{ "Introduction": { "Background": { "text": "
The Kingdom of Yemen (colloquially known as North Yemen) became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic. The British, who had set up a protectorate area around the southern port of Aden in the 19th century, withdrew in 1967 from what became the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (colloquially known as South Yemen). Three years later, the southern government adopted a Marxist orientation and changed the country's name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributed to two decades of hostility between the states. The two countries were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A southern secessionist movement and brief civil war in 1994 was quickly subdued. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed to delineate their border.
Fighting in the northwest between the government and the Huthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010, and then again from 2014-present. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2007.
Public rallies in Sana'a against then President Ali Abdallah SALIH - inspired by similar Arab Spring demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt - slowly built momentum starting in late January 2011 fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. By the following month, some protests had resulted in violence, and the demonstrations had spread to other major cities. By March the opposition had hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for SALIH's immediate ouster. In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in an attempt to mediate the crisis in Yemen, proposed the GCC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH's refusal to sign an agreement led to further violence. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011 calling for an end to the violence and completing a power transfer deal. In November 2011, SALIH signed the GCC Initiative to step down and to transfer some of his powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. Following HADI's uncontested election victory in February 2012, SALIH formally transferred all presidential powers. In accordance with the GCC Initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in March 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. HADI concluded the NDC in January 2014 and planned to begin implementing subsequent steps in the transition process, including constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections.
The Huthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces with SALIH and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen, which culminated in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabled their forces to overrun the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. In January 2015, the Huthis surrounded the presidential palace, HADI's residence, and key government facilities, prompting HADI and the cabinet to submit their resignations. HADI fled to Aden in February 2015 and rescinded his resignation. He subsequently escaped to Oman and then moved to Saudi Arabia and asked the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen to protect the legitimate government from the Huthis. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes against the Huthis and Huthi-affiliated forces. Ground fighting between Huthi-aligned forces and anti-Huthi groups backed by the Saudi-led coalition continued through 2016. In 2016, the UN brokered a months-long cessation of hostilities that reduced airstrikes and fighting, and initiated peace talks in Kuwait. However, the talks ended without agreement. The Huthis and SALIH’s political party announced a Supreme Political Council in August 2016 and a National Salvation Government, including a prime minister and several dozen cabinet members, in November 2016, to govern in Sanaa and further challenge the legitimacy of HADI’s government. However, amid rising tensions between the Huthis and SALIH, sporadic clashes erupted in mid-2017, and escalated into open fighting that ended when Huthi forces killed SALIH in early December 2017. In 2018, anti-Huthi forces made the most battlefield progress in Yemen since early 2016, most notably in Al Hudaydah Governorate. In December 2018, the Huthis and Yemeni Government participated in the first UN-brokered peace talks since 2016, agreeing to a limited cease-fire in Al Hudaydah Governorate and the establishment of a UN Mission to monitor the agreement. In April 2019, Yemen’s parliament convened in Say'un for the first time since the conflict broke out in 2014. In August 2019, violence erupted between HADI's government and the pro-secessionist Southern Transition Council (STC) in southern Yemen. In November 2019, HADI's government and the STC signed a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting between them, and in December 2020, the signatories formed a new cabinet. In 2020 and 2021, fighting continued on the ground in Yemen as the Huthis gained territory, and also conducted regular UAV and missile attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia.
" } }, "Geography": { "Location": { "text": "Middle East, bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, between Oman and Saudi Arabia" }, "Geographic coordinates": { "text": "15 00 N, 48 00 E" }, "Map references": { "text": "Middle East" }, "Area": { "total": { "text": "527,968 sq km" }, "land": { "text": "527,968 sq km" }, "water": { "text": "0 sq km" }, "note": "note: includes Perim, Socotra, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen), and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen)" }, "Area - comparative": { "text": "almost four times the size of Alabama; slightly larger than twice the size of Wyoming" }, "Land boundaries": { "total": { "text": "1,601 km" }, "border countries": { "text": "Oman 294 km; Saudi Arabia 1,307 km" } }, "Coastline": { "text": "1,906 km" }, "Maritime claims": { "territorial sea": { "text": "12 nm" }, "contiguous zone": { "text": "24 nm" }, "exclusive economic zone": { "text": "200 nm" }, "continental shelf": { "text": "200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin" } }, "Climate": { "text": "mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east" }, "Terrain": { "text": "narrow coastal plain backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains; dissected upland desert plains in center slope into the desert interior of the Arabian Peninsula" }, "Elevation": { "highest point": { "text": "Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb 3,666 m" }, "lowest point": { "text": "Arabian Sea 0 m" }, "mean elevation": { "text": "999 m" } }, "Natural resources": { "text": "petroleum, fish, rock salt, marble; small deposits of coal, gold, lead, nickel, and copper; fertile soil in west" }, "Land use": { "agricultural land": { "text": "44.5% (2018 est.)" }, "agricultural land: arable land": { "text": "arable land: 2.2% (2018 est.)" }, "agricultural land: permanent crops": { "text": "permanent crops: 0.6% (2018 est.)" }, "agricultural land: permanent pasture": { "text": "permanent pasture: 41.7% (2018 est.)" }, "forest": { "text": "1% (2018 est.)" }, "other": { "text": "54.5% (2018 est.)" } }, "Irrigated land": { "text": "6,800 sq km (2012)" }, "Population distribution": { "text": "the vast majority of the population is found in the Asir Mountains (part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system), located in the far western region of the country" }, "Natural hazards": { "text": "sandstorms and dust storms in summer
volcanism: limited volcanic activity; Jebel at Tair (Jabal al-Tair, Jebel Teir, Jabal al-Tayr, Jazirat at-Tair) (244 m), which forms an island in the Red Sea, erupted in 2007 after awakening from dormancy; other historically active volcanoes include Harra of Arhab, Harras of Dhamar, Harra es-Sawad, and Jebel Zubair, although many of these have not erupted in over a century
" }, "Geography - note": { "text": "strategic location on Bab el Mandeb, the strait linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of world's most active shipping lanes" } }, "People and Society": { "Population": { "text": "30,984,689 (2022 est.)" }, "Nationality": { "noun": { "text": "Yemeni(s)" }, "adjective": { "text": "Yemeni" } }, "Ethnic groups": { "text": "predominantly Arab; but also Afro-Arab, South Asian, European" }, "Languages": { "Languages": { "text": "Arabic (official); note - a distinct Socotri language is widely used on Socotra Island and Archipelago; Mahri is still fairly widely spoken in eastern Yemen" }, "major-language sample(s)": { "text": "Yemen is a low-income country that faces difficult long-term challenges to stabilizing and growing its economy, and the current conflict has only exacerbated those issues. The ongoing war has halted Yemen’s exports, pressured the currency’s exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. The conflict has also created a severe humanitarian crisis - the world’s largest cholera outbreak currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.
Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.
However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country’s economic decline. In September 2016, President HADI announced the move of the main branch of Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden where his government could exert greater control over the central bank’s dwindling resources. Regardless of which group controls the main branch, the central bank system is struggling to function. Yemen’s Central Bank’s foreign reserves, which stood at roughly $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, have declined to negligible amounts. The Central Bank can no longer fully support imports of critical goods or the country’s exchange rate. The country also is facing a growing liquidity crisis and rising inflation. The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.
Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity.
" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2017": { "text": "$73.63 billion (2017 est.)" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2016": { "text": "$78.28 billion (2016 est.)" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2015": { "text": "$90.63 billion (2015 est.)" }, "note": "note: data are in 2017 dollars" }, "Real GDP growth rate": { "Real GDP growth rate 2017": { "text": "-5.9% (2017 est.)" }, "Real GDP growth rate 2016": { "text": "-13.6% (2016 est.)" }, "Real GDP growth rate 2015": { "text": "-16.7% (2015 est.)" } }, "Real GDP per capita": { "Real GDP per capita 2017": { "text": "$2,500 (2017 est.)" }, "Real GDP per capita 2016": { "text": "$2,700 (2016 est.)" }, "Real GDP per capita 2015": { "text": "$3,200 (2015 est.)" }, "note": "note: data are in 2017 dollars" }, "GDP (official exchange rate)": { "text": "$54.356 billion (2018 est.)" }, "Inflation rate (consumer prices)": { "Inflation rate (consumer prices) 2017": { "text": "24.7% (2017 est.)" }, "Inflation rate (consumer prices) 2016": { "text": "-12.6% (2016 est.)" } }, "GDP - composition, by sector of origin": { "agriculture": { "text": "20.3% (2017 est.)" }, "industry": { "text": "11.8% (2017 est.)" }, "services": { "text": "67.9% (2017 est.)" } }, "GDP - composition, by end use": { "household consumption": { "text": "116.6% (2017 est.)" }, "government consumption": { "text": "17.6% (2017 est.)" }, "investment in fixed capital": { "text": "2.2% (2017 est.)" }, "investment in inventories": { "text": "0% (2017 est.)" }, "exports of goods and services": { "text": "7.5% (2017 est.)" }, "imports of goods and services": { "text": "-43.9% (2017 est.)" } }, "Agricultural products": { "text": "mangoes/guavas, potatoes, sorghum, onions, milk, poultry, watermelons, grapes, oranges, bananas" }, "Industries": { "text": "crude oil production and petroleum refining; small-scale production of cotton textiles, leather goods; food processing; handicrafts; aluminum products; cement; commercial ship repair; natural gas production" }, "Industrial production growth rate": { "text": "8.9% (2017 est.)" }, "Labor force": { "text": "7.425 million (2017 est.)" }, "Labor force - by occupation": { "text": "note: most people are employed in agriculture and herding; services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-fourth of the labor force
" }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2014": { "text": "27% (2014 est.)" }, "Unemployment rate 2003": { "text": "35% (2003 est.)" } }, "Unemployment, youth ages 15-24": { "total": { "text": "24.5%" }, "male": { "text": "23.5%" }, "female": { "text": "34.6% (2014 est.)" } }, "Population below poverty line": { "text": "48.6% (2014 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income": { "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 2014": { "text": "36.7 (2014 est.)" }, "Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income 1999": { "text": "37.3 (1999 est.)" } }, "Household income or consumption by percentage share": { "lowest 10%": { "text": "2.6%" }, "highest 10%": { "text": "30.3% (2008 est.)" } }, "Budget": { "revenues": { "text": "2.821 billion (2017 est.)" }, "expenditures": { "text": "4.458 billion (2017 est.)" } }, "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": { "text": "-5.2% (of GDP) (2017 est.)" }, "Public debt": { "Public debt 2017": { "text": "74.5% of GDP (2017 est.)" }, "Public debt 2016": { "text": "68.1% of GDP (2016 est.)" } }, "Taxes and other revenues": { "text": "9% (of GDP) (2017 est.)" }, "Fiscal year": { "text": "calendar year" }, "Current account balance": { "Current account balance 2017": { "text": "-$1.236 billion (2017 est.)" }, "Current account balance 2016": { "text": "-$1.868 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Exports": { "Exports 2017": { "text": "$384.5 million (2017 est.)" }, "Exports 2016": { "text": "$940 million (2016 est.)" } }, "Exports - partners": { "text": "China 53%, Saudi Arabia 10%, United Arab Emirates 7%, Australia 5% (2019)" }, "Exports - commodities": { "text": "crude petroleum, gold, fish, industrial chemical liquids, scrap iron (2019)" }, "Imports": { "Imports 2017": { "text": "$4.079 billion (2017 est.)" }, "Imports 2016": { "text": "$3.117 billion (2016 est.)" } }, "Imports - partners": { "text": "China 25%, Turkey 10%, United Arab Emirates 9%, Saudi Arabia 8%, India 7% (2019)" }, "Imports - commodities": { "text": "wheat, refined petroleum, iron, rice, cars (2019)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2017": { "text": "$245.4 million (31 December 2017 est.)" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 31 December 2016": { "text": "$592.6 million (31 December 2016 est.)" } }, "Debt - external": { "Debt - external 2018": { "text": "$6.805 billion (2018 est.)" }, "Debt - external 31 December 2016": { "text": "$7.181 billion (31 December 2016 est.)" } }, "Exchange rates": { "Currency": { "text": "Yemeni rials (YER) per US dollar -" }, "Exchange rates 2017": { "text": "275 (2017 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2016": { "text": "214.9 (2016 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2015": { "text": "214.9 (2015 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2014": { "text": "228 (2014 est.)" }, "Exchange rates 2013": { "text": "214.89 (2013 est.)" } } }, "Energy": { "Electricity access": { "population without electricity": { "text": "16 million (2019)" }, "electrification - total population": { "text": "47% (2019)" }, "electrification - urban areas": { "text": "72% (2019)" }, "electrification - rural areas": { "text": "31% (2019)" } }, "Electricity": { "installed generating capacity": { "text": "1.772 million kW (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "2,677,920,000 kWh (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 kWh (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "0 kWh (2020 est.)" }, "transmission/distribution losses": { "text": "753 million kWh (2019 est.)" } }, "Electricity generation sources": { "fossil fuels": { "text": "84.6% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "nuclear": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "solar": { "text": "15.4% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "wind": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "hydroelectricity": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "tide and wave": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "geothermal": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" }, "biomass and waste": { "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)" } }, "Coal": { "production": { "text": "0 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "22,000 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "22,000 metric tons (2020 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "0 metric tons (2019 est.)" } }, "Petroleum": { "total petroleum production": { "text": "70,100 bbl/day (2021 est.)" }, "refined petroleum consumption": { "text": "75,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate exports": { "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil and lease condensate imports": { "text": "0 barrels/day (2018 est.)" }, "crude oil estimated reserves": { "text": "3 billion barrels (2021 est.)" } }, "Refined petroleum products - production": { "text": "20,180 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Refined petroleum products - exports": { "text": "12,670 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Refined petroleum products - imports": { "text": "75,940 bbl/day (2015 est.)" }, "Natural gas": { "production": { "text": "89.906 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "consumption": { "text": "89.906 million cubic meters (2019 est.)" }, "exports": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2020 est.)" }, "imports": { "text": "0 cubic meters (2021 est.)" }, "proven reserves": { "text": "478.554 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)" } }, "Carbon dioxide emissions": { "total emissions": { "text": "10.158 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from coal and metallurgical coke": { "text": "79,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from petroleum and other liquids": { "text": "9.896 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" }, "from consumed natural gas": { "text": "183,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)" } }, "Energy consumption per capita": { "Total energy consumption per capita 2019": { "text": "5.453 million Btu/person (2019 est.)" } } }, "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { "text": "1.24 million (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "4 (2020 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { "text": "15,357,900 (2019)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "55.18 (2019)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { "text": "Yemen continues to provide an exceptionally challenging market for telcos; civil unrest has caused havoc and devastation across most parts of the country, while the threat of sanctions has also made it a challenging environment in which to operate; a large proportion of the population requires humanitarian assistance, and there is little disposable income for services upon which telcos can generate revenue; essential telecom infrastructure, such as mobile towers and fiber cabling, has often been targeted, destroyed, or damaged by the opposing sides in the ongoing conflict; these difficulties have proved to be a disincentive to telcos investing in infrastructure, with the result that the country lacks basic fixed-line infrastructure, and mobile services are based on outdated GSM; this has prevented the development of a mobile broadband sector, or the evolution of mobile data services; the ownership of telecommunication services, and the scrutiny of associated revenues and taxes, have become a political issue in Yemen; in 2019 the recognized government moved Tele Yemen’s headquarters from Sana’a to Aden in a bid to regain control of the company; until telecom infrastructure can be improved across Yemen, and until civil unrest eases, there will be little progress for the sector; MTN Group in November 2021 completed its exit from the country, having incurred losses for several years, and considered that continuing its presence in this market was no longer worth its while. (2022)" }, "domestic": { "text": "the national network consists of microwave radio relay, cable, tropospheric scatter, GSM and CDMA mobile-cellular telephone systems; fixed-line teledensity remains low by regional standards at roughly 4 per 100 but mobile cellular use expanding at over 55 per 100 (2019)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 967; landing points for the FALCON, SeaMeWe-5, Aden-Djibouti, and the AAE-1 international submarine cable connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2020)" }, "note": "note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress toward 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services" }, "Broadcast media": { "text": "state-run TV with 2 stations; state-run radio with 2 national radio stations and 5 local stations; stations from Oman and Saudi Arabia can be accessed" }, "Internet country code": { "text": ".ye" }, "Internet users": { "total": { "text": "7,873,719 (2019 est.)" }, "percent of population": { "text": "27% (2019 est.)" } }, "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": { "total": { "text": "391,000 (2020 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "1 (2020 est.)" } } }, "Transportation": { "National air transport system": { "number of registered air carriers": { "text": "2 (2020)" }, "inventory of registered aircraft operated by air carriers": { "text": "8" }, "annual passenger traffic on registered air carriers": { "text": "336,310 (2018)" }, "annual freight traffic on registered air carriers": { "text": "3.27 million (2018) mt-km" } }, "Civil aircraft registration country code prefix": { "text": "7O" }, "Airports": { "total": { "text": "57 (2021)" } }, "Airports - with paved runways": { "total": { "text": "17" }, "over 3,047 m": { "text": "4" }, "2,438 to 3,047 m": { "text": "9" }, "1,524 to 2,437 m": { "text": "3" }, "914 to 1,523 m": { "text": "1 (2021)" } }, "Airports - with unpaved runways": { "total": { "text": "40" }, "over 3,047 m": { "text": "3" }, "2,438 to 3,047 m": { "text": "5" }, "1,524 to 2,437 m": { "text": "7" }, "914 to 1,523 m": { "text": "16" }, "under 914 m": { "text": "9 (2021)" } }, "Pipelines": { "text": "641 km gas, 22 km liquid petroleum gas, 1,370 km oil (2013)" }, "Roadways": { "total": { "text": "71,300 km (2005)" }, "paved": { "text": "6,200 km (2005)" }, "unpaved": { "text": "65,100 km (2005)" } }, "Merchant marine": { "total": { "text": "34" }, "by type": { "text": "general cargo 2, oil tanker 4, other 28 (2021)" } }, "Ports and terminals": { "major seaport(s)": { "text": "Aden, Al Hudaydah, Al Mukalla" } } }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces; Ministry of Defense: Yemeni National Army, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (includes Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades, which are under the Ministry of Defense but responsible to the president), Popular Committee Forces (government-backed tribal militia); Ministry of Interior: Special Security Forces (paramilitary; formerly known as Central Security Forces), Political Security Organization (state security), National Security Bureau (intelligence), Counterterrorism Unitprior to the start of the civil war in 2014, annual military expenditures were approximately 4-5% of Yemen's GDP
" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { "text": "information limited and widely varied; Yemen Government: up to 300,000 estimated military, paramilitary, militia, and other security forces; UAE- and Saudi-backed forces: estimated 150-200,000 trained militia and paramilitary fighters; Huthis: up to 200,000 estimated fighters (2021)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since the start of the civil war in 2014, it has received limited amounts of donated equipment from some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and UAEthe Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued Maritime Advisory 2022-003 (Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean-Violence Due to Regional Conflict and Piracy) effective 28 February 2022, which states in part the \"Conflict in Yemen continues to pose potential risk to US flagged commercial vessels transiting the southern Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden. Threats may come from a variety of different sources including, but not limited to, missiles, rockets, projectiles, mines, small arms, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vessels, or waterborne improvised explosive devices. These threat vectors continue to pose a direct or collateral risk to US flagged commercial vessels operating in the region. Additionally, piracy poses a threat in the Gulf of Aden, Western Arabian Sea, and Western Indian Ocean.\"
" } }, "Terrorism": { "Terrorist group(s)": { "text": "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Yemen; al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)", "note": "note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T" } }, "Transnational Issues": { "Disputes - international": { "text": "Yemen-Oman: none identified
Yemen-Saudia Arabia: in 2004, Saudi Arabia reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities, including militants and arms; in 2013 and 2015, Saudi Arabia again erected fences
" }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { "text": "69,785 (Somalia), 18,687 (Ethiopia) (2022)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "4,288,739 (conflict in Sa'ada Governorate; clashes between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and government forces) (2022)" } } } }