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},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "27.95 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "27.16 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "34.69 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1245,9 +1245,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Angolan Armed Forces were created in 1991 under the Bicesse Accords signed between the Angolan Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); the current force is responsible for country’s external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities, including border protection, expulsion of irregular migrants, and small-scale counterinsurgency operations against groups like the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda separatists in Cabinda; the Army is one of the largest in the region with six infantry divisions spread amongst six military regions; it is also one of the better equipped, with a significant portion of its units being motorized and supported by approximately 300 Soviet-era tanks, largely acquired in the 1980s and 1990s; the Air Force is also one of the largest and best equipped in the region with a fleet of approximately 100 combat aircraft, plus a substantial inventory of transport aircraft and helicopter gunships; while naval modernization has received more attention in recent years, the Navy remains a small force of fast attack and coastal patrol craft (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Angola are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, five attacks against commercial vessels were reported, an increase from the four attacks in 2021; most of these occurred in the main port of Luanda while ships were berthed or at anchor"
}
},
"Space": {

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},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "33.11 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "31.51 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "6.48 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1227,9 +1227,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "a key focus for the security forces of Benin is countering infiltrations into the country by terrorist groups tied to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) operating just over the border from northern Benin in Burkina Faso and Niger; in May 2022, the Benin Government said it was \"at war\" after suffering a series of attacks from these groups; later that same year, President TALON said his government would spend more than $130 million to recruit up to 4,000 additional military personnel, modernize military equipment, and build and fortify operating bases; in addition, the FAB participates in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) along with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeastern border <br><br>the FAB has a close working relationship with the Belgian armed forces; the Belgians offer military advice, training, and second-hand equipment donations, and deploy to Benin for limited military exercises (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the waters off Benin; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

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},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>the FARDC’s primary focus is internal security; while the FARDC is large on paper, with an estimated 18 operational infantry brigades, it struggles to provide security in large portions of the country; the FARDC is widely assessed to suffer from insufficient training, low equipment readiness, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline, and widespread corruption; it was created out of the armed factions of the Congo wars that ended in 2003, incorporating various militia, paramilitary, and rebel formations; the DRC’s most effective military force, the Republican Guard, is overseen by the office of the presidency rather than the FARDC and focuses largely on protecting the president and government institutions and enforcing internal security</p> <p>the FARDC is actively conducting operations against a variety of illegal armed groups (IOGs) operating in the DRC, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, where more than 15 significant and cohesive IOGs operate; there is also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; some estimates place over 100 IOGs operating in the country, including organized militias, such as the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renewal (NDC-R), which controls a large portion of North Kivu; Mai Mai groups (local militias that operate variously as self-defense networks and criminal rackets); and foreign-origin groups seeking safe haven and resources, such as the Ugandan-origin Allied Democratic Forces (ADF; aka Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the DRC), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), multiple groups originating from Burundi, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and the March 23 Movement (aka M23 or Congolese Revolutionary Army), which the DRC has accused Rwanda of backing; the FARDC has been accused of collaborating with some IOGs, such as the NDC-R; in 2023, the East Africa Community deployed a regional force to oversee the withdrawal of the M23 rebel group from the country; countries sending troops included Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan</p> the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of 2023, MONUSCO had over 14,000 personnel assigned, but it was drawing down its forces towards a complete withdrawal at the request of the DRC Government; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; three infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2022, the same number of attacks as in 2021; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {
@ -1295,7 +1292,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "211,882 (Central African Republic), 208,328 (Rwanda), 53,164 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 43,250 (Burundi) (2023)"
"text": "211,963 (Central African Republic), 208,328 (Rwanda), 53,194 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 436,272 (Burundi) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "6.38 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2023)"

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},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the FAC is a professional and politically independent military; the Army and the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) are organized and equipped for mobile operations; the Army has 4 motorized infantry brigades spread amongst 5 military regions; the US-trained, 5,000-man BIR has up to 9 battalions, detachments, or groups consisting of airborne, air mobile, amphibious, light, and motorized infantry, armored reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and support units, such as artillery and intelligence; the BIR reportedly receives better training, equipment, and pay than regular Army units<br><br>the ground forces are largely focused on internal security, particularly the threat from the terrorist groups Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of 2023, this conflict had left more than 3,500 civilians dead and over 500,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deploys ground units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits; the Navy’s missions include protecting Cameroon’s oil installations, combatting crime and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and patrolling the country’s lakes and rivers; the Air Force supports both the ground and naval forces and has small numbers of light ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft, as well as attack, multipurpose, and transport helicopters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports incidents appear to have stopped in the territorial and offshore waters of Cameroon; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {

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"text": "last held in December 2020 through July 2021 (next to be held 31 December 2025); note - on 27 December 2020, the day of first round elections, voting in many electoral areas was disrupted by armed groups; on 13 February 2021, President TOUADERA announced that new first round elections would be held on 27 February for those areas controlled by armed groups and the second round on 14 March; ultimately, two additional rounds were held on 23 May and 25 July 2021 in areas that continued to suffer from election security problems"
},
"election results": {
"text": "December 2020 to July 2021 election: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - MCU 63, MOUNI 9, URCA 7, MLPC 7, RDC 5, KNK 3, PATRIE 3, CDE 2, RDD 2, MDD 2, PGD 2, PAD 2, CANE 2, other 11, independents 20; composition as of March 2022 - men 122, women 18, percent of women 12.9%"
"text": "December 2020 to July 2021 election: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - MCU 63, MOUNI 9, URCA 7, MLPC 7, RDC 5, KNK 3, PATRIE 3, CDE 2, RDD 2, MDD 2, PGD 2, PAD 2, CANE 2, other 11, independents 20; composition as of March 2022 - men 122, women 18, percent of women 12.9%; note - several members of other parties and independent candidates joined the MCU following the opening session of the National Assembly; as of 21 September 2021, the MCU held 86 seats"
}
},
"Judicial branch": {
@ -601,7 +601,7 @@
}
},
"Political parties and leaders": {
"text": "Action Party for Development or PAD<br>African Party for Radical Transformation and Integration of States or PATRIE [Crepin MBOLI-GOUMBA]<br>Alliance for Democracy and Progress or ADP<br>Be Africa ti e Kwe (also known as Central Africa for Us All or BTK)<br>Central African Democratic Rally or RDC [Desire KOLINGBA]<br>Central African Party for Integrated Development or PCDI<br>Democratic Movement for the Renewal and Evolution of Central Africa or MDREC<br>Kodro Ti Mo Kozo Si Movement or MKMKS<br>Movement for Democracy and Development or MDD<br>Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People or MLPC [Martin ZIGUELE]<br>National Convergence (also known as Kwa Na Kwa or KNK) [Francois BOZIZE]<br>National Movement of Independents or MOUNI <br>National Union for Democracy and Progress or UNDP [Michel AMINE]<br>National Union of Republican Democrats or UNADER<br>New Impetus for Central Africa or CANE<br>Party for Democracy and Solidarity - Kelemba or KPDS<br>Party for Democratic Governance or PGD<br>Path of Hope or CDE [Karim MECKASSOUA]<br>Renaissance for Sustainable Development or RDD<br>Socialist Party or PS<br>Transformation Through Action Initiative or ITA<br>Union for Central African Renewal or URCA [Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE]<br>Union for Renaissance and Development or URD<br>United Hearts Movement or MCU [Faustin-Archange TOUADERA]<br><br><strong>note:</strong> only parties with seats in the Parliament included<strong><br></strong>"
"text": "Action Party for Development or PAD<br>African Party for Radical Transformation and Integration of States or PATRIE [Crepin MBOLI-GOUMBA]<br>Alliance for Democracy and Progress or ADP<br>Be Africa ti e Kwe (also known as Central Africa for Us All or BTK)<br>Central African Democratic Rally or RDC<br>Central African Party for Integrated Development or PCDI<br>Democratic Movement for the Renewal and Evolution of Central Africa or MDREC<br>Kodro Ti Mo Kozo Si Movement or MKMKS<br>Movement for Democracy and Development or MDD [Louis PAPÉNIAH]<br>Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People or MLPC [Martin ZIGUÉLÉ]<br>National Convergence (also known as Kwa Na Kwa or KNK) [Christian GUÉNÉBEM-DEDIZOUM]<br>National Movement of Independents or MOUNI <br>National Union for Democracy and Progress or UNDP [Michel AMINE]<br>National Union of Republican Democrats or UNADER<br>New Impetus for Central Africa or CANE<br>Party for Democracy and Solidarity - Kélémba or KPDS<br>Party for Democratic Governance or PGD<br>Path of Hope or CDE [Karim MECKASSOUA]<br>Renaissance for Sustainable Development or RDD<br>Socialist Party or PS<br>Transformation Through Action Initiative or ITA<br>Union for Central African Renewal or URCA [Anicet-Georges DOLOGUÉLÉ]<br>Union for Renaissance and Development or URD<br>United Hearts Movement or MCU [Faustin-Archange TOUADÉRA]<br><br><strong>note:</strong> only parties with seats in the Parliament included<strong><br></strong>"
},
"International organization participation": {
"text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, BDEAC, CEMAC, EITI (compliant country) (suspended), FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LCBC, MIGA, NAM, OIC (observer), OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"

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},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Djibouti's military forces are largely focused on border, coastal, and internal security duties, including counterterrorism; China, France, Italy, Japan, and the US maintain bases in Djibouti for regional military missions, including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, crisis response, and security assistance (note &ndash; France has multiple bases and hosts troop contingents from Germany and Spain); the EU and NATO also maintain a presence to support multinational naval counter-piracy operations and maritime training efforts (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau&rsquo;s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) reported no piracy attacks for the Horn of Africa in 2022; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warned that Somali pirates continued to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warned that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {
@ -1185,7 +1182,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Djibouti-Somalia:</em> Djibouti maintains economic ties and border accords with \"Somaliland\" leadership while maintaining some political ties to various factions in Somalia;</p> <p><em>Djibouti-Eritrea:</em> in 2008, Eritrean troops moved across the border on Ras Doumera peninsula and occupied Doumera Island with undefined sovereignty in the Red Sea; the Eritrean occupation of remote Doumeira Island and portions peninsula persists unabated as of September 2009; porous boundary over largely uninhabited areas provides access for smuggling and other illegal activities; as of 7 June 2010, Qatar was mediating Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute, </p> <p><em>Djibouti-Ethiopia:</em> While Djibouti has had significant issues along its border with neighbors such as Somalia and Eritrea, the Ethiopia-Djibouti relationship has been relatively harmonious; diplomatic relations between the two countries were initially established in 1984; historically, there is co-ownership of the Addis Ababa-Djibout railways and acts as a symbol of the healthy bi-lateral partnership between both Ethiopia and Djibouti; in 1991 a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed by the two countries; Ethiopia uses the Port of Djibouti as a major hub for export and import of goods since 1998; after establishing independence, there have been no major disputes along this border.</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Djibouti-Somalia:</em> Djibouti maintains economic ties and border accords with \"Somaliland\" leadership while maintaining some political ties to various factions in Somalia</p> <p><em>Djibouti-Eritrea:</em> in 2008, Eritrean troops moved across the border on Ras Doumera peninsula and occupied Doumera Island with undefined sovereignty in the Red Sea, sparking a brief conflict; Qatar mediated and provided peacekeepers until 2017; Djibouti accused Eritrea of reoccupying the area in 2017 after Qatari troops were withdrawn; Djibouti and Eritrea agreed to normalize relations in 2018</p> <p><em>Djibouti-Ethiopia:</em> the Ethiopia-Djibouti relationship has been relatively harmonious, and there have been no major disputes along their shared border</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

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},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "79.28 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "63.16 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "238.56 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1300,9 +1300,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) are responsible for external defense but also have an internal role assisting police and paramilitary security forces during emergencies and in anti-terrorism operations; the EAF also participates in foreign peacekeeping and other security missions, as well as both bilateral and multinational exercises; the military has considerable political power and independence; it has long had a crucial role in Egypt’s politics and has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded<br><br>key areas of concern for the EAF include Islamic militant groups operating out of the Sinai Peninsula, regional challenges such as instability in Libya and Yemen, and maritime security; since 2011, the EAF has been conducting operations alongside other security forces in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; since 2014, it has deployed large numbers of troops along its border with Libya and provided air support to the Saudi-led coalition operating in Yemen; the Navy in recent years has sought to modernize and expand its capabilities and profile in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, including the acquisition of helicopter carriers, modern frigates, and attack submarines; in 2020, the EAF inaugurated a large joint service military base on the Red Sea to secure the country’s southern coasts, protect economic investments and natural resources, and confront security challenges in the Red Sea region<br><br>the EAF is the largest and one of the best equipped militaries in the region; the Army’s primary combat forces include approximately 13 divisions, which are mostly armored or mechanized, complemented by some independent armored and infantry brigades; the EAF has approximately 5,000 artillery systems, plus surface-to-surface missile forces and a large special operations command, which includes airborne, airmobile, commando, special forces, and other specialized units; the Navy’s principal warships are approximately 20 frigates and corvettes, 8 attack submarines, and 2 French-built helicopter-capable amphibious assault ships (LHDs); the Air Force has more than 300 French-, Russian-, and US-made fighter and multipurpose fighter aircraft, as well as nearly 100 US- and Russian-produced attack helicopters<br><br>Egypt is a major security partner of the US and one of the largest recipients of US military aid in the region; it also has Major Non-NATO Ally status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation<br><br>the Multinational Force &amp; Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; ait is composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US are the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Egypt are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, one attempted attack against a commercial vessel was reported, this was the first incident reported in four years; the reported incident occurred in port while the ship was anchored"
}
},
"Space": {
@ -1322,11 +1319,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Sudan claims but Egypt de facto administers security and economic development of Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary; Egypt no longer shows its administration of the Bir Tawil trapezoid in Sudan on its maps; Gazan breaches in the security wall with Egypt in January 2008 highlight difficulties in monitoring the Sinai border</p>"
"text": "<em>Egypt-Gaza Strip:</em> constructed a barrier and established a buffer zone on its border with Gaza to halt the passage of weapons and militants through cross-border smuggling tunnels and pressure the Palestinian HAMAS terrorist group that runs the Gaza Strip<br><br><em>Egypt-Ethiopia</em>: Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile in northern Ethiopia since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; Egypt has described the giant hydroelectric project as an existential threat because of its potential to control the flow of the river that is a key source of water for the country; Ethiopia completed filling the dam in 2023"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "70,021 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 52,446 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,970 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 21,105 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,585 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,025 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,815 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,802 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022); 310,000 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 150,465 (Syria) (2023)"
"text": "70,021 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 52,446 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 20,970 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 21,105 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,585 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,025 (Yemen) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,815 (Iraq) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,802 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022); 310,000 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 151,721 (Syria) (2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "10 (2022)"

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},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the FAGE&rsquo;s National Guard (Army) has only three small infantry battalions with limited combat capabilities; the country has invested heavily in naval capabilities in recent years to protect its oil installations and combat piracy and crime in the Gulf of Guinea; while the Navy was small, its inventory includes a light frigate and a corvette, as well as several off-shore patrol boats; the Air Force has only a few operational combat aircraft and ground attack-capable helicopters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported two incidents in the offshore waters of Equatorial Guinea in 2022; one incident involved a boarding and kidnapping and the other where a ship was fired upon; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea&rdquo;"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Equatorial Guinea-Cameroon: </em>in 2002, ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but a dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River and imprecisely defined maritime coordinates in the ICJ decision delayed final delimitation</p> <p><em>Equatorial Guinea-Gabon:</em> UN urged Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to resolve the sovereignty dispute over Gabon-occupied Mbane and lesser islands and to create a maritime boundary in the hydrocarbon-rich Corisco Bay</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Equatorial Guinea-Cameroon: </em>in 2002, ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but a dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River and imprecisely defined maritime coordinates in the ICJ decision delayed final delimitation</p> <p><em>Equatorial Guinea-Gabon:</em> dispute over Mbane Island and lesser islands in the Corisco Bay submitted to ICJ in 2016</p>"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {

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{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "<p>The area that is modern-day Ethiopia is rich in cultural and religious diversity with more than 80 ethnic groups. The oldest hominid yet found comes from Ethiopia, and Ethiopia was the second country to officially adopt Christianity in the 4th century A.D. A series of monarchies ruled the area that is now Ethiopia from 980 B.C. to 1855, when the Amhara kingdoms of northern Ethiopia united in an empire under Tewodros II. Many Ethiopians still speak reverently about the Battle of Adwa in 1896, when they defeated Italian forces and thus retained their freedom from colonial rule. Emperor Haile SELASSIE became an internationally renowned figure in 1935, when he unsuccessfully appealed to the League of Nations to prevent Italy from occupying Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941. SELASSIE survived an attempted coup in 1960, annexed modern-day Eritrea in 1962, and played a leading role in establishing the Organization of African Unity in 1963. However, in 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed him and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, drought, and massive displacement, the Derg regime was toppled in 1991 by a coalition of opposing forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF became an ethno-federalist political coalition that ruled Ethiopia from 1991 until its dissolution in 2019. Ethiopia adopted its constitution in 1994 and held its first multiparty elections in 1995. A two-and-a-half-year border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. Ethiopia subsequently rejected the 2007 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission demarcation. This intransigence resulted in more than a decade of a tense “no peace, no war” stalemate between the two countries.<br><br>In 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office the same year as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In 2018, ABIY promoted a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement and a reopening of their shared border. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition, the EPRDF, merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party; however, the lead coalition party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), declined to join. In November 2020, a military conflict erupted between forces aligned with the TPLF and the Ethiopian military. The conflict - which was marked by atrocities committed by all parties - ended in November 2022 with a cessation of hostilities agreement between the Tigrayan leaders and the Ethiopian Government. However, Ethiopia continues to experience ethnic-based violence as other groups - including the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and Amhara militias - seek concessions from the Ethiopian Government.</p>"
"text": "<p>The area that is modern-day Ethiopia is rich in cultural and religious diversity with more than 80 ethnic groups. The oldest hominid yet found comes from Ethiopia, and Ethiopia was the second country to officially adopt Christianity in the 4th century A.D. A series of monarchies ruled the area that is now Ethiopia from 980 B.C. to 1855, when the Amhara kingdoms of northern Ethiopia united in an empire under Tewodros II. Many Ethiopians still speak reverently about the Battle of Adwa in 1896, when they defeated Italian forces and thus retained their freedom from colonial rule. <br><br>Emperor Haile SELASSIE became an internationally renowned figure in 1935, when he unsuccessfully appealed to the League of Nations to prevent Italy from occupying Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941. SELASSIE survived an attempted coup in 1960, annexed modern-day Eritrea in 1962, and played a leading role in establishing the Organization of African Unity in 1963. However, in 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed him and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, drought, and massive displacement, the Derg regime was toppled in 1991 by a coalition of opposing forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF became an ethno-federalist political coalition that ruled Ethiopia from 1991 until its dissolution in 2019. Ethiopia adopted its constitution in 1994 and held its first multiparty elections in 1995. <br><br>A two-and-a-half-year border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. Ethiopia subsequently rejected the 2007 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission demarcation. This intransigence resulted in more than a decade of a tense “no peace, no war” stalemate between the two countries.  In 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office the same year as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In 2018, ABIY promoted a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement and a reopening of their shared border. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition, the EPRDF, merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party; however, the lead coalition party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), declined to join. In November 2020, a military conflict erupted between forces aligned with the TPLF and the Ethiopian military. The conflict - which was marked by atrocities committed by all parties - ended in November 2022 with a cessation of hostilities agreement between the Tigrayan leaders and the Ethiopian Government. However, Ethiopia continues to experience ethnic-based violence as other groups - including the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and Amhara militias - seek concessions from the Ethiopian Government.</p>"
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
},
"Languages": {
"Languages": {
"text": "Oromo (official working language of the State of Oromia Regional State) 33.8%, Amharic (official national language) 29.3%, Somali (official working language of Somali Regional State) 6.2%, Tigrigna (Tigrinya) (official working language of the Tigray Regional State) 5.9%, Sidamo 4%, Wolaytta 2.2%, Gurage 2%, Afar (official working language of the Afar Regional State) 1.7%, Hadiyya 1.7%, Gamo 1.5%, Gedeo 1.3%, Opuuo 1.2%, Kafa 1.1%, other 8.1%, English (major foreign language taught in schools), Arabic (2007 est.)"
"text": "Oromo (official working language of Oromia Regional State) 33.8%, Amharic (official national language) 29.3%, Somali (official working language of Somali Regional State) 6.2%, Tigrigna (Tigrinya) (official working language of Tigray Regional State) 5.9%, Sidamo 4%, Wolaytta 2.2%, Gurage 2%, Afar (official working language of Afar Regional State) 1.7%, Hadiyya 1.7%, Gamo 1.5%, Gedeo 1.3%, Opuuo 1.2%, Kafa 1.1%, other 8.1%, English (major foreign language taught in schools), Arabic (2007 est.)"
},
"major-language sample(s)": {
"text": "<br>Kitaaba Addunyaa Waan Qabataamaatiif - Kan Madda Odeeffannoo bu’uraawaatiif baay’ee barbaachisaa ta’e. (Oromo)<br><br>የአለም እውነታ መጽሐፍ፣ ለመሠረታዊ መረጃ እጅግ አስፈላጊ የሆነ ምንጭ። (Amharic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
@ -560,7 +560,7 @@
}
},
"Administrative divisions": {
"text": "11 ethnically based regional states (kililoch, singular - kilil) and 2 chartered cities* (astedader akabibiwach, singular - astedader akabibi); Adis Abeba* (Addis Ababa), Afar, Amara (Amhara), Binshangul Gumuz, Dire Dawa*, Gambela Hizboch (Gambela Peoples), Hareri Hizb (Harari People), Oromiya (Oromia), Sidama, Sumale (Somali), Tigray, YeDebub Biheroch Bihereseboch na Hizboch (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples), YeDebub M'irab Ityop'iya Hizboch (Southwest Ethiopia Peoples)"
"text": "12 ethnically based regional states (kililoch, singular - kilil) and 2 chartered cities* (astedader akabibiwach, singular - astedader akabibi); Adis Abeba* (Addis Ababa), Afar, Amara (Amhara), Binshangul Gumuz, Dire Dawa*, Gambela Hizboch (Gambela), Hareri Hizb (Harari), Oromia, Sidama, Somali, Tigray, YeDebub Biheroch Bihereseboch na Hizboch (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples), YeDebub M'irab Ityop'iya Hizboch (Southwest Ethiopia Peoples), Southern Ethiopia Peoples"
},
"Independence": {
"text": "oldest independent country in Africa and one of the oldest in the world - at least 2,000 years (may be traced to the Aksumite Kingdom, which coalesced in the first century B.C.)"
@ -604,7 +604,7 @@
"text": "President SAHLE-WORK Zewde (since 25 October 2018)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Prime Minister ABIY Ahmed Ali (since April 2018); Deputy Prime Minister DEMEKE Mekonnen Hassen (since 29 November 2012)"
"text": "Prime Minister ABIY Ahmed Ali (since April 2018); Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs DEMEKE Mekonnen Hassen (since 29 November 2012)"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "Council of Ministers selected by the prime minister and approved by the House of People's Representatives"
@ -645,7 +645,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Ethiopia has over fifty national-level and regional-level political parties. The ruling party, the Prosperity Party, was created by Prime Minister ABIY in November 2019 from member parties of the former Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM), plus other EPRDF-allied parties such as the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), Benishangul Gumuz People’s Democratic Party (BGPDP), Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), and the Harari National League (HNL). Once the Prosperity Party was created, the various ethnically-based parties that comprised or were affiliated with the EPRDF were subsequently disbanded; in January 2021, the Ethiopian electoral board de-registered the Tigray People’s Liberation Front or TPLF; national level parties are qualified to register candidates in multiple regions across Ethiopia; regional parties can register candidates for both national and regional parliaments, but only in one region of Ethiopia"
},
"International organization participation": {
"text": "ACP, AfDB, ATMIS, AU, COMESA, EITI, FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNOOSA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
"text": "ACP, AfDB, ATMIS, AU, COMESA, EITI, FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNOOSA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (accession candidate)"
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
@ -1292,11 +1292,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Ethiopia-Eritrea:</em> Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to abide by the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) delimitation decision, but neither party responded to the revised line detailed in the November 2006 EEBC Demarcation Statement <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Somalia:</em> While border clashes continue in the al-Fashqa (Fashaga) area, the US views the 1902 boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan as being in force; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; \"Somaliland\" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera and trade ties to landlocked Ethiopia; <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Sudan:</em> Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; as of 2020, four years of three-way talks between the three capitals over operating the dam and filling its reservoir had made little progress; Ethiopia began filling the dam in July 2020; civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Ethiopia-Eritrea:</em> Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to abide by the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) delimitation decision, but neither party responded to the revised line detailed in the November 2006 EEBC Demarcation Statement <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Somalia:</em> While border clashes continue in the al-Fashqa (Fashaga) area, the US views the 1902 boundary treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan as being in force; the undemarcated former British administrative line has little meaning as a political separation to rival clans within Ethiopia's Ogaden and southern Somalia's Oromo region; Ethiopian forces invaded southern Somalia and routed Islamist courts from Mogadishu in January 2007; \"Somaliland\" secessionists provide port facilities in Berbera and trade ties to landlocked Ethiopia; <br><br><em>Ethiopia-Sudan:</em> Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile in northern Ethiopia since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; Egypt has described the giant hydroelectric project as an existential threat because of its potential to control the flow of the river that is a key source of water for the country; Ethiopia completed filling the dam in 2023</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "417,419 (South Sudan), 302,195 (Somalia), 167,391 (Eritrea), 25,463 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023) (2023)"
"text": "417,478 (South Sudan), 308,068 (Somalia), 167,391 (Eritrea), 25,463 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "4.385 million (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2023)"

4
africa/ga.json
View file

@ -451,7 +451,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "32.2 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "39.1 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "0.53 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
"text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service (18-22 for officers); no conscription; service obligation six months (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Gambian security forces have a history of involvement in domestic politics, including multiple coups attempts and mutinies, with the latest being an attempted coup in 2022; since 2017, Gambia’s security sector has been undergoing reforms as part of a national reconstruction effort to recover from the 22 years of Yahya JAMMEH’s autocratic rule under which the security forces were severely under-resourced in terms of finances and equipment and were largely directed towards regime protection and suppressing dissent; international partners, including member states of the EU, particularly France and Germany, Turkey, and the US have provided support to military and police reforms; several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also provided security forces for stability, as well as assistance and training through the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG); as of 2023, ECOMIG continued to provide about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal<br><br>the GAF is a lightly armed force with about 5 small infantry battalions, a handful of coastal patrol boats, and a few aircraft; in addition to external defense, the responsibilities of the GAF include providing maritime security, countering human trafficking, aiding civil authorities in emergencies and natural disaster relief, and engaging in activities such as engineering, education, health, and agriculture for domestic socio-economic development; the GAF also participates in peacekeeping missions, and since its first deployments in the 1990s, has been involved in more than 10 UN peacekeeping missions while contributing about 4,000 total troops <br><br>the GAF traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the GAF in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of troops from both countries (2023)"
"text": "the Gambian security forces have a history of involvement in domestic politics, including multiple coups attempts and mutinies, with the latest being an attempted coup in 2022; since 2017, Gambia’s security sector has been undergoing reforms as part of a national reconstruction effort to recover from the 22 years of Yahya JAMMEH’s autocratic rule under which the security forces were severely under-resourced in terms of finances and equipment and were largely directed towards regime protection and suppressing dissent; international partners, including member states of the EU, particularly France and Germany, Turkey, and the US have provided support to military and police reforms; several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also provided security forces for stability, as well as assistance and training through the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG); as of 2023, ECOMIG continued to provide about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal<br><br>the GAF is a lightly armed force with about five small infantry battalions, a handful of coastal patrol boats, and a few aircraft; in addition to external defense, the responsibilities of the GAF include providing maritime security, countering human trafficking, aiding civil authorities in emergencies and natural disaster relief, and engaging in activities such as engineering, education, health, and agriculture for domestic socio-economic development; the GAF also participates in peacekeeping missions, and since its first deployments in the 1990s, has been involved in more than 10 UN peacekeeping missions while contributing about 4,000 total troops <br><br>the GAF traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the GAF in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of troops from both countries (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

9
africa/gb.json
View file

@ -422,7 +422,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "38.51 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "26.29 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "5.32 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -543,7 +543,7 @@
"text": "formerly the Council of Ministers, appointed by the prime minister in consultation with the president"
},
"elections/appointments": {
"text": "formerly, the president directly elected by plurality vote for a 5-year term (no term limits); election last held on 26 August 2023; prime minister appointed by the president; note - on 30 August 2023, Gen. Brice OLIGUI Nguema led a military group called Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions in a coup in which President Ali BONGO Ondimba was arrested and detained, election results were canceled, and state institutions dissolved; on 4 September 2023, OLIGUI was sworn in as transitional president"
"text": "formerly, the president directly elected by plurality vote for a 5-year term (no term limits); election last held on 26 August 2023; prime minister appointed by the president; note - on 30 August 2023, Gen. Brice OLIGUI Nguema led a military group called Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions in a coup in which President Ali BONGO Ondimba was arrested and detained, election results were canceled, and state institutions dissolved; on 4 September 2023, OLIGUI was sworn in as transitional president; a general election is planned for August 2025"
},
"election results": {
"text": "<em><br>2016: </em>Ali BONGO Ondimba reelected president; percent of vote - Ali BONGO Ondimba (PDG) 49.8%, Jean PING (UFC) 48.2%, other 2.0%<br><br><em>2009: </em>Ali BONGO Ondimba elected president; percent of vote - Ali BONGO Ondimba (PDG) 41.7%, Andre MBA OBAME (independent) 25.9%, Pierre MAMBOUNDOU (UPG) 25.2%, Zacharie MYBOTO (UGDD) 3.9%, other 3.3% <p> </p>"
@ -1190,9 +1190,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Gabonese military is a small and lightly-armed force that is responsible for both external and internal security; in August 2023, it seized control of the government in a coup; some members of the military attempted a failed coup in 2019; the Army&rsquo;s core forces are the Republican Guard and an airborne infantry battalion, which are supported by several small regionally-based infantry units; the Gendarmerie has regionally-based &ldquo;legions,&rdquo; as well as mobile forces, a national parks security unit, and a special intervention group; the Air Force has a small number of older French-made fighter aircraft and some combat helicopters, also mostly of French origin; the Navy has a small force of patrol boats (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the waters off Gabon; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Space": {
@ -1206,7 +1203,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>UN urges Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to resolve the sovereignty dispute over Gabon-occupied Mbane Island and lesser islands and to establish a maritime boundary in hydrocarbon-rich Corisco Bay</p>"
"text": "<p>dispute with Equatorial Guinea over Mbane Island and lesser islands in the Corisco Bay submitted to ICJ in 2016</p>"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {

7
africa/gh.json
View file

@ -463,7 +463,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "31.95 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "46.04 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "16.67 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1247,9 +1247,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the military’s primary missions are border defense, assisting with internal security, peacekeeping, and protecting the country’s territorial waters, particularly its offshore oil and gas infrastructure; it has benefited from cooperation with foreign partners, such as the UK and the US, and experience gained from participation in multiple international peacekeeping missions; the government in recent years has committed to an increase in funding for equipment acquisitions, including armor, mechanized, and special forces capabilities for the Army, light attack aircraft for the Air Force, and more modern coastal patrol vessels for the Navy; the Army’s primary combat forces include several battalions of light infantry, a motorized rapid reaction/presidential guard battalion, and small regiments of light armored reconnaissance and special forces; the Navy has 2 ocean-going patrol vessels, several coastal patrol craft, and a special forces unit, while the Air Force operates a few ground attack aircraft and multipurpose helicopters<br> <br>in 2022, Ghana began beefing up its military presence in the north of the country against threats from the terrorist organization Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, which has conducted attacks in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo; Ghana’s northern frontier with Burkina Faso is also an area with well-established smuggling routes, porous borders, and illegal gold mining; Ghana has also pushed an initiative to bolster security cooperation and intelligence sharing among Gulf of Guinea neighbors and Sahel countries <br><br>the military traces its origins to the Gold Coast Constabulary that was established in 1879 and renamed the Gold Coast Regiment in 1901; the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast Regiment formed the basis for the new Ghanaian Army (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported seven incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Ghana in 2022, which was an increase over the five incidents reported in 2021; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents include vessels that were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
}
},
"Space": {
@ -1263,7 +1260,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>disputed maritime border between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire</p>"
"text": "disputed maritime border with Cote d'Ivoire was resolved in 2017 through a decision of a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>Ghana is a transit and destination point for illicit drugs trafficked from Asia and South America to other African countries, Europe, and to a lesser extent North America;  not a significant source for drugs entering the United States;  limited local consumption of controlled pharmaceuticals, cocaine, and heroin from Asia and South America; cannabis cultivated and produced in large quantities in most rural areas of Ghana  </p> <p> </p>"

7
africa/gv.json
View file

@ -451,7 +451,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "22.43 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "37.57 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "3 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1209,14 +1209,11 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Guinean military is a small and lightly armed force that is responsible for external defense, but also has some domestic security responsibilities and has historically been involved in suppressing public protests; the military has undergone some attempts at reform since 2010, but in 2021 the Army&rsquo;s special forces led a successful coup; the Army has a mix of approximately 10 infantry, light armor, commando, and special forces battalions, as well as a presidential guard force; piracy and natural resource protection in the Gulf of Guinea are key areas of concern for the small Navy, which possesses only a few patrol boats; the Air Force has a handful of serviceable aircraft, including helicopter gunships (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Guinea in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Sierra Leone considers Guinea's definition of the flood plain limits to define the left bank boundary of the Makona and Moa Rivers excessive and protests Guinea's continued occupation of these lands, including the hamlet of Yenga, occupied since 1998</p>"
"text": "<em>Guinea-Liberia: </em>the border is not disputed and there is joint border management, although the border is porous and there have been occasional disputes relating to military encroachments and use of the boundary rivers<br><br><em>Guinea-Mali: </em>the border is not disputed, although there have been periodic clashes between border communities over land rights and access to natural resources"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "NA"

5
africa/iv.json
View file

@ -464,7 +464,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "23.72 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "40.41 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "9.67 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1259,9 +1259,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the military (FACI) was established in 1960 from home defense units the French colonial government began standing up in 1950; the FACI has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; it is responsible for external defense but also has a considerable internal role supporting the National Gendarmerie and other internal security forces; the operational focus of the FACI, as well as the Gendarmerie and other security forces, is the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the FACI’s Land Forces are assigned to regions, and its combat units are organized into approximately 10 battalions, most of which are infantry or security forces, complemented by artillery, armored, and air defense battalions; the separate special forces branch has a commando/paratrooper battalion; the Air Force has a few operational combat helicopters, while the Navy operates a handful of patrol boats and two offshore patrol vessels acquired since 2022; the National Gendarmerie has seven “legions” deployed throughout the country (Abidjan has two assigned legions) and is organized into mobile and territorial forces; the Mobile Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining and restoring order and is considered the backbone of the country’s domestic security; the Territorial Gendarmerie is responsible for the administrative, judicial, and military police; the Gendarmerie also has separate specialized units for security, intervention (counterterrorism, hostage rescue, etc), VIP protection, and surveillance<br><br>Cote d’Ivoire has close security ties with France, which maintains a military presence; the UN had a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one product tanker hijacked and one product tanker boarded in the territorial and offshore waters of Cote d'Ivoire in 2022; in both cases the ship's cargo and valuables were stolen; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Space": {

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@ -449,7 +449,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "25.85 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "12.52 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "17.91 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1263,9 +1263,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the KDF is considered to be an experienced, effective, and professional force; it has conducted operations in neighboring Somalia since 2011 and taken part in numerous regional peacekeeping and security missions; it is a leading member of the Africa Standby Force; the KDF trains regularly, participates in multinational exercises, and has ties to a variety of foreign militaries, including those of France, the UK, and the US; its chief security concerns and missions include protecting the country’s sovereignty and territory, regional disputes, the threat posed by the al-Shabaab terrorist group based in neighboring Somalia, maritime crime and piracy, and assisting civil authorities in responding to emergency, disaster, or political unrest as requested <br><br>the Army has 5 combat brigades, including 3 infantry, an armored, and an artillery brigade; it also has a helicopter-equipped air cavalry battalion and a special operations regiment comprised of airborne, special forces, and ranger battalions; the Navy has several offshore patrol vessels, large coastal patrol boats, and missile-armed craft; the Air Force has a small inventory of older US-origin fighter aircraft, as well as some transport aircraft and combat helicopters <br><br>Kenyan military forces intervened in Somalia in October 2011 to combat the al Qaida-affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist group, which had conducted numerous cross-border attacks into Kenya; in November 2011, the UN and the African Union invited Kenya to incorporate its forces into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); Kenyan forces were formally integrated into AMISOM in February 2012; they consist of approximately 3,600 troops and are responsible for AMISOM’s Sector 2 comprising Lower and Middle Jubba (see Appendix T for additional details on al-Shabaab; note - as of May 2022, AMISOM was renamed the AU Transition Mission in Somalia or ATMIS)<br><br>the Kenya Military Forces were created following independence in 1963; the current KDF was established and its composition laid out in the 2010 constitution; it is governed by the Kenya Defense Forces Act of 2012; the Army traces its origins back to the Kings African Rifles (KAR), a British colonial regiment raised from Britain's East Africa possessions from 1902 until independence in the 1960s; the KAR conducted both military and internal security functions within the colonial territories, and served outside the territories during the World Wars (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no piracy attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Kenya in 2022; although the opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents; in the past, vessels have also been targeted off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, as well as in the Indian ocean, and off the west and south coasts of India and west Maldives; generally, Somali pirates tend to be well armed with automatic weapons, RPGs and sometimes use skiffs launched from mother vessels, which may be hijacked fishing vessels or dhows; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\" that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships"
}
},
"Space": {

7
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@ -555,7 +555,7 @@
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate"
},
"elections/appointments": {
"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 6-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 10 October 2017 with a run-off on 26 December 2017 (next to be held on 10 October 2023); the runoff originally scheduled for 7 November 2017 was delayed due to allegations of fraud in the first round, which the Supreme Court dismissed"
"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 6-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 10 October 2023 with a run-off on 14 November 2023&nbsp;"
},
"election results": {
"text": "George WEAH elected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - George WEAH (Coalition for Democratic Change) 38.4%, Joseph BOAKAI (UP) 28.8%, Charles BRUMSKINE (LP) 9.6%, Prince JOHNSON (MDR) 8.2%, Alexander B. CUMMINGS (ANC) 7.2%, other 7.8%; percentage of vote in second round - George WEAH 61.5%, Joseph BOAKAI 38.5%"
@ -569,7 +569,7 @@
"text": "<p>Senate - general election held on 10 October 2023 with half the seats up for election (next to be held on 9 October 2029)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 10 October 2023 (next to be held 9 October 2029)</p> <p> </p>"
},
"election results": {
"text": "<p>Senate - percent of vote by party - Collaborating Political Parties 43.3%, Congress for Democratic Change 16.6%, People's Unification Party 6.6%, Movement for Democracy and Reconstructions 3.3%, National Democratic Coalition 3.3%, National Patriotic Party 3.3%, Independent 23.3%; seats by coalition/party- CPP 13, CDC 5, PUP 2, MDR 1, NDC 1, NPP 1, Independent 7; composition - men 28, women 2, percent of women 6.7%<br><br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party/coalition - Coalition for Democratic Change 28.7%, Unity Party 27.3%, People's Unification Party 6.8%, Liberty Party 4.1%, Americo Liberian Party 4.1%, Movement for Democracy and Reconstruction 4.1%, Movement for Economic Empowerment 1.3%, Liberia Transformation Party 1.3%, United People's Party 1.3%, Victory for Change Party 1.3%, Liberian People's Party 1.3%, Liberia National Union 1.3%, Independent 17.8%; seats by coalition/party - CDC 21, UP 20, PUP 5, LP 3, ALP 3, MDR 3, MOVEE 1, LTP 1, UPP 1, VCP 1, LPP 1, LNU 1, Independent 13; composition - men 65, women 8, percent of women 11%; total Parliament percent of women 9.7%</p> <p> </p>"
"text": "<p>Senate - percent of vote by party - Collaborating Political Parties 43.3%, Congress for Democratic Change 16.6%, People's Unification Party 6.6%, Movement for Democracy and Reconstructions 3.3%, National Democratic Coalition 3.3%, National Patriotic Party 3.3%, Independent 23.3%; seats by coalition/party- CPP 13, CDC 5, PUP 2, MDR 1, NDC 1, NPP 1, Independent 7; composition - men 27, women 3, percent of women 11%<br><br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party/coalition - Coalition for Democratic Change 28.7%, Unity Party 27.3%, People's Unification Party 6.8%, Liberty Party 4.1%, Americo Liberian Party 4.1%, Movement for Democracy and Reconstruction 4.1%, Movement for Economic Empowerment 1.3%, Liberia Transformation Party 1.3%, United People's Party 1.3%, Victory for Change Party 1.3%, Liberian People's Party 1.3%, Liberia National Union 1.3%, Independent 17.8%; seats by coalition/party - CDC 21, UP 20, PUP 5, LP 3, ALP 3, MDR 3, MOVEE 1, LTP 1, UPP 1, VCP 1, LPP 1, LNU 1, Independent 13; composition - men 66, women 7, percent of women 9.5%; total Parliament percent of women 9.7%</p> <p> </p>"
}
},
"Judicial branch": {
@ -1178,9 +1178,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the AFL is responsible for external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities if called upon, such as humanitarian assistance during natural disasters and support to law enforcement; it is a small, lightly equipped force comprised of 2 combat infantry battalions and supporting units; the infantry battalions were rebuilt with US assistance in 2007-2008 from the restructured AFL following the end of the second civil war in 2003 when military and police forces were disbanded and approximately 100,000 military, police, and rebel combatants were disarmed<br><br>the first militia unit established for defense of the colony was raised in 1832; the AFL traces its origins to the 1908 establishment of the Liberia Frontier Force, which became the Liberian National Guard in 1965; the AFL was established in 1970<br><br>the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in 2003 as a peacekeeping force; at its height, UNMIL was comprised of about 15,000 personnel, including more than 3,000 troops absorbed from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping mission; Liberian forces reassumed full control of the country’s security in June of 2016, and the UNMIL mission was ended in 2018 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial and offshore waters of Liberia in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

5
africa/ni.json
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@ -463,7 +463,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "48.73 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "55.64 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "120.37 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1283,9 +1283,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Nigerian military is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and regarded as one of its most capable forces; the Army is organized into 8 divisions comprised of a diverse mix of more than 20 combat brigades, including airborne infantry, amphibious infantry, armor, artillery, light infantry, mechanized and motorized infantry, and special operations forces; there is also a presidential guard brigade; the Army typically organizes into battalion- and brigade-sized task forces for operations; the Air Force has a few squadrons of fighters, ground attack fighters, armed UAVs, and attack helicopter squadrons primarily for supporting the Army<br><br>the Army and Air Force are focused largely on internal security and face a number of challenges that have stretched their resources; the Army is deployed in all 36 of the country's states; in the northeast, it is conducting counterinsurgency/counterterrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa (ISIS-WA) terrorist groups, where it has deployed as many as 70,000 troops at times and jihadist-related violence has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, since 2009; in the northwest, it faces growing threats from criminal gangs--locally referred to as bandits--and violence associated with long-standing farmer-herder conflicts, as well as BH and ISIS-WA terrorists; bandits in the northwestern Nigeria are estimated to number in the low 10,000s and violence there has killed more than 10,000 people since the mid-2010s; the military also continues to protect the oil industry in the Niger Delta region against militants and criminal activity, although the levels of violence there have decreased in recent years; since 2021, additional troops and security forces have been deployed to eastern Nigeria to quell renewed agitation for a state of Biafra (Biafra seceded from Nigeria in the late 1960s, sparking a civil war that caused more than 1 million deaths)<br><br>meanwhile, the Navy is focused on security in the Gulf of Guinea; since 2016, it has developed a maritime strategy, boosted naval training and its naval presence in the Gulf, increased participation in regional maritime security efforts, and acquired a considerable number of new naval platforms, including offshore and coastal patrol craft, fast attack boats, and air assets; its principal surface ships currently include a frigate and 4 corvettes or offshore patrol ships<br><br>the Nigerian military traces its origins to the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; in 1956, the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) and in 1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over control of the NMF from the British War Office; the Nigerian Armed Forces were established following independence in 1960 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Nigeria in 2022, down from six attacks in 2021; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
}
},
"Space": {

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@ -431,7 +431,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "27.12 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "34.85 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "0.29 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>a longstanding low-grade conflict continues in parts of Casamance, in Senegal across the border; some rebels use Guinea-Bissau as a safe haven</p>"
"text": "<em>Guinea-Bissau - Senegal:</em> there are no border disputes and the frontier is relatively stable although some rebels conducting a longstanding low-grade insurgency in the southern Casamance region of Senegal have used Guinea-Bissau as a safe haven"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

5
africa/sf.json
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@ -453,7 +453,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "23.58 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "19.75 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "476.64 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1300,9 +1300,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the SANDF’s primary responsibilities include territorial and maritime defense, supporting the Police Service, protecting key infrastructure, and participating in international peacekeeping missions; the SANDF traditionally has been one of Africa’s most capable militaries, but in recent years its operational readiness and modernization programs have been hampered by funding shortfalls; it participates regularly in African and UN peacekeeping missions and is a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Standby Force; in 2021, it sent approximately 1,500 troops to Mozambique as part of a multinational SADC force to help combat an insurgency, and South African forces are a key component of the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; in recent years, the SANDF has been deployed internally to assist the Police Service with quelling unrest and to combat trafficking along the border<br><br>the Army in recent years has reorganized, and its combat forces are organized into 4 “modern” brigades, each designed for specific missions and responding to modern-day threats such as “asymmetric” warfare; the new brigades are separated into airborne, light infantry, mechanized, and motorized forces; the Navy operates a mixed force of warships, patrol craft, submarines, and support vessels; its principal combatants are 4 frigates and 3 attack submarines; the Navy also has a maritime rapid reaction squadron that includes naval infantry and combat divers; the Air Force has squadrons of multipurpose fighter, ground attack, and transport aircraft, as well as attack and transport helicopters<br><br>the SANDF was created in 1994 to replace the South African Defense Force (SADF); the SANDF was opened to all South Africans who met military requirements, while the SADF was a mostly white force (only whites were subject to conscription) with non-whites only allowed to join in a voluntary capacity; the SANDF also absorbed members of the guerrilla and militia forces of the various anti-apartheid opposition groups, including the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, as well as the security forces of the formerly independent Bantustan homelands (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of South Africa are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, one attack against a commercial vessel was reported, this was the first such incident reported in four years; in the reported incident the ship was boarded while underway"
}
},
"Space": {

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@ -466,7 +466,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "37.52 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "38.21 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "10.9 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -622,7 +622,7 @@
}
},
"Political parties and leaders": {
"text": "Alliance for Citizenship and Work or ACT [Abdoul MBAYE]<br>Alliance for the Republic-Yakaar or APR [Macky SALL]<br>Alliance of Forces of Progress or AFP [Moustapha NIASSE]<br>And-Jef/African Party for Democracy and Socialism or AJ/PADS [Landing SAVANE]<br>Benno Bokk Yakaar or BBY (United in Hope) [Mahammed DIONNE] (coalition includes AFP, APR, BGC, LD-MPT, PIT, PS, and UNP)<br>Bokk Gis Gis coalition [Pape DIOP]<br>Citizen Movement for National Reform or MCRN-Bes Du Nakk [Mansour Sy DJAMIL]<br>Dare the Future movement [Aissata Tall SALL]<br>Democratic League-Labor Party Movement or LD-MPT [Mamadou NDOYE]<br>Democratic Renaissance Congress [NA]<br>Front for Socialism and Democracy/Benno Jubel or FSD/BJ [Cheikh Abdoulaye Bamba DIEYE]<br>Gainde Centrist Bloc or BCG [Jean-Paul DIAS Mendes]<br>General Alliance for the Interests of the Republic or AGIR [Thierno BOCOUM]<br>Grand Party or GP [Malick GAKOU]<br>Independence and Labor Party or PIT [Maguette THIAM]<br>Jotna Coalition [Dr Abdoulaye Niane]<br>Liberate the People (Yewwi Askan Wi) or YAW [Barthelemy DIAS, Ousmane SONKO, Khalifa SALL]<br>Madicke 2019 coalition [Madicke NIANG]<br>National Union for the People or UNP [Abdoul MBAYE]<br>Only Senegal Movement [Pierre Goudiaby ATEPA]<br>Party for Truth and Development or PVD [Cheikh Ahmadou Kara MBAKE]<br>Party of Unity and Rally or PUR [Cheikh Mouhamadou Moustapha SY]<br>Patriotic Convergence Kaddu Askan Wi or CP-Kaddu Askan Wi [Abdoulaye BALDE]<br>Rewmi Party [Idrissa SECK]<br>Save Senegal (Wallu Senegal Grand Coalition) or WS [Abdoulaye WADE] (coalition includes PDS, Jotna Coalition, Democratic Renaissance Congress)<br>Senegalese Democratic Party or PDS [Abdoulaye WADE]<br>Socialist Party or PS [Ousmane Tanor DIENG]<br>Tekki Movement [Mamadou Lamine DIALLO]"
"text": "African Patriots for Senegal for Work, Ethics and Fraternity [Ousmane SONKO]<br>Alliance for Citizenship and Work or ACT [Abdoul MBAYE]<br>Alliance for the Republic-Yakaar or APR [Macky SALL]<br>Alliance of Forces of Progress or AFP [Moustapha NIASSE]<br>And-Jef/African Party for Democracy and Socialism or AJ/PADS [Landing SAVANE]<br>Benno Bokk Yakaar or BBY (United in Hope) [Mahammed DIONNE] (coalition includes AFP, APR, BGC, LD-MPT, PIT, PS, and UNP)<br>Bokk Gis Gis coalition [Pape DIOP]<br>Citizen Movement for National Reform or MCRN-Bes Du Nakk [Mansour Sy DJAMIL]<br>Dare the Future movement [Aissata Tall SALL]<br>Democratic League-Labor Party Movement or LD-MPT [Mamadou NDOYE]<br>Democratic Renaissance Congress [NA]<br>Front for Socialism and Democracy/Benno Jubel or FSD/BJ [Cheikh Abdoulaye Bamba DIEYE]<br>Gainde Centrist Bloc or BCG [Jean-Paul DIAS Mendes]<br>General Alliance for the Interests of the Republic or AGIR [Thierno BOCOUM]<br>Grand Party or GP [Malick GAKOU]<br>Independence and Labor Party or PIT [Maguette THIAM]<br>Jotna Coalition [Dr Abdoulaye Niane]<br>Liberate the People (Yewwi Askan Wi) or YAW [Barthelemy DIAS, Ousmane SONKO, Khalifa SALL]<br>Madicke 2019 coalition [Madicke NIANG]<br>National Union for the People or UNP [Abdoul MBAYE]<br>Only Senegal Movement [Pierre Goudiaby ATEPA]<br>Party for Truth and Development or PVD [Cheikh Ahmadou Kara MBAKE]<br>Party of Unity and Rally or PUR [Cheikh Mouhamadou Moustapha SY]<br>Patriotic Convergence Kaddu Askan Wi or CP-Kaddu Askan Wi [Abdoulaye BALDE]<br>Rewmi Party [Idrissa SECK]<br>Save Senegal (Wallu Senegal Grand Coalition) or WS [Abdoulaye WADE] (coalition includes PDS, Jotna Coalition, Democratic Renaissance Congress)<br>Senegalese Democratic Party or PDS [Abdoulaye WADE]<br>Socialist Party or PS [Ousmane Tanor DIENG]<br>Tekki Movement [Mamadou Lamine DIALLO]"
},
"International organization participation": {
"text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CD, CPLP (associate), ECOWAS, EITI (candidate country), FAO, FZ, G-15, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOOSA, UNWTO, UPU, WADB (regional), WAEMU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@
"text": "200 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 950 Mali (MINUSMA); note - Senegal also has up to 1,000 police deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and Mali (MINUSMA) (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "despite limited resources, the FAS is considered to be a well-equipped, experienced, and professional military; it has a history of non-interference in the country’s political process and good relations with civil authorities; it is experienced in foreign deployments and has received considerable assistance from the French military, which maintains a presence in Senegal, and the US, with smaller levels from Germany, Spain, and the UK; the FAS’s primary focuses are border, internal, and maritime security; it is closely watching the prevalence of multiple active terrorist groups across the region and political instability in neighboring Mali and Guinea and has recently established new military and gendarmerie camps along its eastern border; it also works with the government in areas such as preventive healthcare, infrastructure development, environmental protection, and disaster response<br><br>the Army is spread amongst 7 military zones and organized into a mix of light infantry battalions and light armored reconnaissance squadrons, as well as airborne, special operations, and artillery battalions; the Gendarmerie includes mobile units, as well as the Presidential Guard (aka “The Red Guard”); the Navy is a small force of coastal patrol craft; in recent years it has acquired some modern platforms from France and Israel, including its first offshore patrol vessel, to improve the Navy’s ability to patrol Senegal’s coastline and economic exclusion zone, conduct fisheries inspections, counter drug trafficking, and combat piracy; the Air Force is configured for supporting the ground forces and has a small number of light attack aircraft and helicopter gunships, as well as transport and reconnaissance aircraft<br><br>Senegalese security forces have been engaged in a low-level counterinsurgency campaign in the southern Casamance region against various factions of the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MDFC) since 1982; the conflict is one of longest running low-level insurgencies in the World, having claimed more than 5,000 lives while leaving another 60,000 displaced; in May 2023, a faction of the MFDC agreed to a peace deal (2023)"
"text": "despite limited resources, the FAS is considered to be a well-equipped, experienced, and professional military; it has a history of non-interference in the country’s political process and good relations with civil authorities; it is experienced in foreign deployments and has received considerable assistance from the French military, which maintains a presence in Senegal, and the US, with smaller levels from Germany, Spain, and the UK; the FAS’s primary focuses are border, internal, and maritime security; it is closely watching the prevalence of multiple active terrorist groups across the region and political instability in neighboring Mali and Guinea and has recently established new military and gendarmerie camps along its eastern border; it also works with the government in areas such as preventive healthcare, infrastructure development, environmental protection, and disaster response<br><br>the Army is spread amongst seven military zones and organized into a mix of light infantry battalions and light armored reconnaissance squadrons, as well as airborne, special operations, and artillery battalions; the Gendarmerie includes mobile units, as well as the Presidential Guard (aka “The Red Guard”); the Navy is a small force of coastal patrol craft; in recent years it has acquired some modern platforms from France and Israel, including its first offshore patrol vessel, to improve the Navy’s ability to patrol Senegal’s coastline and economic exclusion zone, conduct fisheries inspections, counter drug trafficking, and combat piracy; the Air Force is configured for supporting the ground forces and has a small number of light attack aircraft and helicopter gunships, as well as transport and reconnaissance aircraft<br><br>Senegalese security forces have been engaged in a low-level counterinsurgency campaign in the southern Casamance region against various factions of the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MDFC) since 1982; the conflict is one of longest running low-level insurgencies in the World, having claimed more than 5,000 lives while leaving another 60,000 displaced; in May 2023, a faction of the MFDC agreed to a peace deal (2023)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

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@ -449,7 +449,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "20.63 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "39.42 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "1.09 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1179,9 +1179,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the RSLAF’s principle responsibilities are securing the borders and the country’s territorial waters, supporting civil authorities during emergencies and reconstruction efforts, and participating in peacekeeping missions; it is small, lightly armed, and has a limited budget; since being reduced in size and restructured with British assistance after the end of the civil war in 2002, it has received assistance from several foreign militaries, including those of Canada, China, France, the UK, and the US; the RSLAF has participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Sudan; the Land Forces are by far the largest service with four small light infantry brigades and a separate battalion, each assigned to a separate region, including the capital; the Maritime Forces have a few small coastal and in-shore patrol boats, while the Air Wing has a handful of serviceable combat helicopters; the RSLAF operates under a Joint Forces Command<br><br>the RSLAF’s origins lie in the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the RWAFF fought in both World Wars (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of Sierra Leone in 2022 where the ship was hijacked, this was the first incident reported in two years; this incident was one of only two hijackings Worldwide in 2022; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

3
africa/so.json
View file

@ -1123,9 +1123,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces are actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controls large parts of southern and central Somalia <br><br>of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective are assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government has sent thousands of troops to Eritrea and Uganda for training and in 2023 announced plans to send additional personnel to Egypt and Ethiopia for training<br><br>the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; originally about 20,000-strong (civilians, military, and police), ATMIS began reducing its staffing levels in mid-2023; its planned departure from Somalia is the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) reported no piracy attacks for the Horn of Africa in 2022; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warned that Somali pirates continued to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\"</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

6
africa/su.json
View file

@ -447,7 +447,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "47.92 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "21.43 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "20 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1252,14 +1252,14 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Sudan-Central African Republic</em>: periodic violent skirmishes persist among related pastoral populations along the border with the Central African Republic over water and grazing rights; Sudan closed its border with the Central African Republic in January 2022 due to security concerns</p> <p><em>Sudan-Chad</em>: Chad wants to be a helpful mediator in resolving the Darfur conflict, and in 2010 established a joint border monitoring force with Sudan, which has helped to reduce cross-border banditry and violence; however, since the August 2020 Juba Peace Agreement between the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the termination of the UN’s peacekeeping mission, UNAMID, at the end of 2020, violence continues to break out over land and water access</p> <p><em>Sudan-Egypt</em>: Sudan claims, but Egypt de facto administers, security and economic development of the Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary</p> <p><em>Sudan-Eritrea</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Sudan-Ethiopia</em>: civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia; clashes continue between Sudan and Ethiopia over al-Fashaga, a fertile piece of land inhabited by Ethiopian farmers for years until the Sudanese army expelled them in December 2020, claiming the land belonged to Sudan based on colonial-era maps from over 100 years ago; in February, 2022, the two countries were discussing resuming talks over the border conflict</p> <p><em>Sudan-Libya</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Sudan-South Sudan</em>: the South Sudan-Sudan boundary represents 1 January 1956 alignment, final alignment pending negotiations and demarcation; final sovereignty status of Abyei area pending negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan; clashes continue in the oil-rich Abyei region; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed since 2011, when South Sudan became independent; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has condemned renewed clashes on 23 September 2022 between the Twik and Ngok Dinka communities taking place in Agok, 28 kilometres from Abyei town</p> <p> </p>"
"text": "<p><em>Sudan-Central African Republic</em>: periodic violent skirmishes persist among related pastoral populations along the border with the Central African Republic over water and grazing rights; Sudan closed its border with the Central African Republic in January 2022 due to security concerns</p> <p><em>Sudan-Chad</em>: Chad wants to be a helpful mediator in resolving the Darfur conflict, and in 2010 established a joint border monitoring force with Sudan, which has helped to reduce cross-border banditry and violence; however, since the August 2020 Juba Peace Agreement between the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the termination of the UN’s peacekeeping mission, UNAMID, at the end of 2020, violence continues to break out over land and water access</p> <p><em>Sudan-Egypt</em>: Sudan claims, but Egypt de facto administers, security and economic development of the Halaib region north of the 22nd parallel boundary</p> <p><em>Sudan-Eritrea</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Sudan-Ethiopia</em>: civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the porous boundary with Ethiopia; clashes continue between Sudan and Ethiopia over al-Fashaga, a fertile piece of land inhabited by Ethiopian farmers for years until the Sudanese army expelled them in December 2020, claiming the land belonged to Sudan based on colonial-era maps from over 100 years ago; in February, 2022, the two countries were discussing resuming talks over the border conflict; Ethiopia's construction of a large dam (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) on the Blue Nile in northern Ethiopia since 2011 has become a focal point of relations with Egypt and Sudan; Sudan is concerned the dam will reduce the flow of water into the country; Ethiopia completed filling the dam in 2023</p> <p><em>Sudan-Libya</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Sudan-South Sudan</em>: the South Sudan-Sudan boundary represents 1 January 1956 alignment, final alignment pending negotiations and demarcation; final sovereignty status of Abyei area pending negotiations between South Sudan and Sudan; clashes continue in the oil-rich Abyei region; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has been deployed since 2011, when South Sudan became independent; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has condemned renewed clashes on 23 September 2022 between the Twik and Ngok Dinka communities taking place in Agok, 28 kilometres from Abyei town</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "682,519 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 137,402 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,477 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 72,334 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 18,597 (Central African Republic) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "4.63 million (armed conflict between rival factions of the military government of Sudan since 15 April 2023) (2023); note - includes some non-Sudanese nationals"
"text": "4.86 million (armed conflict between rival factions of the military government of Sudan since 15 April 2023) (2023); note - includes some non-Sudanese nationals"
}
}
}

5
africa/to.json
View file

@ -454,7 +454,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "32.71 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "35.66 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "3 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1239,9 +1239,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "since its creation in 1963, the Togolese military has had a history of interfering in the country’s politics with assassinations, coups, influence, and a large military crackdown in 2005 that killed hundreds; over the past decade, however, it has made some efforts to reform and professionalize, as well as increase its role in UN peacekeeping activities; Togo maintains a regional peacekeeping training center for military and police in Lome; the military participates in multinational exercises and has received training from foreign partners, including France and the US<br><br>the FAT’s current focuses are primarily terrorism and maritime security; in recent years, it has increased operations in the northern border region of the country to boost border security and prevent terrorist infiltrations from Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida-affiliated militant groups based in Mali that also operates in neighboring Burkina Faso; in 2022, the Togolese Government declared a state of emergency in the north due to the threat from JNIM following an attack on a Togolese military post that killed several soldiers; the Navy and Air Force have increased focus on combating piracy and smuggling in the Gulf of Guinea<br><br>the Army has a mixed force of small, lightly-armed combined arms, infantry, and commando regiments, as well as a rapid reaction force; the Gendarmerie includes mobile, regionally-based, and maritime units; the Navy operates a few patrol boats while the Air Force has a small inventory of training, light attack-capable, and transport aircraft, as well as combat helicopters and a few armed UAVs acquired from Turkey in 2022 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "for a second year the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the territorial and offshore waters of Togo; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {

5
africa/tp.json
View file

@ -438,7 +438,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "25.66 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "33.75 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "0.12 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1130,9 +1130,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the FASTP is one of the smallest militaries in Africa and consists of only a few companies of ground troops and some small patrol boats (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Sao Tome and Principe in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

5
africa/tz.json
View file

@ -472,7 +472,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "25.59 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "15.36 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "11.97 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1270,9 +1270,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the TDPF&rsquo;s primary concerns are maritime piracy and smuggling, border security, terrorism, animal poaching, and spillover from instability in neighboring countries, particularly Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); it participates in multinational training exercises, regional peacekeeping deployments, and has ties with a variety of foreign militaries, including those of China and the US; it has contributed troops to the UN&rsquo;s Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC and to the Southern African Development Community intervention force in Mozambique; since 2020, the TPDF has deployed additional troops to its border with Mozambique following several cross-border attacks by fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham operating in Mozambique; the TPDF&rsquo;s principal ground forces are 5 infantry brigades and an armored brigade; the Naval Forces operate patrol and fast attack boats, while the Air Force inventory includes small numbers of combat aircraft and helicopters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no piracy attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Tanzania in 2022; although the opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents; in the past, vessels have also been targeted off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, as well as in the Indian ocean, and off the west and south coasts of India and west Maldives; generally, Somali pirates tend to be well armed with automatic weapons, RPGs and sometimes use skiffs launched from mother vessels, which may be hijacked fishing vessels or dhows; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\" that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

3
africa/uv.json
View file

@ -1200,7 +1200,8 @@
"text": "the FABF has a mix of mostly older or secondhand equipment from a mix of suppliers, including France, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, and the US (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2023)"
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the military junta implemented an emergency law in 2023 that allows the president extensive powers to combat terrorist groups operating in the country, including conscripting citizens into the security services"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "650 (plus about 200 police) Mali (MINUSMA) (2023)",

2
africa/wa.json
View file

@ -439,7 +439,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "22.59 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "11.81 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "4.23 megatons (2016 est.)"

2
antarctica/hm.json
View file

@ -240,7 +240,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>none</p>"
"text": "none identified"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "NA"

2
australia-oceania/cw.json
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "Polynesians from Tahiti were probably the first people to settle Rarotonga around A.D. 900. Over time, Samoans and Tongans also settled in Rarotonga, and Rarotongans voyaged to the northern Cook Islands, settling Manihiki and Rakahanga. Pukapuka and Penrhyn in the northern Cook Islands were settled directly from Samoa. Prior to European contact, there was considerable travel and trade between inhabitants of the different islands and atolls but they were not united in a single political entity. Spanish navigators were the first Europeans to spot the northern Cook Islands in 1595 followed by the first landing in 1606. The Cook Islands remained free of further European contact until the 1760s, and in 1773, British explorer James COOK saw Manuae in the southern Cook Islands. The islands were named after COOK in the 1820s by Russian mapmakers. English missionary activity during the 1820s and 1830s banned singing and dancing and converted most of the population.<br><br>Fearing France would militarily occupy the islands like it did in Tahiti, Rarotongans asked the UK for protectorate status in the 1840s and 1860s, which the UK ignored. In 1888, Queen MAKEA TAKAU of Rarotonga formally petitioned for protectorate status, which the UK reluctantly agreed to. In 1901, the UK placed Rarotonga and the rest of the islands in the New Zealand Colony and in 1915, the Cook Islands Act organized the Cook Islands into one political entity. It remained a protectorate until 1965, when New Zealand granted the Cook Islands self-government status. The Cook Islands has a great deal of local autonomy and is an independent member of international organizations, but it is in free association with New Zealand, which is responsible for defense and foreign affairs. In September 2023, the US recognized the Cook Islands as a sovereign and independent state. Economic opportunities in the Cook Islands are sparse, and more Cook Islanders live in New Zealand than in the Cook Islands.<br><br>In a referendum in 1994, voters chose to keep the name Cook Islands rather than changing to a Maori name for the islands. The issue was revived in 2019, but after being poorly received by the diaspora in New Zealand, the government decided to retain the name Cook Islands but to provide a Maori name alongside it. The Maori name has not yet been determined."
"text": "Polynesians from Tahiti were probably the first people to settle Rarotonga around A.D. 900. Over time, Samoans and Tongans also settled in Rarotonga, and Rarotongans voyaged to the northern Cook Islands, settling Manihiki and Rakahanga. Pukapuka and Penrhyn in the northern Cook Islands were settled directly from Samoa. Prior to European contact, there was considerable travel and trade between inhabitants of the different islands and atolls but they were not united in a single political entity. Spanish navigators were the first Europeans to spot the northern Cook Islands in 1595 followed by the first landing in 1606. The Cook Islands remained free of further European contact until the 1760s, and in 1773, British explorer James COOK saw Manuae in the southern Cook Islands. The islands were named after COOK in the 1820s by Russian mapmakers. English missionary activity during the 1820s and 1830s banned singing and dancing and converted most of the population.<br><br>Fearing France would militarily occupy the islands like it did in Tahiti, Rarotongans asked the UK for protectorate status in the 1840s and 1860s, which the UK ignored. In 1888, Queen MAKEA TAKAU of Rarotonga formally petitioned for protectorate status, which the UK reluctantly agreed to. In 1901, the UK placed Rarotonga and the rest of the islands in the New Zealand Colony and in 1915, the Cook Islands Act organized the Cook Islands into one political entity. It remained a protectorate until 1965, when New Zealand granted the Cook Islands self-government status. The Cook Islands has a great deal of local autonomy and is an independent member of international organizations, but it is in free association with New Zealand, which is responsible for defense and foreign affairs. In September 2023, the US recognized the Cook Islands as a sovereign and independent state. "
}
},
"Geography": {

2
australia-oceania/fp.json
View file

@ -966,7 +966,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>none</p>"
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
}
}
}

2
australia-oceania/gq.json
View file

@ -910,7 +910,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>none</p>"
"text": "none identified"
}
}
}

2
australia-oceania/ne.json
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "<p>Voyagers from Samoa first settled on Niue around A.D. 900 and a second main group of settlers came from Tonga around 1500. With only one reliable source of fresh water, conflict was high on the island. There was continued contact with both Samoa and Tonga, and customs from those islands heavily influenced Niuean culture, including the formation of an island-wide kingship system in the early 1700s. These kings, or patu-iki, were elected by Niueans. In 1774, British explorer James COOK abandoned attempts to land on the island after several unsuccessful tries, and he named it Savage Island because of the warlike appearance of the Niueans. Missionaries arrived in 1830 but were also largely unsuccessful at staying on the island until 1846, when a Niuean trained as a Samoan missionary returned to the island and provided a space from which the missionaries could work. In addition to converting the population, the missionaries worked to stop the violent conflicts between Niueans and helped establish the first parliament in 1849.</p> <p>In 1889, King FATAAIKI and other chiefs asked the UK for protectorate status, a request that was repeated in 1895. The UK finally agreed in 1900 and King TOGIA-PULU-TOAKI formally ceded Niue that year. In 1901, Niue was annexed to New Zealand and included as part of the Cook Islands. Niue’s remoteness and cultural and linguistic differences with the Cook Islands led New Zealand to separate Niue into its own administration in 1904. The island became internally self-governing in 1974; it is an independent member of international organizations but is in free association with New Zealand, which is responsible for defense and foreign affairs. In September 2023, the US recognized Niue as a sovereign and independent state.</p> <p>Economic opportunities in Niue are sparse. The population has trended downwards over recent decades, with substantial emigration to New Zealand. In 2004, a cyclone destroyed much of the southern part of the capital, Alofi, and left about 15% of the population homeless. Many chose not to rebuild and instead moved to New Zealand (2,400 km to the southwest), where approximately 90% of all ethnic Niueans live.</p>"
"text": "<p>Voyagers from Samoa first settled on Niue around A.D. 900 and a second main group of settlers came from Tonga around 1500. With only one reliable source of fresh water, conflict was high on the island. There was continued contact with both Samoa and Tonga, and customs from those islands heavily influenced Niuean culture, including the formation of an island-wide kingship system in the early 1700s. These kings, or patu-iki, were elected by Niueans. In 1774, British explorer James COOK abandoned attempts to land on the island after several unsuccessful tries, and he named it Savage Island because of the warlike appearance of the Niueans. Missionaries arrived in 1830 but were also largely unsuccessful at staying on the island until 1846, when a Niuean trained as a Samoan missionary returned to the island and provided a space from which the missionaries could work. In addition to converting the population, the missionaries worked to stop the violent conflicts between Niueans and helped establish the first parliament in 1849.</p> <p>In 1889, King FATAAIKI and other chiefs asked the UK for protectorate status, a request that was repeated in 1895. The UK finally agreed in 1900 and King TOGIA-PULU-TOAKI formally ceded Niue that year. In 1901, Niue was annexed to New Zealand and included as part of the Cook Islands. Niue’s remoteness and cultural and linguistic differences with the Cook Islands led New Zealand to separate Niue into its own administration in 1904. The island became internally self-governing in 1974; it is an independent member of international organizations but is in free association with New Zealand, which is responsible for defense and foreign affairs. In September 2023, the US recognized Niue as a sovereign and independent state.</p>"
}
},
"Geography": {

2
australia-oceania/tv.json
View file

@ -944,7 +944,7 @@
"text": "no regular military forces; Tuvalu Police Force (Ministry of Justice, Communications, and Foreign Affairs) (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Australia provides support to the Tuvalu Police Force, including donations of patrol boats<br><br>Tuvalu has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Tuvalu's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2023)"
"text": "Tuvalu has a security pact with Austalia; Australia also provides support to the Tuvalu Police Force, including donations of patrol boats<br><br>Tuvalu has a \"shiprider\" agreement with the US, which allows local maritime law enforcement officers to embark on US Coast Guard (USCG) and US Navy (USN) vessels, including to board and search vessels suspected of violating laws or regulations within Tuvalu's designated exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the high seas; \"shiprider\" agreements also enable USCG personnel and USN vessels with embarked USCG law enforcement personnel to work with host nations to protect critical regional resources (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

2
central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json
View file

@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Haitian migrants cross the porous border into the Dominican Republic to find work; illegal migrants from the Dominican Republic cross the Mona Passage each year to Puerto Rico to find better work</p>"
"text": "unauthorized migration and smuggling from impoverished and unstable Haiti has led to occasional border tensions and increased security by the Dominican Republic, including the construction of a fence and the deployment of military troops"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json
View file

@ -371,7 +371,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "21.56 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "10.08 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "0.27 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>none</p>"
"text": "none identified"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>a transit point for cocaine and marijuana destined for North America, Europe, and elsewhere in the Caribbean; some local demand for cocaine and some use of synthetic drugs</p>"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json
View file

@ -442,7 +442,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "23.59 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "20.75 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "16.78 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Guatemala-Belize: </em>Demarcated but insecure boundary due to Guatemala’s claims to more than half of Belizean territory.  Line of Adjacency operates in lieu of an international boundary to control influx of Guatemalan squatters onto Belizean territory. Smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and human trafficking for sexual exploitation and debt bondage are all problems. Belize lacks resources to detect and extradite impoverished Guatemalan peasants squatting in Belizean rain forests in the remote border areas. Both countries agreed in April 2012 to hold simultaneous referenda, scheduled for 6 October 2013, to decide whether to refer the dispute to the ICJ for binding resolution, but this vote was suspended indefinitely. At present, Belize and Honduras 12-nm territorial sea claims close off Guatemalan access to Caribbean in the Bahia de Amatique. Maritime boundary remains unresolved pending further negotiation.<br><em><br>Guatemala-</em><em>Mexico: </em>Mexico must deal with thousands of impoverished Guatemalans and other Central Americans who cross the porous border looking for work in Mexico and the US.</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Guatemala-Belize: </em>demarcated but disputed boundary due to Guatemala’s claims to more than half of Belizean territory; line of Adjacency operates in lieu of an international boundary to control influx of Guatemalan squatters onto Belizean territory; smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and human trafficking are also problems; the dispute was referred to the ICJ in 2019 for binding resolution; the 12-nm territorial sea claims of Belize and Honduras close off Guatemalan access to Caribbean in the Bahia de Amatique; maritime boundary remains unresolved pending further negotiation<br><em><br>Guatemala-</em><em>Mexico: </em>thousands of impoverished Guatemalans and other Central Americans cross the porous border with Mexico looking for work in Mexico and the US</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"IDPs": {

5
central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json
View file

@ -1169,14 +1169,11 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Haiti's military was disbanded in 1995 after it participated in multiple coups and was accused of other political interference and human rights violations; the military was reinstated by former President MOISE in 2017 after the UN ended its peacekeeping operation in Haiti; the reconstituted military established an Army command in 2018 and has received training assistance from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico; the military’s stated mission is to assist with natural disaster relief, border security, and combating transnational crime; in 2023, Prime Minister HENRY called upon the military to assist the National Police (PNH) in combating armed gangs, which have overwhelmed the PNH, killed hundreds of Haitians, and seized control of much of the capital Port-au-Prince since the assassination of President MOISE in 2021; in 2023, an estimated 200 armed gangs were operating in Haiti<br><br>the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) operated in Haiti from 2004 until 2017; its mission was to help restore stability after President Bertrand ARISTIDE fled the country, including assisting with the political process, strengthening government institutions, and promoting and protecting human rights; following the completion of MINUSTAH’s mandate in 2017, a smaller peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), operated until 2019; its mission was to assist with the further development and strengthening of the national police, as well as Haiti’s justice and prison systems, and to promote and protect human rights; in 2019, the UN established the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) with the political mission of advising the Haiti Government in elections, governance, and security; BINUH's current mandate last until July 2023 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of Haiti in 2022, a decrease from the four attacks in 2021; ports in Haiti continue to be affected by the crime of armed robbery; most of these occurred in the main port of Port-au-Prince while ships were berthed or at anchor"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>since 2004, peacekeepers from the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti have assisted in maintaining civil order in Haiti; the mission currently includes 6,685 military, 2,607 police, and 443 civilian personnel; despite efforts to control illegal migration, Haitians cross into the Dominican Republic and sail to neighboring countries; Haiti claims US-administered Navassa Island</p>"
"text": "<em>Haiti-Dominican Republic:</em> the Dominican Republic has increased security along the Haitian border to prevent unauthorized migration and smuggling, including constructing a fence and deploying military troops; some disputes over border limits, particularly along the Massacre River<br><br><em>Haiti-US</em>: Haiti claims US-administered Navassa Island"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"IDPs": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json
View file

@ -445,7 +445,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "20.12 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "18.93 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "9.81 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Honduras-El Salvador:</em> International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on the delimitation of \"bolsones\" (disputed areas) along the El Salvador-Honduras border in 1992 with final settlement by the parties in 2006 after an Organization of American States survey and a further ICJ ruling in 2003; the 1992 ICJ ruling advised a tripartite resolution to a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Fonseca with consideration of Honduran access to the Pacific; El Salvador continues to claim tiny Conejo Island, not mentioned in the ICJ ruling, off Honduras in the Gulf of Fonseca. <br><em><br>Honduras-Belize:</em> Honduras claims the Belizean-administered Sapodilla Cays off the coast of Belize in its constitution, but agreed to a joint ecological park around the cays should Guatemala consent to a maritime corridor in the Caribbean under the OAS-sponsored 2002 Belize-Guatemala Differendum</p>"
"text": "<em>Honduras-El Salvador:</em> International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on the delimitation of \"bolsones\" (disputed areas) along the El Salvador-Honduras border in 1992 with final settlement by the parties in 2006 after an Organization of American States survey and a further ICJ ruling in 2003; the 1992 ICJ ruling advised a tripartite resolution to a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Fonseca with consideration of Honduran access to the Pacific; El Salvador continues to claim tiny Conejo Island, not mentioned in the ICJ ruling, off Honduras in the Gulf of Fonseca. <br><em><br>Honduras-Belize:</em> Honduras claims the Belizean-administered Sapodilla Cays off the coast of Belize in its constitution, but agreed to a joint ecological park around the cays should Guatemala consent to a maritime corridor in the Caribbean under the OAS-sponsored 2002 Belize-Guatemala Differendum"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"IDPs": {

7
east-n-southeast-asia/id.json
View file

@ -456,7 +456,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "15.58 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "19.34 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "563.32 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -592,7 +592,7 @@
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the president"
},
"elections/appointments": {
"text": "president and vice president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 17 April 2019 (next to be held in February 2024)"
"text": "president and vice president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 17 April 2019 (next to be held on 14 February 2024)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "<em><br>2019</em>: Joko WIDODO elected president; percent of vote - Joko WIDODO (PDI-P) 55.5%, PRABOWO Subianto Djojohadikusumo (GERINDRA) 44.5%<br><br><em>2014</em>: Joko WIDODO elected president; percent of vote - Joko WIDODO (PDI-P) 53.15%, PRABOWO Subianto Djojohadikusumo (GERINDRA) 46.85%"
@ -1297,9 +1297,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the military is responsible for external defense, combatting separatism, and responding to natural disasters; in certain conditions it may provide operational support to police, such as for counterterrorism operations, maintaining public order, and addressing communal conflicts; the TNI has undergone reforms since the 1990s to improve its professionalism and limit its involvement in internal politics; the infantry-heavy Army is the largest service and deployed throughout the country in 14 area (KODAM) and three joint area (KOGABWILHAN) defense commands; it also has a special forces command (KOPASSUS) and three strategic reserve (KOSTRAD) infantry division headquarters; as of 2023, the Army was conducting counter-insurgency operations in Papua against the West Papua Liberation Army, the military wing of the Free Papua Organization, which has been fighting a low-level insurgency since Indonesia annexed the former Dutch colony in the 1960s; it has also been assisting police in Sulawesi in countering the Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT; aka East Indonesia Mujahideen), a local militant group affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); the Navy is organized and equipped for coastal defense and patrolling Indonesia’s territorial waters where it faces such issues as piracy, transnational crime, illegal fishing, and incursions by Chinese vessels; its warships include more than 30 frigates and corvettes and a substantial number of patrol vessels, plus a handful of attack-type submarines; the Navy also has a maritime aviation component and an amphibious force with several marine infantry brigades and amphibious assault ships; the Air Force has more than 100 combat aircraft <br><br>Indonesia is not a formal claimant in the South China Sea, although some of its waters lie within China's “nine-dash line” maritime claims, resulting in some stand offs in recent years; since 2016, the Indonesian military has bolstered its presence on Great Natuna Island (aka Pulau Natuna Besar), the main island of the Middle Natuna Archipelago, which is part of the Riau Islands Province, and held military exercises in the surrounding waters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; the number of attacks in Indonesia increased to ten incidents in 2022 compared to nine in 2021; aggressive maritime patrolling by regional authorities has reduced the frequency of attacks in recent years; vessels continue to be boarded while anchored or berthed at Indonesian ports; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia"
}
},
"Space": {

5
east-n-southeast-asia/my.json
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@ -436,7 +436,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "16.04 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "21.52 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "248.29 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1238,9 +1238,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Malaysian military is a professional force primarily focused on internal and maritime security and responding to natural disasters; maritime security has received increased emphasis in recent years, particularly anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca and countering Chinese incursions in Malaysia’s Economic Exclusion Zone, as well as addressing identified shortfalls in maritime capabilities; as such, Malaysia has undertaken efforts to procure more modern ships, improve air and maritime surveillance, expand the Navy’s support infrastructure (particularly bases/ports) and domestic ship-building capacities, restructure naval command and control, and increase naval cooperation with regional and international partners; as of 2023, for example, the Navy had five frigates on order (due in 2026-2029), which would increase the number of operational frigates from two to seven, and complement its small inventory of littoral combat ships (comparable to light frigates in capabilities) and offshore patrol vessels, as well as its two attack-type submarines; in addition, the Navy conducts air and naval patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines; it also cooperates with the US military, including on maritime surveillance and training; the Army’s force structure reflects its traditional focus on counterinsurgency operations and terrorist threats; its four divisional commands are comprised largely of infantry brigades; it also has two security brigades, an airborne brigade that serves as a rapid-reaction force, and a special operations brigade; Malaysia does not have a marine corps, but places considerable emphasis on amphibious capabilities for some of its Army ground units; the Air Force has a mix of about 50 combat aircraft and helicopters <br><br>Malaysia is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported four attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Malaysia in 2022; the South China Sea remains a high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia; crews have been murdered or cast adrift; the Singapore Straits saw 38 attacks against commercial vessels in 2022, a slight increase over 2021 and the highest number of incidents reported since 1992; vessels were boarded in all of the 38 attacks while underway, four crew were taken hostage during these incidents</p>"
}
},
"Space": {

5
east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json
View file

@ -454,7 +454,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "18.38 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "22.45 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "122.29 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1271,9 +1271,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were formally organized during the American colonial period as the Philippine Army; they were established by the National Defense Act of 1935 and were comprised of both Filipinos and Americans<br><br>the US and Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty in 1951; in 2014, the two governments signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that established new parameters for military cooperation; under the EDCA, the Philippine Government may grant US troops access to Philippine military bases on a rotational basis “for security cooperation exercises, joint and combined military training activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities”; the Philippines has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation<br><br>the Philippine Government faces a number of internal threats from several armed separatists, terrorists, and criminal groups; as such, much of the AFP's operational focus is internal security, particularly in the south, where several separatist Islamic insurgent and terrorist groups operate and up to 60% of the armed forces are deployed; additional combat operations are conducted against the Communist People’s Party/New People’s Army, which is active mostly on Luzon, the Visayas, and areas of Mindanao; prior to a peace deal in 2014, the AFP fought a decades-long conflict against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a separatist organization based mostly on the island of Mindanao; the MILF's armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), had up to 40,000 fighters under arms<br><br>the AFP’s air and ground forces are experienced with and largely configured for counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations; a majority of the Air Force’s combat aircraft are ground attack capable and organized in mixed fixed-wing and helicopter squadrons or combat groups formed for mobile operations against insurgents and terrorists; similarly, 10 of the Army’s 11 divisions are light infantry, and the AFP has a joint-service special operations command comprised of rangers, scouts, special forces, counterterrorism, quick reaction, marine, naval, and air units<br><br>in addition to its typical roles of patrolling the country's territorial waters, the Navy conducts interdiction operations against terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups around the southern islands, including joint maritime patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in the Sulu Sea; the Navy has commands for offshore, littoral, and amphibious operations; most of its surface fleet consists of coastal patrol vessels and fast attack craft, although in response to maritime and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea over the past decade the Navy has acquired some larger warships, including frigates, a corvette, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), and landing platform dock (LPD) amphibious assault ships, and has plans to acquire additional corvettes and OPVs in the next few years; the Marine Corps consists of four infantry brigades and also conducts counterinsurgency operations <br><br>the Philippines National Police (PNP) also has an active role in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations alongside the AFP, particularly the Special Action Force, a PNP commando unit that specializes in urban counter-terrorism operations (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters in the South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; an emerging threat area lies in the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the Philippines and Malaysia where six ships were attacked in 2022 compared to nine in 2021; pirates and militants in the southern Philippines conduct attacks on vessels in the Sibutu passage, off Sibutu island, Tawi Tawi, Sulu sea, Celebes sea, and off eastern Sabah; they have attacked tugs, barges, fishing vessels, yachts, and merchant ships to rob and kidnap crews for ransom</p>"
}
},
"Space": {

5
east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json
View file

@ -423,7 +423,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "18.26 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "13.33 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "37.54 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1215,9 +1215,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the SAF's roots go back to 1854 when the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps was formed under colonial rule; the first battalion of regular soldiers, the First Singapore Infantry Regiment, was organized in 1957; the modern SAF was established in 1965 and is today widely viewed as the best equipped military in Southeast Asia; the SAF’s primary responsibility is external defense, but it has trained for certain domestic security operations, including joint deterrence patrols with police in instances of heightened terrorism alerts; the Army is organized into 3 combined arms divisions and a “people’s defense force,” a divisional headquarters responsible for homeland security and counterterrorism; the Army is based largely on 2-year conscripts and reservists with a small cadre of professional soldiers, and Army units are comprised of a mix of active duty and cadre/reserve battalions that are filled out by reservists upon mobilization; the Air Force and Navy are primarily comprised of professionals; the Air Force has over 100 modern US-origin combat aircraft, plus squadrons for anti-submarine warfare, maritime patrol, early warning, surveillance, and logistical support, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles and attack helicopters; the Navy’s principal combat vessels are a mix of about 20 frigates, corvettes, and littoral combat ships (comparable to a corvette in capabilities), plus a few submarines <br><br>Singapore is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported that incidents in the Singapore Straits continue to increase year on year with 38 in 2022 compared to 35 in 2021; vessels were successfully boarded in all 38 incidents in 2022; while the majority of vessels boarded reported incidents as predominately low-level opportunistic thefts, four crew were taken hostage and a further two threatened during these incidents; the majority of incidents were reported during the hours of darkness and while vessels were underway; the territorial and offshore waters in the South China Sea remain a high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia; crews have been murdered or cast adrift"
}
},
"Space": {

5
east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json
View file

@ -445,7 +445,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "29.66 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "20.89 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "192.67 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1256,9 +1256,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the PAVN is the military arm of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and responsible to the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest party organ on military policy; the CMC is led by the CPV General Secretary<br><br>the PAVN is one of the region’s largest militaries and has participated in numerous conflicts since its founding in the mid-1940s, including the First (1946-54) and Second (1950s-1975) Indochina Wars, the Cambodian-Vietnamese War (1978-1989), and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979); the PAVN’s current missions include protecting the country's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national interests; in recent years, it has increased focus on protecting the country’s maritime economy and sovereignty; it also assists with natural disasters and is heavily involved in economic projects, including electrical infrastructure, oil and gas services, hydroelectric projects, aviation and seaport services, telecommunications, and the shipbuilding industry, while military-owned factories and enterprises produce weapons and equipment; the Ground Forces are spread throughout the country in approximately eight regional commands, four operational corps, and dozens of divisions and brigades, including some that are maintained at cadre strength and filled in wartime by an estimated five million reserves; the Navy in recent years has received increased government focus for procurement efforts because of the rise in territorial disputes in the South China Sea and has a growing combat force of about 20 frigates, corvettes, and fast-attack surface vessels, plus eight attack submarines; the Air Force has a mix of approximately 75 Soviet-era and Russian-made combat aircraft (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported that incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Vietnam increased from one in 2021 to two in 2022;&nbsp; the South China Sea remains a high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia"
}
},
"Space": {

4
europe/al.json
View file

@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "17.87 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "16.28 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "4.54 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@
"stateless persons": {
"text": "1,948 (2022)"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 46,570 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-September 2023)"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 46,944 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2023)"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>a source country for cannabis and an active transshipment point for Albanian narco-trafficking organizations moving illicit drugs into European markets</p>"

6
europe/da.json
View file

@ -432,7 +432,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "10.12 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "9.66 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "31.79 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1240,11 +1240,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Iceland, the UK, and Ireland dispute Denmark's claim that the Faroe Islands' continental shelf extends beyond 200 nm; Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and Russia is collecting additional data to augment its 2001 CLCS submission</p>"
"text": "<p>Iceland, the UK, and Ireland dispute Denmark's claim that the Faroe Islands' continental shelf extends beyond 200 nm; in 2019, Denmark signed continental shelf delimitation agreements with Iceland and Norway to parts of the continental shelf in the Ægir Basin, which is located north of the Faroe Islands</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "19,424 (Syria), 5,885 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 39,680 (Ukraine) (as of 27 August 2023)"
"text": "19,424 (Syria), 5,885 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 39,680 (Ukraine) (as of 5 November 2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "11,644 (2022)"

2
europe/ei.json
View file

@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "97,05 (Ukraine) (as of 29 October 2023)"
"text": "97,505 (Ukraine) (as of 29 October 2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "7 (2022)"

4
europe/fi.json
View file

@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "5.88 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "5.47 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "45.87 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>various groups in Finland advocate restoration of Karelia and other areas ceded to the former Soviet Union, but the Finnish Government asserts no territorial demands</p>"
"text": "various groups in Finland advocate restoration of Karelia and other areas ceded to the former Soviet Union, but the Finnish Government asserts no territorial demands"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

2
europe/fo.json
View file

@ -912,7 +912,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>because anticipated offshore hydrocarbon resources have not been realized, earlier Faroese proposals for full independence have been deferred; Iceland, the UK, and Ireland dispute Denmark's claim to UNCLOS that the Faroe Islands' continental shelf extends beyond 200 nm</p>"
"text": "because anticipated offshore hydrocarbon resources have not been realized, earlier Faroese proposals for full independence have been deferred; Iceland, the UK, and Ireland dispute Denmark's claim to UNCLOS that the Faroe Islands' continental shelf extends beyond 200 nm"
}
}
}

2
europe/fr.json
View file

@ -448,7 +448,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "11.64 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "10.46 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"methane emissions": {
"text": "55.99 megatons (2020 est.)"

2
europe/gi.json
View file

@ -824,7 +824,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>in 2002, Gibraltar residents voted overwhelmingly by referendum to reject any \"shared sovereignty\" arrangement; the Government of Gibraltar insists on equal participation in talks between the UK and Spain; Spain disapproves of UK plans to grant Gibraltar even greater autonomy</p>"
"text": "the status of Gibraltar and how to police the border with Spain has been a point of contention since the UK's 2016 vote to leave the EU; the peninsula was excluded from the exit deal reached between Britain and the EU; informal arrangements are in place while the two sides negotiate over Gibraltar, which overwhelmingly backed remaining in the EU in the Brexit referendum"
}
}
}

2
europe/gk.json
View file

@ -682,7 +682,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>none</p>"
"text": "none identified"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "NA"

6
europe/gm.json
View file

@ -435,7 +435,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "11.71 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "10.73 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "727.97 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1311,11 +1311,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>none</p>"
"text": "none identified"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "664,238 (Syria), 183,631 (Afghanistan), 151,254 (Iraq), 64,496 (Eritrea), 47,658 (Iran), 38,755 (Turkey), 32,155 (Somalia), 13,334 (Russia), 12,155 (Nigeria), 9,250 (Pakistan), 6,257 (Serbia and Kosovo), 6,912 (Ethiopia), 5,532 (Azerbaijan) (mid-year 2022); 1,105,210 (Ukraine) (as of 10 October 2023)"
"text": "664,238 (Syria), 183,631 (Afghanistan), 151,254 (Iraq), 64,496 (Eritrea), 47,658 (Iran), 38,755 (Turkey), 32,155 (Somalia), 13,334 (Russia), 12,155 (Nigeria), 9,250 (Pakistan), 6,257 (Serbia and Kosovo), 6,912 (Ethiopia), 5,532 (Azerbaijan) (mid-year 2022); 1,114,070 (Ukraine) (as of 11 October 2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "28,941 (2022)"

6
europe/gr.json
View file

@ -421,7 +421,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "15.69 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "14.62 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "62.43 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Greece and Turkey continue discussions to resolve their complex maritime, air, territorial, and boundary disputes in the Aegean Sea; the mass migration of unemployed Albanians still remains a problem for developed countries, chiefly Greece and Italy</p>"
"text": "<p>Greece and Turkey continue discussions to resolve their complex maritime, air, territorial, and boundary disputes in the Aegean Sea; Greece has a security wall along a portion of its land border with Turkey to deter border crossings by migrants and has announced intentions to extend the wall along the entire border</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@
"stateless persons": {
"text": "4,488 (2022)"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 1,266,725 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2023)"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 1,269,567 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-November 2023)"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "a gateway to Europe for traffickers smuggling cannabis products and heroin from the Middle East and Southwest Asia to the West and precursor chemicals to the East; some South American cocaine transits or is consumed in Greece; money laundering related to drug trafficking and organized crime"

4
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@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
}
},
"Religions": {
"text": "Roman Catholic 37.2%, Calvinist 11.6%, Lutheran 2.2%, Greek Catholic 1.8%, other 1.9%, none 18.2%, no response 27.2% (2011 est.)"
"text": "Catholic 30.1% (Roman Catholic 27.5%, Greek Catholic 1.7%, other Catholic 0.9%), Calvinist 9.8%, Lutheran 1.8%, other Christian (includes Orthodox) 1.6%, other 0.4%, none 16.1%, no answer 40.1% (2022 est.)"
},
"Age structure": {
"0-14 years": {
@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "53,375 (Ukraine) (as of 15 October 2023)"
"text": "53,375 (Ukraine) (as of 5 November 2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "130 (2022)"

4
europe/it.json
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@ -424,7 +424,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "15.28 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "14.22 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"methane emissions": {
"text": "41.3 megatons (2020 est.)"
@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@
"stateless persons": {
"text": "3,000 (2022)"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 837,415 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2023)"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 840,958 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-November 2023)"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>important gateway for drug trafficking; organized crime groups allied with Colombian and Spanish groups trafficking cocaine to Europe</p>"

2
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@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@
"text": "<strong>note: </strong>contributes about 350-550 troops to the Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine joint military brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG), which was established in 2014; the brigade is headquartered in Poland and is comprised of an international staff, three battalions, and specialized units; units affiliated with the multinational brigade remain within the structures of the armed forces of their respective countries until the brigade is activated for participation in an international operation"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Lithuanian Armed Forces are responsible for the defense of the country’s interests, sovereignty, and territory, fulfilling Lithuania’s commitments to NATO and European security, and contributing to UN international peacekeeping efforts; Russia is Lithuania’s primary security focus, which has only increased since the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022; Lithuania has been a member of NATO since 2004 and is reliant on the Alliance as the country’s security guarantor; it is actively engaged in both NATO and EU security, as well as bilaterally with allies such as the other Baltic States, Poland, the UK, Ukraine, and the US; the Lithuanian military has participated in NATO and EU missions abroad and regularly conducts training and exercises with NATO and EU partner forces; it hosts NATO forces, is a member of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, and contributes troops to a multinational brigade with Poland and Ukraine; Lithuania participated in its first UN peacekeeping mission in 1994<br><br>the Land Forces form the backbone of the country’s defense force; the active Land Forces comprise a mechanized infantry brigade and a motorized infantry brigade; they are supplemented by the part-time National Defense Volunteer Forces, which are organized into six district-based territorial units; since 2017, Lithuania has hosted a German-led multinational NATO ground force battlegroup as part of the Alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence initiative<br><br>Lithuania has no combat aircraft but has a ground air defense unit, and NATO has provided air protection for Lithuania since 2004 through its Air Policing mission; NATO member countries that possess air combat capabilities voluntarily contribute to the mission on four-month rotations; NATO fighter aircraft are hosted at Lithuania’s Šiauliai Air Base; Lithuania’s Naval Forces have small patrol vessel and mine warfare squadrons; the Special Operations Forces have air, ground, and naval units for missions such as counterterrorism, direct action, hostage rescue, military assistance, and reconnaissance (2023)"
"text": "the Lithuanian Armed Forces are responsible for the defense of the country’s interests, sovereignty, and territory, fulfilling Lithuania’s commitments to NATO and European security, and contributing to UN international peacekeeping efforts; Russia is Lithuania’s primary security focus, which has only increased since the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022; Lithuania has been a member of NATO since 2004 and is reliant on the Alliance as the country’s security guarantor; it is actively engaged in both NATO and EU security, as well as bilaterally with allies such as the other Baltic States, Germany, Poland, the UK, Ukraine, and the US; the Lithuanian military has participated in NATO and EU missions abroad and regularly conducts training and exercises with NATO and EU partner forces; it hosts NATO forces, is a member of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, and contributes troops to a multinational brigade with Poland and Ukraine; Lithuania participated in its first UN peacekeeping mission in 1994<br><br>the Land Forces form the backbone of the country’s defense force; the active Land Forces comprise a mechanized infantry brigade and a motorized infantry brigade; they are supplemented by the part-time National Defense Volunteer Forces, which are organized into six district-based territorial units; since 2017, Lithuania has hosted a German-led multinational NATO ground force battlegroup as part of the Alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence initiative<br><br>Lithuania has no combat aircraft but has a ground air defense unit, and NATO has provided air protection for Lithuania since 2004 through its Air Policing mission; NATO member countries that possess air combat capabilities voluntarily contribute to the mission on four-month rotations; NATO fighter aircraft are hosted at Lithuania’s Šiauliai Air Base; Lithuania’s Naval Forces have small patrol vessel and mine warfare squadrons; the Special Operations Forces have air, ground, and naval units for missions such as counterterrorism, direct action, hostage rescue, military assistance, and reconnaissance (2023)"
}
},
"Space": {

4
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@ -418,7 +418,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "17.54 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "15.89 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "32.42 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -542,7 +542,7 @@
"text": "President Zuzana CAPUTOVA (since 15 June 2019)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Ľudov&iacute;t &Oacute;DOR (since 15 May 2023); Deputy Prime Ministers Stefan HOLY, Veronika REMISOVA, Richard SULIK (all since 21 March 2020)"
"text": "Prime Minister Robert FICO (since 25 May 2023); Deputy Prime Minister L&iacute;via VASAKOVA (since 23 May 2023)"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the president on the recommendation of the prime minister"

6
europe/mj.json
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@ -449,7 +449,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "20.17 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "19.3 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "2.02 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1245,12 +1245,12 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "62,075 (Ukraine) (as of 2 October 2023)"
"text": "63,205 (Ukraine) (as of 6 November 2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "468 (2022)"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 33,634 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2023)"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 33,784 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-November 2023)"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {

4
europe/mk.json
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@ -415,7 +415,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "28.34 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "25.17 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "7.05 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@
"stateless persons": {
"text": "521 (2022)"
},
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 560,841 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-September 2023)"
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> 562,235 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-October 2023)"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "major transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin and hashish; minor transit point for South American cocaine destined for Europe; although not a financial center and most criminal activity is thought to be domestic, money laundering is a problem due to a mostly cash-based economy and weak enforcement"

6
europe/nl.json
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@ -427,7 +427,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "12.07 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "10.74 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "170.78 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -558,7 +558,7 @@
"text": "King WILLEM-ALEXANDER (since 30 April 2013); Heir Apparent Princess CATHARINA-AMALIA (daughter of King WILLEM-ALEXANDER, born 7 December 2003)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Prime Minister Mark RUTTE (since 14 October 2010); Deputy Prime Ministers Sigrid KAAG and Wopke HOEKSTRA (since 10 January 2022), Carola SCHOUTEN (since 26 October 2017); note - Mark RUTTE's ruling coalition collapsed on 8 July 2023; he is serving as prime minister in a caretaker status until new elections in November 2023"
"text": "Prime Minister Mark RUTTE (since 14 October 2010); Deputy Prime Ministers Sigrid KAAG and Wopke HOEKSTRA (since 10 January 2022), Carola SCHOUTEN (since 26 October 2017); note - Mark RUTTE's ruling coalition collapsed on 8 July 2023; he is serving as prime minister in a caretaker status until new elections on 22 November 2023"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the monarch"
@ -572,7 +572,7 @@
"text": "bicameral States General or Staten Generaal consists of:<br>Senate or Eerste Kamer (75 seats; members indirectly elected by the country's 12 provincial council members by proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)<br>House of Representatives or Tweede Kamer (150 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by open-list proportional representation vote to serve up to 4-year terms)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "Senate - last held on 30 May 2023 (next to be held in May 2027)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 15-17 March 2021 (next to be held in November 2023)"
"text": "Senate - last held on 30 May 2023 (next to be held in May 2027)<br>House of Representatives - last held on 15-17 March 2021 (next to be held on 22 November 2023)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "<br>Senate - percent of vote by party - BBB 21.3%, VVD 13.3%, GL 9.3%, PvdA 9.3%, CDA 8.0%, D66 6.7%, PVV 5.3%, SP 4.0%, CU 4.0%, PvdD 4.0%, JA21 4.0%, Volt 2.7%, SGP 2.7%,  FvD 2.7%, other 2.6%; seats by party - BBB 16, VVD 10, GL 7, PvdA 7, CDA 6, D66 5, PVV 4, SP 3, CU 3, PvdD 3, JA21 3, Volt 2, SGP 2, FvD 2 other 2; composition (as of May 2023) - men 45, women 30, percent of women 40%<br>House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - VVD 22.7%, D66 16%, PVV 11.3%, CDA 9.3%, SP 6%, PvdA 6%, GL 5.3%, FvD 3.3%, PvdD 4%, CU 3.3%, Denk 2%, SGP 2%, JA21 2%, other 5.3%; seats by party - VVD 34, D66 24, PVV 17, CDA 14, GL 8, PvdD 6, PvdA 9, SP 9, CU 5, FvD 5, Denk 3, SGP 3, JA21 3, other 8; composition (as of September 2021) - men 89, women 61, percent of women 40.7%; note - total States General percent of women 37.3%"

6
europe/no.json
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@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "7.02 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "6.3 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "41.02 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@
"text": "the Norwegian Space Agency (NOSA, aka Norsk Romsenter; established 1987) (2023)"
},
"Space launch site(s)": {
"text": "And&oslash;ya Space Center (And&oslash;ya Island; established 1962, privatized 1997) (2023)"
"text": "And&oslash;ya Space Center (And&oslash;ya Island; note - first operational spaceport in continental Europe) (2023)"
},
"Space program overview": {
"text": "has a broad and active space program coordinated with the European Space Agency (ESA) and the EU; jointly designs and builds satellites with foreign partners, including communications, remote sensing (RS), scientific, and navigational/positional; operates satellites; develops and launches sounding rockets; researches and produces a range of other space-related technologies, including satellite/space launch vehicle (SLV) and space station components, telescopes, and robotics; conducts solar and telecommunications research; participates in international space programs, such as the International Space Station; hosts training for Mars landing missions on the island of Svalbard; active member of the ESA and cooperates with a variety of foreign space agencies and industries, including those of Canada, ESA/EU member states, Japan, Russia, and the US; has an active and advanced space industry that cooperates with both the NOSA and foreign space programs and produces a variety of space-related products, from terminals for satellite communications and technologies for RS satellites to sensors for gamma radiation in deep space (2023)",
@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "15,901 (Syria), 10,883 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 56,970 (Ukraine) (as of 30 August 2023)"
"text": "15,901 (Syria), 10,883 (Eritrea) (mid-year 2022); 56,970 (Ukraine) (as of 23 October 2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "3,901 (2022)"

2
europe/si.json
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@ -1241,7 +1241,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "10,315 (Ukraine) (as of 24 October 2023)"
"text": "10,405 (Ukraine) (as of 6 November 2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "10 (2020)"

4
europe/sp.json
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@ -1296,12 +1296,12 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "14,994 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 438,400 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2022); 185,875 (Ukraine) (as of 29 October 2023)"
"text": "14,994 (Syria) (mid-year 2022); 438,400 (Venezuela) (economic and political crisis; includes Venezuelans who have claimed asylum, are recognized as refugees, or have received alternative legal stay) (2022); 185,875 (Ukraine) (as of 5 November 2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "6,489 (2022)"
},
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>322,763 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-October 2023)"
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>324,734 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals, including Canary Islands (January 2015-November 2023)"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>a primary European transit point for cocaine from South America and for hashish from Morocco; cocaine is shipped in raw or liquid form with mixed cargo to avoid detection or altered to escape detection Spanish chemists reconstitute it and distribute to Europe; minor domestic drug production; synthetic drugs, including ketamine, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and MDMA transit from Spain to the United States</p>"

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europe/vt.json
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@ -533,7 +533,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>none</p>"
"text": "none identified"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "NA"

2
middle-east/gg.json
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@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Russia's military support and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence in 2008 continue to sour relations with Georgia</p>"
"text": "Russia's military support and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence in 2008 continue to sour relations with Georgia; Russia maintains military bases and troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

4
middle-east/gz.json
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "<p>The Gaza Strip has been under the de facto governing authority of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) since 2007, and has faced years of conflict, poverty, and humanitarian crises. Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the Gaza Strip area has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The Gaza Strip fell to British forces during World War I, becoming a part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt administered the newly formed Gaza Strip; Israel captured it in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo Accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly-created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank.</p> <p>In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel in late 2005 unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control the Gaza Strip’s land and maritime borders and airspace. In early 2006, HAMAS won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed to maintain a unity government, leading to violent clashes between their respective supporters and HAMAS’s violent seizure of all PA military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since HAMAS’s takeover, Israel and Egypt have enforced tight restrictions on movement and access of goods and individuals into and out of the territory. Fatah and HAMAS have since reached a series of agreements aimed at restoring political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but have struggled to enact them.</p> <p>Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip and the Israel Defense Forces periodically exchange projectiles and air strikes, respectively, threatening broader conflict. In May 2021, HAMAS launched rockets at Israel, sparking an 11-day conflict that also involved other Gaza-based militant groups. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated ceasefires to avert a broader conflict. Since 2018, HAMAS has also coordinated demonstrations along the Gaza-Israel security fence. Many of these protests have turned violent, resulting in several Israeli soldiers’ deaths and injuries as well as more than 200 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries, most of which occurred during weekly March of Return protests from 2018 to the end of 2019. </p>"
"text": "<p>The Gaza Strip has been under the de facto governing authority of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) since 2007, and has faced years of conflict, poverty, and humanitarian crises. Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the Gaza Strip area has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The Gaza Strip fell to British forces during World War I, becoming a part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt administered the newly formed Gaza Strip; Israel captured it in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo Accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly-created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank.</p> <p>In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel in late 2005 unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control the Gaza Strip’s land and maritime borders and airspace. In early 2006, HAMAS won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed to maintain a unity government, leading to violent clashes between their respective supporters and HAMAS’s violent seizure of all PA military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since HAMAS’s takeover, Israel and Egypt have enforced tight restrictions on movement and access of goods and individuals into and out of the territory. Fatah and HAMAS have since reached a series of agreements aimed at restoring political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but have struggled to enact them.</p> Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip and the Israel Defense Forces periodically exchange projectiles and air strikes, respectively, threatening broader conflict. In May 2021, HAMAS launched rockets at Israel, sparking an 11-day conflict that also involved other Gaza-based militant groups. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated ceasefires to avert a broader conflict. Since 2018, HAMAS has also coordinated demonstrations along the Gaza-Israel security fence. Many of these protests have turned violent, resulting in several Israeli soldiers’ deaths and injuries as well as more than 200 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries, most of which occurred during weekly March of Return protests from 2018 to the end of 2019.<br><br>On 7 October 2023, Hamas militants inside the Gaza Strip launched a combined unguided rocket and ground attack inside southern Israel, followed soon after by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) air strikes inside Gaza. The following day, Israeli Prime Minister NETANYAHU formally declared war on Gaza. The IDF, on 28 October, launched a large-scale ground assault inside Gaza. "
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -831,7 +831,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>according to the Oslo Accords, the status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations; Israel removed settlers and military personnel from Gaza Strip in September 2005</p>"
"text": "<p>borders with both Egypt and Israel are sealed with barriers, fences, and walls; Israel completed an underground anti-tunnel barrier in 2021<br><br></p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

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middle-east/is.json
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "Israel has become a regional economic and military powerhouse, leveraging its prosperous high-tech sector, large defense industry, and concerns about Iran to foster partnerships around the world. The State of Israel was established in 1948. The UN General Assembly had proposed to partition the British Mandate for Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state. Arab states rejected the UN plan and were subsequently defeated militarily in the 1948 war that followed the withdrawal of the British on 14 May 1948. Israel was admitted as a member of the UN in 1949 and saw rapid population growth, primarily due to migration from Europe and the Middle East, over the following years. Israel and its Arab neighbors fought wars in 1967 and 1973 and Israel signed peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. Israel took control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the course of the 1967 war, and subsequently administered those territories through military authorities. Israel and Palestinian officials signed interim agreements in the 1990s that created an interim period of Palestinian self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005. While the most recent formal efforts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to negotiate final status issues occurred in 2013-2014, the US continues its efforts to advance peace. Israel signed the US-brokered normalization agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Bahrain, the UAE, and Morocco in 2020 and reached an agreement with Sudan in 2021. Immigration to Israel continues, with more than 73,000 estimated new immigrants, mostly Jewish, in 2022.<br><br>The Israeli economy has undergone a dramatic transformation in the last 30 years, led by cutting-edge, high-tech sectors. Offshore gas discoveries in the Mediterranean, most notably in the Tamar and Leviathan gasfields, place Israel at the center of a potential regional natural gas market. In late 2022, a US-brokered agreement between Israel and Lebanon established their maritime boundary, allowing Israel to begin production on additional gasfields in the Mediterranean. However, Israel's economic prosperity is not consistently mirrored in the Israeli public's financial stability. Structural issues such as low labor force participation among religious and minority populations, low workforce productivity, high costs for housing and consumer staples, and high-income inequality, remain a concern for many Israelis and an important consideration for Israeli politicians. Former Prime Minister Benjamin NETANYAHU returned to office in late 2022 continuing his dominance of Israel's political landscape at the head of Israel's most rightwing and religious government. NETANYAHU previously served as premier from 2009 to June 2021, becoming Israel's longest serving prime minister. "
"text": "Israel has become a regional economic and military powerhouse, leveraging its prosperous high-tech sector, large defense industry, and concerns about Iran to foster partnerships around the world. The State of Israel was established in 1948. The UN General Assembly had proposed to partition the British Mandate for Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state. Arab states rejected the UN plan and were subsequently defeated militarily in the 1948 war that followed the withdrawal of the British on 14 May 1948. Israel was admitted as a member of the UN in 1949 and saw rapid population growth, primarily due to migration from Europe and the Middle East, over the following years. Israel and its Arab neighbors fought wars in 1967 and 1973 and Israel signed peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. Israel took control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the course of the 1967 war, and subsequently administered those territories through military authorities. Israel and Palestinian officials signed interim agreements in the 1990s that created an interim period of Palestinian self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005. While the most recent formal efforts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to negotiate final status issues occurred in 2013-2014, the US continues its efforts to advance peace. Israel signed the US-brokered normalization agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Bahrain, the UAE, and Morocco in 2020 and reached an agreement with Sudan in 2021. Immigration to Israel continues, with more than 73,000 estimated new immigrants, mostly Jewish, in 2022.<br><br>The Israeli economy has undergone a dramatic transformation in the last 30 years, led by cutting-edge, high-tech sectors. Offshore gas discoveries in the Mediterranean, most notably in the Tamar and Leviathan gasfields, place Israel at the center of a potential regional natural gas market. In late 2022, a US-brokered agreement between Israel and Lebanon established their maritime boundary, allowing Israel to begin production on additional gasfields in the Mediterranean. However, Israel's economic prosperity is not consistently mirrored in the Israeli public's financial stability. Structural issues such as low labor force participation among religious and minority populations, low workforce productivity, high costs for housing and consumer staples, and high-income inequality, remain a concern for many Israelis and an important consideration for Israeli politicians. Former Prime Minister Benjamin NETANYAHU returned to office in late 2022 continuing his dominance of Israel's political landscape at the head of Israel's most rightwing and religious government. NETANYAHU previously served as premier from 2009 to June 2021, becoming Israel's longest serving prime minister.<br><br>On 7 October 2023, Hamas militants inside the Gaza Strip launched a combined unguided rocket and ground attack inside southern Israel, followed soon after by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) air strikes inside Gaza. The following day, Israeli Prime Minister NETANYAHU formally declared war on Gaza. The IDF, on 28 October, launched a large-scale ground assault inside Gaza. <br>"
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -617,7 +617,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Stephanie L. HALLETT (since 21 July 2023); note - as of 3 November 2023, Jacob J. LEW, confirmed as US ambassador to Israel, was awaiting the opportunity to present his credentials to the Israeli Government"
"text": "Ambassador Jacob J. LEW (since 5 November 2023)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "14 David Flusser Street, Jerusalem, 9378322"

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middle-east/mu.json
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@ -424,7 +424,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "38.25 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "34.88 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "63.46 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1185,9 +1185,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the SAF’s primary responsibility is external security; it is a small, but professional and well-equipped military that trains regularly, including with foreign partners such as the UK, US, and Gulf Cooperation Council countries; the SAF has a longstanding security relationship with the British military going back to the 18th century; the relationship was notable during the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-1976), when the British military provided considerable assistance to the SAF in their eventually successful counterinsurgency campaign; today, the SAF and the British maintain a joint training base in Oman and exercise together regularly; in 2017, Oman and the UK signed an agreement allowing the British military the use of facilities at Al Duqm Port; in 2019, the US obtained access to the port, expanding on previous military cooperation agreements in 2014, 2010, and 1980; Oman also allows other nations to use some of its maritime facilities, including China<br><br>the Omani Navy conducts maritime security operations along the country’s long coastline, including patrolling, ensuring freedom of navigation in the key naval chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz, and countering piracy and smuggling; while Oman is not a member of the US-led, 34-member nation Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which operates task forces to counter piracy and smuggling, the Omani Navy has at times participated in CMF-led joint exercises; the Navy is a small but relatively modern force; its principal warships include nine corvettes and offshore patrol vessels, which are supported by a number of small patrol and fast attack craft<br><br>the Royal Army was formed as the Muscat Garrison in 1907; today, it has an armored brigade equipped with American and British tanks, 2 brigades of infantry, and a border guard brigade, as well as an airborne regiment; the Royal Guard is comprised of an infantry brigade and 2 special forces regiments; the Air Force has about three dozen modern European- and US-made multipurpose fighter aircraft (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\"; Coalition Task Force (CTF) Sentinel has been established to provide escorts for commercial shipping transiting the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman</p>"
}
},
"Space": {

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middle-east/ym.json
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@ -436,7 +436,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "44.96 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "41.61 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "10.61 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1155,9 +1155,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "government forces under the Yemeni Ministry of Defense are responsible for territorial defense, but also have internal security functions; their main focus is on the Houthi rebels and protecting Yemen’s maritime borders, which are susceptible to smuggling of fighters, arms, and other material support for the Houthis and terrorist groups operating in Yemen, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Yemen; they are organized into brigades of armored, border guard, infantry, mechanized, presidential protection, and special forces; the brigades vary significantly in size, structure, and capabilities; the Air Force has small numbers of mostly Soviet-era aircraft while the Navy and Coast Guard have a few patrol boats<br><br>in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states (UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt) intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Houthis; Saudi military forces conducted operations in Yemen and raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border; UAE's participation in 2015 included several thousand ground troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a smaller military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); UAE has recruited, trained, and equipped tens of thousands of Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units <br><br>Houthi forces are organized into combat, presidential protection, special forces, and tribal/militia/paramilitary brigades and independent battalions; the Houthis also have UAV and missile units, as well as naval forces (mines, missiles, and some boats); Iran has provided military and political support to the Houthis (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports a significant security risk to vessels transiting off Yemen and the Gulf of Aden due to the civil war in Yemen; vessels have been fired upon and approached, not piracy related; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {

2
north-america/gl.json
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@ -953,7 +953,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>managed dispute between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island in the Kennedy Channel between Canada's Ellesmere Island and Greenland; Denmark (Greenland) and Norway have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) and Russia is collecting additional data to augment its 2001 CLCS submission</p>"
"text": "in 2022, Canada and Denmark signed an agreement resolving a managed dispute over uninhabited Tartupaluk/Hans Island in the Kennedy Channel between Canada's Ellesmere Island and Greenland"
}
}
}

5
north-america/mx.json
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@ -463,7 +463,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "20.08 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "17.83 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "486.41 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1326,9 +1326,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Mexican military is responsible for defending the independence, integrity, and sovereignty of Mexico, as well as providing for internal security, disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and socio-economic development; in recent years, internal security duties have been a key focus, particularly in countering narcotics trafficking and organized crime groups, as well as border control and immigration enforcement; the constitution was amended in 2019 to grant the president the authority to use the armed forces to protect internal and national security, and courts have upheld the legality of the armed forces’ role in law enforcement activities in support of civilian authorities through 2028; the military also provides security for strategic facilities, such as oil production infrastructure, and administers most of the country's land and sea ports and customs services, plus the approximately 2,700 branches of a state-owned development bank; in addition, President LOPEZ OBRADOR has placed the military in charge of a growing number of infrastructure projects, such as building and operating a new airport for Mexico City and sections of a train line in the country’s southeast<br><br>the Mexican Army is a lightly armed force comprised largely of infantry supplemented by mechanized or motorized forces; it is primarily focused on internal security operations vice conventional warfare, and its posture and composition reflects an internal focus over external threats; much of the force is deployed throughout the country in 12 military regional commands and 48 subordinate military zones, giving the Army a country-wide presence and the ability to respond immediately to a crisis; force strengths in each zone vary according to the security situation, from a single infantry battalion to over 10 infantry battalions and small motorized cavalry regiments, plus other units on rotation; the Army’s principal mobile combat forces are approximately 10 light or mechanized/motorized infantry brigades, three special forces brigades, and a paratrooper brigade, which are separate from the units under the military zones; the National Guard has up to 12 military police brigades; the Air Force’s inventory reflects its chief roles of supporting the Army, conducting counter-narcotics operations, and providing assistance during natural disasters; its fixed-wing combat aircraft include a handful of US-made fighters acquired in the 1980s and about 30 light attack planes; the Air Force also has more than 30 transport aircraft, as well as about 100 multipurpose helicopters<br><br>the Mexican Navy is largely a coastal patrol force but has a growing blue water capability; it has a range of missions including maritime law enforcement, security of maritime facilities, resources, and the environment, humanitarian assistance, and search and rescue; it has fleet commands for both the Pacific and Caribbean Sea/Gulf of Mexico, plus naval aviation, and naval infantry forces; the Navy’s warships include five frigates and more than 100 patrol vessels of varying sizes and capabilities; the Naval Infantry Corps (Cuerpo de Infantería de Marina) has both external and internal security responsibilities, including providing port security, protecting the coastal fringe, and patrolling major waterways; it also has had a significant role in combating narcotics trafficking and organized crime; the Corps has more than 30 combat battalions, which include amphibious, commando, infantry, paratrooper, security, and special operations forces (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of Mexico in 2022, the same number of attacks as in 2021; ports in Mexico continue to be affected by the crime of armed robbery; this incident occurred in the port of Puerto Dos Bocas while ships were berthed or at anchor; pirates and robbers in this area are armed with guns"
}
},
"Space": {

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@ -117,8 +117,8 @@
}
},
"Military and Security": {
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, along the east coast of Africa, the Bay of Bengal, and the Strait of Malacca; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, have reduced incidents of piracy; 2022 saw no incidents in the region of the Horn of Africa, compared to one incident in 2021<br><br>the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas;\" Coalition Task Force (CTF) Sentinel has been established to provide escorts for commercial shipping transiting the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman"
"Military - note": {
"text": "according to the International Maritime Bureau, areas of high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships in territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters include the Gulf of Aden, along the east coast of Africa, the Bay of Bengal, and the Strait of Malacca; in addition, the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation advises that regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

4
oceans/zh.json
View file

@ -121,8 +121,8 @@
}
},
"Military and Security": {
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2022, there were 19 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a decrease from the total number of 34 incidents in 2021, it included the two hijackings and both ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; though crew kidnappings have decreased from 57 in 2021 to two in 2022, during the duration of the hijackings 29 crew were kept hostage; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-008 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 30 June 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea;” South American ports in Brazil, Guyana, Peru and Venezuela as well as those in Mexico and Haiti continue to be affected by the crime of armed robbery; a decrease, in this region, has been noticed in 2022 with 24 incidents reported compared to 36 in 2021; the reduction is partially attributed to the decrease in reported incidents in Callao, Peru which saw a 33% decrease compared to 2021; the majority of the vessels boarded were anchored and occurred during the hours of darkness; during these incidents, seven crew were taken hostage and six each assaulted and threatened, making this region quite at risk for crew</p>"
"Military - note": {
"text": "according to the International Maritime Bureau and the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation, the risk of piracy and armed robbery of ships in the territorial and offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea off the western coast of Africa is high; some criminals/pirates have operated as far as 200 nm offshore (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

4
oceans/zn.json
View file

@ -123,8 +123,8 @@
}
},
"Military and Security": {
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters in the South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; the Singapore Straits saw 38 attacks against commercial vessels in 2022, a slight increase over 2021 and the highest number of incidents reported since 1992; vessels were boarded in all of the 38 attacks while underway, four crew were taken hostage during these incidents; an emerging threat area lies in the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the Philippines and Malaysia where six ships were attacked in 2022 compare to nine in 2021; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargoes stolen"
"Military - note": {
"text": "according to the International Maritime Bureau, the risk for piracy and armed robbery in the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters in the South China Sea is high,particularly the Singapore Straits and the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the Philippines and Malaysia (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

3
south-america/br.json
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@ -1332,9 +1332,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Brazilian Armed Forces (BAF) are the second largest military in the Western Hemisphere behind the US; while they are responsible for external security and protecting the country’s sovereignty, Brazil does not have any territorial disputes with its neighbors or regional rivalries; the BAF’s missions include patrolling and protecting the country’s long borders and coastline and extensive territorial waters and river network, assisting with internal security, providing domestic disaster response and humanitarian assistance, and participating in multinational peacekeeping missions<br><br>the Army has a considerable internal security role; in the past decade, it has mobilized thousands of troops to conduct counternarcotics operations, support the police in combating crime, assist with disease outbreaks and humanitarian missions, and provide security for major events such as the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics; it has also cooperated with neighboring countries such as Argentina and Paraguay on border security to combat smuggling and trafficking; the Army is organized into regional commands, military regions, and geographically based divisions covering the entirety of the country; it has approximately 30 combat brigades which include light, mechanized, or motorized infantry, light armored/cavalry, special operations, artillery, and helicopter forces; many of the light infantry brigades are specialized for air mobile, airborne, jungle, mountain, or urban warfare operations; the Army has established a battalion-sized (1,000 troops) expeditionary force for foreign international missions that it plans to increase to a 3,000-strong brigade by 2030<br><br>the Navy conducts coastal, regional, and riverine operations and has a wide variety of missions ranging from sea patrolling and power projection to countering piracy, illegal fishing, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime; it is organized into 9 districts covering the entirety of the country; the Navy’s principal warships include approximately 14 frigates, corvettes, and offshore patrol ships, 7 attack submarines, and a multi-purpose helicopter landing platform (LPH) amphibious assault ship that serves as the fleet’s flagship; it also has a considerable coastal and riverine patrol vessel fleet, an aviation wing with about 50 combat aircraft and helicopters, and a marine amphibious force<br><br>the Air Force has over 100 fighter and ground attack aircraft, as well as dozens of support aircraft and helicopters for missions such as patrolling, reconnaissance, transport, logistics, special missions, and training<br><br>the three national police forces – the Federal Police, Federal Highway Police, and Federal Railway Police – have domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Ministry of Justice); there are two distinct units within the state police forces: the civil police, which performs an investigative role, and the military police, charged with maintaining law and order in the states and the Federal District; despite the name, military police forces report to the Ministry of Justice, not the Ministry of Defense; the National Public Security Force (Forca Nacional de Seguranca Publica or SENASP) is a national police force made up of Military Police from various states; the armed forces also have some domestic security responsibilities and report to the Ministry of Defense<br><br>Brazil has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation<br><br>the origins of Brazil's military stretch back to the 1640s; Brazil provided a 25,000-man expeditionary force with air and ground units to fight with the Allies in the Mediterranean Theater during World War II; the Navy participated in the Battle of the Atlantic (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Brazil are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, five attacks against commercial vessels were reported, an increase from the three attacks in 2021; all of these occurred in the port of Macapa while ships were berthed or at anchor"
}
},
"Space": {

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south-america/co.json
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5
south-america/ec.json
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@ -449,7 +449,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "14.91 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "16.55 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "41.15 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1244,9 +1244,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the military is responsible for preserving Ecuador’s national sovereignty and defending the integrity of the state; it also has some domestic security responsibilities and may complement police operations in maintaining public order if required; the military shares responsibility for border enforcement with the National Police; it trains regularly, participates in bilateral and multinational training exercises, and sends troops on UN peacekeeping missions; the military has defense ties to regional countries, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru, and security ties with the US have been revived in recent years<br><br>border conflicts with Peru dominated the military’s focus until the late 1990s and border security remains a priority, but in more recent years, security challenges have included counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations, particularly in the northern border area where violence and other criminal activity related to terrorism, insurgency, and narco-trafficking in Colombia, as well as refugees from Venezuela, have spilled over the border; the military has established a joint service task force for counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations and boosted troop deployments along those borders; other missions include countering illegal mining, smuggling, and maritime piracy; since 2012, the Ecuadorian Government has expanded the military’s role in general public security and domestic crime operations, in part due to rising violence, police corruption, and police ineffectiveness <br><br>the Joint Command of the Armed Forces (El Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas or CCFFAA) is the military’s highest body for planning, preparation, and strategic conduct of military operations; the chief of the CCFFAA is appointed by the president; the military is deployed throughout the country in five joint service operational commands or task forces; it also has a cyber defense command; the Army is organized into four regionally based divisions and approximately 12 combat brigades, including armored cavalry, artillery, aviation, infantry (including specialized jungle infantry), and special forces; the Navy is a compact force comprised of two frigates, six corvettes, three missile attack boats, and two attack submarines; it also has a small aviation force and a Marine Corps with about 2,000 amphibious infantry and commandos; the Air Force has small numbers of operational jet fighters and light ground attack aircraft, as well as some multirole helicopters  <br><br>the military has had a large role in Ecuador’s political history; it ruled the country from 1963-1966 and 1972-1979, and supported a dictatorship in 1970-1972; during the 1980s, the military remained loyal to the civilian government, but civilian-military relations were at times tenuous, and the military had considerable autonomy from civilian oversight; it was involved in coup attempts in 2000 and 2010 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022; the territorial and offshore waters of Ecuador remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; vessels, including commercial shipping and pleasure craft, have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; crews have been robbed and stores or cargoes stolen"
}
},
"Space": {

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south-america/gy.json
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@ -435,7 +435,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "20.46 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "11.11 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "2.38 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1162,14 +1162,11 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) was established in 1965; its primary missions are defense of the country, including border security, assisting civil authorities with law and order as needed, and contributing to the Guyana’s economic development; key areas of concern include disaster response, illegal fishing, narcotics trafficking, piracy, and porous borders; the GDF trains regularly and participates in both bilateral and multinational exercises; it has relationships with Brazil, China, France, the UK, and the US; the GDF’s ground force officers are trained at the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, while coast guard officers receive training at the British Royal Naval College<br><br>the GDF’s ground combat forces include 3 infantry battalions (1 reserve), a special forces squadron, and an artillery company; the coast guard has an offshore patrol craft and a few patrol boats, as well as a small amphibious “raider” force; the air corps does not have any combat aircraft but instead provides tactical observation, transport, casualty evacuation, and other forms of support to the ground forces (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Guyana are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, two attacks against commercial vessels were reported, these are the first attacks reported in three years; all of these occurred in port while ships were berthed or at anchor"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>all of the area west of the Essequibo River is claimed by Venezuela preventing any discussion of a maritime boundary; Guyana has expressed its intention to join Barbados in asserting claims before UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that Trinidad and Tobago's maritime boundary with Venezuela extends into their waters; Suriname claims a triangle of land between the New and Kutari/Koetari Rivers in a historic dispute over the headwaters of the Courantyne</p>"
"text": "<em>Guyana-Venezuela:</em> Venezuela claims all of the area west of the Essequibo River and maintains that Guyana does not have jurisdiction to grant concessions in maritime areas off the Essequibo, waters which are potentially rich in hydrocarbon resources; Guyana submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice in 2018<br><br><em>Guyana-Suriname:</em> Suriname claims a triangle of land between the New and Kutari/Koetari Rivers in a historic dispute over the headwaters of the Courantyne River"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

2
south-america/ns.json
View file

@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Suriname-Brazil</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Suriname-France (French Guiana)</em>: in March 2021, Suriname and France signed an agreement to  establish their border along the Maroni River and its tributary the Lawa River and to cooperate in combatting illegal gold mining; however, the area further south between the Litani and Marouini Rivers is still disputed, with Suriname claiming the border is along the Marouini to the east and France arguing it is along the Litani River to the west</p> <p><em>Suriname-Guyana</em>: the two countries dispute the territory between two rivers, known as the New River Triangle, with Suriname contending that the New River (also called the Upper Corentyne) to the west marks their common border, while Guyana asserts that the Kutari River to the east forms the border; each side claims that their river is the source of the Corentyne River that forms a border further north between the two countries; the Permanent Court of Arbitration settled the maritime boundary between Suriname and Guyana in 2007 in an area with potentially substantial oil reserves</p> <p> </p>"
"text": "<p><em>Suriname-Brazil</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Suriname-France (French Guiana)</em>: in March 2021, Suriname and France signed an agreement to establish their border along the Maroni River and its tributary the Lawa River and to cooperate in combatting illegal gold mining; however, the area further south between the Litani and Marouini Rivers is still disputed, with Suriname claiming the border is along the Marouini to the east and France arguing it is along the Litani River to the west</p> <p><em>Suriname-Guyana</em>: the two countries dispute the territory between two rivers, known as the New River Triangle, with Suriname contending that the New River (also called the Upper Corentyne) to the west marks their common border, while Guyana asserts that the Kutari River to the east forms the border; each side claims that their river is the source of the Corentyne River that forms a border further north between the two countries; the Permanent Court of Arbitration settled the maritime boundary between Suriname and Guyana in 2007 in an area with potentially substantial oil reserves</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>a transit country for South American cocaine en route to Europe; illicit drugs are smuggled in cargo containers, commercial and private air transport and human couriers</p> <p> </p>"

5
south-america/pe.json
View file

@ -459,7 +459,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "24.27 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "29.07 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "57.41 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1282,9 +1282,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Peruvian Armed Forces (FAP) are responsible for external security in addition to some domestic security responsibilities in designated emergency areas and in exceptional circumstances; key areas of focus include counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, disaster relief, and maritime security operations; the FAP trains regularly and participates in both bilateral and multinational exercises; it has contributed to UN missions since 1958 and has ties to regional militaries, particularly Colombia, as well as those of numerous other countries such as China, Russia, Spain, and the US; the FAP’s last external conflict was a brief border war with Ecuador in 1995; the FAP supported the police during anti-government protests in early 2023 and was accused of human rights violations <br><br>the Joint Command of the Armed Forces of Peru (Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas del Perú or CCFFAA) has responsibility for the planning, preparation, coordination, and direction of the military’s operations; the CCFFAA has oversight over commands for air, air defense, cyber, maritime, and special operations, as well as five regional commands (Amazonas, central, north, south, and Ucayali) and a Special Command of the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers (CE-VRAEM); CE-VRAEM is responsible for combating the remnants of the Shining Path terrorist group (aka Sendero Luminoso; see Appendix T) and includes several thousand air, ground, naval, police, and special forces personnel; the FAP also provides aircraft, vehicles, and logistical support to the command  <br><br>the Army was officially established in 1821 with the formation of the Peruvian Guard Legion; it has five regionally based divisions comprised of about 20 combat brigades, which include a mix of armored, artillery, jungle infantry, light infantry, mechanized cavalry, and special forces; the Army also has an aviation brigade and a multi-purpose support brigade designed in large part to provide assistance during natural disasters; the Navy, also established in 1821, includes the Coast Guard; it has undertaken efforts to modernize since the 2000s; the Navy’s warships include seven frigates, 15 corvettes and patrol ships, and six attack submarines; it also has a flotilla of river gunboats, plus naval aviation and a marine force comprised of amphibious infantry, light infantry, jungle infantry, and commandos; the Air Force, established in the 1920s, has several squadrons of French-, Russian-, and US-made fighters, multirole fighters, and fixed-wing ground attack aircraft, as well as attack helicopters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Peru are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, 12 attacks against commercial vessels were reported, a slight decrease over the 18 attacks in 2021; all of these occurred in the main port of Callao while ships were berthed or at anchor"
}
},
"Space": {

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@ -424,7 +424,7 @@
},
"Air pollutants": {
"particulate matter emissions": {
"text": "15.82 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)"
"text": "16.21 micrograms per cubic meter (2019 est.)"
},
"carbon dioxide emissions": {
"text": "164.18 megatons (2016 est.)"
@ -1190,9 +1190,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the armed forces (FANB) are responsible for ensuring Venezuela’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity but also have a domestic role, including assisting with maintaining internal order and law enforcement, contributing to national socio-economic development, and providing disaster/humanitarian assistance; the military conducts security operations in large parts of the country and has been deployed against illegal armed groups operating in the Colombian border region and other areas of the country to combat organized crime gangs involved in narcotics trafficking and illegal mining<br><br>the military has a large role in the country’s economy and political sectors; between 2013 and 2017, Venezuela established at least a dozen military-led firms in economic areas, such as agriculture, banking, construction, insurance, the media, mining, oil, and tourism; military officers reportedly lead as many as 60 state-owned companies; as of 2023, 14 of 32 government ministries were controlled by the military, including the ministries of agriculture, food, petroleum, and water<br><br>the FANB is deployed throughout the country in one maritime and seven geographical regional commands known as Integral Strategic Defense Regions (Regiones Estrategicas de Defensa Integral or REDI) that are mandated to provide for the defense, security, social, and economic needs of their respective areas of responsibility; the REDIs are further broken down into zones and state commands; the Army has six divisional headquarters and approximately 21 combat brigades spread amongst the seven geographical REDIs; the brigades are a mix of armored, artillery, infantry, military police, motorized cavalry, and special operations forces; some infantry brigades are mechanized or are specialized for airborne, jungle, mountain, or security operations; the Army also has an aviation brigade; the Navy is a coastal defense force and includes commands for operations, aviation, and the coast guard; the operational readiness of the Navy’s ship inventory has been affected by Venezuela’s economic problems; its principal operational warships include two frigates and approximately four ocean-going patrol ships; it also has two attack submarines although they are not assessed to be operational; the Navy has a marine infantry force that includes several amphibious or riverine brigades and a special operations brigade; the Air Force has less than 50 US- and Russian-made fighters and multirole fighter aircraft; the National Guard is organized into nine regional commands which control battalion and regimental size units; the Bolivarian Militia is reportedly divided into a reserve service, a territorial guard component comprised of local battalions and detachments, and a coastal guard force<br><br>members of the terrorist organizations National Liberation Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia dissidents (FARC-People's Army and Segundo Marquetalia - see Appendix T) operate in Venezuela, mostly in the states of Amazonas, Apure, Bolivar, Guarico, Tachira, and Zulia; the ELN is assessed to be present in 12 of Venezuela’s 23 states; the groups are particularly active in Apure state; the Venezuelan military has been deployed to the border region to patrol border crossings and has clashed with both the ELN and the FARC dissident groups (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "The International Maritime Bureau reported three attacks in 2022 where ships were boarded in the territorial and offshore waters of Venezuela, an increase from no attacks in 2021; ports in Venezuela continue to be affected by the crime of armed robbery; the Caribbean Sea remains at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous vessels, including commercial shipping and pleasure craft, have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; crews have been robbed and stores or cargoes stolen"
}
},
"Space": {

5
south-asia/bg.json
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@ -1305,9 +1305,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the military’s primary responsibility is external defense but it also has a domestic security role and has traditionally been a significant player in the country’s politics, as well as its economy; the military has a long history of participating in UN peacekeeping missions, which has provided operational experience and a source of funding; it runs an international institute for the training of peacekeepers; the military also conducts multinational and bilateral exercises with foreign partners, particularly India; it has commercial business interests in such areas as banking, food, hotels, manufacturing, real estate, and shipbuilding, and manages government infrastructure and construction projects<br><br>the Army is the dominant service and its primary combat forces are approximately 10 infantry divisions, complemented by several independent brigades and regiments of armor, artillery, and commandos; it maintains a large presence in the Chittagong Hills area where it conducted counterinsurgency operations against tribal guerrillas from the 1970s until the late 1990s; the Navy conducts both coastal and blue water operations and participates in UN and humanitarian missions and multinational exercises; its principal combat ships are a mix of approximately 15 frigates, corvettes, and large patrol ships, as well as a few attack submarines; the Air Force has about 50 mostly Chinese- and Russian-made combat aircraft organized into several squadrons (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Bangladesh remain a risk for armed robbery against ships; there were seven attacks reported in 2022 as opposed to none in 2021"
}
},
"Space": {
@ -1331,7 +1328,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "965,467 (Burma) (2023)"
"text": "967,842 (Burma) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "427,000 (conflict, development, human rights violations, religious persecution, natural disasters) (2022)"

3
south-asia/in.json
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@ -1323,9 +1323,6 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Indian military is a large, experienced, professional, and well-equipped military that performs a variety of missions; it is primarily focused on China and Pakistan and territorial defense, while secondary missions include regional power projection, UN peacekeeping deployments, humanitarian operations, and support to internal security forces; it has fought in several significant conflicts and counterinsurgency operations since 1947 and regularly conducts large-scale exercises; the military may act internally under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) of 1958, an act of the Indian Parliament that granted special powers to put down separatist movements in \"disturbed areas\"; the AFSPA, 1958 and a virtually identical law, the Armed Forces (Jammu &amp; Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, have been in force since 1958 in parts of northeast India, and since 1990 in Jammu &amp; Kashmir<br><br>the Army is organized into 14 operational corps; the basic field formations under the corps are approximately 40 armored, artillery, infantry, mechanized, or mountain infantry divisions; there are also a number of independent airborne, armored, and artillery brigades, as well as special operations forces; in 2023, the Army announced that it was reorganizing its operational corps and divisions into division-sized “integrated battle groups,” which the Army assessed would be more agile and flexible<br><br>the Navy is a blue water force that operates in seas stretching from the western Mediterranean to the Strait of Malacca and the western Pacific; it routinely conducts months-long deployments, exercises with other navies, and conducts a variety of missions such as counter-piracy, humanitarian, and naval diplomacy; its principal ships include two aircraft carriers, more than 50 destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and large patrol vessels, 16 attack submarines, and two nuclear-powered ballistic missile capable submarines; the Navy also has several combat aircraft and anti-submarine warfare helicopter squadrons, as well as a marine amphibious brigade and a marine commando force<br><br>the Air Force is one of the World’s largest with more than 600 British-, French-, Russian/Soviet-, and domestically produced combat aircraft, plus nearly 500 combat helicopters; the tri-service Strategic Forces Command manages all of India’s strategic missile forces <br><br>the short 1962 Sino-India War left in place one of the World’s longest disputed international borders, resulting in occasional standoffs between Indian and Chinese security forces, including lethal clashes in 1975 and 2020; meanwhile, India and Pakistan have fought several conflicts since 1947, including the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and the Indo-Pakistan and Bangladesh War of Independence of 1971, as well as two clashes over the disputed region of Kashmir (the First Kashmir War of 1947 and the 1999 Kargil Conflict); a fragile cease-fire in Kashmir was reached in 2003, revised in 2018, and reaffirmed in 2021, although the Line of Control remains contested, and India has accused Pakistan of backing armed separatists and terrorist organizations in Jammu and Kashmir where Indian forces have conducted counterinsurgency operations since the 1980s; in addition, India and Pakistan have battled over the Siachen Glacier of Kashmir, which was seized by India in 1984 with Pakistan attempting to retake the area at least three times between 1985 and 1995; despite a cease-fire, both sides continue to maintain a permanent military presence there with outposts at altitudes above 20,000 feet (over 6,000 meters) where most casualties are due to extreme weather and the hazards of operating in the high mountain terrain of the world’s highest conflict, including avalanches, exposure, and altitude sickness (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of India are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, three attacks against commercial vessels were reported, an increase from the two attacks in 2021; all of these occurred in port while ships were berthed or at anchor"
}
},
"Space": {

4
world/xx.json
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@ -849,8 +849,8 @@
"Military deployments": {
"text": "there are over 85,000 personnel, including military, police, and civilians from 121 countries deployed on UN peacekeeping missions worldwide (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) received 115 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in 2022 compared with 132 reports in 2021; the 2022 figures are broken down as 107 vessels boarded, five attempted attacks, two vessels hijacked, and one fired upon; though the downward trend in reported incidents is welcomed, the risk to crew remains with 41 crew taken hostage, six assaulted and threatened, and two kidnapped; the continued and much-needed reduction is attributed to an overall decrease of piratical activity within the Gulf of Guinea region – down from 35 incidents in 2021 to 19 in 2022; in 2022, incidents in these waters were reported at up to 260 nm from the coast; though crew kidnappings decreased from 57 in 2021 to two in 2022, during the duration of the hijackings 29 crew were kept hostage<br><br>the Horn of Africa saw no reported piracy attacks in 2022; although the opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents; the decrease in successful pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa since the peak in 2007 was due, in part, to anti-piracy operations by international naval forces, the hardening of vessels, and the increased use of armed security teams aboard merchant ships; despite these preventative measures, the assessed risk remains high<br><br>incidents in the Singapore Straits continue to increase year on year with 38 in 2022 compared to 35 in 2021; vessels were successfully boarded in all 38 incidents in 2022; while the majority of vessels boarded reported incidents as predominately low-level opportunistic thefts, four crew were taken hostage and a further two threatened during these incidents; the majority of incidents were reported during the hours of darkness and while vessels were underway; there were 10 attacks in Indonesian waters in 2022 compared to nine in 2021, primarily to ships anchored or berthed<br><br>South American ports in Brazil, Guyana, Peru, and Venezuela as well as those in Mexico and Haiti continue to be affected by the crime of armed robbery; this region experienced a decrease in 2022 with 24 incidents reported compared to 36 in 2021; the reduction is partially attributed to the decrease in reported incidents in Callao, Peru which saw a 33% drop compared to 2021; the majority of boardings were on anchored vessels and at night; during these incidents, seven crew were taken hostage and six assaulted and threatened, making this region risky for crewmen; the majority (64%) of global attacks against shipping occurred in the offshore waters of five countries - Bangladesh, Ghana, Indonesia, Singapore Straits, and Peru (2021)"
"Military - note": {
"text": "Atlantic Ocean: according to the International Maritime Bureau and the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation, the risk of piracy and armed robbery of ships in the territorial and offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea off the western coast of Africa is high; some criminals/pirates have operated as far as 200 nm offshore <br><br>Indian Ocean: according to the International Maritime Bureau, areas of high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships in territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters include the Gulf of Aden, along the east coast of Africa, the Bay of Bengal, and the Strait of Malacca; in addition, the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation advises that regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin <br><br>Pacific Ocean: according to the International Maritime Bureau, the risk for piracy and armed robbery in the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters in the South China Sea is high,particularly the Singapore Straits and the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the Philippines and Malaysia<br><br>Other: the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation also advises that regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and the Eastern Mediterranean (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {