"notes": "open() inside with statement in nested context — must NOT fire (regression guard)"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
14,
14
],
"notes": "open() inside with statement in nested context — must NOT fire (regression guard)"
}
]
}

11
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/cfg/early_return.expect.json vendored
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@ -31,6 +31,17 @@
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "File handle leaked on one branch of the conditional"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
15,
15
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak \u2014 low-value duplicate of more specific findings"
}
]
}

8
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/cfg/raise_terminator.expect.json vendored
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@ -14,24 +14,24 @@
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
14,
21
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "Validator raise acts as guard - ideally no taint finding since invalid input is rejected"
"notes": "Validator raise acts as guard - no taint finding should fire for subprocess.run([validated]) because invalid input is rejected upstream"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-unguarded-sink",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
15,
20
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "Subprocess call is guarded by validate_cmd raise - should not trigger"
"notes": "Subprocess call is guarded by validate_cmd raise - cfg-unguarded-sink must not fire on this list-arg subprocess call"
}
]
}

33
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/cfg/try_except_resource.expect.json vendored
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@ -20,6 +20,39 @@
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "query_db_leak opens sqlite3 connection but never closes it"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
17,
17
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak \u2014 low-value duplicate of more specific findings"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
4,
4
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: resource leak finding \u2014 secondary to primary fixture purpose"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
6,
6
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cursor not explicitly closed even though conn is \u2014 aspirational cursor-ownership tracking"
}
]
}

11
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/mixed/flask_full_stack.expect.json vendored
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@ -57,6 +57,17 @@
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "eval() is a dangerous function - AST pattern match"
},
{
"rule_id": "py.cmdi.subprocess_shell",
"severity": "HIGH",
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
10,
10
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True) \u2014 AST pattern match for subprocess with shell=True"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": null,

23
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/safe/safe_parameterized_query.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"description": "Safe parameterized SQL query — Python cursor.execute with ? placeholder and bind tuple",
"tags": ["taint", "sqli", "sqlite", "safe"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [4, 9],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "user_id flows into bind tuple, not the SQL string — should not fire"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-unguarded-sink",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [4, 9],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "Parameterized query should suppress cfg-unguarded-sink as well"
}
]
}

9
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/safe/safe_parameterized_query.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
import sqlite3
from flask import request
def get_user():
user_id = request.args.get("id")
conn = sqlite3.connect("app.db")
cursor = conn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
return cursor.fetchone()

63
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/safe/safe_parameterized_variants.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
{
"description": "Parameterized SQL queries across Python drivers — sqlite3 ?, psycopg2 %s, executemany, conn.execute",
"tags": ["taint", "sqli", "sqlite", "psycopg2", "safe", "parameterized"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [6, 11],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "sqlite3 cursor.execute with ? placeholder — safe, must NOT fire"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [14, 20],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "psycopg2 cursor.execute with %s placeholder — safe, must NOT fire"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [23, 27],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "cursor.executemany with ? placeholder — safe, must NOT fire"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [30, 34],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "conn.execute with ? placeholder — safe, must NOT fire"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-unguarded-sink",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [1, 34],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "No cfg-unguarded-sink should fire for parameterized queries"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [1, 34],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: resource leaks unrelated to SQL injection"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [1, 34],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak unrelated to SQL injection"
}
]
}

33
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/safe/safe_parameterized_variants.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
import sqlite3
import psycopg2
from flask import request
# sqlite3 with ? placeholder
def get_user_sqlite():
user_id = request.args.get("id")
conn = sqlite3.connect("app.db")
cursor = conn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
return cursor.fetchone()
# psycopg2 with %s placeholder
def get_user_pg():
name = request.args.get("name")
conn = psycopg2.connect("dbname=app")
cursor = conn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", (name,))
return cursor.fetchone()
# executemany with ? placeholder
def bulk_insert():
items = request.json.get("items")
conn = sqlite3.connect("app.db")
cursor = conn.cursor()
cursor.executemany("INSERT INTO items (name) VALUES (?)", items)
conn.commit()
# conn.execute with ? placeholder
def get_user_conn():
user_id = request.args.get("id")
conn = sqlite3.connect("app.db")
conn.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))

2
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/state/branch_leak.expect.json vendored
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak-possible",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
1,
13

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/state/file_lifecycle.expect.json vendored
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
1,
6
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
{
"rule_id": "state-double-close",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
10,
17
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
{
"rule_id": "state-use-after-close",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
15,
23

35
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/state/socket_lifecycle.expect.json vendored
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@ -12,13 +12,46 @@
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
1,
10
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "connect_and_leak creates socket but never closes it"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
11,
11
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak — low-value duplicate of more specific findings"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
12,
12
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak — low-value duplicate of more specific findings"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
5,
5
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak — low-value duplicate of more specific findings"
}
]
}

11
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/state/with_statement.expect.json vendored
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@ -20,6 +20,17 @@
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "else branch opens file manually and never closes it"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
15,
15
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "open() in else branch without with statement \u2014 f never closed, real resource leak"
}
]
}

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/attribute_taint.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "Attribute write from source (os.getenv) flows through attribute read (config.cmd) to sink (os.system).",
"tags": ["taint", "cmdi", "attribute-access"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [7, 8],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "config.cmd = os.getenv('CMD') flows to os.system(config.cmd) — command injection via attribute propagation"
}
]
}

8
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/attribute_taint.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
import os
class Config:
pass
config = Config()
config.cmd = os.getenv("CMD")
os.system(config.cmd)

25
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/callback_sink_tracking.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
{
"description": "Callback tracking: os.system passed as callback to invoke(), tainted data flows through.",
"tags": [
"taint",
"callback",
"context-sensitivity",
"cmd-injection"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
8,
9
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get flows through invoke() where os.system is invoked as callback — command injection"
}
]
}

9
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/callback_sink_tracking.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
# Callback tracking: os.system passed as callback to invoke(), tainted data flows through.
import os
from flask import request
def invoke(data, handler):
handler(data)
user_input = request.args.get('cmd')
invoke(user_input, os.system)

14
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/closure_captured_var.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
{
"description": "Python nested def captures outer var, then inner() invoked in same scope reaches os.system sink",
"tags": ["taint", "closure", "nested-def", "cmdi", "flask"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [9, 12],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get captured by inner() then flows to os.system(q) inside nested def"
}
]
}

13
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/closure_captured_var.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# Python: nested def captures outer var, then inner() is called.
import os
from flask import Flask, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/a')
def handler():
q = request.args.get('q') # source
def inner():
os.system(q) # sink on captured source
inner()
return 'ok'

25
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/cmdi_subprocess.expect.json vendored
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@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
"modes": [
"full"
],
"strict_unexpected": [
"taint-unsanitised-flow"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
@ -20,6 +23,28 @@
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get('cmd') flows directly into subprocess.run with shell=True"
},
{
"rule_id": "py.cmdi.subprocess_shell",
"severity": "HIGH",
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
9,
9
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True) — AST pattern match for subprocess with shell=True"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
18,
18
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "run_cmd_safe has `cmd not in allowed` allowlist guard at line 16-17 that validates cmd — scanner correctly suppresses taint flow to subprocess.run at line 18. Regression guard."
}
]
}

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/destructuring_taint.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "Multiple env var reads — each independently taints its binding.",
"tags": ["taint", "cmdi", "field-access"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [5, 6],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "os.getenv('ARG') taints arg which flows to subprocess.run"
}
]
}

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/destructuring_taint.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
import os
import subprocess
cmd = os.getenv("CMD")
arg = os.getenv("ARG")
subprocess.run(arg, shell=True)

24
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/django_orm_raw.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
{
"description": "Django ORM raw SQL injection: request.GET flows to User.objects.raw()",
"tags": ["taint", "sqli", "django"],
"modes": ["full"],
"strict_unexpected": ["taint-unsanitised-flow"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [4, 6],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.GET.get('q') flows to User.objects.raw() — SQL injection via Django ORM"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [6, 6],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "User.objects.raw results wrapped in str(...) and flow to HttpResponse — tainted query results reach a response sink"
}
]
}

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/django_orm_raw.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
from django.http import HttpResponse
def user_search(request):
query = request.GET.get("q")
results = User.objects.raw("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'" % query)
return HttpResponse(str(results))

43
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/django_sqli.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
{
"description": "SQL injection via string concatenation with Django request.GET in cursor.execute",
"tags": [
"taint",
"sqli",
"django"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
4,
10
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.GET.get('q') flows into cursor.execute — SQL injection"
},
{
"rule_id": "py.sqli.execute_format",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
7,
7
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "cursor.execute with string concatenation — AST pattern match"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [6, 6],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: connection.cursor() not explicitly closed — Django manages cursor lifecycle via connection"
}
]
}

9
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/django_sqli.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
from django.http import HttpResponse
from django.db import connection
def search(request):
q = request.GET.get("q")
cursor = connection.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM items WHERE name = '" + q + "'")
results = cursor.fetchall()
return HttpResponse(str(results))

25
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/flask_ssti.expect.json vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
{
"description": "SSTI via render_template_string with user input from Flask request",
"tags": [
"taint",
"ssti",
"flask",
"code-exec"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
5,
9
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get('name') flows into render_template_string — SSTI"
}
]
}

8
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/flask_ssti.py vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
from flask import Flask, request, render_template_string
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/greet')
def greet():
name = request.args.get('name')
return render_template_string('<h1>Hello ' + name + '</h1>')

24
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/flask_xss_render.expect.json vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
{
"description": "Flask XSS: request.args.get flows directly into HTML string via make_response",
"tags": [
"taint",
"xss",
"flask"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
5,
10
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get('name') flows into make_response — may not be classified as a sink; return-value-as-response tracking requires framework modeling"
}
]
}

10
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/flask_xss_render.py vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
from flask import Flask, request, make_response
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/greet')
def greet():
name = request.args.get('name')
resp = make_response('<h1>Hello ' + name + '</h1>')
resp.headers['Content-Type'] = 'text/html'
return resp

28
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/heap_alias_cmdi.expect.json vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
{
"description": "Command injection through list alias: a and b share the same list, taint appended via a flows to sink via b",
"tags": [
"taint",
"cmdi",
"flask",
"list",
"container",
"alias",
"heap"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
7,
12
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "heap identity: b = a makes both point to same list, append through a visible at sink through b"
}
]
}

12
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/heap_alias_cmdi.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
from flask import Flask, request
import subprocess
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/alias')
def run():
a = []
b = a
a.append(request.args.get('cmd'))
subprocess.call(b, shell=True)
return 'done'

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/infeasible_null_eq.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "Infeasible null/equality: cmd is None AND cmd == 'rm -rf' is contradictory. Only the outer subprocess.call should produce a finding.",
"tags": ["taint", "constraint", "infeasible", "null"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [5, 10],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "os.environ.get flows to outer subprocess.call — reachable path"
}
]
}

10
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/infeasible_null_eq.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
import os
import subprocess
def handle():
cmd = os.environ.get("CMD")
if cmd is None:
if cmd == "rm -rf":
# Infeasible: cmd is None AND cmd == "rm -rf"
subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)
subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True)

28
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/interproc_list_passthrough.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
{
"description": "CMDI through inter-procedural list passthrough: add_to_list appends tainted input and returns same list",
"tags": [
"taint",
"cmdi",
"flask",
"list",
"container",
"heap",
"interproc"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
10,
14
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "inter-procedural container: add_to_list both stores value into items and returns same list identity"
}
]
}

14
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/interproc_list_passthrough.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
from flask import Flask, request
import subprocess
app = Flask(__name__)
def add_to_list(items, value):
items.append(value)
return items
@app.route('/interproc')
def interproc():
cmds = []
result = add_to_list(cmds, request.args.get('cmd'))
subprocess.run(result, shell=True)

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/isinstance_db_conn_sqli.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "isinstance(conn, sqlite3.Connection) guard narrows conn to DatabaseConnection in PathEnv — SQL injection finding should still be present (type confirms DB connection, does not suppress SQLi)",
"tags": ["taint", "type-flow", "isinstance", "sqli", "python"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [4, 7],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get flows into conn.execute via string concat; isinstance guard narrows type to DatabaseConnection but does not suppress SQLi. must_match false because Python string concat propagation may not be detected."
}
]
}

7
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/isinstance_db_conn_sqli.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
import sqlite3
from flask import request
def query_with_guard(conn):
user_id = request.args.get('id')
if isinstance(conn, sqlite3.Connection):
conn.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + user_id)

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/isinstance_guard_sqli.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
{
"description": "isinstance guard narrows user_id to int before SQL concatenation — type-flow constraint solving should suppress taint finding",
"tags": ["taint", "type-flow", "isinstance", "sqli", "safe"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": []
}

11
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/isinstance_guard_sqli.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
import sqlite3
from flask import request
def get_user():
user_id = request.args.get('id')
if not isinstance(user_id, int):
return "bad input"
conn = sqlite3.connect('app.db')
cursor = conn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + str(user_id))
return cursor.fetchone()

22
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/lambda_closure.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"description": "Python lambda captures outer var; lambda invoked later flows tainted capture to os.system sink",
"tags": ["taint", "closure", "lambda", "cmdi", "flask"],
"modes": ["full"],
"strict_unexpected": ["taint-unsanitised-flow"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [9, 11],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "lambda: os.system(q) captures request.args.get('q') — anon body named via assignment LHS"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [11, 11],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "outer run() invocation re-reports the flow via inline callee analysis — tainted capture reaches os.system in body"
}
]
}

12
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/lambda_closure.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# Python lambda captures outer var; lambda invoked later.
import os
from flask import Flask, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/a')
def handler():
q = request.args.get('q')
run = lambda: os.system(q) # lambda captures q
run()
return 'ok'

25
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/lambda_taint.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
{
"description": "Taint flows through Python lambda parameter into os.system sink",
"tags": [
"taint",
"cmdi",
"lambda",
"python"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
4,
6
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "input() flows through lambda cmd parameter into os.system"
}
]
}

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/lambda_taint.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
import os
def handle():
user_input = input()
# Lambda should be its own body — taint flows through parameter
dangerous = (lambda cmd: os.system(cmd))(user_input)

26
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/list_append_cmdi.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
{
"description": "Command injection via list.append: user input appended to list then passed to subprocess.call",
"tags": [
"taint",
"cmdi",
"flask",
"list",
"container"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
6,
11
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get('cmd') appended to list then passed to subprocess.call"
}
]
}

11
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/list_append_cmdi.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
from flask import Flask, request
import subprocess
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/run')
def run_cmd():
commands = []
commands.append(request.args.get('cmd'))
subprocess.call(commands, shell=True)
return 'done'

25
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/os_system_cmdi.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
{
"description": "Command injection: request.args.get flows into os.system via string concatenation",
"tags": [
"taint",
"cmdi",
"flask",
"os.system"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
6,
10
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get('host') flows into os.system via string concatenation"
}
]
}

10
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/os_system_cmdi.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
import os
from flask import Flask, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/ping')
def ping():
host = request.args.get('host')
os.system('ping -c 1 ' + host)
return 'done'

13
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/pickle_deser.expect.json vendored
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@ -25,13 +25,22 @@
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
7,
14
],
"modes": ["full"],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "User data flows through base64 decode into pickle.loads - aspirational taint finding"
"notes": "User data flows through base64 decode into pickle.loads (full mode only; AST mode does not run taint analysis)"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-unguarded-sink",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [11, 11],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "pickle.loads is a DESERIALIZE sink — structural detection of unguarded deserialization (full mode only)"
}
]
}

47
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/raise_in_try.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
{
"description": "Python raise→except exception edge: taint flows to os.system in try body after conditional raise",
"tags": [
"taint",
"cmdi",
"raise",
"try_except",
"python"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
6,
6
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "input() flows to os.system(val) in try body"
},
{
"rule_id": "py.cmdi.os_system",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
6,
6
],
"notes": "Layer B suppression: AST pattern must NOT fire when taint finding at same sink confirms (regression guard)"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-error-fallthrough",
"severity": "LOW",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
4,
4
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: error check fallthrough detection at if-not-val guard"
}
]
}

8
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/raise_in_try.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
import os
val = input()
try:
if not val:
raise ValueError("bad")
os.system(val)
except ValueError as e:
pass

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/reassignment_compound.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "Compound assignment preserves taint: source concatenated with literal still carries taint to os.system sink.",
"tags": ["taint", "reassignment", "compound"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [1, 6],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "os.getenv flows through cmd + suffix concatenation into os.system"
}
]
}

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/reassignment_compound.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
import os
def run():
cmd = os.getenv("CMD")
cmd = cmd + " -safe"
os.system(cmd)

33
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_constant_args.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
{
"description": "os.system/subprocess.run called with only hardcoded string literals \u2014 no taint source.",
"tags": [
"taint",
"negative",
"cmdi"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "py.cmdi.os_system",
"severity": "HIGH",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
4,
4
],
"notes": "Constant arg to os.system — py.cmdi.os_system must NOT fire (regression guard)"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-unguarded-sink",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
5,
5
],
"notes": "No taint source in fixture — cfg-unguarded-sink must NOT fire (regression guard)"
}
]
}

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_constant_args.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
import os
import subprocess
os.system("ls -la /tmp")
result = subprocess.run(["date"], capture_output=True)
print(result.stdout.decode())

23
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_no_source.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"description": "subprocess.run fed by locally-constructed command list \u2014 no taint source involved.",
"tags": [
"taint",
"negative",
"cmdi"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "cfg-unguarded-sink",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
6,
6
],
"notes": "No taint source in fixture — cfg-unguarded-sink must NOT fire (regression guard)"
}
]
}

7
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_no_source.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
import subprocess
def check_disk():
cmd = ["df", "-h", "/"]
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True)
return result.stdout.decode()

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_ord_bounded.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
{
"description": "SQL: ord(ch) produces a proven-bounded integer (type-inferred Int + abstract interval). Dual gate (type + interval) suppresses SQL injection.",
"tags": ["taint", "sqli", "abstract-interp", "interval-domain", "type-inference", "suppression"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": []
}

9
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_ord_bounded.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
from django.http import HttpResponse
from django.db import connection
def search(request):
ch = request.GET.get("c")
code = ord(ch)
cursor = connection.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM items WHERE code = " + code)
return HttpResponse("ok")

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_reassigned_const.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
{
"description": "Source from os.getenv killed by constant reassignment before reaching os.system sink.",
"tags": ["taint", "negative", "reassignment", "safe"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": []
}

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_reassigned_const.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
import os
def run():
cmd = os.getenv("CMD")
cmd = "echo safe"
os.system(cmd)

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_sanitized_flow.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
{
"description": "request.args source flows through shlex.quote (SHELL_ESCAPE sanitizer) before reaching subprocess.run sink — taint should be cleared.",
"tags": ["taint", "negative", "cmdi", "sanitizer"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": []
}

12
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_sanitized_flow.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
from flask import Flask, request
import shlex
import subprocess
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/run')
def run_tool():
tool = request.args.get('tool')
safe = shlex.quote(tool)
result = subprocess.run(["echo", safe], capture_output=True)
return result.stdout.decode()

24
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_shlex_sanitized.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
{
"description": "Safe command execution: user input sanitized with shlex.quote before passing to os.system",
"tags": [
"taint",
"cmdi",
"flask",
"safe",
"sanitizer"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
8,
12
],
"notes": "shlex.quote sanitizes shell metacharacters; must NOT fire (regression guard for CMD sanitizer)"
}
]
}

12
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_shlex_sanitized.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
import os
import shlex
from flask import Flask, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/ping')
def ping():
host = request.args.get('host')
safe_host = shlex.quote(host)
os.system('ping -c 1 ' + safe_host)
return 'done'

24
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_ssrf_allowlist.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
{
"description": "SSRF negative: URL validated against allowlist before httpx.get \u2014 taint may or may not fire",
"tags": [
"taint",
"ssrf",
"negative"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
1,
16
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "Allowlist check guards the request; scanner may still flag because it does not model 'not in' as validation"
}
]
}

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_ssrf_allowlist.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
from flask import Flask, request
import httpx
app = Flask(__name__)
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com']
@app.route('/proxy')
def proxy():
url = request.args.get('url')
from urllib.parse import urlparse
host = urlparse(url).hostname
if host not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
return 'Forbidden', 403
resp = httpx.get(url)
return resp.text

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_ssrf_constant.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
{
"description": "SSRF negative: hardcoded URL passed to requests.get — no user input source",
"tags": ["taint", "ssrf", "negative"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": []
}

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_ssrf_constant.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
import requests
def fetch_status():
url = 'https://api.example.com/health'
resp = requests.get(url)
return resp.status_code

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_ssrf_prefix.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "SSRF safe (Python): URL has known-safe prefix with scheme + host. Cross-language prefix suppression.",
"tags": ["taint", "ssrf", "abstract-interp", "string-domain"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [7, 8],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "TN: URL prefix 'https://api.internal.example.com/users/' locks the host — SSRF suppressed"
}
]
}

9
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/safe_ssrf_prefix.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
from flask import request
import requests
@app.route('/api/user')
def get_user():
user_id = request.args.get('id')
url = 'https://api.internal.example.com/users/' + user_id
resp = requests.get(url)
return resp.json()

70
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/sqli_concat.expect.json vendored
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@ -21,16 +21,80 @@
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get('id') concatenated directly into SQL query string"
},
{
"rule_id": "py.sqli.execute_format",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
11,
11
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "cursor.execute with string concatenation — AST pattern match for SQL injection via format/concat"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
14,
22
],
"notes": "Parameterized query (? placeholder + tuple args) — must NOT fire (regression guard)"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
10,
10
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "Safe version uses parameterized query - should not trigger"
"notes": "noise: resource leak finding — secondary to primary fixture purpose"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
17,
17
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak — low-value duplicate of more specific findings"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
18,
18
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak — low-value duplicate of more specific findings"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": "HIGH",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
19,
19
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: taint-unsanitised-flow — secondary flow or cross-function leakage"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [
9,
9
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: resource leak finding — secondary to primary fixture purpose"
}
]
}

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/sqli_conn_execute.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "SQL injection via sqlite3 conn.execute() with string concatenation",
"tags": ["taint", "sqli", "sqlite3", "python"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [4, 8],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "os.environ flows into SQL string via concat, then to conn.execute()"
}
]
}

8
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/sqli_conn_execute.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
import os
import sqlite3
def get_user():
user_id = os.environ.get("USER_ID")
conn = sqlite3.connect("app.db")
result = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + user_id)
return result.fetchall()

45
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/sqli_mixed_parameterized.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
{
"description": "Same file has unsafe concat and safe parameterized cursor.execute — only concat fires",
"tags": ["taint", "sqli", "sqlite", "parameterized", "mixed"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [4, 9],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get concatenated into SQL string — unsafe, must fire"
},
{
"rule_id": "py.sqli.execute_format",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [8, 8],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "AST pattern detects string concatenation inside cursor.execute"
},
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [11, 16],
"notes": "Parameterized query with ? placeholder — safe, must NOT fire (regression guard)"
},
{
"rule_id": "state-resource-leak",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [1, 17],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: resource leaks unrelated to SQL injection"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-resource-leak",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [1, 17],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "noise: cfg-resource-leak unrelated to SQL injection"
}
]
}

16
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/sqli_mixed_parameterized.py vendored Normal file
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import sqlite3
from flask import request
def get_user_unsafe():
user_id = request.args.get("id")
conn = sqlite3.connect("app.db")
cursor = conn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + user_id)
return str(cursor.fetchall())
def get_user_safe():
user_id = request.args.get("id")
conn = sqlite3.connect("app.db")
cursor = conn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?", (user_id,))
return str(cursor.fetchall())

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/sqli_session_execute.expect.json vendored Normal file
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{
"description": "SQL injection via SQLAlchemy session.execute() with string concatenation",
"tags": ["taint", "sqli", "sqlalchemy", "python"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [5, 10],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "os.environ flows into SQL string via concat, then to session.execute()"
}
]
}

10
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/sqli_session_execute.py vendored Normal file
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import os
from sqlalchemy import create_engine, text
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
def search_users():
name = os.environ.get("USERNAME")
engine = create_engine("sqlite:///app.db")
session = Session(engine)
result = session.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'")
return result.fetchall()

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/ssrf_httpx_post.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "SSRF: user-controlled URL from request.args flows to httpx.post()",
"tags": ["taint", "ssrf", "flask", "httpx"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [6, 11],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get('url') flows to httpx.post(url) without URL validation"
}
]
}

10
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/ssrf_httpx_post.py vendored Normal file
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from flask import Flask, request
import httpx
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/proxy')
def proxy():
url = request.args.get('url')
resp = httpx.post(url, data={"key": "value"})
return resp.text

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/ssrf_requests.expect.json vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"description": "SSRF: user-controlled URL from request.args flows to httpx.get()",
"tags": ["taint", "ssrf", "flask"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [6, 11],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "request.args.get('url') flows to httpx.get(url) without URL validation"
}
]
}

10
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/ssrf_requests.py vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
from flask import Flask, request
import httpx
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/proxy')
def proxy():
url = request.args.get('url')
resp = httpx.get(url)
return resp.text

35
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/try_except_taint.expect.json vendored Normal file
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{
"description": "Python try/except: user input flows to os.system inside try body",
"tags": [
"taint",
"cmdi",
"try_except",
"python"
],
"modes": [
"full"
],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
4,
4
],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "input() flows to os.system(user_cmd) inside try body"
},
{
"rule_id": "py.cmdi.os_system",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_not_match": true,
"line_range": [
4,
4
],
"notes": "Layer B suppression: AST pattern must NOT fire when taint finding at same sink confirms (regression guard)"
}
]
}

6
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/try_except_taint.py vendored Normal file
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import os
user_cmd = input()
try:
os.system(user_cmd)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error: {e}")

15
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/tuple_unpack_taint.expect.json vendored Normal file
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{
"description": "Tuple unpacking from function return — taint flows through multi-value destructuring.",
"tags": ["taint", "cmdi", "destructuring", "tuple-unpack"],
"modes": ["full"],
"expected": [
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [4, 8],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "get_config() returns (os.getenv(HOST), os.getenv(PORT)); host unpacked from tuple flows to subprocess.run"
}
]
}

8
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/tuple_unpack_taint.py vendored Normal file
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import os
import subprocess
def get_config():
return os.getenv("HOST"), os.getenv("PORT")
host, port = get_config()
subprocess.run(["curl", host], shell=True)

13
tests/fixtures/real_world/python/taint/yaml_deser.expect.json vendored
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@ -25,13 +25,22 @@
{
"rule_id": "taint-unsanitised-flow",
"severity": null,
"must_match": false,
"must_match": true,
"line_range": [
6,
12
],
"modes": ["full"],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "User data flows into yaml.load - aspirational taint finding"
"notes": "User data flows into yaml.load (full mode only; AST mode does not run taint analysis)"
},
{
"rule_id": "cfg-unguarded-sink",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"must_match": false,
"line_range": [9, 9],
"evidence_contains": [],
"notes": "yaml.load is a DESERIALIZE sink — structural detection of unguarded deserialization (full mode only)"
}
]
}