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auto-update week 21
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Yo Robot
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@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@
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"note": "note - as of 2018, women made up an estimated 3% of the active duty military"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020; Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under control of ethnic Armenian forces (the \"Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army\") backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994; six weeks of fighting resulted in about 6,000 deaths and ended after Armenia ceded swathes of Nagorno-Karabakh territory; tensions remained high through 2021, and both sides have accused the other of provocations since the fighting ended; Armenia has accused Azerbaijani forces of a series of border intrusions and of seizing pockets of territory"
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"text": "since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020; Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under control of ethnic Armenian forces (the \"Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army\") backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994; six weeks of fighting resulted in about 6,000 deaths and ended after Armenia ceded swathes of Nagorno-Karabakh territory; tensions remained high in 2022, and both sides have accused the other of provocations since the fighting ended; Armenia has accused Azerbaijani forces of a series of border intrusions and of seizing pockets of territory"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Armenian Armed Forces: Armenian Army (includes land, air, air defense forces) (2021)"
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"text": "Armenian Armed Forces: Armenian Army (includes land, air, air defense forces) (2022)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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@ -1119,14 +1119,14 @@
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"text": "approximately 45,000 active troops (42,000 ground; 3,000 air/defense) (2021)"
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},
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"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
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"text": "the inventory of the Armenian Armed Forces includes mostly Russian and Soviet-era equipment (2021)"
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"text": "the inventory of the Armenian Armed Forces includes mostly Russian and Soviet-era equipment (2022)"
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},
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"Military service age and obligation": {
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"text": "18-27 years of age for voluntary (men and women) or compulsory (men only) military service; 2-year conscript service obligation, which can be served as an officer upon deferment for university studies if enrolled in officer-producing program; 17-year-olds are eligible to become cadets at military higher education institutes, where they are classified as military personnel; citizens aged 27 to 50 are registered in the military reserve and may be called to serve if mobilization is declared; males under the age 36 years, who have not previously served as contract servicemen and are registered in the reserve, as well as females, regardless of whether they are registered in the reserve can be enrolled in contractual military service as privates (2021)",
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"note": "note - as of 2021, conscripts comprised about half of the military's active personnel; as of 2018, women made up about 13% of the active duty military"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020; Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under control of ethnic Armenian forces (the \"Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army\") backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994; six weeks of fighting resulted in about 6,000 deaths and ended after Armenia ceded swathes of Nagorno-Karabakh territory; tensions remained high through 2021, and both sides have accused the other of provocations since the fighting ended; Armenia has accused Azerbaijani forces of a series of border intrusions and of seizing pockets of territory <br><br>Armenia has been a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) since 1994 and contributes troops to CSTO's rapid reaction force"
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"text": "since November 2020, Russia has deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops to the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of a cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; fighting erupted between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September of 2020; Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under control of ethnic Armenian forces (the \"Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army\") backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994; six weeks of fighting resulted in about 6,000 deaths and ended after Armenia ceded swathes of Nagorno-Karabakh territory; tensions remained high into 2022, and both sides have accused the other of provocations since the fighting ended; Armenia has accused Azerbaijani forces of a series of border intrusions and of seizing pockets of territory <br><br>Armenia has been a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) since 1994 and contributes troops to CSTO's rapid reaction force"
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}
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Bahrain Defense Force (BDF): Royal Bahraini Army (includes the Royal Guard), Royal Bahraini Navy, Royal Bahraini Air Force; Ministry of Interior: National Guard, Special Security Forces Command (SSFC), Coast Guard<br> (2021)",
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"text": "Bahrain Defense Force (BDF): Royal Bahraini Army (includes the Royal Guard), Royal Bahraini Navy, Royal Bahraini Air Force; Ministry of Interior: National Guard, Special Security Forces Command (SSFC), Coast Guard<br> (2022)",
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"note": "note(s) - the Royal Guard is officially under the command of the Army, but exercises considerable autonomy; the National Guard's primary mission is to guard critical infrastructure such as the airport and oil fields; while the Guard is under the Ministry of Interior, it reports directly to the king"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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@ -987,10 +987,10 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "5,100,101 (2020)"
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"text": "5,100,101 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "127.9 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "128 (2020 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Georgian Defense Forces: Land Forces (includes Aviation and Air Defense Forces), Special Operations Forces, National Guard; Ministry of Internal Affairs: Border Police, Coast Guard (includes Georgian naval forces, which were merged with the Coast Guard in 2009) (2021)"
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"text": "Georgian Defense Forces: Land Forces (includes Aviation and Air Defense Forces), Special Operations Forces, National Guard; Ministry of Internal Affairs: Border Police, Coast Guard (includes Georgian naval forces, which were merged with the Coast Guard in 2009) (2022)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@
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"note": "note(s) - approximately 6-7,000 individuals are called up annually for conscription for service; approximately 25% enter the Defense Forces, while the remainder serve in the Ministry of Internal Affairs or as prison guards in the Ministry of Corrections; as of 2019, women made up about 6% of the military's full-time personnel"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "as of 2021, Georgia did not have any military stationed in the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but approximately 7-10,000 Russian troops have been stationed in these regions since the 2008 Russia-Georgia War"
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"text": "as of 2022, approximately 7-10,000 Russian troops continued to occupy the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia"
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}
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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@ -645,10 +645,10 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "4,135,363 (includes the West Bank)"
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"text": "4,274,119 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "76 (includes the West Bank) (2017 est.)"
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"text": "84 (2020 est.) includes the West Bank"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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@ -983,7 +983,7 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "127,624,951 (2020)"
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"text": "127,624,951 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "152 (2020 est.)"
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@ -1137,8 +1137,8 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah, IRGC): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces (Popular Mobilization Army); Law Enforcement Forces (border and security troops, assigned to the armed forces in wartime) (2021)<br><br>note(s) - the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz; the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit subordinate to Revolutionary Guard ground forces",
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"note": "note(s) - the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz; the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit subordinate to Revolutionary Guard ground forces"
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"text": "Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah, IRGC): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces (Popular Mobilization Army); Law Enforcement Forces (border and security troops, assigned to the armed forces in wartime) (2022)<br><br>note(s) - the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz; the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit subordinate to IRGC ground forces",
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"note": "note(s) - the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz; the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit subordinate to IRGC ground forces"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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@ -1173,7 +1173,7 @@
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"note": "note - Iran has recruited, trained, and funded thousands of Syrian and foreign fighters to support the ASAD regime during the Syrian civil war"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formed in May 1979 in the immediate aftermath of Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s fall, as leftists, nationalists, and Islamists jockeyed for power; while the interim prime minister controlled the government and state institutions, such as the Army, followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI organized counterweights, including the IRGC, to protect the Islamic revolution; the IRGC’s command structure bypassed the elected president and went directly to KHOMEINI; the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) transformed the IRGC into more of a conventional fighting force with its own ground, air, naval, and special forces, plus control over Iran’s strategic missile and rocket forces; as of 2021, the IRGC was a highly institutionalized and parallel military force to Iran’s regular armed forces (Artesh); it was heavily involved in internal security and had significant influence in the political and economic spheres of Iranian society, as well as Iran’s foreign policy; its special operations forces, known as the Qods/Quds Force, specialized in foreign missions and has provided advice, funding, guidance, material support, training, and weapons to militants in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as extremist groups, including HAMAS, Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (see Appendix-T for additional details on the IRGC and Qods Force); the Qods Force also conducts intelligence and reconnaissance operations </p> <p>the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) is the senior-most body for formulating Iran’s foreign and security policy; it is formally chaired by the president, who also appoints the SCNS secretary; its members include the speaker of the Majles, the head of the judiciary, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (chief of defense or CHOD), the commanders of the Artesh (regular forces) and IRGC, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and intelligence; the SCNS reports to the supreme leader; the supreme leader is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces</p>"
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"text": "<p>the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formed in May 1979 in the immediate aftermath of Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s fall, as leftists, nationalists, and Islamists jockeyed for power; while the interim prime minister controlled the government and state institutions, such as the Army, followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI organized counterweights, including the IRGC, to protect the Islamic revolution; the IRGC’s command structure bypassed the elected president and went directly to KHOMEINI; the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) transformed the IRGC into more of a conventional fighting force with its own ground, air, naval, and special forces, plus control over Iran’s strategic missile and rocket forces; as of 2022, the IRGC was a highly institutionalized and parallel military force to Iran’s regular armed forces (Artesh); it was heavily involved in internal security and had significant influence in the political and economic spheres of Iranian society, as well as Iran’s foreign policy; its special operations forces, known as the Qods/Quds Force, specialized in foreign missions and has provided advice, funding, guidance, material support, training, and weapons to militants in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as extremist groups, including HAMAS, Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (see Appendix-T for additional details on the IRGC and Qods Force); the Qods Force also conducts intelligence and reconnaissance operations </p> <p>the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) is the senior-most body for formulating Iran’s foreign and security policy; it is formally chaired by the president, who also appoints the SCNS secretary; its members include the speaker of the Majles, the head of the judiciary, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (chief of defense or CHOD), the commanders of the Artesh (regular forces) and IRGC, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and intelligence; the SCNS reports to the supreme leader; the supreme leader is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces</p>"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "<p>the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-003 Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea-Threats to US and International Shipping from Iran) effective 28 February 2022, which states in part that \"heightened military activities and increased political tensions in this region continue to present risk to commercial shipping...there is a continued possibility that Iran and/or its regional proxies could take actions against US and partner interests in the region;\" Coalition Task Force (CTF) Sentinel has been established to provide escorts for commercial shipping transiting the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman</p>"
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@ -1025,10 +1025,10 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "11.4 million (2020)"
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"text": "12.27 million (2020 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "131.7 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "142 (2020 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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"Terrorist group(s)": {
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"text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); Kahane Chai; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Palestinian Islamic Jihad",
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"text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Palestinian Islamic Jihad",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
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}
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},
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},
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"Food insecurity": {
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"severe localized food insecurity": {
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"text": "due to civil conflict, low oil prices, and economic slowdown - the 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) for Iraq identified 4.1 million people in need, of which 2.4 million have acute humanitarian needs; while the number of people in need remained similar to the previous year, the severity of those needs increased, largely due to the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic on top of an existing humanitarian crisis, leading to a 35% increase in the number of people in acute need; more than half of these are concentrated in the governorates of Nineveh and Anbar; the number of severely food insecure people is estimated at about 435,000, while 731,000 are vulnerable to food insecurity (2021)"
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"text": "due to civil conflict, low oil prices, and economic slowdown - the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview identified 2.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, of which 0.96 million have acute humanitarian needs; while the number of people in need remained similar to the previous year, the severity of those needs increased, largely due to the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic on top of an existing humanitarian crisis, leading to a 35% increase in the number of people in acute need; more than half of these are concentrated in the governorates of Nineveh and Anbar; the number of severely food insecure people is estimated at about 435,000, while 731,000 are vulnerable to food insecurity (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Waste and recycling": {
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "34,946,600 (2020)"
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"text": "37,475,325 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "91.86 (2020)"
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"text": "93 (2020 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)<br><br>National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS; a Special Forces Division aka the \"Golden Division\"), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police<br><br>Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate<br><br>Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades, Unit (or Division) 70 Forces, Unit (or Division) 80 Forces, special operations/counter-terrorism forces (Counter Terrorism Group, CTG and Counter Terrorism Directorate, CTD); note - Unit 70 and the CTG are associated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) political party, while Unit 80 and the CTD are associated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: Zeravani and Emergency Response Forces (paramilitary internal security forces)<br><br>Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests (2021)"
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"text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)<br><br>National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police<br><br>Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate<br><br>Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades, Unit (or Division) 70 Forces, Unit (or Division) 80 Forces, special operations/counter-terrorism forces (Counter Terrorism Group, CTG and Counter Terrorism Directorate, CTD); note - Unit 70 and the CTG are associated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) political party, while Unit 80 and the CTD are associated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: Zeravani and Emergency Response Forces (paramilitary internal security forces)<br><br>Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests (2022)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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"note": "note - in late 2021, the Iraqi Government approved a draft conscription law for the Council of Representatives to debate"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>as of early 2022, Iraqi security forces (ISF) continued to conduct counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq; Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, aka Peshmerga) also conducted operations against ISIS<br><br>the KSF are formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the country’s constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; in late 2021, the ISF and the KSF signed an agreement to establish a Joint Force Brigade that would provide security in a disputed area known as the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL); the KSF/Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense<br><br>Popular Mobilization Commission and Affiliated Forces (PMF or PMC), also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or al-Hashd al-Sha’abi in Arabic), tribal militia units have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraq’s other security forces and act under the Iraqi Government’s direct control; the Iraqi prime minister legally commands the PMF, but most of the militia brigades take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and two that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US; the PMF/PMU is an umbrella organization comprised of many different militias, the majority of which are Shia; there are typically three types of Shia militia:</p> <p>--militias backed by Iran, particularly the IRGC; they are considered the most active and capable, and include such groups as the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah</p> <p>--militias affiliated with Shia political parties, but not aligned with Iran, such as Moqtada al-SADR's Saray al-Salam (Peace Brigades)</p> <p>--militias not connected with political parties, but affiliated with the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI (Iraq’s supreme Shia cleric), such as the Hawza militias</p> <p>other PMF/PMU militias include Tribal Mobilization militias, or Hashd al-Asha’iri, which are composed of fighters from Sunni tribes; some of these militias take orders from the ISF and local authorities while others respond to orders from the larger Shia PMU militias; still other militias include Yazidi and Christian militias and the Turkmen brigades; the links of these forces to the PMU is not always clear-cut and may be loosely based on financial, legal, or political incentives</p> <p>at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission in Iraq in October 2018 to help Iraqi forces in their fight against ISIS; NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) currently has about 500 troops, but in February 2021 NATO announced it would increase the presence to about 4,000, although no timeframe was given</p> (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2022, Iraqi security forces (ISF) continued to conduct counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq; Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, aka Peshmerga) also conducted operations against ISIS<br><br>the KSF were formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the country’s constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; in late 2021, the ISF and the KSF signed an agreement to establish a Joint Force Brigade that would provide security in a disputed area known as the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL); the KSF/Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense<br><br>Popular Mobilization Commission and Affiliated Forces (PMF or PMC), also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or al-Hashd al-Sha’abi in Arabic), tribal militia units have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraq’s other security forces and act under the Iraqi Government’s direct control; the Iraqi prime minister legally commands the PMF, but many of the militia units take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and two that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US; the PMF/PMU is an umbrella organization comprised of many different militias, the majority of which are Shia; there are typically three types of Shia militia:</p> <p>--militias backed by Iran; they are considered the most active and capable, and include such groups as the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah</p> <p>--militias affiliated with Shia political parties, but not aligned with Iran, such as Moqtada al-SADR's Saray al-Salam (Peace Brigades)</p> <p>--militias not connected with political parties, but affiliated with the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI (Iraq’s supreme Shia cleric), such as the Hawza militias</p> <p>other PMF/PMU militias include Tribal Mobilization militias, or Hashd al-Asha’iri, which are composed of fighters from Sunni tribes; some of these militias take orders from the ISF and local authorities while others respond to orders from the larger Shia PMU militias; still other militias include Yazidi and Christian militias and the Turkmen brigades; the links of these forces to the PMU is not always clear-cut and may be loosely based on financial, legal, or political incentives</p> <p>at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission in Iraq in October 2018 to help Iraqi forces in their fight against ISIS; as of 2022, the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) had about 500 troops</p> (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1011,10 +1011,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "6,987,891 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "6,987,891 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "68.49 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "68 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "last held on 5 December 2020 (next to be held NA)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "all candidates ran as independents, though nearly half were oppositionists; composition - men 50, women 0, percent of women 0%"
|
||||
"text": "all candidates ran as independents, though nearly one-half were oppositionists; composition of elected members - men 50, women 0, percent of women 0%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -950,10 +950,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "6,770,346 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "6,770,346 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "158.5 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "159 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -433,8 +433,8 @@
|
|||
"text": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Lebanon; as of 30 March 2022, Lebanon has reported a total of 1,091,413 cases of COVID-19 or 15,990.35 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with a total of 10,291 cumulative deaths or a rate of 150.77 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 29 March 2022, 37.17% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to the ongoing financial and economic crisis - in August 2020, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia estimated that more than 55% of the population lived in poverty, up from 28% in 2019; current figures are likely to be higher due to a fall in households' purchasing power; the already worrisome economic conditions, with increasing unemployment, poverty, and skyrocketing inflation rates, have further worsened due to the COVID‑19 pandemic and the measures introduced to contain the spread of the disease</p> (2021)"
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to the ongoing financial and economic crisis - the World Food Program (WFP) estimates that, as a result of the ongoing economic crisis, over 1.3 million Lebanese citizens, about 36% of the total population, were food insecure by the end of September 2021; the number of Lebanese households with serious food access constraints reached 57% in September 2021, up from 40% in September 2020; domestic cereal production covers, on average, less than 20% of the consumption needs and the country depends heavily on imports (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -563,13 +563,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"text": "unicameral National Assembly or Majlis al-Nuwab in Arabic or Assemblee Nationale in French (128 seats; members directly elected by listed-based proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms); prior to 2017, the electoral system was by majoritarian vote"
|
||||
"text": "unicameral National Assembly or Majlis al-Nuwab in Arabic or Assemblee Nationale in French (128 seats; members directly elected in multi-member constituencies by listed-based proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms); prior to 2017, the electoral system was by majoritarian vote"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "last held on 6 May 2018 (next to be held on 15 May 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "last held on 15 May 2022 (next to be held in May 2026)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by coalition - NA; seats by coalition – Strong Lebanon Bloc (Free Patriotic Movement-led) 25; Future Bloc (Future Movement-led) 20; Development and Liberation Bloc (Amal Movement-led) 16; Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc (Hizballah-led) 15; Strong Republic Bloc (Lebanese Forces-led) 15; Democratic Gathering (Progressive Socialist Party-led) 9; Independent Centre Bloc 4; National Bloc (Marada Movement-led) 3; Syrian Social Nationalist Party 3; Tashnaq 3; Kata’ib 3; other 8; independent 4; composition - men 122, women 6, percent of women 4.6%"
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by coalition/party – NA; seats by party/coalition – FPM 16, LF 14, Amal Movement 13, Hezbollah 13, PSP 9, Future Movement Bloc (candidates did not run in 2022; members ran as independents) 8, Kata’ib Party 4, other 30, independent 21; composition - men 120, women 8, percent of women 6.3%"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Lebanon’s constitution states the National Assembly cannot conduct regular business until it elects a president when the position is vacant"
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
"text": "Muslim (official; citizens are 85-90% Sunni and 10-15% Shia), other (includes Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh) (2012 est.)",
|
||||
"text": "Muslim (official; citizens are 85-90% Sunni and 10-12% Shia), other (includes Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh) (2020 est.)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> despite having a large expatriate community of various faiths (more than 30% of the population), most forms of public religious expression inconsistent with the government-sanctioned interpretation of Sunni Islam are restricted; non-Muslims are not allowed to have Saudi citizenship and non-Muslim places of worship are not permitted (2013)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Age structure": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -422,7 +422,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil conflict and a stagnant economy - a nationwide food security assessment estimates that about 12.4 million people (60% of the overall population) are now food insecure in 2021, 5.4 million more than at the end of 2019, mostly due to constrained livelihood opportunities and a rapidly worsening economy; although some international food assistance is being provided, Syrian refugees are also pressuring host communities' resources in neighboring countries (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to civil conflict and a stagnant economy - battered by ten years of conflict and spill‑over effects from the financial crisis in Lebanon which used to act as a financial intermediary, the national economy continues to weaken; a nationwide food security assessment estimates that about 12.4 million people (60% of the overall population) are now food insecure in 2021, mostly due to constrained livelihood opportunities and a rapidly worsening economy (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ethnic groups": {
|
||||
"text": "Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 19%, other minorities 7-12% (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 19%, other minorities 6-11% (2016 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -634,7 +634,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador David M. SATTERFIELD (since 28 August 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Jeffrey Lane FLAKE (since 26 January 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "110 Ataturk Boulevard, Kavaklidere, 06100 Ankara"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -462,7 +462,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to conflict, poverty, floods, high food and fuel prices - between January and June 2021, the number of food insecure was projected to increase by nearly 3 million to 16.2 million people; out of these, an estimated 11 million people will likely be in \"Crisis,\" 5 million in \"Emergency,\" and the number of those in \"Catastrophe\" will likely increase to 47,000; economic conditions in the country remain dire; the conflict is further hampering the already constrained livelihood activities and humanitarian access; income earning opportunities have declined due to COVID‑19‑related business disruptions (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to conflict, poverty, floods, high food and fuel prices - between January and June 2021, the number of food insecure was projected to increase by nearly 3 million to 16.2 million people; out of these, an estimated 11 million people will likely be in \"Crisis,\" 5 million in \"Emergency,\" and the number of those in \"Catastrophe\" will likely increase to 47,000; economic conditions in the country remain dire; the conflict is further hampering the already constrained livelihood activities and humanitarian access; income earning opportunities have declined due to COVID‑19‑related business disruptions (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1167,10 +1167,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "68,874 (Somalia), 17,407 (Ethiopia) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "68,874 (Somalia), 17,705 (Ethiopia) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "4,002,012 (conflict in Sa'ada Governorate; clashes between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and government forces) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "4,288,739 (conflict in Sa'ada Governorate; clashes between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and government forces) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue