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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "one of the world’s most connected countries with modern infrastructure and record Internet, broadband, and mobile use; low-cost smartphones drive mobile-broadband penetration; LTE networks cover most of the population with launch of 5G in partnership with Chinese company ZTE; submarine cables connect to South Africa, Middle East, Pakistan, and Europe; ISPs are fully or partially owned by state, allowing control over flow of information; during pandemic, there was a surge of Internet use from home, with temporary government relaxation of restrictions on streaming such as Zoom, Skype, and Microsoft Teams; government censorship and surveillance of online platforms; service prices are highest in the region, yet affordable for population’s affluent users; government launched free digital platforms for students; Dubai and Abu Dhabi are smart cities with government plan to digitize services across country; major importer of broadcasting equipment from China and exporter of broadcasting equipment to Iraq and Saudi Arabia (2020)"
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"text": "the UAE has a strong mobile market, dominated by Etisalat and du; both are majority-owned by the government; in a bid to attract additional foreign investment, it was resolved in early 2021 that the stake held by foreigners in the two companies could be increased; Etisalat and du have deployed LTE networks providing national coverage, while the 5G penetration rate is the second highest globally after China; this has underpinned growth in the mobile broadband sector, and has enabled the strong development in the take-up of rich content and applications, as well as m-commerce; to help increase the capacity of 5G networks in coming years, and so keep up with data demand, the government has allowed for the GSM networks to be closed down and for spectrum and other assets to be re-purposed for 5G by the end of 2022; the fixed-broadband network in the UAE is dominated by fiber, with DSL having a minor and declining presence; this focus on a fully fiber infrastructure has also facilitated growth in e-commerce, and has supported the government’s long-term aim of transitioning the economy from its dependence on oil to being knowledge-based and supported by digital services; the country stands to benefit from having signed the Abraham Accord Declaration with Israel, which aims to normalize relations between the two countries; such benefits can be seen in the agreement to enable local ISPs to access Bezeq International’s submarine cable infrastructure, and so improve direct connectivity to Europe, South East Asia, and Africa; the UAE’s ISPs can also access Bezeq International’s data center in Tel Aviv, improving internet services. (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "microwave radio relay, fiber-optic and coaxial cable; fixed-line roughly 24 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 186 per 100 (2020)"
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@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 971; landing points for the FLAG, SEA-ME-WE-3 ,-4 & -5, Qater UAE Submarine Cable System, FALCON, FOG, Tat TGN-Gulf, OMRAN/EPEG Cable System, AAE-1, BBG, EIG, FEA, GBICS/MENA, IMEWE, Orient Express, TEAMS, TW1 and the UAE-Iran submarine cables, linking to Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Southeast Asia and Australia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 2 Indian) (2020)"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "except for the many organizations now operating in media free zones in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, most TV and radio stations remain government-owned; widespread use of satellite dishes provides access to pan-Arab and other international broadcasts; restrictions since June 2017 on some satellite channels and websites originating from or otherwise linked to Qatar (2018)"
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"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds (if needed) for a 7-year term; a single individual is eligible for unlimited terms; election last held on 11 April 2018 (next to be held in 2025); prime minister and first deputy prime minister appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly; note - a constitutional amendment approved in a September 2016 referendum expanded the presidential term from 5 to 7 years; a separate constitutional amendment approved in the same referendum also introduced the post of first vice-president and additional vice-presidents, who are directly appointed by the president"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "Ilham ALIYEV reelected president in first round; percent of vote - Ilham ALIYEV (YAP) 86%, Zahid ORUJ (independent) 3.1%, other 10.9%"
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"text": "Ilham ALIYEV reelected president (11 April 2018) in first round; percent of vote - Ilham ALIYEV (YAP) 86%, Zahid ORUJ (independent) 3.1%, other 10.9%"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> OSCE observers noted shortcomings in the election, including a restrictive political environment, limits on fundamental freedoms, a lack of genuine competition, and ballot box stuffing"
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},
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}
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},
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"Political parties and leaders": {
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"text": "Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party or ADMP [Elshan MASAYEV]<br>Civil Solidarity Party or CSP [Sabir RUSTAMKHANLI]<br>Civic Unity Party or CUP [Sabir HAJIYEV]<br>Great Order Party [Fazil MUSTAFA]<br>Islamic Party of Azerbaijan [Mavsum SAMADOV]<br>Musavat [Arif HAJILI]<br>Popular Front Party [Ali KARIMLI]<br>Motherland Party or AVP [Fazail AGAMALI]<br>National Front Party [Razi NURULLAYEV]<br>National Revival Movement Party [Faraj GULIYEV]<br>Party for Democratic Reforms or PDR [Asim MOLLAZADE]<br>Republican Alternative Party or REAL [Ilgar MAMMADOV]<br>Social Democratic Party [Ayaz MUTALIBOV]<br>Social Prosperity Party [Khanhusein KAZIMLI]<br>Unity Party or VP [Tahir KARIMLI]<br>Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [Gudrat HASANGULIYEV]<br>Yeni (New) Azerbaijan Party or YAP [President Ilham ALIYEV]"
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"text": "Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party or ADMP [Elshan MASAYEV]<br>Civic Solidarity Party or VHP [Sabir RUSTAMKHANLI]<br>Civic Unity Party or CUP [Sabir HAJIYEV]<br>Great Order Party [Fazil MUSTAFA]<br>Islamic Party of Azerbaijan or AiP [Mavsum SAMADOV]<br>Musavat [Arif HAJILI]<br>Popular Front Party [Ali KARIMLI]<br>Motherland Party or AVP [Fazail AGAMALI]<br>National Front Party [Razi NURULLAYEV]<br>National Revival Movement Party [Faraj GULIYEV]<br>Party for Democratic Reforms or PDR [Asim MOLLAZADE]<br>Republican Alternative Party or REAL [Ilgar MAMMADOV]<br>Social Democratic Party [Ayaz MUTALIBOV]<br>Social Prosperity Party [Asli KAZIMOVA]<br>Unity Party or VP [Tahir KARIMLI]<br>Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [Gudrat HASANGULIYEV]<br>New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasi) or YAP [Ilham ALIYEV]"
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},
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"International organization participation": {
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"text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CICA, CIS, EAPC, EBRD, ECO, FAO, GCTU, GUAM, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 994; the TAE fiber-optic link transits Azerbaijan providing international connectivity to neighboring countries; the old Soviet system of cable and microwave is still serviceable; satellite earth stations - 2 (2019)"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "3 state-run and 1 public TV channels; 4 domestic commercial TV stations and about 15 regional TV stations; cable TV services are available in Baku; 1 state-run and 1 public radio network operating; a small number of private commercial radio stations broadcasting; local FM relays of Baku commercial stations are available in many localities; note - all broadcast media is pro-government, and most private broadcast media outlets are owned by entities directly linked to the government"
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"text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the prime minister"
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},
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"elections/appointments": {
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"text": "president indirectly elected by the National Assembly in 3 rounds if needed for a single 7-year term; election last held on 2-3 March 2022; prime minister elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by the National Assembly; election last held 2 August 2021"
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"text": "president indirectly elected by the National Assembly in 3 rounds if needed for a single 7-year term; election last held on 2-3 March 2022; prime minister elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by the National Assembly; election last held 2 August 2021; the next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Armenia by 2026"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": " <em>2022: </em>Vahagn KHACHATURYAN elected president in second round; note - Vahagn KHACHATURYAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 71-0<em><br><br>2018:</em> Armen SARKISSIAN elected president in first round; note - Armen SARKISSIAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 90-10"
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}
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},
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"Political parties and leaders": {
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"text": "twenty-five political parties or alliances competed in the June 2021 election; the top three parties or alliances that entered parliament garnered 80% of the vote; the below parties received 1% or more of the vote:<br>5165 National Conservative Movement Party [Karin TONOYAN]<br>Alliance of Democrats [Arman BABAJANYAN]<br>Armenia Alliance or HD (alliance of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Reborn Armenia Party) [Robert KOCHARYAN]<br>Armenian National Congress or ANC (bloc of independent and opposition parties) [Levon TER-PETROSSIAN]<br>Bright Armenia [Edmon MARUKYAN]<br>Civil Contract or KP [Nikol PASHINYAN]<br>Homeland Party [Artur VANETSYAN]<br>Homeland of Armenians [Artak GALSTYAN]<br>I Have Honor Alliance (alliance of the RPA and the Homeland Party, co-led by the two allied parties' leaders)<br>Liberal Party [Samvel BABAYAN]<br>National Democratic Party [Vahe GASPARYAN]<br>Prosperous Armenia or BHK [Gagik TSARUKYAN]<br>Republic Party [Aram SARGSYAN]<br>Republican Party of Armenia or RPA [Serzh SARGSIAN]"
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"text": "twenty-five political parties or alliances competed in the June 2021 election; the top three parties or alliances that entered parliament garnered 80% of the vote; the below parties received 1% or more of the vote:<br>5165 National Conservative Movement Party [Karin TONOYAN]<br>Alliance of Democrats [Arman BABAJANYAN]<br>Armenia Alliance or HD [Robert KOCHARYAN] (alliance of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Reborn Armenia Party)<br>Armenian National Congress or ANC [Levon TER-PETROSSIAN] (bloc of independent and opposition parties)<br>Bright Armenia [Edmon MARUKYAN]<br>Civil Contract or KP [Nikol PASHINYAN]<br>Homeland of Armenians [Artak GALSTYAN]<br>Homeland Party [Artur VANETSYAN]<br>I Have Honor Alliance (alliance of the RPA and the Homeland Party, co-led by the two allied parties' leaders)<br>Liberal Party [Samvel BABAYAN]<br>National Democratic Party [Vahe GASPARYAN]<br>Prosperous Armenia or BHK [Gagik TSARUKYAN]<br>Republic Party (Hanrapetutyun Party) [Aram SARGSYAN]<br>Republican Party of Armenia or RPA [Serzh SARGSIAN]"
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},
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"International organization participation": {
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"text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CIS, CSTO, EAEC (observer), EAEU, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, GCTU, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM (observer), OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 374; Yerevan is connected to the Caucasus Cable System fiber-optic cable through Georgia and Iran to Europe; additional international service is available by microwave radio relay and landline connections to the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, through the Moscow international switch, and by satellite to the rest of the world; satellite earth stations - 3 (2019)"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "<p>Armenia’s government-run Public Television network operates alongside 100 privately owned TV stations that provide local to near nationwide coverage; three Russian TV companies are broadcast in Armenia under interstate agreements; subscription cable TV services are available in most regions; several major international broadcasters are available, including CNN; Armenian TV completed conversion from analog to digital broadcasting in late 2016; Public Radio of Armenia is a national, state-run broadcast network that operates alongside 18 privately owned radio stations</p> (2019)"
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "Bahrain continues to develop its telecoms sector in a bid to develop its long-term Economic Vision 2030 strategy; this is a multi-faceted strategy aimed at developing a digital transformation across numerous sectors, including e-government, e-health, e-commerce, and e-banking; the major telcos including Batelco, STC Bahrain, and Zain Bahrain have been supported by the government and regulator to develop services and network infrastructure to facilitate implementing the strategy; 5G services have become widely available since they were launched in 2020; the national broadband network operator BNET was also financially separated from Batelco in mid-2021, in a bid to improve its responsibilities as a neutral wholesale access provider; Bahrain’s telecom sector by the Fourth National Telecommunications Plan (initiated in 2016) which focuses on fiber optic infrastructure deployment and establishing affordable prices for high-speed access. (2022)"
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"text": "Bahrain continues to develop its telecoms sector in a bid to develop its long-term Economic Vision 2030 strategy; this is a multi-faceted strategy aimed at developing a digital transformation across numerous sectors, including e-government, e-health, e-commerce, and e-banking; the major telcos including Batelco, STC Bahrain, and Zain Bahrain have been supported by the government and regulator to develop services and network infrastructure to facilitate implementing the strategy; 5G services have become widely available since they were launched in 2020; the national broadband network operator BNET was also financially separated from Batelco in mid-2021, in a bid to improve its responsibilities as a neutral wholesale access provider; Bahrain’s telecom sector by the Fourth National Telecommunications Plan (initiated in 2016) which focuses on fiber optic infrastructure deployment and establishing affordable prices for high-speed access. (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "approximately 16 per 100 fixed-line and 103 per 100 mobile-cellular; modern fiber-optic integrated services; digital network with rapidly expanding mobile-cellular telephones (2020)"
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 973; landing points for the FALCON, Tata TGN-Gulf, GBICS/MENA, and FOG submarine cable network that provides links to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; tropospheric scatter to Qatar and UAE; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia; satellite earth station - 1 (2019)"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "state-run Bahrain Radio and Television Corporation (BRTC) operates 5 terrestrial TV networks and several radio stations; satellite TV systems provide access to international broadcasts; 1 private FM station directs broadcasts to Indian listeners; radio and TV broadcasts from countries in the region are available (2019)"
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"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 28 November 2018 (next to be held in 2024); prime minister nominated by Parliament, appointed by the president <br><br>note - 2017 constitutional amendments made the 2018 election the last where the president was directly elected; future presidents will be elected by a 300-member College of Electors; in light of these changes, ZOURABICHVILI was allowed a six-year term"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "Salome ZOURABICHVILI elected president in runoff; percent of vote - Salome ZOURABICHVILI (independent, backed by Georgian Dream) 59.5%, Grigol VASHADZE (UNM) 40.5%; Irakli GARIBASHVILI approved as prime minister by Parliamentary vote 89-2"
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"text": "2018 Salome ZOURABICHVILI elected president in runoff; percent of vote - Salome ZOURABICHVILI (independent, backed by Georgian Dream) 59.5%, Grigol VASHADZE (UNM) 40.5%; Irakli GARIBASHVILI approved as prime minister by Parliamentary vote 89-2<br><br>2013 Giorgi MARGVELASHVILI is sworn in as president (Georgian Dream) 62.1%, David BAKRADZE (ENM) 21.7%, Nino BURJANADZE (DM-UG) 10.2%, other 6%"
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}
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},
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"Legislative branch": {
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 995; landing points for the Georgia-Russia, Diamond Link Global, and Caucasus Cable System fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to Russia, Romania and Bulgaria; international service is available by microwave, landline, and satellite through the Moscow switch; international electronic mail and telex service are available (2019)"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "The Tbilisi-based Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) includes Channel 1, Channel 2, and the Batumi-based Adjara TV, and the State Budget funds all three; there are also a number of independent commercial television broadcasters, such as Imedi, Rustavi 2, Pirveli TV, Maestro, Kavkasia, Georgian Dream Studios (GDS), Obiektivi, Mtavari Arkhi, and a small Russian language operator TOK TV; Tabula and Post TV are web-based television outlets; all of these broadcasters and web-based television outlets, except GDS, carry the news; the Georgian Orthodox Church also operates a satellite-based television station called Unanimity; there are 26 regional television broadcasters across Georgia that are members of the Georgian Association of Regional Broadcasters and/or the Alliance of Georgian Broadcasters; the broadcaster organizations seek to strengthen the regional media's capacities and distribution of regional products: a nationwide digital switchover occurred in 2015; there are several dozen private radio stations; GPB operates 2 radio stations (2019)"
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"international": {
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"text": "country code 970 or 972 (2018)"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "1 TV station and about 10 radio stations; satellite TV accessible"
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"text": "the military wing of HAMAS is armed with light weapons, including an inventory of improvised rocket, anti-tank missile, and mortar capabilities; HAMAS acquires its weapons through smuggling or local construction and receives some military support from Iran (2021)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, HAMAS has claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks into Israel and organized protests at the border between Gaza and Israel, resulting in violent clashes, casualties, and reprisal military actions by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in May of 2021, which ended in an informal truce; sporadic clashes continued through 2021, including incendiary balloon attacks from Gaza and retaliatory IDF strikes; Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has conducted numerous attacks on Israel since the 1980s, including a barrage of mortar and rocket strikes in 2020, also prompting IDF counter-strikes; see Appendix-T for more details on HAMAS and PIJ</p>"
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"text": "since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, HAMAS has claimed responsibility for numerous rocket attacks into Israel and organized protests at the border between Gaza and Israel, resulting in violent clashes, casualties, and reprisal military actions by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in May of 2021, which ended in an informal truce; sporadic clashes continued into 2022, including incendiary balloon attacks from Gaza and retaliatory IDF strikes; Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has conducted numerous attacks on Israel since the 1980s, including a barrage of mortar and rocket strikes in 2020, also prompting IDF counter-strikes; see Appendix-T for more details on HAMAS and PIJ<br><br>in 2017, HAMAS and PIJ announced the formation of a \"joint operations room\" to coordinate the activities of their armed wings; by late 2020, the formation consisted of 12 militant groups operating in Gaza and had conducted its first joint training exercise (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 98; landing points for Kuwait-Iran, GBICS & MENA, FALCON, OMRAN/3PEG Cable System, POI and UAE-Iran submarine fiber-optic cable to the Middle East, Africa and India; (TAE) fiber-optic line runs from Azerbaijan through the northern portion of Iran to Turkmenistan with expansion to Georgia and Azerbaijan; HF radio and microwave radio relay to Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Syria, Kuwait, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; satellite earth stations - 13 (9 Intelsat and 4 Inmarsat) (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "state-run broadcast media with no private, independent broadcasters; Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the state-run TV broadcaster, operates 19 nationwide channels including a news channel, about 34 provincial channels, and several international channels; about 20 foreign Persian-language TV stations broadcasting on satellite TV are capable of being seen in Iran; satellite dishes are illegal and, while their use is subjectively tolerated, authorities confiscate satellite dishes from time to time; IRIB operates 16 nationwide radio networks, a number of provincial stations, and an external service; most major international broadcasters transmit to Iran (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Israel’s developed economy largely revolves around high technology products, primarily used in the medical, biotechnology, agricultural, materials, and military industries; the country also attracts investment in its cyber-security industry, and has established itself as a hub for thousands of start-up companies; to underpin these developments, Israel has developed a robust telecoms sector; household broadband subscriptions is high, with a focus on fiber-network deployment; Bezeq offers FttP services with data rates of up to 2.5Gb/s; LTE services are almost universally available, while the August 2020 multi-frequency bands also enabled the MNOs to provide services based on 5G; 5G will be supported by moves to close down GSM and 3G networks in stages through to the end of 2025, with the physical assets and frequencies to be repurposed for LTE and 5G use. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Israel’s developed economy largely revolves around high technology products, primarily used in the medical, biotechnology, agricultural, materials, and military industries; the country also attracts investment in its cyber-security industry, and has established itself as a hub for thousands of start-up companies; to underpin these developments, Israel has developed a robust telecoms sector; household broadband subscriptions is high, with a focus on fiber-network deployment; Bezeq offers FttP services with data rates of up to 2.5Gb/s; LTE services are almost universally available, while the August 2020 multi-frequency bands also enabled the MNOs to provide services based on 5G; 5G will be supported by moves to close down GSM and 3G networks in stages through to the end of 2025, with the physical assets and frequencies to be repurposed for LTE and 5G use. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "good system of coaxial cable and microwave radio relay; all systems are digital; competition among both fixed-line and mobile cellular providers results in good coverage countrywide; fixed-line nearly 36 per 100 and nearly 132 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 972; landing points for the MedNautilus Submarine System, Tameres North, Jonah and Lev Submarine System, submarine cables that provide links to Europe, Cyprus, and parts of the Middle East; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "the Israel Broadcasting Corporation (est 2015) broadcasts on 3 channels, two in Hebrew and the other in Arabic; multi-channel satellite and cable TV packages provide access to foreign channels; the Israeli Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts on 8 radio networks with multiple repeaters and Israel Defense Forces Radio broadcasts over multiple stations; about 15 privately owned radio stations; overall more than 100 stations and repeater stations (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -540,7 +540,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Administrative divisions": {
|
||||
"text": "18 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah (Arabic); parezgakan, singular - parezga (Kurdish)) and 1 region*; 'Al Anbar; Al Basrah; Al Muthanna; Al Qadisiyah (Ad Diwaniyah); An Najaf; Arbil (Erbil) (Arabic), Hewler (Kurdish); As Sulaymaniyah (Arabic), Slemani (Kurdish); Babil; Baghdad; Dahuk (Arabic), Dihok (Kurdish); Dhi Qar; Diyala; Karbala'; Kirkuk; Maysan; Ninawa; Salah ad Din; Wasit",
|
||||
"note": "Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government administers Dahuk, Erbil, and As Sulaymaniyah"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government administers Dahuk, Erbil, and As Sulaymaniyah"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Independence": {
|
||||
"text": "3 October 1932 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration); note - on 28 June 2004 the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Iraq continues to face a number of political and economic challenges, though increasing civil stability has made it easier for mobile and fixed-line operators to rebuild telecom services and infrastructure damaged during the last few years; the government extended the licenses held by the MNOs for an additional three years to compensate for the chaos and destruction caused between 2014 and 2017 when Islamic State held sway in many areas of the country; the three major MNOs are Zain Iraq, Asiacell, and Korek Telecom, which together control over 90% of the mobile market; the companies have struggled to develop LTE services; with LTE services being very low, there is little chance for 5G to be available in the short term; most services are still based on GSM and 3G, except in the Kurdish region where LTE is more widely available. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Iraq continues to face a number of political and economic challenges, though increasing civil stability has made it easier for mobile and fixed-line operators to rebuild telecom services and infrastructure damaged during the last few years; the government extended the licenses held by the MNOs for an additional three years to compensate for the chaos and destruction caused between 2014 and 2017 when Islamic State held sway in many areas of the country; the three major MNOs are Zain Iraq, Asiacell, and Korek Telecom, which together control over 90% of the mobile market; the companies have struggled to develop LTE services; with LTE services being very low, there is little chance for 5G to be available in the short term; most services are still based on GSM and 3G, except in the Kurdish region where LTE is more widely available. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "3G services offered by three major mobile operators; 4G offered by one operator in Iraqi; conflict has destroyed infrastructure in areas; about 10 per 100 for fixed-line and 92 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1099,7 +1099,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 964; landing points for FALCON, and GBICS/MENA submarine cables providing connections to the Middle East, Africa and India; satellite earth stations - 4 (2 Intelsat - 1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean, 1 Intersputnik - Atlantic Ocean region, and 1 Arabsat (inoperative)); local microwave radio relay connects border regions to Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and Turkey (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "the number of private radio and TV stations has increased rapidly since 2003; government-owned TV and radio stations are operated by the publicly funded Iraqi Media Network; private broadcast media are mostly linked to political, ethnic, or religious groups; satellite TV is available to an estimated 70% of viewers and many of the broadcasters are based abroad; transmissions of multiple international radio broadcasters are accessible (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 962; landing point for the FEA and Taba-Aqaba submarine cable networks providing connectivity to Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Asia; satellite earth stations - 33 (3 Intelsat, 1 Arabsat, and 29 land and maritime Inmarsat terminals (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "radio and TV dominated by the government-owned Jordan Radio and Television Corporation (JRTV) that operates a main network, a sports network, a film network, and a satellite channel; first independent TV broadcaster aired in 2007; international satellite TV and Israeli and Syrian TV broadcasts are available; roughly 30 radio stations with JRTV operating the main government-owned station; transmissions of multiple international radio broadcasters are available"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Kuwait’s telecom infrastructure is well developed, with a focus on mobile infrastructure and services; the telecom sector is important to the country’s economy, and this will become more pronounced in coming years as the economy is purposefully transitioned away from a dependence on oil and gas to one which is increasingly knowledge-based and focused on ICT and related services; the MNOs have focused investment on 5G networks, which support and promote the growth of data traffic; this in turn has been a catalyst for revenue growth in recent quarters; while Kuwait’s mobile sector shows considerable progress; the country’s fixed broadband system is the lowest in the region; the government has stepped up efforts to build up fixed broadband networks, and ultimately this sector offers a potential future growth opportunity; improvements to the fixed broadband infrastructure will help develop sectors such as e-commerce, along with smart infrastructure developments, and tech start-ups. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Kuwait’s telecom infrastructure is well developed, with a focus on mobile infrastructure and services; the telecom sector is important to the country’s economy, and this will become more pronounced in coming years as the economy is purposefully transitioned away from a dependence on oil and gas to one which is increasingly knowledge-based and focused on ICT and related services; the MNOs have focused investment on 5G networks, which support and promote the growth of data traffic; this in turn has been a catalyst for revenue growth in recent quarters; while Kuwait’s mobile sector shows considerable progress; the country’s fixed broadband system is the lowest in the region; the government has stepped up efforts to build up fixed broadband networks, and ultimately this sector offers a potential future growth opportunity; improvements to the fixed broadband infrastructure will help develop sectors such as e-commerce, along with smart infrastructure developments, and tech start-ups. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions are nearly 14 per 100 and mobile-cellular stands at nearly 159 per 100 subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 965; landing points for the FOG, GBICS, MENA, Kuwait-Iran, and FALCON submarine cables linking Africa, the Middle East, and Asia; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia; satellite earth stations - 6 (3 Intelsat - 1 Atlantic Ocean and 2 Indian Ocean, 1 Inmarsat - Atlantic Ocean, and 2 Arabsat) (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "state-owned TV broadcaster operates 4 networks and a satellite channel; several private TV broadcasters have emerged; satellite TV available and pan-Arab TV stations are especially popular; state-owned Radio Kuwait broadcasts on a number of channels in Arabic and English; first private radio station emerged in 2005; transmissions of at least 2 international radio broadcasters are available (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Lebanon’s economic crisis has had a dire effect on the country’s telecom services; although some progress has been made with developing 5G, the poor economic conditions have contributed to an erratic electricity supply and a lack of fuel to maintain generators; this has meant that internet services to areas of the country are not available on a regular basis, frustrating all those who depend on stable connectivity, and stalling business growth; adding to the difficulties are the combined stresses of the pandemic and the political crisis; a caretaker cabinet in September 2021 made way for a new government though there is little confidence on the ground that sectarian-based political horse-trading will give way to responsible governing to improve the lot of the stressed populace. (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Lebanon’s economic crisis has had a dire effect on the country’s telecom services; although some progress has been made with developing 5G, the poor economic conditions have contributed to an erratic electricity supply and a lack of fuel to maintain generators; this has meant that internet services to areas of the country are not available on a regular basis, frustrating all those who depend on stable connectivity, and stalling business growth; adding to the difficulties are the combined stresses of the pandemic and the political crisis; a caretaker cabinet in September 2021 made way for a new government though there is little confidence on the ground that sectarian-based political horse-trading will give way to responsible governing to improve the lot of the stressed populace. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 13 per 100 and nearly 63 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 961; landing points for the IMEWE, BERYTAR AND CADMOS submarine cable links to Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "7 TV stations, 1 of which is state owned; more than 30 radio stations, 1 of which is state owned; satellite and cable TV services available; transmissions of at least 2 international broadcasters are accessible through partner stations (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -552,13 +552,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"text": "bicameral Council of Oman or Majlis Oman consists of:<br>Council of State or Majlis al-Dawla (85 seats including the chairman; members appointed by the sultan from among former government officials and prominent educators, businessmen, and citizens)<br> Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura (86 seats; members directly elected in single- and 2-seat constituencies by simple majority popular vote to serve renewable 4-year terms); note - since political reforms in 2011, legislation from the Consultative Council is submitted to the Council of State for review by the Royal Court"
|
||||
"text": "bicameral Council of Oman or Majlis Oman consists of:<br>Council of State or Majlis al-Dawla (85 seats including the chairman; members appointed by the sultan from among former government officials and prominent educators, businessmen, and citizens)<br>Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura (86 seats; members directly elected in single- and 2-seat constituencies by simple majority popular vote to serve renewable 4-year terms); note - since political reforms in 2011, legislation from the Consultative Council is submitted to the Council of State for review by the Royal Court"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "Council of State - last appointments on 11 July 2019 (next - NA)<br> Consultative Assembly - last held on 27 October 2019 (next to be held in October 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "Council of State - last appointments on 11 July 2019 (next to be held in November 2023)<br>Consultative Assembly - last held on 27 October 2019 (next to be held in October 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<br> Council of State - composition - men 70, women 15, percent of women 17.6%<br>Consultative Council percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA (organized political parties in Oman are legally banned); composition men 84, women 2, percent of women 2.3%; note - total Council of Oman percent of women 9.9%"
|
||||
"text": "<br>Council of State - composition - men 70, women 15, percent of women 17.6%<br>Consultative Council percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA (organized political parties in Oman are legally banned); composition men 84, women 2, percent of women 2.3%; note - total Council of Oman percent of women 9.9%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "modern system consisting of open-wire, microwave, and radiotelephone communication stations; domestic satellite system; progressive mobile sector with both 3G and 4G LTE networks and readiness for 5G launch; competition among mobile operators; government program to improve fiber network; important communications hub in the Middle East, with access to numerous submarine cables enabling increased bandwidth; major importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from UAE (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "for many years Oman’s mobile market was a duopoly between the incumbent telco Omantel and its challenger Ooredoo Oman; in February 2021, Vodafone Group and Oman Future Telecommunications consortium secured a license to operate the Sultanate’s third network, with services being under the Vodafone Oman brand; the new operator has been able to extend its reach based on a tower leasing arrangement signed in 2020 with Oman Tower Company; Oman has a modern mobile sector which comprises substantial coverage of both 3G and LTE networks; in February 2021 Omantel launched commercial 5G services, while Ooredoo Group has a five-year framework agreement with Ericsson to develop its 5G platform across the Group’s ten markets, including Oman; the Covid-19 pandemic has caused a spike in mobile data traffic, which prompted Omantel to upgrade a number of sites from 3G to LTE, as well as build a number of additional 5G sites; while Oman’s fixed broadband infrastructure penetration is considered low, it is being improved with the building of fiber-based networks as part of Oman’s Vision 2040 program; Oman has also established itself as an important communications hub in the Middle East, with access to numerous submarine cables including the 2Africa submarine cable, which should become available during 2023-2024; the 9,800km Oman Australia Cable running from Muscat to Perth, with the potential for a branch line to Djibouti, is making progress and is expected to be completed in December 2021; this additional infrastructure will provide considerable additional bandwidth. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 13 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 134 per 100; fixed-line phone service gradually being introduced to remote villages using wireless local loop systems (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 968; landing points for GSA, AAE-1, SeaMeWe-5, Tata TGN-Gulf, FALCON, GBICS/MENA, MENA/Guld Bridge International, TW1, BBG, EIG, OMRAN/EPEG, and POI submarine cables providing connectivity to Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Europe; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (Indian Ocean) (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "1 state-run TV broadcaster; TV stations transmitting from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, and Yemen available via satellite TV; state-run radio operates multiple stations; first private radio station began operating in 2007 and several additional stations now operating (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -557,13 +557,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"text": "unicameral Advisory Council or Majlis al-Shura (45 seats; 30 members directly elected by popular vote for 4-year re-electable terms; 15 members appointed by the monarch to serve until resignation or until relieved; note - legislative drafting authority rests with the Council of Ministers and is reviewed by the Advisory Council or Majlis al-Shura"
|
||||
"text": "unicameral Advisory Council or Majlis al-Shura (45 seats; 30 members directly elected by popular vote for 4-year re-electable terms; 15 members appointed by the monarch to serve until resignation or until relieved; note - legislative drafting authority rests with the Council of Ministers and is reviewed by the Advisory Council"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "first election held for 30 elected members on 2 October 2021 (next to be held in 2025); date of appointed members NA"
|
||||
"text": "first election held for 30 elected members on 2 October 2021 (next to be held in 2025); date of appointed members - 14 October 2021 (next appointments - NA)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "30 nonpartisan members elected; composition of elected members - men 30, women 0"
|
||||
"text": "30 nonpartisan members elected; composition - men 30, women 0 <br>15 appointed members; composition men 13, women 2, percent of women 13.3%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "telecom infrastructure in Qatar demonstrated resilience during the pandemic, following surge in Internet usage; highest fixed-line and mobile penetrations in Middle East with almost 100% LTE coverage; operator deployed 5G across the country with positive subscribership, primarily around Doha; largest user of the Internet in the Middle East; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Qatar had developed a mature telecom sector which has been able to absorb the additional data demands made on it during the pandemic; mobile services based on LTE are universally available, and this has helped the two operators Ooredoo Qatar and Vodafone Qatar to migrate to 5G; in combination with a strong fiber rollout, the country is aiming to provide gigabit services nationally; 5G services are largely based on 3.5GHz spectrum made available following an auction in early 2019. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership nearly 132 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 974; landing points for the Qatar-UAE Submarine Cable System, AAE-1, FOG, GBICS/East North Africa MENA and the FALCON submarine cable network that provides links to Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Southeast Asia; tropospheric scatter to Bahrain; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and the UAE; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) and 1 Arabsat; retains full ownership of two commercial satellites, Es'hailSat 1 and 2 (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "TV and radio broadcast licensing and access to local media markets are state controlled; home of the satellite TV channel Al-Jazeera, which was originally owned and financed by the Qatari government but has evolved to independent corporate status; Al-Jazeera claims editorial independence in broadcasting; local radio transmissions include state, private, and international broadcasters on FM frequencies in Doha; in August 2013, Qatar's satellite company Es'hailSat launched its first communications satellite Es'hail 1 (manufactured in the US), which entered commercial service in December 2013 to provide improved television broadcasting capability and expand availability of voice and Internet; Es'hailSat launched its second commercial satellite in 2018 with aid of SpaceX (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "one of the most progressive telecom markets in the Middle East; mobile penetration high, with a saturated market; mobile operators competitive and meeting the demand for workers, students and citizens working from home; Huawei partners with operator to provide 5G to dozens of cities; broadband is available with DSL, fiber, and wireless; mobile penetration is high; restrictive monarchy places limits on information and services available online; authorities operate extensive censorship and surveillance systems; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE and China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Saudi Arabia’s telecom and ICT sectors continue to benefit from the range of programs aimed at diversifying the economy away from a dependence on oil, and establishing a wider digital transformation over the next decade; an essential element of this has been the widening reach of 5G networks, which by mid-2021 reached about half of the population and the majority of cities; the competitive mobile sector is serviced by Saudi Telecom Company (stc), Mobily, and Zain KSA, as also four licensed MVNOs; the MNOs have focused investment on upgrading LTE infrastructure and further developing 5G; this in part is aimed at generating additional revenue from mobile data services, and also to their contribution to the Vision 2030 program; the ongoing pandemic has resulted in more people working and schooling from home during periods of restricted travel; this has stimulated growth in mobile data traffic, while the government has encouraged non-cash transactions and so helped develop the vast e-commerce market; while Saudi Arabia’s fixed broadband penetration remains relatively low, there has been a concentration of fiber infrastructure and the Kingdom has developed one of the fastest services in the region. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line over 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular subscribership has been increasing rapidly to roughly 124 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 966; landing points for the SeaMeWe-3, -4, -5, AAE-1, EIG, FALCON, FEA, IMEWE, MENA/Gulf Bridge International, SEACOM, SAS-1, -2, GBICS/MENA, and the Tata TGN-Gulf submarine cables providing connectivity to Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Southeast Asia and Australia; microwave radio relay to Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Yemen, and Sudan; coaxial cable to Kuwait and Jordan; satellite earth stations - 5 Intelsat (3 Atlantic Ocean and 2 Indian Ocean), 1 Arabsat, and 1 Inmarsat (Indian Ocean region) (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "broadcast media are state-controlled; state-run TV operates 4 networks; Saudi Arabia is a major market for pan-Arab satellite TV broadcasters; state-run radio operates several networks; multiple international broadcasters are available"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Syria’s telecom sector has paid a heavy toll from years of civil war and destruction leading to major disruptions to the network; operators focusing on rebuilding damaged networks, though lack of basic infrastructure, including power and security, hamper efforts; fairly high mobile penetration for region; remote areas rely on expensive satellite communications; mobile broadband infrastructure is predominantly 3G for about 85% of the population with some LTE ; international aid network provides emergency Internet and telecom services when necessary; government restrictions of Internet freedom; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the years of civil war and destruction to infrastructure continue to have a toll on the telecoms sector in Syria; although over the years the major mobile service providers Syriatel and MTN Syria have endeavored to restore and rebuild damaged networks, the operating environment has been difficult; following disputed demands for back taxes, MTN Group in August 2021 exited the country, after its majority stake had been transferred to judicial guardianship; this effectively meant that the mobile market became a monopoly, with Syriatel as the only operator; in February 2022 the regulator awarded a third mobile license, to Wafa Telecom, following a process which had been ongoing for many years; telecommunication services in Syria are highly regulated; although urban areas can make use of the network built and maintained by the government-owned incumbent Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE), many underserved remote areas in the countryside are obliged to rely on satellite communications; the domestic and international fixed-line markets in Syria remain the monopoly of the STE, despite several initiatives over the years aimed at liberalizing the market; mobile broadband penetration in Syria is still quite low, despite quite a high population coverage of 3G networks and some deployment of LTE infrastructure; this may provide potential opportunities for growth once infrastructure and economic reconstruction efforts make headway, and civil issues subside. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "the number of fixed-line connections increased markedly prior to the civil war in 2011 and now stands at over 16 per 100; mobile-cellular service is just over 95 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 963; landing points for the Aletar, BERYTAR and UGART submarine cable connections to Egypt, Lebanon, and Cyprus; satellite earth stations - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean) and 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region); coaxial cable and microwave radio relay to Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey; participant in Medarabtel (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "state-run TV and radio broadcast networks; state operates 2 TV networks and 5 satellite channels; roughly two-thirds of Syrian homes have a satellite dish providing access to foreign TV broadcasts; 3 state-run radio channels; first private radio station launched in 2005; private radio broadcasters prohibited from transmitting news or political content (2018)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -612,7 +612,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Democracy and Progress Party [Ali BABACAN]<br>Democrat Party or DP [Gultekin UYSAL]<br>Democratic Regions Party or DBP [Saliha AYDENIZ, Keskin BAYINDIR]<br>Felicity Party (Saadet Party) or SP [Temel KARAMOLLAOGLU]<br>Free Cause Party or HUDAPAR [Zekeriya YAPICIOGLU]<br>Future Party [Ahmet DAVUTOGLU]<br>IYI Party [Meral AKSENER]<br>Grand Unity Party or BBP [Mustafa DESTICI]<br>Justice and Development Party or AKP [Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN]<br>Nation Alliance (electoral alliance includes CHP, IYI, SP, DP)<br>Nationalist Movement Party or MHP [Devlet BAHCELI]<br>Patriotic Party or VP [Dogu PERINCEK]<br>People's Alliance (electoral alliance AKP, MHP, BBP)<br>Peoples' Democratic Party or HDP [Pervin BULDAN, Mithat SANCAR]<br>Republican People's Party or CHP [Kemal KILICDAROGLU]",
|
||||
"text": "Democracy and Progress Party [Ali BABACAN]<br>Democrat Party or DP [Gultekin UYSAL]<br>Democratic Regions Party or DBP [Saliha AYDENIZ, Keskin BAYINDIR]<br>Felicity Party (Saadet Party) or SP [Temel KARAMOLLAOGLU]<br>Free Cause Party or HUDA PAR [Zekeriya YAPICIOGLU]<br>Future Party (Gelecek Partisi) [Ahmet DAVUTOGLU]<br>Good Party (IYI Party) [Meral AKSENER]<br>Grand Unity Party or BBP [Mustafa DESTICI]<br>Justice and Development Party or AKP [Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN]<br>Nation Alliance (electoral alliance includes CHP, IYI, SP, DP)<br>Nationalist Movement Party or MHP [Devlet BAHCELI]<br>Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi) or VP [Dogu PERINCEK]<br>People's Alliance (electoral alliance AKP, MHP, BBP)<br>Peoples' Democratic Party or HDP [Pervin BULDAN, Mithat SANCAR]<br>Republican People's Party or CHP [Kemal KILICDAROGLU]",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong> as of September 2021, 116 political parties were legally registered"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "following earthquake damage to infrastructure in 2020, telecom sector undergoing rapid modernization and expansion, especially in mobile-cellular services; mobile broadband becoming increasingly popular; near saturation of 4G LTE coverage for the population; strides made with 5G through investment by Huawei and Ericcson; fixed and mobile infrastructure will help to underpin Smart City initiatives; tight government control on social media platforms; importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Turkey continues to develop its capabilities within its telecom sector, becoming one of the relatively few countries able to build and develop its own communications satellites; with the successful launch of the Turksat 5A and 5B satellites in 2021, the country has vastly increased its bandwidth capacity; these satellites will be joined by the Turksat 6A in early 2023; the country’s telcos have invested in fiber infrastructure, with Vodafone Turkey having trialed a 1Tb/s service in late 2021 to support its 5G network back haul and improve the quality of its fixed infrastructure; deployment of fiber-based broadband networks are well established, with fiber accounting for 26.7% of all fixed broadband connections as of early 2022; the DSL sector still dominates, accounting for about 63% of connections, but its share is steadily declining, year-on-year, while the number of fiber connections has grown strongly; improved fixed and mobile infrastructure is underpinning the country’s initiatives relating to Smart City concepts, which have become a key area of focus for the emerging digital economy and the transformation to a knowledge-based economy; Turkey’s National Smart Cities Strategy and Action Plan runs through to 2023. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "additional digital exchanges are permitting a rapid increase in subscribers; the construction of a network of technologically advanced intercity trunk lines, using both fiber-optic cable and digital microwave radio relay, is facilitating communication between urban centers; remote areas are reached by a domestic satellite system; fixed-line nearly 15 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is over 97 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 90; landing points for the SeaMeWe-3 & -5, MedNautilus Submarine System, Turcyos-1 & -2 submarine cables providing connectivity to Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Southeast Asia and Australia ; satellite earth stations - 12 Intelsat; mobile satellite terminals - 328 in the Inmarsat and Eutelsat systems (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) operates multiple TV and radio networks and stations; multiple privately owned national television stations and 567 private regional and local television stations; multi-channel cable TV subscriptions available; 1,007 private radio broadcast stations</p> (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1268,8 +1268,8 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2019, a new law cut the men’s mandatory military service period in half, as well as making paid military service permanent; with the new system, the period of conscription was reduced from 12 months to six months for privates and non-commissioned soldiers (the service term for reserve officers chosen among university or college graduates remained 12 months); after completing six months of service, if a conscripted soldier wants to and is suitable for extending his military service, he may do so for an additional six months in return for a monthly salary; under the new law, all male Turkish citizens over the age of 20 are required to undergo a one month military training period, but they can obtain an exemption from the remaining five months of their mandatory service by paying 31,000 Turkish Liras<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong> as of 2019, women made up about .3% of the military's full-time personnel"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 150 (Azerbaijan; monitoring cease-fire, clearing mines); 250 Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR); approximately 30,000 Cyprus; 300 Kosovo (NATO/KFOR); 100 Lebanon (UNIFIL); estimated 500 Libya; approximately 3,000 Qatar; approximately 200 Somalia (training mission); estimated 5,000-10,000 Syria (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> between 2016 and 2020, Turkey conducted four major military campaigns in northern Syria; Turkey also has deployed troops into northern Iraq on numerous occasions to combat the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), including large operations involving thousands of troops in 2007, 2011, and 2018, and smaller-scale incursions in 2021 and 2022; in October of 2021, Turkey’s parliament extended the military’s mandate to launch cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria by two more years<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in 2020, Turkey deployed hundreds of Turkish troops and as many as 5,000 Syrian fighters to Libya to support the Libyan Government of National Accord<br>"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 150 (Azerbaijan; monitoring cease-fire, clearing mines); 250 Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR); approximately 30,000 Cyprus; up to approximately 4,000 Iraq; 300 Kosovo (NATO/KFOR); 100 Lebanon (UNIFIL); estimated 500 Libya; approximately 3,000 Qatar; approximately 200 Somalia (training mission); estimated 5,000-10,000 Syria (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> between 2016 and 2020, Turkey conducted four major military campaigns in northern Syria; Turkey also has deployed troops into northern Iraq on numerous occasions to combat the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), including large operations involving thousands of troops in 2007, 2011, and 2018, and smaller-scale incursions in 2021 and 2022; in October of 2021, Turkey’s parliament extended the military’s mandate to launch cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria by two more years<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in 2020, Turkey deployed hundreds of Turkish troops and as many as 5,000 Syrian fighters to Libya to support the Libyan Government of National Accord"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and hosts NATO's Land Forces Command in Izmir, as well as the AN/TPY-2 radar as part of NATO's missile defenses<br><br>under a long-range (2033) strategic plan, the Turkish Armed Forces continued efforts to modernize its equipment and force structure; Land Forces sought to produce a 20-30% smaller, more highly trained force characterized by greater mobility and firepower and capable of joint and combined operations<br><br>the Turkish Navy is a regional naval power that wants to develop the capability to project power beyond Turkey's coastal waters; it is planning to launch new frigates, submarines, and a light aircraft carrier/amphibious assault ship in the next few years, adding to its current force of about 16 frigates and 12 submarines; the Navy is heavily involved in NATO, multinational, and UN operations; its roles include control of territorial waters and security for sea lines of communications <br><br>the Turkish Air Force adopted an \"Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept\" in 2002 and is developing an integrated missile defense system; in a controversial move that complicated its relationship with NATO, it purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system for an estimated $2.5 billion in 2019; Air Force priorities include attaining a modern deployable, survivable, and sustainable force structure, and establishing a sustainable command and control system <br><br>in recent years, Turkey has taken on a greater level of international peacekeeping responsibilities, including keeping a substantial force under NATO in Afghanistan until withdrawing in 2021; Turkey also has built expeditionary military bases in Qatar, Somalia, northern Cyprus, and Sudan<br><br>the military has a substantial stake in Turkey's economy through a holding company that is involved in the automotive, energy, finance, and logistics sectors, as well as iron and steel production (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -862,7 +862,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code 970 or 972; 1 international switch in Ramallah"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "the Palestinian Authority operates 1 TV and 1 radio station; about 20 private TV and 40 radio stations; both Jordanian TV and satellite TV are accessible"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -582,10 +582,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Executive branch": {
|
||||
"chief of state": {
|
||||
"text": "on 7 April 2022, President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI announced the dismissal of Vice President ALI MUHSIN al-Ahmar and formation of the Presidential Leadership Council, an eight-member body chaired by former minister Rashad AL-ALIMI; the council will assume the responsibilities of the president and vice president and carry out the political, security, and military duties of the government"
|
||||
"text": "Chairperson, Presidential Council Rashad Muhammad al-ALIMI, Dr. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Sultan al-ARADA (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Faraj Salmin al- BAHSANI, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Abdullah Al-Alimi BA WAZIR (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Uthman Hussain Faid al-MUJALI (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council TARIQ Muhammad Abdallah Salih, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council 'Abd-al-Rahman ABU ZARA'A al-Muharrami al-Yafai, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Aydarus Qasim al-ZUBAYDI, Maj. Gen. (since 19 April 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"head of government": {
|
||||
"text": "on 7 April 2022, President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI announced the dismissal of Vice President ALI MUHSIN al-Ahmar and the formation of a Presidential Leadership Council, an eight-member body chaired by former minister Rashad AL-ALIMI; the council will assume the responsibilities of the president and vice president and carry out the political, security, and military duties of the government"
|
||||
"text": "Chairperson, Presidential Council Rashad Muhammad al-ALIMI, Dr. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Sultan al-ARADA (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Faraj Salmin al- BAHSANI, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Abdullah Al-Alimi BA WAZIR (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Uthman Hussain Faid al-MUJALI (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council TARIQ Muhammad Abdallah Salih, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council 'Abd-al-Rahman ABU ZARA'A al-Muharrami al-Yafai, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Aydarus Qasim al-ZUBAYDI, Maj. Gen. (since 19 April 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cabinet": {
|
||||
"text": "NA"
|
||||
|
|
@ -595,7 +595,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "in a special election held on 21 February 2012, Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI (GPC) was elected as a consensus president"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> on 7 April 2022, President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI announced the dismissal of Vice President ALI MUHSIN al-Ahmar and the formation of a Presidential Council, an eight-member body chaired by former minister Rashad AL-ALIMI; on 19 April 2022, the Council was sworn in before Parliament and began assuming the responsibilities of the president and vice president and carrying out the political, security, and military duties of the government"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1077,7 +1078,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "large percent of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance and telecom services are vital but disrupted; mobile towers are often deliberately targeted; maintenance is dangerous to staff; aid organizations rely on satellite and radio communications; scarcity of telecom equipment in rural areas; ownership of telecom services and the related revenues and taxes have become a political issue; Chinese company Huawei helping to rebuild some equipment (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Yemen continues to provide an exceptionally challenging market for telcos; civil unrest has caused havoc and devastation across most parts of the country, while the threat of sanctions has also made it a challenging environment in which to operate; a large proportion of the population requires humanitarian assistance, and there is little disposable income for services upon which telcos can generate revenue; essential telecom infrastructure, such as mobile towers and fiber cabling, has often been targeted, destroyed, or damaged by the opposing sides in the ongoing conflict; these difficulties have proved to be a disincentive to telcos investing in infrastructure, with the result that the country lacks basic fixed-line infrastructure, and mobile services are based on outdated GSM; this has prevented the development of a mobile broadband sector, or the evolution of mobile data services; the ownership of telecommunication services, and the scrutiny of associated revenues and taxes, have become a political issue in Yemen; in 2019 the recognized government moved Tele Yemen’s headquarters from Sana’a to Aden in a bid to regain control of the company; until telecom infrastructure can be improved across Yemen, and until civil unrest eases, there will be little progress for the sector; MTN Group in November 2021 completed its exit from the country, having incurred losses for several years, and considered that continuing its presence in this market was no longer worth its while. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "the national network consists of microwave radio relay, cable, tropospheric scatter, GSM and CDMA mobile-cellular telephone systems; fixed-line teledensity remains low by regional standards at roughly 4 per 100 but mobile cellular use expanding at over 55 per 100 (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1085,7 +1086,7 @@
|
|||
"international": {
|
||||
"text": "country code - 967; landing points for the FALCON, SeaMeWe-5, Aden-Djibouti, and the AAE-1 international submarine cable connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress towards 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "state-run TV with 2 stations; state-run radio with 2 national radio stations and 5 local stations; stations from Oman and Saudi Arabia can be accessed"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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Add table
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Reference in a new issue