{ "Introduction": { "Background": { "text": "
The Kingdom of Yemen (colloquially known as North Yemen) became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic. The British, who had set up a protectorate area around the southern port of Aden in the 19th century, withdrew in 1967 from what became the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (colloquially known as South Yemen). Three years later, the southern government adopted a Marxist orientation and changed the country's name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributed to two decades of hostility between the states. The two countries were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A southern secessionist movement and brief civil war in 1994 was quickly subdued. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed to delineate their border. Fighting in the northwest between the government and the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010, and then again from 2014-present. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2007.
Public rallies in Sana'a against then President Ali Abdallah SALIH - inspired by similar Arab Spring demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt - slowly built momentum starting in late January 2011 fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. By the following month, some protests had resulted in violence, and the demonstrations had spread to other major cities. By March the opposition had hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for SALIH's immediate ouster. In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in an attempt to mediate the crisis in Yemen, proposed the GCC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH's refusal to sign an agreement led to further violence. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011 calling for an end to the violence and completing a power transfer deal. In November 2011, SALIH signed the GCC Initiative to step down and to transfer some of his powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. Following HADI's uncontested election victory in February 2012, SALIH formally transferred all presidential powers. In accordance with the GCC Initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in March 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. HADI concluded the NDC in January 2014 and planned to begin implementing subsequent steps in the transition process, including constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections.
The Houthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces with SALIH and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen, which culminated in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabled their forces to overrun the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. In January 2015, the Houthis surrounded the presidential palace, HADI's residence, and key government facilities, prompting HADI and the cabinet to submit their resignations. HADI fled to Aden in February 2015 and rescinded his resignation. He subsequently escaped to Oman and then moved to Saudi Arabia and asked the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen to protect the legitimate government from the Houthis. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes against the Houthis and Houthi-affiliated forces. Ground fighting between Houthi-aligned forces and anti-Houthi groups backed by the Saudi-led coalition continued through 2016. In 2016, the UN brokered a months-long cessation of hostilities that reduced airstrikes and fighting, and initiated peace talks in Kuwait. However, the talks ended without agreement. The Houthis and SALIH’s political party announced a Supreme Political Council in August 2016 and a National Salvation Government, including a prime minister and several dozen cabinet members, in November 2016, to govern in Sanaa and further challenge the legitimacy of HADI’s government. However, amid rising tensions between the Houthis and SALIH, sporadic clashes erupted in mid-2017, and escalated into open fighting that ended when Houthi forces killed SALIH in early December 2017. In 2018, anti-Houthi forces made the most battlefield progress in Yemen since early 2016, most notably in Al Hudaydah Governorate. In December 2018, the Houthis and Yemeni Government participated in the first UN-brokered peace talks since 2016, agreeing to a limited cease-fire in Al Hudaydah Governorate and the establishment of a UN Mission to monitor the agreement. In April 2019, Yemen’s parliament convened in Say'un for the first time since the conflict broke out in 2014. In August 2019, violence erupted between HADI's government and the pro-secessionist Southern Transition Council (STC) in southern Yemen. In November 2019, HADI's government and the STC signed a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting between them, and in December 2020, the signatories formed a new cabinet. In 2020 and 2021, fighting continued on the ground in Yemen as the Houthis gained territory, and also conducted regular UAV and missile attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia. In April 2022, the UN brokered a temporary truce between the Houthis and Saudi-led coalition that resulted in an extended pause of large-scale fighting and cessation of cross-border attacks. Also in April 2022, HADI and his vice-president resigned and were replaced by an eight-person Presidential Leadership Council with the executive powers of the president and vice president.
" } }, "Geography": { "Location": { "text": "Middle East, bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, between Oman and Saudi Arabia" }, "Geographic coordinates": { "text": "15 00 N, 48 00 E" }, "Map references": { "text": "Middle East" }, "Area": { "total": { "text": "527,968 sq km" }, "land": { "text": "527,968 sq km" }, "water": { "text": "0 sq km" }, "note": "note: includes Perim, Socotra, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen), and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen)" }, "Area - comparative": { "text": "almost four times the size of Alabama; slightly larger than twice the size of Wyoming" }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { "text": "1,601 km" }, "border countries": { "text": "Oman 294 km; Saudi Arabia 1,307 km" } }, "Coastline": { "text": "1,906 km" }, "Maritime claims": { "territorial sea": { "text": "12 nm" }, "contiguous zone": { "text": "24 nm" }, "exclusive economic zone": { "text": "200 nm" }, "continental shelf": { "text": "200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin" } }, "Climate": { "text": "mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east" }, "Terrain": { "text": "narrow coastal plain backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains; dissected upland desert plains in center slope into the desert interior of the Arabian Peninsula" }, "Elevation": { "highest point": { "text": "Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb 3,666 m" }, "lowest point": { "text": "Arabian Sea 0 m" }, "mean elevation": { "text": "999 m" } }, "Natural resources": { "text": "petroleum, fish, rock salt, marble; small deposits of coal, gold, lead, nickel, and copper; fertile soil in west" }, "Land use": { "agricultural land": { "text": "44.5% (2018 est.)" }, "agricultural land: arable land": { "text": "arable land: 2.2% (2018 est.)" }, "agricultural land: permanent crops": { "text": "permanent crops: 0.6% (2018 est.)" }, "agricultural land: permanent pasture": { "text": "permanent pasture: 41.7% (2018 est.)" }, "forest": { "text": "1% (2018 est.)" }, "other": { "text": "54.5% (2018 est.)" } }, "Irrigated land": { "text": "6,800 sq km (2012)" }, "Population distribution": { "text": "the vast majority of the population is found in the Asir Mountains (part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system), located in the far western region of the country" }, "Natural hazards": { "text": "sandstorms and dust storms in summer
volcanism: limited volcanic activity; Jebel at Tair (Jabal al-Tair, Jebel Teir, Jabal al-Tayr, Jazirat at-Tair) (244 m), which forms an island in the Red Sea, erupted in 2007 after awakening from dormancy; other historically active volcanoes include Harra of Arhab, Harras of Dhamar, Harra es-Sawad, and Jebel Zubair, although many of these have not erupted in over a century
" }, "Geography - note": { "text": "strategic location on Bab el Mandeb, the strait linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of world's most active shipping lanes" } }, "People and Society": { "Population": { "text": "31,565,602 (2023 est.)" }, "Nationality": { "noun": { "text": "Yemeni(s)" }, "adjective": { "text": "Yemeni" } }, "Ethnic groups": { "text": "predominantly Arab; but also Afro-Arab, South Asian, European" }, "Languages": { "Languages": { "text": "Arabic (official); note - a distinct Socotri language is widely used on Socotra Island and Archipelago; Mahri is still fairly widely spoken in eastern Yemen" }, "major-language sample(s)": { "text": "note: most people are employed in agriculture and herding; services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-fourth of the labor force
" }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2021": { "text": "13.57% (2021 est.)" }, "Unemployment rate 2020": { "text": "13.39% (2020 est.)" }, "Unemployment rate 2019": { "text": "13.06% (2019 est.)" } }, "Youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24)": { "total": { "text": "25.5%" }, "male": { "text": "24.3%" }, "female": { "text": "36.3% (2021 est.)" } }, "Population below poverty line": { "text": "48.6% (2014 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2014": { "text": "36.7 (2014 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { "lowest 10%": { "text": "2.6%" }, "highest 10%": { "text": "30.3% (2008 est.)" } }, "Budget": { "revenues": { "text": "$2.207 billion (2019 est.)" }, "expenditures": { "text": "$3.585 billion (2019 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { "text": "-5.2% (of GDP) (2017 est.)" }, "Public debt": { "Public debt 2017": { "text": "74.5% of GDP (2017 est.)" }, "Public debt 2016": { "text": "68.1% of GDP (2016 est.)" } }, "Taxes and other revenues": { "text": "9% (of GDP) (2017 est.)" }, "Fiscal year": { "text": "calendar year" }, "Current account balance": { "Current account balance 2016": { "text": "-$1.868 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Exports": { "Exports 2017": { "text": "$384.5 million (2017 est.)" }, "Exports 2016": { "text": "$940 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Exports - partners": { "text": "China 53%, Saudi Arabia 10%, United Arab Emirates 7%, Australia 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { "text": "crude petroleum, gold, fish, industrial chemical liquids, scrap iron (2019)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2017": { "text": "$4.079 billion (2017 est.)" }, "Imports 2016": { "text": "$3.117 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Imports - partners": { "text": "China 25%, Turkey 10%, United Arab Emirates 9%, Saudi Arabia 8%, India 7% (2019)" }, "Imports - commodities": { "text": "wheat, refined petroleum, iron, rice, cars (2019)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2020": { "text": "$946.047 million (31 December 2020 est.)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2019": { "text": "$1.414 billion (31 December 2019 est.)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2018": { "text": "$2.334 billion (31 December 2018 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { "Debt - external 2018": { "text": "$6.805 billion (2018 est.)" }, "Debt - external 31 December 2016": { "text": "$7.181 billion (31 December 2016 est.)" } }, "Exchange rates": { "Currency": { "text": "Yemeni rials (YER) per US dollar -" }, "Exchange rates 2021": { "text": "1,035.467 (2021 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2020": { "text": "743.006 (2020 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2019": { "text": "486.731 (2019 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2018": { "text": "214.89 (2018 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2017": { "text": "282.195 (2017 est.)" } } }, "Energy": { "Electricity access": { "population without electricity": { "text": "16 million (2020) 17 million" }, "electrification - total population": { "text": "74.8% (2021)" }, "electrification - urban areas": { "text": "93.1% (2021)" }, "electrification - rural areas": { "text": "63.4% (2021)" } }, "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { "text": "1.772 million kW (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "2,677,920,000 kWh (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 kWh (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "0 kWh (2020 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { "text": "753 million kWh (2019 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { "text": "84.6% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "nuclear": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "solar": { "text": "15.4% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "wind": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "hydroelectricity": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "tide and wave": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "geothermal": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "biomass and waste": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" } }, "Coal": { "production": { "text": "0 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "22,000 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "22,000 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "0 metric tons (2019 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "total petroleum production": { "text": "70,100 bbl/day (2021 est.)" }, "refined petroleum consumption": { "text": "75,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "3 billion barrels (2021 est.)" } }, "Refined petroleum products - production": { "text": "20,180 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Refined petroleum products - exports": { "text": "12,670 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Refined petroleum products - imports": { "text": "75,940 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Natural gas": { "production": { "text": "89.906 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "89.906 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2021 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "478.554 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { "text": "10.158 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from coal and metallurgical coke": { "text": "79,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { "text": "9.896 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from consumed natural gas": { "text": "183,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { "Total energy consumption per capita 2019": { "text": "5.453 million Btu/person (2019 est.)" } } }, "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { "text": "1.2 million (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "4 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { "text": "15 million (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "46 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { "text": "Yemen continues to provide an exceptionally challenging market for telcos; civil unrest has caused havoc and devastation across most parts of the country, while the threat of sanctions has also made it a challenging environment in which to operate; a large proportion of the population requires humanitarian assistance, and there is little disposable income for services upon which telcos can generate revenue; essential telecom infrastructure, such as mobile towers and fiber cabling, has often been targeted, destroyed, or damaged by the opposing sides in the ongoing conflict; these difficulties have proved to be a disincentive to telcos investing in infrastructure, with the result that the country lacks basic fixed-line infrastructure, and mobile services are based on outdated GSM; this has prevented the development of a mobile broadband sector, or the evolution of mobile data services; the ownership of telecommunication services, and the scrutiny of associated revenues and taxes, have become a political issue in Yemen; until telecom infrastructure can be improved across Yemen, and until civil unrest eases, there will be little progress for the sector (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line teledensity is 4 per 100 but mobile cellular is 46 per 100 (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 967; landing points for the FALCON, SeaMeWe-5, Aden-Djibouti, and the AAE-1 international submarine cable connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2020)" } }, "Broadcast media": { "text": "state-run TV with 2 stations; state-run radio with 2 national radio stations and 5 local stations; stations from Oman and Saudi Arabia can be accessed" }, "Internet country code": { "text": ".ye" }, "Internet users": { "total": { "text": "8,229,624 (2022 est.)" }, "percent of population": { "text": "26.6% (2022 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { "text": "391,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } } }, "Transportation": { "National air transport system": { "number of registered air carriers": { "text": "2 (2020)" }, "inventory of registered aircraft operated by air carriers": { "text": "8" }, "annual passenger traffic on registered air carriers": { "text": "336,310 (2018)" }, "annual freight traffic on registered air carriers": { "text": "3.27 million (2018) mt-km" } }, "Civil aircraft registration country code prefix": { "text": "7O" }, "Airports": { "text": "57 (2021)" }, "Airports - with paved runways": { "text": "17", "note": "note: paved runways have a concrete or asphalt surface but not all have facilities for refueling, maintenance, or air traffic control; the length of a runway required for aircraft to safely operate depends on a number of factors including the type of aircraft, the takeoff weight (including passengers, cargo, and fuel), engine types, flap settings, landing speed, elevation of the airport, and average maximum daily air temperature; paved runways can reach a length of 5,000 m (16,000 ft.), but the “typical” length of a commercial airline runway is between 2,500-4,000 m (8,000-13,000 ft.)" }, "Airports - with unpaved runways": { "text": "40", "note": "note: unpaved runways have a surface composition such as grass or packed earth and are most suited to the operation of light aircraft; unpaved runways are usually short, often less than 1,000 m (3,280 ft.) in length; airports with unpaved runways often lack facilities for refueling, maintenance, or air traffic control" }, "Pipelines": { "text": "641 km gas, 22 km liquid petroleum gas, 1,370 km oil (2013)" }, "Roadways": { "total": { "text": "71,300 km (2005)" }, "paved": { "text": "6,200 km (2005)" }, "unpaved": { "text": "65,100 km (2005)" } }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { "text": "30" }, "by type": { "text": "general cargo 2, oil tanker 1, other 27 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Aden, Al Hudaydah, Al Mukalla" } } }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces; Ministry of Defense: Yemeni National Army, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (includes Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades, which are under the Ministry of Defense but responsible to the president), Popular Committee Forces (aka Popular Resistance Forces; government-backed tribal militia); Ministry of Interior: Special Security Forces (paramilitary; formerly known as Central Security Forces), Political Security Organization (state security), National Security Bureau (intelligence), Counterterrorism Unitprior to the start of the civil war in 2014, annual military expenditures were approximately 4-5% of Yemen's GDP
" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { "text": "information limited and widely varied; Yemen Government: up to 300,000 estimated military, paramilitary, militia, and other security forces; UAE- and Saudi-backed forces: estimated 150-200,000 trained militia and paramilitary fighters; Houthis: up to 200,000 estimated fighters (2022)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since the start of the civil war in 2014, it has received limited amounts of donated equipment from some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and UAEYemen-Oman: none identified
Yemen-Saudia Arabia: in 2004, Saudi Arabia reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities, including militants and arms; in 2013 and 2015, Saudi Arabia again erected fences
" }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { "text": "46,596 (Somalia), 17,812 (Ethiopia) (2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "4.52 million (conflict in Sa'ada Governorate; clashes between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and government forces) (2022)" } } } }