docs: shorten Chromium point in README

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feder-cr 2026-06-25 04:26:40 +02:00
parent 9b9e63972c
commit 29df4e873c

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**Most other anti-detect browsers patch Chromium at the JavaScript level** - they override `navigator`, `WebGLRenderingContext.getParameter`, canvas APIs, and so on via injected scripts. This has two fatal problems:
1. **JS patches are detectable.** Anti-bots enumerate native function `.toString()`, check descriptor configurability, compare property enumeration order, watch for prototype mutations. Every patch leaves a fingerprint of its own. CreepJS has an entire battery of "lies detectors" built around this.
2. **Chromium itself is now suspect.** Residential-proxy bot traffic is overwhelmingly Chromium-based, so detectors weight anything Chromium-shaped as risky by default. Chromium-based forks inherit Chrome's open-source layers (BoringSSL, Blink, V8, ANGLE) cleanly, but they still cannot fully match Chrome in practice: Chrome ships closed-source components on top (Widevine, proprietary codecs, Google Update / Safe Browsing endpoints) that flip detectable JS feature flags and network signals, and forks lag Chrome's release cadence by days to weeks, leaving telltale version-specific behaviours that detectors lock onto.
2. **Chromium itself is now suspect.** Forks cant fully match Chrome: it ships closed-source components (Widevine, proprietary codecs, Safe Browsing) that flip detectable JS flags and network signals, and forks lag Chromes release cadence, leaving version-specific tells detectors lock onto.
**invisible_playwright patches Firefox at the C++ level.** The spoofed values come back out through the normal Gecko paths - there is no JS shim, no override, no `Object.defineProperty`. **From the page's point of view, the browser is just telling the truth.** Anti-bot lie-detectors have nothing to latch onto.