{ "Introduction": { "Background": { "text": "
The first recorded kingdom (Choson) on the Korean Peninsula dates from approximately 2300 B.C. Over the subsequent centuries, three main kingdoms - Kogoryo, Paekche, and Silla - were established on the Peninsula. By the 5th century A.D., Kogoryo emerged as the most powerful, with control over much of the Peninsula, as well as part of Manchuria (modern-day northeast China). However, Silla allied with the Chinese to create the first unified Korean state in the late 7th century (688). Following the collapse of Silla in the 9th century, Korea was unified under the Koryo (Goryeo; 918-1392) and the Chosen (Joseon; 1392-1910) dynasties. Korea became the object of intense imperialistic rivalry between the Chinese (its traditional benefactor), Japanese, and Russian empires in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Korea was occupied by Imperial Japan. In 1910, Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula. After World War II, Korea was split along the 38th parallel with the northern half coming under Soviet-sponsored communist control.
In 1948, North Korea (formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) was founded under President KIM Il Sung, who consolidated power and cemented autocratic one-party rule under the Korean Worker's Party (KWP). After the Korean War (1950-53), during which North Korea failed to conquer UN-backed South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea or ROK), North Korea demonized the US as the ultimate threat to its social system through state-funded propaganda and molded political, economic, and military policies around the core ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control. North Korea also declared a central ideology of juche (\"self-reliance\") as an internal check against outside influence while continuing to rely heavily on China and the Soviet Union for economic support. Establishing a policy of hereditary succession in North Korea, KIM Il Sung's son, KIM Jong Il, was officially designated as his father's successor in 1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until the elder KIM's death in 1994. Under KIM Jong Il's reign, North Korea continued developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. KIM Jong Un was publicly unveiled as his father's successor in 2010. Following KIM Jong Il's death in 2011, KIM Jong Un quickly assumed power and has since occupied the regime's highest political and military posts.
After the end of Soviet aid in 1991, North Korea faced serious economic setbacks that exacerbated decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation. Since the mid-1990s, North Korea has faced chronic food shortages and economic stagnation. In recent years, the North's domestic agricultural production has improved, but still falls far short of producing sufficient food to provide for its entire population. Starting in 2002, North Korea began to tolerate semi-private markets but has made few other efforts to meet its goal of improving the overall standard of living. New economic development plans in the 2010s failed to meet government-mandated goals for key industrial sectors, food production, or overall economic performance. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, North Korea instituted a nationwide lockdown that has severely restricted its economy and international engagement. Since then, leader KIM Jong Un has repeatedly expressed concerns with the regime's economic failures and food problems, but in 2021 vowed to continue \"self-reliant\" policies and has reinvigorated his pursuit of greater regime control of the economy. As of 2023, despite slowly renewing cross-border trade, North Korea remains one of the World's most isolated and one of Asia's poorest countries.
North Korea has a history of provocative regional military actions and posturing that are of major concern to the international community and have limited North Korea’s international engagement, particularly economically. These include proliferation of military-related items; ballistic and cruise missile development and testing; WMD programs including tests of nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017; and large conventional armed forces. Following a period of heightened tensions between North Korea and the US in 2017, KIM in 2018 announced a pivot towards diplomacy, including a re-prioritization of economic development, a pause in missile testing beginning in late 2017, and a refrain from anti-US rhetoric starting in June 2018. However, despite high-level efforts to ease tensions during the 2018-19 timeframe, including summits with the leaders of China, South Korea, and the US, North Korea continued developing its WMD programs and, in recent years, issued statements condemning the US and vowing to further strengthen its military capabilities, including long range missiles and nuclear weapons.
late spring droughts often followed by severe flooding; occasional typhoons during the early fall
volcanism: P'aektu-san (2,744 m) (also known as Baitoushan, Baegdu, or Changbaishan), on the Chinese border, is considered historically active
" }, "Geography - note": { "text": "strategic location bordering China, South Korea, and Russia; mountainous interior is isolated and sparsely populated" } }, "People and Society": { "Population": { "text": "26,072,217 (2023 est.)" }, "Nationality": { "noun": { "text": "Korean(s)" }, "adjective": { "text": "Korean" } }, "Ethnic groups": { "text": "racially homogeneous; there is a small Chinese community and a few ethnic Japanese" }, "Languages": { "Languages": { "text": "Korean" }, "major-language sample(s)": { "text": "9 provinces (do, singular and plural) and 4 special administration cities (si, singular and plural)
provinces: Chagang, Hambuk (North Hamgyong), Hamnam (South Hamgyong), Hwangbuk (North Hwanghae), Hwangnam (South Hwanghae), Kangwon, P'yongbuk (North Pyongan), P'yongnam (South Pyongan), Ryanggang
special administration cities: Kaesong, Nampo, P'yongyang, Rason
", "note": "note: P'yongyang is identified as a directly controlled city, while Kaesong, Nampo, and Rason are designated as special cities" }, "Independence": { "text": "15 August 1945 (from Japan)" }, "National holiday": { "text": "Founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), 9 September (1948)" }, "Constitution": { "history": { "text": "previous 1948, 1972; latest adopted 1998 (during KIM Jong-il era)" }, "amendments": { "text": "proposed by the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA); passage requires more than two-thirds majority vote of the total SPA membership; revised several times, last in 2019" } }, "Legal system": { "text": "civil law system based on the Prussian model; system influenced by Japanese traditions and Communist legal theory" }, "International law organization participation": { "text": "has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt" }, "Citizenship": { "citizenship by birth": { "text": "no" }, "citizenship by descent only": { "text": "at least one parent must be a citizen of North Korea" }, "dual citizenship recognized": { "text": "no" }, "residency requirement for naturalization": { "text": "unknown" } }, "Suffrage": { "text": "17 years of age; universal and compulsory" }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { "text": "State Affairs Commission President KIM Jong Un (since 17 December 2011); note - within the North Korean system, KIM Jong Un's role as chief of state is secondary to his role as general secretary of the KWP; chief of state is used to engage with non-communist countries such as the US; North Korea revised its constitution in 2019 to define \"the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission\" as \"the supreme leader who represents the state\"; functions as the commander-in-chief and chief executive; the specific titles associated with this office have changed multiple times under KIM's tenure, however, KIM Jong Un has been supreme leader since his father's death in 2011" }, "head of government": { "text": "Supreme People's Assembly President CHOE Ryong Hae (since 11 April 2019); note - functions as the technical head of state and performs related duties, such as receiving ambassadors' credentials" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Cabinet or Naegak members appointed by the Supreme People's Assembly except the Minister of People's Armed Forces" }, "elections/appointments": { "text": "chief of state and premier indirectly elected by the Supreme People's Assembly; election last held on 10 March 2019 (next to be held in March 2024)" }, "election results": { "text": "KIM Jong Un reelected unopposed" }, "note": "note 1: KIM Jong Un's titles include general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (KWP), chairman of the KWP Central Military Commission, president of the State Affairs Commission, and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army" }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { "text": "unicameral Supreme People's Assembly or Ch'oego Inmin Hoeui (687 seats; members directly elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed to serve 5-year terms); note - functions as a rubberstamp legislature; the Korean Workers' Party selects all candidates" }, "elections": { "text": "last held on 10 March 2019 (next to be held March 2024)" }, "election results": { "text": "percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - KWP 607, KSDP 50, Chondoist Chongu Party 22, General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) 5, religious associations 3; ruling party approves a list of candidates who are elected without opposition; composition as of March 2022 - men 566, women 121, percent of women 17.6%NA
" }, "GDP - composition, by sector of origin": { "agriculture": { "text": "22.5% (2017 est.)" }, "industry": { "text": "47.6% (2017 est.)" }, "services": { "text": "29.9% (2017 est.)" } }, "GDP - composition, by end use": { "household consumption": { "text": "(2014 est.) NA" }, "government consumption": { "text": "(2014 est.) NA" }, "investment in fixed capital": { "text": "(2014 est.) NA" }, "investment in inventories": { "text": "(2014 est.) NA" }, "exports of goods and services": { "text": "5.9% (2016 est.)" }, "imports of goods and services": { "text": "-11.1% (2016 est.)" } }, "Agricultural products": { "text": "rice, maize, vegetables, apples, potatoes, cabbages, fruit, sweet potatoes, beans, soybeans" }, "Industries": { "text": "military products; machine building, electric power, chemicals; mining (coal, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals), metallurgy; textiles, food processing; tourism" }, "Industrial production growth rate": { "text": "1% (2017 est.)" }, "Labor force": { "text": "17.16 million (2021 est.)", "note": "note: estimates vary widely" }, "Labor force - by occupation": { "agriculture": { "text": "37%" }, "industry": { "text": "63% (2008 est.)" } }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2021": { "text": "2.59% (2021 est.)" }, "Unemployment rate 2020": { "text": "2.92% (2020 est.)" }, "Unemployment rate 2019": { "text": "2.59% (2019 est.)" } }, "Youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24)": { "total": { "text": "6.1%" }, "male": { "text": "5.4%" }, "female": { "text": "6.9% (2021 est.)" } }, "Population below poverty line": { "text": "NA" }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { "lowest 10%": { "text": "NA" }, "highest 10%": { "text": "NA" } }, "Budget": { "revenues": { "text": "$3.2 billion (2007 est.)" }, "expenditures": { "text": "$3.3 billion (2007 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { "text": "-0.4% (of GDP) (2007 est.)" }, "Taxes and other revenues": { "text": "11.4% (of GDP) (2007 est.)", "note": "note: excludes earnings from state-operated enterprises" }, "Fiscal year": { "text": "calendar year" }, "Exports": { "Exports 2018": { "text": "$222 million (2018)" }, "Exports 2017": { "text": "$4.582 billion (2017 est.)" }, "Exports 2015": { "text": "$2.908 billion (2015 est.)" } }, "Exports - partners": { "text": "China 67%, Suriname 6% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { "text": "refined petroleum, iron alloys, electricity, cars, vaccines and cultures (2021)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2018": { "text": "$2.32 billion (2018 est.)" }, "Imports 2016": { "text": "$3.86 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Imports - partners": { "text": "China 96% (2019)" }, "Imports - commodities": { "text": "clothing and apparel, soybean oil, rice, wheat products, clocks/watches (2019)" }, "Debt - external": { "Debt - external 2013": { "text": "$5 billion (2013 est.)" } }, "Exchange rates": { "Currency": { "text": "North Korean won (KPW) per US dollar (average market rate)" }, "Exchange rates 2017": { "text": "135 (2017 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2016": { "text": "130 (2016 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2015": { "text": "130 (2015 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2013": { "text": "98.5 (2013 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2012": { "text": "155.5 (2012 est.)" } } }, "Energy": { "Electricity access": { "population without electricity": { "text": "(2020) 19 million" }, "electrification - total population": { "text": "52.6% (2021)" }, "electrification - urban areas": { "text": "36% (2020)" }, "electrification - rural areas": { "text": "11% (2020)" } }, "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { "text": "8.413 million kW (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "13,930,320,000 kWh (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 kWh (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "0 kWh (2020 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { "text": "2.146 billion kWh (2019 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { "text": "15.8% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "nuclear": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "solar": { "text": "0.1% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "wind": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "hydroelectricity": { "text": "84.1% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "tide and wave": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "geothermal": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "biomass and waste": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" } }, "Coal": { "production": { "text": "16.376 million metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "6.698 million metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "22,000 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "600 million metric tons (2019 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "total petroleum production": { "text": "0 bbl/day (2021 est.)" }, "refined petroleum consumption": { "text": "20,300 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { "text": "0 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { "text": "10,600 bbl/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "0 barrels (2021 est.)" } }, "Refined petroleum products - production": { "text": "11,270 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Refined petroleum products - exports": { "text": "0 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Refined petroleum products - imports": { "text": "8,260 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Natural gas": { "production": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2021 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2021 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2021 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2021 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2021 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { "text": "18.465 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from coal and metallurgical coke": { "text": "15.252 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { "text": "3.213 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from consumed natural gas": { "text": "0 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { "Total energy consumption per capita 2019": { "text": "12.61 million Btu/person (2019 est.)" } } }, "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { "text": "1.2 million (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "5 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { "text": "6 million (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "23 (2021 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { "text": "despite years of isolationism, economic under-achievement, and international sanctions, North Korea has improved its telecommunications infrastructure in the last decade; Inconsistent electric power supply and likely difficulties procuring new hardware, however, present enduring obstacles to building reliable high-speed telecom networks; mobile phone use is estimated to have increased to nearly 25% of the polulation as of 2018, yet the high cost of ownership makes mobile communications inaccessible to North Koreans of lower socioeconomic status; strict regime censorship and monitoring of telecom systems in North Korea restricts users from legally contacting anyone outside the country or accessing the global Internet; for those citizens living close to China, it has been possible to illegally obtain Chinese handsets and SIM cards, and to connect to towers located just across the border; while this offers access to the outside world and at much lower prices than the state-controlled offerings, the risks are high including steep fines and the possibility of jail time; North Korea has been effective in building an IT sector and a nascent digital economy on the back of a concerted effort to grow a sizeable, well-trained IT workforce; but even here, its capabilities have been directed more towards nefarious activities such as cyber crime and hacking into foreign countries’ computer and financial systems; North Korea’s determination to maintain ideological control of its populace by isolating itself from the rest of the world will probably lead to tighter controls on communications inside and outside of the country (2023)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-lines are approximately 5 per 100 and mobile-cellular 23 per 100 persons (2021)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 850; satellite earth stations - 2 (1 Intelsat - Indian Ocean, 1 Russian - Indian Ocean region); other international connections through Moscow and Beijing" } }, "Broadcast media": { "text": "no independent media; radios and TVs are pre-tuned to government stations; 4 government-owned TV stations; the Korean Workers' Party owns and operates the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, and the state-run Voice of Korea operates an external broadcast service; the government prohibits listening to and jams foreign broadcasts (2019)" }, "Internet country code": { "text": ".kp" } }, "Transportation": { "National air transport system": { "number of registered air carriers": { "text": "1 (2020)" }, "inventory of registered aircraft operated by air carriers": { "text": "4" }, "annual passenger traffic on registered air carriers": { "text": "103,560 (2018)" }, "annual freight traffic on registered air carriers": { "text": "250,000 (2018) mt-km" } }, "Civil aircraft registration country code prefix": { "text": "P" }, "Airports": { "text": "82 (2021)" }, "Airports - with paved runways": { "total": { "text": "39" }, "civil airports": { "text": "1" }, "military airports": { "text": "18" }, "joint use (civil-military) airports": { "text": "1" }, "other airports": { "text": "19" }, "note": "note: paved runways have a concrete or asphalt surface but not all have facilities for refueling, maintenance, or air traffic control; the length of a runway required for aircraft to safely operate depends on a number of factors including the type of aircraft, the takeoff weight (including passengers, cargo, and fuel), engine types, flap settings, landing speed, elevation of the airport, and average maximum daily air temperature; paved runways can reach a length of 5,000 m (16,000 ft.), but the “typical” length of a commercial airline runway is between 2,500-4,000 m (8,000-13,000 ft.)" }, "Airports - with unpaved runways": { "text": "43", "note": "note: unpaved runways have a surface composition such as grass or packed earth and are most suited to the operation of light aircraft; unpaved runways are usually short, often less than 1,000 m (3,280 ft.) in length; airports with unpaved runways often lack facilities for refueling, maintenance, or air traffic control" }, "Heliports": { "text": "23 (2021)" }, "Pipelines": { "text": "6 km oil (2013)" }, "Railways": { "total": { "text": "7,435 km (2014)" }, "standard gauge": { "text": "7,435 km (2014) 1.435-m gauge (5,400 km electrified)" }, "note": "note: figures are approximate; some narrow-gauge railway also exists" }, "Roadways": { "total": { "text": "25,554 km (2006)" }, "paved": { "text": "724 km (2006)" }, "unpaved": { "text": "24,830 km (2006)" } }, "Waterways": { "text": "2,250 km (2011) (most navigable only by small craft)" }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { "text": "270" }, "by type": { "text": "bulk carrier 9, container ship 5, general cargo 193, oil tanker 33, other 30 (2022)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Ch'ongjin, Haeju, Hungnam, Namp'o, Songnim, Sonbong (formerly Unggi), Wonsan" } } }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Korean People's Army (KPA): KPA Ground Forces, KPA Navy, KPA Air Force and Air Defense Forces, KPA Strategic Forces (missile forces), KPA Special Forces (special operations forces); Security Guard Command (aka Bodyguard Command); Military Security CommandNorth Korea-China: risking arrest, imprisonment, and deportation, tens of thousands of North Koreans cross into China to escape famine, economic privation, and political oppression; North Korea and China dispute the sovereignty of certain islands in Yalu and Tumen Rivers
North Korea-Japan: North Korea supports South Korea in rejecting Japan's claim to Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima)
North Korea-South Korea: Military Demarcation Line within the 4-km-wide Demilitarized Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953; periodic incidents in the Yellow Sea with South Korea which claims the Northern Limiting Line as a maritime boundary
" }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "IDPs": { "text": "undetermined (2021)" } }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { "text": "Tier 3 — the government of North Korea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government did not demonstrate any efforts to address human trafficking; during this reporting period there was a government policy or pattern of human trafficking in prison camps, in labor training centers, in massed mobilizations of adults and children, and through forced labor by North Korean overseas workers; proceeds from state-sponsored forced labor funded government functions and illicit activities (2022)" }, "trafficking profile": { "text": "human traffickers—including government officials—exploit North Koreans at home and abroad; women and children are exploited in sex trafficking within North Korea; forced labor is part of an established system of political repression and a pillar of the economic system; children in prison camps are subject to forced labor for up to 12 hours per day; officials forcibly mobilize adults and school children to work in factories, agriculture, logging, mining, infrastructure work, information technology, and construction sectors; North Koreans sent to work abroad, including through bilateral agreements with foreign businesses or governments, face forced labor conditions; NGOs report overseas workers are managed as a matter of state policy; the government often appropriates and deposits worker salaries into government-controlled accounts; in 2017, the UN Security Council prohibited members from issuing or renewing work authorizations for North Koreans and, with limited exceptions, required repatriation; nonetheless, an estimated 20,000-100,000 North Koreans are working in China, primarily in restaurants and factories; North Korean women and girls lured by promises of jobs in China are forced into prostitution, marriage, or exploitative labor arrangements; many North Koreans continue to work or enter Russia, and some workers are reportedly working in African, Middle Eastern, an Southeast Asian countries (2022)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "at present there is insufficient information to determine the current level of involvement of government officials in the production or trafficking of illicit drugs, but for years, from the 1970s into the 2000s, citizens of North Korea , many of them diplomatic employees of the government, were apprehended abroad while trafficking in narcotics; police investigations in Taiwan, Japan and Australia during that period have linked North Korea to large illicit shipments of heroin and methamphetamine" } } }