auto-update week 11

This commit is contained in:
Yo Robot 2023-03-16 22:10:31 +00:00
parent 8e9f69b496
commit bfea0e590a
211 changed files with 602 additions and 1382 deletions

View file

@ -413,14 +413,10 @@
}
},
"Revenue from forest resources": {
"forest revenues": {
"text": "0.06% of GDP (2018 est.)"
}
"text": "0.06% of GDP (2018 est.)"
},
"Revenue from coal": {
"coal revenues": {
"text": "0% of GDP (2018 est.)"
}
"text": "0% of GDP (2018 est.)"
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
@ -1144,7 +1140,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Libya lacks a nationwide military and the interim government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), relies on its cooperation with disparate militias that it cannot entirely control for security; the GNU has a ministry of defense and access to various ground, air, and naval/coast guard forces comprised of a mix of semi-regular military units, militias, civilian volunteers, and foreign troops and mercenaries<br><br>the Libyan National Army (LNA), under de facto LNA commander Khalifa HAFTER, also includes various ground, air, and naval units comprised of semi-regular military personnel, militias, and foreign troops and mercenaries; as of 2022, the LNA operated independently from the GNU and exerted influence throughout eastern, central, and southern Libya (2022)",
"text": "Libya lacks a nationwide military and the interim government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), relies on its cooperation with disparate militias that it cannot entirely control for security; the GNU has a ministry of defense and access to various ground, air, and naval/coast guard forces comprised of a mix of semi-regular military units, militias, civilian volunteers, and foreign troops and mercenaries<br><br>the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), under de facto LNA commander Khalifa HAFTER, also includes various ground, air, and naval units comprised of semi-regular military personnel, militias, and foreign troops and mercenaries; the LNA operates independently from the GNU and exerts influence throughout eastern, central, and southern Libya (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Stabilization Support Authority (SSA) is a state-funded militia established in January 2021 by the GNU; it is tasked with securing government buildings and officials, participating in combat operations, apprehending those suspected of national security crimes, and cooperating with other security bodies<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the national police force under the Ministry of Interior oversees internal security (with support from military forces under the Ministry of Defense), but much of Libya's security-related police work generally falls to informal armed groups, which received government salaries but lacked formal training, supervision, or consistent accountability"
},
"Military expenditures": {
@ -1154,13 +1150,13 @@
"text": "estimates not available"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "both the forces aligned with the GNU and the LNA are largely equipped with weapons of Russian or Soviet origin; as of 2021, Turkey was the top provider of arms and equipment to the forces supporting the GNU, while the United Arab Emirates was the main supporter of the LNA (2021)"
"text": "both the forces aligned with the GNU and the LNA are largely equipped with weapons of Russian or Soviet origin; in recent years, Turkey has the been the primary supplier of arms to the GNU, while the LNA has received quantities from the UAE (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "not available"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Turkey has been the primary backer of the GNU/GNA; Turkish military advisers have trained and assisted western/GNU Libyan forces in accordance with a 2019 Turkey-GNA security agreement; Turkey has also provided thousands of Syrian mercenaries to Libya, as well as ammunition, weapons and aerial drones; Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt have been the main supporters of the LNA; the LNA has used fighters from other countries, including Chad, Sudan, and Syria <br><br>as of 2022, ISIS continued to maintain a relatively weak presence in Libya with small bands of fighters operating out of ungoverned spaces and conducting small-scale attacks throughout the country (2022)"
"text": "Turkey has been the primary backer of the GNU/GNA; Turkish military advisers have trained and assisted western/GNU Libyan forces in accordance with a 2019 Turkey-GNA security agreement; Turkey has also provided thousands of Syrian mercenaries to Libya, as well as ammunition, weapons and aerial drones; Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt have been the main supporters of the LNA; Russia has provided as many as 2,000 private military contractors; the LNA has also used fighters from other countries, including Chad, Sudan, and Syria <br><br>ISIS continues to maintain a relatively weak presence in Libya with small bands of fighters operating out of ungoverned spaces and conducting small-scale attacks throughout the country (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {