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auto-update week 46
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@ -427,7 +427,7 @@
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},
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"Air pollutants": {
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"particulate matter emissions": {
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"text": "27.95 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
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"text": "27.16 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
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},
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"carbon dioxide emissions": {
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"text": "34.69 megatons (2016 est.)"
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@ -1245,9 +1245,6 @@
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "the Angolan Armed Forces were created in 1991 under the Bicesse Accords signed between the Angolan Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); the current force is responsible for country’s external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities, including border protection, expulsion of irregular migrants, and small-scale counterinsurgency operations against groups like the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda separatists in Cabinda; the Army is one of the largest in the region with six infantry divisions spread amongst six military regions; it is also one of the better equipped, with a significant portion of its units being motorized and supported by approximately 300 Soviet-era tanks, largely acquired in the 1980s and 1990s; the Air Force is also one of the largest and best equipped in the region with a fleet of approximately 100 combat aircraft, plus a substantial inventory of transport aircraft and helicopter gunships; while naval modernization has received more attention in recent years, the Navy remains a small force of fast attack and coastal patrol craft (2023)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Angola are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, five attacks against commercial vessels were reported, an increase from the four attacks in 2021; most of these occurred in the main port of Luanda while ships were berthed or at anchor"
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}
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},
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"Space": {
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@ -453,7 +453,7 @@
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},
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"Air pollutants": {
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"particulate matter emissions": {
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"text": "33.11 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
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"text": "31.51 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
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},
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"carbon dioxide emissions": {
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"text": "6.48 megatons (2016 est.)"
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@ -1227,9 +1227,6 @@
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "a key focus for the security forces of Benin is countering infiltrations into the country by terrorist groups tied to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) operating just over the border from northern Benin in Burkina Faso and Niger; in May 2022, the Benin Government said it was \"at war\" after suffering a series of attacks from these groups; later that same year, President TALON said his government would spend more than $130 million to recruit up to 4,000 additional military personnel, modernize military equipment, and build and fortify operating bases; in addition, the FAB participates in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) along with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeastern border <br><br>the FAB has a close working relationship with the Belgian armed forces; the Belgians offer military advice, training, and second-hand equipment donations, and deploy to Benin for limited military exercises (2023)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the waters off Benin; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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@ -1278,9 +1278,6 @@
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>the FARDC’s primary focus is internal security; while the FARDC is large on paper, with an estimated 18 operational infantry brigades, it struggles to provide security in large portions of the country; the FARDC is widely assessed to suffer from insufficient training, low equipment readiness, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline, and widespread corruption; it was created out of the armed factions of the Congo wars that ended in 2003, incorporating various militia, paramilitary, and rebel formations; the DRC’s most effective military force, the Republican Guard, is overseen by the office of the presidency rather than the FARDC and focuses largely on protecting the president and government institutions and enforcing internal security</p> <p>the FARDC is actively conducting operations against a variety of illegal armed groups (IOGs) operating in the DRC, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, where more than 15 significant and cohesive IOGs operate; there is also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; some estimates place over 100 IOGs operating in the country, including organized militias, such as the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renewal (NDC-R), which controls a large portion of North Kivu; Mai Mai groups (local militias that operate variously as self-defense networks and criminal rackets); and foreign-origin groups seeking safe haven and resources, such as the Ugandan-origin Allied Democratic Forces (ADF; aka Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the DRC), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), multiple groups originating from Burundi, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and the March 23 Movement (aka M23 or Congolese Revolutionary Army), which the DRC has accused Rwanda of backing; the FARDC has been accused of collaborating with some IOGs, such as the NDC-R; in 2023, the East Africa Community deployed a regional force to oversee the withdrawal of the M23 rebel group from the country; countries sending troops included Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan</p> the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of 2023, MONUSCO had over 14,000 personnel assigned, but it was drawing down its forces towards a complete withdrawal at the request of the DRC Government; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; three infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2023)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2022, the same number of attacks as in 2021; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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@ -1295,7 +1292,7 @@
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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"text": "211,882 (Central African Republic), 208,328 (Rwanda), 53,164 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 43,250 (Burundi) (2023)"
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"text": "211,963 (Central African Republic), 208,328 (Rwanda), 53,194 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 436,272 (Burundi) (2023)"
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},
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"IDPs": {
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"text": "6.38 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2023)"
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@ -1281,9 +1281,6 @@
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "the FAC is a professional and politically independent military; the Army and the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) are organized and equipped for mobile operations; the Army has 4 motorized infantry brigades spread amongst 5 military regions; the US-trained, 5,000-man BIR has up to 9 battalions, detachments, or groups consisting of airborne, air mobile, amphibious, light, and motorized infantry, armored reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and support units, such as artillery and intelligence; the BIR reportedly receives better training, equipment, and pay than regular Army units<br><br>the ground forces are largely focused on internal security, particularly the threat from the terrorist groups Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of 2023, this conflict had left more than 3,500 civilians dead and over 500,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deploys ground units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits; the Navy’s missions include protecting Cameroon’s oil installations, combatting crime and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and patrolling the country’s lakes and rivers; the Air Force supports both the ground and naval forces and has small numbers of light ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft, as well as attack, multipurpose, and transport helicopters (2023)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports incidents appear to have stopped in the territorial and offshore waters of Cameroon; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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@ -586,7 +586,7 @@
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"text": "last held in December 2020 through July 2021 (next to be held 31 December 2025); note - on 27 December 2020, the day of first round elections, voting in many electoral areas was disrupted by armed groups; on 13 February 2021, President TOUADERA announced that new first round elections would be held on 27 February for those areas controlled by armed groups and the second round on 14 March; ultimately, two additional rounds were held on 23 May and 25 July 2021 in areas that continued to suffer from election security problems"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "December 2020 to July 2021 election: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - MCU 63, MOUNI 9, URCA 7, MLPC 7, RDC 5, KNK 3, PATRIE 3, CDE 2, RDD 2, MDD 2, PGD 2, PAD 2, CANE 2, other 11, independents 20; composition as of March 2022 - men 122, women 18, percent of women 12.9%"
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"text": "December 2020 to July 2021 election: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - MCU 63, MOUNI 9, URCA 7, MLPC 7, RDC 5, KNK 3, PATRIE 3, CDE 2, RDD 2, MDD 2, PGD 2, PAD 2, CANE 2, other 11, independents 20; composition as of March 2022 - men 122, women 18, percent of women 12.9%; note - several members of other parties and independent candidates joined the MCU following the opening session of the National Assembly; as of 21 September 2021, the MCU held 86 seats"
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}
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},
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"Judicial branch": {
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}
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},
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"Political parties and leaders": {
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"text": "Action Party for Development or PAD<br>African Party for Radical Transformation and Integration of States or PATRIE [Crepin MBOLI-GOUMBA]<br>Alliance for Democracy and Progress or ADP<br>Be Africa ti e Kwe (also known as Central Africa for Us All or BTK)<br>Central African Democratic Rally or RDC [Desire KOLINGBA]<br>Central African Party for Integrated Development or PCDI<br>Democratic Movement for the Renewal and Evolution of Central Africa or MDREC<br>Kodro Ti Mo Kozo Si Movement or MKMKS<br>Movement for Democracy and Development or MDD<br>Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People or MLPC [Martin ZIGUELE]<br>National Convergence (also known as Kwa Na Kwa or KNK) [Francois BOZIZE]<br>National Movement of Independents or MOUNI <br>National Union for Democracy and Progress or UNDP [Michel AMINE]<br>National Union of Republican Democrats or UNADER<br>New Impetus for Central Africa or CANE<br>Party for Democracy and Solidarity - Kelemba or KPDS<br>Party for Democratic Governance or PGD<br>Path of Hope or CDE [Karim MECKASSOUA]<br>Renaissance for Sustainable Development or RDD<br>Socialist Party or PS<br>Transformation Through Action Initiative or ITA<br>Union for Central African Renewal or URCA [Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE]<br>Union for Renaissance and Development or URD<br>United Hearts Movement or MCU [Faustin-Archange TOUADERA]<br><br><strong>note:</strong> only parties with seats in the Parliament included<strong><br></strong>"
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"text": "Action Party for Development or PAD<br>African Party for Radical Transformation and Integration of States or PATRIE [Crepin MBOLI-GOUMBA]<br>Alliance for Democracy and Progress or ADP<br>Be Africa ti e Kwe (also known as Central Africa for Us All or BTK)<br>Central African Democratic Rally or RDC<br>Central African Party for Integrated Development or PCDI<br>Democratic Movement for the Renewal and Evolution of Central Africa or MDREC<br>Kodro Ti Mo Kozo Si Movement or MKMKS<br>Movement for Democracy and Development or MDD [Louis PAPÉNIAH]<br>Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People or MLPC [Martin ZIGUÉLÉ]<br>National Convergence (also known as Kwa Na Kwa or KNK) [Christian GUÉNÉBEM-DEDIZOUM]<br>National Movement of Independents or MOUNI <br>National Union for Democracy and Progress or UNDP [Michel AMINE]<br>National Union of Republican Democrats or UNADER<br>New Impetus for Central Africa or CANE<br>Party for Democracy and Solidarity - Kélémba or KPDS<br>Party for Democratic Governance or PGD<br>Path of Hope or CDE [Karim MECKASSOUA]<br>Renaissance for Sustainable Development or RDD<br>Socialist Party or PS<br>Transformation Through Action Initiative or ITA<br>Union for Central African Renewal or URCA [Anicet-Georges DOLOGUÉLÉ]<br>Union for Renaissance and Development or URD<br>United Hearts Movement or MCU [Faustin-Archange TOUADÉRA]<br><br><strong>note:</strong> only parties with seats in the Parliament included<strong><br></strong>"
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},
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"International organization participation": {
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"text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, BDEAC, CEMAC, EITI (compliant country) (suspended), FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LCBC, MIGA, NAM, OIC (observer), OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "Djibouti's military forces are largely focused on border, coastal, and internal security duties, including counterterrorism; China, France, Italy, Japan, and the US maintain bases in Djibouti for regional military missions, including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, crisis response, and security assistance (note – France has multiple bases and hosts troop contingents from Germany and Spain); the EU and NATO also maintain a presence to support multinational naval counter-piracy operations and maritime training efforts (2023)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) reported no piracy attacks for the Horn of Africa in 2022; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warned that Somali pirates continued to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warned that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\""
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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"Disputes - international": {
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"text": "<p><em>Djibouti-Somalia:</em> Djibouti maintains economic ties and border accords with \"Somaliland\" leadership while maintaining some political ties to various factions in Somalia;</p> <p><em>Djibouti-Eritrea:</em> in 2008, Eritrean troops moved across the border on Ras Doumera peninsula and occupied Doumera Island with undefined sovereignty in the Red Sea; the Eritrean occupation of remote Doumeira Island and portions peninsula persists unabated as of September 2009; porous boundary over largely uninhabited areas provides access for smuggling and other illegal activities; as of 7 June 2010, Qatar was mediating Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute, </p> <p><em>Djibouti-Ethiopia:</em> While Djibouti has had significant issues along its border with neighbors such as Somalia and Eritrea, the Ethiopia-Djibouti relationship has been relatively harmonious; diplomatic relations between the two countries were initially established in 1984; historically, there is co-ownership of the Addis Ababa-Djibout railways and acts as a symbol of the healthy bi-lateral partnership between both Ethiopia and Djibouti; in 1991 a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed by the two countries; Ethiopia uses the Port of Djibouti as a major hub for export and import of goods since 1998; after establishing independence, there have been no major disputes along this border.</p>"
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"text": "<p><em>Djibouti-Somalia:</em> Djibouti maintains economic ties and border accords with \"Somaliland\" leadership while maintaining some political ties to various factions in Somalia</p> <p><em>Djibouti-Eritrea:</em> in 2008, Eritrean troops moved across the border on Ras Doumera peninsula and occupied Doumera Island with undefined sovereignty in the Red Sea, sparking a brief conflict; Qatar mediated and provided peacekeepers until 2017; Djibouti accused Eritrea of reoccupying the area in 2017 after Qatari troops were withdrawn; Djibouti and Eritrea agreed to normalize relations in 2018</p> <p><em>Djibouti-Ethiopia:</em> the Ethiopia-Djibouti relationship has been relatively harmonious, and there have been no major disputes along their shared border</p>"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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},
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"Air pollutants": {
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"particulate matter emissions": {
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"text": "79.28 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
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"text": "63.16 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
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},
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"carbon dioxide emissions": {
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"text": "238.56 megatons (2016 est.)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) are responsible for external defense but also have an internal role assisting police and paramilitary security forces during emergencies and in anti-terrorism operations; the EAF also participates in foreign peacekeeping and other security missions, as well as both bilateral and multinational exercises; the military has considerable political power and independence; it has long had a crucial role in Egypt’s politics and has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded<br><br>key areas of concern for the EAF include Islamic militant groups operating out of the Sinai Peninsula, regional challenges such as instability in Libya and Yemen, and maritime security; since 2011, the EAF has been conducting operations alongside other security forces in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; since 2014, it has deployed large numbers of troops along its border with Libya and provided air support to the Saudi-led coalition operating in Yemen; the Navy in recent years has sought to modernize and expand its capabilities and profile in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, including the acquisition of helicopter carriers, modern frigates, and attack submarines; in 2020, the EAF inaugurated a large joint service military base on the Red Sea to secure the country’s southern coasts, protect economic investments and natural resources, and confront security challenges in the Red Sea region<br><br>the EAF is the largest and one of the best equipped militaries in the region; the Army’s primary combat forces include approximately 13 divisions, which are mostly armored or mechanized, complemented by some independent armored and infantry brigades; the EAF has approximately 5,000 artillery systems, plus surface-to-surface missile forces and a large special operations command, which includes airborne, airmobile, commando, special forces, and other specialized units; the Navy’s principal warships are approximately 20 frigates and corvettes, 8 attack submarines, and 2 French-built helicopter-capable amphibious assault ships (LHDs); the Air Force has more than 300 French-, Russian-, and US-made fighter and multipurpose fighter aircraft, as well as nearly 100 US- and Russian-produced attack helicopters<br><br>Egypt is a major security partner of the US and one of the largest recipients of US military aid in the region; it also has Major Non-NATO Ally status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation<br><br>the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; ait is composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US are the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2023)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Egypt are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, one attempted attack against a commercial vessel was reported, this was the first incident reported in four years; the reported incident occurred in port while the ship was anchored"
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}
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},
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"Space": {
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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"Disputes - international": {
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"text": "<p>Sudan claims but Egypt de facto administers security and economic development of Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary; Egypt no longer shows its administration of the Bir Tawil trapezoid in Sudan on its maps; Gazan breaches in the security wall with Egypt in January 2008 highlight difficulties in monitoring the Sinai border</p>"
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"text": "<em>Egypt-Gaza Strip:</em> constructed a barrier and established a buffer zone on its border with Gaza to halt the passage of weapons and militants through cross-border smuggling tunnels and pressure the Palestinian HAMAS terrorist group that runs the Gaza Strip<br><br><em>Egypt-Ethiopia</em>: Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile in northern Ethiopia since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; Egypt has described the giant hydroelectric project as an existential threat because of its potential to control the flow of the river that is a key source of water for the country; Ethiopia completed filling the dam in 2023"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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"text": "70,021 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 52,446 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,970 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 21,105 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,585 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,025 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,815 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,802 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022); 310,000 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 150,465 (Syria) (2023)"
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"text": "70,021 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 52,446 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,970 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 21,105 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,585 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,025 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,815 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,802 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022); 310,000 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 151,721 (Syria) (2023)"
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},
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"stateless persons": {
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"text": "10 (2022)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "the FAGE’s National Guard (Army) has only three small infantry battalions with limited combat capabilities; the country has invested heavily in naval capabilities in recent years to protect its oil installations and combat piracy and crime in the Gulf of Guinea; while the Navy was small, its inventory includes a light frigate and a corvette, as well as several off-shore patrol boats; the Air Force has only a few operational combat aircraft and ground attack-capable helicopters (2023)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported two incidents in the offshore waters of Equatorial Guinea in 2022; one incident involved a boarding and kidnapping and the other where a ship was fired upon; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea”"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Equatorial Guinea-Cameroon: </em>in 2002, ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but a dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River and imprecisely defined maritime coordinates in the ICJ decision delayed final delimitation</p> <p><em>Equatorial Guinea-Gabon:</em> UN urged Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to resolve the sovereignty dispute over Gabon-occupied Mbane and lesser islands and to create a maritime boundary in the hydrocarbon-rich Corisco Bay</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Equatorial Guinea-Cameroon: </em>in 2002, ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but a dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River and imprecisely defined maritime coordinates in the ICJ decision delayed final delimitation</p> <p><em>Equatorial Guinea-Gabon:</em> dispute over Mbane Island and lesser islands in the Corisco Bay submitted to ICJ in 2016</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"tier rating": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The area that is modern-day Ethiopia is rich in cultural and religious diversity with more than 80 ethnic groups. The oldest hominid yet found comes from Ethiopia, and Ethiopia was the second country to officially adopt Christianity in the 4th century A.D. A series of monarchies ruled the area that is now Ethiopia from 980 B.C. to 1855, when the Amhara kingdoms of northern Ethiopia united in an empire under Tewodros II. Many Ethiopians still speak reverently about the Battle of Adwa in 1896, when they defeated Italian forces and thus retained their freedom from colonial rule. Emperor Haile SELASSIE became an internationally renowned figure in 1935, when he unsuccessfully appealed to the League of Nations to prevent Italy from occupying Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941. SELASSIE survived an attempted coup in 1960, annexed modern-day Eritrea in 1962, and played a leading role in establishing the Organization of African Unity in 1963. However, in 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed him and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, drought, and massive displacement, the Derg regime was toppled in 1991 by a coalition of opposing forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF became an ethno-federalist political coalition that ruled Ethiopia from 1991 until its dissolution in 2019. Ethiopia adopted its constitution in 1994 and held its first multiparty elections in 1995. A two-and-a-half-year border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. Ethiopia subsequently rejected the 2007 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission demarcation. This intransigence resulted in more than a decade of a tense “no peace, no war” stalemate between the two countries.<br><br>In 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office the same year as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In 2018, ABIY promoted a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement and a reopening of their shared border. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition, the EPRDF, merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party; however, the lead coalition party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), declined to join. In November 2020, a military conflict erupted between forces aligned with the TPLF and the Ethiopian military. The conflict - which was marked by atrocities committed by all parties - ended in November 2022 with a cessation of hostilities agreement between the Tigrayan leaders and the Ethiopian Government. However, Ethiopia continues to experience ethnic-based violence as other groups - including the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and Amhara militias - seek concessions from the Ethiopian Government.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The area that is modern-day Ethiopia is rich in cultural and religious diversity with more than 80 ethnic groups. The oldest hominid yet found comes from Ethiopia, and Ethiopia was the second country to officially adopt Christianity in the 4th century A.D. A series of monarchies ruled the area that is now Ethiopia from 980 B.C. to 1855, when the Amhara kingdoms of northern Ethiopia united in an empire under Tewodros II. Many Ethiopians still speak reverently about the Battle of Adwa in 1896, when they defeated Italian forces and thus retained their freedom from colonial rule. <br><br>Emperor Haile SELASSIE became an internationally renowned figure in 1935, when he unsuccessfully appealed to the League of Nations to prevent Italy from occupying Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941. SELASSIE survived an attempted coup in 1960, annexed modern-day Eritrea in 1962, and played a leading role in establishing the Organization of African Unity in 1963. However, in 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed him and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, drought, and massive displacement, the Derg regime was toppled in 1991 by a coalition of opposing forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF became an ethno-federalist political coalition that ruled Ethiopia from 1991 until its dissolution in 2019. Ethiopia adopted its constitution in 1994 and held its first multiparty elections in 1995. <br><br>A two-and-a-half-year border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. Ethiopia subsequently rejected the 2007 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission demarcation. This intransigence resulted in more than a decade of a tense “no peace, no war” stalemate between the two countries. In 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office the same year as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In 2018, ABIY promoted a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement and a reopening of their shared border. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition, the EPRDF, merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party; however, the lead coalition party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), declined to join. In November 2020, a military conflict erupted between forces aligned with the TPLF and the Ethiopian military. The conflict - which was marked by atrocities committed by all parties - ended in November 2022 with a cessation of hostilities agreement between the Tigrayan leaders and the Ethiopian Government. However, Ethiopia continues to experience ethnic-based violence as other groups - including the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and Amhara militias - seek concessions from the Ethiopian Government.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
"text": "Oromo (official working language of the State of Oromia Regional State) 33.8%, Amharic (official national language) 29.3%, Somali (official working language of Somali Regional State) 6.2%, Tigrigna (Tigrinya) (official working language of the Tigray Regional State) 5.9%, Sidamo 4%, Wolaytta 2.2%, Gurage 2%, Afar (official working language of the Afar Regional State) 1.7%, Hadiyya 1.7%, Gamo 1.5%, Gedeo 1.3%, Opuuo 1.2%, Kafa 1.1%, other 8.1%, English (major foreign language taught in schools), Arabic (2007 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "Oromo (official working language of Oromia Regional State) 33.8%, Amharic (official national language) 29.3%, Somali (official working language of Somali Regional State) 6.2%, Tigrigna (Tigrinya) (official working language of Tigray Regional State) 5.9%, Sidamo 4%, Wolaytta 2.2%, Gurage 2%, Afar (official working language of Afar Regional State) 1.7%, Hadiyya 1.7%, Gamo 1.5%, Gedeo 1.3%, Opuuo 1.2%, Kafa 1.1%, other 8.1%, English (major foreign language taught in schools), Arabic (2007 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"major-language sample(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "<br>Kitaaba Addunyaa Waan Qabataamaatiif - Kan Madda Odeeffannoo bu’uraawaatiif baay’ee barbaachisaa ta’e. (Oromo)<br><br>የአለም እውነታ መጽሐፍ፣ ለመሠረታዊ መረጃ እጅግ አስፈላጊ የሆነ ምንጭ። (Amharic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
|
|
@ -560,7 +560,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Administrative divisions": {
|
||||
"text": "11 ethnically based regional states (kililoch, singular - kilil) and 2 chartered cities* (astedader akabibiwach, singular - astedader akabibi); Adis Abeba* (Addis Ababa), Afar, Amara (Amhara), Binshangul Gumuz, Dire Dawa*, Gambela Hizboch (Gambela Peoples), Hareri Hizb (Harari People), Oromiya (Oromia), Sidama, Sumale (Somali), Tigray, YeDebub Biheroch Bihereseboch na Hizboch (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples), YeDebub M'irab Ityop'iya Hizboch (Southwest Ethiopia Peoples)"
|
||||
"text": "12 ethnically based regional states (kililoch, singular - kilil) and 2 chartered cities* (astedader akabibiwach, singular - astedader akabibi); Adis Abeba* (Addis Ababa), Afar, Amara (Amhara), Binshangul Gumuz, Dire Dawa*, Gambela Hizboch (Gambela), Hareri Hizb (Harari), Oromia, Sidama, Somali, Tigray, YeDebub Biheroch Bihereseboch na Hizboch (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples), YeDebub M'irab Ityop'iya Hizboch (Southwest Ethiopia Peoples), Southern Ethiopia Peoples"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Independence": {
|
||||
"text": "oldest independent country in Africa and one of the oldest in the world - at least 2,000 years (may be traced to the Aksumite Kingdom, which coalesced in the first century B.C.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -604,7 +604,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "President SAHLE-WORK Zewde (since 25 October 2018)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"head of government": {
|
||||
"text": "Prime Minister ABIY Ahmed Ali (since April 2018); Deputy Prime Minister DEMEKE Mekonnen Hassen (since 29 November 2012)"
|
||||
"text": "Prime Minister ABIY Ahmed Ali (since April 2018); Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs DEMEKE Mekonnen Hassen (since 29 November 2012)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cabinet": {
|
||||
"text": "Council of Ministers selected by the prime minister and approved by the House of People's Representatives"
|
||||
|
|
@ -645,7 +645,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Ethiopia has over fifty national-level and regional-level political parties. The ruling party, the Prosperity Party, was created by Prime Minister ABIY in November 2019 from member parties of the former Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM), plus other EPRDF-allied parties such as the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), Benishangul Gumuz People’s Democratic Party (BGPDP), Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), and the Harari National League (HNL). Once the Prosperity Party was created, the various ethnically-based parties that comprised or were affiliated with the EPRDF were subsequently disbanded; in January 2021, the Ethiopian electoral board de-registered the Tigray People’s Liberation Front or TPLF; national level parties are qualified to register candidates in multiple regions across Ethiopia; regional parties can register candidates for both national and regional parliaments, but only in one region of Ethiopia"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ACP, AfDB, ATMIS, AU, COMESA, EITI, FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNOOSA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
|
||||
"text": "ACP, AfDB, ATMIS, AU, COMESA, EITI, FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNOOSA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (accession candidate)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1292,11 +1292,11 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Ethiopia-Eritrea:</em> Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to abide by the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) delimitation decision, but neither party responded to the revised line detailed in the November 2006 EEBC Demarcation Statement <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Somalia:</em> While border clashes continue in the al-Fashqa (Fashaga) area, the US views the 1902 boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan as being in force; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; \"Somaliland\" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera and trade ties to landlocked Ethiopia; <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Sudan:</em> Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; as of 2020, four years of three-way talks between the three capitals over operating the dam and filling its reservoir had made little progress; Ethiopia began filling the dam in July 2020; civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Ethiopia-Eritrea:</em> Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to abide by the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) delimitation decision, but neither party responded to the revised line detailed in the November 2006 EEBC Demarcation Statement <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Somalia:</em> While border clashes continue in the al-Fashqa (Fashaga) area, the US views the 1902 boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan as being in force; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; \"Somaliland\" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera and trade ties to landlocked Ethiopia; <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Sudan:</em> Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile in northern Ethiopia since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; Egypt has described the giant hydroelectric project as an existential threat because of its potential to control the flow of the river that is a key source of water for the country; Ethiopia completed filling the dam in 2023</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "417,419 (South Sudan), 302,195 (Somalia), 167,391 (Eritrea), 25,463 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023) (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "417,478 (South Sudan), 308,068 (Somalia), 167,391 (Eritrea), 25,463 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023) (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "4.385 million (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2023)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -451,7 +451,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "32.2 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "39.1 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "0.53 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service (18-22 for officers); no conscription; service obligation six months (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the Gambian security forces have a history of involvement in domestic politics, including multiple coups attempts and mutinies, with the latest being an attempted coup in 2022; since 2017, Gambia’s security sector has been undergoing reforms as part of a national reconstruction effort to recover from the 22 years of Yahya JAMMEH’s autocratic rule under which the security forces were severely under-resourced in terms of finances and equipment and were largely directed towards regime protection and suppressing dissent; international partners, including member states of the EU, particularly France and Germany, Turkey, and the US have provided support to military and police reforms; several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also provided security forces for stability, as well as assistance and training through the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG); as of 2023, ECOMIG continued to provide about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal<br><br>the GAF is a lightly armed force with about 5 small infantry battalions, a handful of coastal patrol boats, and a few aircraft; in addition to external defense, the responsibilities of the GAF include providing maritime security, countering human trafficking, aiding civil authorities in emergencies and natural disaster relief, and engaging in activities such as engineering, education, health, and agriculture for domestic socio-economic development; the GAF also participates in peacekeeping missions, and since its first deployments in the 1990s, has been involved in more than 10 UN peacekeeping missions while contributing about 4,000 total troops <br><br>the GAF traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the GAF in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of troops from both countries (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "the Gambian security forces have a history of involvement in domestic politics, including multiple coups attempts and mutinies, with the latest being an attempted coup in 2022; since 2017, Gambia’s security sector has been undergoing reforms as part of a national reconstruction effort to recover from the 22 years of Yahya JAMMEH’s autocratic rule under which the security forces were severely under-resourced in terms of finances and equipment and were largely directed towards regime protection and suppressing dissent; international partners, including member states of the EU, particularly France and Germany, Turkey, and the US have provided support to military and police reforms; several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also provided security forces for stability, as well as assistance and training through the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG); as of 2023, ECOMIG continued to provide about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal<br><br>the GAF is a lightly armed force with about five small infantry battalions, a handful of coastal patrol boats, and a few aircraft; in addition to external defense, the responsibilities of the GAF include providing maritime security, countering human trafficking, aiding civil authorities in emergencies and natural disaster relief, and engaging in activities such as engineering, education, health, and agriculture for domestic socio-economic development; the GAF also participates in peacekeeping missions, and since its first deployments in the 1990s, has been involved in more than 10 UN peacekeeping missions while contributing about 4,000 total troops <br><br>the GAF traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the GAF in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of troops from both countries (2023)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -422,7 +422,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "38.51 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "26.29 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "5.32 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -543,7 +543,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "formerly the Council of Ministers, appointed by the prime minister in consultation with the president"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "formerly, the president directly elected by plurality vote for a 5-year term (no term limits); election last held on 26 August 2023; prime minister appointed by the president; note - on 30 August 2023, Gen. Brice OLIGUI Nguema led a military group called Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions in a coup in which President Ali BONGO Ondimba was arrested and detained, election results were canceled, and state institutions dissolved; on 4 September 2023, OLIGUI was sworn in as transitional president"
|
||||
"text": "formerly, the president directly elected by plurality vote for a 5-year term (no term limits); election last held on 26 August 2023; prime minister appointed by the president; note - on 30 August 2023, Gen. Brice OLIGUI Nguema led a military group called Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions in a coup in which President Ali BONGO Ondimba was arrested and detained, election results were canceled, and state institutions dissolved; on 4 September 2023, OLIGUI was sworn in as transitional president; a general election is planned for August 2025"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<em><br>2016: </em>Ali BONGO Ondimba reelected president; percent of vote - Ali BONGO Ondimba (PDG) 49.8%, Jean PING (UFC) 48.2%, other 2.0%<br><br><em>2009: </em>Ali BONGO Ondimba elected president; percent of vote - Ali BONGO Ondimba (PDG) 41.7%, Andre MBA OBAME (independent) 25.9%, Pierre MAMBOUNDOU (UPG) 25.2%, Zacharie MYBOTO (UGDD) 3.9%, other 3.3% <p> </p>"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1190,9 +1190,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the Gabonese military is a small and lightly-armed force that is responsible for both external and internal security; in August 2023, it seized control of the government in a coup; some members of the military attempted a failed coup in 2019; the Army’s core forces are the Republican Guard and an airborne infantry battalion, which are supported by several small regionally-based infantry units; the Gendarmerie has regionally-based “legions,” as well as mobile forces, a national parks security unit, and a special intervention group; the Air Force has a small number of older French-made fighter aircraft and some combat helicopters, also mostly of French origin; the Navy has a small force of patrol boats (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the waters off Gabon; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Space": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1206,7 +1203,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>UN urges Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to resolve the sovereignty dispute over Gabon-occupied Mbane Island and lesser islands and to establish a maritime boundary in hydrocarbon-rich Corisco Bay</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>dispute with Equatorial Guinea over Mbane Island and lesser islands in the Corisco Bay submitted to ICJ in 2016</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"tier rating": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -463,7 +463,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "31.95 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "46.04 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "16.67 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1247,9 +1247,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the military’s primary missions are border defense, assisting with internal security, peacekeeping, and protecting the country’s territorial waters, particularly its offshore oil and gas infrastructure; it has benefited from cooperation with foreign partners, such as the UK and the US, and experience gained from participation in multiple international peacekeeping missions; the government in recent years has committed to an increase in funding for equipment acquisitions, including armor, mechanized, and special forces capabilities for the Army, light attack aircraft for the Air Force, and more modern coastal patrol vessels for the Navy; the Army’s primary combat forces include several battalions of light infantry, a motorized rapid reaction/presidential guard battalion, and small regiments of light armored reconnaissance and special forces; the Navy has 2 ocean-going patrol vessels, several coastal patrol craft, and a special forces unit, while the Air Force operates a few ground attack aircraft and multipurpose helicopters<br> <br>in 2022, Ghana began beefing up its military presence in the north of the country against threats from the terrorist organization Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, which has conducted attacks in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo; Ghana’s northern frontier with Burkina Faso is also an area with well-established smuggling routes, porous borders, and illegal gold mining; Ghana has also pushed an initiative to bolster security cooperation and intelligence sharing among Gulf of Guinea neighbors and Sahel countries <br><br>the military traces its origins to the Gold Coast Constabulary that was established in 1879 and renamed the Gold Coast Regiment in 1901; the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast Regiment formed the basis for the new Ghanaian Army (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported seven incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Ghana in 2022, which was an increase over the five incidents reported in 2021; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents include vessels that were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Space": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1263,7 +1260,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>disputed maritime border between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire</p>"
|
||||
"text": "disputed maritime border with Cote d'Ivoire was resolved in 2017 through a decision of a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Ghana is a transit and destination point for illicit drugs trafficked from Asia and South America to other African countries, Europe, and to a lesser extent North America; not a significant source for drugs entering the United States; limited local consumption of controlled pharmaceuticals, cocaine, and heroin from Asia and South America; cannabis cultivated and produced in large quantities in most rural areas of Ghana </p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -451,7 +451,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "22.43 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "37.57 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "3 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1209,14 +1209,11 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the Guinean military is a small and lightly armed force that is responsible for external defense, but also has some domestic security responsibilities and has historically been involved in suppressing public protests; the military has undergone some attempts at reform since 2010, but in 2021 the Army’s special forces led a successful coup; the Army has a mix of approximately 10 infantry, light armor, commando, and special forces battalions, as well as a presidential guard force; piracy and natural resource protection in the Gulf of Guinea are key areas of concern for the small Navy, which possesses only a few patrol boats; the Air Force has a handful of serviceable aircraft, including helicopter gunships (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Guinea in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Sierra Leone considers Guinea's definition of the flood plain limits to define the left bank boundary of the Makona and Moa Rivers excessive and protests Guinea's continued occupation of these lands, including the hamlet of Yenga, occupied since 1998</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<em>Guinea-Liberia: </em>the border is not disputed and there is joint border management, although the border is porous and there have been occasional disputes relating to military encroachments and use of the boundary rivers<br><br><em>Guinea-Mali: </em>the border is not disputed, although there have been periodic clashes between border communities over land rights and access to natural resources"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "NA"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -464,7 +464,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "23.72 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "40.41 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "9.67 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1259,9 +1259,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the military (FACI) was established in 1960 from home defense units the French colonial government began standing up in 1950; the FACI has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; it is responsible for external defense but also has a considerable internal role supporting the National Gendarmerie and other internal security forces; the operational focus of the FACI, as well as the Gendarmerie and other security forces, is the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the FACI’s Land Forces are assigned to regions, and its combat units are organized into approximately 10 battalions, most of which are infantry or security forces, complemented by artillery, armored, and air defense battalions; the separate special forces branch has a commando/paratrooper battalion; the Air Force has a few operational combat helicopters, while the Navy operates a handful of patrol boats and two offshore patrol vessels acquired since 2022; the National Gendarmerie has seven “legions” deployed throughout the country (Abidjan has two assigned legions) and is organized into mobile and territorial forces; the Mobile Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining and restoring order and is considered the backbone of the country’s domestic security; the Territorial Gendarmerie is responsible for the administrative, judicial, and military police; the Gendarmerie also has separate specialized units for security, intervention (counterterrorism, hostage rescue, etc), VIP protection, and surveillance<br><br>Cote d’Ivoire has close security ties with France, which maintains a military presence; the UN had a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one product tanker hijacked and one product tanker boarded in the territorial and offshore waters of Cote d'Ivoire in 2022; in both cases the ship's cargo and valuables were stolen; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Space": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -449,7 +449,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "25.85 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "12.52 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "17.91 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1263,9 +1263,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the KDF is considered to be an experienced, effective, and professional force; it has conducted operations in neighboring Somalia since 2011 and taken part in numerous regional peacekeeping and security missions; it is a leading member of the Africa Standby Force; the KDF trains regularly, participates in multinational exercises, and has ties to a variety of foreign militaries, including those of France, the UK, and the US; its chief security concerns and missions include protecting the country’s sovereignty and territory, regional disputes, the threat posed by the al-Shabaab terrorist group based in neighboring Somalia, maritime crime and piracy, and assisting civil authorities in responding to emergency, disaster, or political unrest as requested <br><br>the Army has 5 combat brigades, including 3 infantry, an armored, and an artillery brigade; it also has a helicopter-equipped air cavalry battalion and a special operations regiment comprised of airborne, special forces, and ranger battalions; the Navy has several offshore patrol vessels, large coastal patrol boats, and missile-armed craft; the Air Force has a small inventory of older US-origin fighter aircraft, as well as some transport aircraft and combat helicopters <br><br>Kenyan military forces intervened in Somalia in October 2011 to combat the al Qaida-affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist group, which had conducted numerous cross-border attacks into Kenya; in November 2011, the UN and the African Union invited Kenya to incorporate its forces into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); Kenyan forces were formally integrated into AMISOM in February 2012; they consist of approximately 3,600 troops and are responsible for AMISOM’s Sector 2 comprising Lower and Middle Jubba (see Appendix T for additional details on al-Shabaab; note - as of May 2022, AMISOM was renamed the AU Transition Mission in Somalia or ATMIS)<br><br>the Kenya Military Forces were created following independence in 1963; the current KDF was established and its composition laid out in the 2010 constitution; it is governed by the Kenya Defense Forces Act of 2012; the Army traces its origins back to the Kings African Rifles (KAR), a British colonial regiment raised from Britain's East Africa possessions from 1902 until independence in the 1960s; the KAR conducted both military and internal security functions within the colonial territories, and served outside the territories during the World Wars (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no piracy attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Kenya in 2022; although the opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents; in the past, vessels have also been targeted off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, as well as in the Indian ocean, and off the west and south coasts of India and west Maldives; generally, Somali pirates tend to be well armed with automatic weapons, RPGs and sometimes use skiffs launched from mother vessels, which may be hijacked fishing vessels or dhows; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\" that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Space": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -555,7 +555,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 6-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 10 October 2017 with a run-off on 26 December 2017 (next to be held on 10 October 2023); the runoff originally scheduled for 7 November 2017 was delayed due to allegations of fraud in the first round, which the Supreme Court dismissed"
|
||||
"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 6-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 10 October 2023 with a run-off on 14 November 2023 "
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "George WEAH elected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - George WEAH (Coalition for Democratic Change) 38.4%, Joseph BOAKAI (UP) 28.8%, Charles BRUMSKINE (LP) 9.6%, Prince JOHNSON (MDR) 8.2%, Alexander B. CUMMINGS (ANC) 7.2%, other 7.8%; percentage of vote in second round - George WEAH 61.5%, Joseph BOAKAI 38.5%"
|
||||
|
|
@ -569,7 +569,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "<p>Senate - general election held on 10 October 2023 with half the seats up for election (next to be held on 9 October 2029)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 10 October 2023 (next to be held 9 October 2029)</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Senate - percent of vote by party - Collaborating Political Parties 43.3%, Congress for Democratic Change 16.6%, People's Unification Party 6.6%, Movement for Democracy and Reconstructions 3.3%, National Democratic Coalition 3.3%, National Patriotic Party 3.3%, Independent 23.3%; seats by coalition/party- CPP 13, CDC 5, PUP 2, MDR 1, NDC 1, NPP 1, Independent 7; composition - men 28, women 2, percent of women 6.7%<br><br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party/coalition - Coalition for Democratic Change 28.7%, Unity Party 27.3%, People's Unification Party 6.8%, Liberty Party 4.1%, Americo Liberian Party 4.1%, Movement for Democracy and Reconstruction 4.1%, Movement for Economic Empowerment 1.3%, Liberia Transformation Party 1.3%, United People's Party 1.3%, Victory for Change Party 1.3%, Liberian People's Party 1.3%, Liberia National Union 1.3%, Independent 17.8%; seats by coalition/party - CDC 21, UP 20, PUP 5, LP 3, ALP 3, MDR 3, MOVEE 1, LTP 1, UPP 1, VCP 1, LPP 1, LNU 1, Independent 13; composition - men 65, women 8, percent of women 11%; total Parliament percent of women 9.7%</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Senate - percent of vote by party - Collaborating Political Parties 43.3%, Congress for Democratic Change 16.6%, People's Unification Party 6.6%, Movement for Democracy and Reconstructions 3.3%, National Democratic Coalition 3.3%, National Patriotic Party 3.3%, Independent 23.3%; seats by coalition/party- CPP 13, CDC 5, PUP 2, MDR 1, NDC 1, NPP 1, Independent 7; composition - men 27, women 3, percent of women 11%<br><br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party/coalition - Coalition for Democratic Change 28.7%, Unity Party 27.3%, People's Unification Party 6.8%, Liberty Party 4.1%, Americo Liberian Party 4.1%, Movement for Democracy and Reconstruction 4.1%, Movement for Economic Empowerment 1.3%, Liberia Transformation Party 1.3%, United People's Party 1.3%, Victory for Change Party 1.3%, Liberian People's Party 1.3%, Liberia National Union 1.3%, Independent 17.8%; seats by coalition/party - CDC 21, UP 20, PUP 5, LP 3, ALP 3, MDR 3, MOVEE 1, LTP 1, UPP 1, VCP 1, LPP 1, LNU 1, Independent 13; composition - men 66, women 7, percent of women 9.5%; total Parliament percent of women 9.7%</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1178,9 +1178,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the AFL is responsible for external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities if called upon, such as humanitarian assistance during natural disasters and support to law enforcement; it is a small, lightly equipped force comprised of 2 combat infantry battalions and supporting units; the infantry battalions were rebuilt with US assistance in 2007-2008 from the restructured AFL following the end of the second civil war in 2003 when military and police forces were disbanded and approximately 100,000 military, police, and rebel combatants were disarmed<br><br>the first militia unit established for defense of the colony was raised in 1832; the AFL traces its origins to the 1908 establishment of the Liberia Frontier Force, which became the Liberian National Guard in 1965; the AFL was established in 1970<br><br>the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in 2003 as a peacekeeping force; at its height, UNMIL was comprised of about 15,000 personnel, including more than 3,000 troops absorbed from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping mission; Liberian forces reassumed full control of the country’s security in June of 2016, and the UNMIL mission was ended in 2018 (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial and offshore waters of Liberia in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -463,7 +463,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "48.73 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "55.64 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "120.37 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1283,9 +1283,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the Nigerian military is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and regarded as one of its most capable forces; the Army is organized into 8 divisions comprised of a diverse mix of more than 20 combat brigades, including airborne infantry, amphibious infantry, armor, artillery, light infantry, mechanized and motorized infantry, and special operations forces; there is also a presidential guard brigade; the Army typically organizes into battalion- and brigade-sized task forces for operations; the Air Force has a few squadrons of fighters, ground attack fighters, armed UAVs, and attack helicopter squadrons primarily for supporting the Army<br><br>the Army and Air Force are focused largely on internal security and face a number of challenges that have stretched their resources; the Army is deployed in all 36 of the country's states; in the northeast, it is conducting counterinsurgency/counterterrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa (ISIS-WA) terrorist groups, where it has deployed as many as 70,000 troops at times and jihadist-related violence has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, since 2009; in the northwest, it faces growing threats from criminal gangs--locally referred to as bandits--and violence associated with long-standing farmer-herder conflicts, as well as BH and ISIS-WA terrorists; bandits in the northwestern Nigeria are estimated to number in the low 10,000s and violence there has killed more than 10,000 people since the mid-2010s; the military also continues to protect the oil industry in the Niger Delta region against militants and criminal activity, although the levels of violence there have decreased in recent years; since 2021, additional troops and security forces have been deployed to eastern Nigeria to quell renewed agitation for a state of Biafra (Biafra seceded from Nigeria in the late 1960s, sparking a civil war that caused more than 1 million deaths)<br><br>meanwhile, the Navy is focused on security in the Gulf of Guinea; since 2016, it has developed a maritime strategy, boosted naval training and its naval presence in the Gulf, increased participation in regional maritime security efforts, and acquired a considerable number of new naval platforms, including offshore and coastal patrol craft, fast attack boats, and air assets; its principal surface ships currently include a frigate and 4 corvettes or offshore patrol ships<br><br>the Nigerian military traces its origins to the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; in 1956, the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) and in 1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over control of the NMF from the British War Office; the Nigerian Armed Forces were established following independence in 1960 (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Nigeria in 2022, down from six attacks in 2021; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Space": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -431,7 +431,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "27.12 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "34.85 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "0.29 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>a longstanding low-grade conflict continues in parts of Casamance, in Senegal across the border; some rebels use Guinea-Bissau as a safe haven</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<em>Guinea-Bissau - Senegal:</em> there are no border disputes and the frontier is relatively stable although some rebels conducting a longstanding low-grade insurgency in the southern Casamance region of Senegal have used Guinea-Bissau as a safe haven"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -453,7 +453,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "23.58 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "19.75 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "476.64 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1300,9 +1300,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the SANDF’s primary responsibilities include territorial and maritime defense, supporting the Police Service, protecting key infrastructure, and participating in international peacekeeping missions; the SANDF traditionally has been one of Africa’s most capable militaries, but in recent years its operational readiness and modernization programs have been hampered by funding shortfalls; it participates regularly in African and UN peacekeeping missions and is a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Standby Force; in 2021, it sent approximately 1,500 troops to Mozambique as part of a multinational SADC force to help combat an insurgency, and South African forces are a key component of the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; in recent years, the SANDF has been deployed internally to assist the Police Service with quelling unrest and to combat trafficking along the border<br><br>the Army in recent years has reorganized, and its combat forces are organized into 4 “modern” brigades, each designed for specific missions and responding to modern-day threats such as “asymmetric” warfare; the new brigades are separated into airborne, light infantry, mechanized, and motorized forces; the Navy operates a mixed force of warships, patrol craft, submarines, and support vessels; its principal combatants are 4 frigates and 3 attack submarines; the Navy also has a maritime rapid reaction squadron that includes naval infantry and combat divers; the Air Force has squadrons of multipurpose fighter, ground attack, and transport aircraft, as well as attack and transport helicopters<br><br>the SANDF was created in 1994 to replace the South African Defense Force (SADF); the SANDF was opened to all South Africans who met military requirements, while the SADF was a mostly white force (only whites were subject to conscription) with non-whites only allowed to join in a voluntary capacity; the SANDF also absorbed members of the guerrilla and militia forces of the various anti-apartheid opposition groups, including the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, as well as the security forces of the formerly independent Bantustan homelands (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of South Africa are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, one attack against a commercial vessel was reported, this was the first such incident reported in four years; in the reported incident the ship was boarded while underway"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Space": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -466,7 +466,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "37.52 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "38.21 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "10.9 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -622,7 +622,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Alliance for Citizenship and Work or ACT [Abdoul MBAYE]<br>Alliance for the Republic-Yakaar or APR [Macky SALL]<br>Alliance of Forces of Progress or AFP [Moustapha NIASSE]<br>And-Jef/African Party for Democracy and Socialism or AJ/PADS [Landing SAVANE]<br>Benno Bokk Yakaar or BBY (United in Hope) [Mahammed DIONNE] (coalition includes AFP, APR, BGC, LD-MPT, PIT, PS, and UNP)<br>Bokk Gis Gis coalition [Pape DIOP]<br>Citizen Movement for National Reform or MCRN-Bes Du Nakk [Mansour Sy DJAMIL]<br>Dare the Future movement [Aissata Tall SALL]<br>Democratic League-Labor Party Movement or LD-MPT [Mamadou NDOYE]<br>Democratic Renaissance Congress [NA]<br>Front for Socialism and Democracy/Benno Jubel or FSD/BJ [Cheikh Abdoulaye Bamba DIEYE]<br>Gainde Centrist Bloc or BCG [Jean-Paul DIAS Mendes]<br>General Alliance for the Interests of the Republic or AGIR [Thierno BOCOUM]<br>Grand Party or GP [Malick GAKOU]<br>Independence and Labor Party or PIT [Maguette THIAM]<br>Jotna Coalition [Dr Abdoulaye Niane]<br>Liberate the People (Yewwi Askan Wi) or YAW [Barthelemy DIAS, Ousmane SONKO, Khalifa SALL]<br>Madicke 2019 coalition [Madicke NIANG]<br>National Union for the People or UNP [Abdoul MBAYE]<br>Only Senegal Movement [Pierre Goudiaby ATEPA]<br>Party for Truth and Development or PVD [Cheikh Ahmadou Kara MBAKE]<br>Party of Unity and Rally or PUR [Cheikh Mouhamadou Moustapha SY]<br>Patriotic Convergence Kaddu Askan Wi or CP-Kaddu Askan Wi [Abdoulaye BALDE]<br>Rewmi Party [Idrissa SECK]<br>Save Senegal (Wallu Senegal Grand Coalition) or WS [Abdoulaye WADE] (coalition includes PDS, Jotna Coalition, Democratic Renaissance Congress)<br>Senegalese Democratic Party or PDS [Abdoulaye WADE]<br>Socialist Party or PS [Ousmane Tanor DIENG]<br>Tekki Movement [Mamadou Lamine DIALLO]"
|
||||
"text": "African Patriots for Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity [Ousmane SONKO]<br>Alliance for Citizenship and Work or ACT [Abdoul MBAYE]<br>Alliance for the Republic-Yakaar or APR [Macky SALL]<br>Alliance of Forces of Progress or AFP [Moustapha NIASSE]<br>And-Jef/African Party for Democracy and Socialism or AJ/PADS [Landing SAVANE]<br>Benno Bokk Yakaar or BBY (United in Hope) [Mahammed DIONNE] (coalition includes AFP, APR, BGC, LD-MPT, PIT, PS, and UNP)<br>Bokk Gis Gis coalition [Pape DIOP]<br>Citizen Movement for National Reform or MCRN-Bes Du Nakk [Mansour Sy DJAMIL]<br>Dare the Future movement [Aissata Tall SALL]<br>Democratic League-Labor Party Movement or LD-MPT [Mamadou NDOYE]<br>Democratic Renaissance Congress [NA]<br>Front for Socialism and Democracy/Benno Jubel or FSD/BJ [Cheikh Abdoulaye Bamba DIEYE]<br>Gainde Centrist Bloc or BCG [Jean-Paul DIAS Mendes]<br>General Alliance for the Interests of the Republic or AGIR [Thierno BOCOUM]<br>Grand Party or GP [Malick GAKOU]<br>Independence and Labor Party or PIT [Maguette THIAM]<br>Jotna Coalition [Dr Abdoulaye Niane]<br>Liberate the People (Yewwi Askan Wi) or YAW [Barthelemy DIAS, Ousmane SONKO, Khalifa SALL]<br>Madicke 2019 coalition [Madicke NIANG]<br>National Union for the People or UNP [Abdoul MBAYE]<br>Only Senegal Movement [Pierre Goudiaby ATEPA]<br>Party for Truth and Development or PVD [Cheikh Ahmadou Kara MBAKE]<br>Party of Unity and Rally or PUR [Cheikh Mouhamadou Moustapha SY]<br>Patriotic Convergence Kaddu Askan Wi or CP-Kaddu Askan Wi [Abdoulaye BALDE]<br>Rewmi Party [Idrissa SECK]<br>Save Senegal (Wallu Senegal Grand Coalition) or WS [Abdoulaye WADE] (coalition includes PDS, Jotna Coalition, Democratic Renaissance Congress)<br>Senegalese Democratic Party or PDS [Abdoulaye WADE]<br>Socialist Party or PS [Ousmane Tanor DIENG]<br>Tekki Movement [Mamadou Lamine DIALLO]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CD, CPLP (associate), ECOWAS, EITI (candidate country), FAO, FZ, G-15, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOOSA, UNWTO, UPU, WADB (regional), WAEMU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "200 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 950 Mali (MINUSMA); note - Senegal also has up to 1,000 police deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and Mali (MINUSMA) (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "despite limited resources, the FAS is considered to be a well-equipped, experienced, and professional military; it has a history of non-interference in the country’s political process and good relations with civil authorities; it is experienced in foreign deployments and has received considerable assistance from the French military, which maintains a presence in Senegal, and the US, with smaller levels from Germany, Spain, and the UK; the FAS’s primary focuses are border, internal, and maritime security; it is closely watching the prevalence of multiple active terrorist groups across the region and political instability in neighboring Mali and Guinea and has recently established new military and gendarmerie camps along its eastern border; it also works with the government in areas such as preventive healthcare, infrastructure development, environmental protection, and disaster response<br><br>the Army is spread amongst 7 military zones and organized into a mix of light infantry battalions and light armored reconnaissance squadrons, as well as airborne, special operations, and artillery battalions; the Gendarmerie includes mobile units, as well as the Presidential Guard (aka “The Red Guard”); the Navy is a small force of coastal patrol craft; in recent years it has acquired some modern platforms from France and Israel, including its first offshore patrol vessel, to improve the Navy’s ability to patrol Senegal’s coastline and economic exclusion zone, conduct fisheries inspections, counter drug trafficking, and combat piracy; the Air Force is configured for supporting the ground forces and has a small number of light attack aircraft and helicopter gunships, as well as transport and reconnaissance aircraft<br><br>Senegalese security forces have been engaged in a low-level counterinsurgency campaign in the southern Casamance region against various factions of the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MDFC) since 1982; the conflict is one of longest running low-level insurgencies in the World, having claimed more than 5,000 lives while leaving another 60,000 displaced; in May 2023, a faction of the MFDC agreed to a peace deal (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "despite limited resources, the FAS is considered to be a well-equipped, experienced, and professional military; it has a history of non-interference in the country’s political process and good relations with civil authorities; it is experienced in foreign deployments and has received considerable assistance from the French military, which maintains a presence in Senegal, and the US, with smaller levels from Germany, Spain, and the UK; the FAS’s primary focuses are border, internal, and maritime security; it is closely watching the prevalence of multiple active terrorist groups across the region and political instability in neighboring Mali and Guinea and has recently established new military and gendarmerie camps along its eastern border; it also works with the government in areas such as preventive healthcare, infrastructure development, environmental protection, and disaster response<br><br>the Army is spread amongst seven military zones and organized into a mix of light infantry battalions and light armored reconnaissance squadrons, as well as airborne, special operations, and artillery battalions; the Gendarmerie includes mobile units, as well as the Presidential Guard (aka “The Red Guard”); the Navy is a small force of coastal patrol craft; in recent years it has acquired some modern platforms from France and Israel, including its first offshore patrol vessel, to improve the Navy’s ability to patrol Senegal’s coastline and economic exclusion zone, conduct fisheries inspections, counter drug trafficking, and combat piracy; the Air Force is configured for supporting the ground forces and has a small number of light attack aircraft and helicopter gunships, as well as transport and reconnaissance aircraft<br><br>Senegalese security forces have been engaged in a low-level counterinsurgency campaign in the southern Casamance region against various factions of the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MDFC) since 1982; the conflict is one of longest running low-level insurgencies in the World, having claimed more than 5,000 lives while leaving another 60,000 displaced; in May 2023, a faction of the MFDC agreed to a peace deal (2023)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -449,7 +449,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "20.63 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "39.42 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "1.09 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1179,9 +1179,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the RSLAF’s principle responsibilities are securing the borders and the country’s territorial waters, supporting civil authorities during emergencies and reconstruction efforts, and participating in peacekeeping missions; it is small, lightly armed, and has a limited budget; since being reduced in size and restructured with British assistance after the end of the civil war in 2002, it has received assistance from several foreign militaries, including those of Canada, China, France, the UK, and the US; the RSLAF has participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Sudan; the Land Forces are by far the largest service with four small light infantry brigades and a separate battalion, each assigned to a separate region, including the capital; the Maritime Forces have a few small coastal and in-shore patrol boats, while the Air Wing has a handful of serviceable combat helicopters; the RSLAF operates under a Joint Forces Command<br><br>the RSLAF’s origins lie in the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the RWAFF fought in both World Wars (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of Sierra Leone in 2022 where the ship was hijacked, this was the first incident reported in two years; this incident was one of only two hijackings Worldwide in 2022; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1123,9 +1123,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces are actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controls large parts of southern and central Somalia <br><br>of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective are assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government has sent thousands of troops to Eritrea and Uganda for training and in 2023 announced plans to send additional personnel to Egypt and Ethiopia for training<br><br>the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; originally about 20,000-strong (civilians, military, and police), ATMIS began reducing its staffing levels in mid-2023; its planned departure from Somalia is the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) reported no piracy attacks for the Horn of Africa in 2022; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warned that Somali pirates continued to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\"</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -447,7 +447,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "47.92 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "21.43 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "20 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1252,14 +1252,14 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Sudan-Central African Republic</em>: periodic violent skirmishes persist among related pastoral populations along the border with the Central African Republic over water and grazing rights; Sudan closed its border with the Central African Republic in January 2022 due to security concerns</p> <p><em>Sudan-Chad</em>: Chad wants to be a helpful mediator in resolving the Darfur conflict, and in 2010 established a joint border monitoring force with Sudan, which has helped to reduce cross-border banditry and violence; however, since the August 2020 Juba Peace Agreement between the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the termination of the UN’s peacekeeping mission, UNAMID, at the end of 2020, violence continues to break out over land and water access</p> <p><em>Sudan-Egypt</em>: Sudan claims, but Egypt de facto administers, security and economic development of the Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary</p> <p><em>Sudan-Eritrea</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Sudan-Ethiopia</em>: civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia; clashes continue between Sudan and Ethiopia over al-Fashaga, a fertile piece of land inhabited by Ethiopian farmers for years until the Sudanese army expelled them in December 2020, claiming the land belonged to Sudan based on colonial-era maps from over 100 years ago; in February, 2022, the two countries were discussing resuming talks over the border conflict</p> <p><em>Sudan-Libya</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Sudan-South Sudan</em>: the South Sudan-Sudan boundary represents 1 January 1956 alignment, final alignment pending negotiations and demarcation; final sovereignty status of Abyei area pending negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan; clashes continue in the oil-rich Abyei region; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed since 2011, when South Sudan became independent; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has condemned renewed clashes on 23 September 2022 between the Twik and Ngok Dinka communities taking place in Agok, 28 kilometres from Abyei town</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Sudan-Central African Republic</em>: periodic violent skirmishes persist among related pastoral populations along the border with the Central African Republic over water and grazing rights; Sudan closed its border with the Central African Republic in January 2022 due to security concerns</p> <p><em>Sudan-Chad</em>: Chad wants to be a helpful mediator in resolving the Darfur conflict, and in 2010 established a joint border monitoring force with Sudan, which has helped to reduce cross-border banditry and violence; however, since the August 2020 Juba Peace Agreement between the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the termination of the UN’s peacekeeping mission, UNAMID, at the end of 2020, violence continues to break out over land and water access</p> <p><em>Sudan-Egypt</em>: Sudan claims, but Egypt de facto administers, security and economic development of the Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary</p> <p><em>Sudan-Eritrea</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Sudan-Ethiopia</em>: civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia; clashes continue between Sudan and Ethiopia over al-Fashaga, a fertile piece of land inhabited by Ethiopian farmers for years until the Sudanese army expelled them in December 2020, claiming the land belonged to Sudan based on colonial-era maps from over 100 years ago; in February, 2022, the two countries were discussing resuming talks over the border conflict; Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile in northern Ethiopia since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; Sudan is concerned the dam will reduce the flow of water into the country; Ethiopia completed filling the dam in 2023</p> <p><em>Sudan-Libya</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Sudan-South Sudan</em>: the South Sudan-Sudan boundary represents 1 January 1956 alignment, final alignment pending negotiations and demarcation; final sovereignty status of Abyei area pending negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan; clashes continue in the oil-rich Abyei region; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed since 2011, when South Sudan became independent; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has condemned renewed clashes on 23 September 2022 between the Twik and Ngok Dinka communities taking place in Agok, 28 kilometres from Abyei town</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "682,519 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 137,402 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,477 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 72,334 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 18,597 (Central African Republic) (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "4.63 million (armed conflict between rival factions of the military government of Sudan since 15 April 2023) (2023); note - includes some non-Sudanese nationals"
|
||||
"text": "4.86 million (armed conflict between rival factions of the military government of Sudan since 15 April 2023) (2023); note - includes some non-Sudanese nationals"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -454,7 +454,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "32.71 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "35.66 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "3 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1239,9 +1239,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "since its creation in 1963, the Togolese military has had a history of interfering in the country’s politics with assassinations, coups, influence, and a large military crackdown in 2005 that killed hundreds; over the past decade, however, it has made some efforts to reform and professionalize, as well as increase its role in UN peacekeeping activities; Togo maintains a regional peacekeeping training center for military and police in Lome; the military participates in multinational exercises and has received training from foreign partners, including France and the US<br><br>the FAT’s current focuses are primarily terrorism and maritime security; in recent years, it has increased operations in the northern border region of the country to boost border security and prevent terrorist infiltrations from Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida-affiliated militant groups based in Mali that also operates in neighboring Burkina Faso; in 2022, the Togolese Government declared a state of emergency in the north due to the threat from JNIM following an attack on a Togolese military post that killed several soldiers; the Navy and Air Force have increased focus on combating piracy and smuggling in the Gulf of Guinea<br><br>the Army has a mixed force of small, lightly-armed combined arms, infantry, and commando regiments, as well as a rapid reaction force; the Gendarmerie includes mobile, regionally-based, and maritime units; the Navy operates a few patrol boats while the Air Force has a small inventory of training, light attack-capable, and transport aircraft, as well as combat helicopters and a few armed UAVs acquired from Turkey in 2022 (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "for a second year the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the territorial and offshore waters of Togo; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -438,7 +438,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "25.66 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "33.75 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "0.12 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1130,9 +1130,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the FASTP is one of the smallest militaries in Africa and consists of only a few companies of ground troops and some small patrol boats (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Sao Tome and Principe in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -472,7 +472,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "25.59 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "15.36 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "11.97 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1270,9 +1270,6 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the TDPF’s primary concerns are maritime piracy and smuggling, border security, terrorism, animal poaching, and spillover from instability in neighboring countries, particularly Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); it participates in multinational training exercises, regional peacekeeping deployments, and has ties with a variety of foreign militaries, including those of China and the US; it has contributed troops to the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC and to the Southern African Development Community intervention force in Mozambique; since 2020, the TPDF has deployed additional troops to its border with Mozambique following several cross-border attacks by fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham operating in Mozambique; the TPDF’s principal ground forces are 5 infantry brigades and an armored brigade; the Naval Forces operate patrol and fast attack boats, while the Air Force inventory includes small numbers of combat aircraft and helicopters (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no piracy attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Tanzania in 2022; although the opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents; in the past, vessels have also been targeted off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, as well as in the Indian ocean, and off the west and south coasts of India and west Maldives; generally, Somali pirates tend to be well armed with automatic weapons, RPGs and sometimes use skiffs launched from mother vessels, which may be hijacked fishing vessels or dhows; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\" that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1200,7 +1200,8 @@
|
|||
"text": "the FABF has a mix of mostly older or secondhand equipment from a mix of suppliers, including France, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, and the US (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (2023)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the military junta implemented an emergency law in 2023 that allows the president extensive powers to combat terrorist groups operating in the country, including conscripting citizens into the security services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "650 (plus about 200 police) Mali (MINUSMA) (2023)",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -439,7 +439,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Air pollutants": {
|
||||
"particulate matter emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "22.59 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "11.81 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
|
||||
"text": "4.23 megatons (2016 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue