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auto-update week 11
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}
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},
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"Revenue from forest resources": {
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"forest revenues": {
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"text": "3.81% of GDP (2018 est.)"
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}
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"text": "3.81% of GDP (2018 est.)"
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},
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"Revenue from coal": {
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"coal revenues": {
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"text": "0% of GDP (2018 est.)"
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}
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"text": "0% of GDP (2018 est.)"
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},
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"Major infectious diseases": {
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"degree of risk": {
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@ -497,7 +493,7 @@
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},
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"Food insecurity": {
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"widespread lack of access": {
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"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in cereal production - </em>according to the latest analysis, about 2.1 million people are projected to be in \"Crisis\" and above, between June and August 2022 due to persisting insecurity in Lac and Tibesti regions that disrupted livelihood activities and caused population displacements, as well as a below-average cereal production in 2021; as of September 2022, floods destroyed about 45,000 hectares of crops and affected more than 450,000 people, mostly in the provinces of Logone Occidental, Mandoul and Sila, increasing the risk of a deterioration of food insecurity (2022)"
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"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in cereal production - </em>according to the latest analysis, about 1.5 million people are projected to experience acute food insecurity during the June to August 2023 lean season period; this would be an improvement compared to the previous year, mostly due to the significantly higher year-on-year cereal output in 2022 after the below-average 2021 production; acute food insecurity is underpinned by persistent insecurity in the Lac and Tibesti regions; elevated food prices, as well as the impact of the severe floods in 2022, which affected approximately 1.5 million people and destroyed about 350,000 hectares of farmland, are compounding food insecurity (2023)"
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}
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},
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"Waste and recycling": {
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@ -1210,7 +1206,7 @@
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Chadian National Army (Armee Nationale du Tchad, ANT): Ground Forces (l'Armee de Terre, AdT), Chadian Air Force (l'Armee de l'Air Tchadienne, AAT), General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Generale des Services de Securite des Institutions de l'Etat, GDSSIE); National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Public Security and Immigration: National Nomadic Guard of Chad (GNNT), Chadian National Police (2022)",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-size unit with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)"
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-size unit with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> Border security duties are shared by the Army, Customs (Ministry of Public Security and Immigration), the Gendarmerie, and the GNNT "
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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@ -1243,7 +1239,7 @@
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> Chad has committed approximately 1,000-1,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically; in 2019, Chad sent more than 1,000 troops to Nigeria’s Borno State to fight Boko Haram as part of the MNJTF mission<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>Chad is also part of a four (formerly five)-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G4 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Chad, Mali (withdrew in 2022), Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; as of 2020, defense forces from each of the participating states were allowed to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the force is backed by France, the UN, and the US"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "the ANT has considerable combat experience against insurgents and terrorist groups and is considered one of the more effective militaries in the region, although its performance has been viewed as uneven, and it has a tradition of deep involvement in domestic politics; over the past decade, the ANT has received considerable foreign military assistance, particularly from France, which maintains a military base in N’Djamena; the ANT's current operational focus is on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; it is engaged with the Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin area (primarily the Lac Province) and in the Sahel, particularly the tri-border area with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger; in addition, the ANT conducts frequent operations against internal anti-government militias and armed dissident groups <br><br>several rebel groups operate in northern Chad from bases in southern Libya, including the FACT (Front pour le Changement et la Concorde au Tchad), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic le Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le salut de la République or CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (le Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement or UFDD), and the Union of Resistance Forces (le Union des Forces de la Résistance UFR); former Chadian President Idriss DEBY<strong> </strong>was killed in April 2021 during fighting in the northern part of the country between the FACT and the Chadian Army; some armed groups, including the UFDD and UFR, signed an accord in August 2022 in return for the release of prisoners, amnesty, and an end to hostilities between the Chadian Government and these armed factions; however, other armed groups, including the FACT and CCSMR, refused to join the accord (2023)"
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"text": "the ANT has considerable combat experience against insurgents and terrorist groups, although it is assessed to be underfunded and its performance to be uneven; it has a tradition of deep involvement in domestic politics; over the past decade, the ANT has received considerable foreign military assistance, particularly from France, which maintains a military base in N’Djamena; the ANT's current operational focus is on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; it is engaged with the Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin area (primarily the Lac Province) and in the Sahel, particularly the tri-border area with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger; in addition, the ANT conducts frequent operations against internal anti-government militias and armed dissident groups <br><br>several rebel groups operate in northern Chad from bases in southern Libya, including the FACT (Front pour le Changement et la Concorde au Tchad), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic le Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le salut de la République or CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (le Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement or UFDD), and the Union of Resistance Forces (le Union des Forces de la Résistance UFR); former Chadian President Idriss DEBY<strong> </strong>was killed in April 2021 during fighting in the northern part of the country between the FACT and the Chadian Army; some armed groups, including the UFDD and UFR, signed an accord in August 2022 in return for the release of prisoners, amnesty, and an end to hostilities between the Chadian Government and these armed factions; however, other armed groups, including the FACT and CCSMR, refused to join the accord (2023)"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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