apunkt/factbook.json
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/factbook/factbook.json.git synced 2026-06-13 19:05:13 +02:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

auto-update week 14

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
Yo Robot 2023-04-06 22:13:08 +00:00
parent 34494b946f
commit ba37646232
185 changed files with 984 additions and 872 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

4
africa/ag.json
View file

@ -802,10 +802,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "37.3% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

10
africa/ao.json
View file

@ -301,7 +301,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, typhoid fever"
@ -441,7 +441,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, typhoid fever"
@ -826,10 +826,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "48.6% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@
"text": "the Angolan Armed Forces were created in 1991 under the Bicesse Accords signed between the Angolan Government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); the current force is responsible for country’s external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities, including border protection, expulsion of irregular migrants, and small-scale counterinsurgency operations against groups like the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda separatists in Cabinda; the Army is one of the largest in the region with 6 infantry divisions spread amongst 6 military regions; it is also one of the better equipped, with a significant portion of its units being motorized and supported by approximately 300 Soviet-era tanks, largely acquired in the 1980s and 1990s; the Air Force is also one of the largest and best equipped in the region with a fleet of approximately 100 combat aircraft, plus a substantial inventory of transport aircraft and helicopter gunships; while naval modernization has received more attention in recent years, the Navy remains a small force of fast attack and coastal patrol craft (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Angola are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2021, four attacks against commercial vessels were reported, a decrease from the six attacks in 2020; most of these occurred in the main port of Luanda while ships were berthed or at anchor"
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Angola are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, five attacks against commercial vessels were reported, an increase from the four attacks in 2021; most of these occurred in the main port of Luanda while ships were berthed or at anchor"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

10
africa/bc.json
View file

@ -295,7 +295,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "high (2020)"
"text": "high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -444,7 +444,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "high (2020)"
"text": "high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -1215,8 +1215,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Botswana Defense Force (BDF): Ground Forces Command, Air Arm Command, Defense Logistics Command (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> both the BDF and the Botswana Police Service report to the Ministry of Defense, Justice, and Security"
"text": "Botswana Defense Force (BDF): Ground Forces Command, Air Arm Command, Defense Logistics Command (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> both the BDF and the Botswana Police Service report to the Ministry of Defense and Security; the Botswana Police Service has primary responsibility for internal security; the BDF reports to the Office of the President through the minister of defense and security and has some domestic security responsibilities"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@
"text": "approximately 300 Mozambique (Southern African Development Community force) (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Bechuanaland/Botswana did not have a permanent military during colonial times, with the British colonial administrators relying instead on small, lightly armed constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police, and by the early 1960s, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); after independence in 1966, Botswana militarized the PMU and gave it responsibility for the country’s defense rather than create a conventional military force; however, turmoil in neighboring countries and numerous cross-border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that the PMU was inadequate for defending the country and led to the establishment of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977; as of 2022, the BDF’s primary missions included securing territorial integrity/border security and internal duties such as disaster relief and anti-poaching <br><br>Botswana participates in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and beginning in 2021 contributed nearly 300 troops to the SADC’s effort to help the Mozambique Government suppress an insurgency (2023)"
"text": "Bechuanaland/Botswana did not have a permanent military during colonial times, with the British colonial administrators relying instead on small, lightly armed constabularies such as the Bechuanaland Mounted Police, the Bechuanaland Border Police, and by the early 1960s, the Police Mobile Unit (PMU); after independence in 1966, Botswana militarized the PMU and gave it responsibility for the country’s defense rather than create a conventional military force; however, turmoil in neighboring countries and numerous cross-border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that the PMU was inadequate for defending the country and led to the establishment of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977; today, the BDF’s primary missions include securing territorial integrity/border security and internal duties such as disaster relief and anti-poaching <br><br>Botswana participates in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force, and beginning in 2021 contributed nearly 300 troops to the SADC’s effort to help the Mozambique Government suppress an insurgency (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

9
africa/bn.json
View file

@ -301,7 +301,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -467,7 +467,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -1236,7 +1236,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Beninese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB; aka Benin Defense Forces): Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of Interior and Public Security: Republican Police (Police Republicaine, DGPR) (2022)"
"text": "Beninese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Beninoises, FAB; aka Benin Defense Forces): Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of Interior and Public Security: Republican Police (Police Republicaine, DGPR) (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> FAB is under the Ministry of Defense and is responsible for external security and supporting the DGPR in maintaining internal security, which has primary responsibility for enforcing law and maintaining order "
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1271,7 +1272,7 @@
"text": "a key focus for the security forces of Benin is countering infiltrations into the country by terrorist groups tied to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) operating just over the border from north Benin in Burkina Faso and Niger; in May 2022, the Benin Government said it was \"at war\" after suffering a series of attacks from these groups; later that same year, President TALON said his government would spend more than $130 million to recruit up to 4,000 additional military personnel, modernize military equipment, and build and fortify operating bases; in addition, the FAB participates in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) along with Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border <br><br>the FAB has a close working relationship with the Belgian armed forces; the Belgians offer military advice, training, and second-hand equipment donations, and deploy to Benin for limited military exercises (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>The International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the waters off Benin; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the waters off Benin; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

6
africa/by.json
View file

@ -304,7 +304,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -470,7 +470,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -1194,7 +1194,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "National Defense Force of Burundi (Force de Defense Nationale du Burundi or FDNB): Land Force (Force Terrestre), the Navy Force (Force Marine), the Air Force (Force Aerienne) and Specialized Units (Unites Specialisees); Ministry of Public Security: National Police (Police Nationale du Burundi) (2023)",
"text": "National Defense Force of Burundi (Force de Defense Nationale du Burundi or FDNB): Land Force (Force Terrestre), the Navy Force (Force Marine), the Air Force (Force Aerienne) and Specialized Units (Unites Specialisees); Ministry of Interior, Community Development, and Public Security: National Police (Police Nationale du Burundi) (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Specialized Units include a special security brigade for the protection of institutions (aka BSPI) and military police"
},
"Military expenditures": {

4
africa/cd.json
View file

@ -1213,8 +1213,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Chadian National Army (Armee Nationale du Tchad, ANT): Ground Forces (l'Armee de Terre, AdT), Chadian Air Force (l'Armee de l'Air Tchadienne, AAT), General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Generale des Services de Securite des Institutions de l'Etat, GDSSIE); National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Public Security and Immigration: National Nomadic Guard of Chad (GNNT), Chadian National Police (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-size unit with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> Border security duties are shared by the Army, Customs (Ministry of Public Security and Immigration), the Gendarmerie, and the GNNT "
"text": "Chadian National Army (Armee Nationale du Tchad, ANT): Land Forces (l'Armee de Terre, AdT), Chadian Air Force (l'Armee de l'Air Tchadienne, AAT), General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Generale des Services de Securite des Institutions de l'Etat, GDSSIE); National Gendarmerie; Ministry of Public Security and Immigration: National Nomadic Guard of Chad (GNNT), Chadian National Police (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the GDSSIE, formerly known as the Republican Guard, is the presidential guard force and is considered to be Chad's elite military unit; it is reportedly a division-size unit with infantry, armor, and special forces/anti-terrorism regiments (known as the Special Anti-Terrorist Group or SATG, aka Division of Special Anti-Terrorist Groups or DGSAT)<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> Border security duties are shared by the Army, Customs (Ministry of Public Security and Immigration), the Gendarmerie, and the GNNT"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {

5
africa/cg.json
View file

@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, FARDC): Land Forces, National Navy (La Marine Nationale), Congolese Air Force (Force Aerienne Congolaise, FAC); Republican Guard; Ministry of Interior: Congolese National Police, Directorate General for Migration (2022)",
"text": "Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces d'Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, FARDC): Land Forces, National Navy (La Marine Nationale), Congolese Air Force (Force Aerienne Congolaise, FAC); Republican Guard; Ministry of Interior: Congolese National Police, Directorate General for Migration (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Republican Guard is a division-size element consisting of approximately 5 regiments; it is regarded as the country’s best equipped and trained military unit and is under the direct control of the president"
},
"Military expenditures": {
@ -1333,6 +1333,9 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>the FARDC’s primary focus is internal security; while the FARDC is large on paper, with an estimated 18 operational infantry brigades, it struggles to provide security in large portions of the country; the FARDC is widely assessed to suffer from insufficient training, low equipment readiness, poor morale and leadership, ill-discipline, and widespread corruption; it was created out of the armed factions of the Congo wars that ended in 2003, incorporating various militia, paramilitary, and rebel formations; the DRC’s most effective military force, the Republican Guard, is overseen by the office of the presidency rather than the FARDC and focuses largely on protecting the president and government institutions and enforcing internal security</p> <p>the FARDC is actively conducting operations against a variety of illegal armed groups (IOGs) operating in the DRC, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, where more than 15 significant and cohesive IOGs operate; there is also violence in Maniema, Kasai, Kasai Central, and Tanganyika provinces; some estimates place over 100 IOGs operating in the country, including organized militias, such as the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renewal (NDC-R), which controls a large portion of North Kivu; Mai Mai groups (local militias that operate variously as self-defense networks and criminal rackets); and foreign-origin groups seeking safe haven and resources, such as the Ugandan-origin Allied Democratic Forces (ADF; aka Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the DRC), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), multiple groups originating from Burundi, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and the March 23 Movement (aka M23 or Congolese Revolutionary Army), which the DRC has accused Rwanda of backing; the FARDC has been accused of collaborating with some IOGs, such as the NDC-R</p> the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has operated in the central and eastern parts of the country since 1999; as of 2022, MONUSCO had around 15,000 military and police personnel; MONUSCO includes a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB; 3 infantry battalions, plus artillery and special forces), the first ever UN peacekeeping force specifically tasked to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize and disarm groups considered a threat to state authority and civilian security (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2022, the same number of attacks as in 2021; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {

6
africa/cm.json
View file

@ -879,10 +879,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "45.3% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "2.1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1338,7 +1338,7 @@
"text": "the FAC is a professional and politically independent military; the Army and the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) are well-organized and mobile; the Army has 4 motorized infantry brigades spread amongst 5 military regions; the US-trained, 5,000-man BIR has up to 9 battalions, detachments, or groups consisting of airborne, air mobile, amphibious, light, and motorized infantry, armored reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and support units, such as artillery and intelligence; the BIR reportedly receives better training, equipment, and pay than regular Army units<br><br>the ground forces are largely focused on internal security, particularly the threat from the terrorist group Boko Haram along its frontiers with Nigeria and Chad (Far North region) and an insurgency from armed Anglophone separatist groups in the North-West and South-West regions (as of 2023, this conflict had left more than 3,500 civilians dead and over 500,000 people displaced since fighting started in 2016); in addition, the FAC often deploys ground units to the border region with the Central African Republic to counter intrusions from armed militias and bandits; the Navy’s missions include protecting Cameroon’s oil installations, combatting crime and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and patrolling the country’s lakes and rivers; the Air Force supports both the ground and naval forces and has small numbers of light ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft, as well as attack, multipurpose, and transport helicopters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of maritime kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports incidents appear to have stopped in the territorial and offshore waters of Cameroon; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {

4
africa/cn.json
View file

@ -1109,8 +1109,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "National Army for Development (l'Armee Nationale de Developpement, AND): Comoran Security Force (also called Comoran Defense Force (Force Comorienne de Defense, FCD), includes Gendarmerie); Ministry of Interior: Coast Guard, Federal Police, National Directorate of Territorial Safety (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>when the Gendarmerie serves as the judicial police, it reports to the Minister of Justice"
"text": "National Army for Development (l'Armee Nationale de Developpement, AND): Comoran Defense Force (Force Comorienne de Defense, FCD), includes Gendarmerie); Ministry of Interior: Coast Guard, Federal Police, National Directorate of Territorial Safety (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>when the Gendarmerie serves as the judicial police, it reports to the Minister of Justice; the Gendarmerie also has an intervention platoon that may act under the authority of the interior minister<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the National Directorate of Territorial Safety oversees customs and immigration<br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> the FCD is also known as the Comoran Security Force"
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "estimated 600 Defense Force personnel; estimated 500 Federal Police (2022)"

2
africa/cv.json
View file

@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@
"text": "18-35 years of age for male and female selective compulsory military service; 24-month conscript service obligation; 17 years of age for voluntary service (with parental consent) (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "as of 2022, the FACV/National Guard was mostly a ground force with 2 infantry battalions and a small air component with a maritime patrol squadron; the Coast Guard had a few coastal patrol craft and patrol boats"
"text": "the FACV/National Guard is mostly a ground force with 2 infantry battalions and a small air component with a maritime patrol squadron; the Coast Guard had a few coastal patrol craft and patrol boats (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

12
africa/dj.json
View file

@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Djibouti Armed Forces (Force Armée Djiboutienne or FAD): Army, Navy, Air Force; Djibouti Coast Guard; Ministry of Interior: National Gendarmerie, National Police (2022)",
"text": "Djibouti Armed Forces (Force Armée Djiboutienne or FAD): Army, Navy, Air Force; Djibouti Coast Guard; Ministry of Interior: National Gendarmerie, National Police (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the National Police is responsible for security within Djibouti City and has primary control over immigration and customs procedures for all land border-crossing points, while the National Gendarmerie is responsible for all security outside of Djibouti City, as well as for protecting critical infrastructure within the city, such as the international airport"
},
"Military expenditures": {
@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@
"text": "the FAD is largely focused on border, coastal, and internal security duties, including counterterrorism; China, France, Italy, Japan, and the US maintain bases in Djibouti for regional military missions, including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, crisis response, and security assistance (note &ndash; France has multiple bases and hosts troop contingents from Germany and Spain); the EU and NATO also maintain a presence to support multinational naval counter-piracy operations and maritime training efforts; in 2017, Djibouti and Saudi Arabia announced plans for the Saudis to build a military base there, although no start date was announced (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau&rsquo;s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) received one incident of piracy and armed robbery in 2021 for the Horn of Africa; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warned that Somali pirates continued to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warned that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2022; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces; China has established a base in Djibouti to support its deployed naval units in the Horn of Africa"
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau&rsquo;s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) reported no piracy attacks for the Horn of Africa in 2022; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warned that Somali pirates continued to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warned that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2024; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces; China has established a base in Djibouti to support its deployed naval units in the Horn of Africa; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {
@ -1227,6 +1227,14 @@
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "14,152 (Somalia), 6,518 (Yemen) (mid-year 2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List &mdash; Djibouti does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; Djibouti partnered with international experts to expand training, formalized standard operating procedures for victim identification, enhanced a partnership with an international organization to develop victim referral procedures for transiting migrants, appointed a government focal point and inter-ministerial task force to combat human trafficking, and conducted awareness campaigns; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; the government did not convict any traffickers for the fifth consecutive year, and judges continue to use outdated versions of the penal code that do not include the 2016 anti-trafficking law; officials did not identify any trafficking victims for the third consecutive year and lacked formal services for victims; despite training, some front-line officials&rsquo; limited understanding of trafficking continued to inhibit law enforcement and victim identification; for the seventh consecutive year, the government only partially implemented its 2015-2022 national action plan; therefore, Djibouti remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year (2022)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Djibouti, and to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit victims from Djibouti abroad; adults and children, primarily undocumented economic migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia, transit Djibouti en route to Yemen and other locations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia; a number of these migrants are exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking at their intended destinations, and they are also vulnerable to trafficking at various transit points, particularly Yemen; economic migrants who transit Djibouti to return to their home countries are vulnerable to trafficking; Djibouti&mdash;with a population of less than one million&mdash;hosts more than 35,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, and many of them have endured and remained vulnerable to trafficking; Djiboutian and migrant women and children living in the streets face exploitation in sex trafficking or forced labor; traffickers, including family members, may exploit local and migrant children in forced begging; foreign workers&mdash;including Ethiopians, Yemenis, Indians, Pakistanis, and Filipinos&mdash;may be exploited in forced labor in domestic servitude, construction, and food service sectors; Cuban medical professionals in Djibouti may have been forced to work by the Cuban government (2022)"
}
}
}
}

13
africa/eg.json
View file

@ -502,13 +502,13 @@
},
"Total water withdrawal": {
"municipal": {
"text": "10.75 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "10.75 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"industrial": {
"text": "5.4 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "5.4 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"agricultural": {
"text": "61.35 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "61.35 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Total renewable water resources": {
@ -856,10 +856,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "33.3% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "4.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1320,6 +1320,9 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of 2022, Egypt had tens of thousands of military troops, police, and other security personnel deployed in the Sinai for internal security duties; in addition, tribal militias were assisting Egyptian security forces<br><br>the military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing; the various enterprises are reportedly profitable enough to make the armed forces largely self-funded<br><br>Egypt has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments<br><br>the Multinational Force &amp; Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; as of 2022, it was composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US were the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2022)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Egypt are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, one attempted attack against a commercial vessel was reported, this was the first incident reported in four years; the reported incident occurred in port while the ship was anchored"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

10
africa/ek.json
View file

@ -303,7 +303,8 @@
},
"animal contact diseases": {
"text": "rabies"
}
},
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>on 27 March 2023, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for Equatorial Guinea for an outbreak of Marburg virus disease; Marburg is a viral hemorrhagic fever spread by contact with blood or body fluids of a person infected with or who has died from Marburg; it is also spread by contact with contaminated objects (such as clothing, bedding, needles, and medical equipment) or by contact with animals, such as bats and nonhuman primates, who are infected with Marburg virus; infection with Marburg virus is often fatal and there are no approved vaccines or treatments for Marburg; avoid non-essential travel to the provinces where the outbreak is occurring; watch your health for symptoms of Marburg while in the outbreak area and for 21 days after leaving the outbreak area; consult the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Travel Health Notices for additional guidance"
},
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "8% (2016)"
@ -432,7 +433,8 @@
},
"animal contact diseases": {
"text": "rabies"
}
},
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>on 27 March 2023, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for Equatorial Guinea for an outbreak of Marburg virus disease; Marburg is a viral hemorrhagic fever spread by contact with blood or body fluids of a person infected with or who has died from Marburg; it is also spread by contact with contaminated objects (such as clothing, bedding, needles, and medical equipment) or by contact with animals, such as bats and nonhuman primates, who are infected with Marburg virus; infection with Marburg virus is often fatal and there are no approved vaccines or treatments for Marburg; avoid non-essential travel to the provinces where the outbreak is occurring; watch your health for symptoms of Marburg while in the outbreak area and for 21 days after leaving the outbreak area; consult the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Travel Health Notices for additional guidance"
},
"Waste and recycling": {
"municipal solid waste generated annually": {
@ -441,7 +443,7 @@
},
"Total water withdrawal": {
"municipal": {
"text": "15.8 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"industrial": {
"text": "3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
@ -1169,7 +1171,7 @@
"text": "the FAGE&rsquo;s National Guard (Army) has only three small infantry battalions with limited combat capabilities; the country has invested heavily in naval capabilities in recent years to protect its oil installations and combat piracy and crime in the Gulf of Guinea; while the Navy was small, its inventory includes a light frigate and a corvette, as well as several off-shore patrol boats; the Air Force has only a few operational combat aircraft and ground attack-capable helicopters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported two incidents in the offshore waters of Equatorial Guinea in 2022; one incident involved a boarding and kidnapping and the other where a ship was fired upon; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea&rdquo;"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

4
africa/er.json
View file

@ -453,13 +453,13 @@
},
"Total water withdrawal": {
"municipal": {
"text": "31 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "30 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"industrial": {
"text": "1 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
},
"agricultural": {
"text": "550 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "550 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Total renewable water resources": {

22
africa/et.json
View file

@ -530,13 +530,13 @@
},
"Total water withdrawal": {
"municipal": {
"text": "810 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "810 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"industrial": {
"text": "51.1 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "50 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"agricultural": {
"text": "9.687 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "9.69 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Total renewable water resources": {
@ -890,10 +890,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "56.6% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "3.8% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1298,8 +1298,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF): Ground Forces, Ethiopian Air Force (Ye Ityopya Ayer Hayl, ETAF); Ministry of Peace: Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which had been disbanded in 1996; in March 2019, Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which would reportedly be based out of Djibouti<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime Minister for protecting senior officials<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>each of the states have regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security and police forces that report to regional civilian authorities and operate separately from federal forces; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the ENDF, and the EFP; there have been some calls for these regional paramilitary forces to be incorporated into the ENDF and EFP<br><br>"
"text": "Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF): Ground Forces, Ethiopian Air Force (Ye Ityopya Ayer Hayl, ETAF); Ministry of Peace: Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which had been disbanded in 1996; in March 2019, Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy, which would reportedly be based out of Djibouti<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard military unit responsible to the Prime Minister for protecting senior officials<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>the regional governments control regional security forces, including \"special\" paramilitary forces, which generally operate independently from the federal government and in some cases operate as regional defense forces maintaining national borders; local militias also operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the ENDF, and the EFP<br>"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1353,6 +1353,14 @@
"text": "2.73 million (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2023)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List &mdash; Ethiopia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; efforts included prosecuting more potential trafficking crimes, convicting more traffickers, increasing training for law enforcement officials, drafting regulations to create a victim protection fund, and conducting awareness campaigns at the federal and regional levels; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous year to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns; protection services for victims remained limited and the government continued to rely on civil society organizations to provide most victim services without financial support; officials continued to focus mostly on transnational trafficking rather than on internal trafficking crimes, including domestic servitude and child sex trafficking; many officials continued to conflate human trafficking and migrant smuggling; government efforts to protect Ethiopian trafficking victims abroad remained minimal, and protection services for returning victims were inadequate; therefore, Ethiopia remained on the Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year (2022)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Ethiopia, as well as Ethiopians abroad; girls from rural areas are exploited in domestic servitude and sex trafficking within the country and boys in forced labor in weaving, construction, agriculture, forced begging, and street vending; girls are exploited by brothel owners in Addis Ababa; traffickers fraudulently recruit vulnerable populations and exploit them in forced labor; several million internally displaced persons are vulnerable to trafficking; nearly 60,000 Ethiopians fleeing conflict in northern regions to seek asylum in Sudan and other neighboring countries are increasingly vulnerable to trafficking; international organizations report armed actors, including Eritrean forces, regional forces, Ethiopian National Defense Force, and the Tigray People&rsquo;s Liberation Front have committed human rights abuses and gender-based violence against women and girls in Tigray, including potential trafficking crimes; Ethiopian girls are exploited in domestic servitude and sex trafficking in neighboring countries, particularly Djibouti and Sudan; Ethiopian boys face forced labor or criminal activity in Djibouti; Ethiopian women and children are exploited in forced begging in Saudi Arabia, and some women suffer forced labor in Romania&rsquo;s hotel industry; Ethiopia hosts more than 840,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, who are increasingly vulnerable to trafficking; Cuban medical professionals in Ethiopia may have been forced to work by the Cuban government (2022)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "transit hub for heroin originating in Southwest and Southeast Asia and destined for Europe, as well as cocaine destined for markets in southern Africa; cultivates qat (khat) for local use and regional export, principally to Djibouti and Somalia (legal in all three countries); the lack of a well-developed financial system limits the country's utility as a money laundering center"
}

10
africa/gb.json
View file

@ -1246,12 +1246,20 @@
"text": "the Gabonese military is a small and lightly-armed force that is responsible for both external and internal security; members of the military attempted a failed coup in 2019; the Gabonese military has benefited from cooperation with international partners, particularly the French military, which has maintained a long-term presence in Gabon; the Army&rsquo;s core forces are the Republican Guard and an airborne infantry battalion, which are supported by several small regionally-based infantry units; the Gendarmerie has regionally-based &ldquo;legions,&rdquo; as well as mobile forces, a national parks security unit, and a special intervention group; the Air Force has a small number of older French-made fighter aircraft and some combat helicopters, also mostly of French origin; the Navy has a small force of patrol boats (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the waters off Gabon; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>UN urges Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to resolve the sovereignty dispute over Gabon-occupied Mbane Island and lesser islands and to establish a maritime boundary in hydrocarbon-rich Corisco Bay</p>"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List &mdash; Gabon does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials investigated more trafficking crimes and convicted more traffickers; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous year to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; for the third consecutive year, the government did not adopt its anti-trafficking national action plan and lacked inter-ministerial coordination; fewer potential victims were identified and efforts to identify, protect, and provide justice for victims remained inadequate; the government did not amend its law to ensure penalties for adult sex trafficking were commensurate with penalties for other grave crimes, nor report investigating allegations of judicial corruption related to trafficking crimes; therefore, Gabon was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List (2022)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Gabon, as well as victims from Gabon abroad; Gabon is a primary destination and transit country for West and Central African men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; poverty continues to represent a key risk factor in forced labor and sex trafficking; girls are exploited in forced labor in domestic service, markets, or roadside restaurants, and boys are forced to work as street vendors, mechanics, and laborers in the fishing sector; West African women are coerced into domestic servitude or commercial sex within Gabon; criminals may exploit children in illegal gold mines and wildlife trafficking; Gabonese labor recruiters force some Cameroonians to work on rubber and palm oil plantations in northern Gabon; West African traffickers reportedly exploit children from other countries to work in markets and urban centers in Gabon; shopkeepers force or coerce Gabonese children to work in markets; smugglers who assist foreign adults migrating to or through Gabon subject them to forced labor or commercial sex; some families willingly give children to intermediaries promising education or employment who instead subject the children to forced labor; women are exploited in sex trafficking at roadside bars, and brothel owners reportedly conduct child sex trafficking (2022)"
}
}
}
}

8
africa/gh.json
View file

@ -852,10 +852,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "41.3% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of the Interior: Ghana Police Service (2022)"
"text": "Ghana Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force; Ministry of the Interior: Ghana Police Service (2023)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@
"text": "the military’s primary missions are border defense, assisting with internal security, peacekeeping, and protecting the country’s territorial waters, particularly its offshore oil and gas infrastructure; it has benefited from cooperation with foreign partners, such as the UK and the US, and experience gained from participation in multiple international peacekeeping missions; the government in recent years has committed to an increase in funding for equipment acquisitions, including armor, mechanized, and special forces capabilities for the Army, light attack aircraft for the Air Force, and more modern coastal patrol vessels for the Navy; the Army’s primary combat forces include several battalions of light infantry, a motorized rapid reaction/presidential guard battalion, and small regiments of light armored reconnaissance and special forces; the Navy has 2 ocean-going patrol vessels, several coastal patrol craft, and a special forces unit, while the Air Force operates a few ground attack aircraft and multipurpose helicopters<br> <br>in 2022, Ghana began beefing up its military presence in the north of the country against threats from the terrorist organization Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups, which has conducted attacks in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo; Ghana’s northern frontier with Burkina Faso is also an area with well-established smuggling routes, porous borders, and illegal gold mining; Ghana has also pushed an initiative to bolster security cooperation and intelligence sharing among Gulf of Guinea neighbors and Sahel countries <br><br>the military traces its origins to the Gold Coast Constabulary that was established in 1879 and renamed the Gold Coast Regiment in 1901; the Gold Coast Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; following independence in 1957, the Gold Coast Regiment formed the basis for the new Ghanaian Army (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported seven incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Ghana in 2022, which was an increase over the five incidents reported in 2021; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents include vessels that were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

2
africa/gv.json
View file

@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@
"text": "the Guinean military is a small and lightly armed force that is responsible for external defense, but also has some domestic security responsibilities and has historically been involved in suppressing public protests; the military has undergone some attempts at reform since 2010, but in 2021 the Army&rsquo;s special forces led a successful coup; the Army has a mix of approximately 10 infantry, light armor, commando, and special forces battalions, as well as a presidential guard force; piracy and natural resource protection in the Gulf of Guinea are key areas of concern for the small Navy, which possesses only a few patrol boats; the Air Force has a handful of serviceable aircraft, including helicopter gunships (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Guinea in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

9
africa/iv.json
View file

@ -859,10 +859,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "39.6% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "3.1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1277,7 +1277,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army, Navy, Cote Air Force, Special Forces; National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense); Ministry of Security and Civil Protection: National Police; Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities) (2022)"
"text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army, Navy, Cote Air Force, Special Forces; National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense); Ministry of Security and Civil Protection: National Police, Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities), Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance is responsible for countering internal threats"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1312,7 +1313,7 @@
"text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; the FACI's operational focus is internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2022)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one product tanker hijacked and one product tanker boarded in the territorial and offshore waters of Cote d'Ivoire in 2022; in both cases the ship's cargo and valuables were stolen; the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {

16
africa/ke.json
View file

@ -857,10 +857,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "52.9% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "4.1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1131,18 +1131,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "66,646 (2020 est.)"
"text": "61,096 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "61,408,904 (2020 est.)"
"text": "65,085,720 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "114 (2020 est.)"
"text": "123 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@
"text": "Kenya&rsquo;s telecom market continues to undergo considerable changes in the wake of increased competition, improved international connectivity, and rapid developments in the mobile market; the country is directly connected to a number of submarine cables, and with Mombasa through a terrestrial network, the country serves as a key junction for onward connectivity to the Arabian states and the Far East; numerous competitors are rolling out national and metropolitan backbone networks and wireless access networks to deliver services to population centers across the country; several fiber infrastructure sharing agreements have been forged, and as a result the number of fiber broadband connections has increased sharply in recent years; much of the progress in the broadband segment is due to the government&rsquo;s revised national broadband strategy, which has been updated with goals through to 2030, and which are largely dependent on mobile broadband platforms based on LTE and 5G (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; multiple providers in the mobile-cellular segment of the market fostering a boom in mobile-cellular telephone usage with teledensity reaching 114 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriptions at 123 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 254; landing point for the EASSy, TEAMS, LION2, DARE1, PEACE Cable, and SEACOM fiber-optic submarine cable systems covering East, North&nbsp;and South Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia; satellite earth stations - 4 Intelsat; launched first micro satellites in 2018 (2019)"
@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@
"text": "the KDF is considered to be an experienced, effective, and professional force; it has conducted operations in neighboring Somalia since 2011 and taken part in numerous regional peacekeeping and security missions; it is a leading member of the Africa Standby Force; the KDF trains regularly, participates in multinational exercises, and has ties to a variety of foreign militaries, including those of France, the UK, and the US; its chief security concerns and missions include protecting the country’s sovereignty and territory, regional disputes, the threat posed by the al-Shabaab terrorist group based in neighboring Somalia, maritime crime and piracy, and assisting civil authorities in responding to emergency, disaster, or political unrest as requested <br><br>the Army has 5 combat brigades, including 3 infantry, an armored, and an artillery brigade; it also has a helicopter-equipped air cavalry battalion and a special operations regiment comprised of airborne, special forces, and ranger battalions; the Navy has several offshore patrol vessels, large coastal patrol boats, and missile-armed craft; the Air Force has a small inventory of older US-origin fighter aircraft, as well as some transport aircraft and combat helicopters <br><br>Kenyan military forces intervened in Somalia in October 2011 to combat the al Qaida-affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist group, which had conducted numerous cross-border attacks into Kenya; in November 2011, the UN and the African Union invited Kenya to incorporate its forces into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); Kenyan forces were formally integrated into AMISOM in February 2012; they consist of approximately 3,600 troops and are responsible for AMISOM’s Sector 2 comprising Lower and Middle Jubba (see Appendix T for additional details on al-Shabaab; note - as of May 2022, AMISOM was renamed the AU Transition Mission in Somalia or ATMIS)<br><br>the Kenya Military Forces were created following independence in 1963; the current KDF was established and its composition laid out in the 2010 constitution; it is governed by the Kenya Defense Forces Act of 2012; the Army traces its origins back to the Kings African Rifles (KAR), a British colonial regiment raised from Britain's East Africa possessions from 1902 until independence in the 1960s; the KAR conducted both military and internal security functions within the colonial territories, and served outside the territories during the World Wars (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships"
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no piracy attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Kenya in 2022; although the opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents; in the past, vessels have also been targeted off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, as well as in the Indian ocean, and off the west and south coasts of India and west Maldives; generally, Somali pirates tend to be well armed with automatic weapons, RPGs and sometimes use skiffs launched from mother vessels, which may be hijacked fishing vessels or dhows; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\" that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

12
africa/li.json
View file

@ -1072,18 +1072,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "6,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0 (2020 est.)"
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1.653 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "1.7 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "33 (2020 est.)"
"text": "32 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@
"text": "Liberia has a telecom market which is mainly based on mobile networks; this is due to the civil war which destroyed much of the fixed-line infrastructure; to facilitate LTC Mobile&rsquo;s market entry, the government in January 2022 set in train amendments to telecom legislation; internet services are available from a number of wireless ISPs as well as the mobile operators; the high cost and limited bandwidth of connections means that internet access is expensive and rates are very low; additional bandwidth is available from an international submarine cable but considerable investment is still needed in domestic fixed-line infrastructure before end-users can make full use of the cable (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100; mobile-cellular subscription base growing and teledensity approached 33 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100; mobile-cellular subscriptions are 32 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 231; landing point for the ACE submarine cable&nbsp;linking 20 West&nbsp;African countries and Europe;&nbsp;satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"
@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@
"text": "the AFL is responsible for external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities if called upon, such as humanitarian assistance during natural disasters and support to law enforcement; it is a small, lightly equipped force comprised of 2 combat infantry battalions and supporting units; the infantry battalions were rebuilt with US assistance in 2007-2008 from the restructured AFL following the end of the second civil war in 2003 when military and police forces were disbanded and approximately 100,000 military, police, and rebel combatants were disarmed<br><br>the first militia unit established for defense of the colony was raised in 1832; the AFL traces its origins to the 1908 establishment of the Liberia Frontier Force, which became the Liberian National Guard in 1965; the AFL was established in 1970<br><br>the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in 2003 as a peacekeeping force; at its height, UNMIL was comprised of about 15,000 personnel, including more than 3,000 troops absorbed from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping mission; Liberian forces reassumed full control of the country’s security in June of 2016, and the UNMIL mission was ended in 2018 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial and offshore waters of Liberia in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

10
africa/lt.json
View file

@ -1076,18 +1076,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "11,574 (2020 est.)"
"text": "9,559 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1,562,648 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1,821,374 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "73 (2020 est.)"
"text": "80 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@
"text": "until late 2020, Lesotho&rsquo;s telecom regulator maintained a market duopoly which is focused on fixed-line services; competition was insufficient to promote effective price reductions for consumers, while the regulator had no mechanisms in place to monitor the telcos to ensure quality of service and fair pricing for consumers; the small size of the country&rsquo;s population provided little incentive for new players to enter the market; a positive outcome for consumers was the deployment in early 2021 of a service to monitor traffic and billing; this ended the practice whereby the regulator was dependent on telcos submitting data about their performance, billing, and other matters; the regulator has also turned its attention to addressing multiple SIM ownership and stem incidences of crimes committed using unregistered SIMs; in May 2022, it instructed the country&rsquo;s MNOs to begin registering SIM cards on their networks from the following month; fixed-wireless 5G trials began in early 2019 (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line is less than 1 per 100 subscriptions; mobile-cellular service subscribership nearly 73 per 100 persons; rudimentary system consisting of a modest number of landlines, a small microwave radio relay system, and a small radiotelephone communication system (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line is less than 1 per 100 subscriptions; mobile-cellular service subscribership is 80 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 266; Internet accessibility has improved with several submarine fiber optic cables that land on African east and west coasts, but the country's land locked position makes access prices expensive; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"

10
africa/ly.json
View file

@ -1003,18 +1003,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1.576 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "1.6 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "23 (2020 est.)"
"text": "23 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2.922 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "2.9 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "43 (2020 est.)"
"text": "43 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@
"text": "political and security instability in Libya has disrupted its telecom sector; much of its infrastructure remains superior to that in most other African countries; rival operators fight for control; investment in fiber backbone and upgrades to international cables; limited LTE and 5G service; some satellite broadband; in 2021 Libya signed deals and projects with US firms to upgrade portions of its infrastructure, increasing the diversity of its telecommunications networks (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "nearly 23 per 100 fixed-line and over 43 per 100 mobile-cellular subscriptions; service generally adequate (2020)"
"text": "nearly 23 per 100 fixed-line and over 43 per 100 mobile-cellular subscriptions; service generally adequate (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 218; landing points for LFON, EIG, Italy-Libya, Silphium and Tobrok-Emasaed&nbsp;submarine cable system connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia; satellite earth stations - 4 Intelsat, Arabsat, and Intersputnik;&nbsp; microwave radio relay to Tunisia and Egypt; tropospheric scatter to Greece; participant in Medarabtel (2019)"

17
africa/ma.json
View file

@ -614,13 +614,13 @@
},
"Judicial branch": {
"highest court(s)": {
"text": "Supreme Court or Cour Supreme (consists of 11 members; addresses judicial administration issues only); High Constitutional Court or Haute Cour Constitutionnelle (consists of 9 members); note - the judiciary includes a High Court of Justice responsible for adjudicating crimes and misdemeanors by government officials, including the president"
"text": "Supreme Court or Cour Supreme (consists of 11 members; addresses judicial administration issues only); High Constitutional Court or Haute Cour Constitutionnelle (consists of 9 members); High Court of Justice (consists of 11 members; addresses cases brought against the president of Madagascar and high officials for high treason, grave violations of the Constitution, or breach of&nbsp; duties incompatible with the exercise of the presidential mandate)"
},
"judge selection and term of office": {
"text": "Supreme Court heads elected by the president and judiciary officials to serve 3-year, single renewable terms; High Constitutional Court members appointed - 3 each by the president, by both legislative bodies, and by the Council of Magistrates; members serve single, 7-year terms"
"text": "Supreme Court heads elected by the president and judiciary officials to serve 3-year, single renewable terms; High Constitutional Court members appointed - 3 each by the president, by both legislative bodies, and by the Council of Magistrates; members serve single, 7-year terms; High Court of Justice members include: first president of the Supreme Court; 2 presidents from the Court of Cassation; 2 presidents from the Court of Appeal; 2 deputies&nbsp; from the National Assembly; 2 senators from the Senate; 2 members from the High Council for the Defense of Democracy and the State of law"
},
"subordinate courts": {
"text": "Courts of Appeal; Courts of First Instance"
"text": "Courts of Appeal; Court of Cassation; Courts of First Instance; military courts; traditional (dina) courts; Trade Court"
}
},
"Political parties and leaders": {
@ -1086,15 +1086,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "69,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "26,271 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "15.869 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "16,279,633 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "57 (2020 est.)"
"text": "56 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1102,7 +1105,7 @@
"text": "telecom services in Madagascar have benefited from intensifying competition between the main operators; there have been positive developments with the country&rsquo;s link to international submarine cables, particularly the METISS cable connecting to South Africa and Mauritius; in addition, the country&rsquo;s connection to the Africa-1 cable, expected in late 2023, will provide it with links to Kenya, Djibouti, countries in north and south Africa, as well Pakistan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and France; a national fiber backbone has been implemented connecting the major cities; in addition, the government has progressed with its five-year plan to develop a digital platform running to 2024; various schemes within the program have been managed by a unit within the President&rsquo;s office; penetration rates in all market sectors remain below the average for the African region, and so there remains considerable growth potential; much progress was made in 2020, stimulated by the particular conditions related to the pandemic, which encouraged greater use of voice and data services (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "less than 1 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity about 57 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "less than 1 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity about 56 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 261; landing points for the EASSy, METISS, and LION fiber-optic submarine cable systems connecting to numerous Indian Ocean Islands, South Africa, and Eastern African countries; satellite earth stations - 2 (1 Intelsat - Indian Ocean, 1 Intersputnik - Atlantic Ocean region) (2019)"

11
africa/mi.json
View file

@ -1106,15 +1106,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "12,465 (2020 est.)"
"text": "12,465 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "10,004,680 (2020 est.)"
"text": "11,940,135 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "52 (2020 est.)"
"text": "60 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@
"text": "with few resources, Malawi is one of the world&rsquo;s least developed countries; there has been little investment in fixed-line telecom infrastructure, and as a result, the country&rsquo;s two mobile networks Airtel Malawi and TMN provide the vast majority of connections for voice and data services; both operators have invested in LTE technologies to improve the quality of data services; the lack of market competition, together with limited international internet bandwidth, has also resulted in some of the highest prices for telecom services in the region; the government in late 2020 secured an average 80% reduction in the cost of data bundles offered by the MNOs; following continuing customer complaints, the regulator in mid-2021 ensured that costs were again reduced, this time by about a third; mobile penetration remains low in comparison to the regional average and so there are considerable opportunities for further growth, particularly in the mobile broadband sector; low penetration is partly attributed to the lack of competition, though there is the possibility that a new play come launch services by the end of 2022; the internet sector is reasonably competitive, with about 50 licensed ISPs, though the limited availability and high cost of international bandwidth has held back growth and kept broadband access prices among the highest in the region; these limitations are being addressed, with the second phase of the national fiber backbone having started in mid-2021 (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "limited fixed-line subscribership less than 1 per 100 households; mobile-cellular services are expanding but network coverage is limited and is based around the main urban areas; mobile-cellular subscribership roughly 52 per 100 households (2020)"
"text": "limited fixed-line subscribership less than 1 per 100 households; mobile-cellular subscribership roughly 60 per 100 households (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 265; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Indian Ocean, 1 Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"

14
africa/ml.json
View file

@ -1121,18 +1121,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "281,638 (2020 est.)"
"text": "301,055 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "25,315,598 (2020 est.)"
"text": "21,882,251 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "125 (2020 est.)"
"text": "100 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@
"text": "Mali&rsquo;s telecom systems are challenged by recent conflict, geography, areas of low population, poverty, security issues, and high illiteracy; telecom infrastructure is barely adequate in urban areas and not available in most of the country with underinvestment in fixed-line networks; high mobile penetration and potential for mobile broadband service; local plans for IXP; dependent on neighboring countries for international bandwidth and access to submarine cables (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscribership is over 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership has increased sharply to 125 per 100 persons; increasing use of local radio loops to extend network coverage to remote areas (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line subscribership is 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership has increased sharply to 100 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 223; satellite communications center and fiber-optic links to neighboring countries; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean, 1 Indian Ocean) (2020)"
@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes or FAMA): Army (includes a riverine patrol force), Republic of Mali Air Force; National Gendarmerie; National Guard (2022)",
"text": "Malian Armed Forces (Forces Armées Maliennes or FAMa): Land Forces (l’Armée de Terre), Air Force (l’Armée de l’Air); National Guard (la Garde Nationale du Mali or GNM); General Directorate of the National Gendarmerie (la Direction Générale de la Gendarmerie Nationale or DGGN) (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared with the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the Gendarmerie's primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areas; it also has a specialized border security unit<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>the National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; its forces include a camel corps for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali<br><br><strong>note 4: </strong>there are also pro-government militias operating in Mali, such as the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA); the leader of GATIA is also a general in the national army"
},
"Military expenditures": {
@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@
"text": "<strong>note: </strong>until announcing its withdrawal in May of 2022, Mali was part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; Mali had committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012)<br><br>the FAMA and the remainder of the security forces collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants and have since been rebuilt with considerable external assistance, including the EU, France, and the UN; for example, the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) from 2013-2022 trained some 14,000 Malian soldiers and 8 combined arms battalions/battlegroups (Groupement Tactique InterArmes, GTIA), each of which was structured to be self-sufficient with its own motorized/mechanized infantry, light armor, commandos, artillery, engineers, and other support forces; EUTM suspended its training program in 2022, citing issues with the ruling military government, including human rights abuses and the presence of Russian private military contractors; over the same period, the French military provided assistance to the Malian security forces and conducted counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Mali; the French suspended operations in 2021 and in August 2022 withdrew the last of its forces while also citing issues with the military government; the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013 with the mission of providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, protecting civilians, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of late 2022, MINUSMA had around 14,000 personnel deployed <br><br>the military government has increased security ties with Russia; Russia has provided military equipment, and in December 2021, Mali contracted with a Russian private military company to provide training for local armed forces and security to senior Malian officials; they have also participated in security operations and been accused of war crimes; as of 2022, there were an estimated 1,000 Russian military contractors in Mali<br><br>Malian security forces are actively engaged in operations against several insurgent terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), as well as other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands spread across the central, northern, and southern regions of the country; the government was reportedly in control of only an estimated 10-20% of the country's central and northern territories, and terror attacks were increasing in the more heavily populated south, including around the capital Bamako; the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), part of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked terror groups, has played a large role in a surge in violence in Mali’s central and southern regions; in the north, ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) has been able to reassert itself  (2022)"
"text": "prior to the coup in August 2020 and military takeover in May 2021, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded in overturning civilian rule (1968, 1991, and 2012)<br><br>the FAMa and the remainder of the security forces collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants and have since been rebuilt with considerable external assistance, including the EU, France, and the UN; for example, the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) from 2013-2022 trained some 14,000 Malian soldiers and 8 combined arms battalions/battlegroups (Groupement Tactique InterArmes, GTIA), each of which was structured to be self-sufficient with its own motorized/mechanized infantry, light armor, commandos, artillery, engineers, and other support forces; EUTM suspended its training program in 2022, citing issues with the ruling military government, including human rights abuses and the presence of Russian private military contractors; over the same period, the French military provided assistance to the Malian security forces and conducted counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Mali; the French suspended operations in 2021 and in August 2022 withdrew the last of its forces while also citing issues with the military government; the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013 with the mission of providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, protecting civilians, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of late 2022, MINUSMA had around 14,000 personnel deployed <br><br>the military government has increased security ties with Russia; Russia has provided military equipment, and in December 2021, Mali contracted with a Russian private military company to provide training for local armed forces and security to senior Malian officials; they have also participated in security operations and been accused of war crimes; as of 2022, there were an estimated 1,000 Russian military contractors in Mali<br><br>Malian security forces are actively engaged in operations against several insurgent terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), as well as other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands spread across the central, northern, and southern regions of the country; the government is reportedly in control of only an estimated 10-20% of the country's central and northern territories, and terror attacks are increasing in the more heavily populated south, including around the capital Bamako; the Macina Liberation Front (FLM), part of the Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of al-Qa'ida-linked terror groups, has played a large role in a surge in violence in Mali’s central and southern regions; in the north, ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) has been able to reassert itself (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

14
africa/mo.json
View file

@ -856,10 +856,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "34% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.4% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1124,18 +1124,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,357,286 (2020 est.)"
"text": "2,460,155 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "6 (2020 est.)"
"text": "7 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "49,421,023 (2020 est.)"
"text": "52.012 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "134 (2020 est.)"
"text": "139 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@
"text": "despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment and illiteracy affecting telecom market, particularly in rural areas; national network nearly 100% digital using fiber-optic links; improved rural service employs microwave radio relay; one of the most state-of-the-art markets in Africa; high mobile penetration rates in the region with low cost for broadband Internet access; improvement in LTE reach and capabilities; service providers have all successfully completed 5G proofs of concept and are currently lining up 5G equipment providers for both radio and core technology; regulatory agency expects to conduct the 5G spectrum auction in 2023; mobile Internet accounts for 93% of all Internet connections; World Bank provided funds for Morocco&rsquo;s digital transformation; government supported digital education during pandemic; submarine cables and satellite provide connectivity to Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Australia (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is just over 6 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular subscribership is nearly 134 per 100 persons; good system composed of open-wire lines, cables, and microwave radio relay links; principal switching centers are Casablanca and Rabat (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is 7 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular subscribership is 139 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 212; landing point for the Atlas Offshore, Estepona-Tetouan, Canalink&nbsp;and SEA-ME-WE-3 fiber-optic telecommunications undersea cables that provide connectivity to Asia,&nbsp;Africa,&nbsp;the Middle East, Europe and Australia; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) and 1 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Gibraltar, Spain, and Western Sahara (2019)"

10
africa/mp.json
View file

@ -1036,18 +1036,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "478,700 (2020 est.)"
"text": "469,100 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "38 (2020 est.)"
"text": "36 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1,912,900 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1,971,300 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "150 (2020 est.)"
"text": "152 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@
"text": "the telecom sector in Mauritius has long been supported by the varied needs of tourists; this has stimulated the mobile market, leading to a particularly high penetration rate; the response of the country&rsquo;s telcos to tourist requirements also contributed to the country being among the first in the region to provide services based on 3G and WiMAX technologies; the incumbent telco provides comprehensive LTE and fiber broadband coverage, and in late 2021 it launched a gigabit fiber-based broadband service; the country has seen improved international internet capacity in recent years, with direct cables linking to India, Madagascar, and South Africa, as well as other connections to Rodrigues and Reunion; mobile subscribers in Mauritius secured 5G services in mid-2021;&nbsp; this followed the regulator&rsquo;s award of spectrum in two bands to the MNOs (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity over 37 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular services teledensity roughly 150 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity over 36 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular services teledensity 152 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 230; landing points for the SAFE, MARS, IOX Cable System, METISS&nbsp;and LION submarine cable system that provides links to Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia, Indian Ocean Islands of Reunion, Madagascar, and Mauritius; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean); new microwave link to Reunion; HF radiotelephone links to several countries (2019)"

10
africa/mr.json
View file

@ -1110,18 +1110,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "62,099 (2020 est.)"
"text": "58,094 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "4,932,571 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6,512,361 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "106 (2020 est.)"
"text": "141 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@
"text": "Mauritania&rsquo;s small population and low economic output has limited the country&rsquo;s ability to develop sustained growth in the telecom sector; low disposable income has restricted growth in the use of services, and thus of revenue which telcos can hope to gain from subscribers; this has impacted on their ability to invest in network upgrades and improvements to service offerings; this has been reflected in the repeated fines imposed against them by the regulator for failing to ensure a good quality of service; there are also practical challenges relating to transparency and tax burdens which have hindered foreign investment; financial support has been forthcoming from the government as well as the World Bank and European Investment Bank; their efforts have focused on implementing appropriate regulatory measures and promoting the further penetration of fixed-line broadband services by improving the national backbone network, ensuring connectivity to international telecom cables, and facilitating operator access to infrastructure; progress has been made to improve internet bandwidth capacity, including the completion of a cable link at the border with Algeria, and the connection to the EllaLink submarine cable; the final stage of the national backbone network was completed in December 2021, which now runs to some 4,000km; penetration of fixed telephony and broadband service is very low and is expected to remain so in coming years, though growth is anticipated following improvements to backbone infrastructure and the reduction in access pricing; most voice and data services are carried over the mobile networks (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular network coverage extends mainly to urban areas with a teledensity of roughly 106 per 100 persons; mostly cable and open-wire lines; a domestic satellite telecommunications system links Nouakchott with regional capitals (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity of roughly 141 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 222; landing point for the ACE submarine cable for connectivity&nbsp;to 19 West African countries and 2 European countries; satellite earth stations - 3 (1 Intelsat - Atlantic Ocean, 2 Arabsat) (2019)"

23
africa/mz.json
View file

@ -575,7 +575,7 @@
}
},
"Legal system": {
"text": "mixed legal system of Portuguese civil law and customary law; note - in rural, apply where applicable predominantly Muslim villages with no formal legal system, Islamic law may be applied"
"text": "mixed legal system of Portuguese civil law and customary law"
},
"International law organization participation": {
"text": "has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt"
@ -616,13 +616,13 @@
},
"Legislative branch": {
"description": {
"text": "unicameral Assembly of the Republic or Assembleia da Republica (250 seats; 248 members elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote and 2 members representing Mozambicans abroad directly elected by simple majority vote; members serve 5-year terms) (2019)"
"text": "unicameral Assembly of the Republic or Assembleia da Republica (250 seats; 248 members elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote and 2 members representing Mozambicans abroad directly elected by simple majority vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "last held on 15 October 2019 (next to be held on 15 October 2024) (2019)"
"text": "last held on 15 October 2019 (next to be held on 15 October 2024)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "percent of vote by party - FRELIMO 71%, RENAMO 23%, MDM 4%; seats by party - FRELIMO 184, RENAMO 60, MDM 6; composition as of July 2022 - men 144, women 106, percent of women 42.4% (2019)"
"text": "percent of vote by party - FRELIMO 71%, RENAMO 23%, MDM 4%; seats by party - FRELIMO 184, RENAMO 60, MDM 6; composition as of July 2022 - men 144, women 106, percent of women 42.4%"
}
},
"Judicial branch": {
@ -1123,15 +1123,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "89,016 (2020 est.)"
"text": "59,682 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "15,463,226 (2020 est.)"
"text": "13,686,234 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "49 (2020 est.)"
"text": "43 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1139,7 +1142,7 @@
"text": "one of the first countries in the region to embark upon telecom reform and to open the sector to competition; the mobile segment in particular has shown strong growth; additional competition followed in late 2020; a new licensing regime ensured that by mid-2019 all operators had been provided with universal licenses, enabling them to offer all types of telephony and data services; mobile, fixed-line and broadband penetration rates remain far below the average for the region; in recent years the government has enforced the registration of SIM cards, but with varying success; at the end of 2016 almost five million unregistered SIM cards were deactivated but poor monitoring meant that the process was revisited in mid-2019 and again in late 2020; the high cost of international bandwidth had long hampered internet use, though the landing of two international submarine cables (SEACOM and EASSy) has reduced the cost of bandwidth and so led to drastic reductions in broadband retail prices as well as a significant jump in available bandwidth; there is some cross-platform competition, with DSL, cable, fibre, WiMAX, and mobile broadband options available, though fixed broadband options can be limited to urban areas; improvements can be expected from the ongoing rollout of a national fiber backbone networks and of upgrades to mobile infrastructure (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "extremely low fixed-line teledensity contrasts with rapid growth in the mobile-cellular network; operators provide coverage that includes all the main cities and key roads; fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and nearly 49 per 100 mobile-cellular teledensity (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and nearly 43 per 100 mobile-cellular teledensity (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 258; landing points for the EASSy and SEACOM/ Tata TGN-Eurasia fiber-optic submarine cable systems linking numerous&nbsp;east African&nbsp;countries, the Middle East and Asia&nbsp;; satellite earth stations - 5 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 3 Indian Ocean); TdM contracts for Itelsat for satellite broadband and bulk haul services (2020)"
@ -1270,7 +1273,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique, FADM): Mozambique Army, Mozambique Navy (Marinha de Guerra de Mocambique, MGM), Mozambique Air Force (Forca Aerea de Mocambique, FAM)<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Mozambique National Police (PRM), the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC), Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR; police special forces), Border Security Force; other security forces include the Presidential Guard and the Force for the Protection of High-Level Individuals (2022)",
"text": "Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique, FADM): Mozambique Army, Mozambique Navy (Marinha de Guerra de Mocambique, MGM), Mozambique Air Force (Forca Aerea de Mocambique, FAM)<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Mozambique National Police (PRM), the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC), Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR; police special forces), Border Security Force; other security forces include the Presidential Guard and the Force for the Protection of High-Level Individuals (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>the FADM and other security forces are referred to collectively as the Defense and Security Forces (DFS)<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong> the PRM, SERNIC, and the UIR are responsible for law enforcement and internal security; the Border Security Force is responsible for protecting the country’s international borders and for carrying out police duties within 24 miles of borders<br><strong><br>note 3</strong>: the Presidential Guard provides security for the president, and the Force for the Protection of High-level Individuals provides security for senior-level officials at the national and provincial"
},
"Military expenditures": {
@ -1300,7 +1303,7 @@
"text": "registration for military service is mandatory for all men and women at 18 years of age; 18-35 years of age for selective compulsory military service; 18 years of age for voluntary service for men and women; 24-month service obligation (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the FADM is responsible for external security, cooperating with police on internal security, and responding to natural disasters and other emergencies; the current primary focus of the FADM is countering an insurgency driven by militants with ties to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, an area known for rich liquid natural gas deposits; insurgent attacks in the province began in 2017 and the fighting has left over 4,000 estimated dead and approximately 1 million displaced; the FADM is widely assessed as lacking the training, equipment, and overall capabilities to address the insurgency; several countries from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the EU, as well as Rwanda and the US are providing various forms of military assistance; the SADC countries and Zambia have sent more than 3,000 military and security personnel, while the EU and the US have provided training assistance (2023)"
"text": "the FADM is responsible for external security, cooperating with police on internal security, and responding to natural disasters and other emergencies; the current primary focus of the FADM is countering an insurgency driven by militants with ties to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, an area known for rich liquid natural gas deposits; insurgent attacks in the province began in 2017 and the fighting has left over 4,000 estimated dead and approximately 1 million displaced; the FADM is widely assessed as lacking the training, equipment, and overall capabilities to address the insurgency; several countries from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the EU, as well as Rwanda and the US are providing various forms of military assistance; the SADC countries and Zambia have sent more than 3,000 military and security personnel, while the EU and the US have provided training assistance<br><br>the Mozambique Government reportedly has created a Local Force comprised of ex-combatants and other civilians who support FADM troops operating in Cabo Delgado; the FADM provides training, uniforms, weapons, and logistical support to the Local Forces (2023)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

13
africa/ng.json
View file

@ -1117,15 +1117,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "58,000 (2020)"
"text": "58,000 (2021)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "14.239 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "14 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "59 (2020 est.)"
"text": "56 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1133,7 +1136,7 @@
"text": "Niger is one of the largest countries in West Africa but also one of the poorest in the world; as with many African markets, a lack of fixed telecoms infrastructure has led to growth in mobile services; Niger&rsquo;s mobile penetration is modest compared to other countries in the region, while fixed broadband penetration is negligible; recent international investment to complete the Trans-Saharan Dorsal optical fibre (SDR) network has extended the reach of fiber infrastructure in the country, and also increased international capacity; new cables linking the country with Chad and Burkina Faso have extended Niger&rsquo;s connectivity with international cable infrastructure (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular at nearly 59 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular at nearly 56 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 227; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean)"
@ -1270,7 +1273,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> Niger is part of a four (formerly five)-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 (now G4) Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali (withdrew in 2022), and Mauritania; it has committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force; as of 2022, defense forces from each of the participating states were allowed to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the force is backed by France, the UN, and the US<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>Niger also has about 1,000 troops committed to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "while the FAN is responsible for ensuring external security, much of its focus is internal, particularly counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations against Islamic militant groups operating in the areas bordering Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria, as well as much of northern Niger and the Diffa and Lake Chad regions; these groups include the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) in the Greater Sahara, Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); up to 70% of the security forces are assigned to fighting militants and protecting borders<br><br>the FAN is a lightly armed, but experienced military; it has conducted training and combat operations with foreign partners, including the French and US; the EU has also provided security assistance, particularly to the GN, GNN, and the National Police; the FAN also conducts counterterrorism operations with the G4 Sahel Group and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which coordinates the Lake Chad states’ operations against Boko Haram<br><br>in recent years, Niger has focused on making its security services more mobile to improve their effectiveness in countering terrorism and protecting the country’s borders; with training support and material assistance from the US and the EU, each security service has created new units or reconfigured existing units with an emphasis on mobility, hybridization, and specialized training; since the 2010s, the Army has created a special operations command, up to 12 special intervention battalions, and an anti-terrorism unit known as the 1st Expeditionary Force of Niger (EFoN); the GN has created mobile units modeled on European gendarmerie forces known as the Rapid Action Group—Surveillance and Response in the Sahel (<em>Groupe d'action Rapides—Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel or GAR-SI Sahel</em>); the GNN has developed mobile Multipurpose Squadrons (<em>Escadrons Polyvalentes de la Garde Nationale de Niger</em> or EP-GNN), while the National Police have created Mobile Border Control Companies (<em>Compagnie Mobile de Contrôle des Frontières or CMCF</em>); Niger has also established training centers for special forces in Tillia and peacekeeping in Ouallam<br><br>the Army was established in 1960 from French colonial forces, while the Air Force was formed as the Niger National Escadrille in 1961; the GN received its first Nigerien commander in 1962; since its establishment, Niger’s military has played a significant role in the country’s politics, conducting successful coups in 1974, 1996, 1999, and 2010, and ruling Niger for much of the period before 1999; the FAN also conducted counterinsurgency operations against Taureg rebels during 1990-95 and 2007-09 (2023)"
"text": "while the FAN is responsible for ensuring external security, much of its focus is internal, particularly counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations against Islamic militant groups operating in the areas bordering Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria, as well as much of northern Niger and the Diffa and Lake Chad regions; these groups include the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) in the Greater Sahara, Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM); up to 70% of the security forces are assigned to fighting militants and protecting borders<br><br>the FAN is a lightly armed, but experienced military; it has conducted training and combat operations with foreign partners, including the French and US; the EU has also provided security assistance, particularly to the GN, GNN, and the National Police; the FAN also conducts counterterrorism operations with the G4 Sahel Group and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which coordinates the Lake Chad states’ operations against Boko Haram<br><br>in recent years, Niger has focused on making its security services more mobile to improve their effectiveness in countering terrorism and protecting the country’s borders; with training support and material assistance from the US and the EU, each security service has created new units or reconfigured existing units with an emphasis on mobility, hybridization, and specialized training; since the 2010s, the Army has created a special operations command, up to 12 special intervention battalions, and an anti-terrorism unit known as the 1st Expeditionary Force of Niger (EFoN); the GN has created mobile units modeled on European gendarmerie forces known as the Rapid Action Group—Surveillance and Response in the Sahel (<em>Groupe d'action Rapides—Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel or GAR-SI Sahel</em>); the GNN has developed mobile Multipurpose Squadrons (<em>Escadrons Polyvalentes de la Garde Nationale de Niger</em> or EP-GNN), while the National Police have created Mobile Border Control Companies (<em>Compagnie Mobile de Contrôle des Frontières or CMCF</em>); Niger has also established training centers for special forces in Tillia and peacekeeping in Ouallam; meanwhile, the Air Force has received a few armed UAVs from Turkey<br><br>the Army was established in 1960 from French colonial forces, while the Air Force was formed as the Niger National Escadrille in 1961; the GN received its first Nigerien commander in 1962; since its establishment, Niger’s military has played a significant role in the country’s politics, conducting successful coups in 1974, 1996, 1999, and 2010, and ruling Niger for much of the period before 1999; the FAN also conducted counterinsurgency operations against Taureg rebels during 1990-95 and 2007-09 (2023)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

19
africa/ni.json
View file

@ -863,10 +863,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "59% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1137,15 +1137,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "107,031 (2020 est.)"
"text": "106,385 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "204,228,678 (2020 est.)"
"text": "195,128,265 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "99 (2020 est.)"
"text": "91 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1153,7 +1156,7 @@
"text": "one of the larger telecom markets in Africa subject to sporadic access to electricity and vandalism of infrastructure; most Internet connections are via mobile networks; market competition with affordable access; LTE technologies available but GSM is dominant; mobile penetration high due to use of multiple SIM cards and phones; government committed to expanding broadband penetration; operators to deploy fiber optic cable in six geopolitical zones and Lagos; operators invested in base stations to deplete network congestion; submarine cable break in 2020 slowed speeds and interrupted connectivity; Nigeria concluded its first 5G spectrum auction in 2021 and granted licenses to two firms; construction of 5G infrastructure has not yet been completed (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscribership remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular services growing rapidly, in part responding to the shortcomings of the fixed-line network; multiple cellular providers operate nationally with subscribership base over 99 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line subscribership remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership is 91 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 234; landing point for the SAT-3/WASC, NCSCS,&nbsp; MainOne, Glo-1 &amp; 2, ACE, and Equiano&nbsp;fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to Europe and South and West Africa; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) (2019)"
@ -1325,10 +1328,10 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Nigeria has committed an Army combat brigade (approximately 3,000 troops) to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional counter-terrorism force comprised of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger; MNJTF conducts operations against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Nigerian military is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and regarded as one of its most capable forces; the Army is organized into 8 divisions comprised of a diverse mix of more than 20 combat brigades, including airborne infantry, amphibious infantry, armor, artillery, light infantry, mechanized and motorized infantry, and special operations forces; there is also a presidential guard brigade; the Army typically organizes into battalion- and brigade-sized task forces for operations; the Air Force has a small mix of fighter, ground attack, and attack helicopter squadrons primarily for supporting the Army<br><br>the Army and Air Force are focused largely on internal security and face a number of challenges that have stretched their resources; the Army is deployed in all 36 of the country's states; in the northeast, it is conducting counterinsurgency/counterterrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa (ISIS-WA) terrorist groups, where it has deployed as many as 70,000 troops at times and jihadist-related violence has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, since 2009; in the northwest, it faces growing threats from criminal gangs, bandits, and violence associated with long-standing farmer-herder conflicts, as well as BH and ISIS-WA terrorists; bandits in the northwest are estimated to number in the low 10,000s and violence there has killed more than 10,000 people since the mid-2010s; the military also continues to protect the oil industry in the Niger Delta region against militants and criminal activity, although the levels of violence there have decreased in recent years; since 2021, additional troops and security forces have been deployed to eastern Nigeria to quell renewed agitation for a state of Biafra (Biafra seceded from Nigeria in the late 1960s, sparking a civil war that caused more than 1 million deaths)<br> <p>meanwhile, the Navy is focused on security in the Gulf of Guinea; since 2016, it has developed a maritime strategy, boosted naval training and its naval presence in the Gulf, increased participation in regional maritime security efforts, and acquired a considerable number of new naval platforms, including offshore and coastal patrol craft, fast attack boats, and air assets; its principal surface ships currently include a frigate and 4 corvettes or offshore patrol ships</p> the Nigerian military traces its origins to the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; in 1956, the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) and in 1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over control of the NMF from the British War Office; the Nigerian Armed Forces were established following independence in 1960 (2023)"
"text": "the Nigerian military is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and regarded as one of its most capable forces; the Army is organized into 8 divisions comprised of a diverse mix of more than 20 combat brigades, including airborne infantry, amphibious infantry, armor, artillery, light infantry, mechanized and motorized infantry, and special operations forces; there is also a presidential guard brigade; the Army typically organizes into battalion- and brigade-sized task forces for operations; the Air Force has a few squadrons of fighters, ground attack fighters, armed UAVs, and attack helicopter squadrons primarily for supporting the Army<br><br>the Army and Air Force are focused largely on internal security and face a number of challenges that have stretched their resources; the Army is deployed in all 36 of the country's states; in the northeast, it is conducting counterinsurgency/counterterrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa (ISIS-WA) terrorist groups, where it has deployed as many as 70,000 troops at times and jihadist-related violence has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, since 2009; in the northwest, it faces growing threats from criminal gangs, bandits, and violence associated with long-standing farmer-herder conflicts, as well as BH and ISIS-WA terrorists; bandits in the northwest are estimated to number in the low 10,000s and violence there has killed more than 10,000 people since the mid-2010s; the military also continues to protect the oil industry in the Niger Delta region against militants and criminal activity, although the levels of violence there have decreased in recent years; since 2021, additional troops and security forces have been deployed to eastern Nigeria to quell renewed agitation for a state of Biafra (Biafra seceded from Nigeria in the late 1960s, sparking a civil war that caused more than 1 million deaths)<br> <p>meanwhile, the Navy is focused on security in the Gulf of Guinea; since 2016, it has developed a maritime strategy, boosted naval training and its naval presence in the Gulf, increased participation in regional maritime security efforts, and acquired a considerable number of new naval platforms, including offshore and coastal patrol craft, fast attack boats, and air assets; its principal surface ships currently include a frigate and 4 corvettes or offshore patrol ships</p> the Nigerian military traces its origins to the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; in 1956, the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) and in 1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over control of the NMF from the British War Office; the Nigerian Armed Forces were established following independence in 1960 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Nigeria in 2022, down from six attacks in 2021; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\"</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

3
africa/od.json
View file

@ -1088,6 +1088,9 @@
"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory (men) and voluntary (men and women) military service; 12-24 months service (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in 2019, women made up less than 10% of the active military"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "in 2023, South Sudan sent approximately 750 troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of an East Africa Community military peacekeeping force"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the SSPDF is largely focused on internal security; the Ground Force has approximately 8 light infantry divisions plus a mechanized presidential guard division (aka the Tiger Division); the Air Force has small numbers of transport aircraft and combat helicopters <br><br>the SSPDF, formerly the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), was founded as a guerrilla movement against the Sudanese Government in 1983 and participated in the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005); the Juba Declaration that followed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 unified the SPLA and the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), the second-largest rebel militia remaining from the civil war, under the SPLA name; in 2017, the SPLA was renamed the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) and in September 2018 was renamed again as the SSPDF<br><br>the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has operated in the country since 2011 with the objectives of consolidating peace and security and helping establish conditions for the successful economic and political development of South Sudan; UNMISS had about 15,000 personnel deployed in the country as of 2022<br><br>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; as of 2022, UNISFA had approximately 2,500 military and police personnel (2023)"
}

19
africa/rw.json
View file

@ -1090,15 +1090,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "11,671 (2020 est.)"
"text": "11,893 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "10,614,408 (2020 est.)"
"text": "10,902,989 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "82 (2020 est.)"
"text": "81 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1106,7 +1109,7 @@
"text": "Rwanda was slow to liberalize the mobile sector; there was effective competition among three operators; the fixed broadband sector has suffered from limited fixed-line infrastructure and high prices; operators are rolling out national backbone networks which also allow them to connect to the international submarine cables on Africa&rsquo;s east coast; these cables gave the entire region greater internet bandwidth and ended the dependency on satellites; while the country also has a new cable link with Tanzania, and via Tanzania&rsquo;s national broadband backbone it has gained connectivity to the networks of several other countries in the region; the number of subscribers on LTE infrastructure has increased sharply, helped by national LTE coverage achieved in mid-2018; mobile remains the dominant platform for voice and data services; the regulator noted that the number of mobile subscribers increased 2.7% in 2021, year-on-year; there was a slight fall in the beginning of 2022 (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "the capital, Kigali, is connected to provincial centers by microwave radio relay, and recently by cellular telephone service; much of the network depends on wire and HF radiotelephone; fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone density has increased to nearly 82 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone density is 81 telephones per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 250; international connections employ microwave radio relay to neighboring countries and satellite communications to more distant countries; satellite earth stations - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean) in Kigali (includes telex and telefax service); international submarine fiber-optic cables on the African east coast has brought international bandwidth and lessened the&nbsp;dependency on satellites"
@ -1200,7 +1203,7 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Rwanda Defense Force (RDF; Ingabo z&rsquo;u Rwanda): Rwanda Army (Rwanda Land Force), Rwanda Air Force (Force Aerienne Rwandaise, FAR), Rwanda Reserve Force, Special Units (2022)"
"text": "Rwanda Defense Force (RDF; Ingabo z&rsquo;u Rwanda): Rwanda Army (Rwanda Land Force), Rwanda Air Force (Force Aerienne Rwandaise, FAR), Rwanda Reserve Force, Special Units (2023)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1226,13 +1229,13 @@
"text": "the RDF's inventory includes mostly Soviet-era and older Western--largely French and South African--equipment; in recent years, Russia has been the top supplier of arms to Rwanda (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18 years of age for men and women for voluntary military service; no conscription; Rwandan citizenship is required; enlistment is either as contract (5-years, renewable twice) or career (2021)"
"text": "18 years of age for men and women for voluntary military service; no conscription; Rwandan citizenship is required; enlistment is either as contract (5-years, renewable twice) or career (2023)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "2,450 (plus about 500 police) Central African Republic (approximately 1,700 for MINUSCA; an additional 750 troops sent separately under a bilateral agreement with CAR in August, 2021); up to 2,000 Mozambique (deployed mid-2021 under a bi-lateral agreement to assist with combating insurgency; includes both military and police forces); 2,600 (plus about 400 police) South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)"
"text": "2,450 (plus about 500 police) Central African Republic (approximately 1,700 for MINUSCA; an additional 750 troops sent separately under a bilateral agreement with CAR in August, 2021); up to 2,800 Mozambique (deployed mid-2021 under a bi-lateral agreement to assist with combating insurgency; includes both military and police forces); 2,600 (plus about 400 police) South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>the RDF is lightly equipped, but widely regarded as one of East Africa’s best trained, experienced, and most professional militaries; the Army is relatively large with 4 divisions that are mostly comprised of light infantry brigades; it also has separate artillery, presidential guard, and special operations brigades; the Air Force has a small inventory of combat helicopters and a handful of transport aircraft</p> the RDF’s principle responsibilities are ensuring territorial integrity and national sovereignty and preventing infiltrations of illegal armed groups from neighboring countries, particularly the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); since 2021, Rwanda has deployed troops to the border with the DRC to combat the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which it has accused the DRC of backing; the RDF has been accused by the DRC Government of making incursions into the DRC and providing material support to the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army) rebel group, which has been fighting with DRC troops and UN peacekeeping forces; the RDF also participates in UN and regional military operations; over 6,000 RDF personnel are deployed in the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and South Sudan  <br><br>the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were established following independence in 1962; after the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide, the victorious Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front's military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), became the country's military force; the RPA participated in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congolese Wars; the RPA was renamed the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) in 2003, by which time it had assumed a more national character with the inclusion of many former Hutu officers as well as newly recruited soldiers (2023)"
"text": "<p>the RDF is lightly equipped and widely regarded as one of East Africa’s best trained, experienced, and most professional militaries; the Army is relatively large with 4 divisions that are mostly comprised of light infantry brigades; it also has separate artillery, presidential guard, and special operations brigades; the Air Force has a small inventory of combat helicopters and a handful of transport aircraft</p> the RDF’s principle responsibilities are ensuring territorial integrity and national sovereignty and preventing infiltrations of illegal armed groups from neighboring countries, particularly the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); since 2021, Rwanda has deployed troops to the border with the DRC to combat the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which it has accused the DRC of backing; the RDF has been accused by the DRC Government of making incursions into the DRC and providing material support to the March 23 Movement (M23, aka Congolese Revolutionary Army) rebel group, which has been fighting with DRC troops and UN peacekeeping forces; the RDF also participates in UN and regional military operations; over 6,000 RDF personnel are deployed in the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and South Sudan  <br><br>the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were established following independence in 1962; after the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide, the victorious Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front's military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), became the country's military force; the RPA participated in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congolese Wars; the RPA was renamed the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) in 2003, by which time it had assumed a more national character with the inclusion of many former Hutu officers as well as newly recruited soldiers (2023)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

12
africa/se.json
View file

@ -540,7 +540,7 @@
},
"Legislative branch": {
"description": {
"text": "unicameral National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (35 seats in the 2020 -25 term; 26 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and up to 9 members elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
"text": "unicameral National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (35 seats in the 2020-25 term; 26 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and up to 9 members elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
},
"elections": {
"text": "last held on 22-24 Oct 2020 (next to be held&nbsp;October 2025); note - the election was originally scheduled for 2021 but was moved up a year and will be held alongside the presidential election in order to cut election costs"
@ -1016,18 +1016,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "18,882 (2020 est.)"
"text": "18,768 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "19 (2020 est.)"
"text": "18 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "183,498 (2020)"
"text": "184,161 (2021)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "187 (2020)"
"text": "173 (2021)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@
"text": "effective system; direct international calls to over 100 countries; radiotelephone communications between islands in the archipelago; 3 ISPs; use of Internet cafes' for access to Internet; 4G services and 5G pending (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line a little over 19 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is nearly 187 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line&nbsp; is 18 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is 173 telephones per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 248; landing points for the PEACE and the SEAS submarine cables&nbsp;providing connectivity to Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia; direct radiotelephone communications with adjacent island countries and African coastal countries; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean) (2019)"

7
africa/sf.json
View file

@ -851,10 +851,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "21.4% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "4.9% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1319,6 +1319,9 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the SANDF’s primary responsibilities include territorial and maritime defense, supporting the Police Service, protecting key infrastructure, and participating in international peacekeeping missions; the SANDF traditionally has been one of Africa’s most capable militaries, but in recent years its operational readiness and modernization programs have been hampered by funding shortfalls; it participates regularly in African and UN peacekeeping missions and is a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Standby Force; in 2021, it sent approximately 1,500 troops to Mozambique as part of a multinational SADC force to help combat an insurgency, and South African forces are a key component of the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; in recent years, the SANDF has been deployed internally to assist the Police Service with quelling unrest and to combat trafficking along the border<br><br>the Army in recent years has reorganized, and its combat forces are organized into 4 “modern” brigades, each designed for specific missions and responding to modern-day threats such as “asymmetric” warfare; the new brigades are separated into airborne, light infantry, mechanized, and motorized forces; the Navy operates a mixed force of warships, patrol craft, submarines, and support vessels; its principal combatants are 4 frigates and 3 attack submarines; the Navy also has a maritime rapid reaction squadron that includes naval infantry and combat divers; the Air Force has squadrons of multipurpose fighter, ground attack, and transport aircraft, as well as attack and transport helicopters<br><br>the SANDF was created in 1994 to replace the South African Defense Force (SADF); the SANDF was opened to all South Africans who met military requirements, while the SADF was a mostly white force (only whites were subject to conscription) with non-whites only allowed to join in a voluntary capacity; the SANDF also absorbed members of the guerrilla and militia forces of the various anti-apartheid opposition groups, including the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, as well as the security forces of the formerly independent Bantustan homelands (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of South Africa are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2022, one attack against a commercial vessel was reported, this was the first such incident reported in four years; in the reported incident the ship was boarded while underway"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

12
africa/sg.json
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Introduction": {
"Background": {
"text": "Senegal is one of the few countries in the world with evidence of continuous human life from the Paleolithic era to present. Between the 14th and 16th centuries, the Jolof Empire ruled most of Senegal. Starting in the 15th century, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain traded along the Senegalese coast. Senegal’s location on the western tip of Africa made it a favorable base for the European slave trade. European powers used the Senegalese island of Goree as a base to purchase slaves from the warring chiefdoms on the mainland, and at the height of the slave trade in Senegal, over one-third of the Senegalese population was enslaved. In 1815, France abolished slavery and began expanding inland. During the second half of the 19th century, France took possession of Senegal as a French colony. In 1959, the French colonies of Senegal and French Sudan were merged and granted independence in 1960 as the Mali Federation. The union broke up after only a few months. In 1982, Senegal joined with The Gambia to form the nominal confederation of Senegambia. The envisaged integration of the two countries was never implemented, and the union dissolved in 1989.<br><br>Since the 1980s, the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance - a separatist movement based in southern Senegal - has led a low-level insurgency. Several attempts at reaching a comprehensive peace agreement have failed. Since 2012, despite sporadic incidents of violence, an unofficial cease-fire has remained largely in effect. Senegal is one of the most stable democracies in Africa and has a long history of participating in international peacekeeping and regional mediation. The Socialist Party of Senegal ruled for 40 years until Abdoulaye WADE was elected president in 2000 and re-elected in 2007. WADE amended Senegal's constitution over a dozen times to increase executive power and weaken the opposition. In 2012, WADE’s decision to run for a third presidential term sparked public backlash that led to his defeat to current President Macky SALL. A 2016 constitutional referendum limited future presidents to two consecutive five-year terms. The change, however, does not apply to SALL's first term. In February 2019, SALL won his bid for reelection; his second term will end in 2024."
"text": "Senegal is one of the few countries in the world with evidence of continuous human life from the Paleolithic period to present. Between the 14th and 16th centuries, the Jolof Empire ruled most of Senegal. Starting in the 15th century, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain traded along the Senegalese coast. Senegal’s location on the western tip of Africa made it a favorable base for the European slave trade. European powers used the Senegalese island of Goree as a base to purchase slaves from the warring chiefdoms on the mainland, and at the height of the slave trade in Senegal, over one-third of the Senegalese population was enslaved. In 1815, France abolished slavery and began expanding inland. During the second half of the 19th century, France took possession of Senegal as a French colony. In 1959, the French colonies of Senegal and French Sudan were merged and granted independence in 1960 as the Mali Federation. The union broke up after only a few months. In 1982, Senegal joined with The Gambia to form the nominal confederation of Senegambia. The envisaged integration of the two countries was never implemented, and the union dissolved in 1989.<br><br>Since the 1980s, the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance - a separatist movement based in southern Senegal - has led a low-level insurgency. Several attempts at reaching a comprehensive peace agreement have failed. Since 2012, despite sporadic incidents of violence, an unofficial cease-fire has remained largely in effect. Senegal is one of the most stable democracies in Africa and has a long history of participating in international peacekeeping and regional mediation. The Socialist Party of Senegal ruled for 40 years until Abdoulaye WADE was elected president in 2000 and re-elected in 2007. WADE amended Senegal's constitution over a dozen times to increase executive power and weaken the opposition. In 2012, WADE’s decision to run for a third presidential term sparked public backlash that led to his defeat to current President Macky SALL. A 2016 constitutional referendum limited future presidents to two consecutive five-year terms. The change, however, does not apply to SALL's first term. In February 2019, SALL won his bid for reelection; his second term will end in 2024."
}
},
"Geography": {
@ -1118,18 +1118,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "228,774 (2020 est.)"
"text": "261,440 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
"text": "2 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "19,078,948 (2020 est.)"
"text": "19,859,981 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "114 (2020 est.)"
"text": "118 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@
"text": "Senegal&rsquo;s telecom market continues to show steady growth in all sectors; this has been supported by the particular demands made on consumers during the pandemic, which resulted in a particularly strong increase in the number of subscribers; the mobile subscriber base increased 6.7% in 2020, year-on-year, and by 4.1% in 2021, while the number of fixed broadband subscribers increased 17.5% year-on-year in 2021; mobile internet platforms account for the vast majority of all internet accesses; quality of service issues continue to plague the market, with the regulator periodically issuing fines to the market players (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "generally reliable urban system with a fiber-optic network; about two-thirds of all fixed-line connections are in Dakar; mobile-cellular service is steadily displacing fixed-line service, even in urban areas; fixed-line roughly 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular 114 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line is 2 per 100 and mobile-cellular 118 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 221; landing points for the ACE, Atlantis-2, MainOne and SAT-3/WASC submarine cables providing connectivity from South Africa, numerous western African countries, Europe and South America;&nbsp;satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"

10
africa/sh.json
View file

@ -712,18 +712,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "3,000 (2018 est.)"
"text": "4,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "50 (2018 est.)"
"text": "74 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "4,000 (2018 est.)"
"text": "4,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "67 (2019 est.)"
"text": "74 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -731,7 +731,7 @@
"text": "capability to&nbsp;communicate worldwide; ADSL- broadband service; LTE coverage of 95% of population, includes voice calls, text messages, mobile data as well as inbound and outbound roaming; Wi-Fi hotspots in Jamestown, 1 ISP, many services are not offered locally but made available for visitors; some sun outages due to the reliance of international telephone and Internet communication relying on single satellite link (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "automatic digital network; fixed-line roughly 50 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 67 per 100 persons (2019)"
"text": "automatic digital network; fixed-line is 74 per 100 and mobile-cellular is 74 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code (Saint Helena) - 290, (Ascension Island) - 247; landing point for the SaEx1 submarine cable providing connectivity to South Africa, Brazil, Virginia Beach (US) and islands in Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan de Cunha; international direct dialing; satellite voice and data communications; satellite earth stations - 5 (Ascension Island - 4, Saint Helena - 1) (2019)"

14
africa/sl.json
View file

@ -1080,15 +1080,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "189 (2020 est.)"
"text": "269 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "0 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "6,884,201 (2020 est.)"
"text": "8,227,093 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "86 (2020 est.)"
"text": "98 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1096,7 +1099,7 @@
"text": "the telecom sector has only gradually recovered from the destruction caused during the war years, and only since 2019 has there been an effective terrestrial fiber backbone infrastructure, while the cable link to neighboring Guinea was not completed until February 2020; there is considerable available capacity from the ACE submarine cable and the national fiber network, but this is used inefficiently and so the price of internet connectivity remains one of the highest in the region; the theft of equipment and cabling, compounded by neglect, mismanagement, and under investment, means that telcos continue to operate in difficult conditions; the telecom regulator has made efforts to improve the market, including the liberalization of the international gateway and regular checks on QoS; the regulator reduced the price floor for mobile voice calls in early 2020, though consumers objected to the MNOs withdrawing a number of cheap packages as a response; the mobile sector has been the main driver of overall telecom revenue (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular just over 86 per 100 (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line less than 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular just over 98 per 100 (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 232; landing point for the ACE submarine cable linking to South Africa, over 20 western African countries and Europe; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"
@ -1217,6 +1220,9 @@
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the RSLAF’s principle responsibilities are securing the borders and the country’s territorial waters, supporting civil authorities during emergencies and reconstruction efforts, and participating in peacekeeping missions; it is small, lightly armed, and has a limited budget; since being reduced in size and restructured with British assistance after the end of the civil war in 2002, it has received assistance from several foreign militaries, including those of Canada, China, France, the UK, and the US; the RSLAF has participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Sudan; the Land Forces are by far the largest service and have 4 small light infantry brigades; the Maritime Forces have a few small coastal and in-shore patrol boats, while the Air Wing has a handful of serviceable combat helicopters<br><br>the RSLAF’s origins lie in the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the RWAFF fought in both World Wars (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of Sierra Leone in 2022 where the ship was hijacked, this was the first incident reported in two years; this incident was one of only two hijackings Worldwide in 2022; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

2
africa/so.json
View file

@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@
"text": "the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces are actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); al-Shabaab controls large parts of southern and central Somalia <br><br>of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective are assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2022, the Danab Brigade numbered about 1,500 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have up to 5,000 trained troops; the Somali Government has sent thousands of troops to Eritrea and Uganda for training and in 2023 announced plans to send additional personnel to Egypt and Ethiopia for training<br><br>the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US, UK, and Turkey maintain separate military training missions in Somalia (the US has also supported the SNA with air strikes); the UAE maintains a military presence in Somaliland (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) received one incident of piracy and armed robbery in 2021 for the Horn of Africa; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warns that Somalia pirates continue to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warns that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2022; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces</p>"
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) reported no piracy attacks for the Horn of Africa in 2022; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warned that Somali pirates continued to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2024; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces; China has established a base in Djibouti to support its deployed naval units in the Horn of Africa; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\"</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

2
africa/su.json
View file

@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "796,831 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 134,367 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,478 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 70,935 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 24,369 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
"text": "134,367 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,478 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 70,935 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 24,369 (Central African Republic) (2022); 802,748 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "3.71 million (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2022)"

4
africa/to.json
View file

@ -1280,10 +1280,10 @@
"text": "730 (plus about 300 police) Mali (MINUSMA) (May 2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "since its creation in 1963, the Togolese military has had a history of interfering in the country’s politics with assassinations, coups, influence, and a large military crackdown in 2005 that killed hundreds; over the past decade, however, it has made some efforts to reform and professionalize, as well as increase its role in UN peacekeeping activities; Togo maintains a regional peacekeeping training center for military and police in Lome; the FAT participates in multinational exercises and has received training from foreign partners, including France and the US<br><br>the FAT’s current focuses are primarily terrorism and maritime security; in recent years, it has increased operations in the northern border region of the country to boost border security and prevent terrorist infiltrations from Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida-affiliated militant groups based in Mali that also operates in neighboring Burkina Faso; in 2022, the Togolese Government declared a state of emergency in the north due to the threat from JNIM following an attack on a Togolese military post that killed several soldiers; the Navy and Air Force have increased focus on combating piracy and smuggling in the Gulf of Guinea<br><br>the Army has a mixed force of small, lightly-armed combined arms, infantry, and commando regiments, as well as a rapid reaction force; the Gendarmerie includes mobile, regionally-based, and maritime units; the Navy operates a few patrol boats while the Air Force has a small inventory of training, light attack- capable, and transport aircraft, as well as combat helicopters (2023)"
"text": "since its creation in 1963, the Togolese military has had a history of interfering in the country’s politics with assassinations, coups, influence, and a large military crackdown in 2005 that killed hundreds; over the past decade, however, it has made some efforts to reform and professionalize, as well as increase its role in UN peacekeeping activities; Togo maintains a regional peacekeeping training center for military and police in Lome; the FAT participates in multinational exercises and has received training from foreign partners, including France and the US<br><br>the FAT’s current focuses are primarily terrorism and maritime security; in recent years, it has increased operations in the northern border region of the country to boost border security and prevent terrorist infiltrations from Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida-affiliated militant groups based in Mali that also operates in neighboring Burkina Faso; in 2022, the Togolese Government declared a state of emergency in the north due to the threat from JNIM following an attack on a Togolese military post that killed several soldiers; the Navy and Air Force have increased focus on combating piracy and smuggling in the Gulf of Guinea<br><br>the Army has a mixed force of small, lightly-armed combined arms, infantry, and commando regiments, as well as a rapid reaction force; the Gendarmerie includes mobile, regionally-based, and maritime units; the Navy operates a few patrol boats while the Air Force has a small inventory of training, light attack-capable, and transport aircraft, as well as combat helicopters and a few armed UAVs acquired from Turkey in 2022 (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
"text": "for a second year the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in 2022 in the territorial and offshore waters of Togo; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Terrorism": {

12
africa/tp.json
View file

@ -1047,18 +1047,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,790 (2020 est.)"
"text": "2,619 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "1 (2020 est.)"
"text": "1 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "174,203 (2020 est.)"
"text": "189,239 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "79 (2020 est.)"
"text": "85 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@
"text": "local telephone network of adequate quality with most lines connected to digital switches; mobile cellular superior choice to landland; dial-up quality low; broadband expensive (2018)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line roughly 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 79 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line is 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is 85 telephones per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 239; landing points for the Ultramar GE and ACE submarine cables&nbsp;from South Africa&nbsp;to over 20&nbsp;West African countries and Europe; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"
@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@
"text": "the FASTP is one of the smallest militaries in Africa and consists of only a few companies of ground troops and some small patrol boats (2022)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported no incidents in the territorial and offshore waters of Sao Tome and Principe in 2022; the offshore waters of the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

4
africa/ts.json
View file

@ -799,10 +799,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "21.9% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "3.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

6
africa/tz.json
View file

@ -864,10 +864,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "33.1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "4.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@
"text": "the TDPF&rsquo;s primary concerns are maritime piracy and smuggling, border security, terrorism, animal poaching, and spillover from instability in neighboring countries, particularly Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); it participates in multinational training exercises, regional peacekeeping deployments, and has ties with a variety of foreign militaries, including those of China and the US; it has contributed troops to the UN&rsquo;s Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC and to the Southern African Development Community intervention force in Mozambique; since 2020, the TPDF has deployed additional troops to its border with Mozambique following several cross-border attacks by fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham operating in Mozambique; the TPDF&rsquo;s principal ground forces are 5 infantry brigades and an armored brigade; the Naval Forces operate patrol and fast attack boats, while the Air Force inventory includes small numbers of combat aircraft and helicopters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships</p>"
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported no piracy attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Tanzania in 2022; although the opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents; in the past, vessels have also been targeted off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique, as well as in the Indian ocean, and off the west and south coasts of India and west Maldives; generally, Somali pirates tend to be well armed with automatic weapons, RPGs and sometimes use skiffs launched from mother vessels, which may be hijacked fishing vessels or dhows; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-003 - Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab al Mandeb Strait, Red Sea, and Somali Basin-Threats to Commercial Vessels) effective 23 February 2023, which states in part that \"Regional conflict, military activity, and political tensions pose threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas\" that shipping in territorial and offshore waters in the Indian Ocean remain at risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

8
africa/ug.json
View file

@ -836,10 +836,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "44.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@
"text": "approximately 50,000 troops, including about 1,000-1,500 air and marine personnel; approximately 20-30,000 personnel in the Local Defense Units (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the UPDF's inventory is mostly older Russian/Soviet-era equipment with a limited mix of more modern Russian- and Western-origin arms; in recent years, Russia has been the leading supplier of arms to the UPDF (2022)"
"text": "the UPDF's inventory is mostly older Russian/Soviet-era equipment with a limited mix of more modern Russian- and Western-origin arms; in recent years, Russia has been the leading supplier of arms to the UPDF (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military duty for men and women; 18-30 for those with degrees/diplomas in specialized fields such as medicine, engineering, chemistry, and education, or possess qualifications in some vocational skills; 9-year service obligation (2022)"
@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> in December 2022, Uganda sent approximately 1,000 troops to the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as part of a newly formed East Africa Community Regional Force (EACRF) to assist the DRC military against the rebel group M23"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>the UPDF’s missions include defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda, assisting the civilian authorities in emergencies and natural disasters, and participating in socio-economic development projects; it supports the police in maintaining internal security and participates in African and UN peacekeeping missions; it is a key contributor to the East Africa Standby Force; the UPDF also has considerable political influence; it is constitutionally granted seats in parliament and is widely viewed as a key constituency for MUSEVENI; it has been used by MUSEVENI and his political party to break up rallies, raid opposition offices, and surveil rival candidates <br><br>the UPDF is considered to be a well-equipped force with cosiderable operational experience; from 2012-2017, it led regional efforts to pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a small, violent group of Ugandan origin that conducted widespread attacks against civilians in much of Central Africa; Uganda intervened in the South Sudan civil war in 2013-2016, and UPDF forces have clashed with South Sudanese forces along the border as recently as 2020; it is also conducting operations along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against a DRC-based (and formerly based in western Uganda) Ugandan rebel group, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), which has been designated by the US as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the DRC (see Appendix T); in December 2022, Uganda sent about 1,000 UPDF troops to the DRC as part of a regional force to assist the DRC Government in combating the M23 rebel group; in addition, elements of the UPDF are deployed in the northeast region of Karamoja against cattle rustlers and criminal gangs<br><br>the Land Force has 5 light infantry divisions, including one trained for mountain warfare; it also has independent armored, artillery, and motorized infantry brigades, as well as a marine force for patrolling Uganda’s lakes and rivers; the special forces command has armor, artillery, commandos, motorized infantry, and presidential guard forces; the Air Force has small numbers of largely Russian-made combat aircraft and helicopters</p> the military traces its history back to the formation of the Uganda Rifles in 1895 under the British colonial government; the Uganda Rifles were merged with the Central Africa Regiment and the East Africa Rifles to form the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in 1902, which participated in both world wars, as well as the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya (1952-1960); in 1962, the Ugandan battalion of the KAR was transformed into the country's first military force, the Uganda Rifles, which was subsequently renamed the Uganda Army; the UPDF was established in 1995 from the former rebel National Resistance Army following the enactment of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda (2023)"
"text": "<p>the UPDF’s missions include defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda, assisting the civilian authorities in emergencies and natural disasters, and participating in socio-economic development projects; it supports the police in maintaining internal security and participates in African and UN peacekeeping missions; it is a key contributor to the East Africa Standby Force; the UPDF also has considerable political influence; it is constitutionally granted seats in parliament and is widely viewed as a key constituency for MUSEVENI; it has been used by MUSEVENI and his political party to break up rallies, raid opposition offices, and surveil rival candidates <br><br>the UPDF is considered to be a well-equipped force with considerable operational experience; from 2012-2017, it led regional efforts to pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a small, violent group of Ugandan origin that conducted widespread attacks against civilians in much of Central Africa; Uganda intervened in the South Sudan civil war in 2013-2016, and UPDF forces have clashed with South Sudanese forces along the border as recently as 2020; it is also conducting operations along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) against a DRC-based (and formerly based in western Uganda) Ugandan rebel group, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), which has been designated by the US as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the DRC (see Appendix T); in December 2022, Uganda sent about 1,000 UPDF troops to the DRC as part of a regional force to assist the DRC Government in combating the M23 rebel group; in addition, elements of the UPDF are deployed in the northeast region of Karamoja against cattle rustlers and criminal gangs<br><br>the Land Force has 5 light infantry divisions, including one trained for mountain warfare; it also has independent armored, artillery, and motorized infantry brigades, as well as a marine force for patrolling Uganda’s lakes and rivers; the special forces command has armor, artillery, commandos, motorized infantry, and presidential guard forces; the Air Force has small numbers of largely Russian-made combat aircraft and helicopters</p> the military traces its history back to the formation of the Uganda Rifles in 1895 under the British colonial government; the Uganda Rifles were merged with the Central Africa Regiment and the East Africa Rifles to form the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in 1902, which participated in both world wars, as well as the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya (1952-1960); in 1962, the Ugandan battalion of the KAR was transformed into the country's first military force, the Uganda Rifles, which was subsequently renamed the Uganda Army; the UPDF was established in 1995 from the former rebel National Resistance Army following the enactment of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda (2023)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

22
africa/uv.json
View file

@ -296,7 +296,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -454,7 +454,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -1221,8 +1221,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso, FABF), National Gendarmerie; Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP) (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Justice; Gendarmerie troops are typically integrated with Army forces in anti-terrorism operations; specialized counterterrorism units include the Army's special forces, the Special Legion of the National Gendarmerie, and the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of National Police<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the VDP is a civilian defense force established in 2019 to act as auxiliaries to the Army in the fight against militants; the volunteers receive two weeks of training and typically assist with carrying out surveillance, information-gathering, and escort duties<br>"
"text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso ((FABF; aka National Armed Forces (FAN), aka Defense and Security Forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité or FDS)): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso), National Gendarmerie, National Fire Brigade (Brigade Nationale de Sapeurs-Pompiers or BNSP); Homeland Defense Volunteers (Forcés de Volontaires de Défense pour la Patrie or VDP); Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité): National Police (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security; Gendarmerie troops are typically integrated with Army forces in anti-terrorism operations; specialized counterterrorism units include the Army's special forces, the Special Legion of the National Gendarmerie, and the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of National Police<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the VDP is a lightly-armed civilian defense force established in 2019 to act as auxiliaries to the Army in the fight against militants; the volunteers receive two weeks of training and typically assist with carrying out surveillance, information-gathering, and escort duties, as well as local defense, and were to be based in each of the country's more than 300 municipalities; in 2022, the military government created a \"Patriotic Watch and Defense Brigade\" (La Brigade de Veille et de Défense Patriotique or BVDP) under the FABF to coordinate the VDP recruits"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1242,11 +1242,11 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "approximately 13,000 personnel (8,000 Army; 500 Air Force; 4,500 National Gendarmerie) (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>in 2022, the Burkina Faso Government announced a special recruitment for 3,000 additional soldiers to assist with its fight against terrorist groups operating in the country; it also put out a recruitment call for up to 50,000 VDF volunteers (the VDF's original recruited strength was 15,000)<br><strong><br><br></strong>"
"text": "approximately 14,000 personnel (8,500 Army; 500 Air Force; 5,000 National Gendarmerie) (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>in 2022, the Burkina Faso Government announced a special recruitment for up to 6,000 additional soldiers to assist with its fight against terrorist groups operating in the country; it also put out a recruitment call for up to 50,000 VDF volunteers (the VDF's original recruited strength was 15,000)<br><strong><br><br></strong>"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FABF has a mix of mostly older or secondhand equipment from a mix of suppliers, including France, South Africa, the UK, and the US (2022)"
"text": "the FABF has a mix of mostly older or secondhand equipment from a mix of suppliers, including France, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, and the US (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; women may serve in supporting roles (2022)"
@ -1276,6 +1276,14 @@
"IDPs": {
"text": "<p>1,761,915 (2022)</p>"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List &mdash; Burkina Faso does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; the government has established child protection units throughout the country, identifying potential victims, and continued working with teachers to prevent forced child begging; officials collaborated with international organizations and foreign donors to implement a humanitarian response plan to assist vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas, including potential trafficking victims; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous year to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; substantial personnel turnover, related to the January 2022 coup d&rsquo;&eacute;tat and formation of a transition government, hindered Burkina Faso&rsquo;s ability to maintain consistent anti-trafficking efforts; officials did not report any prosecutions or convictions for the third consecutive year nor effectively screen vulnerable populations; the national anti-trafficking committee did not meet or coordinate anti-trafficking activities; the government did not adequately address complicity in trafficking crimes, including allegations of local officials exploiting internally displaced persons (IDPs) in sex trafficking; therefore, Burkina Faso remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year (2022)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Burkina Faso, and traffickers exploit victims from Burkina Faso abroad; traffickers fraudulently recruit Burkinabe children under the pretext of educational opportunities and exploit them as farm hands, laborers in artisanal mines, street vendors, and domestic servants; some parents knowingly allow their children to be exploited in domestic servitude to supplement family income; girls are exploited in sex trafficking in Ouagadougou and mining towns; some Quranic teachers force students to beg, sometimes with their parents&rsquo; knowledge; traffickers transport Burkinabe children&mdash;including homeless children&mdash;to Cote d&rsquo;Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Niger for forced labor in artisanal mining, forced begging, cocoa production, and sex trafficking; traffickers recruit women with fraudulent employment offers to work in Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and&mdash;to a lesser extent&mdash;Europe then exploit them in sex trafficking or domestic servitude; more than 1.4 million IDPs are vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking; violent extremist groups exploit women and children in forced labor and sex trafficking, recruit and use child soldiers, and reportedly coerce victims to carry out attacks or act as accomplices; traffickers exploit children from neighboring countries, including Cote d&rsquo;Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, in forced labor and sex trafficking; women from other West African countries are falsely recruited for employment in Burkina Faso and then exploited in forced labor in restaurants or domestic service; Nigerian women and girls are recruited for work in shops and salons and instead exploited in sex trafficking in mining regions; Cubans, including medical professionals, working in Burkina Faso may have been forced to work by the Cuban government; Burkina Faso is a transit country for traffickers moving children from Mali to Cote d&rsquo;Ivoire and women and girls from Cote d&rsquo;Ivoire to Saudi Arabia, as well as Ghanaian migrants traveling to Libya and Italy, some of whom are trafficking victims (2022)"
}
}
}
}

10
africa/wa.json
View file

@ -1104,18 +1104,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "140,370 (2020 est.)"
"text": "91,869 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "6 (2020 est.)"
"text": "4 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,898,125 (2020 est.)"
"text": "2,915,307 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "114 (2020 est.)"
"text": "115 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@
"text": "the government&rsquo;s Broadband Policy aims to provide 95% population coverage by 2024; mobile network coverage has increased sharply in recent years; by 2021, 3G infrastructure provided 89% population coverage while LTE infrastructure provided 79% coverage (compared to only 40% a year earlier); despite the relatively advanced nature of the market, progress towards 5G has been slow, partly due to unsubstantiated public concerns over health implications of the technology which caused the government to order an environmental assessment of 5G in mid-2020; the government has requested the regulator to speed up its 5G development strategy; Namibia&rsquo;s internet and broadband sector is reasonably competitive, its development was for many years held back by high prices for international bandwidth caused by the lack of a direct connection to international submarine cables; this market situation improved after operators invested in diversifying terrestrial access routes to adjacent countries; by the end of 2022 Namibia is expected to be connected by a 1,050km branch line of cable running between Portugal and South Africa (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscribership is less than 6 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 102 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line subscribership is 4 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 115 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 264;&nbsp;landing points for the ACE and WACS&nbsp;fiber-optic submarine cable linking southern and western African countries to Europe; satellite earth stations - 4 Intelsat (2019)"

14
africa/wz.json
View file

@ -461,13 +461,13 @@
},
"Total water withdrawal": {
"municipal": {
"text": "41.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "40 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"industrial": {
"text": "20.7 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "20 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"agricultural": {
"text": "1.006 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "1.01 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Total renewable water resources": {
@ -1186,6 +1186,14 @@
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>in 2006, Swati king advocated resorting to ICJ to claim parts of Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal from South Africa</p>"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List &mdash; Eswatini does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials convicted more traffickers and identified more victims; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous year to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; the lack of government coordination and leadership by the Inter Agency Task Force and Prevention of People Trafficking and the People Smuggling Secretariat, dedicated funding, and training for front-line officers continued to hamper anti-trafficking efforts; serious allegations of trafficking and victim abuse against senior government officials have remained pending for multiple years; the government failed to refer all victims to services, and the first shelter for victims refurbished in collaboration with foreign donor support remained inoperative; therefore, Eswatini was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List (2022)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Eswatini, and traffickers exploit victims from Eswatini abroad; traffickers target vulnerable communities, particularly those with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates; Swati girls, particularly orphans, are exploited in sex trafficking and domestic servitude, primarily in Eswatini and South Africa; Swati boys and foreign children are forced into labor in agriculture, cattle herding, and market vending within Eswatini; some Mozambican boys who migrate to Eswatini for work are exploited by traffickers in forced labor; Cuban nationals on medical missions in Eswatini may have been forced to work by the Cuban government; traffickers use Eswatini as a transit country to move foreign victims, primarily Mozambicans, to South Africa for forced labor; some Mozambican women reportedly are forced into commercial sex in Eswatini or transported to South Africa; some Swatis, including orphaned girls and girls from poor families who voluntarily migrate in search of work&mdash;particularly in South Africa&mdash;are exploited in sex trafficking; Swati men recruited in border communities are exploited in forced labor in South Africa&rsquo;s timber industry (2022)"
}
}
}
}

4
australia-oceania/as.json
View file

@ -827,10 +827,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "9.3% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "3.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

8
australia-oceania/cq.json
View file

@ -728,10 +728,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "20,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "20,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "35 (2020 est.)"
"text": "40 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
@ -739,7 +739,7 @@
"text": "20,474 (2004 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "36 (2004)"
"text": "28 (2004)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -747,7 +747,7 @@
"text": "digital fiber-optic cables and satellites connect the islands to worldwide networks; demand for broadband growing given that mobile services are the source for Internet across region; future launch of 5G (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "wide variety of services available including dial-up and broadband Internet, mobile cellular, international private lines, payphones, phone cards, voicemail, and automatic call distribution systems; fixed-line teledensity roughly 35 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is 40 per 100 persons; mobile cellular subscriptions are 28 per 100 (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-670; landing points for the Atisa and Mariana-Guam submarine cables linking Mariana islands to Guam; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean) (2019)"

6
australia-oceania/fj.json
View file

@ -446,13 +446,13 @@
},
"Total water withdrawal": {
"municipal": {
"text": "25.3 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "30 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"industrial": {
"text": "9.6 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "9.6 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"agricultural": {
"text": "50 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "50 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Total renewable water resources": {

12
australia-oceania/fm.json
View file

@ -923,26 +923,26 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "7,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "7,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "6 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "22,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "22,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "19 (2020 est.)"
"text": "19 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "adequate system, the demand for mobile broadband is increasing due to mobile services being the primary and most wide-spread source for Internet access across the region (2020)"
"text": "<p>Australia, Japan, and the United States are committed to working in partnership with the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, and Nauru to improve internet connectivity to these three Pacific nations by providing funding to build a new undersea cable; the proposed undersea cable will provide faster, higher quality, and more reliable and secure communications to approximately 100,000 people across three countries; this will support increased economic growth, drive development opportunities, and help to improve living standards as the region recovers from the severe impacts of COVID-19; the new cable will connect Kosrae (FSM), Nauru, and Tarawa (Kiribati) with the existing HANTRU-1 cable at Pohnpei (FSM), providing internet connectivity through a submarine cable for the first time</p> (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "islands interconnected by shortwave radiotelephone, satellite (Intelsat) ground stations, and some coaxial and fiber-optic cable; mobile-cellular service available on the major islands; fixed line teledensity roughly 6 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 19 per 100 (2020)"
"text": "fixed line teledensity roughly 6 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 19 per 100 (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 691; landing points for the Chuukk-Pohnpei Cable and HANTRU-1 submarine cable system linking the Federated States of Micronesia and the US;&nbsp;satellite earth stations - 5 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean) (2019)"

10
australia-oceania/kr.json
View file

@ -1001,18 +1001,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "33 (2020 est.)"
"text": "10 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "(2020 est.) less than 1"
"text": "(2021 est.) less than 1"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "54,661 (2020 est.)"
"text": "54,527 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "46 (2020 est.)"
"text": "42 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@
"text": "generally good national and international service; wireline service available on Tarawa and Kiritimati (Christmas Island); connections to outer islands by HF/VHF radiotelephone; recently formed (mobile network operator) MNO is implementing the first phase of improvements with 3G and 4G upgrades on some islands; islands are connected to each other and the rest of the world via satellite; launch of Kacific-1 in December 2019 will improve telecommunication for Kiribati (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular approximately 46 per 100 subscriptions (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line less than 1 per 100 and mobile-cellular approximately 42 per 100 subscriptions (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 686; landing point for the Southern Cross NEXT submarine cable system from Australia, 7 Pacific Ocean island countries to the US; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean) (2019)"

10
australia-oceania/nc.json
View file

@ -888,18 +888,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "46,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "46,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "16 (2020 est.)"
"text": "16 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "260,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "260,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "91 (2020 est.)"
"text": "90 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -907,7 +907,7 @@
"text": "New Caledonia&rsquo;s telecom sector provides fixed and mobile voice services, mobile internet, fixed broadband access, and wholesale services for other ISPs; the country is well serviced by extensive 3G and LTE networks, and is considered to have one of the highest smartphone adoption rates in the Pacific region; by 2025, smart phone penetration is expected to reach 71%; while DSL is still the dominant fixed broadband technology, and a nationwide FttP network; the South Pacific region has become a hub for submarine cable system developments in recent years, with further networks scheduled to come online later in 2021 and into 2022; these new cables are expected to increase competition in the region with regards to international capacity; in 2020, the government owned telco commissioned Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) to build the Gondwana-2 cable system to provide additional network capacity and complement the Gondwana-1 cable (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line nearly 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership 91 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line is 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership 90 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 687; landing points for the Gondwana-1 and Picot-1 providing connectivity via submarine cables&nbsp;around New&nbsp;Caledonia and&nbsp;to Australia; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean) (2019)"

6
australia-oceania/ne.json
View file

@ -741,10 +741,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1,000 (2018 est.)"
"text": "1,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "62 (2018 est.)"
"text": "52 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -752,7 +752,7 @@
"text": "in 2020, the Manatua One Polynesia Fiber Cable provided Niue with high speed Internet access for the first time replacing a 4 megabit satellite link with gigabit fiber connectivity; the government set out a strategy to upgrade to a new infrastructure that would be robust enough to operate reliably in a challenging climate: 40 40&deg;C heat, 40% humidity, salty air, frequent power outages during storms, and no air conditioning (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "single-line (fixed line) telephone system connects all villages on island; fixed teledensity at nearly 62 per 100 (2018)"
"text": "single-line (fixed line) telephone system connects all villages on island; fixed teledensity at nearly 52 per 100 (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 683; landing point for the Manatua submarine cable linking Niue to several South Pacific Ocean Islands; expansion of satellite services (2019)"

2
australia-oceania/nf.json
View file

@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
"Communications": {
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "the current infrastructure consists of fixed line telephone utilizing copper twisted pair cable and optic fiber, two Satellite Earth Station, GSM Mobile switch with five remote base stations and 2 micro cells, central public exchange which switches international as well as national calls, ADSL Broadband internet connection &nbsp;(Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line), and an ISP (Internet Service Provider) (2020)"
"text": "the current infrastructure consists of fixed line telephone utilizing copper twisted pair cable and optic fiber, two Satellite Earth Station, GSM Mobile switch with five remote base stations and 2 micro cells, central public exchange which switches international as well as national calls, ADSL Broadband internet connection (Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line), and an ISP (Internet Service Provider); 3G/4G telecommunications network went live on Tuesday 12 January, 2021 (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "free local calls"

10
australia-oceania/nr.json
View file

@ -933,18 +933,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1,900 (2009 est.)"
"text": "(2018 est.) 0"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "19 (2009 est.)"
"text": "(2018 est.) 0"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "10,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "10,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "92 (2020 est.)"
"text": "80 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -952,7 +952,7 @@
"text": "relies on satellite as the primary Internet service provider and mobile operator; internet connectivity on the island is very limited and unstable due to the vulnerability of the network infrastructure to bad weather and limited network coverage, with several blind spots (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular subscribership approximately 92 per 100 (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line 0 per 100 and mobile-cellular subscribership approximately 80 per 100 (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 674; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean)"

16
australia-oceania/nz.json
View file

@ -801,10 +801,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "13.4% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "4.8% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1073,26 +1073,26 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "858,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "651,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "18 (2020 est.)"
"text": "13 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "6.148 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "5.846 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "127 (2020 est.)"
"text": "114 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "the principal growth areas in in New Zealand&rsquo;s telecom market have been in mobile broadband and fiber; the UFB1 rollout was completed in November 2019 and the UFB2 rollout is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2022; Chorus noted that as of the beginning of 2022, 1Gb/s plans accounted for about 23% of all fiber connections, while 43% of business customers adopted a gigabit service; New Zealand&rsquo;s mobile market continues to undergo significant developments; there have been considerable gains made in LTE services, with effective competition between Spark, Vodafone NZ, and 2degrees; the widening coverage of LTE networks has been supported by the Rural Broadband Initiative rollout, which added a significant number of mobile sites to new or underserved areas; as the initiative is winding down, this has enabled the participating telcos to invest in NB-IoT and other platforms; Vodafone NZ expects to extend its NB-IoT footprint to cover at least 60% of the country by 2024; the market is undergoing additional consolidation, with approval of the merger between 2degrees and Orcon Group having been granted by regulators in May 2022; this will create the country&rsquo;s third-largest integrated telco, offering fixed and mobile services in competition with Spark and Vodafone NZ. The merger proposal came fast of the heels of Vocus Group and its local subsidiary Orcon having acquired 2degrees from Trilogy International in December 2021; this deal created a new company, Voyage Digital. (2020)"
"text": "<p>the growth areas in in New Zealand’s telecom market have been in mobile broadband and fiber; New Zealand’s mobile market continues to undergo significant developments; the coverage of LTE networks has been supported by the Rural Broadband Initiative rollout, which added a significant number of mobile sites to new or underserved areas; the market is undergoing additional consolidation; offering fixed and mobile services</p> (2023)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line roughly 18 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership 127 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line roughly 13 per 100 and mobile-cellular telephone subscribership 114 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 64; landing points for the Southern Cross NEXT, Aqualink, Nelson-Levin, SCCN and Hawaiki submarine cable system providing links to Australia, Fiji, American Samoa, Kiribati, Samo, Tokelau, US and around New Zealand; satellite earth stations - 8 (1 Inmarsat - Pacific Ocean, 7 other) (2019)"

12
australia-oceania/ps.json
View file

@ -882,26 +882,26 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "8,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "8,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "44 (2020 est.)"
"text": "44 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "24,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "24,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "133 (2020 est.)"
"text": "130 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "well-developed mobile sector, recently boosted by satellite network capacity upgrades; 3G services available with satellite; lack of telecom regulations; newest and most powerful commercial satellite, Kacific-1 satellite, launched in 2019 to improve telecommunications in the Asia Pacific region (2020)"
"text": "Palau telecommunications is a small, formerly unregulated sector undertaking significant growth with the improvement and cost reduction in technology; mobile services have taken over the share of the market from landlines, with both 2-3G cell services throughout the islands; sim cards are easily available and offer 3G and data options; there are pre-paid and post-paid options for both voice and data; there are three data options for using a wireless hotspot network throughout Palau; connection from hotel and restaurant premises is available, enabling users to connect via WiFi throughout the main Islands of Palau (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line nearly 44 per 100 and mobile-cellular services roughly 133 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line nearly 44 per 100 and mobile-cellular services roughly 130 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 680; landing point for the SEA-US submarine cable linking Palau, Philippines, Micronesia, Indonesia, Hawaii (US), Guam (US) and&nbsp;California (US); satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean) (2019)"

10
australia-oceania/rm.json
View file

@ -893,18 +893,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,361 (2018 est.)"
"text": "2,361 (2014 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "4 (2018 est.)"
"text": "5 (2014 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "16,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "16,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "27 (2020 est.)"
"text": "38 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -912,7 +912,7 @@
"text": "the National Telecommunications Act, through Bill No. 66, ushered in a new era in telecommunications in the Marshall Islands; this will enable an open, competitive market for telecommunications that is regulated by a Telecommunications Commissioner; telecom officials announced that they would be able to offer satellite internet services beginning in mid-2023; the World Bank has been promoting telecommunications reform here for a decade and has a multi-million-dollar telecommunications reform grant program in progress (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "Majuro Atoll and Ebeye and Kwajalein islands have regular, seven-digit, direct-dial telephones; other islands interconnected by high frequency radiotelephone (used mostly for government purposes) and mini-satellite telephones; fixed-line roughly 4 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular is nearly 27 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line roughly 5 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular is nearly 38 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 692; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean); US Government satellite communications system on Kwajalein"

10
australia-oceania/ws.json
View file

@ -1031,18 +1031,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "6,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "3 (2020 est.)"
"text": "3 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "69,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "69,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "35 (2020 est.)"
"text": "32 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@
"text": "Samoa was one of the first Pacific Island countries to establish a regulatory infrastructure and to liberalize its telecom market; the advent of competition in the mobile market saw prices fall by around 50% and network coverage increase to more than 90% of the population; Samoa also boasts one of the highest rates of mobile phone coverage in the Pacific region; the growth of fixed-line internet has been impeded by factors including the high costs for bandwidth, under investment in fixed-line infrastructure; Samoa&rsquo;s telecoms sector has been inhibited by a lack of international connectivity; Samoa has had access to the Samoa-America-Samoa (SAS) cable laid in 2009, this cable has insufficient capacity to meet the country&rsquo;s future bandwidth needs; this issue was addressed with two new submarine cables that became available in 2018 and 2019; combined with the Samoa National Broadband Highway (SNBH), have improved internet data rates and reliability, and have helped to reduce the high costs previously associated with internet access in Samoa; in April 2022, the Samoan government announced its decision to take over control of the Samoa Submarine Cable Company, looking to the cable to generate additional revenue for the state (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line roughly 3 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity nearly 35 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line is 3 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity&nbsp; 32 telephones per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 685; landing points for the Tui-Samo, Manatua, SAS, and Southern Cross NEXT submarine cables providing connectivity to Samoa, Fiji,&nbsp;Wallis&nbsp;&amp; Futuna, Cook Islands, Niue, French Polynesia, American Samoa, Australia, New Zealand, Kiribati, Los Angeles (US), and Tokelau;&nbsp;satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean) (2019)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json
View file

@ -830,10 +830,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "25.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

2
central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json
View file

@ -597,7 +597,7 @@
"text": "unicameral National Assembly of People's Power or Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular (605 seats; (586 seats filled in 2021); members directly elected by absolute majority vote; members serve 5-year terms); note 1 - the National Candidature Commission submits a slate of approved candidates; to be elected, candidates must receive more than 50% of valid votes otherwise the seat remains vacant or the Council of State can declare another election; note 2 - in July 2019, the National Assembly passed a law which reduces the number of members from 605 to 474, effective with the 2023 general election"
},
"elections": {
"text": "last held on 11 March 2018 (next to be held in early 2023)"
"text": "last held on 26 March 2023 (next to be held in early 2028)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "Cuba's Communist Party is the only legal party, and officially sanctioned candidates run unopposed; composition (as of June 2021) - men 273, women 313, percent of women 53.4%"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json
View file

@ -835,10 +835,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "26.8% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "3.8% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

18
central-america-n-caribbean/es.json
View file

@ -467,13 +467,13 @@
},
"Total water withdrawal": {
"municipal": {
"text": "474 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "470 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"industrial": {
"text": "213 million cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "210 million cubic meters (2020 est.)"
},
"agricultural": {
"text": "1.431 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)"
"text": "1.43 billion cubic meters (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Total renewable water resources": {
@ -816,10 +816,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "26.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "0.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1285,6 +1285,14 @@
"text": "71,500 (2021)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List &mdash; El Salvador does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials convicted more traffickers and identified more victims; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous year to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; the government significantly reduced the number of specialized prosecutors; less than half of all victims received government services or referrals to care providers; officials did not implement procedures to identify potential victims among children apprehended for gang-related activity or persons forcibly displaced from their homes; the government did not initiate any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of officials allegedly complicit in trafficking crimes or report progress on investigations from previous years; the anti-trafficking council was inactive and did not draft a new national anti-trafficking action plan, report on the government's 2021 efforts, or compile data across agencies; therefore, El Salvador was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List (2022)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in El Salvador, and traffickers exploit victims from El Salvador abroad; adults and children are exploited in sex trafficking within the country; children without parents, adolescent girls, and LGBTQI+ persons&mdash;especially transgender persons&mdash;are at particular risk; sex trafficking reportedly occurs in the tourism industry; traffickers exploit victims within their own communities, sometimes their own children or other family members; Salvadoran adults and children are exploited in forced labor in agriculture, domestic service, and begging; adults and children from neighboring countries&mdash;particularly Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua&mdash;are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in construction, domestic service, or the informal sector; traffickers recruit victims in regions of El Salvador with high levels of violence; limited government presence in gang-controlled territory exacerbates trafficking risks; gangs use the pretense of domestic employment to lure women into forced labor; transnational criminal organizations and gangs including MS-13 and Barrio 18 recruit, abduct, train, arm, and subject children to forced labor&mdash;including assassinations, extortion, and drug trafficking; these groups subject women and children, including LGBTQI+ children, to sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic service and child care; Salvadoran men, women, and children are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in Belize, Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States; traffickers exploit some Central and South American, African, and Asian migrants who transit El Salvador to Guatemala, Mexico, the United States, and Canada in sex and labor trafficking; endemic corruption and complicity, including within law enforcement, the judiciary, the prison system, and local government, hinder anti-trafficking efforts (2022)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>a transit country for illicit drugs destined for the United States  </p>"
}

4
central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json
View file

@ -828,10 +828,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "41.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.6% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

6
central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json
View file

@ -307,7 +307,7 @@
"text": "very high (2020)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever"
"text": "cholera, bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever"
},
"vectorborne diseases": {
"text": "dengue fever and malaria"
@ -455,7 +455,7 @@
"text": "very high (2020)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever"
"text": "cholera, bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever"
},
"vectorborne diseases": {
"text": "dengue fever and malaria"
@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@
"text": "according to the Haitian Government, the mission of the reconstituted armed forces will focus on patrolling the border with the Dominican Republic, combating smuggling, and executing recovery efforts after natural disasters<br><br>the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) operated in Haiti from 2004 until 2017; its mission was to help restore stability after President Bertrand ARISTIDE fled the country, including assisting with the political process, strengthening government institutions, and promoting and protecting human rights; following the completion of MINUSTAH’s mandate in 2017, a smaller peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), operated until 2019; its mission was to assist with the further development and strengthening of the national police, as well as Haiti’s justice and prison systems, and to promote and protect human rights; in 2019, the UN established the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) with the political mission of advising the Haiti Government in elections, governance, and security; BINUH's current mandate last until July 2023 (2022)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of Haiti are a risk for armed robbery against ships; in 2021, four attacks against commercial vessels were reported, a slight decrease from the five attacks reported in 2020; most of these occurred in the main port of Port-au-Prince while ships were berthed or at anchor"
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of Haiti in 2022, a decrease from the four attacks in 2021; ports in Haiti continue to be affected by the crime of armed robbery; most of these occurred in the main port of Port-au-Prince while ships were berthed or at anchor"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

4
central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json
View file

@ -819,10 +819,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "32.8% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "4.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

10
central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json
View file

@ -1049,18 +1049,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "436,249 (2020 est.)"
"text": "473,617 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "15 (2020 est.)"
"text": "17 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2,873,259 (2020 est.)"
"text": "2,905,408 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "97 (2020 est.)"
"text": "103 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@
"text": "Jamaica&rsquo;s telecom sector has for many years been propped up by the mobile sector, which accounts for the vast majority of internet connections and voice lines; it also accounts for just over half of telecom sector revenue; in December 2020, the government announced the rollout of a national broadband network costing up to $237 million; the funding will be spent on improving connectivity in under served areas, improving access to education, and deploying networks to public locations such as hospitals, municipal institutions, and police stations; to aid in this national broadband effort, the government received a donation of 650km of fiber cabling from local cable TV providers and the two main toll road operators; to encourage the use of digital channels as the country deals with the Covid-19 pandemic (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions nearly 15 per 100, cellular-mobile roughly 97 per 100 subscriptions (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions nearly 17 per 100, cellular-mobile roughly 103 per 100 subscriptions (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-876 and 1-658; landing points for the ALBA-1, CFX-1, Fibralink, East-West, and Cayman-Jamaican Fiber System submarine cables providing connections to South America, parts of the Caribbean, Central America and the US; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"

10
central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json
View file

@ -787,18 +787,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "3,000 (2018 est.)"
"text": "3,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "60 (2018 est.)"
"text": "67 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "5,000 (2018 est.)"
"text": "5,000 (2020 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "101 (2019 est.)"
"text": "110 (2020 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -806,7 +806,7 @@
"text": "telecom market one of growth in Caribbean and fully digitalized;&nbsp;high dependency on tourism and offshore financial&nbsp;services; operators expand FttP (Fiber to Home) services; LTE launches and operators invest in mobile networks; effective competition in all sectors (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line roughly 60 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity nearly 101 per 100 persons (2019)"
"text": "fixed-line is 67 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is 110 per 100 persons (2020)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-664; landing point for the ECFS optic submarine cable with links to 14 other islands in the eastern Caribbean extending from the British Virgin Islands to Trinidad (2019)"

14
central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json
View file

@ -588,10 +588,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "68,840 (2017)"
"text": "68,840 (2012)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "195.94 (2019)"
"text": "196 (2012)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -599,7 +599,7 @@
"text": "generally adequate facilities; growth sectors include mobile telephone and data segments; effective competition; LTE expansion; tourism and telecom sector contribute greatly to the GDP (2018)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "extensive interisland microwave radio relay links; 196 per 100 mobile-cellular teledensity (2019)"
"text": "196 per 100 mobile-cellular teledensity (2012)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-721; landing points for SMPR-1 and the ECFS submarine cables providing connectivity to the Caribbean; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"
@ -655,6 +655,14 @@
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "non identified"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
"text": "Tier 3 &mdash; Sint Maarten does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Sint Maarten was downgraded to Tier 3; officials took some steps to address trafficking, including investigating a potential trafficking case; however, the government did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers nor identify any victims for the second consecutive year; Sint Maarten was not equipped to provide services to trafficking victims due to its lack of shelters, funding, and formal arrangements with service providers; the government did not update its national action plan, which expired in 2018, and interagency coordination was severely lacking; officials consistently conflated human trafficking with migrant smuggling (2022)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Sint Maarten; some brothel and dance club owners exploit women and girls from Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Russia in sex trafficking; women from Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela are especially vulnerable to sex trafficking in Sint Maarten; government officials report a significant number of migrant workers are vulnerable to coercive schemes in domestic service, construction, Chinese national-owned markets, retail shops, food service, landscaping, and housekeeping; criminals, including smugglers, subject migrants&mdash;specifically Cuban and Brazilian nationals&mdash;who transit Sint Maarten en route to the United States and Canada to forced labor or sex trafficking; traffickers may exploit, under false pretenses, Colombian and Venezuelan women traveling to the islands in forced labor or sex trafficking (2022)"
}
}
}
}

10
central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json
View file

@ -1068,18 +1068,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "210,981 (2020 est.)"
"text": "207,577 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "3 (2020 est.)"
"text": "3 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "5,976,479 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6,233,864 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "90 (2020 est.)"
"text": "91 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@
"text": "Nicaragua&rsquo;s telecoms market has mirrored the country&rsquo;s poor economic achievements, with fixed-line teledensity and mobile penetration also being the lowest in Central America; the fixed line broadband market remains nascent, with population penetration below 4%; most internet users are concentrated in the largest cities, given that rural and marginal areas lack access to the most basic telecom infrastructure; internet caf&eacute;s provide public access to internet and email services, but these also tend to be restricted to the larger population centers; to address poor infrastructure, the World Bank has funded a project aimed at improving connectivity via a national fiber broadband network; there are separate schemes to improve broadband in eastern regions and provide links to Caribbean submarine cables; the number of mobile subscribers overtook the number of fixed lines in early 2002, and the mobile sector now accounts for most lines in service (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "since privatization, access to fixed-line and mobile-cellular services has improved; fixed-line teledensity roughly 3 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone subscribership has increased to roughly 90 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is 3 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone subscribership is 91 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 505; landing point for the ARCOS fiber-optic submarine cable which provides connectivity to South and Central America, parts of the Caribbean, and the US; satellite earth stations - 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region) and 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) (2019)"

14
central-america-n-caribbean/pm.json
View file

@ -821,10 +821,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "15.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1097,18 +1097,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "649,156 (2020 est.)"
"text": "790,486 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "15 (2020 est.)"
"text": "18 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "5,825,677 (2020 est.)"
"text": "6,003,255 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "135 (2020 est.)"
"text": "138 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@
"text": "Panama has seen a steady increase in revenue from the telecom sector in recent years; mobile services and broadband remain the key growth sectors, with mobile connections accounting for 90% of all connections, and over half of telecom sector revenue; the mobile market has effective competition; internet services have grown in recent years as consumers responded to government fixed-line projects, improved mobile broadband connectivity and mobile applications (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line about 14 per 100 and rapid subscribership of mobile-cellular telephone roughly 132 per 100 (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line is 18 per 100 and subscribership of mobile-cellular telephone is 138 per 100 (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 507; landing points for the&nbsp;PAN-AM, ARCOS, SAC, AURORA,&nbsp;PCCS, PAC, and the MAYA-1 submarine cable systems that together provide links to the US and parts of the Caribbean, Central America, and South America; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean); connected to the Central American Microwave System (2019)"

4
central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json
View file

@ -461,10 +461,10 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "68,840 (2017 est.)"
"text": "68,840 (2012 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "196 (2019 est.)"
"text": "196 (2012 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {

10
central-america-n-caribbean/rq.json
View file

@ -886,18 +886,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "711,512 (2020 est.)"
"text": "726,739 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "25 (2020 est.)"
"text": "22 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "3,483,570 (2020 est.)"
"text": "3,661,176 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "122 (2020 est.)"
"text": "112 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -905,7 +905,7 @@
"text": "Puerto Rico has a small telecom market which in recent years has been deeply affected by a combination of economic mismanagement and natural disasters, including two hurricanes which landed in late 2017 and an earthquake which struck in January 2020; these disasters caused considerable destruction of telecom infrastructure, which in turn led to a marked decline in the number of subscribers for all services; compounding these difficulties have been a long-term economic downturn which encouraged many people not to resume telecom services after these were restored; after some delay, the FCC in late 2019 issued an order relating to the release of funds to help rebuild telecom infrastructure; although Puerto Rico is a US territory it lags well behind the mainland US states in terms of fixed-line and broadband services; this is partly due to high unemployment rates (and consequently low disposable income) and poor telecoms investment in a market; the mobile market has been impacted by several mergers and acquisitions over the last few years; the activities of large multinational telcos continue to impact the Puerto Rican market; operators have secured spectrum in the 600MHz and 3.5GHz bands, thus enabling them to expand the reach of LTE services and launch services based on 5G;&nbsp; the growing number of submarine cables landing in Puerto Rico is helping to drive down the cost of telecom services, creating a demand for streaming content from abroad; the uptake of cloud-based applications for both business and individuals is also creating a heightened demand for affordable services (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "digital telephone system; mobile-cellular services; fixed-line nearly 25 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 122 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line is 22 per 100 and mobile-cellular is 112 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-787, 939; landing points for the GTMO-PR, AMX-1, BRUSA, GCN, PCCS, SAm-1, Southern Caribbean Fiber, Americas-II, Antillas, ARCOS, SMPR-1, and Taino-Carib submarine cables providing connectivity to the mainland US, Caribbean, Central and South America; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (2019)"

10
central-america-n-caribbean/sc.json
View file

@ -944,18 +944,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "15,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "16,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "28 (2020 est.)"
"text": "33 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "78,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "57,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "147 (2020 est.)"
"text": "120 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -963,7 +963,7 @@
"text": "good interisland and international connections; broadband access; expanded FttP (Fiber to the Home) and LTE markets; regulatory development; telecom sector contributes greatly to the overall GDP; telecom sector is a growth area (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "interisland links via ECFS; fixed-line teledensity about 28 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 147 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is 33 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is 120 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-869; landing points for&nbsp;the ECFS, Southern Caribbean Fiber and the SSCS&nbsp;submarine cables providing connectivity for numerous Caribbean Islands (2019)"

10
central-america-n-caribbean/st.json
View file

@ -994,18 +994,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "38,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "14,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "21 (2020 est.)"
"text": "8 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "203,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "170,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "111 (2020 est.)"
"text": "96 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
"text": "an adequate system that is automatically switched; good interisland and international connections; broadband access; expanded FttP (Fiber to the Home) and LTE markets; regulatory development; telecom sector contributes to the overall GDP; telecom sector is a growth area (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is 20 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 111 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is 8 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 96 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-758; landing points for the ECFS&nbsp;and Southern Caribbean Fiber submarine cables providing connectivity to numerous Caribbean islands; direct microwave radio relay link with Martinique and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; tropospheric scatter to Barbados (2019)"

10
central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json
View file

@ -968,18 +968,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "12,483 (2020 est.)"
"text": "11,385 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "11 (2020 est.)"
"text": "11 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "97,059 (2020 est.)"
"text": "114,892 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "87 (2020 est.)"
"text": "110 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -987,7 +987,7 @@
"text": "adequate island-wide, fully automatic telephone system; broadband access; expanded FttP (Fiber to the Home) markets; LTE launches; regulatory development; telecom sector contributes greatly to the overall GDP; telecom sector is a growth area (2020)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity exceeds 11 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular teledensity is about 87 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is 11 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular teledensity is 110 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 1-784;&nbsp;landing points for the ECFS, CARCIP&nbsp;and Southern Caribbean Fiber submarine cables providing connectivity to US and Caribbean Islands; connectivity also provided by VHF/UHF radiotelephone from Saint Vincent to Barbados; SHF radiotelephone to Grenada and Saint Lucia; access to Intelsat earth station in Martinique through Saint Lucia (2019)"

10
central-asia/kg.json
View file

@ -1075,18 +1075,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "299,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "300,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "5 (2020 est.)"
"text": "5 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "8.511 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "8.5 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "130 (2020 est.)"
"text": "130 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@
"text": "the country&rsquo;s telecom sector (specifically the mobile segment) has been able to prosper; Kyrgyzstan has opened up its telecom market to competition; the mobile market has achieved high levels of penetration (140% in 2021) along with a fairly competitive operating environment with four major players; mobile broadband has come along strongly, reaching over 125% penetration in 2019 before falling back slightly during the Covid-19 crisis; slow-to-moderate growth is expected for both segments in coming years, supported by the anticipated rollout of 5G services starting from late 2022 (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line penetration at nearly 5 per 100 persons remains low and concentrated in urban areas; mobile-cellular subscribership up to over 130 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions 5 per 100; mobile-cellular subscribership up to over 130 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 996; connections with other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States, 9 members post-Soviet Republics in EU) countries by landline or microwave radio relay and with other countries by leased connections with Moscow international gateway switch and by satellite; satellite earth stations - 2 (1 Intersputnik, 1 Intelsat) (2019)"

14
central-asia/kz.json
View file

@ -829,10 +829,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "44.9% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1100,18 +1100,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "3.091 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "2,997,400 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "16 (2020 est.)"
"text": "16 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "24,293,900 (2020 est.)"
"text": "24.323 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "129 (2020 est.)"
"text": "127 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@
"text": "Kazakhstan has one of the most developed telecommunications sectors in the Central Asian region; this is especially true of the mobile segment, where widespread network coverage has enabled very high penetration rates reaching 180% as far back as 2012; the mobile and fixed-line segments have both pared back their subscriber numbers to more modest levels; the telcos have still been successful in terms of improving their margins and revenues by growing value-added services along with exploiting the capabilities of their higher speed networks (4G LTE as well as fiber) to drive significant increases in data usage; Kazakhstan has enjoyed a&nbsp; high fixed-line teledensity thanks to concerted efforts to invest in the fixed-line infrastructure as well as next-generation networks; demand for traditional voice services is on the wane as customers take a preference for the flexibility and ubiquity of the mobile platform for voice as well as data services; mobile clearly dominates the telecom sector in Kazakhstan, yet 2020 saw a sharp drop in subscriber numbers for both mobile voice and mobile broadband services as the Covid-19 crisis took hold; with the exception of fixed-line voice services, Kazakhstan&rsquo;s telecom market is expected to return to moderate growth from 2022 onward; the extensive deployment of LTE networks across the country (along with the prospect of 5G services being added to the mix in 2023) points towards an even greater uptake of lucrative mobile broadband services, in particular (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "intercity by landline and microwave radio relay; number of fixed-line connections is approximately 16 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriber base 129 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed telephone subscriptions are 16 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriber base 127 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 7; international traffic with other former Soviet republics and China carried by landline and microwave radio relay and with other countries by satellite and by the TAE fiber-optic cable; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat"

14
central-asia/rs.json
View file

@ -875,10 +875,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "28% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "7.4% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1147,18 +1147,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "25,892,405 (2020 est.)"
"text": "24 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "18 (2020 est.)"
"text": "16 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "238,733,217 (2020 est.)"
"text": "250 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "164 (2020 est.)"
"text": "170 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@
"text": "the telecom market is the largest in Europe, supported by a population approaching 147 million; the overall market is dominated by the western regions, particularly Moscow and St Petersburg which are the main cities and economic centers; all sectors of the market have been liberalized, with competition most prevalent in the two largest regional markets; the fiber broadband sector has shown considerable growth, supported by the government&rsquo;s program to extend the reach of broadband to outlying regions; the development of 5G services has been stymied by the lack of spectrum; although MNOs have licenses to use 700MHz spectrum for 5G, this spectrum will not be released until at least August 2023; progress is being made by MNOs to develop a joint strategy to deploy 5G using shared network and spectrum assets; mobile penetration is high, though this is partly due to the popularity of multiple SIM card use; there is pressure on operator revenue from the poor economic climate, lower pricing resulting from intense competition, regulatory measures introduced in 2018 which saw the end of roaming charges, and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "cross-country digital trunk lines run from Saint Petersburg to Khabarovsk, and from Moscow to Novorossiysk; the telephone systems in 60 regional capitals have modern digital infrastructures; cellular services, both analog and digital, are available in many areas; in rural areas, telephone services are still outdated, inadequate, and low-density; nearly 19 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular a bit over 164 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "16 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular is 170 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 7; landing points for the Far East Submarine Cable System, HSCS, Sakhalin-Kuril Island Cable, RSCN, BCS North-Phase 2, Kerch Strait Cable and the Georgia-Russian submarine cable system connecting Russia, Japan, Finland, Georgia and Ukraine; satellite earth stations provide access to Intelsat, Intersputnik, Eutelsat, Inmarsat, and Orbita systems (2019)"

6
central-asia/ti.json
View file

@ -308,8 +308,7 @@
},
"vectorborne diseases": {
"text": "malaria"
},
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>on 21 March 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Asia; Tajikistan is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and <em>that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus</em>; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine"
}
},
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "14.2% (2016)"
@ -454,8 +453,7 @@
},
"vectorborne diseases": {
"text": "malaria"
},
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>on 21 March 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Asia; Tajikistan is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and <em>that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus</em>; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
"municipal solid waste generated annually": {

4
central-asia/tx.json
View file

@ -802,10 +802,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "37.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "2.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

6
central-asia/uz.json
View file

@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
},
"Executive branch": {
"chief of state": {
"text": "President Shavkat MIRZIYOYEV (interim president from 8 September 2016; formally elected president on 4 December 2016 to succeed longtime President Islom KARIMOV, who died on 2 September 2016"
"text": "President Shavkat MIRZIYOYEV (interim president from 8 September 2016; formally elected president on 4 December 2016 to succeed longtime President Islom KARIMOV, who died on 2 September 2016)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Prime Minister Abdulla ARIPOV (since 14 December 2016)"
@ -807,10 +807,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "30.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "2.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

12
east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json
View file

@ -315,7 +315,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -477,7 +477,7 @@
},
"Major infectious diseases": {
"degree of risk": {
"text": "very high (2020)"
"text": "very high (2023)"
},
"food or waterborne diseases": {
"text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
@ -644,8 +644,8 @@
}
},
"Political parties and leaders": {
"text": "Arakan National Party or ANP [THAR TUN HLA]<br>Democratic Party or DP [U THU WAI]<br>Kayah State Democratic Party or KySDP <br>Kayin People's Party or KPP [TUN AUNG MYINT]<br>Kokang Democracy and Unity Party or KDUP [LUO XINGGUANG]<br>La Hu National Development Party or LHNDP [KYA HAR SHAL]<br>Lisu National Development Party or LNDP [U ARKI DAW]<br>Mon Unity Party (formed in 2019 from the All Mon Region Democracy Party and Mon National Party)<br>National Democratic Force or NDF [KHIN MAUNG SWE]<br>National League for Democracy or NLD [AUNG SAN SUU KYI]<br>National Unity Party or NUP [U HAN SHWE]<br>Pa-O National Organization or PNO [AUNG KHAM HTI]<br>People's Party [KO KO GYI]<br>Shan Nationalities Democratic Party or SNDP [SAI AI PAO]<br>Shan Nationalities League for Democracy or SNLD <br>Ta'ang National Party or TNP [AIK MONE]<br>Tai-Leng Nationalities Development Party or TNDP [ U SAI HTAY AUNG]<br>Union Solidarity and Development Party or USDP [THAN HTAY]<br>Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State or UDPKS [U KHAT HTEIN NAN]<br>Wa Democratic Party or WDP [KHUN HTUN LU]<br>Wa National Unity Party or WNUP [NYI PALOTE]<br>Zomi Congress for Democracy or ZCD [PU CIN SIAN THANG]<br>numerous smaller parties",
"note": "<strong>note: </strong>the military junta in January 2023 announced a new law that restricts the ability of political parties to participate in elections, including: 1) barring parties and candidates deemed to have links to individuals or organizations alleged to have committed terrorism or other unlawful acts; 2) stipulating that political parties that want to contest the national election would also need to secure at least 100,000 members within 90 days of registration and have funds of 100 million Myanmar kyat ($45,500), 100 times more than previously required, which would need to be deposited with a state-owned bank; 3) requiring that any existing party must apply for registration within 60 days of the legislation being announced or be invalidated; parties can also be suspended for 3 years, and ultimately dissolved, for failing to comply with the provisions of the new law; 4) not allowing parties to lodge an appeal against election commission decisions on registration"
"text": "Arakan National Party or ANP [THAR TUN HLA]<br>Democratic Party or DP [U THU WAI]<br>Kayah State Democratic Party or KySDP <br>Kayin People's Party or KPP [TUN AUNG MYINT]<br>Kokang Democracy and Unity Party or KDUP [LUO XINGGUANG]<br>La Hu National Development Party or LHNDP [KYA HAR SHAL]<br>Lisu National Development Party or LNDP [U ARKI DAW]<br>Mon Unity Party (formed in 2019 from the All Mon Region Democracy Party and Mon National Party)<br>National Democratic Force or NDF [KHIN MAUNG SWE]<br>National League for Democracy or NLD [AUNG SAN SUU KYI]<br>National Unity Party or NUP [U HAN SHWE]<br>Pa-O National Organization or PNO [AUNG KHAM HTI]<br>People's Party [KO KO GYI]<br>Shan Nationalities Democratic Party or SNDP [SAI AI PAO]<br>Shan Nationalities League for Democracy or SNLD <br>Ta'ang National Party or TNP [AIK MONE]<br>Tai-Leng Nationalities Development Party or TNDP [ U SAI HTAY AUNG]<br>Union Solidarity and Development Party or USDP [THAN HTAY]<br>Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State or UDPKS [U KHAT HTEIN NAN]<br>Wa Democratic Party or WDP [KHUN HTUN LU]<br>Wa National Unity Party or WNUP [NYI PALOTE]<br>Zomi Congress for Democracy or ZCD [PU CIN SIAN THANG]<br>(numerous smaller parties; approximately 90 parties ran in the 2020 election)",
"note": "<strong>note</strong>: in January 2023, the military junta announced a new law restricting political parties and their ability to participate in elections, including: 1) barring parties and candidates deemed by the junta to have links to individuals or organizations alleged to have committed terrorism or other unlawful acts; 2) stipulating that political parties that wanted to contest the national election would also need to secure at least 100,000 members within 90 days of registration and have funds of 100 million Myanmar kyat ($45,500), 100 times more than previously required, which would need to be deposited with a state-owned bank; 3) requiring that any existing party must apply for registration within 60 days of the legislation being announced or be invalidated; allowing for parties to be suspended for 3 years, and ultimately dissolved, for failing to comply with the provisions of the new law; 4) not allowing parties to lodge an appeal against election commission decisions on registration<br><br>in March 2023, the military junta announced that 40 political parties had been dissolved, including the National League for Democracy, because they did not register under the junta's new party establishment rules <strong><br><br></strong>"
},
"International organization participation": {
"text": "ADB, ARF, ASEAN, BIMSTEC, CP, EAS, EITI (candidate country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, ITUC (NGOs), NAM, OPCW (signatory), SAARC (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@ -852,10 +852,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "56.1% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "0.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

4
east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json
View file

@ -825,10 +825,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "42.3% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "2.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

18
east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json
View file

@ -878,10 +878,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "21.6% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "2.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1315,6 +1315,9 @@
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Strategic Support Force includes the Space Systems Department, which is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking, and control, and space warfare<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the PAP is a paramilitary police component of China’s armed forces that is under the dual authority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Central Military Commission and charged with internal security, law enforcement, counterterrorism, and maritime rights protection<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>in 2018, the Coast Guard was moved from the State Oceanic Administration to the PAP; in 2013, China merged four of its five major maritime law enforcement agencies – the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Maritime Police, Fishery Law Enforcement (FLE), and Anti-Smuggling Police – into a unified coast guard"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
"text": "1.4% of GDP (2022 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
@ -1322,13 +1325,10 @@
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2019)"
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2019 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2018)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2017": {
"text": "1.8% of GDP (2017)"
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2018 est.)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@ -1363,10 +1363,10 @@
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
"text": "Tier 3 &mdash; China does not fully meet the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore China remained on Tier 3; the government initiated its first prosecution of a domestic trafficking case, approved a new National Action Plan for 2021-2030, and conducted some anti-trafficking training; however, there was a government policy or pattern of widespread forced labor, including continued mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other Turkic and Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; the government also implemented similar policies against other religious minorities and Tibetans in other provinces; Chinese nationals reportedly suffered forced labor in several countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe hosting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects; for the fifth consecutive year, the government did not report complete law enforcement data, nor did it identify any trafficking victims or refer them to protection services &nbsp;(2022)"
"text": "Tier 3 &mdash; China does not fully meet the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore China remained on Tier 3; the government initiated its first prosecution of a domestic trafficking case, approved a new national action plan for 2021-2030, and conducted some anti-trafficking training; however, there was a government policy or pattern of widespread forced labor, including continued mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other Turkic and Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; the government also implemented similar policies against other religious minorities and Tibetans in other provinces; Chinese nationals reportedly suffered forced labor in several countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe hosting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects; for the fifth consecutive year, the government did not report complete law enforcement data, nor did it identify any trafficking victims or refer them to protection services &nbsp;(2022)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in China and Chinese people abroad; Chinese men, women, and children are victims of forced labor and sex trafficking in at least 60 countries; traffickers also use China as a transit point to subject foreign individuals to trafficking in other countries throughout Asia and in international maritime industries; state-sponsored forced labor is intensifying under the government&rsquo;s mass detention and political indoctrination campaign against Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; well-organized criminal syndicates and local gangs subject Chinese women and girls to sex trafficking within China; women and girls from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and several countries in Africa experience forced labor in domestic service, forced concubinism leading to forced childbearing, and sex trafficking via forced and fraudulent marriage to Chinese men; African and Asian men reportedly experience conditions indicative of forced labor aboard Chinese-flagged fishing vessels; many North Korean refugees and asylum-seekers living in China illegally are particularly vulnerable to trafficking (2022)"
"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in China, as well as Chinese people abroad; Chinese men, women, and children are victims of forced labor and sex trafficking in more than 80 countries; traffickers also use China as a transit point to subject foreign individuals to trafficking in other countries throughout Asia and in international maritime industries; state-sponsored forced labor persists under the government&rsquo;s mass detention and political indoctrination campaign against Muslim and Turkic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; authorities in some localities subject families of men arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang to forced labor; highly organized criminal syndicates and local gangs subject Chinese women and girls to sex trafficking within China; women and girls from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and several countries in Africa experience forced labor in domestic service, forced concubinism leading to forced childbearing, and sex trafficking via forced and fraudulent marriage to Chinese men; African and Asian men reportedly experience conditions indicative of forced labor aboard Chinese-flagged fishing vessels; many North Korean refugees and asylum-seekers living in China illegally are particularly vulnerable to trafficking, while some of the women are forced into commercial sex, forced marriage, or forced labor; North Korea exploits some of its citizens in forced labor in China as part of its proliferation finance system (2022)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {

4
east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json
View file

@ -685,10 +685,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "14.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},

6
east-n-southeast-asia/id.json
View file

@ -862,10 +862,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "31.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "7.2% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1332,7 +1332,7 @@
"text": "the TNI’s primary missions are internal security, responding to natural disasters, and protecting the country’s territorial waters; it has undergone reforms since the 1990s to improve its professionalism and limit involvement in internal politics; the infantry-heavy Army is the largest service and deployed throughout the country in 14 area (KODAM) and 3 joint area (KOGABWILHAN) defense commands, as well as a special forces command (KOPASSUS) and 3 strategic reserve (KOSTRAD) infantry division headquarters; as of 2023, it was conducting counter-insurgency operations in Papua against the West Papua Liberation Army, the military wing of the Free Papua Organization, which has been fighting a low-level insurgency since Indonesia annexed the former Dutch colony in the 1960s; it has also been assisting police in Sulawesi in countering the Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT; aka East Indonesia Mujahideen), a local militant group affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); the Navy is organized and equipped for coastal defense and patrolling Indonesia’s territorial waters where it faces such issues as piracy, transnational crime, illegal fishing, and incursions by Chinese vessels; it has more than 30 frigates and corvettes, several attack-type submarines, and a force of coastal patrol vessels and maritime patrol aircraft; it also has an amphibious force with several marine infantry brigades and landing platform dock (LPD) amphibious assault ships; the Air Force has more than 100 combat aircraft <br><br>Indonesia is not a formal claimant in the South China Sea, although some of its waters lie within China's “nine-dash line” maritime claims, resulting in some stand offs in recent years; since 2016, the Indonesian military has bolstered its presence on Great Natuna Island (aka Pulau Natuna Besar), the main island of the Middle Natuna Archipelago, which is part of the Riau Islands Province, and held military exercises in the surrounding waters (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; the number of attacks decreased from 26 incidents in 2020 to nine in 2021 due to aggressive maritime patrolling by regional authorities; vessels continue to be boarded while anchored or berthed at Indonesian ports with seven vessels attacked; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia"
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; the number of attacks in Indonesia increased to ten incidents in 2022 compared to nine in 2021; aggressive maritime patrolling by regional authorities has reduced the frequency of attacks in recent years; vessels continue to be boarded while anchored or berthed at Indonesian ports; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

16
east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json
View file

@ -819,10 +819,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "16% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "2.3% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1091,26 +1091,26 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "61,978,594 (2020 est.)"
"text": "61,583,600 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "49 (2020 est.)"
"text": "49 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "195,054,893 (2020 est.)"
"text": "200,478,808 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "154 (2020 est.)"
"text": "161 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Japan has one of the best developed telecom markets globally, the fixed-line segment remains stagnant and the focus for growth is in the mobile sector; the MNOs have shifted their investment from LTE to 5G, and growth in 5G showed early promise although there have been recent setbacks; these have partly been attributed to the economic difficulties, the impact of restrictions imposed during the pandemic, and unfavourable investment climate (not helped by the delay of the Tokyo Olympics from 2020 to 2021), and to restrictions in the supply of 5G-enabled devices; the fixed broadband market is dominated by fiber, with a strong cable platform also evident; fiber will continue to increase its share of the fixed broadband market, largely at the expense of DSL; the mobile market is dominated by three MNOs, mobile broadband subscriber growth is expected to be relatively low over the next five years, partly due to the high existing subscriptions though growth has been stimulated by measures which have encouraged people to school and work from home; there has also been a boost in accessing entertainment via mobile devices since 2020; plans to provide 55% population coverage with 5G by March 2022 and nationwide 5G coverage by 2023 (2021)"
"text": "Japan has one of the best developed telecom markets globally, the fixed-line segment remains stagnant and the focus for growth is in the mobile sector; the MNOs have shifted their investment from LTE to 5G, and growth in 5G showed early promise although there have been recent setbacks; these have partly been attributed to the economic difficulties, the impact of restrictions imposed during the pandemic, and unfavorable investment climate (not helped by the delay of the Tokyo Olympics from 2020 to 2021), and to restrictions in the supply of 5G-enabled devices; the fixed broadband market is dominated by fiber, with a strong cable platform also evident; fiber will continue to increase its share of the fixed broadband market, largely at the expense of DSL; the mobile market is dominated by three MNOs, mobile broadband subscriber growth is expected to be relatively low over the next five years, partly due to the high existing subscriptions though growth has been stimulated by measures which have encouraged people to school and work from home; there has also been a boost in accessing entertainment via mobile devices since 2020 (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "high level of modern technology and excellent service of every kind; 49 per 100 for fixed-line and 152 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
"text": "49 per 100 for fixed-line and 161 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 81; numerous submarine cables with landing points for HSCS, JIH, RJCN, APCN-2, JUS, EAC-C2C, PC-1, Tata TGN-Pacific, FLAG North Asia Loop/REACH North Asia Loop, APCN-2, FASTER, SJC, SJC2, Unity/EAC-Pacific, JGA-N, APG, ASE, AJC, JUPITER, MOC, Okinawa Cellular Cable, KJCN, GOKI, KJCN, and SeaMeWE-3, submarine cables provide links throughout Asia, Australia, the Middle East, Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa&nbsp;and US; satellite earth stations - 7 Intelsat (Pacific and Indian Oceans), 1 Intersputnik (Indian Ocean region), 2 Inmarsat (Pacific and Indian Ocean regions), and 8 SkyPerfect JSAT (2019)"

10
east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json
View file

@ -946,18 +946,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1.18 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "1.2 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "5 (2020 est.)"
"text": "5 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "6 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "6 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "23 (2020 est.)"
"text": "23 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -965,7 +965,7 @@
"text": "following years of isolationism and economic under-achievement, North Korea languishes near the bottom of the world&rsquo;s telecom maturity index alongside Afghanistan and Turkmenistan (who also happen to be struggling under repressive political regimes); the obstacles to building a functioning telecom network are so numerous that a fixed-line segment barely exists; mobile communication is estimated to have eased up slightly to reach 19% in 2021, yet the high cost of ownership coupled with strict censorship makes mobile communications the exclusive domain of senior government officials and diplomats; for those citizens living close to China, it has been possible to obtain Chinese handsets and SIM cards, and to connect to towers (illegally) located just across the border; while this offers access to the outside world and at much lower prices than the state-controlled offerings, the risks are high including steep fines and the possibility of jail time; North Korea has been slightly more effective in building an IT sector and a nascent digital economy on the back of a concerted effort to grow a sizeable, well-trained IT workforce; but even here, its capabilities have been directed more towards nefarious activities such as cyber crime and hacking into Western countries&rsquo; computer systems; North Korea&rsquo;s determination to put itself offside with the rest of the world in pursuit of its ideology can only lead to tighter controls on communications inside and outside of the country (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-lines are approximately 5 per 100 and mobile-cellular 23 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-lines are approximately 5 per 100 and mobile-cellular 23 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 850; satellite earth stations - 2 (1 Intelsat - Indian Ocean, 1 Russian - Indian Ocean region); other international connections through Moscow and Beijing"

14
east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json
View file

@ -815,10 +815,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "13.8% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "2.7% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1083,18 +1083,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "23,858,239 (2020 est.)"
"text": "23,213,189 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "47 (2020 est.)"
"text": "45 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "70,513,676 (2020 est.)"
"text": "72,855,492 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "138 (2020 est.)"
"text": "141 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@
"text": "South Korea is second only to Hong Kong in the world rankings of telecom market maturity; it is also on the leading edge of the latest telecom technology developments, including around 6G; with its highly urbanized, tech-savvy population, South Korea also enjoys very high communication levels across all segments &ndash; fixed-line telephony (44% at the start of 2022), fixed broadband (46%), mobile voice and data (144%), and mobile broadband (120%); the performance of the mobile sector is on a par with other developed markets around the region, but it&rsquo;s the wire line segment that allows South Korea to stand out from the crowd; this is partly a reflection of the large proportion of its population who live in apartment buildings (around 60%), making fiber and apartment LAN connections relatively easy and cost-effective to deploy; the government&rsquo;s Ultra Broadband convergence Network (UBcN) had aimed to reach 50% adoption by the end of 2022, but that target may be a few more years away; fixed-line teledensity is also at a very high level compared to most of the rest of the world, but it has been on a sharp decline from a rate of 60% ten years ago; on the mobile front, users have enthusiastically migrated from one generation of mobile platform to the next as each iteration becomes available; there also doesn&rsquo;t appear to be any great concern about there being a lack of demand for 5G in South Korea (when the country is already well supported by 4G networks), with 30% of all subscribers having already made the switch; part of the reason behind the rapid transition may be the subsidized handsets on offer from each of the MNOs and the MVNOs (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line approximately 47 per 100 and mobile-cellular services 134 per 100 persons; rapid assimilation of a full range of telecommunications technologies leading to a boom in e-commerce (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line approximately 45 per 100 and mobile-cellular services 141 per 100 persons; rapid assimilation of a full range of telecommunications technologies leading to a boom in e-commerce (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 82;&nbsp;landing points for EAC-C2C, FEA, SeaMeWe-3, TPE, APCN-2, APG, FLAG North Asia Loop/REACH North Asia Loop, KJCN, NCP, and&nbsp;SJC2 submarine cables providing links throughout Asia, Australia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, Southeast Asia and US; satellite earth stations - 66 (2019)"

14
east-n-southeast-asia/la.json
View file

@ -827,10 +827,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "50% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "10.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1101,18 +1101,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1.491 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "1,300,195 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "20 (2020 est.)"
"text": "18 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "4.1 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "4,822,973 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "56 (2020 est.)"
"text": "65 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@
"text": "Laos joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2013; one of the conditions of admittance was to establish an independent regulator for its telecom sector within two years; the government had committed to do so by February 2015 as part of the accession agreement; there still has been no sign of any firm plans being made to create an independent regulatory body; the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) retains the primary role in regulating the country&rsquo;s telecom market; with the government also having a financial stake (in part or in whole) in every one of the major fixed-line and mobile operators, the MPT&rsquo;s position and decision-making is far from what could be considered independent; sufficient returns on investment cannot be guaranteed with such strict pricing controls as well as the potential for political interference; fixed-line and mobile penetration levels have, as a result, remained much lower than what&rsquo;s seen in neighboring South East Asian markets; there are signs of growth in the mobile broadband segment as LTE network coverage slowly widens and, more recently, the country&rsquo;s first 5G services start to come on stream; residents in the capital will at least be able to enjoy high-speed services in the near future, while the rest of the country waits patiently to catch up with the rest of the world. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line nearly 20 per 100 and 56 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line nearly 18 per 100 and 65 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 856; satellite earth station - 1 Intersputnik (Indian Ocean region) and a second to be developed by China"

10
east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json
View file

@ -878,18 +878,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "110,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "110,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "17 (2020 est.)"
"text": "16 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "2.793 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "2.8 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "430 (2020 est.)"
"text": "410 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -897,7 +897,7 @@
"text": "Macau&rsquo;s economy and GDP have been on a roller coaster ride since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020; the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China is heavily dependent on tourists coming from the mainland and Hong Kong to play in Macau&rsquo;s many casinos, but the ensuing lock downs contributed to a dramatic fall in visitor numbers as well as income; this too, has had a major effect on the telecom sector (particularly in the mobile segment) with short-stay visitors as well as foreign workers on temporary-stay visas being forced to stay away.; total mobile subscription numbers are estimated to have dropped from a high of 2.8 million in 2019 (representing a whopping 442% penetration rate in a region with a population of just 700,000) to less than half that by the end of 2021: 1.3 million subscribers; Macau had almost the highest mobile penetration rate in the world; it is now sitting at a more &lsquo;reasonable&rsquo; level of 200%; a significant bounce back can be expected to follow the easing of travel restrictions, although perhaps not up to the same lofty heights achieved in 2019; asecond factor behind the steep fall in 2020 was the introduction of a Cyber Security Law that required all prepaid SIM cards to become registered or face being deactivated in October 2020; the combined effect of the pandemic and the new restrictions meant that prepaid subscriber numbers fell by more than 80%; postpaid accounts, largely the domain of Macau&rsquo;s permanent residents, were barely affected by the external upheaval; they continued to increase in number, year-on-year, and provided better returns to the operators thanks to substantially increased data usage during the lock downs; the mobile broadband market has experienced the same dramatic fluctuations as the broader mobile segment over the last two years, at least in terms of subscriber numbers; but this is largely because mobile broadband uptake is inextricably tied to the base mobile offering in Macau; with total mobile broadband data traffic going up, not down, between 2019 and 2021, that again points to the strength of the contract segment helping to drive future growth in Macau&rsquo;s telecom sector (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line nearly 17 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 430 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line nearly 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular roughly 410 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 853; landing point for the SEA-ME-WE-3 submarine cable network that provides links to Asia, Africa, Australia, the Middle East, and Europe; HF radiotelephone communication facility; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Indian Ocean) (2019)"

10
east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json
View file

@ -1091,18 +1091,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "160,153 (2020 est.)"
"text": "399,237 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "5 (2020 est.)"
"text": "12 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "4,363,919 (2020 est.)"
"text": "4,687,304 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "133 (2020 est.)"
"text": "140 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@
"text": "liberalized and competitive telecoms market comprises of a number of operators; fixed-line penetration increased steadily in the years to 2018 as more people took on fixed-line access for voice calls and to access copper-based broadband services; the number of lines fell in 2019, and again and more sharply in 2020, partly through the economic consequences of the pandemic (GDP fell 5.3% in 2020, year-on-year) and partly due to the migration to the mobile platform and to VoIP; fixed broadband penetration remains low, mainly due to a limited number of fixed lines and the dominance of the mobile platform; the attraction of fixed broadband as a preferred access where it is available is waning as the mobile networks are upgraded with greater capacity and capabilities; the growing popularity of mobile broadband continues to underpin overall broadband and telecom sector growth, with Mongolia&rsquo;s market very much being dominated by mobile services, supported by widely available LTE; this will largely determine and shape the future direction of Mongolia&rsquo;s developing digital economy (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "very low fixed-line teledensity of less than 5 per 100; there are four mobile-cellular providers and subscribership is roughly 133 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line teledensity of 12 per 100; mobile-cellular subscribership is 140 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 976; satellite earth stations - 7 (2016)"

30
east-n-southeast-asia/my.json
View file

@ -605,14 +605,14 @@
}
},
"Political parties and leaders": {
"text": "<strong>National Front (Barisan Nasional) or BN:<br></strong>All Malaysian Indian Progressive Front or IPF [Loganathan THORAISAMY]<br>Love Malaysia Party or PCM [Huan Cheng GUAN]<br>Malaysian Chinese Association (Persatuan Cina Malaysia) or MCA [Wee Ka SIONG]<br>Malaysian Indian Congress (Kongres India Malaysia) or MIC [Vigneswaran SANASEE]<br>Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress or KIMMA [Datuk Seri Haji SYED]<br>Malaysia Makkal Sakti Party or MMSP [R.S. THANENTHIRAN]<br>United Malays National Organization (Pertubuhan Kebansaan Melayu Bersatu) or UNMO [Ahmad Zahid HAMIDI]<br>United Sabah People's Party (Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah) or PBRS [Joseph KURUP]<br><br><strong>Coalition of Hope (Pakatan Harapan) or PH:</strong><br>Democratic Action Party (Parti Tindakan Demokratik) or DAP [LIM Guan Eng]<br>National Trust Party (Parti Amanah Negara) or AMANAH [Mohamad SABU]<br>People's Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) or PKR [ANWAR Ibrahim]<br>United Progressive Kinabalu Organization or UPKO [Wilfred Madius TANGAU]<br><br><strong>Coalition Perikatan Nasional (National Alliance) or PN</strong><br>Homeland Solidarity Party (Parti Solidariti Tanah Airku) or STAR [Datuk Seri Jeffrey Kitingan]<br>Malaysian People's Movement Party (Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia) or GERAKAN or PGRM [Dominic Lau Hoe CHAI]<br>Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia) or PPBM or BERSATU [Tan Sri MUHYIDDIN Yassin]<br>Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam se Malaysia) or PAS [Abdul HADI Awang]<br>Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia or GERAKAN [Dominic Lau Hoe CHAI]<br> <p><strong>Sarawak Parties Alliance (Gabungan Parti Sarawak) or GPS [ABANG JOHARI Openg] </strong><br>Progressive Democratic Party or PDP [TIONG King Sing]<br>Sarawak People's Party (Parti Rakyat Sarawak) or PRS [James MASING]<br>Sarawak United People's Party (Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sarawak) or SUPP [Dr. SIM Kui Hian]<br>United Traditional Bumiputera Party (Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersata) or PBB [Abang Abdul Rahman Johari Abang Openg or \"Abang Jo\"]<br><strong><br>Gabungan Rakya Sabah or GRS:<br></strong>Homeland Solidarity Party or STAR [Jeffrey KITINGAN]<br>Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia) or PPBM [Tan Sri MUHYIDDIN Yassin]<br>Sabah Progressive Party or SAPP [Yong Teck LEE]<br>United Sabah Party (Parti Bersatu Sabah) or PBS [Maximus ONGKILI]<br><strong><br>Others receiving votes in 2022 general election</strong>:<strong><br></strong>Gerakan Tanah Air or GTA Party [Hajiji NOOR] (a coalition of parties in Sabah)<br>Malaysian Nation Party (Parti Bangsa Malaysia) or PBM [Larry Sng Wei SHIEN] (formerly Sarawak Workers Party)<br>Malaysian United Democratic Alliance or MUDA [Syed SADDIQ bin Syed Abdul Rahman]<br>Perikatan Rakyat Bersatu Sarawak or PERKASA (coalition of Sarawak parties)<br>Sabah Heritage Party (Parti Warisan Sabah) or WARISAN [SHAFIE Apdal]<br>Social Democratic Harmony Party or KDM [Peter ANTHONY]<br>Socialist Party of Malaysia or PSM [Michael Jeyakumar DEVARA]<br><br></p>"
"text": "<strong>National Front (Barisan Nasional) or BN:<br></strong>All Malaysia Indian Progressive Front or IPF (Barisan Kemajuan India Se-Malaysia) or AMIPF [LOGANATHAN Thoraisamy]<br>Love Malaysia Party (Parti Cinta Malaysia) or PCM [HUAN Cheng Guan]<br>Malaysian Chinese Association (Persatuan Cina Malaysia) or MCA [WEE Ka Siong]<br>Malaysian Indian Congress (Kongres India Malaysia) or MIC [VIGNESWARAN Sanasee]<br>Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (Kongres India Muslim Malaysia) or KIMMA [Syed IMBRAHIM Kader]<br>Malaysia Makkal Sakti Party (Parti Makkal Sakti Malaysia) or MMSP [R.S. THANENTHIRAN]<br>United Malays National Organization (Pertubuhan Kebansaan Melayu Bersatu) or UMNO [Ahmad ZAHID Hamidi]<br>United Sabah People's Party (Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah) or PBRS [Arthur Joseph KURUP]<br><br><strong>Alliance of Hope (Pakatan Harapan) or PH:</strong><br>Democratic Action Party (Parti Tindakan Demokratik) or DAP [Anthony LOKE Siew Fook]<br>Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (Ikatan Demokratik Malaysia) or MUDA [Syed SADDIQ Syed Adbdul Rahman]<br>National Trust Party (Parti Amanah Negara) or AMANAH [MOHAMAD Sabu]<br>People's Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) or PKR [ANWAR Ibrahim]<br>United Progressive Kinabalu Organization (Pertubuhan Kinabalu Progresif Bersatu) or UPKO [EWON Benedick]<br><br><strong>National Alliance (Perikatan Nasional) or PN</strong><br>Malaysian People's Movement Party (Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia) or GERAKAN or PGRM [LAU Hoe Chai]<br>Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia) or PPBM or BERSATU [MUHYIDDIN Yassin]<br>Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) or PAS [Abdul HADI Awang]<br> <p><strong>Sabah People's Alliance (Gabungan Rakya Sabah) or GRS:<br></strong>Homeland Solidarity Party (Parti Solidariti Tanah Airku) or STAR [Jeffrey KITINGAN]<br>Sabah People's Ideas Party (Parti Gagasan Rakyat Sabah) or GAGASAN or PGRS [HAJIJI Noor]<br>Sabah Progressive Party (Parti Maju Sabah) or SAPP [Yong Teck Lee]<br>United Sabah National Organization (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Sabah Bersatu ((Baru)) or USNO (Baru) [PANDIKAR Amin Mulia]<br>United Sabah Party (Parti Bersatu Sabah) or PBS [Maximus Johnity ONGKILI]<br><br><strong>Sarawak Parties Alliance (Gabungan Parti Sarawak) or GPS </strong><br>Progressive Democratic Party (Parti Demokratik Progresif) or PDP [TIONG King Sing]<br>Sarawak People's Party (Parti Rakyat Sarawak) or PRS [Joseph SALANG Gandum]<br>Sarawak United People's Party (Parti Rakyat Bersatu Sarawak) or SUPP [SIM Kui Hian]<br>United Bumiputera Heritage Party (Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersata) or PBB [Abang Abdul Rahman Zohari Abang Openg or or ABANG JOHARI or \"Abang Jo\"]<br><strong><br>Others receiving votes in 2022 general election</strong>:<strong><br></strong>Malaysian Nation Party (Parti Bangsa Malaysia) or PBM [Larry SNG Wei Shein] (formerly Sarawak Workers Party)<br>Heritage Party (Parti Warisan) or WARISAN [SHAFIE Apdal]<br>Social Democratic Harmony Party (Parti Kesejahteraan Demokratik Masyarakat) or KDM [PETER Anthony]<br>Socialist Party of Malaysia (Parti Sosialis Malaysia) or PSM [Michael JEYAKUMAR Devaraj]<br><br><br></p>"
},
"International organization participation": {
"text": "ADB, APEC, ARF, ASEAN, BIS, C, CICA (observer), CP, D-8, EAS, FAO, G-15, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINURSO, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OPCW, PCA, PIF (partner), UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "ambassador (vacant); Charg&eacute; d'Affaires Fairuz Adli Mohd ROZALI (since 28 August 2021)"
"text": "Ambassador Mohamed NAZRI Abudul Aziz (since 9 February 2023)"
},
"chancery": {
"text": "3516 International Court NW, Washington, DC 20008"
@ -826,10 +826,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "21.5% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.8% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1098,18 +1098,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "7,467,900 (2020 est.)"
"text": "8,247,100 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "23 (2020 est.)"
"text": "25 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "43,723,600 (2020 est.)"
"text": "47,201,700 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "135 (2020 est.)"
"text": "141 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@
"text": "as part of a diverse range of initiatives designed to move the country from developing to developed status by 2025, Malaysia has enabled and encouraged open competition in its telecommunications market; the result is very high penetration levels in both the mobile (147%) and mobile broadband (127%) segments, and near-universal coverage of 4G LTE networks; steady growth is occurring as more fiber optic cable networks are being deployed around the country; consumers are the main beneficiaries of the highly competitive market; they enjoy widespread access to high-speed mobile services as well as attractive offers on bundles to keep data use up but prices low; the downside is that most of Malaysia&rsquo;s MNOs and MVNOs have struggled to increase revenue in line with growth in subscriber numbers as well as demand for broadband data; while the operators have been very successful in moving a significant proportion (now over 30%) of customers from prepaid over to higher-value postpaid accounts, ARPU continues to fall year after year as a result of competitive pricing pressures; the mobile market, in particular, has become overcrowded and the government is keen to see further rationalization and consolidation with the operators; while customers will no doubt continue to enjoy high quality services at competitive rates, the new entity will be hopeful of squeezing better margins through improved economies of scale; the government&rsquo;s next move is to encourage the private mobile operators to sign up to the country&rsquo;s wholesale 5G network; this will develop and deploy the 5G infrastructure across the country; the government&rsquo;s stated intent was to avoid duplication of networks and infrastructure, and thus reduce investment costs for the operators; to date, no MNO has agreed to the deal and are instead demanding the development of a dual wholesale network model (one that no doubt offers more flexible terms, at least in the eyes of the MNOs); Malaysia&rsquo;s 5G rollout has, in effect, come to a standstill while the government tries to find a way to restart negotiations (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line roughly 23 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 135 per 100 persons; domestic satellite system with 2 earth stations (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line roughly 25 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 141 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 60; landing points for BBG, FEA, SAFE, SeaMeWe-3 &amp; 4 &amp; 5, AAE-1, JASUKA, BDM, Dumai-Melaka Cable System, BRCS, ACE, AAG, East-West Submarine Cable System, SEAX-1, SKR1M, APCN-2, APG, BtoBe,&nbsp; BaSICS, and Labuan-Brunei Submarine and MCT submarine cables providing connectivity to Asia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Australia and Europe; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Indian Ocean, 1 Pacific Ocean); launch of Kacific-1 satellite in 2019 (2019)"
@ -1254,8 +1254,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Malaysian Armed Forces (Angkatan Tentera Malaysia, ATM): Malaysian Army (Tentera Darat Malaysia), Royal Malaysian Navy (Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia, TLDM), Royal Malaysian Air Force (Tentera Udara Diraja Malaysia, TUDM); Ministry of Home Affairs: Royal Malaysian Police (PRMD), Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA; aka Malaysian Coast Guard) (2022)",
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>the PRMD includes the General Operations Force, a paramilitary force with a variety of roles, including patrolling borders, counter-terrorism, maritime security, and counterinsurgency<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong> Malaysia created a National Special Operations Force in 2016 for combating terrorism threats; the force is comprised of personnel from the Armed Forces, the Royal Malaysian Police, and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency "
"text": "Malaysian Armed Forces (Angkatan Tentera Malaysia, ATM): Malaysian Army (Tentera Darat Malaysia), Royal Malaysian Navy (Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia, TLDM), Royal Malaysian Air Force (Tentera Udara Diraja Malaysia, TUDM); Ministry of Home Affairs: Royal Malaysian Police (PRMD), Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA; aka Malaysian Coast Guard) (2023)",
"note": "<strong>note 1: </strong>the PRMD includes the General Operations Force, a paramilitary force with a variety of roles, including patrolling borders, counter-terrorism, maritime security, and counterinsurgency<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong> Malaysia created a National Special Operations Force in 2016 for combating terrorism threats; the force is comprised of personnel from the Armed Forces, the Royal Malaysian Police, and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
@ -1278,20 +1278,20 @@
"text": "approximately 115,000 active duty troops (80,000 Army; 18,000 Navy; 17,000 Air Force) (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the military fields a diverse mix of older and more modern imported weapons systems from a wide variety of suppliers across Europe, Asia, and the US; in recent years it has received military equipment from approximately 20 countries (2022)"
"text": "the military fields a diverse mix of older and more modern imported weapons systems from a wide variety of suppliers across Europe, Asia, and the US; in recent years it has received military equipment from approximately 20 countries with South Korea as one of the leading suppliers (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "17 years 6 months of age for voluntary military service for men and women (younger with parental consent and proof of age); mandatory retirement age 60; no conscription (2021)",
"text": "17 years 6 months of age for voluntary military service for men and women (younger with parental consent and proof of age); maximum age of 27 to enlist; mandatory retirement age 60; no conscription (2023)",
"note": "note - in 2020, the military announced a goal of having 10% of the active force comprised of women"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "830 Lebanon (UNIFIL) (May 2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "maritime security has long been a top priority for the Malaysian Armed Forces, but it has received even greater emphasis in the 2000s, particularly anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca and countering Chinese naval incursions in Malaysia’s Economic Exclusion Zone, as well as addressing identified shortfalls in maritime capabilities; as such, it has undertaken modest efforts to procure more modern ships, improve air and maritime surveillance, expand the Navy’s support infrastructure (particularly bases/ports) and domestic ship-building capacities, restructure naval command and control, and increase naval cooperation with regional and international partners; as of 2022, for example, the Navy had 5 frigates on order, which would increase the number of operational frigates from 2 to 7; in addition, it began tri-lateral air and naval patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines in 2017; Malaysia also cooperates closely with the US military, including on maritime surveillance and participating regularly in bilateral and multilateral training exercises<br><br>Malaysia is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily (2022)"
"text": "maritime security has long been a top priority for the Malaysian Armed Forces, but it has received even greater emphasis in the 2000s, particularly anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca and countering Chinese naval incursions in Malaysia’s Economic Exclusion Zone, as well as addressing identified shortfalls in maritime capabilities; as such, it has undertaken modest efforts to procure more modern ships, improve air and maritime surveillance, expand the Navy’s support infrastructure (particularly bases/ports) and domestic ship-building capacities, restructure naval command and control, and increase naval cooperation with regional and international partners; as of 2023, for example, the Navy had 5 frigates on order, which would increase the number of operational frigates from 2 to 7; in addition, it began tri-lateral air and naval patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines in 2017; Malaysia also cooperates closely with the US military, including on maritime surveillance and participating regularly in bilateral and multilateral training exercises<br><br>Malaysia is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia; crews have been murdered or cast adrift; the Singapore Straits saw 35 attacks against commercial vessels in 2021, a 50% increase over 2020 and the highest number of incidents reported since 1992; vessels were boarded in 33 of the 35 incidents, one crew was injured, another assaulted and two threatened during these incidents</p>"
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reported four attacks in the territorial and offshore waters of Malaysia in 2022; the South China Sea remains a high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia; crews have been murdered or cast adrift; the Singapore Straits saw 38 attacks against commercial vessels in 2022, a slight increase over 2021 and the highest number of incidents reported since 1992; vessels were boarded in all of the 38 attacks while underway, four crew were taken hostage during these incidents</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

10
east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json
View file

@ -1081,18 +1081,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "166,000 (2020 est.)"
"text": "170,000 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "2 (2020 est.)"
"text": "2 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "4.818 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "4.8 million (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "54 (2020 est.)"
"text": "48 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@
"text": "fixed-line teledensity in Papua New Guinea has seen little change over the past two decades; progress in the country&rsquo;s telecom sector has come primarily from mobile networks, where accessibility has expanded considerably in recent years, with population coverage increasing from less than 3% in 2006 to more than 90% by early 2021; the MNOs operate networks offering services based on GSM, 3G, and LTE, depending on location; GSM is prevalent in many rural and remote areas, while 3G and LTE are centered more on urban areas; MNOs&rsquo; investments in 4G are growing, though GSM still represents the bulk of all mobile connections owing to the low penetration of smartphones and the concentration of high-speed data networks predominantly in high value urban areas; a lack of sufficient competition and investment in the wire line segment has driven up prices and hampered network coverage and quality; infrastructure deployment costs are high, partly due to the relatively low subscriber base, the difficult terrain, and the high proportion of the population living in rural areas; fixed telecom infrastructure is almost non-existent outside urban centers, leaving most of the population under served; PNG is the Pacific region&rsquo;s largest poorly developed telecom market, with only around 22% of its people connected to the internet; this falls far behind the recommended targets set in the country&rsquo;s National Broadband Policy drafted in 2013, which aimed to provide broadband access to 90% of the total population by 2018; the existing submarine cable infrastructure is insufficient to serve the country&rsquo;s needs; low international capacity has meant that internet services are expensive and slow; the cable links PNG to the Solomon Islands and Australia (landing at Sydney); despite the improvement in recent years, the country is still impacted by a connectivity infrastructure deficit, making it reliant on more expensive alternatives such as satellites, also weighing on the affordability of services for end-users (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "access to telephone services is not widely available; fixed-line nearly 2 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 54 per 100 persons (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line nearly 2 per 100 and mobile-cellular is 48 per 100 persons (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 675; landing points for the Kumul Domestic Submarine Cable System, PNG-LNG, APNG-2, CSCS and the PPC-1&nbsp;submarine cables to Australia, Guam, PNG and Solomon Islands; satellite earth station - 1 Intelsat (Pacific Ocean) (2019)"

18
east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json
View file

@ -845,10 +845,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "42% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.4% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1119,18 +1119,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "4,731,196 (2020 est.)"
"text": "5,028,018 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "4 (2020 est.)"
"text": "4 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "149,579,406 (2020 est.)"
"text": "163,345,244 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "137 (2020 est.)"
"text": "143 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@
"text": "the Covid-19 pandemic had a relatively minor impact on the Philippine&rsquo;s telecom sector in 2020; subscriber numbers fell in some areas, but this was offset by strong growth in mobile data and broadband usage since a significant proportion of the population transitioned to working or studying from home; major investment programs covering LTE, 5G, and fiber broadband networks suffered slight delays due to holdups in supply chains, but activity has since ramped up in an attempt to complete the roll outs as per the original schedule; the major telecom operators had mixed financial results for the past year; overall, the number of mobile subscribers is expected to grow to 153 million by the end of 2021, with the penetration rate approaching 144%; the government remains keen, and committed, to seeing strong competition, growth, and service excellence in the telecom sector, so there is likely to be continued support (financially as well as through legislation such as enabling mobile tower sharing and number portability) to ensure that the sector remains viable for emerging players; the mobile sector will remain the Philippines&rsquo; primary market for telecommunications well into the future; the unique terrain and resulting challenges associated with accessing remote parts of the archipelago means that in many areas fixed networks are neither cost-effective nor logistically viable; the bulk of telecoms investment over the coming years will continue to be in 5G and 5G-enabled LTE networks; coverage of LTE and 5G networks extends to over 95% of the population, and for the vast majority of people mobile will likely remain their only platform for telecom services (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "telecommunications infrastructure includes the following platforms: fixed line, mobile cellular, cable TV, over-the-air TV, radio and (very small aperture terminal) VSAT, fiber-optic cable, and satellite for redundant international connectivity; fixed-line nearly 4 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 137 per 100 (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line nearly 4 per 100 and mobile-cellular nearly 143 per 100 (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 63; landing points for the NDTN, TGN-IA, AAG, PLCN, EAC-02C, DFON, SJC, APCN-2, SeaMeWe, Boracay-Palawan Submarine Cable System, Palawa-Illoilo Cable System, NDTN, SEA-US, SSSFOIP, ASE and JUPITAR submarine cables that together provide connectivity to the US, Southeast Asia, Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Australia (2019)"
@ -1303,10 +1303,10 @@
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> as of 2020, women made up about 6% of the active military; women were allowed to enter the Philippine Military Academy and train as combat soldiers in 1993"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were formally organized during the American colonial period as the Philippine Army; they were established by the National Defense Act of 1935 and were comprised of both Filipinos and Americans<br><br>the US and Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty in 1951; in 2014, the two governments signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that established new parameters for military cooperation; under the EDCA, the Philippine Government may grant US troops access to Philippine military bases on a rotational basis “for security cooperation exercises, joint and combined military training activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities”; the Philippines has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US; MNNA is a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation; while MNNA status provides military and economic privileges, it does not entail any security commitments<br><br>as of 2022, the AFP's primary air and ground operational focus was on internal security duties, particularly in the south, where several separatist Islamic insurgent and terrorist groups operated and up to 60% of the armed forces were deployed; additional combat operations were being conducted against the Communist Peoples Party/New People’s Army, which was active mostly on Luzon, the Visayas, and areas of Mindanao; prior to a peace deal in 2014, the AFP fought a decades-long conflict against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a separatist organization based mostly on the island of Mindanao; the MILF's armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), had up to 40,000 fighters under arms<br><br>in addition to its typical roles of patrolling and defending the country's maritime claims, the Navy conducts interdiction operations against terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups around the southern islands; in 2017, the Philippines began conducting joint maritime patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia to counter regional terrorist activities, particularly in the Sulu Sea; the Philippine Marine Corps assists the Army in counterinsurgency operations<br><br>the Philippines National Police (PNP) also has an active role in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations alongside the AFP, particularly the Special Action Force, a PNP commando unit that specializes in urban counter-terrorism operations (2022)"
"text": "the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were formally organized during the American colonial period as the Philippine Army; they were established by the National Defense Act of 1935 and were comprised of both Filipinos and Americans<br><br>the US and Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty in 1951; in 2014, the two governments signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that established new parameters for military cooperation; under the EDCA, the Philippine Government may grant US troops access to Philippine military bases on a rotational basis “for security cooperation exercises, joint and combined military training activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities”; the Philippines has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation<br><br>the AFP's primary air and ground operational focus is on internal security duties, particularly in the south, where several separatist Islamic insurgent and terrorist groups operated and up to 60% of the armed forces are deployed; additional combat operations are being conducted against the Communist Peoples Party/New People’s Army, which is active mostly on Luzon, the Visayas, and areas of Mindanao; prior to a peace deal in 2014, the AFP fought a decades-long conflict against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a separatist organization based mostly on the island of Mindanao; the MILF's armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), had up to 40,000 fighters under arms<br><br>in addition to its typical roles of patrolling and defending the country's maritime claims, the Navy conducts interdiction operations against terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups around the southern islands; in 2017, the Philippines began conducting joint maritime patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia to counter regional terrorist activities, particularly in the Sulu Sea; the Philippine Marine Corps assists the Army in counterinsurgency operations<br><br>the Philippines National Police (PNP) also has an active role in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations alongside the AFP, particularly the Special Action Force, a PNP commando unit that specializes in urban counter-terrorism operations (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters in the South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; an emerging threat area lies in the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the Philippines and Malaysia where 11 ships were attacked in 2021; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargoes stolen</p>"
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial waters of littoral states and offshore waters in the South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; an emerging threat area lies in the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the Philippines and Malaysia where six ships were attacked in 2022 compared to nine in 2021; pirates and militants in the southern Philippines conduct attacks on vessels in the Sibutu passage, off Sibutu island, Tawi Tawi, Sulu sea, Celebes sea, and off eastern Sabah; they have attacked tugs, barges, fishing vessels, yachts, and merchant ships to rob and kidnap crews for ransom</p>"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

16
east-n-southeast-asia/sn.json
View file

@ -796,10 +796,10 @@
}
},
"Average household expenditures": {
"On food": {
"on food": {
"text": "6.9% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
},
"On alcohol and tobacco": {
"on alcohol and tobacco": {
"text": "1.9% of household expenditures (2018 est.)"
}
},
@ -1069,18 +1069,18 @@
"Communications": {
"Telephones - fixed lines": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "1.891 million (2020 est.)"
"text": "1,887,500 (2021 est.)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "32 (2020 est.)"
"text": "32 (2021 est.)"
}
},
"Telephones - mobile cellular": {
"total subscriptions": {
"text": "9,034,300 (2019)"
"text": "8,660,700 (2021)"
},
"subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
"text": "156 (2019)"
"text": "146 (2021)"
}
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@
"text": "a wealthy city-state, Singapore has a highly developed ICT infrastructure; government supported near universal home broadband penetration and free public access to wireless network; the government's telecommunication regulator, Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA), issued awards in mid-2020 to telecom operators with the goal of having at least 50% of the city-state covered with a standalone 5G network by the end of 2022; government actively promoting Smart Nation initiative supporting digital innovation; government oversees service providers and controls Internet content; well served by submarine cable and satellite connections (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "excellent domestic facilities; fixed-line roughly 32 per 100 and mobile-cellular 144 per 100 teledensity; multiple providers of high-speed Internet connectivity (2020)"
"text": "fixed-line is 32 per 100 and mobile-cellular 146 per 100 teledensity (2021)"
},
"international": {
"text": "country code - 65; landing points for INDIGO-West, SeaMeWe -3,-4,-5, SIGMAR, SJC, i2icn,&nbsp;PGASCOM, BSCS,&nbsp;IGG,&nbsp;B3JS, SAEx2, APCN-2, APG, ASC, SEAX-1, ASE, EAC-C2C, Matrix Cable System and SJC2 submarine cables providing links throughout Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, Australia, the Middle East, and Europe; satellite earth stations - 3, Bukit Timah, Seletar, and Sentosa; supplemented by VSAT coverage (2019 )"
@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@
"text": "Singapore is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily <br><br>the SAF's roots go back to 1854 when the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps was formed under colonial rule; the first battalion of regular soldiers, the First Singapore Infantry Regiment, was organized in 1957; the modern SAF was established in 1965; the SAF is widely viewed as the best equipped military in southeast Asia; the Army is largely based on conscripts and reservists with a small cadre of professional soldiers, while the Air Force and Navy are primarily comprised of well-trained professionals (2022)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the South China Sea as high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia; crews have been murdered or cast adrift; the Singapore Straits saw 35 attacks against commercial vessels in 2021, a 50% increase over 2020 and the highest number of incidents reported since 1992; vessels were boarded in 33 of the 35 incidents, one crew was injured, another assaulted and two threatened during these incidents"
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported that incidents in the Singapore Straits continue to increase year on year with 38 in 2022 compared to 35 in 2021; vessels were successfully boarded in all 38 incidents in 2022; while the majority of vessels boarded reported incidents as predominately low-level opportunistic thefts, four crew were taken hostage and a further two threatened during these incidents; the majority of incidents were reported during the hours of darkness and while vessels were underway; the territorial and offshore waters in the South China Sea remain a high risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; numerous commercial vessels have been attacked and hijacked both at anchor and while underway; hijacked vessels are often disguised and cargo diverted to ports in East Asia; crews have been murdered or cast adrift"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show more