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74 lines
3.3 KiB
JavaScript
74 lines
3.3 KiB
JavaScript
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/**
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EXPECTED OUTPUT (high-level):
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1) cfg-unguarded-sink (High / High confidence)
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- handler(req,res): source req.body.cmd flows to child_process.exec(cmd) without sanitizer/guard.
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- Should rank high (entry-point-ish function name 'handler', close to entry).
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2) cfg-auth-gap (High / Medium)
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- handler is entry-point-ish (name matches handler/route/api conventions).
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- No auth guard dominates sink (require_auth / is_authenticated / is_admin / authorize).
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3) cfg-error-fallthrough (Medium / Medium)
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- Example: if (err) { console.log(err); } then exec(...) still runs.
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- This is the JS analogue of your Go heuristic. If your implementation only targets Go, this should be NO finding.
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If you later generalize, this file includes a pattern you can test against.
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4) cfg-unguarded-sink (HTML) (Medium/High)
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- req.query.html is written into innerHTML without DOMPurify.sanitize
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5) No findings for safe paths:
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- safeHandler uses encodeURIComponent before exec (URL_ENCODE sanitizer) OR uses a dedicated sanitizer you map to SHELL_ESCAPE.
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NOTE: encodeURIComponent is URL_ENCODE, not SHELL_ESCAPE — so for SHELL_ESCAPE sinks, it may still be flagged depending on your caps logic.
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The “definitely safe” case here uses a dummy sanitize_shell() wrapper to match your Rust-style naming if you add it for JS later.
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- safeHtml uses DOMPurify.sanitize before innerHTML (HTML_ESCAPE).
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Taint / dataflow:
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- should find taint from req.body / req.query / process.env sources to exec/eval/innerHTML sinks.
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*/
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const child_process = require("child_process");
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// ─── Entry-point-ish + unguarded shell sink + auth gap ────────────────────────────
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function handler(req, res) {
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// Source (Cap::all): req.body
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const cmd = req.body.cmd;
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// Vulnerable sink (Cap::SHELL_ESCAPE): child_process.exec
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child_process.exec(cmd);
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res.end("ok");
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}
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// ─── Guarded HTML sink (should NOT be flagged) ────────────────────────────────────
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function safeHtml(req, res, DOMPurify) {
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const html = req.query.html; // Source
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const cleaned = DOMPurify.sanitize(html); // Sanitizer(HTML_ESCAPE)
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document.getElementById("app").innerHTML = cleaned; // Sink(HTML_ESCAPE)
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res.end("ok");
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}
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// ─── Unguarded HTML sink (should be flagged) ─────────────────────────────────────
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function unsafeHtml(req, res) {
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const html = req.query.html; // Source
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document.getElementById("app").innerHTML = html; // Sink(HTML_ESCAPE) without sanitizer
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res.end("ok");
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}
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// ─── Heuristic error fallthrough pattern (JS analogue) ───────────────────────────
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// If your error-handling analysis is Go-only, ignore this for now.
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// If generalized later, it should be flagged.
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function errFallthrough(req, res) {
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const err = req.query.err;
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if (err) {
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console.log(err);
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}
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child_process.exec(req.body.cmd);
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res.end("ok");
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}
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// ─── Optional: eval sink (should be flagged) ─────────────────────────────────────
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function evalSink(req) {
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const payload = process.env.PAYLOAD; // Source
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eval(payload); // Sink(SHELL_ESCAPE) per your rules
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}
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