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auto-update week 21
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@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Algerian People's National Army (ANP): Land Forces, Naval Forces (includes coast guard), Air Forces, Territorial Air Defense Forces, Republican Guard (under ANP, but responsible to the President), National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Interior: General Directorate of National Security (national police) (2021)"
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"text": "Algerian People's National Army (ANP): Land Forces, Naval Forces (includes coast guard), Air Forces, Territorial Air Defense Forces, Republican Guard (under ANP, but responsible to the President), National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Interior: General Directorate of National Security (national police) (2022)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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@ -1156,14 +1156,14 @@
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}
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},
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"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
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"text": "approximately 140,000 ANP personnel (120,000 Army; 6,000 Navy; 14,000 Air Force); approximately 130,000 National Gendarmerie; approximately 200,000 General Directorate of National Security (2021)"
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"text": "approximately 140,000 ANP personnel (120,000 Army; 6,000 Navy; 14,000 Air Force); approximately 130,000 National Gendarmerie; approximately 200,000 General Directorate of National Security (2022)"
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},
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"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
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"text": "the ANP's inventory includes mostly Russian-sourced equipment; since 2010, Algeria has received arms from more than 15 countries, with Russia as the leading supplier (2021)"
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},
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"Military service age and obligation": {
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"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service (including women); 19-30 years of age for compulsory service (all Algerian men must register at age 17); conscript service obligation reduced from 18 to 12 months in 2014 (2021)",
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"note": "note - in 2020, conscripts comprised an estimated 70% of the military"
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"note": "note - as of 2020, conscripts comprised an estimated 70% of the military"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>the ANP has played a large role in the country’s politics since independence in 1962, including coups in 1965 and 1991; it was a key backer of BOUTEFLIKA’s election in 1999 and remained a center of power during his 20-year rule; the military was instrumental in BOUTEFLIKA’s resignation in 2019 when it withdrew support and called for him to be removed from office</p> <p>the ANP traditionally has focused on internal stability and on Morocco where relations as of 2022 remained tense over Western Sahara and Algerian accusations that Morocco supports the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK), a separatist group in Algeria’s Kabylie region; however, following the Arab Spring events of 2011 and a series of cross-border terrorist attacks emanating from Mali in 2012-2013, particularly the 2013 attack on a commercial gas plant by al-Qa’ida-linked terrorists that resulted in the deaths of 35 hostages and 29 jihadists, it has made a concerted effort to beef up security along its other borders and promote regional security cooperation; since 2013, additional Army and paramilitary forces were deployed to the borders with Tunisia, Libya, Niger, and Mali to interdict and deter cross-border attacks by Islamic militant groups; in addition, Algeria has provided security assistance to some neighboring countries, particularly Tunisia, and conducted joint military/counter-terrorism operations</p>"
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@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Angolan Armed Forces (Forcas Armadas Angolanas, FAA): Army, Navy (Marinha de Guerra Angola, MGA), Angolan National Air Force (Forca Aerea Nacional Angolana, FANA; under operational control of the Army); Rapid Reaction Police (paramilitary) (2021)"
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"text": "Angolan Armed Forces (Forcas Armadas Angolanas, FAA): Army, Navy (Marinha de Guerra Angola, MGA), Angolan National Air Force (Forca Aerea Nacional Angolana, FANA; under operational control of the Army); Rapid Reaction Police (paramilitary) (2022)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@
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"text": "20-45 years of age for compulsory male and 18-45 years for voluntary male military service (registration at age 18 is mandatory); 20-45 years of age for voluntary female service; 2-year conscript service obligation; Angolan citizenship required; the Navy (MGA) is entirely staffed with volunteers (2021)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>the Angolan Armed Forces were created in 1991 under the Bicesse Accords signed between the Angolan Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); the name remained even after UNITA rejected the 1992 election results and returned to fighting against the Angolan Government</p> <p>the Angolan Armed Forces are responsible for external security but also have domestic security responsibilities, including border security, expulsion of irregular migrants, and small-scale actions against groups like the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda separatists in Cabinda</p>"
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"text": "<p>the Angolan Armed Forces were created in 1991 under the Bicesse Accords signed between the Angolan Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); the name remained even after UNITA rejected the 1992 election results and returned to fighting against the Angolan Government</p> <p>the Angolan Armed Forces are responsible for external security but also have domestic security responsibilities, including border security, expulsion of irregular migrants, and small-scale actions against groups like the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda separatists in Cabinda</p> (2022)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Angola are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2021, four attacks against commercial vessels were reported, a decrease from the six attacks in 2020; most of these occurred in the main port of Luanda while ships were berthed or at anchor"
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@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Botswana Defense Force (BDF): Ground Forces Command, Air Arm Command, Defense Logistics Command (2021)",
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"text": "Botswana Defense Force (BDF): Ground Forces Command, Air Arm Command, Defense Logistics Command (2022)",
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"note": "note - both the armed forces and the Botswana Police Service report to the Ministry of Defense, Justice, and Security"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@
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"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service (men and women); no conscription (2021)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>Bechuanaland/Botswana did not have a permanent military during colonial times, with the British colonial administrators relying instead on small, lightly armed constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police, and by the early 1960s, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); after independence in 1966, Botswana militarized the PMU and gave it responsibility for the country’s defense rather than create a conventional military force; however, turmoil in neighboring countries and numerous cross-border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces demonstrated that the PMU was inadequate for defending the country and led to the establishment of the BDF in 1977; as of 2021, the BDF’s primary missions included securing territorial integrity/border security and internal duties such as disaster relief and anti-poaching</p> <p>as of 2021, the Army was comprised of approximately 4 small combat brigades (2 infantry, 1 light armored, 1 artillery), while the Air Force had 1 fighter/ground attack squadron; Botswana has no navy, but the Army has a marine unit with boats and other river craft for patrolling the country’s numerous waterways, particularly the Chobe River and Okavango swamps</p> <p>Botswana participates in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and in 2021 contributed nearly 300 troops to the SADC’s effort to help the Mozambique Government suppress an insurgency</p>"
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"text": "<p>Bechuanaland/Botswana did not have a permanent military during colonial times, with the British colonial administrators relying instead on small, lightly armed constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police, and by the early 1960s, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); after independence in 1966, Botswana militarized the PMU and gave it responsibility for the country’s defense rather than create a conventional military force; however, turmoil in neighboring countries and numerous cross-border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces demonstrated that the PMU was inadequate for defending the country and led to the establishment of the BDF in 1977; as of 2022, the BDF’s primary missions included securing territorial integrity/border security and internal duties such as disaster relief and anti-poaching</p> <p>Botswana participates in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and in 2021-2022 contributed nearly 300 troops to the SADC’s effort to help the Mozambique Government suppress an insurgency</p>"
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}
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
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},
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"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
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"chief of mission": {
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"text": "Ambassador Patricia MAHONEY (since 4 July 2019)"
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"text": "Ambassador Brian SHUKAN (since 5 May 2022)"
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},
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"embassy": {
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"text": "01 BP 2012, Cotonou"
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@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Benin Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB): Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of Interior and Public Security: Republican Police (Police Republicaine, DGPR) (2021)"
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"text": "Benin Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB): Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of Interior and Public Security: Republican Police (Police Republicaine, DGPR) (2022)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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"text": "260 (plus about 160 police) Mali (MINUSMA) (Jan 2022)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "as of 2021, Benin participated in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against the terrorist group Boko Haram (see Appendix T) along with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria; the Benin military contingent is in charge of MNJTF garrison duties<br> <p>as of 2021, the FAB had a close working relationship with the Belgian armed forces; the Belgians offered advice, training, and secondhand equipment donations, and deployed to Benin for limited military exercises</p>"
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"text": "Benin participates in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against the terrorist group Boko Haram (see Appendix T) along with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria<br> <p>the FAB has a close working relationship with the Belgian armed forces; the Belgians offer military advice, training, and secondhand equipment donations, and deploy to Benin for limited military exercises</p> (2022)"
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},
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"Maritime threats": {
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"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
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},
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"Food insecurity": {
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"widespread lack of access": {
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"text": "about 1 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure between January and March 2022, due to livelihood losses and displacements caused by the rising water level of Lake Tanganyika and the overflow of rivers, sustained repatriation flows and the socio-economic impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic (2022)"
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"text": "due to the effects of weather - about 1 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure between January and March 2022, due to livelihood losses and displacements caused by the rising water level of Lake Tanganyika and the overflow of rivers, sustained repatriation flows and the socio-economic impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Waste and recycling": {
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@ -1010,10 +1010,10 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "6,631,154 (2020)"
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"text": "6,631,151 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "55.77 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "56 (2020 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "National Defense Forces (Forces de Defense Nationale, FDN): Army (includes maritime wing, air wing); Ministry of Public Security: National Police (Police Nationale du Burundi) (2021)"
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"text": "National Defense Forces (Forces de Defense Nationale, FDN): Army (includes maritime wing, air wing); Ministry of Public Security: National Police (Police Nationale du Burundi) (2022)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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@ -484,7 +484,7 @@
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},
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"Food insecurity": {
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"widespread lack of access": {
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"text": "due to civil insecurity - according to the latest analysis, about 965 000 people were estimated to be in \"Crisis\" and above, between October and December 2021 due to persisting insecurity in Lac and Tibesti regions that disrupted livelihood activities and caused population displacements; domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021 due to adverse weather and the civil conflict; as a result, between June and August 2022, 1.74 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
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"text": "due to civil insecurity and shortfall in cereal production - according to the latest analysis, about 965 000 people were estimated to be in \"Crisis\" and above, between October and December 2021 due to persisting insecurity in Lac and Tibesti regions that disrupted livelihood activities and caused population displacements; domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021 due to adverse weather and the civil conflict; as a result, between June and August 2022, 1.74 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Waste and recycling": {
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@ -1024,10 +1024,10 @@
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "8,687,151 (2020)"
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"text": "8,687,151 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "52.89 (2020 est.)"
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"text": "53 (2020 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Chadian National Army (Armee Nationale du Tchad, ANT): Ground Forces (l'Armee de Terre, AdT), Chadian Air Force (l'Armee de l'Air Tchadienne, AAT), General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Generale des Services de Securite des Institutions de l'Etat, GDSSIE); National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Public Security and Immigration: National Nomadic Guard of Chad (GNNT), national police (2021)",
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"text": "Chadian National Army (Armee Nationale du Tchad, ANT): Ground Forces (l'Armee de Terre, AdT), Chadian Air Force (l'Armee de l'Air Tchadienne, AAT), General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Generale des Services de Securite des Institutions de l'Etat, GDSSIE); National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Public Security and Immigration: National Nomadic Guard of Chad (GNNT), Chadian National Police (2022)",
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"note": "note(s) - the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-size unit with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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@ -1168,7 +1168,7 @@
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"note": "note(s) - Chad is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; Chad has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane; Chad hosts the headquarters of Operation Barkhane in N’Djamena<br><br>Chad has committed approximately 1,000-1,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically; in 2019, Chad sent more than 1,000 troops to Nigeria’s Borno State to fight BH as part of the MNJTF mission"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "as of 2021, the ANT was chiefly focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; it was engaged with the Boko Haram (BH) and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin area (primarily the Lac Province) and in the Sahel; in 2020, it conducted a large military operation against BH in the Lake Chad region; that same year, Chad sent troops to the tri-border area with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to combat ISWA militants (it also contributes a large force to the UN MINUSCA mission in Mali); in addition, the ANT was conducting operations against internal anti-government militias and armed dissident groups; several Chadian rebel groups, including the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) and the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), operate in northern Chad from bases in Libya; former Chadian President Idriss DEBY<strong> </strong>was killed in April 2021 during fighting in the northern part of the country between FACT and the Chadian Army"
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"text": "as of 2022, the ANT was chiefly focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; it was engaged with the Boko Haram (BH) and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin area (primarily the Lac Province) and in the Sahel, particularly the tri-border area with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger; in addition, the ANT was conducting operations against internal anti-government militias and armed dissident groups; several Chadian rebel groups, including the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) and the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), operate in northern Chad from bases in Libya; former Chadian President Idriss DEBY<strong> </strong>was killed in April 2021 during fighting in the northern part of the country between FACT and the Chadian Army"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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},
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"Food insecurity": {
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"severe localized food insecurity": {
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"text": "due to restrictive measures related to the COVID‑19 pandemic - the negative impact of the restrictive measures related to the COVID‑19 pandemic on informal labor and on food supply chains, resulted, on one side, in the loss of income and, on the other, in high food prices due to a decline in food supply; these factors limited the access to food for the most vulnerable population (2021)"
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"text": "due to floods - on 29 November 2021, a state of emergency was declared due to floods in northern areas that caused crop and livestock losses, and displaced people, particularly in Likouala, Sangha, Cuvette and Plateaux departments; it is estimated that about 71,700 people have been affected, (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Waste and recycling": {
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},
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"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
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"total subscriptions": {
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"text": "5 million (2018 est.)"
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"text": "4.89 million (2020 est.)"
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},
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"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
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"text": "98.93 (2019 est.)"
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"text": "89 (2020 est.)"
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}
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Congolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Congolaises, FAC): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy, Congolese Air Force (Armee de l'Air Congolaise), Gendarmerie (2021)"
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"text": "Congolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Congolaises, FAC): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy, Congolese Air Force (Armee de l'Air Congolaise), Gendarmerie (2022)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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"text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service; women may serve in the armed forces (2021)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>as of 2021, that FAC had limited capabilities due to obsolescent and poorly maintained equipment and low levels of training; its primary focus was internal security; since its creation in 1961, the FAC has had a turbulent history; it has been sidelined by some national leaders in favor of personal militias, endured an internal rebellion (1996), and clashed with various rebel groups and political or ethnic militias (1993-1996, 2002-2005, 2017); during the 1997-1999 civil war, the military generally split along ethnic lines, with most northern officers supporting eventual winner SASSOU-Nguesso, and most southerners backing the rebels; others joined ethnic-based factions loyal to regional warlords; forces backing SASSOU-Nguesso were supported by Angolan troops and received some French assistance; the FAC also has undergone at least three reorganizations that included the incorporation of former rebel combatants and various ethnic and political militias; in recent years, France has provided some advice and training, and a military cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2019</p>"
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"text": "<p>as of 2022, the FAC had limited capabilities due to obsolescent and poorly maintained equipment and low levels of training; its primary focus was internal security; since its creation in 1961, the FAC has had a turbulent history; it has been sidelined by some national leaders in favor of personal militias, endured an internal rebellion (1996), and clashed with various rebel groups and political or ethnic militias (1993-1996, 2002-2005, 2017); during the 1997-1999 civil war, the military generally split along ethnic lines, with most northern officers supporting eventual winner SASSOU-Nguesso, and most southerners backing the rebels; others joined ethnic-based factions loyal to regional warlords; forces backing SASSOU-Nguesso were supported by Angolan troops and received some French assistance; the FAC also has undergone at least three reorganizations that included the incorporation of former rebel combatants and various ethnic and political militias; in recent years, France has provided some advice and training, and a military cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2019</p>"
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}
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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"text": "28,985 (Central African Republic), 22,108 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
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"text": "29,011 (Central African Republic), 22,108 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
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},
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"IDPs": {
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"text": "304,430 (multiple civil wars since 1992) (2021)"
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},
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"Food insecurity": {
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"widespread lack of access": {
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"text": "according to a November 2021 analysis, 26 million people are projected to be severely food insecure, in \"Crisis\" or above, between January and June 2022; this is due to persisting conflict in eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, which continues to cause displacements, coupled with the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
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"text": "due to internal conflict in eastern regions and economic downturn - according to a November 2021 analysis, 26 million people are projected to be severely food insecure, in \"Crisis\" or above, between January and June 2022; this is due to persisting conflict in eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, which continues to cause displacements, coupled with the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
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}
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},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1059,10 +1059,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "40,798,396 (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "40,798,396 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "45.55 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "46 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, FARDC): Land Forces, National Navy (La Marine Nationale), Congolese Air Force (Force Aerienne Congolaise, FAC); Republican Guard (2021)<br><br>note - the Republican Guard is a division-size element consisting of approximately 5 regiments; it is regarded as the country’s best equipped and trained military unit and is under the direct control of the president",
|
||||
"text": "Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, FARDC): Land Forces, National Navy (La Marine Nationale), Congolese Air Force (Force Aerienne Congolaise, FAC); Republican Guard; Ministry of Interior: Congolese National Police, Directorate General for Migration (2022)<br><br>note - the Republican Guard is a division-size element consisting of approximately 5 regiments; it is regarded as the country’s best equipped and trained military unit and is under the direct control of the president",
|
||||
"note": "note - the Republican Guard is a division-size element consisting of approximately 5 regiments; it is regarded as the country’s best equipped and trained military unit and is under the direct control of the president"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "210,621 (Rwanda), 210,357 (Central African Republic), 56,356 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,522 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "210,476 (Rwanda), 210,357 (Central African Republic), 56,356 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,522 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "5.61 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -493,7 +493,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity and population displacements - according to a March 2021 analysis, about 1.9 million people (7 percent of the total population) were projected to be severely food insecure in the June‑August 2021 period; this mainly results from the effects of Boko Haram incursions in the Far North Region, the socio‑political unrest in the Northwest and Southwest regions and COVID‑19 related economic shocks, which disrupted trade flows and agricultural practices, deteriorated livelihoods and displaced people (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity and population displacements - according to October 2021 analysis, about 2.4 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure between October and December 2021; this mainly results from the impacts of Boko Haram incursions in Far North Region, the socio‑political unrest in Northwest and Southwest regions and COVID‑19‑related economic shocks, which disrupted trade flows and agricultural practices, deteriorated livelihoods and displaced people (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1062,10 +1062,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "25,245,134 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "22,350,310 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "95.1 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "84 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1203,8 +1203,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Cameroon Armed Forces (Forces Armees Camerounaises, FAC): Army (L'Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale Republique, MNR, includes naval infantry), Air Force (Armee de l'Air du Cameroun, AAC), Rapid Intervention Battalion (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide, BIR), Gendarmerie, Presidential Guard (2021)",
|
||||
"note": "note(s) - the National Police (under the General Delegation of National Security) and the Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Rapid Intervention Battalion (RIB) is a large brigade-sized force comprised of approximately 9 battalions, detachments, or groups (5 infantry, 1 airborne, 1 amphibious, 1 armored reconnaissance, and 1 counter-terrorism); the RIB maintains its own command and control structure and reports directly to the president, rather than the defense minister"
|
||||
"text": "Cameroon Armed Forces (Forces Armees Camerounaises, FAC): Army (L'Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale Republique, MNR, includes naval infantry), Air Force (Armee de l'Air du Cameroun, AAC), Rapid Intervention Battalion (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide, BIR), National Gendarmerie, Presidential Guard (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note(s) - the National Police and the National Gendarmerie are responsible for internal security; the Police report to the General Delegation of National Security, while the Gendarmerie reports to the Secretariat of State for Defense in charge of the Gendarmerie; the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) maintains its own command and control structure and reports directly to the president; it is a large brigade-sized force comprised of approximately 9 battalions, detachments, or groups (5 infantry, 1 airborne, 1 amphibious, 1 armored reconnaissance, and 1 counter-terrorism)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - Cameroon has committed approximately 2,000-2,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations occur occasionally"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the FAC is largely focused on the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of Feb 2021, this internal conflict has left an estimated 3,000 civilians dead and over 700,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deploys units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits"
|
||||
"text": "as of 2022, the FAC was largely focused on the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of early 2022, this internal conflict has left an estimated 4,000 civilians dead and over 700,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deployed units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -921,10 +921,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "472,815 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "781,579 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "54.37 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "90 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "18 years of age for 2-year voluntary male and female military service; no conscription (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the AND is limited in capabilities to performing search and rescue operations and maintaining internal security; a defense treaty with France provides naval resources for protection of territorial waters, training of Comoran military personnel, and air surveillance; France maintains a small maritime base and a Foreign Legion contingent on neighboring Mayotte (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the AND is limited in capabilities to performing search and rescue operations and maintaining internal security; a defense treaty with France provides naval resources for protection of territorial waters, training of Comoran military personnel, and air surveillance; France maintains a small maritime base and a Foreign Legion contingent on neighboring Mayotte (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -467,7 +467,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "Persisting conflicts and displacements are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities and limit farmers’ access to crop growing areas and inputs, with a negative impact on 2022 crop production; in most prefectures, civil insecurity in 2021 continued to cause population displacements and widespread disruption of agricultural and marketing activities with negative consequences on food availability and access; the socio‑economic effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic, coupled with the high level of prices of some food staples, reduced substantially the households’ purchasing power (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "due to internal conflict - persisting conflicts and displacements are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities and limit farmers’ access to crop growing areas and inputs, with a negative impact on 2022 crop production; in most prefectures, civil insecurity in 2021 continued to cause population displacements and widespread disruption of agricultural and marketing activities with negative consequences on food availability and access; the socio‑economic effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic, coupled with the high level of prices of some food staples, reduced substantially the households’ purchasing power (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -995,10 +995,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "1,595,294 (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "1.831 million (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "33.62 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "38 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA): Army (includes an air squadron, Escadrille Centrafricaine), General Directorate of Gendarmerie Inspection (DGIG); Ministry of Interior: National Police (2021)",
|
||||
"text": "Central African Armed Forces (Forces Armees Centrafricaines, FACA): Army (includes an air squadron, Escadrille Centrafricaine); Ministry of Interior: National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale), National Police (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - in 2019-2021, CAR created three Mixed Special Security units (<em>Unités Spéciales Mixtes de Sécurité</em> or USMS), regionally based battalion-sized units comprised of about 40% government and 60% rebel soldiers that are intended to provide security along transportation corridors and at mining sites; the units are intended to be transitional in nature with a scheduled deployment time of two years"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 10,000 active troops, including an air component of about 200 and up to 2,000 Gendarmerie; approximately 2,000 Mixed Special Security Units (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 8,000 FACA troops; up to 2,000 Gendarmerie; approximately 2,000 Mixed Special Security Units (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FACA is lightly and poorly armed with mostly outdated weapons; since 2010, it has received small amounts of second-hand equipment from China, Russia, and Ukraine (2021)",
|
||||
|
|
@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "18 years of age for military service; no conscription (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; reportedly only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and it has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; the European Union, France, Russia, the UN, and the US are providing various levels of security assistance <br><br>in 2018, the UN Security Council approved Russian security assistance for the CAR to help train and advise FACA personnel, as well as transport them to operational areas, provide logistical support, and assist with medical evacuation; Russia sent private military contractors, and as of late 2021, there were reportedly as many as 2,000 providing assistance to the FACA, as well as performing other security roles such as guarding mines and government officials; some Russian contractors and the CAR forces they supported have been accused of carrying out indiscriminate killings, using excessive force against civilians, and looting<br><br>the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its peacekeeping mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; in November 2019, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission another year; as of February 2022, MINUSCA had about 14,000 total personnel<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016; the EUTM-RCA contributes to the restructuring of the country's military and defense sector through advice, training, and educational programs; as of mid-2021, it had trained 4 territorial infantry battalions (Bataillon d’Infanterie Territorial) and 1 amphibious infantry battalion<br><br> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; reportedly only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and it has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; the European Union, France, Russia, the UN, and the US have provided various levels of security assistance <br><br>in 2018, the UN Security Council approved Russian security assistance for the CAR to help train and advise FACA personnel, as well as transport them to operational areas, provide logistical support, and assist with medical evacuation; Russia sent private military contractors, and as of late 2021, there were reportedly as many as 2,000 providing assistance to the FACA, as well as performing other security roles such as guarding mines and government officials; some Russian contractors and the CAR forces they supported have been accused of carrying out indiscriminate killings, using excessive force against civilians, and looting<br><br>the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its peacekeeping mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; in November 2019, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission another year; as of 2022, MINUSCA had about 14,000 total personnel<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016, providing advice, training, and educational programs to the country's security forces<br> <p> </p> (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -953,10 +953,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "544,729 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "544,729 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "97.98 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "98 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Cabo Verdean Armed Forces (FACV): Army (also called the National Guard, GN; includes a small air component), Cabo Verde Coast Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Cabo Verdean Armed Forces (FACV): Army (also called the National Guard, GN; includes a small air component), Cabo Verde Coast Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV); Ministry of Internal Affairs: National Police (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "18-35 years of age for male and female selective compulsory military service; 2-years conscript service obligation; 17 years of age for voluntary service (with parental consent) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2021, the FACV/National Guard was mostly a ground force with 2 infantry battalions and a small air component with a maritime patrol squadron; the Coast Guard had a few coastal patrol craft and patrol boats</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2022, the FACV/National Guard was mostly a ground force with 2 infantry battalions and a small air component with a maritime patrol squadron; the Coast Guard had a few coastal patrol craft and patrol boats</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -968,10 +968,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "434,035 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "434,035 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "43.93 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "44 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Djibouti Armed Forces (FAD): Army, Navy, Air Force; Djibouti Coast Guard; Ministry of Interior: National Gendarmerie, National Police (2021)",
|
||||
"text": "Djibouti Armed Forces (FAD): Army, Navy, Air Force; Djibouti Coast Guard; Ministry of Interior: National Gendarmerie, National Police (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - the National Police is responsible for security within Djibouti City and has primary control over immigration and customs procedures for all land border-crossing points, while the National Gendarmerie is responsible for all security outside of Djibouti City, as well as for protecting critical infrastructure within the city, such as the international airport"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "95,357,427 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "95,357,427 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "93.18 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "93 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1195,7 +1195,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF): Army (includes surface-to-surface missile forces, special forces, Republican Guard), Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force, Air Defense Command, Border Guard Forces; Interior Ministry: Public Security Sector Police, the Central Security Force, National Security Sector (2021)<br><br>note(s) - the Public Security Sector Police are responsible for law enforcement nationwide; the Central Security Force protects infrastructure and is responsible for crowd control; the National Security Sector is responsible for internal security threats and counterterrorism along with other security services; in addition to its external defense duties, the EAF also has a mandate to assist police in protecting vital infrastructure during a state of emergency; military personnel were granted full arrest authority in 2011 but normally only use this authority during states of emergency and “periods of significant turmoil”",
|
||||
"text": "Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF): Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force, Air Defense Command, Border Guard Forces; Interior Ministry: Public Security Sector Police, the Central Security Force, National Security Sector (2022)<br><br>note(s) - the Public Security Sector Police are responsible for law enforcement nationwide; the Central Security Force protects infrastructure and is responsible for crowd control; the National Security Sector is responsible for internal security threats and counterterrorism along with other security services; in addition to its external defense duties, the EAF also has a mandate to assist police in protecting vital infrastructure during a state of emergency; military personnel were granted full arrest authority in 2011 but normally only use this authority during states of emergency and “periods of significant turmoil”",
|
||||
"note": "note(s) - the Public Security Sector Police are responsible for law enforcement nationwide; the Central Security Force protects infrastructure and is responsible for crowd control; the National Security Sector is responsible for internal security threats and counterterrorism along with other security services; in addition to its external defense duties, the EAF also has a mandate to assist police in protecting vital infrastructure during a state of emergency; military personnel were granted full arrest authority in 2011 but normally only use this authority during states of emergency and “periods of significant turmoil”"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1229,12 +1229,12 @@
|
|||
"text": "1,000 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 1,050 Mali (MINUSMA) (Jan 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of 2021, Egypt reportedly had approximately 40,000 military troops, police, and other security personnel deployed in the Sinai for internal security duties; in addition, tribal militias were assisting Egyptian security forces<br><br>the military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, and shipping lines, producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded<br><br>Egypt has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments<br><br></p> the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; as of 2021, it was composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries"
|
||||
"text": "since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of 2022, Egypt had tens of thousands of military troops, police, and other security personnel deployed in the Sinai for internal security duties; in addition, tribal militias were assisting Egyptian security forces<br><br>the military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, and shipping lines, producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded<br><br>Egypt has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments<br><br>the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; as of 2022, it was composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US were the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Army of Islam; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; al-Qa’ida",
|
||||
"text": "Army of Islam; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; al-Qa’ida",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -930,10 +930,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "591,223 (2018)"
|
||||
"text": "645,000 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "44.86 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "46 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Equatorial Guinea Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Guinea Ecuatorial, FAGE): Equatorial Guinea National Guard (Guardia Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial, GNGE (Army), Navy, Air Force; Gendarmerie (2021)",
|
||||
"text": "Equatorial Guinea Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Guinea Ecuatorial, FAGE): Equatorial Guinea National Guard (Guardia Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial, GNGE (Army)), Navy, Air Force; Gendarmerie (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - the Gendarmerie reports to the Ministry of National Defense and is responsible for security outside cities and for special events; military personnel also fulfill some police functions in border areas, sensitive sites, and high-traffic areas"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1067,16 +1067,16 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 1,400 active duty troops; approximately 3-400 Gendarmerie (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 2,000 active duty troops; approximately 400 Gendarmerie (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FAGE is armed with mostly older (typically Soviet-era) and second-hand weapons systems; in recent years, it has sought to modernize its naval inventory; Ukraine is the leading provider of equipment since 2010 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the FAGE is armed with mostly older (typically Soviet-era) and second-hand weapons systems; in recent years, it has sought to modernize its naval inventory; Ukraine has been the leading provider of equipment since 2010 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for selective compulsory military service, although conscription is rare in practice; 2-year service obligation; women hold only administrative positions in the Navy (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2021, the FAGE’s National Guard (Army) had only three small infantry battalions with limited combat capabilities; the Navy focused on anti-piracy and protecting the country’s natural resources in the Gulf of Guinea; the Navy is small is size, but its inventory included a light frigate and a corvette, as well as several off-shore patrol boats; the Air Force possessed only a few operational combat aircraft and ground attack-capable helicopters</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2022, the FAGE’s National Guard (Army) had only three small infantry battalions with limited combat capabilities; the country has invested heavily in naval capabilities in the 2010s to protect its oil installations and combat piracy and crime in the Gulf of Guinea; while the Navy was small, it was well-equipped with an inventory that included a light frigate and a corvette, as well as several off-shore patrol boats; the Air Force possessed only a few operational combat aircraft and ground attack-capable helicopters</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -933,10 +933,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "695,000 (2017)"
|
||||
"text": "1.801 million (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "20.36 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "51 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Eritrean Defense Forces: Eritrean Ground Forces, Eritrean Navy, Eritrean Air Force (includes Air Defense Force) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Eritrean Defense Forces: Eritrean Ground Forces, Eritrean Navy, Eritrean Air Force (includes Air Defense Force) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - as of 2020, women reportedly made up as much as 30% of the Eritrean military"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>in 2020-2021, the Eritrean military assisted the Ethiopian Government in its war with the Tigray regional government, providing ground forces and combat aircraft; information is limited and varied, but the Eritrean military in 2021 reportedly consisted of about 20 Army divisions (approximately 15 light infantry, 4 mechanized, and 1 commando/special operations) while the Air Force had 2 fighter/ground attack squadrons</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>in 2020-2021, the EDF assisted the Ethiopian Government in its war with the Tigray regional government, providing ground forces and combat aircraft; during the fighting, the EDF was accused of committing human rights abuses against civilians</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil conflict - more than 16 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the May−June 2021 period; the high levels of food insecurity are mainly due to the lingering impact of the measures implemented in 2020 to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic, macro‑economic challenges resulting in high food prices, localized but significant locust‑induced crop and pasture losses, the negative impact on crop and livestock production of erratic rains in the first half of the year and to the intensification of inter‑communal violence since 2020 in several areas and the ongoing conflict in Tigray Region (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "due to civil conflict and drought - more than 16 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the May−June 2021 period; the high levels of food insecurity are mainly due to the lingering impact of the measures implemented in 2020 to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic, macro‑economic challenges resulting in high food prices, localized but significant locust‑induced crop and pasture losses, the negative impact on crop and livestock production of erratic rains in the first half of the year and to the intensification of inter‑communal violence since 2020 in several areas and the ongoing conflict in Tigray Region (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1076,10 +1076,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "39.54 million (2018)"
|
||||
"text": "44.5 million (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "37.22 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "39 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF): Ground Forces, Ethiopian Air Force (Ye Ityopya Ayer Hayl, ETAF) (2021)",
|
||||
"text": "Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF): Ground Forces, Ethiopian Air Force (Ye Ityopya Ayer Hayl, ETAF) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note(s) - in January 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which was disbanded in 1996; in March 2019 Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which will reportedly be based out of Djibouti<br><br>in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime Minister for protecting senior officials<br><br>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - in August 2021, Sudan asked the UN to remove the Ethiopian troops from the UNISFA mission"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "each of the nine states has a regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security forces that report to regional civilian authorities; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP), and the Ethiopian military; the EFP reports to the Ministry of Peace, which was created in October of 2018<br><br>since November 2020, the Government of Ethiopia has been engaged in a protracted military conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former governing party of the Tigray Region; the government deemed a TPLF attack on Ethiopia military forces as a domestic terrorism incident and launched a military offensive in response; the TPLF asserted that its actions were self-defense in the face of planned Ethiopian Government action to remove it from the provincial government; the Ethiopian Government sent large elements of the ENDF into Tigray to remove the TPLF and invited militia and paramilitary forces from the states of Afar and Amara, as well as the military forces of Eritrea, to assist; fighting continued through the end of 2021 with heavy civilian and military casualties and widespread human rights abuses reported<br><br>the military forces of the Tigray regional government are known as the Tigray Defense Force (TDF); the TDF is comprised of state paramilitary forces, local militia, and troops that defected from the ENDF; it reportedly had up to 250,000 fighters at the start of the conflict; in August 2021, the TPLF struck an alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) <p>as of 2021, the Ethiopian military consisted of approximately 22 Army divisions (approximately 14 light infantry, 6 mechanized, and 1 commando/special operations), while the Air Force had 2 fighter/ground attack and 2 mixed attack/transport helicopter squadrons</p> <br> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "each of the nine states has a regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security forces that report to regional civilian authorities; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP), and the Ethiopian military; the EFP reports to the Ministry of Peace, which was created in October of 2018<br><br>since November 2020, the Government of Ethiopia has been engaged in a protracted military conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former governing party of the Tigray Region; the government deemed a TPLF attack on Ethiopia military forces as a domestic terrorism incident and launched a military offensive in response; the TPLF asserted that its actions were self-defense in the face of planned Ethiopian Government action to remove it from the provincial government; the Ethiopian Government sent large elements of the ENDF into Tigray to remove the TPLF and invited militia and paramilitary forces from the states of Afar and Amara, as well as the military forces of Eritrea, to assist; the fighting included heavy civilian and military casualties with widespread abuses reported; the conflict continued as of April 2022<br><br>the military forces of the Tigray regional government are known as the Tigray Defense Force (TDF); the TDF is comprised of state paramilitary forces, local militia, and troops that defected from the ENDF; it reportedly had up to 250,000 fighters at the start of the conflict; in August 2021, the TPLF struck an alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "395,810 (South Sudan), 243,040 (Somalia), 159,040 (Eritrea), 46,963 (Sudan) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "395,810 (South Sudan), 243,040 (Somalia), 159,369 (Eritrea), 47,179 (Sudan) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1,990,168 (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1003,10 +1003,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "2,677,954 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "2,677,954 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "110.8 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "111 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Gambia Armed Forces: the Gambian National Army (GNA; includes a small air wing), Navy, Republican National Guard (responsible for VIP protection, riot control, and presidential security) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Gambia Armed Forces: the Gambian National Army (GNA), Gambia Navy, Gambia Air Force, Republican National Guard (responsible for VIP protection, riot control, and presidential security) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service (18-22 for officers); no conscription; service obligation 6 months (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>in 2017, several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent security forces to The Gambia to conduct stability operations and provide assistance and training following the 2016 election; as of 2021, the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) was comprised of about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal; ECOMIG is slated to become a police mission by the end of 2021</p> <p>the Gambian Armed Forces (GAF) traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the Gambian Armed Forces in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of two-thirds Senegalese and one-third Gambian soldiers</p> <p>the military in Gambia, including the Field Force, has a history of heavy involvement in the country’s politics, including multiple coups or coup attempts and mutinies</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>in 2017, several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent security forces to The Gambia to conduct stability operations and provide assistance and training following the 2016 election; as of 2022, the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) was comprised of about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal</p> <p>the Gambian Armed Forces (GAF) traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the Gambian Armed Forces in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of two-thirds Senegalese and one-third Gambian soldiers</p> <p>the military in Gambia, including the Field Force, has a history of heavy involvement in the country’s politics, including multiple coups or coup attempts and mutinies; as of 2022, the Gambia Armed Forces’ principal responsibilities included aiding civil authorities in emergencies and providing natural disaster relief</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -986,10 +986,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "3,088,742 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "3,049,530 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "138.8 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "137 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Gabonese Defense Forces (Forces de Defense Gabonaise): Land Forces (Army), Navy, Air Forces, National Gendarmerie; Republican Guard (land forces under direct presidential control) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Gabonese Defense Forces (Forces de Defense Gabonaise): Land Forces (Army), Navy, Air Forces, National Gendarmerie; Republican Guard (land forces under direct presidential control) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1036,10 +1036,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "40,461,609 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "40,461,609 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "130.2 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "130 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "150 Mali (MINUSMA); 875 Lebanon (UNIFIL); 730 (plus about 300 police) South Sudan (UNMISS) (Jan 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the military of Ghana traces its origins to the Gold Coast Constabulary that was established in 1879 and renamed the Gold Coast Regiment in 1901; the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast Regiment formed the basis for the new Ghanaian Army</p> <p>as of 2021, the primary missions for the Ghanaian military included assisting other security services with internal security and patrolling the country’s economic exclusion zone, which has led to efforts to expand the Navy’s capabilities in recent years; since sending a contingent of troops to the Congo in 1960, the Ghana military has been a regular contributor to African- and UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>the military of Ghana traces its origins to the Gold Coast Constabulary that was established in 1879 and renamed the Gold Coast Regiment in 1901; the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast Regiment formed the basis for the new Ghanaian Army</p> <p>as of 2022, the primary missions for the Ghanaian military included assisting other security services with internal security and patrolling the country’s economic exclusion zone, which has led to efforts to expand the Navy’s capabilities in recent years; since sending a contingent of troops to the Congo in 1960, the Ghana military has been a regular contributor to African- and UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "6,045 (Cote d'Ivoire) (flight from 2010 post-election fighting) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "5,779 (Cote d'Ivoire) (flight from 2010 post-election fighting) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -483,7 +483,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls of cereal production - despite overall favorable food security conditions, the most vulnerable households still need external food assistance; the aggregate number of severely food insecure people was estimated at 267,000 during the lean season between June and August 2020; it is very likely that the number of food insecure population increased with the impact of COVID‑19 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes - about 740,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1040,10 +1040,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "12.873 million (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "13.795 million (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "100.8 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "105 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "National Armed Forces: Army, Guinean Navy (Armee de Mer or Marine Guineenne), Guinean Air Force (Force Aerienne de Guinee), Presidential Security Battalion (Battailon Autonome de la Sécurité Presidentielle, BASP), Gendarmerie (2021)",
|
||||
"text": "National Armed Forces: Army, Guinean Navy (Armee de Mer or Marine Guineenne), Guinean Air Force (Force Aerienne de Guinee), Presidential Security Battalion (Battailon Autonome de la Sécurité Presidentielle, BASP), Gendarmerie (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - the National Gendarmerie is overseen by the Ministry of Defense, while the National Police is under the Ministry of Security; the Gendarmerie and National Police share responsibility for internal security, but only the Gendarmerie can arrest police or military officials"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "670 Mali (MINUSMA) (Jan 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the Army is responsible for external defense, but also has some domestic security responsibilities; piracy and natural resource protection in the Gulf of Guinea are key areas of concern for the small Navy, which possesses only a few patrol boats</p>"
|
||||
"text": "the Army is responsible for external defense, but also has some domestic security responsibilities; piracy and natural resource protection in the Gulf of Guinea are key areas of concern for the small Navy, which possesses only a few patrol boats (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "40,095,246 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "40,095,246 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "152 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale), Cote Air Force (Force Aerienne Cote), Special Forces (Forces Speciale); National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense); National Police (under the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection); Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale), Cote Air Force (Force Aerienne Cote), Special Forces (Forces Speciale); National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense); Ministry of Security and Civil Protection: National Police; Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1210,10 +1210,10 @@
|
|||
"text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary male and female military service; conscription is not enforced; voluntary recruitment of former rebels into the new national army is restricted to ages 22-29 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "860 Mali (MINUSMA) (Jan 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "860 Mali (MINUSMA) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; as of late 2021, the FACI was focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017"
|
||||
"text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; as of 2022, the FACI was focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -466,7 +466,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "about 3.1 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in February 2022 reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 that affected crop and livestock production, mainly in northern and eastern pastoral, agro-pastoral and marginal agricultural areas; the deterioration of the food security situation is mainly due to the negative impact of two consecutive poor rainy seasons since October 2020 on crop and livestock production and on on‑farm income‑earning opportunities; the impact of the measures implemented to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic on economic activities exacerbated food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "due to drought conditions - about 3.1 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in February 2022 reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 that affected crop and livestock production, mainly in northern and eastern pastoral, agro-pastoral and marginal agricultural areas; the deterioration of the food security situation is mainly due to the negative impact of two consecutive poor rainy seasons since October 2020 on crop and livestock production and on on‑farm income‑earning opportunities; the impact of the measures implemented to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic on economic activities exacerbated food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -612,7 +612,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Senate - last held on 8 August 2017 (next to be held in August 2022)<br>National Assembly - last held on 8 August 2017 (next to be held on 9 August 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "Senate - percent of vote by party/coalition - NA; seats by party/coalition - Jubilee Party 24; National Super Alliance 28, other 14, independent 1; composition - men 47, women 21, percent of women is 30.9%<br><br>National Assembly - percent of vote by party/coalition - NA; seats by party/coalition - Jubilee Party 165, National Super Alliance 119, other 51, independent 13; composition - men 275, women 75, percent of women 21.4%; note - total Parliament percent of women 23%"
|
||||
"text": "Senate - percent of vote by party/coalition - NA; seats by party/coalition - Jubilee Party 24; National Super Alliance 28, other 14, independent 1; composition - men 46, women 22, percent of women is 32.4%<br><br>National Assembly - percent of vote by party/coalition - NA; seats by party/coalition - Jubilee Party 165, National Super Alliance 119, other 51, independent 13; composition - men 275, women 75, percent of women 21.4%; note - total Parliament percent of women 23%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1049,10 +1049,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "61,408,904 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "61,408,904 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "114.2 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "114 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "279,145 (Somalia), 141,414 (South Sudan), 20,924 (Ethiopia), 19,036 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 7,521 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "279,145 (Somalia), 141,414 (South Sudan), 21,001 (Ethiopia), 19,036 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 7,521 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -460,6 +460,11 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>on 21 March 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Africa; Liberia is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and <em>that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus</em>; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to high food prices - production of rice, a main staple food, was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, a factor that is expected to further aggravate food insecurity in 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
"municipal solid waste generated annually": {
|
||||
"text": "564,467 tons (2007 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1148,7 +1153,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "5,365 (Cote d'Ivoire) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "8,054 (Cote d'Ivoire) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -449,7 +449,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to localized shortfalls in production and loss of income-generating activities - a slow economic recovery in 2021 will continue to impose constraints on households’ incomes, impinging on their economic capacity to access food; overall, the number of food insecure people is expected to decline from the estimated 582,000 that faced acute food insecurity in the October 2020−March 2021 period; the possibility of a third wave of COVID‑19 cases in the country and neighboring South Africa, increases the risk for the enforcement of new containment measures, which could prolong the high levels of unemployment and cause further income losses among the most vulnerable households</p> (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to loss of income-generating activities - the number of people facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022 is estimated at 338,000, reflecting the effects of a slow economic recovery that has impinged on households’ economic capacity to access food (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -572,13 +572,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:<br>Senate (33 seats; 22 principal chiefs and 11 other senators nominated by the king with the advice of the Council of State, a 13-member body of key government and non-government officials; members serve 5-year terms)<br> National Assembly (120 seats; 80 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 40 elected through proportional representation; members serve 5-year terms)"
|
||||
"text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:<br>Senate (33 seats; 22 principal chiefs and 11 other senators nominated by the king with the advice of the Council of State, a 13-member body of key government and non-government officials; members serve 5-year terms)<br>National Assembly (120 seats; 80 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 40 elected through proportional representation; members serve 5-year terms)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "Senate - last nominated by the king 11 July 2017 (next NA)<br> National Assembly - last held on 3 June 2017 (next to be held in 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Senate - last nominated by the king 11 July 2017 (next NA)<br>National Assembly - last held on 3 June 2017 (next to be held in 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "Senate - percent of votes by party - NA, seats by party - NA; composition - men 25, women 8, percent of women 24.2%<br> National Assembly - percent of votes by party - ABC 40.5%, DC 25.8%, LCD 9%, AD 7.3%, MEC 5.1%, BNP 4.1, PFD 2.3%, other 5.9%; seats by party - ABC 51, DC 30, LCD 11, AD 9, MEC 6, BNP 5, PFD 3, other 5; composition - men 95, women 27, percent of women 22.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 22.9%"
|
||||
"text": "Senate - percent of votes by party - NA, seats by party - NA; composition - men 26, women 7, percent of women 21.2%<br>National Assembly - percent of votes by party - ABC 40.5%, DC 25.8%, LCD 9%, AD 7.3%, MEC 5.1%, BNP 4.1, PFD 2.3%, other 5.9%; seats by party - ABC 51, DC 30, LCD 11, AD 9, MEC 6, BNP 5, PFD 3, other 5; composition - men 95, women 27, percent of women 22.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 22.9%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -422,7 +422,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity, economic and political instability, and high food prices - an estimated 1.3 million people (23% of the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance of which 700,000 require food assistance; half of the people in need of humanitarian assistance are internally displaced or migrants that are residing in, or transiting through, the country (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity, economic and political instability, and high food prices - an estimated 800,000 people, 10% of the population, need humanitarian assistance, of which 500,000 require food assistance (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "18,346 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,014 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "18,675 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 14,919 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "168,011 (conflict between pro-QADHAFI and anti-QADHAFI forces in 2011; post-QADHAFI tribal clashes 2014) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to drought in southern areas and limited income-earning opportunities - an estimated 1.14 million people are food insecure in southern and southeastern regions and require urgent humanitarian assistance; the effects of a severe drought on agricultural production in 2021 and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly the loss of incomes due to the economic slowdown, are the key drivers of food insecurity (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to the effects of extreme weather events - cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in eastern regions, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase later in 2022; moreover, drought conditions continue to affect households in the south, which is likely to result in an increase in the severity and prevalence of food insecurity in these areas (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -470,7 +470,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes - nationally, cereal production is estimated at a bumper high in 2021, which is expected to result in average to above‑average household cereal supplies and thus improvements in food security; despite the good food supply situation, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to curb access to food due to reduced incomes (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes and shortfalls in cereal producation - an estimated 1.65 million people are facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022, underpinned by localized shortfalls in cereal production and the lingering impact of an economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic; the effects of poor rains at the start of the cropping season and tropical storm Ana in January 2022 are expected to cause an increase in humanitarian needs later in 2022, due to crop and livelihood losses (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "33,089 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 12,377 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers), 7,526 (Rwanda) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "12,377 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers), 7,526 (Rwanda) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Mali has 13 national languages in addition to its official language"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
"text": "Muslim 93.9%, Christian 2.8%, animist .7%, none 2.5% (2018 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "Muslim 93.9%, Christian 2.8%, animist 0.7%, none 2.5% (2018 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Demographic profile": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Mali’s total population is expected to double by 2035; its capital Bamako is one of the fastest-growing cities in Africa. A young age structure, a declining mortality rate, and a sustained high total fertility rate of 6 children per woman – the third highest in the world – ensure continued rapid population growth for the foreseeable future. Significant outmigration only marginally tempers this growth. Despite decreases, Mali’s infant, child, and maternal mortality rates remain among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa because of limited access to and adoption of family planning, early childbearing, short birth intervals, the prevalence of female genital cutting, infrequent use of skilled birth attendants, and a lack of emergency obstetrical and neonatal care.</p><p>Mali’s high total fertility rate has been virtually unchanged for decades, as a result of the ongoing preference for large families, early childbearing, the lack of female education and empowerment, poverty, and extremely low contraceptive use. Slowing Mali’s population growth by lowering its birth rate will be essential for poverty reduction, improving food security, and developing human capital and the economy.</p><p>Mali has a long history of seasonal migration and emigration driven by poverty, conflict, demographic pressure, unemployment, food insecurity, and droughts. Many Malians from rural areas migrate during the dry period to nearby villages and towns to do odd jobs or to adjoining countries to work in agriculture or mining. Pastoralists and nomads move seasonally to southern Mali or nearby coastal states. Others migrate long term to Mali’s urban areas, Cote d’Ivoire, other neighboring countries, and in smaller numbers to France, Mali’s former colonial ruler. Since the early 1990s, Mali’s role has grown as a transit country for regional migration flows and illegal migration to Europe. Human smugglers and traffickers exploit the same regional routes used for moving contraband drugs, arms, and cigarettes.</p><p>Between early 2012 and 2013, renewed fighting in northern Mali between government forces and Tuareg secessionists and their Islamist allies, a French-led international military intervention, as well as chronic food shortages, caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malians. Most of those displaced domestically sought shelter in urban areas of southern Mali, except for pastoralist and nomadic groups, who abandoned their traditional routes, gave away or sold their livestock, and dispersed into the deserts of northern Mali or crossed into neighboring countries. Almost all Malians who took refuge abroad (mostly Tuareg and Maure pastoralists) stayed in the region, largely in Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso.</p>"
|
||||
|
|
@ -484,7 +484,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to civil insecurity - according to the latest analysis, about 1.37 million people are estimated to be in a food “Crisis” in the June−August 2021 period as a result of the escalation of the conflict that continues to cause population displacements, combined with the impacts of the pandemic and weather shocks</p> (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in staple food production - between June and August 2022, 1.84 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity, driven in part by a shortfall in staple food production in 2021; sanctions imposed on the country, following the postponement of elections by the transitional military government, are likely to slow down economic activity and further weigh on households’ economic capacity to access food</p> (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "18 years of age for selective compulsory and voluntary military service (men and women); 2-year conscript service obligation (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "Mali is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane "
|
||||
"text": "until announcing its withdrawal in May of 2022, Mali was part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; Mali had committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "prior to the coups in August 2020 and May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants; it has been since rebuilt, but continues to have limited capabilities and is heavily reliant on external assistance <br><br>as of 2022, Malian security forces were conducting operations against insurgents and terrorist groups in the eastern, central, and northern parts of the country<br><br>the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of February 2022, MINUSMA had around 14,000 personnel deployed<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) and the French military have also operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; as 2021, the mission included almost 700 personnel from 25 European countries; as of early 2022, the French had approximately 2,400 troops providing military assistance and conducting counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations; note - in February 2022, France announced it would remove its personnel from Mali, citing obstructions from the ruling military government; in April of 2022, the EU said it would halt its training program in Mali"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "21,645 (Niger), 14,965 (Mauritania), 14,934 (Burkina Faso) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "17,124 (Burkina Faso), 14,951 (Mauritania), 12,845 (Niger) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "350,110 (Tuareg rebellion since 2012) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -484,9 +484,6 @@
|
|||
"Major infectious diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "<strong>note:</strong> clusters of cases of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) are occurring in Morocco; as of 6 October 2021, Morocco has reported a total of 936,236 cases of COVID-19 or 2,536.5 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 38.94 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 2 October 2021, 60.91% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "<p><strong>note:</strong> data does not include former Western Sahara</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
"municipal solid waste generated annually": {
|
||||
"text": "6.852 million tons (2014 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ethnic groups": {
|
||||
"text": "Black Moors (Haratines - Arabic-speaking descendants of African origin who are or were enslaved by white Moors) 40%, White Moors (of Arab-Berber descent, known as Beydane) 30%, Sub-Saharan Mauritanians (non-Arabic speaking, largely resident in or originating from the Senegal River Valley, including Halpulaar, Fulani, Soninke, Wolof, and Bambara ethnic groups) 30%"
|
||||
"text": "Black Moors (Haratines - Arabic-speaking descendants of African origin who are or were enslaved by White Moors) 40%, White Moors (of Arab-Berber descent, known as Beydane) 30%, Sub-Saharan Mauritanians (non-Arabic speaking, largely resident in or originating from the Senegal River Valley, including Halpulaar, Fulani, Soninke, Wolof, and Bambara ethnic groups) 30%"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -476,7 +476,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to poor performance of pastoral cropping season - according to the latest analysis, about 484,000 people are assessed to need humanitarian assistance in the June−August 2021 period as a result of fodder production deficits in Trarza, Brakna, Gorgol, Guidimaka and Assaba districts (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to poor performance of cereal production - domestic cereal production declined in 2021 due to poor weather, which is likely to worsen conditions of the most vulnerable households; in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 660,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "26,001 (Sahrawis) (mid-year 2021); 80,373 (Mali) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "26,001 (Sahrawis) (mid-year 2021); 84,526 (Mali) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ethnic groups": {
|
||||
"text": "African 99% (Makhuwa, Tsonga, Lomwe, Sena, and others), Mestizo 0.8%, other (includes European, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese) .2% (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "African 99% (Makhuwa, Tsonga, Lomwe, Sena, and others), Mestizo 0.8%, other (includes European, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese) 0.2% (2017 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
"text": "Makhuwa 26.1%, Portuguese (official) 16.6%, Tsonga 8.6%, Nyanja 8.1, Sena 7.1%, Lomwe 7.1%, Chuwabo 4.7%, Ndau 3.8%, Tswa 3.8%, other Mozambican languages 11.8%, other 0.5%, unspecified 1.8% (2017 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -471,7 +471,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to economic downturn, localized shortfalls in staple food production, and insecurity in northern areas - an estimated 1.65 million people require humanitarian assistance at least up until September 2021; populations in Cabo Delgado are experiencing the severest levels of acute food insecurity, where an estimated 227,000 people are facing \"Emergency\" levels of food insecurity, reflecting the effects of the conflict on livelihoods and rainfall deficits that caused a drop in cereal production in 2021</p> (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to localized shortfalls in staple food production, insecurity in northern areas, extreme weather events - an estimated 1.9 million people require humanitarian assistance until at least March 2022, primarily due to shortfalls in food production and the impact of insecurity in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where populations are experiencing the severest levels of acute food insecurity; approximately 24,000 people are facing \"Emergency\" levels of food insecurity; cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in central provinces, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase in late 2022</p> (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "10,866 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 8,447 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "10,866 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 8,558 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "881,047 (violence between the government and an opposition group, violence associated with extremists groups in 2018, political violence 2019) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "as of January 2022, an estimated 265 000 people have been displaced due to civil conflict; in addition, domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, which is expected to further aggravate conditions; the aggregate cereal production in 2021 is officially estimated at 3.5 million mt, nearly 40 percent below the five‑year average; as a result, between June and August 2022, 3.64 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; this is a 40 percent increase compared to the current post‑harvest period, underpinned by the reduced cereal production in 2021, high food prices and the high likelihood of persisting disruptions of markets and agricultural activities amid increasing insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "due to internal conflict and shortfall in cereal production - as of January 2022, an estimated 265,000 people have been displaced due to civil conflict; in addition, domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, which is expected to further aggravate conditions; the aggregate cereal production in 2021 is officially estimated at 3.5 million mt, nearly 40% below the five‑year average; as a result, between June and August 2022, 3.64 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; this is a 40% increase compared to the current post‑harvest period, underpinned by the reduced cereal production in 2021, high food prices and the high likelihood of persisting disruptions of markets and agricultural activities amid increasing insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "187,148 (Nigeria), 61,534 (Mali) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "187,148 (Nigeria), 62,077 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "264,257 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -498,7 +498,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to persistent civil conflict in the northern areas - according to the latest analysis, about 12.8 million people are assessed to be in need of humanitarian assistance in the June−August 2021 period as a result of worsening conflict that is driving new population displacements; over 2.8 million people are estimated to be internally displaced in northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, due to communal clashes in northwestern/northcentral zones and natural disasters; the areas inaccessible to humanitarian interventions are facing the worst food insecurity conditions (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to persistent civil conflict in the northern areas - according to the latest analysis, between June and August 2022, the number of food insecure is projected to increase to 18 million people period as a result of worsening conflict that is driving new population displacements; the areas inaccessible to humanitarian interventions are facing the worst food insecurity conditions (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - Nigeria has committed an Army combat brigade (approximately 3,000 troops) to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), regional counter-terrorism force comprised of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger; the national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "as of 2022, the Nigerian military was sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and regarded as one of its most capable forces; it was focused largely on internal security and faced a number of challenges that have stretched its resources, however; the military was deployed in all 36 of the country's states; in the northeast, it was conducting counterinsurgency/counter-terrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) terrorist groups, where it has deployed as many as 70,000 troops at times and jihadist-related violence has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, since 2009 (as of late 2021); in the northwest, it faced growing threats from criminal gangs, bandits, and violence associated with historical and ongoing farmer-herder conflicts, as well as BH and ISWA terrorists; bandits in the northwest were estimated to number in the low 10,000s and violence there has killed more than 10,000 since the mid-2010s; the military also continued to protect the oil industry in the Niger Delta region against militants and criminal activity, although the levels of violence there have decreased in recent years; in May 2021, a contingent of military troops and police were deployed to eastern Nigeria to quell renewed agitation for a state of Biafra (Biafra seceded from Nigeria in the late 1960s, sparking a civil war that caused more than 1 million deaths)<br> <p>the Nigerian military traces its origins to the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; in 1956, the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) and in 1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over control of the NMF from the British War Office; the Nigerian Armed Forces were established following independence in 1960</p>"
|
||||
"text": "as of 2022, the Nigerian military was sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and regarded as one of its most capable forces; it was focused largely on internal security and faced a number of challenges that have stretched its resources, however; the Army was deployed in all 36 of the country's states; in the northeast, it was conducting counterinsurgency/counter-terrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) terrorist groups, where it has deployed as many as 70,000 troops at times and jihadist-related violence has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, since 2009 (as of late 2021); in the northwest, it faced growing threats from criminal gangs, bandits, and violence associated with historical and ongoing farmer-herder conflicts, as well as BH and ISWA terrorists; bandits in the northwest were estimated to number in the low 10,000s and violence there has killed more than 10,000 since the mid-2010s; the military also continued to protect the oil industry in the Niger Delta region against militants and criminal activity, although the levels of violence there have decreased in recent years; in May 2021, a contingent of military troops and police were deployed to eastern Nigeria to quell renewed agitation for a state of Biafra (Biafra seceded from Nigeria in the late 1960s, sparking a civil war that caused more than 1 million deaths)<br> <p>as of 2022, the Navy was focused on security in the Gulf of Guinea; since 2016, it has developed a maritime strategy, boosted naval training and its naval presence in the Gulf, increased participation in regional maritime security efforts, and acquired a significant number of new naval platforms, including offshore and coastal patrol craft, fast attack boats, and air assets</p> <p>the Nigerian military traces its origins to the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; in 1956, the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) and in 1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over control of the NMF from the British War Office; the Nigerian Armed Forces were established following independence in 1960</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "77,379 (Cameroon) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "77,878 (Cameroon) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "3,030,544 (northeast Nigeria; Boko Haram attacks and counterinsurgency efforts in northern Nigeria; communal violence between Christians and Muslims in the middle belt region, political violence; flooding; forced evictions; cattle rustling; competition for resources) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -435,7 +435,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to economic downturn, civil insecurity, lingering impact of floods and prolonged conflict - despite sustained humanitarian assistance, food insecurity still affects large segments of the population, driven by insufficient food supplies, an economic downturn, high food prices and the lingering impact of widespread floods in 2020; about 7.2 million people (about 60% of the total population) are estimated to be severely food insecure in the April−July 2021 period; particular concern exists for households in Jonglei, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states and in neighboring Pibor Administrative Area, where 60-85% of the population is estimated to be severely food insecure, with a total of 108,000 people facing “Catastrophe” levels of food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "due to economic downturn, civil insecurity, lingering impact of floods and prolonged conflict - despite sustained humanitarian assistance, food insecurity still affects large segments of the population, driven by insufficient food supplies, an economic downturn, high food prices and the lingering impact of widespread floods in 2020; particular concern exists for households in Jonglei, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states, and in neighbouring Pibor Administrative Area, where 60-85% of the population were estimated to be severely food insecure (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1046,7 +1046,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "309,025 (Sudan), 18,407 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "311,819 (Sudan), 18,407 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1,436,000 (alleged coup attempt and ethnic conflict beginning in December 2013; information is lacking on those displaced in earlier years by: fighting in Abyei between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in May 2011; clashes between the SPLA and dissident militia groups in South Sudan; inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle; attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army; floods and drought) (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -565,7 +565,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "unicameral National People's Assembly or Assembleia Nacional Popular (102 seats; 100 members directly elected in 27 multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote and 2 elected in single-seat constituencies for citizens living abroad (Africa 1, Europe 1 ); all members serve 4-year terms)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "last held on 10 March 2019 (next to be held in March 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "note: President dissolved parliament on 16 May 2022 and decreed new elections for 18 December 2022<br> <br>last held on 10 March 2019 (next to be held in March 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - PAIGC 35.2%, Madem G-15 21.1%, PRS 21.1%, other 22.6%; seats by party - PAIGC 47, Madem G-15 27, PRS 21, other 7; composition - men 88, women 14, percent of women 13.7%"
|
||||
|
|
@ -932,10 +932,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "1,913,858 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "1,913,858 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "97.25 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "97 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "People's Revolutionary Armed Force (FARP): Army, Navy, Air Force<br><br>Ministry of Internal Administration: Guard Nacional (a gendarmerie force), Public Order Police, Border Police, Rapid Intervention Police, Maritime Police (2021)",
|
||||
"text": "People's Revolutionary Armed Force (FARP): Army, Navy, Air Force<br><br>Ministry of Internal Administration: Guard Nacional (a gendarmerie force), Public Order Police, Border Police, Rapid Intervention Police, Maritime Police (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - the Public Order Police is responsible for maintaining law and order, while the Judicial Police, under the Ministry of Justice, has primary responsibility for investigating drug trafficking, terrorism, and other transnational crimes"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Ethnic groups": {
|
||||
"text": "Black African 80.9%, Colored 8.8%, White 7.8%, Indian/Asian 2.5% (2018 est.)",
|
||||
"text": "Black African 80.9%, Colored 8.8%, White 7.8%, Indian/Asian 2.6% (2021 est.)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> colored is a term used in South Africa, including on the national census, for persons of mixed race ancestry who developed a distinct cultural identity over several hundred years"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Languages": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -488,7 +488,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in cereal production - according to the latest analysis, about 490,000 people are estimated to need humanitarian assistance in the June−August 2021 period due to the effects of adverse weather events (droughts and floods) on cereal and fodder production (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in cereal production - about 770,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity between June and August 2022, reflecting persisting food access constraints; mostly on account of localized shortfalls in cereal production and reduced incomes owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -471,7 +471,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to high food prices - about 1.76 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure during the June−August 2021 period on account of high food prices and low purchasing power, resulting in acute constraints on households’ access to food; the main drivers of the food insecurity are the effects of adverse weather events (flooding), Fall Armyworm attacks on maize in some localized areas, high inflation rate, weakening local currency and the effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic restrictions (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to high food prices - about 1.45 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period on account of high food prices and low purchasing power, resulting in acute constraints on households’ economic access to food (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "an estimated 4.15 million people are facing severe food insecurity between February and March 2022, mainly as a result of consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020, which severely affected crop and livestock production, and due to heightened conflict since early 2021; two consecutive poor rainy seasons resulted in significant crop and livestock production shortfalls, while food access has been severely affected in recent months by declining employment opportunities in rural areas and by the escalation of conflict (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "due to drought conditions and internal conflict - an estimated 4.15 million people are facing severe food insecurity between February and March 2022, mainly as a result of consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020, which severely affected crop and livestock production, and due to heightened conflict since early 2021; two consecutive poor rainy seasons resulted in significant crop and livestock production shortfalls, while food access has been severely affected in recent months by declining employment opportunities in rural areas and by the escalation of conflict (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to conflict, civil insecurity, and soaring food prices - the number of severely food insecure people was estimated at 9.8 million in the June−September 2021 period, due to flood-induced livelihood losses sustained in 2020, soaring food prices and inter‑communal conflict; the main drivers are macro‑economic challenges resulting in rampant food and non‑food inflation, the lingering impact of 2020 widespread floods on livelihoods and the escalation of inter‑communal violence in western Greater Darfur Region and in eastern South Kordofan, North Kordofan and Blue Nile states (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to conflict, civil insecurity, and soaring food prices - the number of severely food insecure people was estimated at 6 million between October 2021 and February 2022, mainly due to high food prices and inter-communal conflict (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -490,7 +490,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in staple food production - number of severely food insecure people estimated at 490,000 for period May‑September 2021, markedly lower than in period November 2019‑April 2020 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in staple food production - about 437,000 people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance between November 2021 and April 2022, mainly located in northeastern Mara, Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga regions, reflecting a reduced “Vuli” harvest due to poor rains (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -473,8 +473,8 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>on 21 March 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Africa; Uganda is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and <em>that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus</em>; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes, and floods - in traditionally food secure urban areas, including the capital, Kampala, more than 600,000 people were food insecure due to the restrictive measures introduced to curb the spread of the COVID-19 virus; the food security situation in urban areas was the most affected by the COVID‑19‑related restrictive measures, as poor households mainly rely on the daily wages obtained through casual labor, petty trading, food vending, construction activities and domestic work; despite the phasing out of some restrictive measures, the food security situation of the urban poor has not significantly improved, as the restrictions still in place on business operations are resulting in a slow recovery of the economic activities; in rural areas, torrential rains in April and May 2020 resulted in localized crop and livelihood losses (2021)"
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to weather extremes - in Karamoja Region, about 188,000 people, 16% of the population, were estimated to be severely food insecure between August 2021 and January 2022, mainly a result of consecutive poor rainy seasons that adversely affected crop and livestock production (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "963,086 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 462,120 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 48,555 (Burundi), 55,877 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 26,092 (Rwanda), 22,843 (Eritrea) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "963,086 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 462,120 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 43,731 (Burundi), 55,877 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 25,915 (Rwanda), 22,505 (Eritrea) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -467,7 +467,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity in the north - according to the latest analysis, about 2.87 million people are estimated to need humanitarian assistance in the June−August 2021; in Centre-Nord and Sahel regions, insecurity continues to cause population displacements, further deteriorating the food security situation (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity in the north - in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 2.6 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; domestic cereal production in 2021 was estimated at a below-average level due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, further aggravating conditions; in Centre-Nord and Sahel regions, insecurity continues to cause population displacements, further deteriorating the food security situation; a coup d’état on January 2022 is an additional factor that could increase civil insecurity and further stress food insecurity conditions (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1023,10 +1023,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "22,117,218 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "22,117,218 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "105.8 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "106 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1135,8 +1135,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso, FABF), National Gendarmerie; Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (a civilian defense force established in 2019 to act as auxiliaries to the military in the fight against militants) (2021)",
|
||||
"note": "note - the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Justice; Gendarmerie troops are typically integrated with Army forces in anti-terrorism operations; for example, Gendarmerie, Army, and police forces were combined to form a 1,500-member task force known as the <em>Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes</em> (GFAT) to address terrorist activities along the country's northern border in 2013"
|
||||
"text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso, FABF), National Gendarmerie; Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note(s) - the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Justice; Gendarmerie troops are typically integrated with Army forces in anti-terrorism operations; the VDP is a civilian defense force established in 2019 to act as auxiliaries to the military in the fight against militants"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "approximately 12,000 personnel (7,000 Army; 500 Air Force; 4,500 National Gendarmerie) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FABF has a mix of foreign-supplied weapons; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of mostly donated second-hand equipment from more than 10 countries (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the FABF has a mix of foreign-supplied weapons; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of mostly donated second-hand equipment from a variety of countries (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; women may serve in supporting roles (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -454,7 +454,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes - an above-average harvest in 2021 is expected to lead to an improvement in food security compared to the previous year, however, the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily income and job losses, are expected to continue to constrain households’ access to food (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in cereal production - an estimated 750,000 people are projected to face \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between December 2021 and March 2022, as a result of localized areas that suffered from poor harvests in 2021 and the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily through income and job losses that constrained households’ access to food (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -443,7 +443,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to the reduction in income-generating activities - the economy is only expected to recover moderately in 2021, following the pandemic-driven contraction in 2020, and households will continue to face food access constraints; an estimated 209,000 people are projected to be food insecure in the April−September 2021 period, down from 347,000 in the January−March 2021 period (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to economic downturn - nearly 336,000 people were assessed to be food insecure at least until March 2022, prior to the main harvest period, primarily due to food access constraints, underpinned by the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -978,10 +978,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
|
||||
"total subscriptions": {
|
||||
"text": "1.052 million (2018)"
|
||||
"text": "1.243 million (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
|
||||
"text": "93.53 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "107 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Umbutfo Eswatini Defense Force (UEDF): Army (includes a small air wing) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Umbutfo Eswatini Defense Force (UEDF): Army (includes a small air wing) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1089,13 +1089,13 @@
|
|||
"text": "approximately 3,000 active personnel (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the UEDF is lightly armed with mostly South African material; it has received minimal amounts of secondhand equipment since 2010 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the UEDF is lightly armed with mostly South African material; it has received small amounts of secondhand equipment since 2010 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-30 years of age for male and female voluntary military service; no conscription (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the UEDF was originally created in 1973 as the Royal Swaziland Defense Force; as of 2021, the UEDF’s primary mission was external security but it also had domestic security responsibilities, including protecting members of the royal family; the king is the UEDF commander in chief and holds the position of minister of defense, although the UEDF reports to the Army commander and principal undersecretary of defense for day-to-day operations; the Royal Eswatini Police Service (REPS) is responsible for maintaining internal security as well as migration and border crossing enforcement; it is under the prime minister, although the king is the force’s titular commissioner in chief</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>the UEDF was originally created in 1973 as the Royal Swaziland Defense Force; the UEDF’s primary mission is external security but it also has domestic security responsibilities, including protecting members of the royal family; the king is the UEDF commander in chief and holds the position of minister of defense, although the UEDF reports to the Army commander and principal undersecretary of defense for day-to-day operations; the Royal Eswatini Police Service (REPS) is responsible for maintaining internal security as well as migration and border crossing enforcement; it is under the prime minister, although the king is the force’s titular commissioner in chief</p> <p> </p> (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -468,7 +468,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes - the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions have aggravated food insecurity across the country, particularly due to income reductions that have constrained households’ economic access to food; cereal production is estimated at a bumper high in 2021 and, as a result, overall food security is expected to improve compared to the previous year (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes and localized shortfalls in cereal production - an estimated 1.58 million people are projected to need humanitarian assistance at least up until March 2022, down from 2 million assessed to be food insecure in the corresponding period in 2020/21; the overall large national agricultural output in 2021 helped to reduce the prevalence of food insecurity in early 2022, however, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which have constrained households’ economic access to food as well as localized shortfalls in crop production, have limited a larger improvement (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -473,7 +473,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to High food prices and economic downturn - an estimated 3 million people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance between January and March 2022, largely on account of poor food access due to prevailing high food prices and reduced incomes owing to the effects of an economic downturn; below-average rainfall and extreme weather events in 2021/22 are likely to result in a decrease in cereal production and heighten food insecurity later in 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "due to high food prices and economic downturn - an estimated 3 million people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance between January and March 2022, largely on account of poor food access due to prevailing high food prices and reduced incomes owing to the effects of an economic downturn; below-average rainfall and extreme weather events in 2021/22 are likely to result in a decrease in cereal production and heighten food insecurity later in 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue