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Yo Robot
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@ -127,12 +127,12 @@
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"text": "Arabic (official), English, Hindi, Malayam, Urdu, Pashto, Tagalog, Persian"
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},
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"printed major-language sample": {
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"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
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"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
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}
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},
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"Religions": {
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"text": "Muslim (official) 76%, Christian 9%, other (primarily Hindu and Buddhist, less than 5% of the population consists of Parsi, Baha'i, Druze, Sikh, Ahmadi, Ismaili, Dawoodi Bohra Muslim, and Jewish) 15% (2005 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> data represent the total population; as of 2019, immigrants make up about 87.9% of the total population, according to UN data",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data represent the total population; as of 2019, immigrants make up about 87.9% of the total population, according to UN data"
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"text": "Muslim (official) 76%, Christian 9%, other (primarily Hindu and Buddhist, less than 5% of the population consists of Parsi, Baha'i, Druze, Sikh, Ahmadi, Ismaili, Dawoodi Bohra Muslim, and Jewish) 15% (2005 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> data represent the total population; as of 2019, immigrants make up about 87.9% of the total population, according to UN data",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data represent the total population; as of 2019, immigrants make up about 87.9% of the total population, according to UN data"
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},
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"Age structure": {
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"0-14 years": {
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@ -279,13 +279,13 @@
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}
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
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"text": "NA"
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"text": "0.1% (2020)"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
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"text": "NA"
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"text": "<1,000 (2020)"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
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"text": "NA"
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"text": "100 <100 (2020)"
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},
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"Major infectious diseases": {
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"text": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout UAE; as of 6 April 2021, UAE has reported a total of 472,148 cases of COVID-19 or 4,773.8 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 15.29 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 23 February 2021, 35.2% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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{
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"Introduction": {
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"Background": {
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"text": "<p>Azerbaijan - a secular nation with a majority-Turkic and majority-Shia Muslim population - was briefly independent (from 1918 to 1920) following the collapse of the Russian Empire; it was subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union for seven decades. Azerbaijan remains involved in the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh was a primarily ethnic Armenian region that Moscow recognized in 1923 as an autonomous oblast within Soviet Azerbaijan. In the late Soviet period, a separatist movement developed which sought to end Azerbaijani control over the region. Fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh began in 1988 and escalated after Armenia and Azerbaijan attained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. By the time a ceasefire took effect in May 1994, separatists, with Armenian support, controlled Nagorno‑Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories. Following a Second Nagorno-Karabakh War that took place in September-November 2020, Azerbaijan recaptured much of the territory it had lost a quarter century earlier and under the terms of a cease fire agreement, Armenia returned the remaining territories it occupied to Azerbaijan. <br /><br />In the 25 years following its independence, Azerbaijan succeeded in significantly reducing the poverty rate and has directed revenues from its oil and gas production to develop the country’s infrastructure. However, corruption remains a problem, and the government has been accused of authoritarianism. The country’s leadership has remained in the Aliyev family since Heydar ALIYEV became president in 1993 and was succeeded by his son, President Ilham ALIYEV in 2003. Following two national referendums in the past several years that eliminated presidential term limits and extended presidential terms from 5 to 7 years, President ALIYEV secured a fourth term as president in April 2018 in an election that international observers noted had serious shortcomings. Reforms are underway to diversify the country’s non-oil economy and additional reforms are needed to address weaknesses in government institutions, particularly in the education and health sectors, and the court system.</p>"
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"text": "<p>Azerbaijan - a secular nation with a majority-Turkic and majority-Shia Muslim population - was briefly independent (from 1918 to 1920) following the collapse of the Russian Empire; it was subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union for seven decades. Azerbaijan remains involved in the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh was a primarily ethnic Armenian region that Moscow recognized in 1923 as an autonomous oblast within Soviet Azerbaijan. In the late Soviet period, a separatist movement developed which sought to end Azerbaijani control over the region. Fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh began in 1988 and escalated after Armenia and Azerbaijan attained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. By the time a ceasefire took effect in May 1994, separatists, with Armenian support, controlled Nagorno‑Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories. Following a Second Nagorno-Karabakh War that took place in September-November 2020, Azerbaijan recaptured much of the territory it had lost a quarter century earlier and under the terms of a cease fire agreement, Armenia returned the remaining territories it occupied to Azerbaijan. <br><br>In the 25 years following its independence, Azerbaijan succeeded in significantly reducing the poverty rate and has directed revenues from its oil and gas production to develop the country’s infrastructure. However, corruption remains a problem, and the government has been accused of authoritarianism. The country’s leadership has remained in the Aliyev family since Heydar ALIYEV became president in 1993 and was succeeded by his son, President Ilham ALIYEV in 2003. Following two national referendums in the past several years that eliminated presidential term limits and extended presidential terms from 5 to 7 years, President ALIYEV secured a fourth term as president in April 2018 in an election that international observers noted had serious shortcomings. Reforms are underway to diversify the country’s non-oil economy and additional reforms are needed to address weaknesses in government institutions, particularly in the education and health sectors, and the court system.</p>"
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}
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},
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"Geography": {
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@ -113,12 +113,17 @@
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region is populated almost entirely by ethnic Armenians"
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},
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"Languages": {
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"text": "Azerbaijani (Azeri) (official) 92.5%, Russian 1.4%, Armenian 1.4%, other 4.7% (2009 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> Russian is widely spoken",
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"Languages": {
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"text": "Azerbaijani (Azeri) (official) 92.5%, Russian 1.4%, Armenian 1.4%, other 4.7% (2009 est.)"
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},
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"printed major-language sample": {
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"text": "<br>Dünya fakt kitabı, əsas məlumatlar üçün əvəz olunmaz mənbədir (Azerbaijani)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Russian is widely spoken"
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},
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"Religions": {
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"text": "Muslim 96.9% (predominantly Shia), Christian 3%, other <0.1, unaffiliated <0.1 (2010 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> religious affiliation for the majority of Azerbaijanis is largely nominal, percentages for actual practicing adherents are probably much lower",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> religious affiliation for the majority of Azerbaijanis is largely nominal, percentages for actual practicing adherents are probably much lower"
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"text": "Muslim 96.9% (predominantly Shia), Christian 3%, other <0.1, unaffiliated <0.1 (2010 est.)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> religious affiliation for the majority of Azerbaijanis is largely nominal, percentages for actual practicing adherents are probably much lower",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> religious affiliation for the majority of Azerbaijanis is largely nominal, percentages for actual practicing adherents are probably much lower"
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},
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"Age structure": {
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"0-14 years": {
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@ -296,13 +301,13 @@
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}
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
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"text": "0.1% (2019 est.)"
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"text": "0.1% (2020 est.)"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
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"text": "9,700 (2019 est.)"
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"text": "9,900 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
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"text": "<500 (2019 est.)"
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"text": "<200 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
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"text": "19.9% (2016)"
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@ -555,7 +560,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Political parties and leaders": {
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"text": "Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party <br />Civil Solidarity Party or CSP [Sabir RUSTAMKHANLI]<br />Civil Unity Party or CUP [Sabir HAJIYEV]<br />Great Order Party<br />Islamic Party of Azerbaijan [Mavsum SAMADOV]<br />Musavat [Arif HAJILI]<br />Popular Front Party [Ali KARIMLI]<br />Motherland Party or AVP [Fazail AGAMALI]<br />National Renaissance Party<br />Party for Democratic Reforms (PDR)<br />Social Democratic Party [Ayaz MUTALIBOV]<br />Social Prosperity Party [Khanhusein KAZIMLI]<br />Unity Party (VP) [Tahir KARIMLI]<br />Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [Gudrat HASANGULIYEV]<br />Yeni (New) Azerbaijan Party or YAP [President Ilham ALIYEV]"
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"text": "Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party <br>Civil Solidarity Party or CSP [Sabir RUSTAMKHANLI]<br>Civil Unity Party or CUP [Sabir HAJIYEV]<br>Great Order Party<br>Islamic Party of Azerbaijan [Mavsum SAMADOV]<br>Musavat [Arif HAJILI]<br>Popular Front Party [Ali KARIMLI]<br>Motherland Party or AVP [Fazail AGAMALI]<br>National Renaissance Party<br>Party for Democratic Reforms (PDR)<br>Social Democratic Party [Ayaz MUTALIBOV]<br>Social Prosperity Party [Khanhusein KAZIMLI]<br>Unity Party (VP) [Tahir KARIMLI]<br>Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [Gudrat HASANGULIYEV]<br>Yeni (New) Azerbaijan Party or YAP [President Ilham ALIYEV]"
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},
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"International organization participation": {
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"text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CICA, CIS, EAPC, EBRD, ECO, FAO, GCTU, GUAM, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
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@ -1126,8 +1131,8 @@
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},
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"Terrorism": {
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"Terrorist group(s)": {
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"text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
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"text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
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}
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
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"text": "Armenian (official) 97.9%, Kurdish (spoken by Yezidi minority) 1%, other 1%; note - Russian is widely spoken (2011 est.)"
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},
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"printed major-language sample": {
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"text": "<br />Աշխարհի Փաստագիրք, Անփոխարինելի Աղբյւր Հիմնական Տեղեկատվւթյան. (Armenian)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
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"text": "<br>Աշխարհի Փաստագիրք, Անփոխարինելի Աղբյւր Հիմնական Տեղեկատվւթյան. (Armenian)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
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}
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},
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"Religions": {
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@ -296,13 +296,13 @@
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}
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
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"text": "0.1% (2019 est.)"
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"text": "0.2% (2020 est.)"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
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"text": "3,500 (2019 est.)"
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"text": "4,800 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
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"text": "<100 (2019 est.)"
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"text": "<100 (2020 est.)"
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},
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"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
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"text": "20.2% (2016)"
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}
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},
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"Political parties and leaders": {
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"text": "Armenian National Congress or ANC (bloc of independent and opposition parties) [Levon TER-PETROSSIAN]<br />Armenian Revolutionary Federation or ARF (\"Dashnak\" Party) [Hakob TER-KHACHATURYAN]<br />Bright Armenia [Edmon MARUKYAN]<br />Citizen's Decision [Suren SAHAKYAN] <br />Civil Contract [Nikol PASHINYAN]<br />Free Democrats [Khachatur KOKOBELYAN]<br />Heritage Party [Raffi HOVANNISIAN]<br />Prosperous Armenia or BHK [Gagik TSARUKYAN]<br />Republic [Aram SARGSYAN]<br />Republican Party of Armenia or RPA [Serzh SARGSIAN]<br />Rule of Law Party (Orinats Yerkir) or OEK [Artur BAGHDASARIAN]<br />Sasna Tser [Varuzhan AVETISYAN]"
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"text": "Armenian National Congress or ANC (bloc of independent and opposition parties) [Levon TER-PETROSSIAN]<br>Armenian Revolutionary Federation or ARF (\"Dashnak\" Party) [Hakob TER-KHACHATURYAN]<br>Bright Armenia [Edmon MARUKYAN]<br>Citizen's Decision [Suren SAHAKYAN] <br>Civil Contract [Nikol PASHINYAN]<br>Free Democrats [Khachatur KOKOBELYAN]<br>Heritage Party [Raffi HOVANNISIAN]<br>Prosperous Armenia or BHK [Gagik TSARUKYAN]<br>Republic [Aram SARGSYAN]<br>Republican Party of Armenia or RPA [Serzh SARGSIAN]<br>Rule of Law Party (Orinats Yerkir) or OEK [Artur BAGHDASARIAN]<br>Sasna Tser [Varuzhan AVETISYAN]"
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},
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"International organization participation": {
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"text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CIS, CSTO, EAEC (observer), EAEU, EAPC, EBRD, FAO, GCTU, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM (observer), OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, OSCE, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "<p>telecom market struggles to provide an effective national telecom service; country remains dependent on the economic health of Russian and EU economies; fixed-line penetration falling, driven by growth in mobile and fixed-line broadband; growth of 4G networks and falling prices due to growing competition; fixed broadband is growing but remains low by international comparisons; flat mobile market; strong growth predicted for mobile broadband market; government participating in a project to ensure eventual nationwide 5G network; government approved plans for a new data center built via public-private partnership; communication technologies sectors have attracted foreign investment; top importer of broadcast equipment from China (2021)</p> (2020)"
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"text": "<p>telecom market struggles to provide an effective national telecom service; country remains dependent on the economic health of Russian and EU economies; fixed-line penetration falling, driven by growth in mobile and fixed-line broadband; growth of 4G networks and falling prices due to growing competition; fixed broadband is growing but remains low by international comparisons; flat mobile market; strong growth predicted for mobile broadband market; government participating in a project to ensure eventual nationwide 5G network; government approved plans for a new data center built via public-private partnership; communication technologies sectors have attracted foreign investment; top importer of broadcast equipment from China (2021)</p> (2020)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "15 per 100 fixed-line, 122 per 100 mobile-cellular; reliable fixed-line and mobile-cellular services are available across Yerevan and in major cities and towns; mobile-cellular coverage available in most rural areas (2019)"
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "<p>Armenia’s government-run Public Television network operates alongside 100 privately owned TV stations that provide local to near nationwide coverage; three Russian TV companies are broadcast in Armenia under interstate agreements; subscription cable TV services are available in most regions; several major international broadcasters are available, including CNN; Armenian TV completed conversion from analog to digital broadcasting in late 2016; Public Radio of Armenia is a national, state-run broadcast network that operates alongside 18 privately owned radio stations</p> (2019)"
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"text": "<p>Armenia’s government-run Public Television network operates alongside 100 privately owned TV stations that provide local to near nationwide coverage; three Russian TV companies are broadcast in Armenia under interstate agreements; subscription cable TV services are available in most regions; several major international broadcasters are available, including CNN; Armenian TV completed conversion from analog to digital broadcasting in late 2016; Public Radio of Armenia is a national, state-run broadcast network that operates alongside 18 privately owned radio stations</p> (2019)"
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},
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"Internet country code": {
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"text": ".am"
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"text": "Armenians may be exploited domestically or abroad, and foreigners may be subjected to sex trafficking or forced labor in Armenia; Armenian women and children are exploited in sex and labor trafficking domestically, as well as sex trafficking in the UAE and Turkey; Armenian migrants experience forced labor in Russia, the UAE, and Turkey; Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian women working as dancers are vulnerable to sex trafficking, while Indian employment seekers are subjected to forced labor in Armenia"
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},
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"tier rating": {
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"text": "<p>Tier 2 Watch List — Armenia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; law enforcement authorities did not conduct proactive investigations and relied on victims to self-identify; prevention efforts decreased and protection efforts were weak, with the government continuing to lack a formal victim-witness protection program; the government had no convictions, including convictions of complicit government employees, for the second consecutive year and has not had a forced labor conviction since 2014; legislation was passed to strengthen the health and labor body and training was provided to law enforcement officials; government and local NGOs provided legal, medical, and psychological assistance, housing, and monetary compensation to victims; however, civil society continued to provide reintegration and long-term support services without government funding (2020)</p>"
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"text": "<p>Tier 2 Watch List — Armenia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; law enforcement authorities did not conduct proactive investigations and relied on victims to self-identify; prevention efforts decreased and protection efforts were weak, with the government continuing to lack a formal victim-witness protection program; the government had no convictions, including convictions of complicit government employees, for the second consecutive year and has not had a forced labor conviction since 2014; legislation was passed to strengthen the health and labor body and training was provided to law enforcement officials; government and local NGOs provided legal, medical, and psychological assistance, housing, and monetary compensation to victims; however, civil society continued to provide reintegration and long-term support services without government funding (2020)</p>"
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}
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},
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"Illicit drugs": {
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{
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"Introduction": {
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"Background": {
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"text": "<p>In 1783, the Sunni Al-Khalifa family took power in Bahrain. In order to secure these holdings, it entered into a series of treaties with the UK during the 19th century that made Bahrain a British protectorate. The archipelago attained its independence in 1971. A steady decline in oil production and reserves since 1970 prompted Bahrain to take steps to diversify its economy, in the process developing petroleum processing and refining, aluminum production, and hospitality and retail sectors. It has also endeavored to become a leading regional banking center, especially with respect to Islamic finance. Bahrain's small size, central location among Gulf countries, economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, and proximity to Iran require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbors. Its foreign policy activities usually fall in line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.</p> <p>The Sunni royal family has long struggled to manage relations with its large Shia-majority population. In early 2011, amid Arab uprisings elsewhere in the region, the Bahraini Government confronted similar pro-democracy and reform protests at home with police and military action, including deploying Gulf Cooperation Council security forces to Bahrain. Failed political talks prompted opposition political societies to boycott 2014 legislative and municipal council elections. In 2018, a law preventing members of political societies dissolved by the courts from participating in elections effectively sidelined the majority of opposition figures from taking part in national elections. As a result, most members of parliament are independents. Ongoing dissatisfaction with the political status quo continues to factor into sporadic clashes between demonstrators and security forces. On 15 September 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed peace agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Israel – brokered by the US – in Washington DC. Bahrain and the UAE thus became the third and fourth Middle Eastern countries, along with Egypt and Jordan, to recognize Israel.</p>"
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"text": "<p>In 1783, the Sunni Al-Khalifa family took power in Bahrain. In order to secure these holdings, it entered into a series of treaties with the UK during the 19th century that made Bahrain a British protectorate. The archipelago attained its independence in 1971. A steady decline in oil production and reserves since 1970 prompted Bahrain to take steps to diversify its economy, in the process developing petroleum processing and refining, aluminum production, and hospitality and retail sectors. It has also endeavored to become a leading regional banking center, especially with respect to Islamic finance. Bahrain's small size, central location among Gulf countries, economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, and proximity to Iran require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbors. Its foreign policy activities usually fall in line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.</p> <p>The Sunni royal family has long struggled to manage relations with its large Shia-majority population. In early 2011, amid Arab uprisings elsewhere in the region, the Bahraini Government confronted similar pro-democracy and reform protests at home with police and military action, including deploying Gulf Cooperation Council security forces to Bahrain. Failed political talks prompted opposition political societies to boycott 2014 legislative and municipal council elections. In 2018, a law preventing members of political societies dissolved by the courts from participating in elections effectively sidelined the majority of opposition figures from taking part in national elections. As a result, most members of parliament are independents. Ongoing dissatisfaction with the political status quo continues to factor into sporadic clashes between demonstrators and security forces. On 15 September 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed peace agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Israel – brokered by the US – in Washington DC. Bahrain and the UAE thus became the third and fourth Middle Eastern countries, along with Egypt and Jordan, to recognize Israel.</p>"
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}
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},
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"Geography": {
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@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
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"text": "Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu"
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},
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"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -503,13 +503,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of:<br />Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura (40 seats; members appointed by the king)<br />Council of Representatives or Majlis al-Nuwab (40 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 4-year renewable terms)"
|
||||
"text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of:<br>Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura (40 seats; members appointed by the king)<br>Council of Representatives or Majlis al-Nuwab (40 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 4-year renewable terms)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />Consultative Council - last appointments on 12 December 2018 (next NA)<br />Council of Representatives - first round for 9 members held on 24 November 2018; second round for remaining 31 members held on 1 December 2018 (next to be held in 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<br>Consultative Council - last appointments on 12 December 2018 (next NA)<br>Council of Representatives - first round for 9 members held on 24 November 2018; second round for remaining 31 members held on 1 December 2018 (next to be held in 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />Consultative Council - composition - men 31, women 9, percent of women 22.5%<br /><br />Council of Representatives (for 2018 election) - percent of vote by society - NA; seats by society - Islamic Al-Asalah (Sunni Salafi) 3, Minbar al-Taqadumi (Communist) 2, National Unity Gathering (Sunni progovernment) 1, National Islamic Minbar (Sunni Muslim Brotherhood) 1, independent 33; composition - men 34, women 6, percent of women 15%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 19%"
|
||||
"text": "<br>Consultative Council - composition - men 31, women 9, percent of women 22.5%<br><br>Council of Representatives (for 2018 election) - percent of vote by society - NA; seats by society - Islamic Al-Asalah (Sunni Salafi) 3, Minbar al-Taqadumi (Communist) 2, National Unity Gathering (Sunni progovernment) 1, National Islamic Minbar (Sunni Muslim Brotherhood) 1, independent 33; composition - men 34, women 6, percent of women 15%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 19%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -558,7 +558,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Building #979, Road 3119 (next to Al-Ahli Sports Club), Block 331, Zinj District, Manama"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mailing address": {
|
||||
"text": "PSC 451, Box 660, FPO AE 09834-5100 <br />international mail: American Embassy, Box 26431, Manama"
|
||||
"text": "PSC 451, Box 660, FPO AE 09834-5100 <br>international mail: American Embassy, Box 26431, Manama"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"FAX": {
|
||||
"text": "[973] 1727-2594"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1032,7 +1032,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Bahrain Defense Force (BDF): Royal Bahraini Army (includes the Royal Guard), Royal Bahraini Navy, Royal Bahraini Air Force; Ministry of Interior: National Guard<span style=\"display: inline !important; float: none; background-color: #ffffff; color: #000000; font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration: none; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;\">, Special Security Forces Command (SSFC), Coast Guard<br /></span> (2021)<br><br>note: the Royal Guard is officially under the command of the Army, but exercises considerable autonomy",
|
||||
"text": "Bahrain Defense Force (BDF): Royal Bahraini Army (includes the Royal Guard), Royal Bahraini Navy, Royal Bahraini Air Force; Ministry of Interior: National Guard, Special Security Forces Command (SSFC), Coast Guard<br> (2021)<br><br>note: the Royal Guard is officially under the command of the Army, but exercises considerable autonomy",
|
||||
"note": "note: the Royal Guard is officially under the command of the Army, but exercises considerable autonomy"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "size assessments for the Bahrain Defense Force vary; approximately 10,000 active personnel (7,500 Army; 1,000 Navy; 1,500 Air Force); est. 3,000 National Guard (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 10,000 active personnel (7,500 Army; 1,000 Navy; 1,500 Air Force); est. 3,000 National Guard (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the inventory of the Bahrain Defense force is comprised mostly of equipment acquired from the US along with a smaller quantity of material from European suppliers; since 2010, the US is the leading supplier of arms to Bahrain (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1064,8 +1064,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "al-Ashtar Brigades; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "al-Ashtar Brigades; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The region of present day Georgia contained the ancient kingdoms of Colchis and Kartli-Iberia. The area came under Roman influence in the first centuries A.D., and Christianity became the state religion in the 330s. Domination by Persians, Arabs, and Turks was followed by a Georgian golden age (11th-13th centuries) that was cut short by the Mongol invasion of 1236. Subsequently, the Ottoman and Persian empires competed for influence in the region. Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th century. Independent for three years (1918-1921) following the Russian revolution, it was forcibly incorporated into the USSR in 1921 and regained its independence when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.</p> <p>Mounting public discontent over rampant corruption and ineffective government services, followed by an attempt by the incumbent Georgian Government to manipulate parliamentary elections in November 2003, touched off widespread protests that led to the resignation of Eduard SHEVARDNADZE, president since 1995. In the aftermath of that popular movement, which became known as the \"Rose Revolution,\" new elections in early 2004 swept Mikheil SAAKASHVILI into power along with his United National Movement (UNM) party. Progress on market reforms and democratization has been made in the years since independence, but this progress has been complicated by Russian assistance and support to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Periodic flare-ups in tension and violence culminated in a five-day conflict in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia, including the invasion of large portions of undisputed Georgian territory. Russian troops pledged to pull back from most occupied Georgian territory, but in late August 2008 Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russian military forces remain in those regions.</p> <p>Billionaire Bidzina IVANISHVILI's unexpected entry into politics in October 2011 brought the divided opposition together under his Georgian Dream coalition, which won a majority of seats in the October 2012 parliamentary elections and removed UNM from power. Conceding defeat, SAAKASHVILI named IVANISHVILI as prime minister and allowed Georgian Dream to create a new government. Giorgi MARGVELASHVILI was inaugurated as president on 17 November 2013, ending a tense year of power-sharing between SAAKASHVILI and IVANISHVILI. At the time, these changes in leadership represented unique examples of a former Soviet state that emerged to conduct democratic and peaceful government transitions of power. IVANISHVILI voluntarily resigned from office after the presidential succession, and Georgia's legislature on 20 November 2013 confirmed Irakli GARIBASHVILI as his replacement. GARIBASHVILI was replaced by Giorgi KVIRIKASHVILI in December 2015. KVIRIKASHVILI remained prime minister following Georgian Dream’s success in the October 2016 parliamentary elections, where the party won a constitutional majority. IVANISHVILI reemerged as Georgian Dream party chairman in April 2018. KVIRIKASHVILI resigned in June 2018 and was replaced by Mamuka BAKHTADZE. In September 2019, BAKHTADZE resigned and Giorgi GAKHARIA was named the country's new head of government, Georgia's fifth prime minister in seven years. Popular and government support for integration with the West is high in Georgia. Joining the EU and NATO are among the country's top foreign policy goals.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The region of present day Georgia contained the ancient kingdoms of Colchis and Kartli-Iberia. The area came under Roman influence in the first centuries A.D., and Christianity became the state religion in the 330s. Domination by Persians, Arabs, and Turks was followed by a Georgian golden age (11th-13th centuries) that was cut short by the Mongol invasion of 1236. Subsequently, the Ottoman and Persian empires competed for influence in the region. Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th century. Independent for three years (1918-1921) following the Russian revolution, it was forcibly incorporated into the USSR in 1921 and regained its independence when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.</p> <p>Mounting public discontent over rampant corruption and ineffective government services, followed by an attempt by the incumbent Georgian Government to manipulate parliamentary elections in November 2003, touched off widespread protests that led to the resignation of Eduard SHEVARDNADZE, president since 1995. In the aftermath of that popular movement, which became known as the \"Rose Revolution,\" new elections in early 2004 swept Mikheil SAAKASHVILI into power along with his United National Movement (UNM) party. Progress on market reforms and democratization has been made in the years since independence, but this progress has been complicated by Russian assistance and support to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Periodic flare-ups in tension and violence culminated in a five-day conflict in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia, including the invasion of large portions of undisputed Georgian territory. Russian troops pledged to pull back from most occupied Georgian territory, but in late August 2008 Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russian military forces remain in those regions.</p> <p>Billionaire Bidzina IVANISHVILI's unexpected entry into politics in October 2011 brought the divided opposition together under his Georgian Dream coalition, which won a majority of seats in the October 2012 parliamentary elections and removed UNM from power. Conceding defeat, SAAKASHVILI named IVANISHVILI as prime minister and allowed Georgian Dream to create a new government. Giorgi MARGVELASHVILI was inaugurated as president on 17 November 2013, ending a tense year of power-sharing between SAAKASHVILI and IVANISHVILI. At the time, these changes in leadership represented unique examples of a former Soviet state that emerged to conduct democratic and peaceful government transitions of power. IVANISHVILI voluntarily resigned from office after the presidential succession, and Georgia's legislature on 20 November 2013 confirmed Irakli GARIBASHVILI as his replacement. GARIBASHVILI was replaced by Giorgi KVIRIKASHVILI in December 2015. KVIRIKASHVILI remained prime minister following Georgian Dream’s success in the October 2016 parliamentary elections, where the party won a constitutional majority. IVANISHVILI reemerged as Georgian Dream party chairman in April 2018. KVIRIKASHVILI resigned in June 2018 and was replaced by Mamuka BAKHTADZE. In September 2019, BAKHTADZE resigned and Giorgi GAKHARIA was named the country's new head of government, Georgia's fifth prime minister in seven years. Popular and government support for integration with the West is high in Georgia. Joining the EU and NATO are among the country's top foreign policy goals.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "earthquakes"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<strong>note 1:</strong> strategically located east of the Black Sea; Georgia controls much of the Caucasus Mountains and the routes through them <br /><br /><strong>note 2:</strong> the world's four deepest caves are all in Georgia, including two that are the only known caves on earth deeper than 2,000 m: Krubera Cave at -2,197 m (-7,208 ft; reached in 2012) and Veryovkina Cave at -2,212 (-7,257 ft; reached in 2018)"
|
||||
"text": "<strong>note 1:</strong> strategically located east of the Black Sea; Georgia controls much of the Caucasus Mountains and the routes through them <br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the world's four deepest caves are all in Georgia, including two that are the only known caves on earth deeper than 2,000 m: Krubera Cave at -2,197 m (-7,208 ft; reached in 2012) and Veryovkina Cave at -2,212 (-7,257 ft; reached in 2018)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"People and Society": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Georgian (official) 87.6%, Azeri 6.2%, Armenian 3.9%, Russian 1.2%, other 1%; note - Abkhaz is the official language in Abkhazia (2014 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />მსოფლიო ფაქტების წიგნი, ძირითადი ინფორმაციის აუცილებელი წყარო. (Georgian)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>მსოფლიო ფაქტების წიგნი, ძირითადი ინფორმაციის აუცილებელი წყარო. (Georgian)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -304,13 +304,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "0.3% (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "0.3% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
|
||||
"text": "9,100 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "9,100 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "21.7% (2016)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -531,7 +531,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Cabinet of Ministers"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 28 November 2018 (next to be held in 2024); prime minister nominated by Parliament, appointed by the president <br /><br />note - 2017 constitutional amendments made the 2018 election the last where the president was directly elected; future presidents will be elected by a 300-member College of Electors; in light of these changes, ZOURABICHVILI was allowed a six-year term"
|
||||
"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 28 November 2018 (next to be held in 2024); prime minister nominated by Parliament, appointed by the president <br><br>note - 2017 constitutional amendments made the 2018 election the last where the president was directly elected; future presidents will be elected by a 300-member College of Electors; in light of these changes, ZOURABICHVILI was allowed a six-year term"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "Salome ZOURABICHVILI elected president in runoff; percent of vote - Salome ZOURABICHVILI (independent, backed by Georgian Dream) 59.5%, Grigol VASHADZE (UNM) 40.5%; Irakli GARIBASHVILI approved as prime minister by Parliamentary vote 89-2"
|
||||
|
|
@ -553,14 +553,14 @@
|
|||
"text": "Supreme Court (consists of 28 judges organized into several specialized judicial chambers; number of judges determined by the president of Georgia); Constitutional Court (consists of 9 judges); note - the Abkhazian and Ajarian Autonomous republics each have a supreme court and a hierarchy of lower courts"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"judge selection and term of office": {
|
||||
"text": "<span style=\"display: inline !important; float: none; background-color: transparent; color: #000000; font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 18px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration: none; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;\">Supreme Court judges nominated by the High Council of Justice (a 14-member body consisting of the Supreme Court chairperson, common court judges, and appointees of the president of Georgia) and appointed by Parliament; judges appointed for life; Constitutional Court judges appointed 3 each by the president, by Parliament, and by the Supreme Court judges; judges appointed for 10-year terms</span>"
|
||||
"text": "Supreme Court judges nominated by the High Council of Justice (a 14-member body consisting of the Supreme Court chairperson, common court judges, and appointees of the president of Georgia) and appointed by Parliament; judges appointed for life; Constitutional Court judges appointed 3 each by the president, by Parliament, and by the Supreme Court judges; judges appointed for 10-year terms"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subordinate courts": {
|
||||
"text": "Courts of Appeal; regional (town) and district courts"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Alliance of Patriots [Irma INASHVILI]<br />Democratic Movement-United Georgia [Nino BURJANADZE]<br />Citizens Party<br />Development Movement [Davit USPASHVILI]<br />European Georgia-Movement for Liberty [Davit BAKRADZE] <br />For Justice Party [Eka BESELIA]<br />Free Democrats or FD [Shalva SHAVGULIDZE]<br />Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia [Bidzina IVANISHVILI]<br />Girchi (Pinecone) [Zurab JAPARIDZE]<br />Industry Will Save Georgia (Industrialists) or IWSG [Giorgi TOPADZE]<br />Labor Party [Shalva NATELASHVILI]<br />Lelo for Georgia [Mamuka KHAZARADZE]<br />New Georgia [Giorgi VASHADZE]<br />Republican Party [Khatuna SAMNIDZE]<br />Strategy Aghmashenebeli [Giorgi VASHADZE]<br />United National Movement or UNM [Grigol VASHADZE]"
|
||||
"text": "Alliance of Patriots [Irma INASHVILI]<br>Democratic Movement-United Georgia [Nino BURJANADZE]<br>Citizens Party<br>Development Movement [Davit USPASHVILI]<br>European Georgia-Movement for Liberty [Davit BAKRADZE] <br>For Justice Party [Eka BESELIA]<br>Free Democrats or FD [Shalva SHAVGULIDZE]<br>Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia [Bidzina IVANISHVILI]<br>Girchi (Pinecone) [Zurab JAPARIDZE]<br>Industry Will Save Georgia (Industrialists) or IWSG [Giorgi TOPADZE]<br>Labor Party [Shalva NATELASHVILI]<br>Lelo for Georgia [Mamuka KHAZARADZE]<br>New Georgia [Giorgi VASHADZE]<br>Republican Party [Khatuna SAMNIDZE]<br>Strategy Aghmashenebeli [Giorgi VASHADZE]<br>United National Movement or UNM [Grigol VASHADZE]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ADB, BSEC, CD, CE, CPLP (associate), EAPC, EBRD, FAO, G-11, GCTU, GUAM, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, OAS (observer), OIF (observer), OPCW, OSCE, PFP, SELEC (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
|
||||
|
|
@ -984,7 +984,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced downturn, particularly in mobile device production; many network operators delayed upgrades to infrastructure; progress towards 5G implementation was postponed or slowed in some countries; consumer spending on telecom services and devices was affected by large-scale job losses and the consequent restriction on disposable incomes; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home became evident, and received some support from governments"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Broadcast media": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The Tbilisi-based Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) includes Channel 1, Channel 2 as well as the Batumi-based Adjara TV, and the State Budget funds all three; there are also a number of independent commercial television broadcasters, such as Imedi, Rustavi 2, Pirveli TV, Maestro, Kavkasia, Georgian Dream Studios (GDS), Obiektivi, Mtavari Arkhi, and a small Russian language operator TOK TV; Tabula and Post TV are web-based television outlets; all of these broadcasters and web-based television outlets, except GDS, carry the news; the Georgian Orthodox Church also operates a satellite-based television station called Unanimity; there are 26 regional television broadcasters across Georgia that are members of the Georgian Association of Regional Broadcasters and/or the Alliance of Georgian Broadcasters; the broadcaster organizations seek to strengthen the regional media's capacities and distribution of regional products: a nationwide digital switchover occurred in 2015; there are several dozen private radio stations; GPB operates 2 radio stations</p> (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The Tbilisi-based Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) includes Channel 1, Channel 2 as well as the Batumi-based Adjara TV, and the State Budget funds all three; there are also a number of independent commercial television broadcasters, such as Imedi, Rustavi 2, Pirveli TV, Maestro, Kavkasia, Georgian Dream Studios (GDS), Obiektivi, Mtavari Arkhi, and a small Russian language operator TOK TV; Tabula and Post TV are web-based television outlets; all of these broadcasters and web-based television outlets, except GDS, carry the news; the Georgian Orthodox Church also operates a satellite-based television station called Unanimity; there are 26 regional television broadcasters across Georgia that are members of the Georgian Association of Regional Broadcasters and/or the Alliance of Georgian Broadcasters; the broadcaster organizations seek to strengthen the regional media's capacities and distribution of regional products: a nationwide digital switchover occurred in 2015; there are several dozen private radio stations; GPB operates 2 radio stations</p> (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Internet country code": {
|
||||
"text": ".ge"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the Gaza Strip has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The Gaza Strip fell to British forces during World War I, becoming a part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt administered the newly formed Gaza Strip; Israel captured it in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly-created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank. In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p> <p>Israel by late 2005 unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control the Gaza Strip’s land and maritime borders and airspace. In early 2006, the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Attempts to form a unity government between Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed, leading to violent clashes between their respective supporters and HAMAS's violent seizure of all military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since HAMAS’s takeover, Israel and Egypt have enforced tight restrictions on movement and access of goods and individuals into and out of the territory. Fatah and HAMAS have since reached a series of agreements aimed at restoring political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but have struggled to enact them; a reconciliation agreement signed in October 2017 remains unimplemented.</p> <p>In July 2014, HAMAS and other Gaza-based militant groups engaged in a 51-day conflict with Israel culminating in late August with an open-ended truce. Since 2014, Palestinian militants and the Israel Defense Forces have exchanged projectiles and air strikes respectively, sometimes lasting multiple days and resulting in multiple deaths on both sides. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated multiple ceasefires to avert a broader conflict. Since March 2018, HAMAS has coordinated weekly demonstrations along the Gaza security fence, many of which have turned violent, resulting in one Israeli soldier death and several Israeli soldier injuries as well as more than 200 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the Gaza Strip has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The Gaza Strip fell to British forces during World War I, becoming a part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt administered the newly formed Gaza Strip; Israel captured it in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly-created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank. In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</p> <p>Israel by late 2005 unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and soldiers and dismantled its military facilities in the Gaza Strip, but it continues to control the Gaza Strip’s land and maritime borders and airspace. In early 2006, the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election. Attempts to form a unity government between Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed, leading to violent clashes between their respective supporters and HAMAS's violent seizure of all military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since HAMAS’s takeover, Israel and Egypt have enforced tight restrictions on movement and access of goods and individuals into and out of the territory. Fatah and HAMAS have since reached a series of agreements aimed at restoring political unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank but have struggled to enact them; a reconciliation agreement signed in October 2017 remains unimplemented.</p> <p>In July 2014, HAMAS and other Gaza-based militant groups engaged in a 51-day conflict with Israel culminating in late August with an open-ended truce. Since 2014, Palestinian militants and the Israel Defense Forces have exchanged projectiles and air strikes respectively, sometimes lasting multiple days and resulting in multiple deaths on both sides. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated multiple ceasefires to avert a broader conflict. Since March 2018, HAMAS has coordinated weekly demonstrations along the Gaza security fence, many of which have turned violent, resulting in one Israeli soldier death and several Israeli soldier injuries as well as more than 200 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic, Hebrew (spoken by many Palestinians), English (widely understood)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -219,8 +219,8 @@
|
|||
"text": "3.54 children born/woman (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Contraceptive prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "57.2% (2014)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> includes Gaza Strip and West Bank",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Gaza Strip and West Bank"
|
||||
"text": "57.3% (2019/20)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> includes Gaza Strip and West Bank",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Gaza Strip and West Bank"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Drinking water source": {
|
||||
"improved: urban": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -700,8 +700,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Army of Islam; Abdallah Azzam Brigades; al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; HAMAS; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)-Sinai Province; Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; Palestine Islamic Jihad; Palestine Liberation Front; PFLP-General Command; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Army of Islam; Abdallah Azzam Brigades; al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; HAMAS; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)-Sinai Province; Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; Palestine Islamic Jihad; Palestine Liberation Front; PFLP-General Command; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Persian Farsi (official), Azeri and other Turkic dialects, Kurdish, Gilaki and Mazandarani, Luri, Balochi, Arabic"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />چکیده نامه جهان، منبعی ضروری برای کسب اطلاعات کلی جهان (Persian)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>چکیده نامه جهان، منبعی ضروری برای کسب اطلاعات کلی جهان (Persian)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -304,13 +304,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
|
||||
"text": "59,000 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "54,000 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
|
||||
"text": "2,500 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "3,200 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Major infectious diseases": {
|
||||
"degree of risk": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -322,7 +322,7 @@
|
|||
"vectorborne diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> a new coronavirus is causing sustained community spread of respiratory illness (COVID-19) in Iran; sustained community spread means that people have been infected with the virus, but how or where they became infected is not known, and the spread is ongoing; illness with this virus has ranged from mild to severe with fatalities reported; as of 6 June 2021, Iran has reported a total of 2,960,751<span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> </span>cases of COVID-19 or 3,525.0 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 96.4 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 8 June 2021, 4.66% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> a new coronavirus is causing sustained community spread of respiratory illness (COVID-19) in Iran; sustained community spread means that people have been infected with the virus, but how or where they became infected is not known, and the spread is ongoing; illness with this virus has ranged from mild to severe with fatalities reported; as of 20 July 2021, Iran has reported a total of 3,548,704 cases of COVID-19 or 4,225 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 104.03 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 19 July 2021, 6.98% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "25.8% (2016)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -458,7 +458,7 @@
|
|||
"vectorborne diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> a new coronavirus is causing sustained community spread of respiratory illness (COVID-19) in Iran; sustained community spread means that people have been infected with the virus, but how or where they became infected is not known, and the spread is ongoing; illness with this virus has ranged from mild to severe with fatalities reported; as of 6 June 2021, Iran has reported a total of 2,960,751<span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> </span>cases of COVID-19 or 3,525.0 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 96.4 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 8 June 2021, 4.66% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> a new coronavirus is causing sustained community spread of respiratory illness (COVID-19) in Iran; sustained community spread means that people have been infected with the virus, but how or where they became infected is not known, and the spread is ongoing; illness with this virus has ranged from mild to severe with fatalities reported; as of 20 July 2021, Iran has reported a total of 3,548,704 cases of COVID-19 or 4,225 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 104.03 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 19 July 2021, 6.98% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
"municipal solid waste generated annually": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -592,7 +592,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Combatant Clergy Association (an active political group)<br />Council for Coordinating the Reforms Front<br />Executives of Construction Party<br />Followers of the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent [Ali LARIJANI]<br />Front of Islamic Revolutionary Stability [Morteza AGHA-TEHRANI, general secretary]<br />Islamic Coalition Party<br />Islamic Iran Participation Front [associated with former President Mohammed KHATAMI]<br />Islamic Law Party<br />Militant Clerics Society<br />Moderation and Development Party<br />National Trust Party<br />National Unity Party<br />Pervasive Coalition of Reformists [Ali SUFI, chairman] (includes Council for Coordinating the Reforms Front, National Trust Party, Union of Islamic Iran People Party, Moderation and Development Party)<br />Principlists Grand Coalition [Ali Reza ZAKANI] (includes Combatant Clergy Association and Islamic Coalition Party, Society of Devotees and Pathseekers of the Islamic Revolution, Front of Islamic Revolution Stability)<br />Progress, Welfare, and Justice Front<br />Progress and Justice Population of Islamic Iran or PJP [Hosein GHORBANZADEH, general secretary]<br />Resistance Front of Islamic Iran [Yadollah HABIBI, general secretary]<br />Steadfastness Front<br />Union of Islamic Iran People's Party<br />Wayfarers of the Islamic Revolution"
|
||||
"text": "Combatant Clergy Association (an active political group)<br>Council for Coordinating the Reforms Front<br>Executives of Construction Party<br>Followers of the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent [Ali LARIJANI]<br>Front of Islamic Revolutionary Stability [Morteza AGHA-TEHRANI, general secretary]<br>Islamic Coalition Party<br>Islamic Iran Participation Front [associated with former President Mohammed KHATAMI]<br>Islamic Law Party<br>Militant Clerics Society<br>Moderation and Development Party<br>National Trust Party<br>National Unity Party<br>Pervasive Coalition of Reformists [Ali SUFI, chairman] (includes Council for Coordinating the Reforms Front, National Trust Party, Union of Islamic Iran People Party, Moderation and Development Party)<br>Principlists Grand Coalition [Ali Reza ZAKANI] (includes Combatant Clergy Association and Islamic Coalition Party, Society of Devotees and Pathseekers of the Islamic Revolution, Front of Islamic Revolution Stability)<br>Progress, Welfare, and Justice Front<br>Progress and Justice Population of Islamic Iran or PJP [Hosein GHORBANZADEH, general secretary]<br>Resistance Front of Islamic Iran [Yadollah HABIBI, general secretary]<br>Steadfastness Front<br>Union of Islamic Iran People's Party<br>Wayfarers of the Islamic Revolution"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "CICA, CP, D-8, ECO, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, SAARC (observer), SCO (observer), UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -620,7 +620,7 @@
|
|||
"lyrics/music": {
|
||||
"text": "multiple authors/Hassan RIAHI"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> adopted 1990; Iran has had six national anthems; the first, entitled Salam-e Shah (Royal Salute) was in use from 1873-1909; next came Salamati-ye Dowlat-e Elliye-ye Iran (Salute of the Sublime State of Persia, 1909-1933); it was followed by Sorud-e melli (The Imperial Anthem of Iran; 1933-1979), which chronicled the exploits of the Pahlavi Dynasty; Ey Iran (Oh Iran) functioned unofficially as the national anthem for a brief period between the ouster of the Shah in 1979 and the early days of the Islamic Republic in 1980; Payandeh Bada Iran (Long Live Iran) was used between 1980 and 1990 during the time of Ayatollah KHOMEINI<br /><br /><strong>note 2:</strong> a recording of the current Iranian national anthem is unavailable since the US Navy Band does not record anthems for countries from which the US does not anticipate official visits; the US does not have diplomatic relations with Iran"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> adopted 1990; Iran has had six national anthems; the first, entitled Salam-e Shah (Royal Salute) was in use from 1873-1909; next came Salamati-ye Dowlat-e Elliye-ye Iran (Salute of the Sublime State of Persia, 1909-1933); it was followed by Sorud-e melli (The Imperial Anthem of Iran; 1933-1979), which chronicled the exploits of the Pahlavi Dynasty; Ey Iran (Oh Iran) functioned unofficially as the national anthem for a brief period between the ouster of the Shah in 1979 and the early days of the Islamic Republic in 1980; Payandeh Bada Iran (Long Live Iran) was used between 1980 and 1990 during the time of Ayatollah KHOMEINI<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> a recording of the current Iranian national anthem is unavailable since the US Navy Band does not record anthems for countries from which the US does not anticipate official visits; the US does not have diplomatic relations with Iran"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Economy": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah, IRGC): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (special operations), Cyber Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces (Popular Mobilization Army); Law Enforcement Forces (border and security troops, assigned to the armed forces in wartime) (2021)<br><br>note: the Iranian Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz",
|
||||
"text": "Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah, IRGC): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (special operations), Cyber Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces (Popular Mobilization Army); Law Enforcement Forces (border and security troops, assigned to the armed forces in wartime) (2021)<br><br>note: the Iranian Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz",
|
||||
"note": "note: the Iranian Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "(Estimates)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "assessments of the size of the armed forces of Iran vary; approximately 550-600,000 total active personnel; approximately 400,000 Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (350,000 Ground Forces; 18,000 Navy; 40,000 Air Force/Air Defense Forces); approximately 150-190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (100-150,000 Ground Forces; 20,000 Navy; 15,000 Aerospace Force; 5-15,000 Qods Force); est. 90,000 active Basij Paramilitary Forces (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 550-600,000 total active personnel; approximately 400,000 Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (350,000 Ground Forces; 18,000 Navy; 40,000 Air Force/Air Defense Forces); approximately 150-190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (100-150,000 Ground Forces; 20,000 Navy; 15,000 Aerospace Force; 5-15,000 Qods Force); est. 90,000 active Basij Paramilitary Forces (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the Iranian military's inventory includes a mix of domestically-produced and mostly older foreign equipment largely of Chinese, Russian, Soviet, and US origin (US equipment acquired prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979); weapons imports from Western countries are restricted by international sanctions; since 2010, Iran has received equipment from Belarus, China, and Russia; Iran has a defense industry with the capacity to develop, produce, support, and sustain air, land, missile, and naval weapons programs (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1156,8 +1156,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Jaysh al Adl (Jundallah); Kurdistan Workers' Party; al-Qa’ida<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Jaysh al Adl (Jundallah); Kurdistan Workers' Party; al-Qa’ida<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "sandstorms may occur during spring and summer; droughts; periodic earthquakes"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<strong>note 1:</strong> Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) is an important freshwater source; the Dead Sea is the second saltiest body of water in the world (after Lake Assal in Djibouti)<br /><br /><strong>note 2: </strong>the Malham Cave in Mount Sodom is the world's longest salt cave at 10 km (6 mi); its survey is not complete and its length will undoubtedly increase; Mount Sodom is actually a hill some 220 m (722 ft) high that is 80% salt (multiple salt layers covered by a veneer of rock) <br /><br /><strong>note 3:</strong> in March 2019, there were 380 Israeli settlements,to include 213 settlements and 132 outposts in the West Bank, and 35 settlements in East Jerusalem; there are no Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, as all were evacuated in 2005 (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "<strong>note 1:</strong> Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) is an important freshwater source; the Dead Sea is the second saltiest body of water in the world (after Lake Assal in Djibouti)<br><br><strong>note 2: </strong>the Malham Cave in Mount Sodom is the world's longest salt cave at 10 km (6 mi); its survey is not complete and its length will undoubtedly increase; Mount Sodom is actually a hill some 220 m (722 ft) high that is 80% salt (multiple salt layers covered by a veneer of rock) <br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> in March 2019, there were 380 Israeli settlements,to include 213 settlements and 132 outposts in the West Bank, and 35 settlements in East Jerusalem; there are no Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, as all were evacuated in 2005 (2019)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"People and Society": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Hebrew (official), Arabic (special status under Israeli law), English (most commonly used foreign language)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />ספר עובדות העולם, המקור החיוני למידע בסיסי (Hebrew)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>ספר עובדות העולם, המקור החיוני למידע בסיסי (Hebrew)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -557,7 +557,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Democratic Union [Nitzan HOROWITZ] (alliance includes Democratic Israel, Meretz, Green Movement)<br />Joint List [Ayman ODEH] (alliance includes Hadash, Ta’al, United Arab List, Balad)<br />Kahol Lavan [Benny GANTZ] (alliance includes Israeli Resilience, Yesh Atid, Telem)<br />Labor-Gesher [Amir PERETZ]<br />Likud [Binyamin NETANYAHU]<br />Otzma Yehudit [Itamar BEN-GVIR]<br />Religous Zionist Party [Belzalel SMOTRICH, chairperson]<br />SHAS [Arye DERI]<br />United Torah Judaism, or UTJ [Yaakov LITZMAN] (alliance includes Agudat Israel and Degel HaTorah)<br />Yamina [Ayelet SHAKED]<br />Yesh Atid [Yair LAPID]<br />Yisrael Beiteinu [Avigdor LIEBERMAN]<br />Zehut [Moshe FEIGLIN]</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Democratic Union [Nitzan HOROWITZ] (alliance includes Democratic Israel, Meretz, Green Movement)<br>Joint List [Ayman ODEH] (alliance includes Hadash, Ta’al, United Arab List, Balad)<br>Kahol Lavan [Benny GANTZ] (alliance includes Israeli Resilience, Yesh Atid, Telem)<br>Labor-Gesher [Amir PERETZ]<br>Likud [Binyamin NETANYAHU]<br>Otzma Yehudit [Itamar BEN-GVIR]<br>Religous Zionist Party [Belzalel SMOTRICH, chairperson]<br>SHAS [Arye DERI]<br>United Torah Judaism, or UTJ [Yaakov LITZMAN] (alliance includes Agudat Israel and Degel HaTorah)<br>Yamina [Ayelet SHAKED]<br>Yesh Atid [Yair LAPID]<br>Yisrael Beiteinu [Avigdor LIEBERMAN]<br>Zehut [Moshe FEIGLIN]</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "BIS, BSEC (observer), CE (observer), CERN, CICA, EBRD, FAO, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, OAS (observer), OECD, OPCW (signatory), OSCE (partner), Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club, PCA, SELEC (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1141,8 +1141,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Kahane Chai; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Palestinian Islamic Jihad<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Kahane Chai; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Palestinian Islamic Jihad<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was occupied by the United Kingdom during World War I and was declared a League of Nations mandate under UK administration in 1920. Iraq attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. It was proclaimed a \"republic\" in 1958 after a coup overthrew the monarchy, but in actuality, a series of strongmen ruled the country until 2003. The last was SADDAM Husayn from 1979 to 2003. Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88). In August 1990, Iraq seized Kuwait but was expelled by US-led UN coalition forces during the Gulf War of January-February 1991. After Iraq's expulsion, the UN Security Council (UNSC) required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and to allow UN verification inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions led to the Second Gulf War in March 2003 and the ouster of the SADDAM Husayn regime by US-led forces.</p> <p>In October 2005, Iraqis approved a constitution in a national referendum and, pursuant to this document, elected a 275-member Council of Representatives (COR) in December 2005. The COR approved most cabinet ministers in May 2006, marking the transition to Iraq's first constitutional government in nearly a half century. Iraq held elections for provincial councils in all governorates in January 2009 and April 2013 and postponed the next provincial elections, originally planned for April 2017, until 2019. Iraq has held three national legislative elections since 2005, most recently in May 2018 when 329 legislators were elected to the COR. Adil ABD AL-MAHDI assumed the premiership in October 2018 as a consensus and independent candidate - the first prime minister who is not an active member of a major political bloc. However, widespread protests that began in October 2019 demanding more employment opportunities and an end to corruption prompted ABD AL-MAHDI to announce his resignation on 20 November 2019.</p> <p>Between 2014 and 2017, Iraq was engaged in a military campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) to recapture territory lost in the western and northern portion of the country. Iraqi and allied forces recaptured Mosul, the country's second-largest city, in 2017 and drove ISIS out of its other urban strongholds. In December 2017, then-Prime Minister Haydar al-ABADI publicly declared victory against ISIS while continuing operations against the group's residual presence in rural areas. Also in late 2017, ABADI responded to an independence referendum held by the Kurdistan Regional Government by ordering Iraqi forces to take control of disputed territories across central and northern Iraq that were previously occupied and governed by Kurdish forces.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was occupied by the United Kingdom during World War I and was declared a League of Nations mandate under UK administration in 1920. Iraq attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. It was proclaimed a \"republic\" in 1958 after a coup overthrew the monarchy, but in actuality, a series of strongmen ruled the country until 2003. The last was SADDAM Husayn from 1979 to 2003. Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88). In August 1990, Iraq seized Kuwait but was expelled by US-led UN coalition forces during the Gulf War of January-February 1991. After Iraq's expulsion, the UN Security Council (UNSC) required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and to allow UN verification inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions led to the Second Gulf War in March 2003 and the ouster of the SADDAM Husayn regime by US-led forces.</p> <p>In October 2005, Iraqis approved a constitution in a national referendum and, pursuant to this document, elected a 275-member Council of Representatives (COR) in December 2005. The COR approved most cabinet ministers in May 2006, marking the transition to Iraq's first constitutional government in nearly a half century. Iraq held elections for provincial councils in all governorates in January 2009 and April 2013 and postponed the next provincial elections, originally planned for April 2017, until 2019. Iraq has held three national legislative elections since 2005, most recently in May 2018 when 329 legislators were elected to the COR. Adil ABD AL-MAHDI assumed the premiership in October 2018 as a consensus and independent candidate - the first prime minister who is not an active member of a major political bloc. However, widespread protests that began in October 2019 demanding more employment opportunities and an end to corruption prompted ABD AL-MAHDI to announce his resignation on 20 November 2019.</p> <p>Between 2014 and 2017, Iraq was engaged in a military campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) to recapture territory lost in the western and northern portion of the country. Iraqi and allied forces recaptured Mosul, the country's second-largest city, in 2017 and drove ISIS out of its other urban strongholds. In December 2017, then-Prime Minister Haydar al-ABADI publicly declared victory against ISIS while continuing operations against the group's residual presence in rural areas. Also in late 2017, ABADI responded to an independence referendum held by the Kurdistan Regional Government by ordering Iraqi forces to take control of disputed territories across central and northern Iraq that were previously occupied and governed by Kurdish forces.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic (official), Kurdish (official), Turkmen (a Turkish dialect), Syriac (Neo-Aramaic), and Armenian are official in areas where native speakers of these languages constitute a majority of the population"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، أحسن مصدر للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، أحسن مصدر للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -315,7 +315,7 @@
|
|||
"food or waterborne diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Iraq; as of 6 June 2021, Iraq has reported a total of 1,221,678 cases of COVID-19 or 3,037.3 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 41.1 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 8 June 2021, 1.11% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Iraq; as of 19 July 2021, Iraq has reported a total of 1,501,595 cases of COVID-19 or 3,733.22 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 44.48 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 19 July 2021, 1.74% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "30.4% (2016)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
|
|||
"food or waterborne diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Iraq; as of 6 June 2021, Iraq has reported a total of 1,221,678 cases of COVID-19 or 3,037.3 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 41.1 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 8 June 2021, 1.11% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Iraq; as of 19 July 2021, Iraq has reported a total of 1,501,595 cases of COVID-19 or 3,733.22 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 44.48 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 19 July 2021, 1.74% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -540,7 +540,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "president indirectly elected by Council of Representatives (COR) to serve a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); COR election last held on 12 May 2018 (next NA)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>COR vote in first round - Barham SALIH (PUK) 165, Fuad HUSAYN (KDP) 90; Barham SALIH elected president in second round - Barham SALIH 219, Fuad HUSAYN 22; note - the COR vote on 1 October 2018 failed due to a lack of quorum, and a new session was held on 2 October</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>COR vote in first round - Barham SALIH (PUK) 165, Fuad HUSAYN (KDP) 90; Barham SALIH elected president in second round - Barham SALIH 219, Fuad HUSAYN 22; note - the COR vote on 1 October 2018 failed due to a lack of quorum, and a new session was held on 2 October</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -566,7 +566,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />Al Fatah Alliance [Hadi al-AMIRI]<br />Al Nasr Alliance [Haydar al-ABADI]<br />Al Sadiqun Bloc [Adnan al-DULAYMI]<br />Al Sa'irun Alliance [Muqtda al-SADR]<br />Badr Organization [Hadi al-AMIRI]<br />Da`wa Party [Nuri al-MALIKI]<br />Fadilah Party [Muhammad al-YAQUBI]<br />Goran Movement [Omar SAYYID ALI]<br />Iraqi Communist Party [Hamid Majid MUSA]<br />Iraq Decision Alliance [Khamis al-KHANJAR, Usama al-NUJAYFI]<br />Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq or ISCI [Humam HAMMUDI]<br />Kurdistan Democratic Party or KDP [Masoud BARZANI]<br />National Wisdom Trend [Ammar al-HAKIM]<br />New Generation Movement [SHASWAR Abd al-Wahid Qadir]<br />Our Identity [Muhammad al-HALBUSI]<br />Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or PUK [KOSRAT Rasul Ali, acting]<br />State of Law Coalition [Nuri al MALIKI<br />Wataniyah coalition [Ayad ALLAWI]<br />numerous smaller religious, local, tribal, and minority parties"
|
||||
"text": "<br>Al Fatah Alliance [Hadi al-AMIRI]<br>Al Nasr Alliance [Haydar al-ABADI]<br>Al Sadiqun Bloc [Adnan al-DULAYMI]<br>Al Sa'irun Alliance [Muqtda al-SADR]<br>Badr Organization [Hadi al-AMIRI]<br>Da`wa Party [Nuri al-MALIKI]<br>Fadilah Party [Muhammad al-YAQUBI]<br>Goran Movement [Omar SAYYID ALI]<br>Iraqi Communist Party [Hamid Majid MUSA]<br>Iraq Decision Alliance [Khamis al-KHANJAR, Usama al-NUJAYFI]<br>Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq or ISCI [Humam HAMMUDI]<br>Kurdistan Democratic Party or KDP [Masoud BARZANI]<br>National Wisdom Trend [Ammar al-HAKIM]<br>New Generation Movement [SHASWAR Abd al-Wahid Qadir]<br>Our Identity [Muhammad al-HALBUSI]<br>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or PUK [KOSRAT Rasul Ali, acting]<br>State of Law Coalition [Nuri al MALIKI<br>Wataniyah coalition [Ayad ALLAWI]<br>numerous smaller religious, local, tribal, and minority parties"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, CICA, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "assessments of the size of the Iraqi military and militia forces vary; approximately 225,000 active military personnel (190,000 Army; 5,000 Navy; 5,000 Air Force; est. 10,000 Iraqi Counterterrorism Service; est. 10,000 Presidential Brigades; est. 5,000 Prime Minister’s Special Forces Division); 100-160,000 Popular Mobilization Forces; 150,000-200,000 Peshmerga Forces (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 200,000 personnel under the Ministry of Defense (est. 190,000 Army/Aviation Command/Special Forces; est. 5,000 Navy; est. 5,000 Air/Air Defense Forces); approximately 25,000 National-Level Security Forces (est. 10,000 Iraqi Counterterrorism Service; est. 10,000 Presidential Brigades; est. 5,000 Prime Minister’s Special Forces Division); 100-160,000 Popular Mobilization Forces; 150,000-200,000 Peshmerga Forces (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the Iraqi military inventory is comprised of Russian and Soviet-era equipment combined with newer European- and US-sourced platforms; since 2010, Russia and the US are the leading suppliers of military hardware to Iraq (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1146,13 +1146,13 @@
|
|||
"text": "18-40 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2019)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of early 2021, Iraqi military and security forces continued to conduct counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq</p> <p>Shia militia and paramilitary units from the Popular Mobilization Committee and Affiliated Forces (PMF) have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraq’s other security forces and act under the Iraqi government’s direct control; the Iraqi prime minister legally commands the PMF, but most of the militia brigades take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps</p> <p>the Kurdish Peshmerga are formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the country’s constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; the Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense<br /><br />at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission in Iraq in October 2018 to help Iraqi forces in their fight against ISIS; NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) currently has about 500 troops, but in February 2021 NATO announced it would increase the presence to about 4,000, although no timeframe was given</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of early 2021, Iraqi military and security forces continued to conduct counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq</p> <p>Shia militia and paramilitary units from the Popular Mobilization Committee and Affiliated Forces (PMF) have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraq’s other security forces and act under the Iraqi government’s direct control; the Iraqi prime minister legally commands the PMF, but most of the militia brigades take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps</p> <p>the Kurdish Peshmerga are formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the country’s constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; the Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense<br><br>at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission in Iraq in October 2018 to help Iraqi forces in their fight against ISIS; NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) currently has about 500 troops, but in February 2021 NATO announced it would increase the presence to about 4,000, although no timeframe was given</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Ansar al-Islam; Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi; Kata'ib Hizballah; Kurdistan Workers' Party<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Ansar al-Islam; Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi; Kata'ib Hizballah; Kurdistan Workers' Party<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic (official), English (widely understood among upper and middle classes)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -301,13 +301,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2018 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
|
||||
"text": "<500 (2018 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<1,000 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2018 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Major infectious diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Jordan; as of 6 April 2021, Jordan has reported a total of 639,444 cases of COVID-19 or 6,267.13 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 71.38 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 7 April 2021, 4% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
|
|
@ -546,13 +546,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"text": "bicameral National Assembly or Majlis al-'Umma consists of:<br />Senate or the House of Notables or Majlis al-Ayan (65 seats; members appointed by the monarch to serve 4-year terms)<br />Chamber of Deputies or House of Representatives or Majlis al-Nuwaab (130 seats; 115 members directly elected in 23 multi-seat constituencies by open-list proportional representation vote and 15 seats for women; 12 of the 115 seats reserved for Christian, Chechen, and Circassian candidates; members serve 4-year terms)"
|
||||
"text": "bicameral National Assembly or Majlis al-'Umma consists of:<br>Senate or the House of Notables or Majlis al-Ayan (65 seats; members appointed by the monarch to serve 4-year terms)<br>Chamber of Deputies or House of Representatives or Majlis al-Nuwaab (130 seats; 115 members directly elected in 23 multi-seat constituencies by open-list proportional representation vote and 15 seats for women; 12 of the 115 seats reserved for Christian, Chechen, and Circassian candidates; members serve 4-year terms)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />Chamber of Deputies - last held on 10 November 2020 (next to be held in November 2024)"
|
||||
"text": "<br>Chamber of Deputies - last held on 10 November 2020 (next to be held in November 2024)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />Chamber of Deputies - note - tribal, centrist, and pro-government candidates dominated in the 130-seat election; the Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, garnered only 10 seats, down from 15 in the previous election; women, who are guaranteed 15 seats by Jordan’s legislative quota system, only won the requisite number, down from the 20 seats won in the previous election <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "<br>Chamber of Deputies - note - tribal, centrist, and pro-government candidates dominated in the 130-seat election; the Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, garnered only 10 seats, down from 15 in the previous election; women, who are guaranteed 15 seats by Jordan’s legislative quota system, only won the requisite number, down from the 20 seats won in the previous election <p> </p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -567,7 +567,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Ahrar al-Urdun (Free People of Jordan) Party [Samir al-ZU'BI]<br />Al-Awn al-Watani (National Aid) Party [Faysal al-AWAR]<br />Al-Balad al-Amin Party [Khalil al-SAYED]<br />Al-Itijah al-Watani (National Trend Party) [Ahmad al-KAYED]<br />Al-Mustaqbal (Future) Party [Salah al-QUDAH]<br />Al-Nida’ Party [Abd-al-Majid ABU-KHALID]<br />Al-Rayah Party (Flag Party) [Bilal DHEISAT]<br />Al-Shahama Party [Mashhour ZREIQAT]<br />Al-Shura Party [Firas al-ABBADI]<br />Arab Socialist Ba’th Party [Zyad AL-HOMSI]<br />Conservatives Party [Hasan RASHID]<br />Democratic Popular Unity Party [Sa’eed DHIYAB]<br />Democratic Sha’b Party (HASHD) [Abla ABU-OLBEH]<br />Freedom and Equality Party [Hamad Abu ZEID]<br />Islamic Action Front [Murad AL-ADAYLAH]<br />Islamic Centrist Party [Madallah AL-TARAWNEH]<br />Jordanian Al-Ansar Party [Awni al-RJOUB]<br />Jordanian Al-Hayah Party [Abd-al-Fattah al-KILANI]<br />Jordanian Communist Party [Faraj ITMIZYEH]<br />Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party [Jamil al-NIMRI]<br />Jordanian Democratic Tabiy’ah (Nature) Party [Ali ASFOUR]<br />Jordanian Equality Party [Zuhair al-SHURAFA]<br />Jordanian Fursan (Cavaliers Party) [Ali al-DHWEIB]<br />Jordanian Justice and Development Party [Ali al-SHURAFA]<br />Jordanian National Action Party [Abd-al-Hadi al-MAHARMAH]<br />Jordanian National Constitutional Party [Ahmad al-SHUNNAQ]<br />Jordanian National Democratic Grouping Party [Shakir al-ABBADI]<br />Jordanian National Party [Muna ABU-BAKR]<br />Jordanian National Union Party [Zeid ABU-ZEID]<br />Jordanian Progressive Ba’th Party [Fu’ad DABBOUR]<br />Jordanian Promise Party [Mahmoud al-KHALILI]<br />Jordanian Reform Party [Eid DHAYYAT]<br />Jordanian Social Justice Party [Abd-al-Fattah al-NSOUR]<br />Jordanian Wafa’ (Loyalty) Party [Mazin al-QADI]<br />Justice and Reform Party [Sa’eed Nathir ARABIYAT]<br />Modernity and Change Party [Nayef al-HAMAYDEH]<br />National Congress Party [Irhayil GHARAYBEH] (formerly the Zamzam party)<br />National Renaissance Front Party [Isma’il KHATATBEH]<br />National Unity Party [Muhammad al-ZBOUN]<br />Pan Arab Movement Party [Dayfallah FARRAJ]<br />Partnership and Salvation Party [Muhammad al-HAMMOURI]<br />Reform and Renewal Party [Mazin RYAL]<br />Risalah Party [Hazim QASHOU’]<br />Stronger Jordan Party [Rula al-HROUB]<br />Unified Jordanian Front Party [Farouq AL-ABBADI]"
|
||||
"text": "Ahrar al-Urdun (Free People of Jordan) Party [Samir al-ZU'BI]<br>Al-Awn al-Watani (National Aid) Party [Faysal al-AWAR]<br>Al-Balad al-Amin Party [Khalil al-SAYED]<br>Al-Itijah al-Watani (National Trend Party) [Ahmad al-KAYED]<br>Al-Mustaqbal (Future) Party [Salah al-QUDAH]<br>Al-Nida’ Party [Abd-al-Majid ABU-KHALID]<br>Al-Rayah Party (Flag Party) [Bilal DHEISAT]<br>Al-Shahama Party [Mashhour ZREIQAT]<br>Al-Shura Party [Firas al-ABBADI]<br>Arab Socialist Ba’th Party [Zyad AL-HOMSI]<br>Conservatives Party [Hasan RASHID]<br>Democratic Popular Unity Party [Sa’eed DHIYAB]<br>Democratic Sha’b Party (HASHD) [Abla ABU-OLBEH]<br>Freedom and Equality Party [Hamad Abu ZEID]<br>Islamic Action Front [Murad AL-ADAYLAH]<br>Islamic Centrist Party [Madallah AL-TARAWNEH]<br>Jordanian Al-Ansar Party [Awni al-RJOUB]<br>Jordanian Al-Hayah Party [Abd-al-Fattah al-KILANI]<br>Jordanian Communist Party [Faraj ITMIZYEH]<br>Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party [Jamil al-NIMRI]<br>Jordanian Democratic Tabiy’ah (Nature) Party [Ali ASFOUR]<br>Jordanian Equality Party [Zuhair al-SHURAFA]<br>Jordanian Fursan (Cavaliers Party) [Ali al-DHWEIB]<br>Jordanian Justice and Development Party [Ali al-SHURAFA]<br>Jordanian National Action Party [Abd-al-Hadi al-MAHARMAH]<br>Jordanian National Constitutional Party [Ahmad al-SHUNNAQ]<br>Jordanian National Democratic Grouping Party [Shakir al-ABBADI]<br>Jordanian National Party [Muna ABU-BAKR]<br>Jordanian National Union Party [Zeid ABU-ZEID]<br>Jordanian Progressive Ba’th Party [Fu’ad DABBOUR]<br>Jordanian Promise Party [Mahmoud al-KHALILI]<br>Jordanian Reform Party [Eid DHAYYAT]<br>Jordanian Social Justice Party [Abd-al-Fattah al-NSOUR]<br>Jordanian Wafa’ (Loyalty) Party [Mazin al-QADI]<br>Justice and Reform Party [Sa’eed Nathir ARABIYAT]<br>Modernity and Change Party [Nayef al-HAMAYDEH]<br>National Congress Party [Irhayil GHARAYBEH] (formerly the Zamzam party)<br>National Renaissance Front Party [Isma’il KHATATBEH]<br>National Unity Party [Muhammad al-ZBOUN]<br>Pan Arab Movement Party [Dayfallah FARRAJ]<br>Partnership and Salvation Party [Muhammad al-HAMMOURI]<br>Reform and Renewal Party [Mazin RYAL]<br>Risalah Party [Hazim QASHOU’]<br>Stronger Jordan Party [Rula al-HROUB]<br>Unified Jordanian Front Party [Farouq AL-ABBADI]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, CD, CICA, EBRD, FAO, G-11, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, MINUSTAH, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OSCE (partner), PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "<p>human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Jordan and Jordanians abroad; victims are primarily from South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Egypt, and Syria; foreign migrants, many undocumented, working in construction, agriculture, textiles, and domestic work are the most vulnerable to trafficking because of informal work agreements and frequently changing employers; forced labor victims experience withheld or unpaid wages, confiscation of identity documents, restricted freedom of movement, unsafe living conditions, long hours without rest, isolation, and verbal and physical abuse; child labor and potential forced child labor increased; traffickers exploit Lebanese, North African, and Eastern European women who have migrated to Jordan to work in restaurants and nightclubs are subject to sex trafficking</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tier rating": {
|
||||
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List —<strong> </strong>Jordan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; the government increased the training of law enforcement personnel and victim advocates, maintained a trafficking shelter offering a wide range of services, partnered with civil society actors to proactively identify and protect trafficking victims, and conducted anti-trafficking awareness campaigns; the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts as fewer traffickers were investigated, prosecuted, and convicted; fewer victims were identified and assisted, and victims were still arrested, detained, and deported for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; under Jordan’s anti-trafficking law, penalties for sex trafficking offenses were not commensurate with penalties for other serious crimes (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Tier 2 Watch List —<strong> </strong>Jordan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; the government increased the training of law enforcement personnel and victim advocates, maintained a trafficking shelter offering a wide range of services, partnered with civil society actors to proactively identify and protect trafficking victims, and conducted anti-trafficking awareness campaigns; the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts as fewer traffickers were investigated, prosecuted, and convicted; fewer victims were identified and assisted, and victims were still arrested, detained, and deported for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; under Jordan’s anti-trafficking law, penalties for sex trafficking offenses were not commensurate with penalties for other serious crimes (2020)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs. <br /><br />An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Kuwait has been ruled by the AL-SABAH dynasty since the 18th century. The threat of Ottoman invasion in 1899 prompted Amir Mubarak AL-SABAH to seek protection from Britain, ceding foreign and defense responsibility to Britain until 1961, when the country attained its independence. Kuwait was attacked and overrun by Iraq in August 1990. Following several weeks of aerial bombardment, a US-led UN coalition began a ground assault in February 1991 that liberated Kuwait in four days. In 1992, the Amir reconstituted the parliament that he had dissolved in 1986. Amid the 2010-11 uprisings and protests across the Arab world, stateless Arabs, known as Bidoon, staged small protests in early 2011 demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Other demographic groups, notably Islamists and Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds, soon joined the growing protest movements, which culminated in late 2011 with the resignation of the prime minister amidst allegations of corruption. Demonstrations renewed in late 2012 in response to an amiri decree amending the electoral law that lessened the voting power of the tribal blocs. <br><br>An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic (official), English widely spoken"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1041,8 +1041,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Kuwaiti Armed Forces: Kuwaiti Land Forces (KLF), Kuwaiti Navy, Kuwaiti Air Force (Al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Kuwaitiya; includes Kuwaiti Air Defense Force, KADF), 25th Commando Brigade, and the Kuwait Emiri Guard Brigade; Kuwaiti National Guard (KNG); Coast Guard (Ministry of Interior) (2020)<br><br>note: the <span class=\"inlineLinkContainer \"><a class=\"inlineLinkAnchor\" title=\"Kuwait\" data-bind=\"attr: { title: label }, click : onClick, event : { contextmenu : onClick}\">Kuwait</a></span> Emiri Guard Authority and the 25th Commando Brigade exercise independent command authority within the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, although activities such as training and equipment procurement are often coordinated with the other services; the KNG possesses an independent command structure, equipment inventory, and logistics corps separate from the Ministry of Defense, the regular armed services, and the Ministry of Interior",
|
||||
"note": "note: the <span class=\"inlineLinkContainer \"><a class=\"inlineLinkAnchor\" title=\"Kuwait\" data-bind=\"attr: { title: label }, click : onClick, event : { contextmenu : onClick}\">Kuwait</a></span> Emiri Guard Authority and the 25th Commando Brigade exercise independent command authority within the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, although activities such as training and equipment procurement are often coordinated with the other services; the KNG possesses an independent command structure, equipment inventory, and logistics corps separate from the Ministry of Defense, the regular armed services, and the Ministry of Interior"
|
||||
"text": "Kuwaiti Armed Forces: Kuwaiti Land Forces (KLF), Kuwaiti Navy, Kuwaiti Air Force (Al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Kuwaitiya; includes Kuwaiti Air Defense Force, KADF), 25th Commando Brigade, and the Kuwait Emiri Guard Brigade; Kuwaiti National Guard (KNG); Coast Guard (Ministry of Interior) (2020)<br><br>note: the Kuwait Emiri Guard Authority and the 25th Commando Brigade exercise independent command authority within the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, although activities such as training and equipment procurement are often coordinated with the other services; the KNG possesses an independent command structure, equipment inventory, and logistics corps separate from the Ministry of Defense, the regular armed services, and the Ministry of Interior",
|
||||
"note": "note: the Kuwait Emiri Guard Authority and the 25th Commando Brigade exercise independent command authority within the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, although activities such as training and equipment procurement are often coordinated with the other services; the KNG possesses an independent command structure, equipment inventory, and logistics corps separate from the Ministry of Defense, the regular armed services, and the Ministry of Interior"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2020": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "the Kuwaiti Armed Forces have approximately 17,000 active personnel (12,500 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,500 Air Force); est. 6,500 National Guard; note – Army figures include the Kuwait Emiri Guard Authority (est. 500) and the 25<sup>th</sup> Commando Brigade (N/A) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the Kuwaiti Armed Forces have approximately 17,000 active personnel (12,500 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,500 Air Force); est. 6,500 National Guard; note – Army figures include the Kuwait Emiri Guard Authority (est. 500) and the 25th Commando Brigade (N/A) (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the inventory of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces consists of a range of European- and US-sourced weapons systems; the US is the leading supplier of arms to Kuwait since 2010 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic (official), French, English, Armenian"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -270,13 +270,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
|
||||
"text": "2,700 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "2,700 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2019 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Major infectious diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Lebanon; as of 6 April 2021, Lebanon has reported a total of 480,502 cases of COVID-19 or 7,039.86 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 94.4 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 10 April 2021, 2.5% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
|
|
@ -528,7 +528,7 @@
|
|||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by coalition - NA; seats by coalition – Strong Lebanon Bloc (Free Patriotic Movement-led) 25; Future Bloc (Future Movement-led) 20; Development and Liberation Bloc (Amal Movement-led) 16; Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc (Hizballah-led) 15; Strong Republic Bloc (Lebanese Forces-led) 15; Democratic Gathering (Progressive Socialist Party-led) 9; Independent Centre Bloc 4; National Bloc (Marada Movement-led) 3; Syrian Social Nationalist Party 3; Tashnaq 3; Kata’ib 3; other 8; independent 4; composition - men 122, women 6, percent of women 4.6%"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Lebanon’s constitution states the National Assembly cannot conduct regular business until it elects a president when the position is vacant"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Lebanon’s constitution states the National Assembly cannot conduct regular business until it elects a president when the position is vacant"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
"highest courts": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -542,14 +542,14 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Al-Ahbash or Association of Islamic Charitable Projects [Adnan TARABULSI]<br />Amal Movement [Nabih BERRI]<br />Azm Movement [Najib MIQATI]<br />Ba’th Arab Socialist Party of Lebanon [Fayiz SHUKR]<br />Free Patriotic Movement or FPM [Gibran BASSIL]<br />Future Movement Bloc [Sa'ad al-HARIRI]<br />Hizballah [Hassan NASRALLAH]<br />Islamic Actions Front [Sheikh Zuhayr al-JU’AYD]<br />Kata'ib Party [Sami GEMAYEL]<br />Lebanese Democratic Party [Talal ARSLAN]<br />Lebanese Forces or LF [Samir JA'JA]<br />Marada Movement [Sulayman FRANJIEH]<br />Progressive Socialist Party or PSP [Walid JUNBLATT]<br />Social Democrat Hunshaqian Party [Sabuh KALPAKIAN]Syrian Social Nationalist Party [Ali QANSO]<br />Syrian Social Nationalist Party [Hanna al-NASHIF]<br />Tashnaq or Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Hagop PAKRADOUNIAN]</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Al-Ahbash or Association of Islamic Charitable Projects [Adnan TARABULSI]<br>Amal Movement [Nabih BERRI]<br>Azm Movement [Najib MIQATI]<br>Ba’th Arab Socialist Party of Lebanon [Fayiz SHUKR]<br>Free Patriotic Movement or FPM [Gibran BASSIL]<br>Future Movement Bloc [Sa'ad al-HARIRI]<br>Hizballah [Hassan NASRALLAH]<br>Islamic Actions Front [Sheikh Zuhayr al-JU’AYD]<br>Kata'ib Party [Sami GEMAYEL]<br>Lebanese Democratic Party [Talal ARSLAN]<br>Lebanese Forces or LF [Samir JA'JA]<br>Marada Movement [Sulayman FRANJIEH]<br>Progressive Socialist Party or PSP [Walid JUNBLATT]<br>Social Democrat Hunshaqian Party [Sabuh KALPAKIAN]Syrian Social Nationalist Party [Ali QANSO]<br>Syrian Social Nationalist Party [Hanna al-NASHIF]<br>Tashnaq or Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Hagop PAKRADOUNIAN]</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Gabriel ISSA (since 24 January 2018)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Wael HACHEM (since 15 March 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"chancery": {
|
||||
"text": "2560 28th Street NW, Washington, DC 20008"
|
||||
|
|
@ -953,7 +953,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>struggling with effects of economic malaise during pandemic and following explosion in Beirut port; Lebanon’s telecom infrastructure is relatively weak, and services are expensive; rural areas are less connected and have power cuts; state retains a monopoly over the Internet backbone and dominant ownership of the telecom industry; government backed improvements to fixed infrastructure; new landlines and fiber-optic networks provide faster DSL; limited 5G services; three international gateways through submarine cables; importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE; UAE investment in tech solutions (2021)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>struggling with effects of economic malaise during pandemic and following explosion in Beirut port; Lebanon’s telecom infrastructure is relatively weak, and services are expensive; rural areas are less connected and have power cuts; state retains a monopoly over the Internet backbone and dominant ownership of the telecom industry; government backed improvements to fixed infrastructure; new landlines and fiber-optic networks provide faster DSL; limited 5G services; three international gateways through submarine cables; importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE; UAE investment in tech solutions (2021)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line 13 per 100 and 62 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1114,8 +1114,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Abdallah Azzam Brigades; al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; Asbat al-Ansar; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Hizballah; al-Nusrah Front (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham); Palestine Liberation Front; PFLP-General Command; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Abdallah Azzam Brigades; al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; Asbat al-Ansar; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Hizballah; al-Nusrah Front (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham); Palestine Liberation Front; PFLP-General Command; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>The inhabitants of the area of Oman have long prospered from Indian Ocean trade. In the late 18th century, the nascent sultanate in Muscat signed the first in a series of friendship treaties with Britain. Over time, Oman's dependence on British political and military advisors increased, although the sultanate never became a British colony. In 1970, QABOOS bin Said Al-Said overthrew his father, and has since ruled as sultan. Sultan QABOOS has no children and has not designated a successor publicly; the Basic Law of 1996 outlines Oman’s succession procedure. Sultan QABOOS’ extensive modernization program opened the country to the outside world, and the sultan has prioritized strategic ties with the UK and US. Oman's moderate, independent foreign policy has sought to maintain good relations with its neighbors and to avoid external entanglements.<br /><br />Inspired by the popular uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa beginning in January 2011, some Omanis staged demonstrations, calling for more jobs and economic benefits and an end to corruption. In response to those protester demands, QABOOS in 2011 pledged to implement economic and political reforms, such as granting Oman’s bicameral legislative body more power and authorizing direct elections for its lower house, which took place in November 2011. Additionally, the Sultan increased unemployment benefits, and, in August 2012, issued a royal directive mandating the speedy implementation of a national job creation plan for thousands of public and private sector Omani jobs. As part of the government's efforts to decentralize authority and allow greater citizen participation in local governance, Oman successfully conducted its first municipal council elections in December 2012. Announced by the sultan in 2011, the municipal councils have the power to advise the Royal Court on the needs of local districts across Oman's 11 governorates. Sultan QABOOS, Oman's longest reigning monarch, died on 11 January 2020. His cousin, HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said, former Minister of Heritage and Culture, was sworn in as Oman's new sultan the same day.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>The inhabitants of the area of Oman have long prospered from Indian Ocean trade. In the late 18th century, the nascent sultanate in Muscat signed the first in a series of friendship treaties with Britain. Over time, Oman's dependence on British political and military advisors increased, although the sultanate never became a British colony. In 1970, QABOOS bin Said Al-Said overthrew his father, and has since ruled as sultan. Sultan QABOOS has no children and has not designated a successor publicly; the Basic Law of 1996 outlines Oman’s succession procedure. Sultan QABOOS’ extensive modernization program opened the country to the outside world, and the sultan has prioritized strategic ties with the UK and US. Oman's moderate, independent foreign policy has sought to maintain good relations with its neighbors and to avoid external entanglements.<br><br>Inspired by the popular uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa beginning in January 2011, some Omanis staged demonstrations, calling for more jobs and economic benefits and an end to corruption. In response to those protester demands, QABOOS in 2011 pledged to implement economic and political reforms, such as granting Oman’s bicameral legislative body more power and authorizing direct elections for its lower house, which took place in November 2011. Additionally, the Sultan increased unemployment benefits, and, in August 2012, issued a royal directive mandating the speedy implementation of a national job creation plan for thousands of public and private sector Omani jobs. As part of the government's efforts to decentralize authority and allow greater citizen participation in local governance, Oman successfully conducted its first municipal council elections in December 2012. Announced by the sultan in 2011, the municipal councils have the power to advise the Royal Court on the needs of local districts across Oman's 11 governorates. Sultan QABOOS, Oman's longest reigning monarch, died on 11 January 2020. His cousin, HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said, former Minister of Heritage and Culture, was sworn in as Oman's new sultan the same day.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic (official), English, Baluchi, Swahili, Urdu, Indian dialects"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -533,13 +533,13 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Legislative branch": {
|
||||
"description": {
|
||||
"text": "bicameral Council of Oman or Majlis Oman consists of:<br />Council of State or Majlis al-Dawla (85 seats including the chairman; members appointed by the sultan from among former government officials and prominent educators, businessmen, and citizens)<br /> Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura (86 seats; members directly elected in single- and 2-seat constituencies by simple majority popular vote to serve renewable 4-year terms); note - since political reforms in 2011, legislation from the Consultative Council is submitted to the Council of State for review by the Royal Court"
|
||||
"text": "bicameral Council of Oman or Majlis Oman consists of:<br>Council of State or Majlis al-Dawla (85 seats including the chairman; members appointed by the sultan from among former government officials and prominent educators, businessmen, and citizens)<br> Consultative Council or Majlis al-Shura (86 seats; members directly elected in single- and 2-seat constituencies by simple majority popular vote to serve renewable 4-year terms); note - since political reforms in 2011, legislation from the Consultative Council is submitted to the Council of State for review by the Royal Court"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections": {
|
||||
"text": "Council of State - last appointments on 11 July 2019 (next - NA)<br /> Consultative Assembly - last held on 27 October 2019 (next to be held in October 2023)"
|
||||
"text": "Council of State - last appointments on 11 July 2019 (next - NA)<br> Consultative Assembly - last held on 27 October 2019 (next to be held in October 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<br /> Council of State - composition - men 70, women 15, percent of women 17.6%<br />Consultative Council percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA (organized political parties in Oman are legally banned); composition men 84, women 2, percent of women 2.3%; note - total Council of Oman percent of women 9.9%"
|
||||
"text": "<br> Council of State - composition - men 70, women 15, percent of women 17.6%<br>Consultative Council percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA (organized political parties in Oman are legally banned); composition men 84, women 2, percent of women 2.3%; note - total Council of Oman percent of women 9.9%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Ruled by the Al Thani family since the mid-1800s, Qatar within the last 60 years transformed itself from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling into an independent state with significant oil and natural gas revenues. Former Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani, who overthrew his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, ushered in wide-sweeping political and media reforms, unprecedented economic investment, and a growing Qatari regional leadership role, in part through the creation of the pan-Arab satellite news network Al-Jazeera and Qatar's mediation of some regional conflicts. In the 2000s, Qatar resolved its longstanding border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and by 2007 had attained the highest per capita income in the world. Qatar did not experience domestic unrest or violence like that seen in other Near Eastern and North African countries in 2011, due in part to its immense wealth and patronage network. In mid-2013, HAMAD peacefully abdicated, transferring power to his son, the current Amir TAMIM bin Hamad. TAMIM is popular with the Qatari public, for his role in shepherding the country through an economic embargo by some other regional countries, for his efforts to improve the country's healthcare and education systems, and for his expansion of the country's infrastructure in anticipation of Doha's hosting of the 2022 World Cup.</p> Recently, Qatar’s relationships with its neighbors have been tense, although since the fall of 2019 there have been signs of improved prospects for a thaw. Following the outbreak of regional unrest in 2011, Doha prided itself on its support for many popular revolutions, particularly in Libya and Syria. This stance was to the detriment of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which temporarily recalled their respective ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. TAMIM later oversaw a warming of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in November 2014 following Kuwaiti mediation and signing of the Riyadh Agreement. This reconciliation, however, was short-lived. In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the \"Quartet\") cut diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar in response to alleged violations of the agreement, among other complaints."
|
||||
"text": "<p>Ruled by the Al Thani family since the mid-1800s, Qatar within the last 60 years transformed itself from a poor British protectorate noted mainly for pearling into an independent state with significant oil and natural gas revenues. Former Amir HAMAD bin Khalifa Al Thani, who overthrew his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, ushered in wide-sweeping political and media reforms, unprecedented economic investment, and a growing Qatari regional leadership role, in part through the creation of the pan-Arab satellite news network Al-Jazeera and Qatar's mediation of some regional conflicts. In the 2000s, Qatar resolved its longstanding border disputes with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and by 2007 had attained the highest per capita income in the world. Qatar did not experience domestic unrest or violence like that seen in other Near Eastern and North African countries in 2011, due in part to its immense wealth and patronage network. In mid-2013, HAMAD peacefully abdicated, transferring power to his son, the current Amir TAMIM bin Hamad. TAMIM is popular with the Qatari public, for his role in shepherding the country through an economic embargo by some other regional countries, for his efforts to improve the country's healthcare and education systems, and for his expansion of the country's infrastructure in anticipation of Doha's hosting of the 2022 World Cup.</p> Recently, Qatar’s relationships with its neighbors have been tense, although since the fall of 2019 there have been signs of improved prospects for a thaw. Following the outbreak of regional unrest in 2011, Doha prided itself on its support for many popular revolutions, particularly in Libya and Syria. This stance was to the detriment of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which temporarily recalled their respective ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. TAMIM later oversaw a warming of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in November 2014 following Kuwaiti mediation and signing of the Riyadh Agreement. This reconciliation, however, was short-lived. In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the \"Quartet\") cut diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar in response to alleged violations of the agreement, among other complaints."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic (official), English commonly used as a second language"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -277,13 +277,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "0.1% (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
|
||||
"text": "<500 (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<200 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2017 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "35.1% (2016)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. The king's official title is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. The modern Saudi state was founded in 1932 by ABD AL-AZIZ bin Abd al-Rahman Al SAUD (Ibn Saud) after a 30-year campaign to unify most of the Arabian Peninsula. One of his male descendants rules the country today, as required by the country's 1992 Basic Law. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia accepted the Kuwaiti royal family and 400,000 refugees while allowing Western and Arab troops to deploy on its soil for the liberation of Kuwait the following year. The continuing presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil after the liberation of Kuwait became a source of tension between the royal family and the public until all operational US troops left the country in 2003. Major terrorist attacks in May and November 2003 spurred a strong ongoing campaign against domestic terrorism and extremism. US troops returned to the Kingdom in October 2019 after attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.</p> <p>From 2005 to 2015, King ABDALLAH bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud incrementally modernized the Kingdom. Driven by personal ideology and political pragmatism, he introduced a series of social and economic initiatives, including expanding employment and social opportunities for women, attracting foreign investment, increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, and discouraging businesses from hiring foreign workers. These reforms have accelerated under King SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz, who ascended to the throne in 2015, and has since lifted the Kingdom's ban on women driving and allowed cinemas to operate for the first time in decades. Saudi Arabia saw some protests during the 2011 Arab Spring but not the level of bloodshed seen in protests elsewhere in the region. Shia Muslims in the Eastern Province protested primarily against the detention of political prisoners, endemic discrimination, and Bahraini and Saudi Government actions in Bahrain. Riyadh took a cautious but firm approach by arresting some protesters but releasing most of them quickly and by using its state-sponsored clerics to counter political and Islamist activism.</p> <p>The government held its first-ever elections in 2005 and 2011, when Saudis went to the polls to elect municipal councilors. In December 2015, women were allowed to vote and stand as candidates for the first time in municipal council elections, with 19 women winning seats. After King SALMAN ascended to the throne in 2015, he placed the first next-generation prince, MUHAMMAD BIN NAYIF bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, in the line of succession as Crown Prince. He designated his son, MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, as the Deputy Crown Prince. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of 10 countries in a military campaign to restore the legitimate government of Yemen, which had been ousted by Huthi forces allied with former president ALI ABDULLAH al-Salih. The war in Yemen has drawn international criticism for civilian casualties and its effect on the country’s dire humanitarian situation. In December 2015, then Deputy Crown Prince MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced Saudi Arabia would lead a 34-nation Islamic Coalition to fight terrorism (it has since grown to 41 nations). In May 2017, Saudi Arabia inaugurated the Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology (also known as \"Etidal\") as part of its ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism. In June 2017, King SALMAN elevated MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN to Crown Prince.</p> <p>The country remains a leading producer of oil and natural gas and holds about 16% of the world's proven oil reserves as of 2015. The government continues to pursue economic reform and diversification, particularly since Saudi Arabia's accession to the WTO in 2005, and promotes foreign investment in the Kingdom. In April 2016, the Saudi Government announced a broad set of socio-economic reforms, known as Vision 2030. Low global oil prices throughout 2015 and 2016 significantly lowered Saudi Arabia’s governmental revenue. In response, the government cut subsidies on water, electricity, and gasoline; reduced government employee compensation packages; and announced limited new land taxes. In coordination with OPEC and some key non-OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia agreed cut oil output in early 2017 to regulate supply and help elevate global prices.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. The king's official title is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. The modern Saudi state was founded in 1932 by ABD AL-AZIZ bin Abd al-Rahman Al SAUD (Ibn Saud) after a 30-year campaign to unify most of the Arabian Peninsula. One of his male descendants rules the country today, as required by the country's 1992 Basic Law. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia accepted the Kuwaiti royal family and 400,000 refugees while allowing Western and Arab troops to deploy on its soil for the liberation of Kuwait the following year. The continuing presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil after the liberation of Kuwait became a source of tension between the royal family and the public until all operational US troops left the country in 2003. Major terrorist attacks in May and November 2003 spurred a strong ongoing campaign against domestic terrorism and extremism. US troops returned to the Kingdom in October 2019 after attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.</p> <p>From 2005 to 2015, King ABDALLAH bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud incrementally modernized the Kingdom. Driven by personal ideology and political pragmatism, he introduced a series of social and economic initiatives, including expanding employment and social opportunities for women, attracting foreign investment, increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, and discouraging businesses from hiring foreign workers. These reforms have accelerated under King SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz, who ascended to the throne in 2015, and has since lifted the Kingdom's ban on women driving and allowed cinemas to operate for the first time in decades. Saudi Arabia saw some protests during the 2011 Arab Spring but not the level of bloodshed seen in protests elsewhere in the region. Shia Muslims in the Eastern Province protested primarily against the detention of political prisoners, endemic discrimination, and Bahraini and Saudi Government actions in Bahrain. Riyadh took a cautious but firm approach by arresting some protesters but releasing most of them quickly and by using its state-sponsored clerics to counter political and Islamist activism.</p> <p>The government held its first-ever elections in 2005 and 2011, when Saudis went to the polls to elect municipal councilors. In December 2015, women were allowed to vote and stand as candidates for the first time in municipal council elections, with 19 women winning seats. After King SALMAN ascended to the throne in 2015, he placed the first next-generation prince, MUHAMMAD BIN NAYIF bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, in the line of succession as Crown Prince. He designated his son, MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, as the Deputy Crown Prince. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of 10 countries in a military campaign to restore the legitimate government of Yemen, which had been ousted by Huthi forces allied with former president ALI ABDULLAH al-Salih. The war in Yemen has drawn international criticism for civilian casualties and its effect on the country’s dire humanitarian situation. In December 2015, then Deputy Crown Prince MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced Saudi Arabia would lead a 34-nation Islamic Coalition to fight terrorism (it has since grown to 41 nations). In May 2017, Saudi Arabia inaugurated the Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology (also known as \"Etidal\") as part of its ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism. In June 2017, King SALMAN elevated MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN to Crown Prince.</p> <p>The country remains a leading producer of oil and natural gas and holds about 16% of the world's proven oil reserves as of 2015. The government continues to pursue economic reform and diversification, particularly since Saudi Arabia's accession to the WTO in 2005, and promotes foreign investment in the Kingdom. In April 2016, the Saudi Government announced a broad set of socio-economic reforms, known as Vision 2030. Low global oil prices throughout 2015 and 2016 significantly lowered Saudi Arabia’s governmental revenue. In response, the government cut subsidies on water, electricity, and gasoline; reduced government employee compensation packages; and announced limited new land taxes. In coordination with OPEC and some key non-OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia agreed cut oil output in early 2017 to regulate supply and help elevate global prices.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic (official)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -279,13 +279,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
|
||||
"text": "8,200 (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "12,000 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
|
||||
"text": "<500 (2016 est.)"
|
||||
"text": "<200 (2020 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "35.4% (2016)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -943,7 +943,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>one of the most progressive telecom markets in the Middle East; mobile penetration high, with a saturated market; mobile operators competitive and meeting the demand for workers, students and citizens working from home; Huawei partners with operator to provide 5G to dozens of cities; broadband is available with DSL, fiber, and wireless; mobile penetration is high; restrictive monarchy places limits on information and services available online; authorities operate extensive censorship and surveillance systems; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE and China (2020)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>one of the most progressive telecom markets in the Middle East; mobile penetration high, with a saturated market; mobile operators competitive and meeting the demand for workers, students and citizens working from home; Huawei partners with operator to provide 5G to dozens of cities; broadband is available with DSL, fiber, and wireless; mobile penetration is high; restrictive monarchy places limits on information and services available online; authorities operate extensive censorship and surveillance systems; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE and China (2020)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line 16 per 100 and mobile-cellular subscribership has been increasing rapidly to 121 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1119,8 +1119,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); al-Qa’ida; al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); al-Qa’ida; al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Saudi Arabia is a destination country for men and women subjected to forced labor and, to a lesser extent, forced prostitution; men and women primarily from South and Southeast Asia and Africa voluntarily travel to Saudi Arabia to work in domestic service, construction, agriculture or other low-skilled jobs, but some subsequently face conditions indicative of involuntary servitude (many are forced to work months or years beyond their contract term because employers withhold passports and required exit visas); women, primarily from Asian and African countries, are reported to be forced into prostitution in Saudi Arabia"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tier rating": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Tier 2 Watch List — Saudi Arabia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so and was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List;</p> the government enacted the country’s first-ever national referral mechanism (NRM) and increased the number of prosecutions and convictions under the anti-trafficking law; victims are identified and referred for care; the government convicted and sentenced two Saudi officials complicit in trafficking crimes; however, the government continued to fine, jail, and/or deport migrant workers for prostitution or immigration violations who may have been trafficking victims; authorities regularly misclassified potential trafficking crimes as labor law violations rather than as criminal offenses (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Tier 2 Watch List — Saudi Arabia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so and was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List;</p> the government enacted the country’s first-ever national referral mechanism (NRM) and increased the number of prosecutions and convictions under the anti-trafficking law; victims are identified and referred for care; the government convicted and sentenced two Saudi officials complicit in trafficking crimes; however, the government continued to fine, jail, and/or deport migrant workers for prostitution or immigration violations who may have been trafficking victims; authorities regularly misclassified potential trafficking crimes as labor law violations rather than as criminal offenses (2020)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Following World War I, France acquired a mandate over the northern portion of the former Ottoman Empire province of Syria. The French administered the area as Syria until granting it independence in 1946. The new country lacked political stability and experienced a series of military coups. Syria united with Egypt in February 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. In September 1961, the two entities separated, and the Syrian Arab Republic was reestablished. In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria lost the Golan Heights region to Israel. During the 1990s, Syria and Israel held occasional, albeit unsuccessful, peace talks over its return. In November 1970, Hafiz al-ASAD, a member of the socialist Ba'ath Party and the minority Alawi sect, seized power in a bloodless coup and brought political stability to the country. Following the death of President Hafiz al-ASAD, his son, Bashar al-ASAD, was approved as president by popular referendum in July 2000. Syrian troops - stationed in Lebanon since 1976 in an ostensible peacekeeping role - were withdrawn in April 2005. During the July-August 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizballah, Syria placed its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its ally Hizballah. In May 2007, Bashar al-ASAD's second term as president was approved by popular referendum.</p> <p>Influenced by major uprisings that began elsewhere in the region, and compounded by additional social and economic factors, antigovernment protests broke out first in the southern province of Dar'a in March 2011 with protesters calling for the repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials. Demonstrations and violent unrest spread across Syria with the size and intensity of protests fluctuating. The government responded to unrest with a mix of concessions - including the repeal of the Emergency Law, new laws permitting new political parties, and liberalizing local and national elections - and with military force and detentions. The government's efforts to quell unrest and armed opposition activity led to extended clashes and eventually civil war between government forces, their allies, and oppositionists.</p> <p>International pressure on the ASAD regime intensified after late 2011, as the Arab League, the EU, Turkey, and the US expanded economic sanctions against the regime and those entities that support it. In December 2012, the Syrian National Coalition, was recognized by more than 130 countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. In September 2015, Russia launched a military intervention on behalf of the ASAD regime, and domestic and foreign government-aligned forces recaptured swaths of territory from opposition forces, and eventually the country’s second largest city, Aleppo, in December 2016, shifting the conflict in the regime’s favor. The regime, with this foreign support, also recaptured opposition strongholds in the Damascus suburbs and the southern province of Dar’a in 2018. The government lacks territorial control over much of the northeastern part of the country, which is dominated by the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF has expanded its territorial hold over much of the northeast since 2014 as it has captured territory from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Since 2016, Turkey has also conducted three large-scale military operations into Syria, capturing territory along Syria's northern border in the provinces of Aleppo, Ar Raqqah, and Al Hasakah. Political negotiations between the government and opposition delegations at UN-sponsored Geneva conferences since 2014 have failed to produce a resolution of the conflict. Since early 2017, Iran, Russia, and Turkey have held separate political negotiations outside of UN auspices to attempt to reduce violence in Syria. According to an April 2016 UN estimate, the death toll among Syrian Government forces, opposition forces, and civilians was over 400,000, though other estimates placed the number well over 500,000. As of December 2019, approximately 6 million Syrians were internally displaced. Approximately 11.1 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance across the country, and an additional 5.7 million Syrians were registered refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa. The conflict in Syria remains one of the largest humanitarian crises worldwide.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Following World War I, France acquired a mandate over the northern portion of the former Ottoman Empire province of Syria. The French administered the area as Syria until granting it independence in 1946. The new country lacked political stability and experienced a series of military coups. Syria united with Egypt in February 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. In September 1961, the two entities separated, and the Syrian Arab Republic was reestablished. In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria lost the Golan Heights region to Israel. During the 1990s, Syria and Israel held occasional, albeit unsuccessful, peace talks over its return. In November 1970, Hafiz al-ASAD, a member of the socialist Ba'ath Party and the minority Alawi sect, seized power in a bloodless coup and brought political stability to the country. Following the death of President Hafiz al-ASAD, his son, Bashar al-ASAD, was approved as president by popular referendum in July 2000. Syrian troops - stationed in Lebanon since 1976 in an ostensible peacekeeping role - were withdrawn in April 2005. During the July-August 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizballah, Syria placed its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its ally Hizballah. In May 2007, Bashar al-ASAD's second term as president was approved by popular referendum.</p> <p>Influenced by major uprisings that began elsewhere in the region, and compounded by additional social and economic factors, antigovernment protests broke out first in the southern province of Dar'a in March 2011 with protesters calling for the repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials. Demonstrations and violent unrest spread across Syria with the size and intensity of protests fluctuating. The government responded to unrest with a mix of concessions - including the repeal of the Emergency Law, new laws permitting new political parties, and liberalizing local and national elections - and with military force and detentions. The government's efforts to quell unrest and armed opposition activity led to extended clashes and eventually civil war between government forces, their allies, and oppositionists.</p> <p>International pressure on the ASAD regime intensified after late 2011, as the Arab League, the EU, Turkey, and the US expanded economic sanctions against the regime and those entities that support it. In December 2012, the Syrian National Coalition, was recognized by more than 130 countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. In September 2015, Russia launched a military intervention on behalf of the ASAD regime, and domestic and foreign government-aligned forces recaptured swaths of territory from opposition forces, and eventually the country’s second largest city, Aleppo, in December 2016, shifting the conflict in the regime’s favor. The regime, with this foreign support, also recaptured opposition strongholds in the Damascus suburbs and the southern province of Dar’a in 2018. The government lacks territorial control over much of the northeastern part of the country, which is dominated by the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF has expanded its territorial hold over much of the northeast since 2014 as it has captured territory from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Since 2016, Turkey has also conducted three large-scale military operations into Syria, capturing territory along Syria's northern border in the provinces of Aleppo, Ar Raqqah, and Al Hasakah. Political negotiations between the government and opposition delegations at UN-sponsored Geneva conferences since 2014 have failed to produce a resolution of the conflict. Since early 2017, Iran, Russia, and Turkey have held separate political negotiations outside of UN auspices to attempt to reduce violence in Syria. According to an April 2016 UN estimate, the death toll among Syrian Government forces, opposition forces, and civilians was over 400,000, though other estimates placed the number well over 500,000. As of December 2019, approximately 6 million Syrians were internally displaced. Approximately 11.1 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance across the country, and an additional 5.7 million Syrians were registered refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa. The conflict in Syria remains one of the largest humanitarian crises worldwide.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -123,12 +123,12 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic (official), Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian, French, English"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
"text": "Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%), Christian 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%<br><br><strong>note:</strong> the Christian population may be considerably smaller as a result of Christians fleeing the country during the ongoing civil war",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Christian population may be considerably smaller as a result of Christians fleeing the country during the ongoing civil war"
|
||||
"text": "Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%), Christian 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%<br><br><strong>note:</strong> the Christian population may be considerably smaller as a result of Christians fleeing the country during the ongoing civil war",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Christian population may be considerably smaller as a result of Christians fleeing the country during the ongoing civil war"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Age structure": {
|
||||
"0-14 years": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -297,13 +297,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "<.1% (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
|
||||
"text": "<1000 (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "<1,000 (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "<100 (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "27.8% (2016)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -418,7 +418,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil conflict and a stagnant economy - a nationwide food security assessment estimates that about 12.4 million people (60% of the overall population) are now food insecure, 5.4 million more than at the end of 2019, mostly due to constrained livelihood opportunities and a rapidly worsening economy; although some international food assistance is being provided, Syrian refugees are also pressuring host communities' resources in neighboring countries (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "due to civil conflict and a stagnant economy - a nationwide food security assessment estimates that about 12.4 million people (60% of the overall population) are now food insecure in 2021, 5.4 million more than at the end of 2019, mostly due to constrained livelihood opportunities and a rapidly worsening economy; although some international food assistance is being provided, Syrian refugees are also pressuring host communities' resources in neighboring countries (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -552,7 +552,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "<strong>legal parties/alliances:<br /></strong> Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party [Bashar al-ASAD, regional secretary] <br />Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'th) Party [President Bashar al-ASAD] <br />Arab Socialist Union of Syria or ASU [Safwan al-QUDSI]<br />Democratic Arab Socialist Union [Hassan Abdul AZIM, general secretary] <br />National Progressive Front or NPF [Bashar al-ASAD, Suleiman QADDAH] (alliance includes Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'th) Party, Socialist Unionist Democratic Party)<br />Socialist Unionist Party [Fayiz ISMAIL]<br />Socialist Unionist Democratic Party [Fadlallah Nasr al-DIN]<br />Syrian Communist Party (two branches) [Wissal Farha BAKDASH, Yusuf Rashid FAYSAL] <br />Syrian Social Nationalist Party or SSNP [Ali HAIDAR]<br />Unionist Socialist Party [Fayez ISMAIL]<br /><strong><br />Major Kurdish parties</strong> <br />Kurdish Democratic Union Party or PYD [Shahoz HASAN and Aysha HISSO]<br />Kurdish National Council [Sa'ud MALA]<br /> <br /><strong>other:</strong> Syrian Democratic Party [Mustafa QALAAJI]"
|
||||
"text": "<strong>legal parties/alliances:<br></strong> Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party [Bashar al-ASAD, regional secretary] <br>Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'th) Party [President Bashar al-ASAD] <br>Arab Socialist Union of Syria or ASU [Safwan al-QUDSI]<br>Democratic Arab Socialist Union [Hassan Abdul AZIM, general secretary] <br>National Progressive Front or NPF [Bashar al-ASAD, Suleiman QADDAH] (alliance includes Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'th) Party, Socialist Unionist Democratic Party)<br>Socialist Unionist Party [Fayiz ISMAIL]<br>Socialist Unionist Democratic Party [Fadlallah Nasr al-DIN]<br>Syrian Communist Party (two branches) [Wissal Farha BAKDASH, Yusuf Rashid FAYSAL] <br>Syrian Social Nationalist Party or SSNP [Ali HAIDAR]<br>Unionist Socialist Party [Fayez ISMAIL]<br><strong><br>Major Kurdish parties</strong> <br>Kurdish Democratic Union Party or PYD [Shahoz HASAN and Aysha HISSO]<br>Kurdish National Council [Sa'ud MALA]<br> <br><strong>other:</strong> Syrian Democratic Party [Mustafa QALAAJI]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, ICSID, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WBG, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -637,7 +637,7 @@
|
|||
"Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2013": {
|
||||
"text": "$61.9 billion (2013 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data are in 2015 US dollars<br />the war-driven deterioration of the economy resulted in a disappearance of quality national level statistics in the 2012-13 period"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> data are in 2015 US dollars<br>the war-driven deterioration of the economy resulted in a disappearance of quality national level statistics in the 2012-13 period"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"GDP (official exchange rate)": {
|
||||
"text": "$24.6 billion (2014 est.)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -949,7 +949,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Syria’s telecom sector has paid a heavy toll from years of civil war and destruction leading to major disruptions to the network; operators focusing on rebuilding damaged networks, though lack of basic infrastructure, including power and security, hamper efforts; fairly high mobile penetration for region; remote areas rely on expensive satellite communications; mobile broadband infrastructure is predominantly 3G for about 85% of the population with some LTE ; international aid network provides emergency Internet and telecom services when necessary; government restrictions of Internet freedom; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE (2021)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Syria’s telecom sector has paid a heavy toll from years of civil war and destruction leading to major disruptions to the network; operators focusing on rebuilding damaged networks, though lack of basic infrastructure, including power and security, hamper efforts; fairly high mobile penetration for region; remote areas rely on expensive satellite communications; mobile broadband infrastructure is predominantly 3G for about 85% of the population with some LTE ; international aid network provides emergency Internet and telecom services when necessary; government restrictions of Internet freedom; major importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE (2021)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "the number of fixed-line connections increased markedly prior to the civil war in 2011 and now stands at 17 per 100; mobile-cellular service stands at about 114 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1101,8 +1101,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Ansar al-Islam; Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq; Hizballah; Hurras al-Din; Islamic Jihad Union; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps -- Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; Kata'ib Hizballah; Kurdistan Workers' Party; Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; al-Nusrah Front (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham); al-Qa'ida; Palestine Liberation Front; PFLP-General Command; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Ansar al-Islam; Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq; Hizballah; Hurras al-Din; Islamic Jihad Union; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps -- Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; Kata'ib Hizballah; Kurdistan Workers' Party; Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; al-Nusrah Front (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham); al-Qa'ida; Palestine Liberation Front; PFLP-General Command; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Modern Turkey was founded in 1923 from the remnants of the defeated Ottoman Empire by national hero Mustafa KEMAL, who was later honored with the title Ataturk or \"Father of the Turks.\" Under his leadership, the country adopted radical social, legal, and political reforms. After a period of one-party rule, an experiment with multi-party politics led to the 1950 election victory of the opposition Democrat Party and the peaceful transfer of power. Since then, Turkish political parties have multiplied, but democracy has been fractured by periods of instability and military coups (1960, 1971, 1980), which in each case eventually resulted in a return of formal political power to civilians. In 1997, the military again helped engineer the ouster - popularly dubbed a \"post-modern coup\" - of the then Islamic-oriented government. An unsuccessful coup attempt was made in July 2016 by a faction of the Turkish Armed Forces.</p> <p>Turkey intervened militarily on Cyprus in 1974 to prevent a Greek takeover of the island and has since acted as patron state to the \"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,\" which only Turkey recognizes. A separatist insurgency begun in 1984 by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization, has long dominated the attention of Turkish security forces and claimed more than 40,000 lives. In 2013, the Turkish Government and the PKK conducted negotiations aimed at ending the violence, however intense fighting resumed in 2015. Turkey joined the UN in 1945 and in 1952 it became a member of NATO. In 1963, Turkey became an associate member of the European Community; it began accession talks with the EU in 2005. Over the past decade, economic reforms, coupled with some political reforms, have contributed to a growing economy, although economic growth slowed in recent years.</p> <p>From 2015 and continuing through 2016, Turkey witnessed an uptick in terrorist violence, including major attacks in Ankara, Istanbul, and throughout the predominantly Kurdish southeastern region of Turkey. On 15 July 2016, elements of the Turkish Armed forces attempted a coup that ultimately failed following widespread popular resistance. More than 240 people were killed and over 2,000 injured when Turkish citizens took to the streets en masse to confront the coup forces. The government accused followers of the Fethullah Gulen transnational religious and social movement (\"Hizmet\") for allegedly instigating the failed coup and designates the movement’s followers as terrorists. Since the attempted coup, Turkish Government authorities arrested, suspended, or dismissed more than 130,000 security personnel, journalists, judges, academics, and civil servants due to their alleged connection to Gulen's movement. Following the failed coup, the Turkish Government instituted a State of Emergency from July 2016 to July 2018. The Turkish Government conducted a referendum on 16 April 2017 in which voters approved constitutional amendments changing Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system. The amendments went into effect fully following the presidential and parliamentary elections in June 2018.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Modern Turkey was founded in 1923 from the remnants of the defeated Ottoman Empire by national hero Mustafa KEMAL, who was later honored with the title Ataturk or \"Father of the Turks.\" Under his leadership, the country adopted radical social, legal, and political reforms. After a period of one-party rule, an experiment with multi-party politics led to the 1950 election victory of the opposition Democrat Party and the peaceful transfer of power. Since then, Turkish political parties have multiplied, but democracy has been fractured by periods of instability and military coups (1960, 1971, 1980), which in each case eventually resulted in a return of formal political power to civilians. In 1997, the military again helped engineer the ouster - popularly dubbed a \"post-modern coup\" - of the then Islamic-oriented government. An unsuccessful coup attempt was made in July 2016 by a faction of the Turkish Armed Forces.</p> <p>Turkey intervened militarily on Cyprus in 1974 to prevent a Greek takeover of the island and has since acted as patron state to the \"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,\" which only Turkey recognizes. A separatist insurgency begun in 1984 by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization, has long dominated the attention of Turkish security forces and claimed more than 40,000 lives. In 2013, the Turkish Government and the PKK conducted negotiations aimed at ending the violence, however intense fighting resumed in 2015. Turkey joined the UN in 1945 and in 1952 it became a member of NATO. In 1963, Turkey became an associate member of the European Community; it began accession talks with the EU in 2005. Over the past decade, economic reforms, coupled with some political reforms, have contributed to a growing economy, although economic growth slowed in recent years.</p> <p>From 2015 and continuing through 2016, Turkey witnessed an uptick in terrorist violence, including major attacks in Ankara, Istanbul, and throughout the predominantly Kurdish southeastern region of Turkey. On 15 July 2016, elements of the Turkish Armed forces attempted a coup that ultimately failed following widespread popular resistance. More than 240 people were killed and over 2,000 injured when Turkish citizens took to the streets en masse to confront the coup forces. The government accused followers of the Fethullah Gulen transnational religious and social movement (\"Hizmet\") for allegedly instigating the failed coup and designates the movement’s followers as terrorists. Since the attempted coup, Turkish Government authorities arrested, suspended, or dismissed more than 130,000 security personnel, journalists, judges, academics, and civil servants due to their alleged connection to Gulen's movement. Following the failed coup, the Turkish Government instituted a State of Emergency from July 2016 to July 2018. The Turkish Government conducted a referendum on 16 April 2017 in which voters approved constitutional amendments changing Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system. The amendments went into effect fully following the presidential and parliamentary elections in June 2018.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Turkish (official), Kurdish, other minority languages"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />The World Factbook, temel bilgi edinmek için vazgeçilmez bir kaynak. (Turkish)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>The World Factbook, temel bilgi edinmek için vazgeçilmez bir kaynak. (Turkish)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -314,7 +314,7 @@
|
|||
"respiratory diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "Covid-19 (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Turkey; as of 6 June 2021, Turkey has reported a total of 5,282,594<span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> </span>cases of COVID-19 or 6,263.5 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 57 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 14 June 2021, 24.86% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Turkey; as of 6 June 2021, Turkey has reported a total of 5,537,386 cases of COVID-19 or 6,565.62 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 60 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 19 July 2021, 46.29% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "32.1% (2016)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -444,7 +444,7 @@
|
|||
"respiratory diseases": {
|
||||
"text": "Covid-19 (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Turkey; as of 6 June 2021, Turkey has reported a total of 5,282,594<span style=\"font-size: medium;\"> </span>cases of COVID-19 or 6,263.5 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 57 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 14 June 2021, 24.86% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Turkey; as of 6 June 2021, Turkey has reported a total of 5,537,386 cases of COVID-19 or 6,565.62 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 population with 60 cumulative deaths per 100,000 population; as of 19 July 2021, 46.29% of the population has received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
"municipal solid waste generated annually": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -565,8 +565,8 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Democrat Party or DP [Gultekin UYSAL]<br />Democratic Regions Party or DBP [Sebahat TUNCEL, Mehmet ARSLAN]<br />Felicity Party or SP [Temel KARAMOLLAOGLU]<br />Free Cause Party or HUDAPAR [Ishak SAGLAM]<br />Good Party or TYIi [Meral AKSENER]<br />Grand Unity Party or BBP [Mustafa DESTICI]<br />Justice and Development Party or AKP [Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN]<br />Nation Alliance (CHP, IYI, SP) (electoral alliance)<br />Nationalist Movement Party or MHP [Devlet BAHCELI]<br />People's Alliance (AKP, MHP) (electoral alliance)<br />Patriotic Party or VP [Dogu PERINCEK]<br />Peoples' Democratic Party or HDP [Pervin BULDAN, Sezai TEMELLI]<br />Republican People's Party or CHP [Kemal KILICDAROGLU]<br><br><strong>note: </strong> as of December 2018, 83 political parties were legally registered",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong> as of December 2018, 83 political parties were legally registered"
|
||||
"text": "Democrat Party or DP [Gultekin UYSAL]<br>Democratic Regions Party or DBP [Sebahat TUNCEL, Mehmet ARSLAN]<br>Felicity Party or SP [Temel KARAMOLLAOGLU]<br>Free Cause Party or HUDAPAR [Ishak SAGLAM]<br>Good Party or TYIi [Meral AKSENER]<br>Grand Unity Party or BBP [Mustafa DESTICI]<br>Justice and Development Party or AKP [Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN]<br>Nation Alliance (CHP, IYI, SP) (electoral alliance)<br>Nationalist Movement Party or MHP [Devlet BAHCELI]<br>People's Alliance (AKP, MHP) (electoral alliance)<br>Patriotic Party or VP [Dogu PERINCEK]<br>Peoples' Democratic Party or HDP [Pervin BULDAN, Sezai TEMELLI]<br>Republican People's Party or CHP [Kemal KILICDAROGLU]<br><br><strong>note: </strong> as of December 2018, 83 political parties were legally registered",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note: </strong> as of December 2018, 83 political parties were legally registered"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "ADB (nonregional member), Australia Group, BIS, BSEC, CBSS (observer), CD, CE, CERN (observer), CICA, CPLP (associate observer), D-8, EAPC, EBRD, ECO, EU (candidate country), FAO, FATF, G-20, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OIC, OPCW, OSCE, Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club (associate), PCA, PIF (partner), SCO (dialogue member), SELEC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC"
|
||||
|
|
@ -994,7 +994,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>following earthquake damage to infrastructure in 2020, telecom sector undergoing rapid modernization and expansion, especially in mobile-cellular services; mobile broadband becoming increasingly popular; near saturation of 4G LTE coverage for the population; strides made with 5G through investment by Huawei and Ericcson; fixed and mobile infrastructure will help to underpin Smart City initiatives; tight government control on social media platforms; importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from China (2021)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>following earthquake damage to infrastructure in 2020, telecom sector undergoing rapid modernization and expansion, especially in mobile-cellular services; mobile broadband becoming increasingly popular; near saturation of 4G LTE coverage for the population; strides made with 5G through investment by Huawei and Ericcson; fixed and mobile infrastructure will help to underpin Smart City initiatives; tight government control on social media platforms; importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from China (2021)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "additional digital exchanges are permitting a rapid increase in subscribers; the construction of a network of technologically advanced intercity trunk lines, using both fiber-optic cable and digital microwave radio relay, is facilitating communication between urban centers; remote areas are reached by a domestic satellite system; fixed-line 14 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is 97 telephones per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have approximately 400,000 total active duty personnel (300,000 Army; 45,000 Navy; 50,000 Air Force); approximately 150,000 Gendarmerie (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 425,000 active duty personnel (325,000 Army; 50,000 Navy; 50,000 Air Force); approximately 150,000 Gendarmerie (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the Turkish Armed Forces inventory is mostly comprised of a mix of domestically-produced and Western weapons systems, although in recent years, Turkey has also acquired some Chinese, Russian, and South Korean equipment; since 2010, the US is the leading provider of armaments to Turkey, followed by Italy, South Korea, and Spain; Turkey has a robust defense industry capable of producing a range of weapons systems for both export and internal use, including armored vehicles, naval vessels, and unmanned aerial platforms, although it is heavily dependent on Western technology; Turkey's defense industry also partners with other countries for defense production (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1173,8 +1173,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Kurdistan Workers' Party; al-Qa'ida; Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Kurdistan Workers' Party; al-Qa'ida; Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"Introduction": {
|
||||
"Background": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the West Bank has been dominated by many different peoples throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The West Bank fell to British forces during World War I, becoming part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the West Bank was captured by Transjordan (later renamed Jordan), which annexed the West Bank in 1950; it was captured by Israel in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the West Bank as well as the Gaza Strip. In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start direct negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the area.<br /><br /></p> Roughly 60% of the West Bank, remains under Israeli civil and military control. In early 2006, the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) election. Attempts to form a unity government between Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed, leading to violent clashed between their respective supporters and HAMAS's violent siezure of all military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since 2007, the PA has administered parts of the West Bank under its control, mainly the major Palestinian population centers and areas immediately surrounding them. Fatah and HAMAS have made several attempts at reconciliation, but the factions have been unable to implement agreements including the latest agreement signed in October 2017. In December 2018, the Palestinian Constitutional Court dissolved the PLC. In 2019, PA President ABBAS renewed his calls for PLC elections."
|
||||
"text": "<p>Inhabited since at least the 15th century B.C., the West Bank has been dominated by many different peoples throughout its history; it was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the early 16th century. The West Bank fell to British forces during World War I, becoming part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the West Bank was captured by Transjordan (later renamed Jordan), which annexed the West Bank in 1950; it was captured by Israel in the Six-Day War in 1967. Under a series of agreements known as the Oslo accords signed between 1993 and 1999, Israel transferred to the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA) security and civilian responsibility for many Palestinian-populated areas of the West Bank as well as the Gaza Strip. In 2000, a violent intifada or uprising began, and in 2001 negotiations to determine the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip stalled. Subsequent attempts to re-start direct negotiations have not resulted in progress toward determining final status of the area.<br><br></p> Roughly 60% of the West Bank, remains under Israeli civil and military control. In early 2006, the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) election. Attempts to form a unity government between Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed, leading to violent clashed between their respective supporters and HAMAS's violent siezure of all military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since 2007, the PA has administered parts of the West Bank under its control, mainly the major Palestinian population centers and areas immediately surrounding them. Fatah and HAMAS have made several attempts at reconciliation, but the factions have been unable to implement agreements including the latest agreement signed in October 2017. In December 2018, the Palestinian Constitutional Court dissolved the PLC. In 2019, PA President ABBAS renewed his calls for PLC elections."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Geography": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Arabic, Hebrew (spoken by Israeli settlers and many Palestinians), English (widely understood)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"printed major-language sample": {
|
||||
"text": "<br />كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br /><br />The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
"text": "<br>كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)<br><br>The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information."
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Religions": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "3.02 children born/woman (2021 est.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Contraceptive prevalence rate": {
|
||||
"text": "57.2% (2014)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> includes Gaza Strip and the West Bank",
|
||||
"text": "57.3% (2019/20)<br><br><strong>note:</strong> includes Gaza Strip and the West Bank",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> includes Gaza Strip and the West Bank"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Drinking water source": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -860,8 +860,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
"Terrorist group(s)": {
|
||||
"text": "Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; HAMAS; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Kahane Chai; Palestine Islamic Jihad; Palestine Liberation Front; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in <a title=\"Appendix-T\" href=\"../appendix/appendix-t.html\">Appendix-T</a>"
|
||||
"text": "Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; HAMAS; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/Qods Force; Kahane Chai; Palestine Islamic Jihad; Palestine Liberation Front; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<br><br><strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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