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"text": "Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 78% (Dari functions as the lingua franca), Pashto (official) 50%, Uzbek 10%, English 5%, Turkmen 2%, Urdu 2%, Pashayi 1%, Nuristani 1%, Arabic 1%, Balochi 1%, other <1% (2017 est.)"
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},
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"printed major-language sample": {
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"text": "<br /> <p>منبع ضروری برای اطلاعات اساسی کتاب حقایق جهانی، (Dari)</p> د دنیا د حقائېقو کتاب، بنیادی معلوماتو لپاره ضروری سرچینه- (Pashto)"
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"text": "<br> <p>کتاب حقایق جهان، مرجعی ضروری برای اطلاعات اولیە (Dari)</p> د دنیا د حقائېقو کتاب، بنیادی معلوماتو لپاره ضروری سرچینه- (Pashto)"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> data represent most widely spoken languages; shares sum to more than 100% because there is much bilingualism in the country and because respondents were allowed to select more than one language\r\n<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Turkic languages Uzbek and Turkmen, as well as Balochi, Pashayi, Nuristani, and Pamiri are the third official languages in areas where the majority speaks them"
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},
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@ -247,8 +247,8 @@
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"text": "4.72 children born/woman (2021 est.)"
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},
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"Contraceptive prevalence rate": {
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"text": "18.9% (2018)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> percent of women aged 12-49",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> percent of women aged 12-49"
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"text": "18.9% (2018)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> percent of women aged 12-49",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> percent of women aged 12-49"
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},
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"Drinking water source": {
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"improved: urban": {
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@ -300,13 +300,13 @@
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}
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
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"text": "<.1% (2019 est.)"
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"text": "<.1% (2020 est.)"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
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"text": "11,000 (2019 est.)"
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"text": "12,000 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
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"text": "<500 (2019 est.)"
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"text": "<1,000 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"Major infectious diseases": {
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"degree of risk": {
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@ -563,13 +563,13 @@
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},
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"Legislative branch": {
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"description": {
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"text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of:<br />Meshrano Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats; 34 members indirectly elected by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by district councils to serve 3-year terms, 34 indirectly elected by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by provincial councils to serve 4-year terms, and 34 appointed by the president from nominations by civic groups, political parties, and the public, of which 17 must be women, 2 must represent the disabled, and 2 must be Kuchi nomads; presidential appointees serve 5-year terms)<br />Wolesi Jirga or House of People (250 seats, including 68 reserved for women; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)"
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"text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of:<br>Meshrano Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats; 34 members indirectly elected by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by district councils to serve 3-year terms, 34 indirectly elected by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by provincial councils to serve 4-year terms, and 34 appointed by the president from nominations by civic groups, political parties, and the public, of which 17 must be women, 2 must represent the disabled, and 2 must be Kuchi nomads; presidential appointees serve 5-year terms)<br>Wolesi Jirga or House of People (250 seats, including 68 reserved for women; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)"
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},
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"elections": {
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"text": "Meshrano Jirga - district councils - within 5 days of installation; provincial councils - within 15 days of installation; presidential appointees - within 2 weeks after the presidential inauguration (last held 10 January 2015); note - in early 2016, President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani extended their mandate until parliamentary and district elections are held.<br />Wolesi Jirga - last held on 20 October 2018) (next to be held in 2023)"
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"text": "Meshrano Jirga - district councils - within 5 days of installation; provincial councils - within 15 days of installation; presidential appointees - within 2 weeks after the presidential inauguration (last held 10 January 2015); note - in early 2016, President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani extended their mandate until parliamentary and district elections are held.<br>Wolesi Jirga - last held on 20 October 2018) (next to be held in 2023)"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "<br />Meshrano Jirga - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 85, women 17, percent of women 16.7%<br />Wolesi Jirga - percent of vote by party NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 182, women 68, percent of women 27.2%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 24.1%"
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"text": "<br>Meshrano Jirga - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 85, women 17, percent of women 16.7%<br>Wolesi Jirga - percent of vote by party NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 182, women 68, percent of women 27.2%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 24.1%"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the constitution allows the government to convene a constitutional Loya Jirga (Grand Council) on issues of independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity; it consists of members of the National Assembly and chairpersons of the provincial and district councils; a Loya Jirga can amend provisions of the constitution and prosecute the president; no constitutional Loya Jirga has ever been held, and district councils have never been elected; the president appointed 34 members of the Meshrano Jirga that the district councils should have indirectly elected"
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},
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}
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},
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"Political parties and leaders": {
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"text": "<p>note - the Ministry of Justice licensed 72 political parties as of April 2019 </p>"
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"text": "<p>note - the Ministry of Justice licensed 72 political parties as of April 2019 </p>"
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},
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"International organization participation": {
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"text": "ADB, CICA, CP, ECO, EITI (candidate country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OSCE (partner), SAARC, SACEP, SCO (dialogue member), UN, UNAMA, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
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@ -643,7 +643,7 @@
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},
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"Economy": {
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"Economic overview": {
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"text": "<p>Prior to 2001, Afghanistan was an extremely poor, landlocked, and foreign aid-dependent country. Increased domestic economic activity occurred following the US-led invasion, as well as significant international economic development assistance. This increased activity expanded access to water, electricity, sanitation, education, and health services, and fostered consistent growth in government revenues since 2014. While international security forces have been drawing down since 2012, with much higher U.S. forces’ drawdowns occurring since 2017, economic progress continues, albeit uneven across sectors and key economic indicators. After recovering from the 2018 drought and growing 3.9% in 2019, political instability, expiring international financial commitments, and the COVID-19 pandemic have wrought significant adversity on the Afghan economy, with a projected 5% contraction.</p> <p>Current political parties’ power-sharing agreement following the September 2019 presidential elections as well as ongoing Taliban attacks and peace talks have led to Afghan economic instability. This instability, coupled with expiring international grant and assistance, endangers recent fiscal gains and has led to more internally displaced persons. In November 2020, Afghanistan secured $12 billion in additional international aid for 2021-2025, much of which is conditional upon Taliban peace progress. Additionally, Afghanistan continues to experience influxes of repatriating Afghanis, mostly from Iran, significantly straining economic and security institutions.</p> <p>Afghanistan’s trade deficit remains at approximately 31% of GDP and is highly dependent on financing through grants and aid. While Afghan agricultural growth remains consistent, recent industrial and services growth have been enormously impacted by COVID-19 lockdowns and trade cessations. While trade with the People’s Republic of China has rapidly expanded in recent years, Afghanistan still relies heavily upon India and Pakistan as export partners but is more diverse in its import partners. Furthermore, Afghanistan still struggles to effectively enforce business contracts, facilitate easy tax collection, and enable greater international trade for domestic enterprises.<br /><br />Current Afghan priorities focus on the following goals:</p> <ul> <li>Securing international economic agreements, many of which are contingent on Taliban peace progress;</li> <li>Increasing exports to $2 billion USD by 2023;</li> <li>Continuing to expand government revenue collection;</li> <li>Countering corruption and navigating challenges from the power-sharing agreement; and</li> <li>Developing a strong private sector that can empower the economy.</li> </ul>"
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"text": "<p>Prior to 2001, Afghanistan was an extremely poor, landlocked, and foreign aid-dependent country. Increased domestic economic activity occurred following the US-led invasion, as well as significant international economic development assistance. This increased activity expanded access to water, electricity, sanitation, education, and health services, and fostered consistent growth in government revenues since 2014. While international security forces have been drawing down since 2012, with much higher U.S. forces’ drawdowns occurring since 2017, economic progress continues, albeit uneven across sectors and key economic indicators. After recovering from the 2018 drought and growing 3.9% in 2019, political instability, expiring international financial commitments, and the COVID-19 pandemic have wrought significant adversity on the Afghan economy, with a projected 5% contraction.</p> <p>Current political parties’ power-sharing agreement following the September 2019 presidential elections as well as ongoing Taliban attacks and peace talks have led to Afghan economic instability. This instability, coupled with expiring international grant and assistance, endangers recent fiscal gains and has led to more internally displaced persons. In November 2020, Afghanistan secured $12 billion in additional international aid for 2021-2025, much of which is conditional upon Taliban peace progress. Additionally, Afghanistan continues to experience influxes of repatriating Afghanis, mostly from Iran, significantly straining economic and security institutions.</p> <p>Afghanistan’s trade deficit remains at approximately 31% of GDP and is highly dependent on financing through grants and aid. While Afghan agricultural growth remains consistent, recent industrial and services growth have been enormously impacted by COVID-19 lockdowns and trade cessations. While trade with the People’s Republic of China has rapidly expanded in recent years, Afghanistan still relies heavily upon India and Pakistan as export partners but is more diverse in its import partners. Furthermore, Afghanistan still struggles to effectively enforce business contracts, facilitate easy tax collection, and enable greater international trade for domestic enterprises.<br><br>Current Afghan priorities focus on the following goals:</p> <ul> <li>Securing international economic agreements, many of which are contingent on Taliban peace progress;</li> <li>Increasing exports to $2 billion USD by 2023;</li> <li>Continuing to expand government revenue collection;</li> <li>Countering corruption and navigating challenges from the power-sharing agreement; and</li> <li>Developing a strong private sector that can empower the economy.</li> </ul>"
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},
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"Real GDP growth rate": {
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"Real GDP growth rate 2017": {
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@ -989,7 +989,7 @@
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "<p>despite decades of war, Afghanistan has successfully rebuilt infrastructure to create a functional telecom sector that covers nearly all of the population; due to mountainous geography, country relies on its mobile network; mobile broadband penetration growing, but is still low compared to other countries in Asia; operator launched LTE in Kabul; World Bank and other donors support development of a nationwide fiber backbone; terrestrial cable connectivity to five neighboring countries; work on the ‘Wakhan Corridor Fiber Optic Survey Project’ to connect to China is nearing completion; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE (2020)</p> (2020)"
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"text": "<p>despite decades of war, Afghanistan has successfully rebuilt infrastructure to create a functional telecom sector that covers nearly all of the population; due to mountainous geography, country relies on its mobile network; mobile broadband penetration growing, but is still low compared to other countries in Asia; operator launched LTE in Kabul; World Bank and other donors support development of a nationwide fiber backbone; terrestrial cable connectivity to five neighboring countries; work on the ‘Wakhan Corridor Fiber Optic Survey Project’ to connect to China is nearing completion; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE (2020)</p> (2020)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "less than 1 per 100 for fixed-line teledensity; 59 per 100 for mobile-cellular; an increasing number of Afghans utilize mobile-cellular phone networks (2019)"
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 93; multiple VSAT's provide international and domestic voice and data connectivity (2019)"
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},
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"note": "<strong><strong>note: </strong></strong>the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments\r\n<p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\"> "
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"note": "<strong><strong>note: </strong></strong>the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments\r\n<p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\"> </p>"
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "state-owned broadcaster, Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), operates a series of radio and television stations in Kabul and the provinces; an estimated 174 private radio stations, 83 TV stations, and about a dozen international broadcasters are available (2019)"
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are comprised of military, police, and other security elements:<br /><br />Ministry of Defense: Afghan National Army ((ANA), Afghan Air Force, Afghan Army Special Security Forces (ASSF; includes ANA Special Operations Command, General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW)), Afghanistan National Army Territorial Forces (ANA-TF, lightly-armed local security forces); Afghan Border Force (ABF); Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF)<br /><br />Ministry of Interior: Afghan Uniform (National) Police (AUP); Public Security Police (PSP); Afghan Border Police (ABP); Afghan Anti-Crime Police; Afghan Local Police; Afghan Public Protection Force; Special Security Forces<br /><br />National Directorate of Security ((NDS), intelligence service) (2021)"
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"text": "Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are comprised of military, police, and other security elements:<br><br>Ministry of Defense: Afghan National Army ((ANA), Afghan Air Force, Afghan Army Special Security Forces (ASSF; includes ANA Special Operations Command, General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW)), Afghanistan National Army Territorial Forces (ANA-TF, lightly-armed local security forces); Afghan Border Force (ABF); Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF)<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Afghan Uniform (National) Police (AUP); Public Security Police (PSP); Afghan Border Police (ABP); Afghan Anti-Crime Police; Afghan Local Police; Afghan Public Protection Force; Special Security Forces<br><br>National Directorate of Security ((NDS), intelligence service) (2021)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2019": {
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"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2019)"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "<p>the Afghan military focuses on internal security threats from several armed groups, particularly the Taliban and militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), al-Qa’ida, and Haqqani Network terrorist groups (see the Terrorist Organizations Appendix); the primary threat to the Afghan Government and its security forces is the Taliban, which has conducted an insurgency since the early 2000s and conducted thousands of attacks against government forces, including widespread assassinations of government employees, security officials, and society leaders; the Taliban calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; its political and military decisions are made by a leadership council (Rahbari Shura) currently led by HAIBATULLAH Akhundzada; as of mid-2020, the group had an estimated 60-80,000 full-time fighters; in addition to their strongholds in the provinces of Helmond and Kandahar, the Taliban has conducted attacks in nearly every Afghanistan province; the Taliban has close ties to al-Qaida and the Haqqani Network<br /><br /><br /></p>"
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"text": "<p>the Afghan military focuses on internal security threats from several armed groups, particularly the Taliban and militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), al-Qa’ida, and Haqqani Network terrorist groups (see the Terrorist Organizations Appendix); the primary threat to the Afghan Government and its security forces is the Taliban, which has conducted an insurgency since the early 2000s and conducted thousands of attacks against government forces, including widespread assassinations of government employees, security officials, and society leaders; the Taliban calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; its political and military decisions are made by a leadership council (Rahbari Shura) currently led by HAIBATULLAH Akhundzada; as of mid-2020, the group had an estimated 60-80,000 full-time fighters; in addition to their strongholds in the provinces of Helmond and Kandahar, the Taliban has conducted attacks in nearly every Afghanistan province; the Taliban has close ties to al-Qaida and the Haqqani Network<br><br><br></p>"
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}
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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"Terrorist group(s)": {
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"text": "Haqqani Taliban Network; Harakat ul-Mujahidin; Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami; Islamic Jihad Union; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Khorasan Province; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Jaish-e-Mohammed; Jaysh al Adl (Jundallah); Lashkar i Jhangvi; Lashkar-e Tayyiba; al-Qa’ida; al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix T</a>",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix T</a>"
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"text": "Haqqani Taliban Network; Harakat ul-Mujahidin; Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami; Islamic Jihad Union; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Khorasan Province; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Jaish-e-Mohammed; Jaysh al Adl (Jundallah); Lashkar i Jhangvi; Lashkar-e Tayyiba; al-Qa’ida; al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix T",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix T"
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}
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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"text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims and returning Afghan migrants and exploit Afghan victims abroad; internal trafficking is more prevalent than transnational trafficking; traffickers exploit men, women, and a large number of children domestically; victims are subjected to forced labor in agriculture, brick kilns, carpet weaving, domestic servitude, commercial sex, begging, poppy cultivation and harvesting, salt mining, transnational drug smuggling, and truck driving; Afghan security forces and non-state armed groups, including the pro-government militias and the Taliban, continue to unlawfully recruit and use child soldiers; sexual exploitation of boys remains pervasive nationwide, and traffickers subject some boys to sexual exploitation abroad"
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},
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"tier rating": {
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"text": "<p>Tier 3<strong> —</strong><strong> </strong>Afghanistan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government decreased law enforcement efforts against civilian and official perpetrators of trafficking, and officials complicit in recruitment and use of child soldiers and the sexual exploitation of boys continued to operate with impunity; authorities continued to arrest, detain, and penalize many trafficking victims, including punishing sex trafficking victims for “moral crimes”; the judiciary remained underfunded, understaffed, and undertrained (2020)</p>"
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"text": "<p>Tier 3<strong> —</strong><strong> </strong>Afghanistan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government decreased law enforcement efforts against civilian and official perpetrators of trafficking, and officials complicit in recruitment and use of child soldiers and the sexual exploitation of boys continued to operate with impunity; authorities continued to arrest, detain, and penalize many trafficking victims, including punishing sex trafficking victims for “moral crimes”; the judiciary remained underfunded, understaffed, and undertrained (2020)</p>"
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}
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},
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"Illicit drugs": {
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