diff --git a/africa/ao.json b/africa/ao.json
index 612885e6..40ba4abf 100644
--- a/africa/ao.json
+++ b/africa/ao.json
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "23,255 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 9,272 (Guinea), 6,357 (Cote d'Ivoire), 5,725 (Mauritania) (2023)"
+ "text": "23,265 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 9,272 (Guinea), 6,357 (Cote d'Ivoire), 5,725 (Mauritania) (2023)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
diff --git a/africa/by.json b/africa/by.json
index aa48fd67..74e2b123 100644
--- a/africa/by.json
+++ b/africa/by.json
@@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "86,230 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
+ "text": "86,380 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "76,987 (some ethnic Tutsis remain displaced from intercommunal violence that broke out after the 1993 coup and fighting between government forces and rebel groups; violence since April 2015) (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/cf.json b/africa/cf.json
index c5fdff01..e0e8a3ec 100644
--- a/africa/cf.json
+++ b/africa/cf.json
@@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "30,290 (Central African Republic), 27,476 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers)(2023)"
+ "text": "31,324 (Central African Republic), 27,930 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers)(2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "27,000 (multiple civil wars since 1992) (2022)"
diff --git a/africa/cg.json b/africa/cg.json
index 1f0fd1c6..2036e836 100644
--- a/africa/cg.json
+++ b/africa/cg.json
@@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "211,274 (Central African Republic), 208,075 (Rwanda), 57,020 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 43,271 (Burundi) (2023)"
+ "text": "211,366 (Central African Republic), 208,075 (Rwanda), 57,403 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 43,706 (Burundi) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "6.17 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/cn.json b/africa/cn.json
index ea2c78d8..a77a7b6d 100644
--- a/africa/cn.json
+++ b/africa/cn.json
@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@
"note": "note 1: when the Gendarmerie serves as the judicial police, it reports to the Minister of Justice; the Gendarmerie also has an intervention platoon that may act under the authority of the interior minister
note 2: the National Directorate of Territorial Safety oversees customs and immigration
note 3: the FCD is also known as the Comoran Security Force"
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "estimated 600 Defense Force personnel; estimated 500 Federal Police (2022)"
+ "text": "estimated 600 Defense Force personnel; estimated 500 Federal Police (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the defense forces are lightly armed with a mix of mostly older equipment originating from several countries, including France, Italy, Russia, and the US (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/ct.json b/africa/ct.json
index 9ad57cf4..ccc6ab11 100644
--- a/africa/ct.json
+++ b/africa/ct.json
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "18,011 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 6,636 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (2023)"
+ "text": "18,011 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 6,676 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "514,547 (clashes between army and rebel groups since 2005; tensions between ethnic groups) (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/dj.json b/africa/dj.json
index 36b80661..d307409e 100644
--- a/africa/dj.json
+++ b/africa/dj.json
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "13,308 (Somalia) (2023); 6,518 (Yemen) (mid-year 2022)"
+ "text": "13,329 (Somalia) (2023); 6,518 (Yemen) (mid-year 2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
diff --git a/africa/ek.json b/africa/ek.json
index 15252a77..a9b22958 100644
--- a/africa/ek.json
+++ b/africa/ek.json
@@ -1095,6 +1095,9 @@
"note": "note: police report to the Ministry of National Security, while gendarmes report to the Ministry of National Defense; police generally are responsible for maintaining law and order in the cities, while gendarmes are responsible for security outside cities and for special events; military personnel also fulfill some police functions in border areas, sensitive sites, and high-traffic areas"
},
"Military expenditures": {
+ "Military Expenditures 2022": {
+ "text": "1.1% of GDP (2022 est.)"
+ },
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
@@ -1106,13 +1109,10 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
"text": "1.1% of GDP (2018 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2017": {
- "text": "1.1% of GDP (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 1,500 active duty troops; approximately 500 Gendarmerie (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 1,500 active-duty troops; approximately 500 Gendarmerie (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FAGE is armed with mostly older (typically Soviet-era) and second-hand weapons systems; in recent years, it has sought to modernize its naval inventory with purchases of vessels from several countries, including Bulgaria and Israel; China and Russia have also supplied small amounts of equipment to the FAGE (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/ga.json b/africa/ga.json
index f1026b71..05980ccd 100644
--- a/africa/ga.json
+++ b/africa/ga.json
@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@
"text": "the GAF has a limited and obsolescent equipment inventory originating from several suppliers, including China, the UK, and the US (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service (18-22 for officers); no conscription; service obligation 6 months (2021)"
+ "text": "18-25 years of age for male and female voluntary military service (18-22 for officers); no conscription; service obligation 6 months (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Gambian security forces have a history of involvement in domestic politics, including multiple coups attempts and mutinies, with the latest being an attempted coup in 2022; since 2017, Gambia’s security sector has been undergoing reforms as part of a national reconstruction effort to recover from the 22 years of Yahya JAMMEH’s autocratic rule under which the security forces were severely under-resourced in terms of finances and equipment and were largely directed towards regime protection and suppressing dissent; international partners, including member states of the EU, particularly France and Germany, and the US have provided support to military and police reforms; several members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also provided security forces for stability, as well as assistance and training through the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG); as of 2023, ECOMIG continued to provide about 1,000 military and gendarmerie personnel from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal
the GAF is a lightly armed force with about 5 small infantry battalions, a handful of coastal patrol boats, and a few aircraft; in addition to external defense, the responsibilities of the GAF include providing maritime security, countering human trafficking, aiding civil authorities in emergencies and natural disaster relief, and engaging in activities such as engineering, education, health, and agriculture for domestic socio-economic development; the GAF also participates in peacekeeping missions, and since its first deployments in the 1990s, has been involved in more than 10 UN peacekeeping missions while contributing about 4,000 total troops
the GAF traces its origins to the Gambia Regiment of the British Army; established in 1901, the Gambia Regiment was part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF, later Royal West African Frontier Force or RWAFF) and served in both World Wars, including the British 1944-45 military campaign in Burma; the Gambia Regiment was disbanded in 1958 and replaced by the Field Force, a police paramilitary unit; the Field Force was responsible for The Gambia’s security until the establishment of the GAF in 1985; in addition, a defense agreement signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat; from 1981-1989, The Gambia and Senegal formed a Confederal Army that was made up of troops from both countries (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/gb.json b/africa/gb.json
index 0cae93b4..56d8e2cd 100644
--- a/africa/gb.json
+++ b/africa/gb.json
@@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 6,500 active duty troops including the Republican Guard and Gendarmerie (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 6,500 active-duty troops including the Republican Guard and Gendarmerie (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the Gabonese military is lightly armed with a mix of equipment from a variety of suppliers including Brazil, China, France, Germany, and South Africa (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/gh.json b/africa/gh.json
index b29045b3..dd608b4a 100644
--- a/africa/gh.json
+++ b/africa/gh.json
@@ -1233,13 +1233,13 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 14,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,000 Air Force) (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 14,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,000 Air Force) (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the military's inventory is a mix older and some newer Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service, with basic education certificate; no conscription (2022)"
+ "text": "18-27 years of age for voluntary military service, with basic education certificate; no conscription (2023)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "140 Mali (MINUSMA); 875 Lebanon (UNIFIL); 725 (plus about 275 police) South Sudan (UNMISS); 650 Sudan (UNISFA) (2023)",
diff --git a/africa/gv.json b/africa/gv.json
index 785c3114..6d7314d5 100644
--- a/africa/gv.json
+++ b/africa/gv.json
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
"text": "950 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major rivers (by length in km)": {
- "text": "Niger river source (shared with Mali, and Nigeria [m]) - 4,200 km; Gambia river source (shared with Senegal and The Gambia [m]) - 1,094 km
note – [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth"
+ "text": "Niger river source (shared with Mali, and Nigeria [m]) - 4,200 km; Gambie (Gambia) river source (shared with Senegal and The Gambia [m]) - 1,094 km
note – [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth"
},
"Major watersheds (area sq km)": {
"text": "Atlantic Ocean drainage: Niger (2,261,741 sq km), Senegal (456,397 sq km)"
@@ -315,7 +315,8 @@
},
"aerosolized dust or soil contact diseases": {
"text": "Lassa fever"
- }
+ },
+ "note": "note: on 20 September 2023, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention updated a Travel Health Alert for a diphtheria outbreak in several states in Guinea; vaccination against diphtheria is essential to protect against disease; if you are traveling to an affected area, you should be up to date with your diphtheria vaccines; before travel, discuss the need for a booster dose with your healthcare professional; diphtheria is a serious infection caused by strains of Corynebacterium diphtheriae bacteria that make a toxin from which people get very sick; diphtheria bacteria spread from person to person through respiratory droplets like from coughing or sneezing; people can also get sick from touching open sores or ulcers of people sick with diphtheria (see attached map)"
},
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "7.7% (2016)"
@@ -471,7 +472,7 @@
}
},
"Major rivers (by length in km)": {
- "text": "Niger river source (shared with Mali, and Nigeria [m]) - 4,200 km; Gambia river source (shared with Senegal and The Gambia [m]) - 1,094 km
note – [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth"
+ "text": "Niger river source (shared with Mali, and Nigeria [m]) - 4,200 km; Gambie (Gambia) river source (shared with Senegal and The Gambia [m]) - 1,094 km
note – [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth"
},
"Major watersheds (area sq km)": {
"text": "Atlantic Ocean drainage: Niger (2,261,741 sq km), Senegal (456,397 sq km)"
@@ -1201,7 +1202,7 @@
"text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of aging and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; in recent years, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, and South Africa (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "Voluntary and selective conscripted service, 9-24 mos (2022)"
+ "text": "18 years of age for voluntary and selective conscripted service; 9-12 months of service (2023)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "670 Mali (MINUSMA) (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/iv.json b/africa/iv.json
index fd26be3a..0163ce47 100644
--- a/africa/iv.json
+++ b/africa/iv.json
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army, including about 2,000 Special Forces; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force); 5-10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army, including about 2,000 Special Forces; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force); 5-10,000 Gendarmerie (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; in recent years it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from a variety of suppliers, including Bulgaria, China, and France (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/ke.json b/africa/ke.json
index b4eae99d..41564dd5 100644
--- a/africa/ke.json
+++ b/africa/ke.json
@@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "281,319 (Somalia), 157,402 (South Sudan), 57,286 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 21,847 (Ethiopia), 8,392 (Burundi), 5,756 (Sudan) (2023)"
+ "text": "281,319 (Somalia), 157,402 (South Sudan), 58,322 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 21,847 (Ethiopia), 8,392 (Burundi), 5,756 (Sudan) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "30,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2022)"
diff --git a/africa/mi.json b/africa/mi.json
index b2da2900..7428a9a4 100644
--- a/africa/mi.json
+++ b/africa/mi.json
@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "33,520 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) 11,433 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,563 (Rwanda) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
+ "text": "33,681 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) 11,433 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers), 6,563 (Rwanda) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
diff --git a/africa/mo.json b/africa/mo.json
index e5e0ae3e..fab18028 100644
--- a/africa/mo.json
+++ b/africa/mo.json
@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 200,000 active personnel (175,000 Army; 10,000 Navy; 15,000 Air Force); estimated 20,000 Gendarmerie; estimated 5,000 Mobile Intervention Corps; estimated 25-30,000 Auxiliary Forces (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 200,000 active personnel (175,000 Army; 10,000 Navy; 15,000 Air Force); estimated 20,000 Gendarmerie; estimated 5,000 Mobile Intervention Corps; estimated 25-30,000 Auxiliary Forces (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the Moroccan military's inventory is comprised of mostly older French and US equipment, although in recent years, it has received quantities of more modern equipment from a variety of countries with France and the US continuing to be the leading suppliers (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/mr.json b/africa/mr.json
index c475825b..d9840016 100644
--- a/africa/mr.json
+++ b/africa/mr.json
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@
"text": "the military's inventory is limited and made up largely of older French and Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, Mauritania has received small amounts of mostly secondhand military equipment from a variety of suppliers, with China as the leading provider (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)"
+ "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; has a compulsory two-year military service law, but the law has reportedly never been applied (2022)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "450 (plus about 320 police) Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (2023)",
diff --git a/africa/mz.json b/africa/mz.json
index 0496b9e9..ce61cab4 100644
--- a/africa/mz.json
+++ b/africa/mz.json
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "12,554 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,655 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
+ "text": "12,678 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 10,655 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "875,972 (north Mozambique, violence between the government and an opposition group, violence associated with extremists groups in 2018, political violence 2019) (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/ng.json b/africa/ng.json
index 6ced8154..bc5ab306 100644
--- a/africa/ng.json
+++ b/africa/ng.json
@@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "189,245 (Nigeria), 66,5020 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
+ "text": "216,655 (Nigeria), 66,5020 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "335,277 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/ni.json b/africa/ni.json
index eb7bad25..a58a1f2a 100644
--- a/africa/ni.json
+++ b/africa/ni.json
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@
"aerosolized dust or soil contact diseases": {
"text": "Lassa fever"
},
- "note": "note 1: on 4 May 2022, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a Travel Health Notice for a Yellow Fever outbreak in Nigeria; a large, ongoing outbreak of yellow fever in Nigeria began in September 2017; the outbreak is now spread throughout the country with the Nigerian Ministry of Health reporting cases of the disease in multiple states (Bauchi, Benue, Delta, Ebonyi, and Enugu); the CDC recommends travelers going to Nigeria should receive vaccination against yellow fever at least 10 days before travel and should take steps to prevent mosquito bites while there; those never vaccinated against yellow fever should avoid travel to Nigeria during the outbreak (see attached map)
note 2: on 31 August 2023, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Africa; Nigeria is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine
note 3: on 21 July 2023, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a Travel Health Alert for a diphtheria outbreak in several states in Nigeria; vaccination against diphtheria is essential to protect against disease; if you are traveling to an affected area, you should be up to date with your diphtheria vaccines; before travel, discuss the need for a booster dose with your healthcare professional; diphtheria is a serious infection caused by strains of Corynebacterium diphtheriae bacteria that make a toxin from which people get very sick; diphtheria bacteria spread from person to person through respiratory droplets like from coughing or sneezing; people can also get sick from touching open sores or ulcers of people sick with diphtheria (see attached map)"
+ "note": "note 1: on 4 May 2022, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a Travel Health Notice for a Yellow Fever outbreak in Nigeria; a large, ongoing outbreak of yellow fever in Nigeria began in September 2017; the outbreak is now spread throughout the country with the Nigerian Ministry of Health reporting cases of the disease in multiple states (Bauchi, Benue, Delta, Ebonyi, and Enugu); the CDC recommends travelers going to Nigeria should receive vaccination against yellow fever at least 10 days before travel and should take steps to prevent mosquito bites while there; those never vaccinated against yellow fever should avoid travel to Nigeria during the outbreak (see attached map)
note 2: on 31 August 2023, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Africa; Nigeria is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an “infected” person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine
note 3: on 20 September 2023, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention updated a Travel Health Alert for a diphtheria outbreak in several states in Nigeria; vaccination against diphtheria is essential to protect against disease; if you are traveling to an affected area, you should be up to date with your diphtheria vaccines; before travel, discuss the need for a booster dose with your healthcare professional; diphtheria is a serious infection caused by strains of Corynebacterium diphtheriae bacteria that make a toxin from which people get very sick; diphtheria bacteria spread from person to person through respiratory droplets like from coughing or sneezing; people can also get sick from touching open sores or ulcers of people sick with diphtheria (see attached map)"
},
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "8.9% (2016)"
diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json
index ada3fed7..2fa0f1dc 100644
--- a/africa/od.json
+++ b/africa/od.json
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "245,371 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 12,491 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)"
+ "text": "245,371 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 12,845 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "2.258 million (alleged coup attempt and ethnic conflict beginning in December 2013; information is lacking on those displaced in earlier years by: fighting in Abyei between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in May 2011; clashes between the SPLA and dissident militia groups in South Sudan; inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle; attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army; floods and drought) (2023)"
diff --git a/africa/rw.json b/africa/rw.json
index 37154b17..704e3933 100644
--- a/africa/rw.json
+++ b/africa/rw.json
@@ -1181,7 +1181,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 33,000 active RDF personnel (32,000 Army; 1,000 Air Force) (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 33,000 active RDF personnel (32,000 Army; 1,000 Air Force) (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the RDF's inventory includes mostly Soviet-era and older Western--largely French and South African--equipment; in recent years, Russia has been the top supplier of arms to Rwanda (2023)"
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "77,898 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 48,793 (Burundi) (2023)"
+ "text": "79,569 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 48,029 (Burundi) (2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "9,500 (2022)"
diff --git a/africa/sg.json b/africa/sg.json
index f0b9e3fa..e20cbe18 100644
--- a/africa/sg.json
+++ b/africa/sg.json
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
"text": "1,200 sq km (2012)"
},
"Major rivers (by length in km)": {
- "text": "Senegal (shared with Guinea [s], Mali, and Mauritania [m] ) - 1,641 km; Gambia (shared with Guinea [s] and The Gambia [m]) - 1,094 km
note – [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth"
+ "text": "Senegal (shared with Guinea [s], Mali, and Mauritania [m] ) - 1,641 km; Gambie (Gambia) (shared with Guinea [s] and The Gambia [m]) - 1,094 km
note – [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth"
},
"Major watersheds (area sq km)": {
"text": "Atlantic Ocean drainage: Senegal (456,397 sq km)"
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@
}
},
"Major rivers (by length in km)": {
- "text": "Senegal (shared with Guinea [s], Mali, and Mauritania [m] ) - 1,641 km; Gambia (shared with Guinea [s] and The Gambia [m]) - 1,094 km
note – [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth"
+ "text": "Senegal (shared with Guinea [s], Mali, and Mauritania [m] ) - 1,641 km; Gambie (Gambia) (shared with Guinea [s] and The Gambia [m]) - 1,094 km
note – [s] after country name indicates river source; [m] after country name indicates river mouth"
},
"Major watersheds (area sq km)": {
"text": "Atlantic Ocean drainage: Senegal (456,397 sq km)"
diff --git a/africa/sl.json b/africa/sl.json
index a1181ce0..fe41a9ef 100644
--- a/africa/sl.json
+++ b/africa/sl.json
@@ -1175,10 +1175,10 @@
"text": "the RSLAF has a small inventory that includes a mix of Soviet-origin and other older foreign-supplied equipment; in recent years, it has received limited amounts of mostly donations and secondhand equipment (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "18-29 for voluntary military service; women are eligible to serve; no conscription (2022)"
+ "text": "18-30 for voluntary military service for men and women (25-40 for specialists); no conscription (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
- "text": "the RSLAF’s principle responsibilities are securing the borders and the country’s territorial waters, supporting civil authorities during emergencies and reconstruction efforts, and participating in peacekeeping missions; it is small, lightly armed, and has a limited budget; since being reduced in size and restructured with British assistance after the end of the civil war in 2002, it has received assistance from several foreign militaries, including those of Canada, China, France, the UK, and the US; the RSLAF has participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Sudan; the Land Forces are by far the largest service with four small light infantry brigades; the Maritime Forces have a few small coastal and in-shore patrol boats, while the Air Wing has a handful of serviceable combat helicopters
the RSLAF’s origins lie in the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the RWAFF fought in both World Wars (2023)"
+ "text": "the RSLAF’s principle responsibilities are securing the borders and the country’s territorial waters, supporting civil authorities during emergencies and reconstruction efforts, and participating in peacekeeping missions; it is small, lightly armed, and has a limited budget; since being reduced in size and restructured with British assistance after the end of the civil war in 2002, it has received assistance from several foreign militaries, including those of Canada, China, France, the UK, and the US; the RSLAF has participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Sudan; the Land Forces are by far the largest service with four small light infantry brigades and a separate battalion, each assigned to a separate region, including the capital; the Maritime Forces have a few small coastal and in-shore patrol boats, while the Air Wing has a handful of serviceable combat helicopters; the RSLAF operates under a Joint Forces Command
the RSLAF’s origins lie in the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the RWAFF fought in both World Wars (2023)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reported one incident in the territorial waters of Sierra Leone in 2022 where the ship was hijacked, this was the first incident reported in two years; this incident was one of only two hijackings Worldwide in 2022; the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; past incidents have been reported where vessels were attacked and crews kidnapped; these incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in the area are well armed and violent; pirates have robbed vessels and kidnapped crews for ransom; in the past, product tankers were hijacked and cargo stolen; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2023-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 3 January 2023, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
diff --git a/africa/tz.json b/africa/tz.json
index cc8c80d7..acf9e789 100644
--- a/africa/tz.json
+++ b/africa/tz.json
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "125,221 (Burundi), 88,160 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)"
+ "text": "121,142 (Burundi), 88,445 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
diff --git a/africa/ug.json b/africa/ug.json
index ce722856..1ae2d270 100644
--- a/africa/ug.json
+++ b/africa/ug.json
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "893,925 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 494,874 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 51,692 (Somalia), 41,132 (Burundi), 36,900 (Eritrea), 23,808 (Rwanda), 9,139 (Ethiopia), 5,776 (Sudan) (2023)"
+ "text": "893,866 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 498,133 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 41,277 (Somalia), 38,533 (Burundi), 36,900 (Eritrea), 23,808 (Rwanda), 9,139 (Ethiopia), 5,776 (Sudan) (2023)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "67,000 (2022)"
diff --git a/africa/wa.json b/africa/wa.json
index c47ed88a..68a29a08 100644
--- a/africa/wa.json
+++ b/africa/wa.json
@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "6,285 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
+ "text": "6,170 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2023)"
}
}
}
diff --git a/africa/wz.json b/africa/wz.json
index da72dcd6..7e8ab058 100644
--- a/africa/wz.json
+++ b/africa/wz.json
@@ -1150,10 +1150,10 @@
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
- "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Eswatini does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials convicted more traffickers and identified more victims; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous year to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; the lack of government coordination and leadership by the Inter Agency Task Force and Prevention of People Trafficking and the People Smuggling Secretariat, dedicated funding, and training for front-line officers continued to hamper anti-trafficking efforts; serious allegations of trafficking and victim abuse against senior government officials have remained pending for multiple years; the government failed to refer all victims to services, and the first shelter for victims refurbished in collaboration with foreign donor support remained inoperative; therefore, Eswatini was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List (2022)"
+ "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Eswatini does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; Eswatini established multi-agency emergency response teams to respond to trafficking victim identification; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts, compared with the previous year, to expand its anti-trafficking capacity; the lack of government coordination and leadership of the Prevention of People Trafficking and Smuggling Secretariat continued to hinder efforts; the government did not allocate funding for the Prevention of People Trafficking and People Smuggling Task Force to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts; the lack of specialized training for front-line officers continued to hamper efforts; serious allegations of trafficking and victim abuse by senior government officials have remained pending for multiple years; the first shelter for victims refurbished in collaboration with foreign donor support remained inoperative for the second consecutive year; therefore, Eswatini remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year (2023)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
- "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Eswatini, and traffickers exploit victims from Eswatini abroad; traffickers target vulnerable communities, particularly those with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates; Swati girls, particularly orphans, are exploited in sex trafficking and domestic servitude, primarily in Eswatini and South Africa; Swati boys and foreign children are forced into labor in agriculture, cattle herding, and market vending within Eswatini; some Mozambican boys who migrate to Eswatini for work are exploited by traffickers in forced labor; Cuban nationals on medical missions in Eswatini may have been forced to work by the Cuban government; traffickers use Eswatini as a transit country to move foreign victims, primarily Mozambicans, to South Africa for forced labor; some Mozambican women reportedly are forced into commercial sex in Eswatini or transported to South Africa; some Swatis, including orphaned girls and girls from poor families who voluntarily migrate in search of work—particularly in South Africa—are exploited in sex trafficking; Swati men recruited in border communities are exploited in forced labor in South Africa’s timber industry (2022)"
+ "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Eswatini, and traffickers exploit victims from Eswatini abroad; traffickers target vulnerable communities, particularly those with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates; Swati girls, particularly orphans, are exploited in sex trafficking and domestic servitude, primarily in Eswatini and South Africa; some Swati girls in forced domestic work are physically and sexually abused by their employers, and sex traffickers exploit orphaned girls in exchange for food and money; Swati boys and foreign children are forced into labor in agriculture, cattle herding, and market vending within Eswatini; some Mozambican boys who migrate to Eswatini for work are exploited by traffickers in forced labor; Cuban nationals on medical missions in Eswatini may have been forced to work by the Cuban government; traffickers use Eswatini as a transit country to move foreign victims, primarily Mozambicans, to South Africa for forced labor; some Mozambican women reportedly are forced into commercial sex in Eswatini or transported to South Africa; some Swati people, including orphaned girls and girls from poor families who voluntarily migrate in search of work—particularly in South Africa—are exploited in sex trafficking; Swati men recruited in border communities are exploited in forced labor in South Africa’s timber industry (2023)"
}
}
}
diff --git a/africa/za.json b/africa/za.json
index 24f676e7..ada3114c 100644
--- a/africa/za.json
+++ b/africa/za.json
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@
"text": "Alliance for Democracy and Development or ADD [Charles MILUPI]
Forum for Democracy and Development or FDD [Edith NAWAKWI]
Movement for Multiparty Democracy or MMD [Dr. Nevers MUMBA]
Party of National Unity and Progress or PNUP [Highvie HAMUDUDU]
Patriotic Front or PF [Edgar LUNGU]
United Party for National Development or UPND [Hakainde HICHILEMA]"
},
"International organization participation": {
- "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, COMESA, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MONUSCO, NAM, OPCW, PCA, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
+ "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, COMESA, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MONUSCO, NAM, OPCW, PCA, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNDOF, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "57,301 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 8,330 (Burundi) (2023)"
+ "text": "58,274 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 8,330 (Burundi) (2023)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
diff --git a/africa/zi.json b/africa/zi.json
index 45678da5..276464cb 100644
--- a/africa/zi.json
+++ b/africa/zi.json
@@ -1185,20 +1185,20 @@
"text": "Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF): Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ)
Ministry of Home Affairs: Zimbabwe Republic Police (2023)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
+ "Military Expenditures 2022": {
+ "text": "0.5% of GDP (2022 est.)"
+ },
+ "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+ "text": "0.8% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+ },
+ "Military Expenditures 2020": {
+ "text": "0.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
+ },
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "2.6% of GDP (2019 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2018 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2017": {
- "text": "1.5% of GDP (2017 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2016": {
- "text": "1.8% of GDP (2016 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2015": {
- "text": "1.9% of GDP (2015 est.)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
- "text": "11,833 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 9,926 (Mozambique) (2023)"
+ "text": "11,867 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 9,926 (Mozambique) (2023)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
diff --git a/australia-oceania/tn.json b/australia-oceania/tn.json
index e502da14..a65449ba 100644
--- a/australia-oceania/tn.json
+++ b/australia-oceania/tn.json
@@ -1094,20 +1094,20 @@
"text": "His Majesty's Armed Forces Tonga (aka Tonga Defense Services): Tonga Royal Guard, Land Force (Royal Tongan Marines), Tonga Navy, Air Wing
Ministry of Police and Fire Services: Tonga Police Force (2023)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
+ "Military Expenditures 2023": {
+ "text": "1.6% of GDP (2023 est.)"
+ },
+ "Military Expenditures 2022": {
+ "text": "1.6% of GDP (2022 est.)"
+ },
+ "Military Expenditures 2021": {
+ "text": "1.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+ },
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
"text": "2.1% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "2.4% of GDP (2019 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2018": {
- "text": "1.5% of GDP (2018 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2017": {
- "text": "2.1% of GDP (2017 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2016": {
- "text": "1.7% of GDP (2016 est.)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json
index 2a7dea69..2021b238 100644
--- a/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json
+++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/do.json
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@
"text": "president nominated by the prime minister and leader of the opposition party and elected by the House of Assembly for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 1 October 2018 (next to be held in October 2023); prime minister appointed by the president"
},
"election results": {
- "text": "Charles A. SAVARIN (DLP) reelected president unopposed"
+ "text": "27 September 2023, parliament elects Sylvanie BURTON (DLP) with 20 votes for and five against; takes office on 2 October 2023"
}
},
"Legislative branch": {
diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json
index 7c576394..7b99a959 100644
--- a/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json
+++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json
@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "information varies; approximately 60,000 active personnel (30,000 Army; 13,000 Navy; 17,000 Air Force); approximately 30,000 National Police (2022)"
+ "text": "information varies; approximately 60,000 active personnel (30,000 Army; 13,000 Navy; 17,000 Air Force); approximately 30,000 National Police (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the military is lightly armed with an inventory consisting mostly of older US equipment (2023)"
diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json
index 9089df52..5caf6652 100644
--- a/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json
+++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/es.json
@@ -1245,15 +1245,15 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"IDPs": {
- "text": "71,500 (2021)"
+ "text": "52,000 (2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
- "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — El Salvador does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials convicted more traffickers and identified more victims; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous year to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; the government significantly reduced the number of specialized prosecutors; less than half of all victims received government services or referrals to care providers; officials did not implement procedures to identify potential victims among children apprehended for gang-related activity or persons forcibly displaced from their homes; the government did not initiate any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of officials allegedly complicit in trafficking crimes or report progress on investigations from previous years; the anti-trafficking council was inactive and did not draft a new national anti-trafficking action plan, report on the government's 2021 efforts, or compile data across agencies; therefore, El Salvador was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List (2022)"
+ "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — El Salvador does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; El Salvador hired more police and prosecutors in specialized anti-trafficking units and provided awareness training for Salvadorans participating in temporary work programs abroad; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts, compared with the previous year, to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; the government investigated, prosecuted, and convicted fewer traffickers; less than half of all victims received government services or referrals to care providers, and services provided were inadequate; the government arrested and detained thousands of suspected gang members, disabling criminal networks that fueled demand for sex and labor trafficking, but authorities arrested and detained children affiliated with gangs without screening for trafficking indicators; interagency coordination remained weak, government data was unreliable, and the national anti-trafficking council did not reconcile the data or publish a report on the government’s 2022 efforts; therefore, El Salvador remained on Tier 2 Watch list (2023)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
- "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in El Salvador, and traffickers exploit victims from El Salvador abroad; adults and children are exploited in sex trafficking within the country; children without parents, adolescent girls, and LGBTQI+ persons—especially transgender persons—are at particular risk; sex trafficking reportedly occurs in the tourism industry; traffickers exploit victims within their own communities, sometimes their own children or other family members; Salvadoran adults and children are exploited in forced labor in agriculture, domestic service, and begging; adults and children from neighboring countries—particularly Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua—are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in construction, domestic service, or the informal sector; traffickers recruit victims in regions of El Salvador with high levels of violence; limited government presence in gang-controlled territory exacerbates trafficking risks; gangs use the pretense of domestic employment to lure women into forced labor; transnational criminal organizations and gangs including MS-13 and Barrio 18 recruit, abduct, train, arm, and subject children to forced labor—including assassinations, extortion, and drug trafficking; these groups subject women and children, including LGBTQI+ children, to sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic service and child care; Salvadoran men, women, and children are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in Belize, Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States; traffickers exploit some Central and South American, African, and Asian migrants who transit El Salvador to Guatemala, Mexico, the United States, and Canada in sex and labor trafficking; endemic corruption and complicity, including within law enforcement, the judiciary, the prison system, and local government, hinder anti-trafficking efforts (2022)"
+ "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in El Salvador, and traffickers exploit victims from El Salvador abroad; adults and children are exploited in sex trafficking within the country; orphans, adolescent girls, and LGBTQI+ persons are at particular risk; sex trafficking reportedly occurs in the tourism industry; traffickers exploit victims within their own communities or homes, sometimes their own children or other family members; Salvadoran adults and children are exploited in forced labor in agriculture, domestic service, and begging; adults and children from neighboring countries—particularly Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua—are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in construction, domestic service, or the informal sector; traffickers recruit victims in regions of El Salvador with high levels of violence and capitalize on fear to coerce victims and their families through threats of violence; in 2022, territorial gang control decreased dramatically across El Salvador, following the arrests of thousands of suspected gang members under the government’s state of exception; reports indicate extortion and violence declined significantly, but no data is available on the state of exception’s impact on trafficking; prior to the state of exception, limited government presence in gang-controlled territory exacerbated trafficking risks among vulnerable groups; many families were displaced fleeing gang exploitation of children; transnational criminal organizations and gangs, including MS-13 and Barrio 18, recruited, abducted, trained, armed, and subjected children to forced labor—including assassinations, extortion, and drug trafficking; these groups subjected women and children, including LGBTQI+ children, to sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic service and child care; Salvadoran men, women, and children are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in Belize, Guatemala, Mexico, and the US; traffickers exploit some Salvadorans who irregularly migrate to the US in forced labor, criminal activity, and sex trafficking en route or upon arrival; traffickers exploit some victims from Asia, South America, or other Central American countries in sex and labor trafficking in El Salvador; reported corruption and complicity among some government officials may have obstructed anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts (2023)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json
index fa2de0c7..65e85170 100644
--- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json
+++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@
"text": "Cabinet appointed by president"
},
"elections/appointments": {
- "text": "president directly elected by simple majority popular vote for a 4-year term; election last held on 28 November 2021 (next to be held in 30 November 2025); note - in 2015, the Constitutional Chamber of the Honduran Supreme Court struck down the constitutional provisions on presidential term limits"
+ "text": "president directly elected by simple majority popular vote for a 4-year term; election last held on 28 November 2021 (next to be held on 30 November 2025); note - in 2015, the Constitutional Chamber of the Honduran Supreme Court struck down the constitutional provisions on presidential term limits"
},
"election results": {
"text": "
2021: Iris Xiomara CASTRO de Zelaya elected president; percent of vote - Iris Xiomara CASTRO de Zelaya (LIBRE) 51.1%, Nasry Juan ASFURA Zablah (PNH) 36.9%, Yani Benjamin ROSENTHAL Hidalgo (PL) 10%, other 2%
2017: Juan Orlando HERNANDEZ Alvarado reelected president; percent of vote - Juan Orlando HERNANDEZ Alvarado (PNH) 43%, Salvador NASRALLA (Alianza de Oposicion contra la Dictadura) 41.4%, Luis Orlando ZELAYA Medrano (PL) 14.7%, other 0.9%"
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 16,000 active personnel (7,500 Army; 1,500 Navy, including about 1,000 marines; 2,000 Air Force; 5,000 Military Police of Public Order); approximately 18,000 National Police (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 16,000 active personnel (7,500 Army; 1,500 Navy, including about 1,000 marines; 2,000 Air Force; 5,000 Military Police of Public Order); approximately 18,000 National Police (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FFAA's inventory is comprised of mostly older imported equipment from Israel, the UK, and the US; in recent years, it has received limited amounts of military equipment from several countries, including Colombia and Israel (2023)"
diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json
index 64a94706..d170438a 100644
--- a/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json
+++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json
@@ -1151,13 +1151,13 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 4,000 personnel (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 5,000 personnel (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the JDF is lightly armed with a limited inventory featuring equipment mostly from Europe and the US (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "no conscription; 18-23 for voluntary military service (17 with parental consent); 18-28 for the reserves; since 2017, the JDF's standard mode of recruitment is to enroll recruits ages 18-23 through the Jamaica National Service Corps (JNSC); in the JNSC, soldiers receive basic military, vocational, and life skills training; upon completion of 12 months of service, soldiers can continue on with the JDF or seek other opportunities with other government agencies (2022)"
+ "text": "no conscription; 18-23 for voluntary military service (17 with parental consent); 18-28 for the reserves; since 2017, the JDF's standard mode of recruitment is to enroll recruits ages 18-23 through the Jamaica National Service Corps (JNSC); in the JNSC, soldiers receive basic military, vocational, and life skills training; upon completion of 12 months of service, soldiers can continue on with the JDF or seek other opportunities with other government agencies (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "in addition to its responsibility of defending against external aggression, the JDF's primary missions are border, internal, and maritime security, including support to police operations in combating crime and violence; other missions include search and rescue, disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping; it has arrest authority and partners with the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF); both the JDF and JCF are under the Ministry of National Security, which directs policy for the security forces; the JDF participates in bilateral and multinational training exercises, including with the militaries of Canada, the UK, the US, and other Caribbean nations
while Jamaica had a militia force as early as the 1660s, the JDF was constituted in 1962 from the West India Regiment (WIR), a British colonial regiment which dates back to 1795; troops for the WIR were recruited from freed slaves from North America, slaves purchased in the West Indies, and slaves from Africa bought off slave ships (2023)"
diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json
index d01b026b..49ebefe5 100644
--- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json
+++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json
@@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
- "text": "0.5% of GDP (2022 est.)"
+ "text": "0.6% of GDP (2022 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "0.6% of GDP (2021 est.)"
@@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@
"text": "the military's inventory includes mostly secondhand Russian/Soviet-era equipment; in recent years, Russia has been the leading arms supplier to Nicaragua (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "18-30 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; tour of duty 18-36 months (2022)"
+ "text": "18-30 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; tour of duty 18-36 months (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the military is responsible for defending Nicaragua’s independence, sovereignty, and territory, but also has some domestic security responsibilities; key tasks include border security, assisting the police, protecting natural resources, and providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; it has ties with the militaries of Cuba, Venezuela, and Russia; Russia has provided training support and equipment
the military’s Land Forces have a mechanized brigade and approximately 8 regional commands or detachments, each with 1 or more light infantry battalions; there is also a small special operations command; the Naval Forces operate patrol boats and have a naval infantry battalion; the Air Forces do not possess any combat aircraft
the modern Army of Nicaragua was created in 1979 as the Sandinista Popular Army (1979-1984); prior to 1979, the military was known as the National Guard, which was organized and trained by the US in the 1920s and 1930s; the first commander of the National Guard, Anastasio SOMOZA GARCIA, seized power in 1937 and ran the country as a military dictator until his assassination in 1956; his sons ran the country either directly or through figureheads until the Sandinistas came to power in 1979; the defeated National Guard was disbanded by the Sandinistas (2023)"
diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json
index a547e560..2fa134a0 100644
--- a/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json
+++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/vc.json
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
{
+ "Introduction": {
+ "Background": {
+ "text": "Resistance by native Caribs prevented colonization on Saint Vincent until 1719. Disputed by France and the UK for most of the 18th century, the island was ceded to Britain in 1783. The British prized Saint Vincent due to its fertile soil, which allowed for thriving slave-run plantations of sugar, coffee, indigo, tobacco, cotton, and cocoa. In 1834, the British abolished slavery. Immigration of indentured servants eased the ensuing labor shortage, as did subsequent Portuguese immigrants from Madeira and East Indian laborers. Conditions remained harsh for both former slaves and immigrant agricultural workers, however, as depressed world sugar prices kept the economy stagnant until the early 1900s. The economy then went into a period of decline with many landowners abandoning their estates and leaving the land to be cultivated by liberated slaves. Between 1960 and 1962, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was a separate administrative unit of the Federation of the West Indies. Autonomy was granted in 1969 and independence in 1979. In April 2021, the explosive eruption of the La Soufrière volcano in the north of Saint Vincent destroyed much of Saint Vincent’s most productive agricultural lands. Unlike most of its tourism-dependent neighbors, the Vincentian economy is primarily agricultural. The US provided $4.7 million in humanitarian support after the eruption."
+ }
+ },
"Geography": {
"Location": {
"text": "Caribbean, islands between the Caribbean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean, north of Trinidad and Tobago"
@@ -95,11 +100,6 @@
"text": "the administration of the islands of the Grenadines group is divided between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is comprised of 32 islands and cays"
}
},
- "Introduction": {
- "Background": {
- "text": "Resistance by native Caribs prevented colonization on Saint Vincent until 1719. Disputed by France and the UK for most of the 18th century, the island was ceded to Britain in 1783. The British prized Saint Vincent due to its fertile soil, which allowed for thriving slave-run plantations of sugar, coffee, indigo, tobacco, cotton, and cocoa. In 1834, the British abolished slavery. Immigration of indentured servants eased the ensuing labor shortage, as did subsequent Portuguese immigrants from Madeira and East Indian laborers. Conditions remained harsh for both former slaves and immigrant agricultural workers, however, as depressed world sugar prices kept the economy stagnant until the early 1900s. The economy then went into a period of decline with many landowners abandoning their estates and leaving the land to be cultivated by liberated slaves. Between 1960 and 1962, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was a separate administrative unit of the Federation of the West Indies. Autonomy was granted in 1969 and independence in 1979. In April 2021, the explosive eruption of the La Soufrière volcano in the north of Saint Vincent destroyed much of Saint Vincent’s most productive agricultural lands. Unlike most of its tourism-dependent neighbors, the Vincentian economy is primarily agricultural. The US provided $4.7 million in humanitarian support after the eruption."
- }
- },
"People and Society": {
"Population": {
"text": "100,804 (2023 est.)"
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "no regular military forces; Royal Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force (RSVPF; includes the Coast Guard, Special Services Unit, Rapid Response Unit, Drug Squad, and Anti-Trafficking Unit) (2023)",
- "note": "note: the RSVPF is the only security force in the country and is responsible for maintaining internal security; it reports to the minister of national security, a portfolio held by the prime minister"
+ "note": "note: the RSVPF is the only security force in the country and is responsible for maintaining internal security; it reports to the Minister of National Security, a portfolio held by the prime minister"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the country has been a member of the Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS) since its creation in 1982; RSS signatories (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts, and Saint Lucia) agreed to prepare contingency plans and assist one another, on request, in national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, fishery protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control, national and other disasters, and threats to national security (2023)"
diff --git a/central-asia/kg.json b/central-asia/kg.json
index 01f51c21..6acb1415 100644
--- a/central-asia/kg.json
+++ b/central-asia/kg.json
@@ -1171,6 +1171,9 @@
"text": "Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic: Land Forces, Air Defense Forces, National Guard; Internal Troops; State Committee for National Security (GKNB): State Border Service (2023)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
+ "Military Expenditures 2022": {
+ "text": "1.5% of GDP (2022 est.)"
+ },
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
"text": "1.7% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
@@ -1182,13 +1185,10 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
"text": "2.3% of GDP (2018 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2017": {
- "text": "2.3% of GDP (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 14,000 active-duty troops (8,500 Land Forces; 2,500 Air Force/Air Defense; 3,000 National Guard) (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 15,000 active-duty troops (9,000 Land Forces; 3,000 Air Force/Air Defense; 3,000 National Guard) (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the Kyrgyz military inventory is comprised of mostly older Russian and Soviet-era equipment; Russia is the leading supplier of armaments (2023)"
diff --git a/central-asia/rs.json b/central-asia/rs.json
index e148ff9d..b6c91bdf 100644
--- a/central-asia/rs.json
+++ b/central-asia/rs.json
@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@
"note": "note 1: in February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with an estimated 150,000 troops; prior to the invasion, it maintained an estimated 30,000 troops in areas of Ukraine occupied since 2014
note 2: as of 2023, Russia was assessed to have about 3,000-5,000 private military contractors conducting military and security operations in Africa and the Middle East, including in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Syria"
},
"Military - note": {
- "text": "the Russian military is a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers that is capable of conducting the full range of air, land, maritime, and strategic missile operations; it is also active in the areas of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and space; in addition to protecting Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the military supports Moscow’s national security objectives, which include maintaining and projecting influence and power outside Russia, particularly in the former Soviet republics, and deterring perceived external threats from the US and NATO; in recent years, the Russian military has conducted combat operations in both Syria and Ukraine; in February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the military, particularly the ground forces, continues to be heavily engaged there in what is the largest war in Europe since World War II ended in 1945; Russia has occupied Ukraine’s province of Crimea and backed separatist forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine since 2014 with arms, equipment, and training, as well as special operations forces and troops, although Moscow denied their presence prior to 2022; Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war at the request of the ASAD government in September 2015 in what was Moscow’s first overseas expeditionary operation since the Soviet era; Russian assistance has included air support, arms and equipment, intelligence, military advisors, private military contractors, special operations forces, and training; it seized the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008; separately, Russia has provided military personnel and private military contractors to conduct missions in Africa, including in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan
Russia is the leading member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and has committed approximately 8,000 troops to CSTO's rapid reaction force (2023)"
+ "text": "the Russian military is a mixed force of conscripts and volunteers that is capable of conducting the full range of air, land, maritime, and strategic missile operations; it is also active in the areas of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and space; in addition to protecting Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the military supports Moscow’s national security objectives, which include maintaining and projecting influence and power outside Russia, particularly in the former Soviet republics, and deterring perceived external threats from the US and NATO; in recent years, the Russian military has conducted combat operations in both Syria and Ukraine; in February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the military, particularly the ground forces, continues to be heavily engaged there in what is the largest war in Europe since World War II ended in 1945; Russia has occupied Ukraine’s province of Crimea and backed separatist forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine since 2014 with arms, equipment, and training, as well as special operations forces and troops, although Moscow denied their presence prior to 2022; Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war at the request of the ASAD government in September 2015 in what was Moscow’s first overseas expeditionary operation since the Soviet era; Russian assistance has included air support, arms and equipment, intelligence, military advisors, private military contractors, special operations forces, and training; it seized the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008; separately, Russia has provided military personnel and private military contractors to conduct missions in Africa, including in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan
Russian forces are organized into five military districts and operational/joint strategic commands; the Ground Troops are configured into at least 11 combined arms armies, one tank army, and four army corps, each comprised of a mixture of tank or “motorized rifle” (mechanized or motorized infantry) division and brigade structures supplemented by artillery, tactical missile, and air defense forces; the most capable ground forces are the special forces (Spetsial’noye naznacheniye or Spetsnaz) brigades and Airborne and Air Assault Troops (VDV), which are considered strategic-level assets; the Spetsnaz forces have eight brigades, while the VDV has two airborne and two air assault divisions, plus four independent air assault brigades and a Spetsnaz reconnaissance regiment
the Navy conducts operations globally and has four fleets (Baltic, Black Sea, Pacific, and Northern), as well as a flotilla in the Caspian Sea; the principal surface warships are an aircraft carrier (under repair until at least 2024), four battlecruisers or cruisers, and over 20 destroyers and frigates; the backbone of the Navy is its submarine force, which has approximately 50-60 nuclear ballistic missile, nuclear cruise missile, nuclear attack-type, and conventional attack submarines; the ballistic missile submarines are an essential arm of Russia’s nuclear triad; the Navy has an aviation force with fighters, multipurpose fighters, and surface attack aircraft, as well as anti-submarine warfare and attack helicopters; it also has coastal defense forces and a ground force of several naval infantry brigades, which have been used as ground troops in Ukraine
the Aerospace Forces include as sub-branches the Air Force, the Air and Missile Defense Forces, and Space Forces; the Air and Air/Missile Defense elements are typically organized into armies, commands, bases, brigades, and regiments; the Air Forces are some of the largest in the world, and prior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine included nearly 1,500 fighters, multirole fighters, and bombers, as well as nearly 1,500 combat helicopters
the Strategic Rocket Forces have both road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and are organized into three armies with 12 subordinate divisions, each further broken down into regiments
the paramilitary Russian National Guard is organized into regions or districts with subordinate divisions and brigades, which include a mix of security, special purpose, protective, and motorized units, as well as some artillery and aviation forces (2023)"
}
},
"Space": {
diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json
index 661419d8..0c926c97 100644
--- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json
+++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json
@@ -1165,10 +1165,10 @@
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"tier rating": {
- "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Brunei does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so, therefore Brunei was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including initiating a labor trafficking prosecution, increasing investigations, and continuing construction of shelters; however, officials did not convict any traffickers under its trafficking statute, nor did it identify any victims; the government continued to detain, deport, and charge potential victims without attempting to discern if traffickers compelled the victims to engage in unlawful acts (2023)"
+ "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Brunei does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so, therefore Brunei was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List; key achievements included referring two alleged traffickers for prosecution, including one Bruneian national, identifying and providing assistance to 14 victims, opening two shelters for victims, and signing a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with Bangladesh on recruitment of migrant workers; however, the government did not effectively screen for trafficking among foreign nationals in commercial sex and migrant workers; officials handled some potential trafficking cases administratively, if at all, and probably inappropriately detained, prosecuted, and deported potentially unidentified sex and labor trafficking victims; for the sixth consecutive year, the government did not convict any traffickers under its anti-trafficking law, and other laws that could be used to prosecute traffickers did not provide sufficiently stringent sentences (2023)"
},
"trafficking profile": {
- "text": "human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Brunei; some men and women who migrate to Brunei to work in domestic service, retail, or construction work are subject to involuntary servitude, debt-based coercion, contract switching, non-payment of wages, passport confiscation, physical abuse, or confinement; some female migrants entering Brunei on tourist visas are forced into prostitution; some traffickers use Brunei as a transit point for victims used for sex and labor trafficking in Malaysia and Indonesia; Anti-LGBTQI+ laws place some LGBTQI+ individuals at higher risk; Trafficking experts in Brunei have received threats from traffickers (2022)"
+ "text": "human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Brunei; some men and women who migrate to Brunei to work in domestic service, retail, or construction work are subject to involuntary servitude, debt-based coercion, contract switching, non-payment of wages, passport confiscation, physical abuse, or confinement; some female migrants entering Brunei on tourist visas are forced into prostitution, and some Kenyan women reportedly faced forced labor in Brunei; workers from Bangladesh and China may have been forced to work in Brunei at Chinese-run projects; some traffickers use Brunei as a transit point for victims used for sex and labor trafficking in Malaysia and Indonesia; Anti-LGBTQI+ laws place some LGBTQI+ individuals at higher risk; trafficking experts in Brunei have received threats from traffickers (2023)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {
diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json
index 1cfdc756..28bf08aa 100644
--- a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json
+++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json
@@ -1210,20 +1210,20 @@
"note": "note 1: the National Committe for Maritime Security performs coast guard functions and has representation from military and civilian agencies
note 2: the Cambodian National Police are under the Ministry of Interior"
},
"Military expenditures": {
+ "Military Expenditures 2022": {
+ "text": "2.1% of GDP (2022 est.)"
+ },
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
- "text": "2.5% of GDP (2021 est.)"
+ "text": "2.3% of GDP (2021 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
- "text": "2.5% of GDP (2020 est.)"
+ "text": "2.3% of GDP (2020 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "2.2% of GDP (2019 est.)"
},
"Military Expenditures 2018": {
"text": "2.2% of GDP (2018 est.)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2017": {
- "text": "2.1% of GDP (2017 est.)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json
index 720b8ffa..a4e1e7f6 100644
--- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json
+++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json
@@ -1259,17 +1259,17 @@
"note": "note: the Japanese Government in 2022 pledged to increase defense expenditures to 2% of GDP in line with NATO standards by 2028; if the planned increase occurs, Japan would have one of the world's largest defense budgets"
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 240,000 active personnel (150,000 Ground; 45,000 Maritime; 45,000 Air); 14,000 Coast Guard (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 240,000 active personnel (150,000 Ground; 45,000 Maritime; 45,000 Air); 14,000 Coast Guard (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the JSDF is equipped with a mix of imported and domestically produced equipment; Japan has a robust defense industry and is capable of producing a wide range of air, ground, and naval weapons systems; the majority of its weapons imports are from the US and some domestically produced weapons are US-origin and manufactured under license (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (maximum enlistment age 32); no conscription (2022)",
- "note": "note: as of 2020, women made up about 7% of the military's full-time personnel"
+ "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (maximum enlistment age 32); no conscription (2023)",
+ "note": "note: as of 2021, women made up about 7% of the military's full-time personnel"
},
"Military deployments": {
- "text": "approximately 180 Djibouti (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 200 Djibouti (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "Japan was disarmed after its defeat in World War II; shortly after the Korean War began in 1950, US occupation forces in Japan created a 75,000-member lightly armed force called the National Police Reserve; the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was founded in 1954; the current JSDF is a trained and professional military equipped with modern weaponry; its primary concerns are China and North Korea, as well as protecting the country’s territorial waters, countering piracy and terrorism, and conducting humanitarian operations; it exercises regularly with the US military and increasingly with other regional countries, such as Australia; the ground forces are organized into 10 divisions and a number of independent brigades, which include airborne, air assault, and amphibious rapid reaction forces; the maritime force is one of the largest and most modern navies in the world; its principal warships include four helicopter carriers (two are undergoing conversion to light aircraft carriers), nearly 50 destroyers and frigates/destroyer escorts, three landing platform/dock (LPD) amphibious assault ships, and more than 20 attack-type submarines; it also has a large force of maritime aircraft, including over 150 for anti-submarine warfare; the Air Self Defense Force has over 300 modern combat aircraft, as well as more than 200 other aircraft for surveillance, early warning, electronic warfare, search and rescue, transportation, and logistics
Japan’s alliance with the US (signed in 1951) is one of the cornerstones of the country’s security, as well as a large part of the US security role in Asia; approximately 55,000 US troops and other military assets, including aircraft and naval ships, are stationed in Japan and have exclusive use of more than 80 bases and facilities; in exchange for their use, the US guarantees Japan’s security; the Japanese Government provides about $2 billion per year to offset the cost of stationing US forces in Japan; in addition, it pays compensation to localities hosting US troops, rent for bases, and costs for new facilities to support the US presence; Japan also has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation
Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 constitution renounced the use of force as a means of settling international disputes; however, Japan has interpreted Article 9 to mean that it can maintain a military for national defense purposes and, since 1991, has allowed the JSDF to participate in noncombat roles overseas in a number of UN peacekeeping missions and in the US-led coalition in Iraq; in 2014-2015 the Japanese Government reinterpreted the constitution as allowing for \"collective self-defense,\" described as the use of force on others’ behalf if Japan’s security was threatened; in 2022, the government released three documents that provided a blueprint that could fundamentally reshape Japan’s approach to its security; the documents labeled China as an “unprecedented strategic challenge,” declared Japan’s intention to develop \"counterstrike” capabilities, including cruise missiles and armed drones, and outlined plans to increase Japan’s security-related expenditures to 2% of its national gross domestic product (GDP), in line with NATO standards; post-war Japan generally has limited defense spending to 1% of its GDP (2023)"
diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json
index 1f416416..fdffbadc 100644
--- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json
+++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@
},
"National heritage": {
"total World Heritage Sites": {
- "text": "15 (13 cultural, 2 natural)"
+ "text": "16 (14 cultural, 2 natural)"
},
"selected World Heritage Site locales": {
"text": "Jeju Volcanic Island and Lava Tubes (n); Changdeokgung Palace Complex (c); Jongmyo Shrine (c); Seokguram Grotto and Bulguksa Temple (c); Gochang, Hwasun, and Ganghwa Dolmen Sites (c); Gyeongju Historic Areas (c); Namhansanseong (c); Baekje Historic Areas (c); Sansa, Buddhist Mountain Monasteries in Korea (c); Royal Tombs of the Joseon Dynasty (c)"
@@ -1226,6 +1226,9 @@
"note": "note 1: in January 2022, the South Korean military announced the formation of a space branch under its Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate the development of space and space-enabled capabilities across the Army, Navy and Air Force
note 2: the military reserves include Mobilization Reserve Forces (First Combat Forces) and Homeland Defense Forces (Regional Combat Forces)"
},
"Military expenditures": {
+ "Military Expenditures 2023": {
+ "text": "2.6% of GDP (2023)"
+ },
"Military Expenditures 2022": {
"text": "2.6% of GDP (2022 est.)"
},
@@ -1237,13 +1240,10 @@
},
"Military Expenditures 2019": {
"text": "2.7% of GDP (2019)"
- },
- "Military Expenditures 2018": {
- "text": "2.5% of GDP (2018)"
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 550,000 active-duty personnel (420,000 Army; 70,000 Navy, including about 30,000 Marines; 60,000 Air Force) (2023)"
+ "text": "approximately 500,000 active-duty personnel (365,000 Army; 70,000 Navy, including about 30,000 Marines; 65,000 Air Force) (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the South Korean military is equipped with a mix of domestically produced and imported weapons systems; South Korea has a robust defense industry and production includes armored fighting vehicles, artillery, aircraft, naval ships, and missiles; its weapons are designed to be compatible with US and NATO systems; in recent years the top foreign weapons supplier has been the US, and some domestically produced systems are built under US license (2023)"
diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json
index 895603ca..82e96e1f 100644
--- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json
+++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
- "text": "approximately 115,000 active duty troops (80,000 Army; 18,000 Navy; 17,000 Air Force) (2022)"
+ "text": "approximately 110,000 active-duty troops (80,000 Army; 15,000 Navy; 15,000 Air Force) (2023)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the military fields a diverse mix of older and more modern imported weapons systems from a wide variety of suppliers across Europe, Asia, and the US; in recent years it has received military equipment from approximately 20 countries with South Korea as one of the leading suppliers (2023)"
diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json
index a25ccefb..56106615 100644
--- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json
+++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json
@@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@
"text": "the PNGDF is lightly armed; most of its military assistance has come from Australia (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "18-27 for a general enlistee or 18-30 for an officer cadet; no conscription (2022)"
+ "text": "18-27 for voluntary military service; no conscription (2023)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the PNGDF is a small, lightly armed, and underfunded force tasked with defense of the country and its territories against external attack, as well as internal security and socio-economic development duties; the Land Element includes two infantry battalions, an engineer battalion, a signal squadron, an explosive ordnance disposal unit, and a preventive medicine platoon; the Air Element is a small air wing operating a light transport aircraft and two leased helicopters while the Maritime Element consists of four patrol boats and two landing craft
the PNGDF was established in 1973, and its primary combat unit, the Royal Pacific Islands Regiment (RPIR), is descended from Australian Army infantry battalions comprised of native soldiers and led by Australian officers and non-commissioned officers formed during World War II to help fight the Japanese; the RPIR was disbanded after the war, but reestablished in 1951 as part of the Australian Army where it continued to serve until Papua New Guinea gained its independence in 1975, when it became part of the PNGDF
Papua New Guinea's traditional security partners are Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the US; Australia and the US are assisting the country with expanding and improving the Defense Force naval base at Lombrum on Manus Island; the US first established a Lombrum base in 1944 during World War II; in recent years, Papua New Guinea has established security ties with France and the UK; the US and PNG signed a defense cooperation agreement in May 2023, which included a shiprider agreement that provides the opportunity for PNG personnel to work on US Coast Guard and US Navy vessels, and vice versa, to tackle maritime crime such as illegal fishing (2023)"
diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json
index 4af16aa0..eea4121a 100644
--- a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json
+++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json
@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@
"text": "the AFP is equipped with a wide mix of imported weapons systems; in recent years, it has received equipment from more than a dozen countries led by Israel, South Korea, and the US (2023)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
- "text": "18-25 (enlisted) and 21-29 (officers) years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2022)",
+ "text": "18-27 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2023)",
"note": "note: as of 2020, women made up about 6% of the active military; women were allowed to enter the Philippine Military Academy and train as combat soldiers in 1993"
},
"Military - note": {
diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json
index f2ac43ef..b4243013 100644
--- a/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json
+++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/vm.json
@@ -314,7 +314,8 @@
},
"vectorborne diseases": {
"text": "dengue fever, malaria, and Japanese encephalitis"
- }
+ },
+ "note": "note: On 20 September 2023, the CDC issued a travel notice for an outbreak of diphtheria in several provinces in Vietnam (see attached map); vaccination against diphtheria is essential to protect against disease; if you are traveling to an affected area, you should be up to date with your diphtheria vaccines; Diphtheria is a serious infection caused by strains of bacteria called Corynebacterium diphtheriae that make a toxin; Diphtheria bacteria spread from person to person, usually through respiratory droplets, like from coughing or sneezing"
},
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
"text": "2.1% (2016)"
diff --git a/europe/al.json b/europe/al.json
index 4caf11e9..6567e7fa 100644
--- a/europe/al.json
+++ b/europe/al.json
@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@
"stateless persons": {
"text": "1,948 (2022)"
},
- "note": "note: 45,491 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-July 2023)"
+ "note": "note: 45,889 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-August 2023)"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "
a source country for cannabis and an active transshipment point for Albanian narco-trafficking organizations moving illicit drugs into European markets
" diff --git a/europe/bk.json b/europe/bk.json index b357a066..8855653f 100644 --- a/europe/bk.json +++ b/europe/bk.json @@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "48 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 132,858 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-August 2023)" + "note": "note: 133,892 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-September 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets
" diff --git a/europe/bu.json b/europe/bu.json index 04fa28c8..be5c0d27 100644 --- a/europe/bu.json +++ b/europe/bu.json @@ -1299,10 +1299,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Bulgaria does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials prosecuted significantly more suspected traffickers, ordered restitution, and drafted an annual national program with increased funding for combating trafficking and protecting victims; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; authorities investigated and convicted significantly fewer traffickers, the fewest since the government began reporting trafficking data; courts continued to issue suspended sentences for most convicted traffickers; victim identification and assistance data remained unreliable, making it difficult to accurately assess trafficking; authorities penalized victims for crimes traffickers compelled them to commit; lack of resources, legal authority, and training impeded law enforcement; corruption in law enforcement and the judiciary hindered progress, and alleged complicity in trafficking crimes persisted; therefore, Bulgaria was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List (2022)" + "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Bulgaria does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials convicted more traffickers, informally adopted new National Action Plans for 2022 and 2023, and utilized seized assets to supplement shelters and service centers assisting victims; the government mandated specialized training for investigative prosecutors and magistrates and required assignment of trafficking cases to those individuals; the National Investigative Service established a cyber unit, focusing on internet-based exploitation, including trafficking; Bulgaria and Germany cooperated on a bilateral program to combat labor trafficking, information campaigns targeting the large number of Bulgarians seeking jobs in Germany, and a referral mechanism for trafficking cases between countries; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts, compared with the previous reporting period, to expand its anti-trafficking capacity; courts continued to issue suspended sentences for most convicted traffickers; officials did not adequately screen for trafficking indicators or identify victims, particularly among vulnerable groups such as Roma; the government provided limited funding to NGOs for victim services and a national commission for capacity building and implementation of anti-trafficking activities, limiting the sustainability of the government’s anti-trafficking systems; a lack of resources, legal authority, and training impeded law enforcement; corruption in law enforcement and the judiciary hindered progress, and alleged complicity in trafficking crimes persisted; therefore, Bulgaria remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year (2023) " }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Bulgaria, and traffickers exploit victims from Bulgaria abroad; Bulgaria remains one of the primary source countries of human trafficking in the EU; vulnerable groups include the unemployed, children in residential care, individuals working in commercial sex, and members of the Romani community; most victims are individuals with disabilities and those with mental health conditions; Bulgarian women and children are exploited in sex trafficking throughout Western Europe and Bulgaria; Bulgarians of Turkish ethnicity and Romani women and girls account for most of the sex trafficking victims in Bulgaria; traffickers typically exploit Bulgarian women and girls from poorer regions and increasingly use the internet or social media to recruit victims; family- or clan-based organizations and independent traffickers are overwhelmingly of Romani ethnicity and usually know the victims, who are also Roma; traffickers exploit Bulgarian men and boys in forced labor across Europe, predominantly in agriculture, construction, and the service sector; Romani children are exploited in forced labor, particularly begging and pick-pocketing in Austria, France, and Sweden; child trafficking cases reportedly are increasing; children are exploited in small family-owned shops, textile production, restaurants, and construction businesses, and some face sexual exploitation in government-run institutions; Ukrainian refugees are highly vulnerable to trafficking (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Bulgaria, and traffickers exploit victims from Bulgaria abroad; Bulgaria remains one of the primary source countries of human trafficking in the EU; vulnerable groups include Bulgarians with little education and income, the unemployed, children in residential care, homeless individuals, individuals working in commercial sex, migrants, and Roma; most victims are Roma or individuals with disabilities or mental health conditions; Bulgarians of Turkish ethnicity and Romani women and girls account for most of the sex trafficking victims in Bulgaria; family- or clan-based organizations and independent traffickers are overwhelmingly of Romani ethnicity and usually know the victims, who are also Roma; sex trafficking rings typically consist of Bulgarian traffickers who cooperate with foreign nationals in destination countries but do not have direct ties to organized crime groups; traffickers exploit Bulgarian women and girls in sex trafficking throughout Western Europe and in Bulgaria, and exploit Bulgarian men and boys in forced labor across Europe, predominantly in agriculture, construction, and hospitality industries; Romani children are exploited in forced labor, particularly begging and pick-pocketing in Austria, France, and Sweden; child trafficking cases reportedly are increasing; thousands of Ukrainian refugees fleeing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and seeking sanctuary in Bulgaria are highly vulnerable to trafficking; corruption among law enforcement and judiciary officials continues to enable some trafficking crimes (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/europe/cy.json b/europe/cy.json index e9a85af3..87c3188b 100644 --- a/europe/cy.json +++ b/europe/cy.json @@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "74 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 53,552 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-June 2023)" + "note": "note: 55,098 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-August 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "the ROC financial system is vulnerable to money laundering by domestic and foreign criminals; proceeds generated by illicit activity abroad pose a greater threat; primary sources of illicit proceeds are investment fraud, corruption, advance fee fraud, tax evasion, illegal drugs, and tobacco smuggling. Additionally, cybercrime, especially phishing, e-mail hacking, and ransomware use, continues to increase. Criminals have reportedly used ROC banks to launder proceeds, particularly from Russian and Ukrainian illicit activity.
" diff --git a/europe/da.json b/europe/da.json index 6209dc4a..a656b5b9 100644 --- a/europe/da.json +++ b/europe/da.json @@ -652,38 +652,38 @@ "text": "diversified EU trade-based economy; environmental regulatory innovator; dominant services sector; increased government spending but retaining budget surpluses; currently high inflation; unique \"flexicurity\" labor market" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { + "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2022": { + "text": "$352.436 billion (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2021": { "text": "$339.472 billion (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { "text": "$323.751 billion (2020 est.)" }, - "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { - "text": "$330.34 billion (2019 est.)" - }, "note": "note: data are in 2017 dollars" }, "Real GDP growth rate": { + "Real GDP growth rate 2022": { + "text": "3.8% (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP growth rate 2021": { "text": "4.86% (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP growth rate 2020": { "text": "-1.99% (2020 est.)" - }, - "Real GDP growth rate 2019": { - "text": "1.49% (2019 est.)" } }, "Real GDP per capita": { + "Real GDP per capita 2022": { + "text": "$59,700 (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP per capita 2021": { "text": "$58,000 (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP per capita 2020": { "text": "$55,500 (2020 est.)" }, - "Real GDP per capita 2019": { - "text": "$56,800 (2019 est.)" - }, "note": "note: data are in 2017 dollars" }, "GDP (official exchange rate)": { diff --git a/europe/ez.json b/europe/ez.json index 129a5edf..bc21de89 100644 --- a/europe/ez.json +++ b/europe/ez.json @@ -1206,14 +1206,14 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "approximately 26,000 active personnel (20,000 Army; 6,000 Air Force) (2022)" + "text": "approximately 27,000 active personnel (21,000 Army; 6,000 Air Force) (2023)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the Czech military has a mix of Soviet-era and more modern equipment, mostly of Western European origin from such suppliers as Austria, Germany, and Spain; Czechia has a considerable domestic defense industry; during the Cold War, Czechoslovakia was a major producer of tanks, armored personnel carriers, military trucks, and trainer aircraft (2023)", "note": "note: in 2019, Czechia announced a modernization plan to acquire more Western equipment that was compliant with NATO standards, including aircraft and armored vehicles" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18-28 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; conscription abolished 2004 (2022)", + "text": "18-28 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; conscription abolished 2004 (2023)", "note": "note: as of 2019, women comprised about 13% of the military's full-time personnel" }, "Military deployments": { diff --git a/europe/fi.json b/europe/fi.json index f89870e8..b1621cc5 100644 --- a/europe/fi.json +++ b/europe/fi.json @@ -669,38 +669,38 @@ "text": "highly industrialized, export-based EU economy and euro user; high per capita GDP; major timber, metals, engineering, telecommunications, and electronics industries; manageable public debts; rigid labor laws impose higher regulatory burdens" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { + "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2022": { + "text": "$275.545 billion (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2021": { "text": "$270.143 billion (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { "text": "$262.343 billion (2020 est.)" }, - "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { - "text": "$268.259 billion (2019 est.)" - }, "note": "note: data are in 2017 dollars" }, "Real GDP growth rate": { + "Real GDP growth rate 2022": { + "text": "2.1% (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP growth rate 2021": { "text": "2.97% (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP growth rate 2020": { "text": "-2.21% (2020 est.)" - }, - "Real GDP growth rate 2019": { - "text": "1.22% (2019 est.)" } }, "Real GDP per capita": { + "Real GDP per capita 2022": { + "text": "$49,600 (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP per capita 2021": { "text": "$48,800 (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP per capita 2020": { "text": "$47,400 (2020 est.)" }, - "Real GDP per capita 2019": { - "text": "$48,600 (2019 est.)" - }, "note": "note: data are in 2017 dollars" }, "GDP (official exchange rate)": { diff --git a/europe/fr.json b/europe/fr.json index f300a3bc..65941192 100644 --- a/europe/fr.json +++ b/europe/fr.json @@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ "note": "note 1: in 2019, women comprised approximately 16% of the uniformed armed forces
drug trafficking groups are major players in the procurement and transportation of of large quantities of cocaine destined for European markets
" diff --git a/europe/hu.json b/europe/hu.json index cf2351d2..c2cdccb2 100644 --- a/europe/hu.json +++ b/europe/hu.json @@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ "text": "the military's inventory consists largely of Soviet-era weapons, with a smaller mix of more modern European and US equipment; in recent years, Germany has been the top supplier of military hardware to Hungary (2023)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (abolished 2005); 6-month service obligation (2022)", + "text": "18-25 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (abolished 2005); 6-month service obligation (2023)", "note": "note: as of 2019, women comprised approximately 20% of Hungary's full-time military personnel" }, "Military deployments": { diff --git a/europe/it.json b/europe/it.json index 027aaa16..8c189e9a 100644 --- a/europe/it.json +++ b/europe/it.json @@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "3,000 (2022)" }, - "note": "note: 811,094 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-September 2023)" + "note": "note: 826,119 estimated refugee and migrant arrivals (January 2015-September 2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "
important gateway for drug trafficking; organized crime groups allied with Colombian and Spanish groups trafficking cocaine to Europe
" diff --git a/europe/lg.json b/europe/lg.json index 4109aca8..18c74973 100644 --- a/europe/lg.json +++ b/europe/lg.json @@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ "text": "President Egils LEVITS (since 8 July 2019)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister vacant (as of 17 August 2023); note - Krisjanis KARINS stepped down on 17 August 2023" + "text": "Prime Minister Evika SILINA (since 15 September 2023)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Cabinet of Ministers nominated by the prime minister, appointed by Parliament" @@ -562,7 +562,8 @@ }, "election results": { "text": "a primary European transit point for cocaine from South America and for hashish from Morocco; cocaine is shipped in raw or liquid form with mixed cargo to avoid detection or altered to escape detection Spanish chemists reconstitute it and distribute to Europe; minor domestic drug production; synthetic drugs, including ketamine, new psychoactive substances (NPS), and MDMA transit from Spain to the United States
" diff --git a/europe/sw.json b/europe/sw.json index 1911fe4e..0c511f3d 100644 --- a/europe/sw.json +++ b/europe/sw.json @@ -660,38 +660,38 @@ "text": "small, open, competitive, and thriving economy that remains outside of the euro zone; has achieved an enviable standard of living, with its combination of free-market capitalism and extensive welfare benefits" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { + "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2022": { + "text": "$574.877 billion (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2021": { "text": "$558.427 billion (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2020": { "text": "$531.455 billion (2020 est.)" }, - "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2019": { - "text": "$543.245 billion (2019 est.)" - }, "note": "note: data are in 2017 dollars" }, "Real GDP growth rate": { + "Real GDP growth rate 2022": { + "text": "2.6% (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP growth rate 2021": { "text": "5.08% (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP growth rate 2020": { "text": "-2.17% (2020 est.)" - }, - "Real GDP growth rate 2019": { - "text": "1.99% (2019 est.)" } }, "Real GDP per capita": { + "Real GDP per capita 2022": { + "text": "$54,800 (2022 est.)" + }, "Real GDP per capita 2021": { "text": "$53,600 (2021 est.)" }, "Real GDP per capita 2020": { "text": "$51,300 (2020 est.)" }, - "Real GDP per capita 2019": { - "text": "$52,900 (2019 est.)" - }, "note": "note: data are in 2017 dollars" }, "GDP (official exchange rate)": { diff --git a/europe/vt.json b/europe/vt.json index 9c6c46de..7cf76abb 100644 --- a/europe/vt.json +++ b/europe/vt.json @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ "note": "note: the Swiss Guard Corps has protected the Pope and his residence since 1506" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "Pontifical Swiss Guard Corps: 19-30 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; must be a single Roman Catholic male with Swiss citizenship who has completed basic training with the Swiss military and can obtain a certificate of good conduct; qualified candidates must apply to serve; the service contract is between 2 and 25 years (2022)" + "text": "Pontifical Swiss Guard Corps: 19-30 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; must be a single Roman Catholic male with Swiss citizenship who has completed basic training with the Swiss military and can obtain a certificate of good conduct; qualified candidates must apply to serve; the service contract is between 2 and 25 years (2023)" }, "Military - note": { "text": "defense is the responsibility of Italy" diff --git a/middle-east/ae.json b/middle-east/ae.json index d57705a4..8ffa4b2c 100644 --- a/middle-east/ae.json +++ b/middle-east/ae.json @@ -1179,6 +1179,12 @@ "note": "note: each emirate maintains a local police force called a general directorate, which is officially a branch of the federal Ministry of Interior; all emirate-level general directorates of police enforce their respective emirate’s laws autonomously; they also enforce federal laws within their emirate in coordination with one another under the federal ministry; the State Security Directorate (SSD) in Abu Dhabi and Dubai State Security (DSS) have primary responsible for counterterrorism law enforcement efforts; local, emirate-level police forces, especially the Abu Dhabi Police and Dubai Police, are the first responders in such cases and provide technical assistance to SSD and DSS" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2022": { + "text": "4% of GDP (2022 est.)" + }, + "Military Expenditures 2021": { + "text": "5% of GDP (2021 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "5.6% of GDP (2020 est.)" }, @@ -1187,12 +1193,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2018": { "text": "5.5% of GDP (2018 est.)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2017": { - "text": "5.2% of GDP (2017 est.)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2016": { - "text": "6% of GDP (2016 est.)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { diff --git a/middle-east/aj.json b/middle-east/aj.json index d97bbea3..b6ea52aa 100644 --- a/middle-east/aj.json +++ b/middle-east/aj.json @@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ "note": "note: most of the military is made up of professional contract soldiers; as of 2018, women made up an estimated 3% of the active duty military" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Azerbaijani military was established in 1991, although its origins go back to 1918; much of the military’s original equipment was acquired from former Soviet military forces that left Azerbaijan by 1992; territorial defense is the military’s primary focus, particularly with regards to neighboring Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region; a secondary focus is guarding against Iran; the Ground Forces have five army corps and an independent combined arms army in the Azerbaijani exclave of Naxicvan (Nakhichevan); four of the army corps are deployed around Nagorno-Karabakh (one corps also has units deployed along the Iranian border) while the fifth is responsible for the defense of the capital Baku; between them, the corps and the combined arms army have more than 20 mechanized or motorized combat brigades; the Ground Forces also have separate brigades of artillery, battlefield rockets, and special forces; the Air Force has about 30 Russian-origin fighters and ground attack aircraft, as well as some combat helicopters; the Navy patrols the Caspian Sea with a corvette and several coastal patrol craftAvanza Libertad or AL [José Luis ESPERT]
Civic Coalition ARI or CC-ARI [Elisa CARRIÓ, Maximiliano FERRARO]
Consenso Federal (Federal Consensus) or CF [Roberto LAVAGNA, Juan Manuel URTUBEY]
Frente Cívico por Santiago (Civic Front for Santiago) [Gerardo ZAMORA]
Frente de Izquierda y de los Trabajadores – Unidad (Workers' Left Front) or FIT-U [Nicolás DEL CAÑO, Miriam BREGMAN] (coalition of leftist parties in lower house; includes PTS, PO, and MST)
Frente de la Concordia Misionero (Front for the Renewal of Social Concord) or FRCS [Carlos Eduardo ROVIRA]
Frente de Todos (Everyone's Front) or FdT [Alberto FERNÁNDEZ] (includes FR, La Campora, and PJ); note - ruling coalition since 2019; includes several national and provincial Peronist political parties
Frente Renovador (Renewal Front) or FR [Sergio MASSA, Pablo MIROLO]
Generación por un Encuentro Nacional (Generation for a National Encounter) or GEN [Margarita STOLBIZER]
Hacemos por Córdoba (We do for Cordoba) or HC [Juan SCHIARETTI]
Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change) or JxC [Patricia BULLRICH, Horacio Rodríguez LARRETA, Mauricio MACRI] (includes CC-ARI, PRO, and UCR); note - primary opposition coalition since 2019
Juntos Somos Río Negro (Together We Are Rio Negro) or JSRN [Alberto WERETILNECK]
Justicialist Party or PJ [Alberto Angel FERNÁNDEZ]
La Cámpora [Maximo KIRCHNER]
La Libertad Avanza (The Liberty Advances) or LLA [Javier MILEI]
Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Neuquén People's Movement) or MPN [Omar GUTIÉRREZ]
Movimiento Socialista de los Trabajadores (Workers' Socialist Movement) or MST [Vilma RIPOLL, Alejandro BODART]
Partido de los Trabajadores Socialistas (Socialist Workers' Party) or PTS [Nicolás DEL CAÑO]
Partido Obrero (Workers' Party) or PO [Gabriel SOLANO]
Partido Socialista or PS [Mónica Haydée FEIN]
Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal) or PRO [Mauricio MACRI]
Unidad Federal (coalition of provencial parties in the lower house; includes FRCS and JSRN)
Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union) or UCR [Gerardo Rubén MORALES]
Vamos con Vos (Let's Go with You) or VcV [Florencio RANDAZZO]
A private initiative to come up with a new list for seven of the world’s wonders sprang up early in the new Millennium. Worldwide balloting – via the Internet or by telephone – took place covering a list of 200 existing monuments. Reportedly over 100 million votes were cast over a period of several years and the final list was announced on 7-7-2007. Even though the polling was unscientific, the seven “winners” were a worthy compilation of extraordinary Wonders to be found around the world. All seven of the New Wonders are inscribed as UNESCO World Heritage Sites and are frequently cited in the literature.
1. Chichen Itza, Yucatan, Mexico
This archeological site includes the impressive remains of a large pre-Columbian Maya city that flourished from ca. A.D. 600-1100. Among the outstanding structures at the site are the massive Temple of the Warriors complex, an Observatory (El Caracol), the Great Ball Court, and the Sacred Cenote (sinkhole) where offerings were made. The most famous building, however, is the step-pyramid known as the Temple of Kukulcan that dominates the center of the site and serves as the symbol of Chichen Itza. The pyramidal structure is 24 m high; the crowning temple adds another 6 m. Although located in the dense jungles of Yucatan, it remains one of the most visited tourist sites in Mexico.
2. The Colosseum, Rome, Italy
Construction began with the Roman Emperor Vespasian in A.D. 72 and was completed by his son Titus in A.D. 80. Some further modifications were made by Domitian (A.D. 81-96). The three emperors make up the Flavian Dynasty, thus providing the alternate name for the structure as the Flavian Amphitheater. The massive structure is estimated to have seated, on average, about 65 thousand spectators and was most famously used for gladiatorial contests and public spectacles. Substantially ruined by earthquakes and thieves who looted much of the stone, the structure nonetheless remains an iconic symbol of Rome. The Colosseum is one of the most popular tourist attractions in the World.
3. Christ the Redeemer Statue, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Built between 1922 and 1931, the 30-meter-tall sculpture is reputed to be the largest Art Deco statue in the World. Its pedestal provides another 8 m in height and the arms stretch out to 28 m. Constructed of reinforced concrete and soapstone, the statue has become the cultural icon not only of Rio but also of Brazil.
4. Great Wall, China
The name refers to a remarkable series of fortification systems that stretched across the northern historical borders of China and served as protection against various nomadic peoples. The earliest of these walls date to the 7th century B.C.; certain stretches began to be linked in the 3rd century B.C. and successive dynasties added to or maintained various sections of the walls. The best known and best-preserved portions of the wall are those built by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). An archeological survey revealed that the Wall and all its associated branches measures 21,196 km. Winding through amazingly varied terrain, the Great Wall is acknowledged as one of the most impressive architectural feats in history.
5. Machu Picchu, Cuzco Region, Peru
Perhaps the most spectacular archeological site in the Americas, the Inca citadel of Machu Picchu, situated on a 2,430 m Andean mountain ridge, is now thought to have been erected as an estate for the Inca Emperor Pachacuti (r. 1438-1471). Additionally, it may also have served as a religious sanctuary. Built between about 1450 and 1460, it was abandoned approximately a century later, at the time of the Spanish conquest. Construction was carried out in the classic Inca style of polished, dry-stone, fitted walls. Some 750 people lived at this royal estate, most of them support staff to the nobility. The site is roughly divided into an agricultural sector (with myriad terraces for raising crops) and an urban sector. The latter is composed of an upper town (with temples) and a lower town (with warehouses). Some of the religious monuments include: the Intiwatana (a carved, ritual stone that served as a type of sundial and that is referred to as “The Hitching Post of the Sun”); the Torreon or Temple of the Sun, a small tower that likely served as a type of observatory; and the Intimachay, a sacred cave with a masonry entrance.
6. Petra, Ma’an, Jordan
Petra is believed to have been established in the 4th century B.C. as the capital of the Nabataean Kingdom, an entity that grew fabulously wealthy as the nexus of trade routes in the southern Levant. The kingdom retained its independence until annexed by the Roman Empire in A.D. 106. The city is justifiably famous for two things, its stunning rock-cut architecture and its water conduit system, which allowed the Nabataeans to control and store the water supply in this desert region and create an artificial oasis. At its peak in the 1st century A.D., the city may have had a population of 20 thousand.
7. Taj Mahal, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, India
This gorgeous ivory-white mausoleum – described as “one of the universally admired masterpieces of the World’s heritage” – was commissioned in 1632 by Shah Jahan (r. 1628-1658) as the final resting place for his favorite wife, Mumtaz Mahal. The building also houses the tomb of Shah Jahan himself. The Taj Mahal is the centerpiece of an entire 17-hectare complex that also includes a guest house, a mosque, and formal gardens. The entire project was not completed until about 1653. The Taj Mahal remains one of the most visited tourist sites in the World.
note: The Great Pyramid of Egypt, the only surviving Wonder of the ancient Seven, received an honorary status among the New Seven Wonders. Its inclusion enabled a Wonder to be listed for each of the continents but Australia.
" }, "The World Factbook's Seven Natural Ultra-Wonders of the World": { - "text": "While all of the above Wonders are indeed outstanding, their presence in any type of list is entirely subjective. There are many other fabulous sites around the world that are equally worthy of being designated as Wonders. (An example is the inclusion of Chichen Itza from Mexico. While it is spectacular, it became a 'Wonder' for its popularity as a tourist site. Equally worthy in the same country is Teotihuacan, a far larger site outside of Mexico City that has two immense pyramids that dwarf the one at Chichen Itza.)
Taking these considerations into account, The World Factbook has come up with a Seven Wonders list that is indisputable, i.e., a list derived in a completely objective manner. A decision was made to focus on natural wonders and not anything man-made. These Wonders all are the biggest in their respective categories (they cannot be topped) and so there can be no dispute with the choice, therefore the 'ultra' designation. This fact distinguishes the Factbook listing from other Seven Natural Wonders lists that have been compiled in the past.
1. Amazonia
A trans-national Wonder that is: a. the World's largest collection of land biodiversity, b. the World's largest rainforest, and c. includes the World's largest swamp in the Amazon River floodplain; mostly in Brazil, Peru, and Colombia, but also in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana.
2. Central Indo-Pacific Region
A Wonder hotspot that is the World's largest collection of marine biodiversity; best represented by the Coral Triangle in the tropical waters around the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste; as well as by the Great Barrier Reef (the World's largest reef) in Australia.
3. The Aurora (Aurora Borealis and Aurora Australis; aka the Polar Lights)
The World's largest light display that never ceases to awe; seen in countries of the northern latitudes, as well as those of the southern latitudes and Antarctica.
4. Mount Everest and the Himalayas
The World's tallest mountain and mountain range above sea level that stretches across Nepal, China (Tibet), India, Pakistan, and Bhutan (see alternate below).
5. Victoria Falls
The World's largest unbroken waterfall on the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe (see alternates below).
6. Sahara
The World's largest hot desert that spreads across Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia (see alternate below).
7. Animal Migrations
The Earth is full of astounding migrations – occurring daily, seasonally, or annually – that are truly awe-inspiring natural wonders. A few extraordinary examples are: a. the diel vertical migrations (DVM, the World's largest animal migration in terms of biomass and number of animals participating), which occur twice daily in all the oceans when zooplankton (microscopic animals) and fish rise to near the surface at night to feed on phytoplankton (microscopic plants) and then with the return of day dive back into the depths to hide in dark waters; b. the Arctic tern's annual round trip of 71,000 km (from the Northern Hemisphere to the Southern Hemisphere and back (the World's longest avian migration); or c. the 22,000 km annual migration of the humpback whale (World's longest mammal migration).
Alternates
Mountain alternate (no. 4). If measured strictly from base to peak, then the World's tallest and largest mountains would be on the Island of Hawaii, which includes both the World's tallest mountain [Mauna Kea] and the World's largest active volcano and most voluminous mountain [Mauna Loa]); United States (Hawaii).
Waterfall alternate (no. 5). What constitutes the 'biggest' waterfall(s) can be approached in a number of ways. Depending on one's viewpoint, Iguazu Falls (World's largest waterfall system (275 drops)) in Argentina and Brazil, or Angel Falls (World's tallest waterfall) in Venezuela could substitute.
Desert alternate (no. 6). If a desert is defined as a barren area where little precipitation occurs, then Antarctica with the World's largest polar desert would certainly qualify; it is about 1.5 times the size of the Sahara. The southern continent does not belong to any one country but is a condominium governed by parties to the Antarctic Treaty.
note: A question might arise, how about the World's largest canyon? The Grand Canyon (United States, Arizona) is sometimes mentioned as a Wonder of the World, but 'largest' canyons can be notoriously difficult to define and measure. Does one go by length, depth, or total area of canyon system? Then too, there are largely inaccessible canyons in the Himalayas that have never been properly surveyed and massive canyons are known to exist in some ice-covered parts of Greenland and Antarctica. Therefore, it is not possible to come up with a superlative canyon.
While all of the above Wonders are indeed outstanding, their presence in any type of list is entirely subjective. There are many other fabulous sites around the world that are equally worthy of being designated as Wonders. (An example is the inclusion of Chichen Itza from Mexico. While it is spectacular, it became a 'Wonder' for its popularity as a tourist site. Equally worthy in the same country is Teotihuacan, a far larger site outside of Mexico City that has two immense pyramids that dwarf the one at Chichen Itza.)
Taking these considerations into account, The World Factbook has come up with a Seven Wonders list that is indisputable, i.e., a list derived in a completely objective manner. A decision was made to focus on natural wonders and not anything man-made. These Wonders are all the biggest in their respective categories (they cannot be topped) and so there can be no dispute with the choice, therefore the 'ultra' designation. This fact distinguishes the Factbook listing from other Seven Natural Wonders lists that have been compiled in the past.
1. Amazonia
A trans-national Wonder that is: a. the World's largest collection of land biodiversity, b. the World's largest rainforest, and c. includes the World's largest swamp in the Amazon River floodplain; mostly in Brazil, Peru, and Colombia, but also in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana.
2. Central Indo-Pacific Region
A Wonder hotspot that is the World's largest collection of marine biodiversity; best represented by the Coral Triangle in the tropical waters around the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste; as well as by the Great Barrier Reef (the World's largest reef) in Australia.
3. The Aurora (Aurora Borealis and Aurora Australis; aka the Polar Lights)
The World's largest light display that never ceases to awe; seen in countries of the northern latitudes, as well as those of the southern latitudes and Antarctica.
4. Mount Everest and the Himalayas
The World's tallest mountain and mountain range above sea level that stretches across Nepal, China (Tibet), India, Pakistan, and Bhutan (see alternate below).
5. Victoria Falls
The World's largest unbroken waterfall on the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe (see alternates below).
6. Sahara
The World's largest hot desert that spreads across Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia (see alternate below).
7. Animal Migrations
The Earth is full of astounding migrations – occurring daily, seasonally, or annually – that are truly awe-inspiring natural wonders. A few extraordinary examples are: a. the diel vertical migrations (DVM, the World's largest animal migration in terms of biomass and number of animals participating), which occur twice daily in all the oceans when zooplankton (microscopic animals) and fish rise to near the surface at night to feed on phytoplankton (microscopic plants) and then with the return of day dive back into the depths to hide in dark waters; b. the Arctic tern's annual round trip of 71,000 km (from the Northern Hemisphere to the Southern Hemisphere and back (the World's longest avian migration); or c. the 22,000 km annual migration of the humpback whale (World's longest mammal migration).
Alternates
Mountain alternate (no. 4). If measured strictly from base to peak, then the World's tallest and largest mountains would be on the Island of Hawaii, which includes both the World's tallest mountain [Mauna Kea] and the World's largest active volcano and most voluminous mountain [Mauna Loa]); United States (Hawaii).
Waterfall alternate (no. 5). What constitutes the 'biggest' waterfall(s) can be approached in a number of ways. Depending on one's viewpoint, Iguazu Falls (World's largest waterfall system (275 drops)) in Argentina and Brazil, or Angel Falls (World's tallest waterfall) in Venezuela could substitute.
Desert alternate (no. 6). If a desert is defined as a barren area where little precipitation occurs, then Antarctica with the World's largest polar desert would certainly qualify; it is about 1.5 times the size of the Sahara. The southern continent does not belong to any one country but is a condominium governed by parties to the Antarctic Treaty.
note: A question might arise, how about the World's largest canyon? The Grand Canyon (United States, Arizona) is sometimes mentioned as a Wonder of the World, but 'largest' canyons can be notoriously difficult to define and measure. Does one go by length, depth, or total area of canyon system? Then too, there are largely inaccessible canyons in the Himalayas that have never been properly surveyed and massive canyons are known to exist in some ice-covered parts of Greenland and Antarctica. Therefore, it is not possible to come up with a superlative canyon.