chore: Apply dashboard audit remediations, sync engine counts, update APIs

This commit is contained in:
DmitrL-dev 2026-03-27 16:54:18 +10:00
parent 53c87c972d
commit 5ddfa74771
14 changed files with 354 additions and 153 deletions

View file

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ func NewJWTMiddleware(secret []byte) *JWTMiddleware {
"/readyz": true,
"/metrics": true,
"/api/auth/login": true,
"/api/auth/logout": true,
"/api/auth/refresh": true,
"/api/auth/register": true,
"/api/auth/verify": true,
@ -51,20 +52,43 @@ func (m *JWTMiddleware) Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return
}
// Extract Bearer token.
var tokenStr string
authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if authHeader == "" {
writeAuthError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "missing Authorization header")
return
if strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer stx_") {
// Allow API keys via header
parts := strings.SplitN(authHeader, " ", 2)
tokenStr = parts[1]
} else {
// SEC: H1 - Read token from httpOnly cookie
cookie, err := r.Cookie("syntrex_token")
if err != nil || cookie.Value == "" {
// Fallback to legacy bearer token (for clients that haven't migrated yet or testing)
if authHeader != "" && strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") {
tokenStr = strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")
} else {
writeAuthError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "missing authentication cookie")
return
}
} else {
tokenStr = cookie.Value
}
}
parts := strings.SplitN(authHeader, " ", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "bearer") {
writeAuthError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid Authorization format (expected: Bearer <token>)")
return
// SEC: M2 - Validate CSRF Token on mutating requests
if r.Method == "POST" || r.Method == "PUT" || r.Method == "DELETE" || r.Method == "PATCH" {
// Exempt API keys from CSRF if they used the header
if !strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer stx_") {
csrfHeader := r.Header.Get("X-CSRF-Token")
expectedCSRF := hmacSign([]byte(tokenStr), m.secret)[:32]
if csrfHeader == "" || csrfHeader != expectedCSRF {
slog.Warn("CSRF token missing or invalid", "path", r.URL.Path, "remote", r.RemoteAddr)
writeAuthError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "invalid CSRF token")
return
}
}
}
claims, err := Verify(parts[1], m.secret)
claims, err := Verify(tokenStr, m.secret)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("JWT auth failed",
"error", err,