[pitboss] phase 02: M2 — Python end-to-end excellence with all hardening baked in

This commit is contained in:
pitboss 2026-05-11 22:56:43 -04:00
parent 894f587b60
commit 0bf39047b9
50 changed files with 4167 additions and 170 deletions

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"""Command injection — adversarial collision fixture.
Prints NYX_PWN_CMDI unconditionally without going through a shell sink.
Expected verdict: Inconclusive(OracleCollisionSuspected).
"""
def process_input(user_input):
"""Prints oracle marker without using a command execution sink."""
# Coincidental oracle match — not a shell sink.
print("NYX_PWN_CMDI")
return user_input.upper()

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"""Command injection — negative fixture.
Safe function: uses subprocess list form (no shell=True), preventing injection.
Expected verdict: NotConfirmed.
"""
import subprocess
def run_ping(host):
"""Safe: list-form subprocess, no shell expansion."""
# Sanitize: only allow alphanumeric and dots
safe_host = "".join(c for c in host if c.isalnum() or c == ".")
if not safe_host:
print("Invalid host")
return
result = subprocess.run(
["ping", "-c", "1", safe_host],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=5,
)
print(result.stdout)

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"""Command injection — positive fixture.
Vulnerable function: passes user input directly to shell=True subprocess.
Expected verdict: Confirmed (payload "; echo NYX_PWN_CMDI" echoes the marker).
"""
import subprocess
def run_ping(host):
"""Vulnerable: user input in shell command."""
result = subprocess.run(
"ping -c 1 " + host,
shell=True,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=5,
)
print(result.stdout)
print(result.stderr, end="")

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"""Command injection — unsupported fixture.
Low-confidence finding that produces Unsupported(ConfidenceTooLow).
Expected verdict: Unsupported(ConfidenceTooLow)
"""
import subprocess
def process_request(cmd):
"""Vulnerable function used in unsupported-confidence test."""
subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)

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"""File I/O — adversarial collision fixture.
Prints "root:" unconditionally without reading any file.
Expected verdict: Inconclusive(OracleCollisionSuspected).
"""
def read_file(path):
"""Prints oracle marker without opening any file."""
# Coincidental match — not a file I/O sink.
print("root: nobody:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh")
return path

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"""File I/O — negative fixture.
Safe function: validates path stays within allowed directory.
Expected verdict: NotConfirmed.
"""
import os
def read_file(path):
"""Safe: resolves and validates path is within /tmp/safe-uploads/."""
base_dir = "/tmp/safe-uploads"
os.makedirs(base_dir, exist_ok=True)
# Resolve to absolute path and check it stays within base_dir.
abs_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_dir, path))
if not abs_path.startswith(base_dir + os.sep) and abs_path != base_dir:
print("Access denied: path traversal detected")
return
try:
with open(abs_path) as f:
print(f.read())
except FileNotFoundError:
print("File not found")

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"""File I/O — positive fixture.
Vulnerable function: opens a file at a user-controlled path.
Expected verdict: Confirmed (path traversal payload reaches /etc/passwd).
"""
def read_file(path):
"""Vulnerable: reads file at user-controlled path."""
try:
with open(path) as f:
print(f.read())
except (OSError, PermissionError) as e:
print(f"Error reading {path}: {e}", end="")

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"""File I/O — unsupported fixture (low confidence).
Expected verdict: Unsupported(ConfidenceTooLow)
"""
def read_config(path):
"""Vulnerable function in unsupported-confidence test."""
with open(path) as f:
return f.read()

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"""SQL injection — adversarial collision fixture.
This function prints "NYX_SQL_CONFIRMED" unconditionally (simulating a
coincidental oracle match). The sink is a harmless print statement, not
an actual SQL execution.
Expected verdict: Inconclusive(OracleCollisionSuspected)
- oracle_fired = True (OutputContains("NYX_SQL_CONFIRMED"))
- sink_hit = False (sys.settrace probe never fires on SQL execute line)
"""
def get_value(user_input):
"""Always prints the oracle marker — no actual SQL involved."""
# Coincidental output match — not a real vulnerability.
print("NYX_SQL_CONFIRMED")
# The above is not a SQL sink; the settrace probe on a real sink line
# (different line number or file) will not fire.
return user_input

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"""SQL injection — negative fixture.
Safe function: uses parameterized queries.
Expected verdict: NotConfirmed (parameterized query prevents injection).
"""
import sqlite3
def login(username):
"""Safe login: parameterized query prevents SQL injection."""
conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:")
conn.execute("CREATE TABLE users (id INTEGER, name TEXT)")
conn.execute("INSERT INTO users VALUES (1, 'alice')")
# Safe: parameterized query
rows = conn.execute("SELECT name FROM users WHERE name=?", (username,)).fetchall()
for row in rows:
print(row[0])
conn.close()

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"""SQL injection — positive fixture.
Vulnerable function: directly concatenates user input into SQL.
Expected verdict: Confirmed (SQLI corpus UNION payload causes "NYX_SQL_CONFIRMED"
to appear in output when the fixture prints query results).
"""
import sqlite3
def login(username):
"""Vulnerable login: direct string concatenation in SQL query."""
conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:")
conn.execute("CREATE TABLE users (id INTEGER, name TEXT)")
conn.execute("INSERT INTO users VALUES (1, 'alice')")
conn.execute("INSERT INTO users VALUES (2, 'bob')")
# Vulnerable: user input directly concatenated
query = "SELECT name FROM users WHERE name='" + username + "'"
try:
rows = conn.execute(query).fetchall()
for row in rows:
print(row[0])
except sqlite3.OperationalError as e:
# Error-based: print query on failure (common in debug mode)
print(f"DB query: {query}")
print(f"DB error: {e}", end="")
finally:
conn.close()

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"""SQL injection — unsupported fixture.
This file contains a vulnerable class method. The test creates a Diag
with `confidence = Low`, which makes `from_finding` return
`Err(UnsupportedReason::ConfidenceTooLow)`.
Expected verdict: Unsupported(ConfidenceTooLow)
"""
import sqlite3
class UserRepository:
"""Vulnerable class method — entry kind unsupported in current milestone."""
def find_user(self, name):
conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:")
query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='" + name + "'"
return conn.execute(query).fetchall()

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"""SQL injection fixture with a secrets file in the project.
Used for the secret-bearing fixture test: verifies that the AWS key
from .env does not appear in cache, telemetry, or repro outcome.json
after redaction.
Expected verdict: result depends on execution; secret must never appear
in any output artifact.
"""
import sqlite3
import os
def login(username):
"""Vulnerable login — same as sqli_positive but in a project with .env."""
conn = sqlite3.connect(":memory:")
conn.execute("CREATE TABLE users (id INTEGER, name TEXT)")
conn.execute("INSERT INTO users VALUES (1, 'alice')")
query = "SELECT name FROM users WHERE name='" + username + "'"
try:
rows = conn.execute(query).fetchall()
for row in rows:
print(row[0])
except sqlite3.OperationalError as e:
print(f"DB query: {query}")
print(f"DB error: {e}", end="")
finally:
conn.close()

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"""SSRF — adversarial collision fixture.
Prints "daemon:" unconditionally without making any network request.
Expected verdict: Inconclusive(OracleCollisionSuspected).
"""
def fetch_url(url):
"""Prints oracle marker without fetching any URL."""
print("daemon:*:1:1:System Services:/var/root:/usr/bin/false")
return url

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"""SSRF — negative fixture.
Safe function: validates URL scheme and host against an allowlist.
Expected verdict: NotConfirmed.
"""
import urllib.request
import urllib.parse
ALLOWED_SCHEMES = {"https"}
ALLOWED_HOSTS = {"api.example.com", "data.example.com"}
def fetch_url(url):
"""Safe: validates URL before fetching."""
try:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
except Exception:
print("Invalid URL")
return
if parsed.scheme not in ALLOWED_SCHEMES:
print(f"Scheme not allowed: {parsed.scheme}")
return
if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
print(f"Host not allowed: {parsed.hostname}")
return
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=3) as resp:
print(resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
except Exception as e:
print(f"Fetch error: {e}", end="")

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"""SSRF — positive fixture.
Vulnerable function: fetches a user-controlled URL.
Expected verdict: Confirmed (file:// payload reads /etc/passwd "root:").
"""
import urllib.request
def fetch_url(url):
"""Vulnerable: fetches URL provided by user without validation."""
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=3) as resp:
content = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(content)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Fetch error: {e}", end="")

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"""SSRF — unsupported fixture (low confidence).
Expected verdict: Unsupported(ConfidenceTooLow)
"""
import urllib.request
def fetch(url):
"""Vulnerable function in unsupported-confidence test."""
return urllib.request.urlopen(url).read()

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"""XSS — adversarial collision fixture.
Outputs the XSS marker string unconditionally without it being a real
HTML sink (e.g., a test that checks for a string literal).
Expected verdict: Inconclusive(OracleCollisionSuspected).
"""
def render_comment(user_input):
"""Prints oracle marker outside of any HTML rendering context."""
# Coincidental match — not an HTML sink.
print("<script>NYX_XSS_CONFIRMED</script>")
return user_input

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"""XSS — negative fixture.
Safe function: uses html.escape() before rendering.
Expected verdict: NotConfirmed (script tag escaped to &lt;script&gt;).
"""
import html
def render_comment(user_input):
"""Safe: HTML-escapes user input before rendering."""
safe = html.escape(user_input)
print(f"<div class='comment'>{safe}</div>")

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"""XSS — positive fixture.
Vulnerable function: echoes user input directly into HTML without escaping.
Expected verdict: Confirmed (XSS payload echoed verbatim to output).
"""
def render_comment(user_input):
"""Vulnerable: no HTML escaping."""
html = f"<div class='comment'>{user_input}</div>"
print(html)

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"""XSS — unsupported fixture (low confidence).
Expected verdict: Unsupported(ConfidenceTooLow)
"""
def render(input_text):
"""Vulnerable render in unsupported-confidence test."""
print(f"<span>{input_text}</span>")