diff --git a/africa/ag.json b/africa/ag.json index d525b6b5..97dcd03a 100644 --- a/africa/ag.json +++ b/africa/ag.json @@ -1228,10 +1228,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Algeria does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; the government made key achievements during the reporting period, therefore Algeria was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List; authorities identified more trafficking victims, increased investigations and prosecutions, while continuing to convict traffickers; Algeria partnered with international organizations to train officials and conduct public awareness campaigns; however, government identification of and services for victims remained insufficient; authorities continued to punish some potential victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Algeria does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Algeria was downgraded to Tier 3; the government did take some steps to address trafficking, including adopting a National Action Plan, creating specialized trafficking units, and approving standardized victim identification indicators, although the indicators had not yet been promulgated; a draft anti-trafficking law was pending in Parliament at the end of the reporting period and the government continued work with an international organization to develop a National Referral Mechanism and train officials; however, officials conducted fewer investigations and prosecutions, and efforts to identify and assist victims remained insufficient; authorities most likely continued to penalize trafficking victims for immigration offenses committed as a result of being trafficked; government efforts to deport undocumented migrants without screening for trafficking indicators deterred some victims from reporting crimes or seeking assistance (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims; Algerian women and girls are vulnerable to sex trafficking due to financial problems or after running away from home; undocumented sub-Saharan migrants are vulnerable to labor and sex trafficking and are exploited in restaurants, houses, and informal worksites; sub-Saharan men and women needing more funds for their onward journey to Europe work illegally in construction and commercial sex and are vulnerable to sex trafficking and debt bondage; foreign women and girls, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, are subject to sex trafficking in bars and informal brothels; criminal begging rings that exploit sub-Saharan African migrant children are common and reportedly increasing (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Algeria, and Algerians are exploited abroad; undocumented migrants, primarily from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria are vulnerable to labor and sex trafficking in Algeria; unaccompanied women and women traveling with children are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced domestic work; refugees and asylum seekers are vulnerable to trafficking before and during migration to Algeria; false promises of work in beauty salons or restaurants lure migrants to Algeria where they are exploited in sex and labor trafficking; victims report physical and sexual abuse from smugglers and traffickers; sub-Saharan men and women needing funds for their onward journey to Europe work illegally in construction and commercial sex and are vulnerable to sex trafficking and debt bondage;  Algerian women and girls are vulnerable to sex trafficking due to financial problems or after running away from home; criminal begging rings that exploit sub-Saharan African migrant children are common; Cuban medical workers in Algeria may have been forced to work by the Cuban Government, and North Korean and Chinese nationals working in Algeria may be at risk of exploitation (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/africa/cd.json b/africa/cd.json index f0d64de3..242a9b95 100644 --- a/africa/cd.json +++ b/africa/cd.json @@ -1189,10 +1189,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Chad does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; officials investigated trafficking cases and finalized a National Action Plan for 2021-2022 and began implementation of standard operating procedures and a National Referral Mechanism for identifying and referring victims for care; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increased efforts to increase anti-trafficking capacity; government turnover hindered Chad’s ability to maintain consistent anti-trafficking efforts and reporting; authorities did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers, identifying victims, or conducting awareness campaigns; nonetheless, because the government has devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, Chad was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from downgrade to Tier 3; therefore, Chad remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Chad does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Chad was downgraded to Tier 3; officials took some steps to address trafficking, prosecuting trafficking cases and launching an inter-ministerial committee to enhance protections for migrant workers and reduce vulnerabilities to trafficking; however, the government did not identify any victims or convict traffickers for the second consecutive year; officials did not consistently implement standard operating procedures to screen for and identify victims; the government did not operationalize its National Trafficking Commission nor conduct awareness campaigns (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Chad, and traffickers exploit Chadian victims abroad; most trafficking is internal; some children are sent by their parents to relatives or intermediaries to receive education, an apprenticeship, goods, or money and are then forced to work in domestic service or cattle herding; children are also forced to work in agriculture, gold mines, charcoal vending, and fishing, and those attending Koranic schools are forced into begging and street vending; girls from rural areas who search for work in larger towns are exploited in sex trafficking and domestic servitude; terrorist groups abduct children to serve as soldiers, suicide bombers, brides, and forced laborers (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Chad, and traffickers exploit Chadian victims abroad; most trafficking is internal; some children are sent by their parents to relatives or intermediaries to receive education, an apprenticeship, goods, or money and are then forced to work in domestic service or cattle herding; children are also forced to work in agriculture, gold mines, charcoal production, and fishing, and those attending Quranic schools are forced into begging and street vending or other forms of trafficking; some military or local officials exploit with impunity child herders in forced labor; girls from rural areas who search for work in larger towns are exploited in sex trafficking and domestic servitude; armed groups most likely recruit and use children in armed conflict; traffickers exploit some undocumented migrants in sex or labor trafficking; Chinese and Cuban nationals working in Chad may have been forced to work by their governments (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/africa/cn.json b/africa/cn.json index 1a527d5d..2fe66399 100644 --- a/africa/cn.json +++ b/africa/cn.json @@ -515,10 +515,10 @@ "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 24 March 2019 (next to be held in 2024)" + "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term; election last held on 14 January 2024 (next to be held in 2029)" }, "election results": { - "text": "
2019: AZALI Assoumani (CRC) elected president in first round - AZALI Assoumani (CRC) 60.8%, Ahamada MAHAMOUDOU (PJ) 14.6%, Mouigni Baraka Said SOILIHI (independent) 5.6%, other 19%

2016: AZALI Assoumani (CRC) elected president in the second round; percent of vote in first round - Mohamed Ali SOILIHI (UPDC) 17.6%, Mouigni BARAKA (RDC) 15.1%, AZALI Assoumani (CRC) 15%, Fahmi Said IBRAHIM (PEC) 14.5%, other 37.8%; percent of vote in second round - AZALI Assoumani (CRC) 41.4%, Mohamed Ali SOILIHI (UPDC) 39.7%; Mouigni BARAKA (RDC) 19%" + "text": "
2024: AZALI Assoumani reelected president in first round - AZALI Assoumani (CRC) 63%, SALIM ISSA Abdallah (PJ) 20.3%, DAOUDOU Abdallah Mohamed (Orange Party) 5.9%, Bourhane HAMIDOU (independent) 5.1%

2019: AZALI Assoumani (CRC) elected president in first round - AZALI Assoumani (CRC) 60.8%, Ahamada MAHAMOUDOU (PJ) 14.6%, Mouigni Baraka Said SOILIHI (independent) 5.6%, other 19%" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ "note": "
 

 " }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros or CRC [AZALI Assoumani]
Orange Party [Mohamed DAOUDOU]
Independents

Note: only parties with seats in the Assembly of the Union included (2020)" + "text": "Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros or CRC [AZALI Assoumani]
Juwa Party (Parti Juwa) or PJ [Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed SAMBI]
Orange Party [Mohamed DAOUDOU]


Note: only parties with seats in the Assembly of the Union included (2020)" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ACP, AfDB, AMF, AOSIS, AU, CAEU (candidates), COMESA, FAO, FZ, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, InOC, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)" diff --git a/africa/dj.json b/africa/dj.json index cbb0c56a..6700db5f 100644 --- a/africa/dj.json +++ b/africa/dj.json @@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "27,326 (2021 est.)" + "text": "27,931 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "2 (2021 est.)" @@ -1169,10 +1169,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Djibouti does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; Djibouti partnered with international experts to expand training, formalized standard operating procedures for victim identification, enhanced a partnership with an international organization to develop victim referral procedures for transiting migrants, appointed a government focal point and inter-ministerial task force to combat human trafficking, and conducted awareness campaigns; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts to improve its anti-trafficking capacity; the government did not convict any traffickers for the fifth consecutive year, and judges continue to use outdated versions of the penal code that do not include the 2016 anti-trafficking law; officials did not identify any trafficking victims for the third consecutive year and lacked formal services for victims; despite training, some front-line officials’ limited understanding of trafficking continued to inhibit law enforcement and victim identification; for the seventh consecutive year, the government only partially implemented its 2015-2022 national action plan; therefore, Djibouti remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Djibouti does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Djibouti was downgraded to Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including partnering with international organizations to establish a shelter and provide services to victims, and directing creation of a national coordinating body to combat trafficking; however, officials did not report investigating or prosecuting any cases and did not convict any traffickers for the sixth consecutive year; prosecutors dropped trafficking charges or reclassified cases as other crimes with lower penalties, and judges did not incorporate provisions from the 2016 anti-trafficking law; no victims were identified for the fourth consecutive year, and protection services remained limited; the government lacked coordinated anti-trafficking efforts and did not draft a new National Action Plan to replace the expired plan; some officials continued to deny the existence of sex and labor trafficking in Djibouti (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Djibouti, and to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit victims from Djibouti abroad; adults and children, primarily undocumented economic migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia, transit Djibouti en route to Yemen and other locations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia; a number of these migrants are exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking at their intended destinations, and they are also vulnerable to trafficking at various transit points, particularly Yemen; economic migrants who transit Djibouti to return to their home countries are vulnerable to trafficking; Djibouti—with a population of less than one million—hosts more than 35,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, and many of them have endured and remained vulnerable to trafficking; Djiboutian and migrant women and children living in the streets face exploitation in sex trafficking or forced labor; traffickers, including family members, may exploit local and migrant children in forced begging; foreign workers—including Ethiopians, Yemenis, Indians, Pakistanis, and Filipinos—may be exploited in forced labor in domestic servitude, construction, and food service sectors; Cuban medical professionals in Djibouti may have been forced to work by the Cuban government (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Djibouti, and to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit victims from Djibouti abroad; traffickers, including family members, exploit local and migrant children in forced begging; homeless Djiboutian and migrant women and children face exploitation in sex trafficking or forced labor; foreign workers—including Ethiopians, Filipinos, Indians, Pakistanis, and Yemenis—may be exploited in forced labor in domestic servitude, construction, and food service sectors; adults and children, primarily undocumented economic migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia, transit Djibouti en route to Yemen and other locations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia; some of these migrants are exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking at their intended destinations; migrants who transit Djibouti to return to their home countries are vulnerable to trafficking, particularly in agricultural labor and sex trafficking; Djibouti hosts approximately 35,000 refugees and asylumseekers, and many of them have endured and remain vulnerable to trafficking; Cuban medical professionals in Djibouti may have been forced to work by the Cuban government (2023)" } } } diff --git a/africa/ek.json b/africa/ek.json index da934919..2fbc76fe 100644 --- a/africa/ek.json +++ b/africa/ek.json @@ -1116,10 +1116,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 2 Watch List — Equatorial Guinea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; the government increased anti-trafficking awareness campaigns, as well as finalized and began implementing an updated 2022-2024 national action plan and standard operating procedures on victim protection and care; officials improved internal coordination, trained local leaders and law enforcement officials in trafficking indicators, victim identification, and investigation; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increased anti-trafficking efforts compared with the previous year; officials have never convicted a trafficker under its 2004 anti-trafficking law, did not prosecute traffickers or identify victims during the reporting period, and the law did not criminalize all forms of trafficking; senior government officials allegedly were complicit in trafficking crimes; because the government devoted sufficient resources to a plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet minimum standards, Equatorial Guinea was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3, and therefore remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year (2022)

" + "text": "

Tier 3 — Equatorial Guinea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Equatorial Guinea was downgraded to Tier 3; officials took some steps such as training law enforcement officials on trafficking; however, the government did not prosecute any traffickers and has never convicted a trafficker under its 2004 anti-trafficking law; officials did not identify any victims for the second consecutive year nor screen vulnerable populations; the anti-trafficking law did not criminalize all forms of trafficking; allegations of senior government officials’ complicity in trafficking crimes continued to hinder efforts to combat trafficking (2023)

" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Equatorial Guinea and Equatoguineans abroad; the majority of trafficking victims are subjected to forced domestic service and commercial sex in cities, particularly in the hospitality and restaurant sector; local and foreign women, including Latin Americans, are exploited in commercial sex domestically, while some Equatoguinean women are sex trafficked in Spain; some children from rural areas have been forced into domestic servitude; children from nearby countries are forced to labor as domestic workers, market workers, vendors, and launderers; individuals recruited from African countries and temporary workers from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela are sometimes exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking; observers report LGBTQI+ youth are often left homeless and stigmatized by family and society, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Equatorial Guinea and Equatoguineans abroad; the majority of trafficking victims are subjected to forced domestic service and sex trafficking in cities, particularly in the hospitality and restaurant sector; local and foreign women are exploited in commercial sex domestically, while some Equatoguineans may face sex trafficking in Spain; some business owners recruit women from Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, other African countries, and Latin America for work in Equatorial Guinea and exploit them in forced labor and sex trafficking; some children from rural areas have been exploited in forced labor; traffickers fraudulently recruit Equatoguinean and foreign children to attend school or learn a trade but exploit them in domestic servitude and other forced labor; observers report LGBTQI+ youth are often left homeless and stigmatized by family and society, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking (2023)" } } } diff --git a/africa/er.json b/africa/er.json index 7c3eb292..ba878e63 100644 --- a/africa/er.json +++ b/africa/er.json @@ -1144,10 +1144,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Eritrea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; a government policy or pattern of human trafficking existed; the government continued to exploit its nationals in forced labor in its compulsory national service and citizen militia by forcing them to serve indefinitely or for arbitrary periods; the government did not demonstrate any efforts to address human trafficking (2022)" + "text": "

Tier 3 — Eritrea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Eritrea remained on Tier 3; the government continued to have a policy or pattern of human trafficking; the government exploited its citizens in forced labor in its compulsory national service and citizen militia by forcing them to serve indefinitely or for arbitrary periods; officials directed policies that perpetuated mobilization of children for forced labor in public works projects, usually within the agricultural sector, during the student summer work program known as Maetot; the government did not demonstrate any efforts to address human trafficking (2023)

" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic victims in Eritrea and abroad; National Service is mandatory at age 18 and may take a variety of forms, including military service and physical labor but also government office jobs and teaching; the 18-month limit on compulsory national service was suspended since the 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict, blocking the demobilization of most individuals who are forced to serve indefinitely under threats of detention, torture, or familial reprisal; Eritreans who flee the country, usually with the aim of reaching Europe, seek the help of paid smugglers and are vulnerable to trafficking when they cross the border clandestinely into Sudan and Ethiopia; Eritreans are subject to forced labor and sex trafficking mainly in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Libya (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic victims in Eritrea and abroad, and may exploit foreign victims in Eritrea; National Service is mandatory at age 18 and may take a variety of forms, including military service and physical labor but also the full range of government jobs as well as teaching; the 18-month limit on compulsory national service was suspended since the 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict, blocking the demobilization of most individuals who are forced to serve indefinitely under threats of detention, torture, or familial reprisal; Eritreans who flee the country, usually with the aim of reaching Europe, seek the help of paid smugglers to evade Eritrea’s strict exit controls and are vulnerable to trafficking; Eritreans are subject to forced labor and sex trafficking mainly in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Libya; Eritrean military and security officials reportedly subject young women and girls to domestic servitude and sex trafficking, as well as committing human rights abuses and gender-based violence against women and girls in Tigray; Chinese nationals employed at worksites affiliated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative are vulnerable to forced labor, including in construction and mining (2023)" } } } diff --git a/africa/mp.json b/africa/mp.json index 02394174..5e14aeb6 100644 --- a/africa/mp.json +++ b/africa/mp.json @@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ }, "Transnational Issues": { "Disputes - international": { - "text": "

Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory); claims French-administered Tromelin Island

Mauritius-France: Mauritius has claimed French-administered Tromelin Island (part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands) since 1976

Mauritius-UK: Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory)

" + "text": "

Mauritius-France: Mauritius has claimed French-administered Tromelin Island (part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands) since 1976

Mauritius-UK: Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory)

" }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json index c0710cc7..da0c4ae0 100644 --- a/africa/od.json +++ b/africa/od.json @@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "254,953 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 13,114 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)" + "text": "254,953 (Sudan) (refugees since 15 April 2023), 13,337 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2023)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "2.258 million (alleged coup attempt and ethnic conflict beginning in December 2013; information is lacking on those displaced in earlier years by: fighting in Abyei between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in May 2011; clashes between the SPLA and dissident militia groups in South Sudan; inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle; attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army; floods and drought) (2023)" @@ -1059,10 +1059,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 3 — South Sudan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore it remains on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including convening an inter-ministerial task force, finalizing a National Action plan, and conducting awareness activities; however, there was a government policy or pattern whereby security and law enforcement officers continued to forcibly recruit child soldiers and did not hold any members criminally accountable for these unlawful acts; for the tenth consecutive year, there were no reported investigations into or prosecutions for forced labor or sex trafficking; officials did not report identifying or assisting any victims and continued to penalize victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit (2022)

" + "text": "

Tier 3 — South Sudan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore South Sudan remains on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including convening its anti-trafficking inter-ministerial task force and conducting training in partnership with international organizations; however, there was a government policy or pattern of employing or recruiting child soldiers; government security and law enforcement officers continued to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers and did not hold any members of the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces or South Sudan National Police Services criminally accountable for these unlawful acts; for the eleventh consecutive year, authorities did not report investigating or prosecuting any trafficking crimes; the government did not report identifying or assisting any victims and continued to penalize victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked (2023)

" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in South Sudan and South Sudanese abroad; women and girls, particularly from rural areas or internally displaced, are vulnerable to domestic servitude, and some are exploited by males in the households in sexual abuse or trafficking; South Sudanese girls are exploited in sex trafficking in restaurants, hotels, and brothels—sometimes involving corrupt law enforcement officials; some children are coerced to work in begging, herding, construction, and a wide range of physically demanding labor sectors; men and women recruited from neighboring countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic of the Congo, and Uganda, as well as South Sudanese women and children are recruited with fraudulent employment offers in hotels, restaurants, and construction and forced to work for little or no pay or coerced into commercial sex; government forces use children to fight or serve in support roles; several milliion internally displaced persons and South Sudanese refugees living in neighboring countries are at risk of trafficking, and unaccompanied children in the camps are vulnerable to abduction by sex and labor traffickers (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in South Sudan, as well as South Sudanese abroad; South Sudanese women and girls, particularly from rural areas or internally displaced, are vulnerable to domestic servitude, sometimes by prominent individuals in state capitals and rural areas; males in the households sexually abuse some of these women and girls and may exploit them in commercial sex; South Sudanese and foreign businesspeople exploit South Sudanese girls in sex trafficking in restaurants, hotels, and brothels—sometimes involving corrupt law enforcement officials; some children are coerced to work in construction, market vending, begging, herding, and a wide range of physically demanding labor sectors; men and women from neighboring countries—including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic of the Congo, and Uganda—as well as South Sudanese women and children are recruited with fraudulent employment offers in hotels, restaurants, and construction and exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking; child and forced marriages remain a problem, and husbands and their families may subject these girls to sex trafficking or domestic servitude; East African migrants transiting through Sudan are vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking; government and opposition forces continue to use children to fight or serve in support roles; several million internally displaced persons and South Sudanese refugees living in neighboring countries are at risk of trafficking, and unaccompanied children in the camps are vulnerable to abduction by sex and labor traffickers (2023)" } } } diff --git a/africa/pu.json b/africa/pu.json index a7afabc0..71e8b853 100644 --- a/africa/pu.json +++ b/africa/pu.json @@ -1128,10 +1128,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Guinea-Bissau does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Guinea-Bissau remained on Tier 3; despite the lack of efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including investigating cases, identifying potential victims, launching a national referral mechanism, and convening its anti-trafficking committee; however, Guinea-Bissau has never convicted a trafficker and failed to prosecute alleged traffickers for the third consecutive year; the government continued to lack adequate victim identification and services, and has lacked sufficient resources and political will to comprehensively combat trafficking (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Guinea-Bissau does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Guinea-Bissau remained on Tier 3; despite the lack of efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including implementing procedures in its National Referral Mechanism to refer child victims to services from civil society organizations, providing anti-trafficking training to border officials, and conducting a public awareness radio campaign; however, Guinea-Bissau has never convicted a trafficker and failed to prosecute any alleged traffickers for the fourth consecutive year; the government continued to lack adequate victim identification and services, and continued to lack resources and political will to comprehensively combat trafficking (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Guinea-Bissau and Bissau-Guineans abroad; forced child begging is the most prevalent form of trafficking; boys reportedly were transported to southern Senegal for forced manual and agricultural labor; girls may be subjected to forced domestic service and child prostitution in Guinea, Senegal and the Gambia; women are recruited and exploited in domestic servitude abroad; girls, and to a lesser extent boys, are exploited in child sex tourism in the Bijagos, an archipelago off the coast of Guinea-Bissau that is largely devoid of government and law enforcement presence; Cuban nationals in Guinea-Bissau may have been forced to work by the Cuban government (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Guinea-Bissau and Bissau-Guineans abroad; forced child begging is the most prevalent form of trafficking, exploited in many cases by corrupt Quranic teachers or associated traffickers; the corrupt teachers send large numbers of Bissau-Guinean boys to Senegal, as well as some to Guinea, Mali, and The Gambia; they also force boys from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leon, and The Gambia to beg in Bissau; boys reportedly were transported to southern Senegal for forced manual and agricultural labor; girls may be subjected to forced domestic service and child prostitution in Guinea, Senegal and the Gambia; women are recruited and exploited in domestic servitude abroad; girls, and to a lesser extent boys, are exploited in child sex tourism in the Bijagos, an archipelago off the coast of Guinea-Bissau that is largely devoid of government and law enforcement presence; Cuban nationals in Guinea-Bissau may have been forced to work by the Cuban government (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/africa/rw.json b/africa/rw.json index 1360f9c7..82cecd84 100644 --- a/africa/rw.json +++ b/africa/rw.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "

Rwanda - a small and centralized country dominated by rugged hills and fertile volcanic soil - has exerted disproportionate influence over the African Great Lakes region for centuries. A Rwandan kingdom increasingly dominated the region from the mid-18th century onward, with the Tutsi monarchs gradually extending the power of the royal court into peripheral areas and expanding their borders through military conquest. While the current ethnic labels Hutu and Tutsi predate colonial rule, their flexibility and importance have varied significantly over time and often manifested more as a hierarchical class distinction than an ethnic or cultural distinction. The majority Hutu and minority Tutsi have long shared a common language and culture, and intermarriage was not rare. The Rwandan royal court centered on the Tutsi king (mwami), who relied on an extensive hierarchy of political, cultural, and economic relationships that intertwined Rwanda’s social groups. Social categories became more rigid during the reign of RWABUGIRI (1860-1895), who focused on aggressive expansion and solidifying Rwanda’s bureaucratic structures. German colonial conquest began in the late 1890s, but the territory was ceded to Belgian forces in 1916 during World War I. Both European nations quickly realized the benefits of ruling through the already centralized Rwandan Tutsi kingdom. Colonial rule reinforced existing trends toward autocratic and exclusionary rule, leading to the elimination of traditional positions of authority for Hutus and a calcification of ethnic identities. Belgian administrators significantly increased requirements for communal labor and instituted harsh taxes, increasing frustration and inequality. Changing political attitudes in Belgium contributed to colonial and Catholic officials shifting their support from Tutsi to Hutu leaders in the years leading up to independence.

Newly mobilized political parties and simmering resentment of minority rule exploded in 1959, three years before independence from Belgium, when Hutus overthrew the Tutsi king. Thousands of Tutsis were killed over the next several years, and some 150,000 were driven into exile in neighboring countries. Army Chief of Staff Juvenal HABYARIMANA seized power in a coup in 1973 and ruled Rwanda as a single-party state for two decades. HABYARIMANA increasingly discriminated against Tutsi and extremist Hutu factions that gained prominence after multiple parties were introduced in the early 1990s. The children of Tutsi exiles later formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and began a civil war in 1990. The civil war exacerbated ethnic tensions and culminated in the shooting down of HABYARIMANA’s private jet in April 1994. The event sparked a state-orchestrated genocide in which Rwandans killed approximately 800,000 of their fellow citizens, including approximately three-quarters of the Tutsi population. The genocide ended later that same year when the predominantly Tutsi RPF, operating out of Uganda and northern Rwanda, defeated the national army and Hutu militias and established an RPF-led government of national unity. Rwanda held its first local elections in 1999 and its first post-genocide presidential and legislative elections in 2003, formalizing President Paul KAGAME’s de facto role as head of government. KAGAME was formally elected in 2010, and again in 2017 after changing the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.

" + "text": "

Rwanda - a small and centralized country dominated by rugged hills and fertile volcanic soil - has exerted disproportionate influence over the African Great Lakes region for centuries. A Rwandan kingdom increasingly dominated the region from the mid-18th century onward, with the Tutsi monarchs gradually extending the power of the royal court into peripheral areas and expanding their borders through military conquest. While the current ethnic labels Hutu and Tutsi predate colonial rule, their flexibility and importance have varied significantly over time and often manifested more as a hierarchical class distinction than an ethnic or cultural distinction. The majority Hutu and minority Tutsi have long shared a common language and culture, and intermarriage was frequent. The Rwandan royal court centered on the Tutsi king (mwami), who relied on an extensive hierarchy of political, cultural, and economic relationships that intertwined Rwanda’s social groups. Social categories became more rigid during the reign of RWABUGIRI (1860-1895), who focused on aggressive expansion and solidifying Rwanda’s bureaucratic structures. German colonial conquest began in the late 1890s, but the territory was ceded to Belgian forces in 1916 during World War I. Both European nations quickly realized the benefits of ruling through the already centralized Rwandan Tutsi kingdom. Colonial rule reinforced existing trends toward autocratic and exclusionary rule, leading to the elimination of traditional positions of authority for Hutus and a calcification of ethnic identities. Belgian administrators significantly increased requirements for communal labor and instituted harsh taxes, increasing frustration and inequality. Changing political attitudes in Belgium contributed to colonial and Catholic officials shifting their support from Tutsi to Hutu leaders in the years leading up to independence.

Newly mobilized political parties and simmering resentment of minority rule exploded in 1959, three years before independence from Belgium, when Hutus overthrew the Tutsi king. Thousands of Tutsis were killed over the next several years, and some 150,000 were driven into exile in neighboring countries. Army Chief of Staff Juvenal HABYARIMANA seized power in a coup in 1973 and ruled Rwanda as a single-party state for two decades. HABYARIMANA increasingly discriminated against Tutsi and extremist Hutu factions gained prominence after multiple parties were introduced in the early 1990s. The children of Tutsi exiles later formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and began a civil war in 1990. The civil war exacerbated ethnic tensions and culminated in the shooting down of HABYARIMANA’s private jet in April 1994. The event sparked a state-orchestrated genocide in which Rwandans killed morethan 800,000 of their fellow citizens, including approximately three-quarters of the Tutsi population. The genocide ended later that same year when the predominantly Tutsi RPF, operating out of Uganda and northern Rwanda, defeated the national army and Hutu militias and established an RPF-led government of national unity. Rwanda held its first local elections in 1999 and its first post-genocide presidential and legislative elections in 2003, formalizing President Paul KAGAME’s de facto role as head of government. KAGAME was formally elected in 2010, and again in 2017 after changing the constitution to allow him to run for a third term.

" } }, "Geography": { @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ } }, "Religions": { - "text": "Protestant 57.7% (includes Adventist 12.6%), Roman Catholic 38.2%, Muslim 2.1%, other 1% (includes traditional, Jehovah's Witness), none 1.1% (2019-20 est.)" + "text": "Christian 95.9% (Protestant 57.7% [includes Adventist 12.6%], Roman Catholic 38.2%), Muslim 2.1%, other 1% (includes traditional, Jehovah's Witness), none 1.1% (2019-20 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { "text": "

Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016 and 3.3 in 2022. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.

The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts approximately 125,000 refugees as of 2022; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

" @@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ }, "Judicial branch": { "highest court(s)": { - "text": "Supreme Court (consists of the chief and deputy chief justices and 15 judges; normally organized into 3-judge panels); High Court (consists of the court president, vice president, and a minimum of 24 judges and organized into 5 chambers)" + "text": "Supreme Court (consists of the chief and deputy chief justices and 5 judges; normally organized into 3-judge panels); High Court (consists of the court president, vice president, and a minimum of 24 judges and organized into 5 chambers)" }, "judge selection and term of office": { "text": "Supreme Court judges nominated by the president after consultation with the Cabinet and the Superior Council of the Judiciary (SCJ), a 27-member body of judges, other judicial officials, and legal professionals) and approved by the Senate; chief and deputy chief justices appointed for 8-year nonrenewable terms; tenure of judges NA; High Court president and vice president appointed by the president of the republic upon approval by the Senate; judges appointed by the Supreme Court chief justice upon approval of the SCJ; judge tenure NA" @@ -593,10 +593,10 @@ "note": " " }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Democratic Green Party of Rwanda or DGPR [Frank HABINEZA]
Liberal Party or PL [Donatille MUKABALISA]
Party for Progress and Concord or PPC [Dr. Alivera MUKABARAMBA]
Rwandan Patriotic Front or RPF [Paul KAGAME]
Rwandan Patriotic Front Coalition (includes RPF, PPC) [Paul KAGAME]
Social Democratic Party or PSD [Vincent BIRUTA]
Social Party Imberakuri or PS-Imberakuri [Christine MUKABUNANI]" + "text": "Democratic Green Party of Rwanda or DGPR [Frank HABINEZA]
Liberal Party or PL [Donatille MUKABALISA]
Party for Progress and Concord or PPC [Dr. Alivera MUKABARAMBA]
Rwandan Patriotic Front or RPF [Paul KAGAME]
Rwandan Patriotic Front Coalition (includes RPF, PPC, PSP, UDPR, PDI, PSR, PDC) [Paul KAGAME]
Social Democratic Party or PSD [Vincent BIRUTA]
Social Party Imberakuri or PS-Imberakuri [Christine MUKABUNANI]" }, "International organization participation": { - "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CEPGL, COMESA, EAC, EADB, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNOOSA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO" + "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CEPGL, COMESA, EAC, EADB, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNOOSA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO" }, "Diplomatic representation in the US": { "chief of mission": { @@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "11,893 (2021 est.)" + "text": "10,327 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "(2021 est.) less than 1" @@ -1124,13 +1124,13 @@ }, "Roadways": { "total": { - "text": "4,700 km (2012)" + "text": "7,797 km (2024)" }, "paved": { - "text": "1,207 km (2012)" + "text": "2,652 km (2024)" }, "unpaved": { - "text": "3,493 km (2012)" + "text": "5,145 km (2024)" } }, "Waterways": { diff --git a/africa/sf.json b/africa/sf.json index be3e9b32..e833ca49 100644 --- a/africa/sf.json +++ b/africa/sf.json @@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ }, "Telecommunication systems": { "general assessment": { - "text": "South Africa’s telecom sector boasts one of the most advanced infrastructures on the continent; the focus in recent years has been on back haul capacity and on fiber and LTE networks to extend and improve internet service connectivity; with the ongoing migration to fiber, the incumbent telco expects to close down its copper network in 2024; the mobile sector has developed strongly in recent years, partly due to the poor availability and level of service of fixed-line networks, which meant that many people had no alternative to mobile networks for voice and data services; the multi-spectrum auction was delayed several times due to legal wrangling, and was finally held in March 2022; the delay caused difficulties for network operators, which were forced to reform spectrum for 3G and LTE use, and provide 5G services on temporary licenses; six qualified bidders acquired spectrum, netting the regulator ZAR14.4 billion in revenues; the market is shrugging off the impact of the pandemic, which had a significant impact on production and supply chains globally, and saw a slowdown in some network expansions, particularly around 5G; on the consumer side, spending on telecoms services and devices remains slightly under pressure amid ongoing macroeconomic challenges facing the country; the crucial nature of telecom services, both for general communication as well as a tool for home-working, will offset such pressures; in many markets the net effect should be a steady though reduced increase in subscriber growth (2022)" + "text": "South Africa’s telecom sector boasts one of the most advanced infrastructures on the continent; the focus in recent years has been on back haul capacity and on fiber and LTE networks to extend and improve internet service connectivity; several satellite solutions also appeared in 2023, aimed at providing additional backhaul and improving connectivity in rural areas; the mobile sector has developed strongly in recent years, partly due to the poor availability and level of service of fixed-line networks, which meant that many people had no alternative to mobile networks for voice and data services (2024)" }, "domestic": { "text": "fixed-line is 2 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular is 167 telephones per 100 persons (2022)" @@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ } }, "Broadcast media": { - "text": "the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) operates 46 free-to-air TV stations; e.tv, a private station, is accessible to more than half the population; multiple subscription TV services provide a mix of local and international channels; well-developed mix of public and private radio stations at the national, regional, and local levels; the SABC radio network, state-owned and controlled but nominally independent, operates 18 stations, one for each of the 11 official languages, 4 community stations, and 3 commercial stations; more than 100 community-based stations extend coverage to rural areas" + "text": "the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) operates 6 free-to-air TV stations; e.tv, a private station, is accessible to more than half the population; multiple subscription TV services provide a mix of local and international channels; well-developed mix of public and private radio stations at the national, regional, and local levels; the SABC radio network, state-owned and controlled but nominally independent, operates 18 stations, one for each of the 11 official languages, 4 community stations, and 3 commercial stations; more than 100 community-based stations extend coverage to rural areas" }, "Internet country code": { "text": ".za" diff --git a/africa/sh.json b/africa/sh.json index 100caaad..5fad347e 100644 --- a/africa/sh.json +++ b/africa/sh.json @@ -497,17 +497,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "2,486 (1998 est.)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "agriculture": { - "text": "6%" - }, - "industry": { - "text": "48%" - }, - "services": { - "text": "46% (1987 est.)" - } - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 1998": { "text": "14% (1998 est.)" diff --git a/africa/uv.json b/africa/uv.json index d70c475e..f74ec787 100644 --- a/africa/uv.json +++ b/africa/uv.json @@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ "note": "note: the military junta implemented an emergency law in 2023 that allows the president extensive powers to combat terrorist groups operating in the country, including conscripting citizens into the security services" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the FABF has a history of interference in the country’s politics, having conducted eight coups since its formation in 1960-61, including the most recent in September of 2022; several combat units were disbanded in 2011 following mutinies; while the FABF is responsible for external defense, it has an internal security role and can be called out to assist internal security forces in restoring public order, combating crime, securing the border, and counterterrorism; indeed, for more than a decade, its focus has largely been combatting terrorism, and it is actively engaged in combat operations to counter terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), particularly in the northern and eastern regions; the FABF is struggling to contain the groups, however, and a large portion of the country—40% by some estimates—is not under government control

in the north, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups taht act as al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Magreb's (AQIM) arm in the Sahel, has exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; in 2022, JNIM conducted attacks in 10 of the country's 13 provinces; most of the attacks were assessed to be by the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) of the JNIM coalition; the ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) terrorist group operates in the eastern part of the country

the Army’s combat forces include a mix of about eight small (battalion-sized) infantry and combined arms regiments, plus battalions of artillery and special forces historically deployed in three military regions; in November 2022, the military government announced it was creating six rapid reaction battalions (bataillon de réaction rapide or BIR), expanding the number of military regions to six, and establishing six Gendarmerie “legions”; currently, the Gendarmerie has approximately eight mobile squadrons; in addition to its counterterrorism missions, the Gendarmerie’s Special Legion fights organized crime and provides security for high-level officials and government institutions; the Air Force’s primary mission is providing support to the Army; it has small numbers of combat aircraft, combat helicopters, and armed UAVs acquired from Turkey (2023)" + "text": "the FABF has a history of interference in the country’s politics, having conducted eight coups since its formation in 1960-61, including the most recent in September of 2022; several combat units were disbanded in 2011 following mutinies; while the FABF is responsible for external defense, it has an internal security role and can be called out to assist internal security forces in restoring public order, combating crime, securing the border, and counterterrorism; indeed, for more than a decade, its focus has largely been counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and it is actively engaged in combat operations against terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), particularly in the northern and eastern regions; the FABF is struggling to contain the groups, however, and a large portion of the country—40% by some estimates—is not under government control

in the north, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups that act as al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Magreb's (AQIM) arm in the Sahel, has exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; in 2023, JNIM was active in 11 of the country's 13 provinces; the ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) terrorist group operates in the eastern part of the country

the Army’s combat forces include a mix of approximately eight small (battalion-sized) infantry and combined arms regiments, plus battalions of artillery and special forces; in November 2022, the military government announced it was expanding the Army by adding up to six rapid reaction battalions (bataillon de réaction rapide or BIR); at the same time, the military said it was establishing six Gendarmerie “legions” to reinforce the Gendarmerie's eight existing mobile squadrons; the Gendarmerie's primary mission is counterterrorism; in addition, the Gendarmerie's Special Legion fights organized crime and provides security for high-level officials and government institutions ; the Air Force’s primary mission is providing support to the Army; it has small numbers of combat aircraft, combat helicopters, and armed UAVs acquired from Turkey (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/as.json b/australia-oceania/as.json index 663aa792..eefc93bc 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/as.json +++ b/australia-oceania/as.json @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ "text": "Senate - last held on 21 May 2022 (next to be held in May 2025)
House of Representatives - last held on 21 May 2022 (next to be held in May 2025)" }, "election results": { - "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party or bloc - Liberal/National Coalition 40.7%, ALP 34.2%, Greens 14.5%, Pauline Hansen's One Nation 2.6%, Jacqui Lambee Network 2.6%, United Australia Party 1.3%, Independents 3.9%; seats by party or bloc - Liberal/National Coalition 31, ALP 26, Australian Greens 11, Pauline Hansen's One Nation 2, Jacqui Lambee Network 2, United Australia Party 1, Independents 3; composition - 33 men, 43 women; percentage of women 56.6%

House of Representatives - percent of vote by party or bloc - ALP 50.9%, Coalition 36.4%, 7.9%, 2.6%, others less than 1%; seats by party or bloc - ALP 77, Coalition 55, Independent 12, Greens 4, Katter's 1, Center Alliance 1; composition: 93 men, 58 women; percentage of women 38.4%" + "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party or bloc - Liberal/National Coalition 40.7%, ALP 34.2%, Greens 14.5%, Pauline Hansen's One Nation 2.6%, Jacqui Lambee Network 2.6%, United Australia Party 1.3%, independent 3.9%; seats by party or bloc - Liberal/National Coalition 31, ALP 26, Australian Greens 11, Pauline Hansen's One Nation 2, Jacqui Lambee Network 2, United Australia Party 1, independent 3; composition - 33 men, 43 women; percentage of women 56.6%

House of Representatives - percent of vote by party/coalition - ALP 50.9%, Coalition 36.4%, 7.9%, 2.6%, others less than 1%; seats by party/coalition - ALP 77, Coalition 55, Independent 12, Greens 4, Katter's 1, Center Alliance 1; composition: 93 men, 58 women; percentage of women 38.4%" } }, "Judicial branch": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/ck.json b/australia-oceania/ck.json index aa8f0e64..08f8c222 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ck.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ck.json @@ -353,9 +353,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "NA" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "text": "

note: the Cocos Islands Cooperative Society Ltd. employs construction workers, stevedores, and lighterage workers; tourism is the other main source of employment

" - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2011": { "text": "0.1% (2011)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/cw.json b/australia-oceania/cw.json index 9cef1cc2..37c11be9 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/cw.json +++ b/australia-oceania/cw.json @@ -586,17 +586,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "6,820 (2001)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "agriculture": { - "text": "29%" - }, - "industry": { - "text": "15%" - }, - "services": { - "text": "56% (1995)" - } - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2005": { "text": "13.1% (2005)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/ne.json b/australia-oceania/ne.json index dab3e923..c2b7d9b6 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/ne.json +++ b/australia-oceania/ne.json @@ -522,9 +522,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "663 (2001)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "text": "

note: most work on family plantations; paid work exists only in government service, small industry, and the Niue Development Board

" - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2001": { "text": "12% (2001)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/nf.json b/australia-oceania/nf.json index beb4b882..efd70a31 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/nf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/nf.json @@ -424,17 +424,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "978 (2006)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "agriculture": { - "text": "6%" - }, - "industry": { - "text": "14%" - }, - "services": { - "text": "80% (2006 est.)" - } - }, "Budget": { "revenues": { "text": "$4.6 million (FY99/00)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/pc.json b/australia-oceania/pc.json index 477f7fe1..51d26c58 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/pc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/pc.json @@ -404,9 +404,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "15 (2004)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "text": "

note: no business community in the usual sense; some public works; subsistence farming and fishing

" - }, "Budget": { "revenues": { "text": "$746,000 (FY04/05)" diff --git a/australia-oceania/wf.json b/australia-oceania/wf.json index 069536c8..e9c74c29 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/wf.json +++ b/australia-oceania/wf.json @@ -507,17 +507,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "4,482 (2013)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "agriculture": { - "text": "74%" - }, - "industry": { - "text": "3%" - }, - "services": { - "text": "23% (2015 est.)" - } - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2013": { "text": "8.8% (2013 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json index f4a629fa..f1741042 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json @@ -1198,10 +1198,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 3 — Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government made some efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict sex traffickers, and identify victims; however, there was a government policy or pattern to profit from labor export programs with strong indications of forced labor, particularly in its foreign medical missions program; the government continued to deploy Cuban workers to foreign countries using deceptive and coercive tactics, and failed to address an increasing number of allegations from credible NGOs and foreign governments of labor violations and trafficking, and of Cuban officials’ involvement in abuses; Cuban law did not explicitly prohibit labor trafficking as defined in international law (2022)

" + "text": "

Tier 3 — Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Cuba remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, such as amending the penal code to include criminalization of labor trafficking; however, there was a government policy or pattern to profit from labor export programs with strong indications of forced labor, particularly in its foreign medical missions program; the government continued to deploy Cuban workers to foreign countries using deceptive and coercive tactics, and failed to address an increasing number of allegations from credible NGOs and foreign governments of Cuban officials’ involvement in trafficking crimes; the government used its legal framework to threaten, coerce, and punish workers and their families if they left the labor export and medical programs (2023)

" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cuba and Cubans abroad; individuals are forced or coerced into participating and threatened to stay in labor export programs, most notably foreign medical missions; sex trafficking and sex tourism, including child victims, occur within Cuba; traffickers exploit Cubans in sex trafficking and forced labor in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, Latin America, and the United States; foreigners from Africa and Asia are subject to sex trafficking and forced labor in Cuba to pay off travel debts; officials identified children, young women, elderly, and disabled persons as the most vulnerable to trafficking; the government uses high school students in some rural areas to harvest crops without pay, claiming that the work is voluntary (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cuba and Cubans abroad; individuals are forced or coerced into participating in labor export programs, most notably the foreign medical missions program; sex trafficking and sex tourism, including child victims, occur within Cuba; traffickers exploit Cubans in sex trafficking and forced labor in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Mediterranean, and the United States; foreigners from Africa and Asia are subject to sex trafficking and forced labor in Cuba to pay off travel debts; officials identified children, young women, elderly, and disabled persons as the most vulnerable to trafficking; LGBTQI+ individuals and migrants are vulnerable to sex trafficking; professional baseball players are at risk of labor trafficking; the government uses high school students in some rural areas to harvest crops without pay, claiming that the work is voluntary (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json index 1ded7e28..d72db0f8 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json @@ -542,10 +542,10 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "President Alejandro GIAMMATTEI (since 14 January 2020); Vice President Cesar Guillermo CASTILLO Reyes (since 14 January 2020); note - the president is both chief of state and head of government" + "text": "President Bernardo ARÉVALO de León (since 15 January 2024); Vice President Karin HERRERA (since 15 January 2024); note - the president is both chief of state and head of government" }, "head of government": { - "text": "President Alejandro GIAMMATTEI (since 14 January 2020); Vice President Cesar Guillermo CASTILLO Reyes (since 14 January 2020)" + "text": "President Bernardo ARÉVALO de León (since 15 January 2024); Vice President Karin HERRERA (since 15 January 2024)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the president" @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ "text": "president and vice president directly elected on the same ballot by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 4-year term (not eligible for consecutive terms); election last held on 25 June 2023 with a runoff on 20 August 2023 (next to be held in June 2027)" }, "election results": { - "text": "
2023: Bernardo ARÉVALO de León elected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Sandra TORRES (UNE) 21%; Bernardo ARÉVALO de León (SEMILLA) 15.6%, Manuel CONDE Orellana (VAMOS) 10.4%; Armando CASTILLO Alvarado (VIVA) 9.6%, other 43.4%; percent of vote in second round - Bernardo ARÉVALO de León 60.9%, Sandra TORRES 39.1%; note - ARÉVALO is scheduled to take office 14 January 2024

2019: Alejandro GIAMMATTEI elected president; percent of vote in first round - Sandra TORRES (UNE) 25.5%, Alejandro GIAMMATTEI (VAMOS) 14%, Edmond MULET (PHG) 11.2%, Thelma CABRERA (MLP) 10.4%, Roberto ARZU (PAN-PODEMOS) 6.1%, other 32.8%; percent of vote in second round - Alejandro GIAMMATTEI 58%, Sandra TORRES 42%" + "text": "
2023: Bernardo ARÉVALO de León elected president in second round; percent of vote in first round - Sandra TORRES (UNE) 21%; Bernardo ARÉVALO de León (SEMILLA) 15.6%, Manuel CONDE Orellana (VAMOS) 10.4%; Armando CASTILLO Alvarado (VIVA) 9.6%, other 43.4%; percent of vote in second round - Bernardo ARÉVALO de León 60.9%, Sandra TORRES 39.1%

2019: Alejandro GIAMMATTEI elected president; percent of vote in first round - Sandra TORRES (UNE) 25.5%, Alejandro GIAMMATTEI (VAMOS) 14%, Edmond MULET (PHG) 11.2%, Thelma CABRERA (MLP) 10.4%, Roberto ARZU (PAN-PODEMOS) 6.1%, other 32.8%; percent of vote in second round - Alejandro GIAMMATTEI 58%, Sandra TORRES 42%" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "2,319,643 (2021 est.)" + "text": "1,917,670 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "13 (2021 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json index b3606659..13bdd8af 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json @@ -546,17 +546,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "4,521 (2012)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "agriculture": { - "text": "1.4%" - }, - "industry": { - "text": "12.7%" - }, - "services": { - "text": "85.9% (2017 est.)" - } - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2017": { "text": "5.6% (2017 est.)" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json index 0cb800d3..48f8b8bf 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nn.json @@ -365,10 +365,10 @@ "text": "unicameral Parliament of Sint Maarten (15 seats; members directly elected by proportional representation vote to serve 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "last held 9 January 2020 (next to be held on 11 January 2024)" + "text": "last held 11 January 2024 (next to be held in 2028)" }, "election results": { - "text": "percent of vote by party - NA 35.2%, UP 24.2%, US Party 13.2%, PFP 10.6%, UD 8.7%, other 8.1%; seats by party - NA 6, UP 4, PFP 2, US Party 2, UD 1" + "text": "percent of vote by party - NA 23.9%, UPP 19.6%, URSM 13.9%, DP 13.6%, PFP 11.9%, NOW 10.3%, other 6.8%; seats by party - NA 4, UPP 3, URSM 2, DP 2, PFP2, NOW 2" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "National Alliance or NA [Silveria JACOBS]
Party for Progress or PFP [Melissa GUMBS]
Sint Maarten Christian Party or SMCP [Garcia ARRINDELL]
United Democrats Party or UD [Sarah WESCOT-WILLIAMS]
United People's Party or UP [Theodore HEYLIGER]
United Sint Maarten Party or US Party [Frans RICHARDSON]" + "text": "Democratic Party or DP [Sarah WESCOT-WILLIAMS]
National Alliance or NA [Silveria JACOBS]
National Opportunity Wealth or NOW [Christophe EMMANUEL]
Party for Progress or PFP [Melissa GUMBS]
Sint Maarten Christian Party or SMCP [Garcia ARRINDELL]
Unified Resilient St Maarten Movement or URSM [Luc MERCELINA]
United People's Party or UPP [Rolando BRISON]
United Sint Maarten Party or US Party [Frans RICHARDSON]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "

Caricom (observer), ILO, Interpol, UNESCO (associate), UPU, WMO

" @@ -475,17 +475,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "23,200 (2008 est.)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "agriculture": { - "text": "1.1%" - }, - "industry": { - "text": "15.2%" - }, - "services": { - "text": "83.7% (2008 est.)" - } - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2012": { "text": "12% (2012 est.)" @@ -635,10 +624,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Sint Maarten does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Sint Maarten was downgraded to Tier 3; officials took some steps to address trafficking, including investigating a potential trafficking case; however, the government did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers nor identify any victims for the second consecutive year; Sint Maarten was not equipped to provide services to trafficking victims due to its lack of shelters, funding, and formal arrangements with service providers; the government did not update its national action plan, which expired in 2018, and interagency coordination was severely lacking; officials consistently conflated human trafficking with migrant smuggling (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Sint Maarten does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Sint Maarten remained on Tier 3; officials took some steps to address trafficking, including passing a National Action Plan and upholding three trafficking convictions; however, the government did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers nor identifying any victims for the third consecutive year; Sint Maarten could not provide services to trafficking victims due to its lack of shelters, funding, and formal arrangements with service providers; interagency coordination was severely lacking; officials consistently conflated human trafficking with migrant smuggling (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Sint Maarten; some brothel and dance club owners exploit women and girls from Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Russia in sex trafficking; women from Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela are especially vulnerable to sex trafficking in Sint Maarten; government officials report a significant number of migrant workers are vulnerable to coercive schemes in domestic service, construction, Chinese national-owned markets, retail shops, food service, landscaping, and housekeeping; criminals, including smugglers, subject migrants—specifically Cuban and Brazilian nationals—who transit Sint Maarten en route to the United States and Canada to forced labor or sex trafficking; traffickers may exploit, under false pretenses, Colombian and Venezuelan women traveling to the islands in forced labor or sex trafficking (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit foreign victims and, to a lesser extent, domestic victims in Sint Maarten; women and girls from Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Russia are vulnerable to sex trafficking; women from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela are especially vulnerable to sex trafficking in Sint Maarten; government officials report a significant number of migrant workers are vulnerable to forced labor in domestic service and housekeeping, construction, Chinese national-owned markets, retail shops, food service, and landscaping; criminals, including smugglers, may exploit migrants who transit Sint Maarten en route to the US and Canada—especially Brazilian and  Cuban nationals—to forced labor or sex trafficking (2023)" } } } diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json index e3399247..50b8c116 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/nu.json @@ -1176,10 +1176,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Nicaragua does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government took some steps to address trafficking, prosecuting eight alleged traffickers and convicting four sex traffickers; however, the government continued to downplay the severity of the trafficking problem, denying that traffickers exploited Nicaraguans in foreign countries; officials did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees, despite endemic corruption and widespread official complicity; the government did not cooperate with NGOs and civil society in a national anti-trafficking coalition seeking to identify and provide services to victims (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Nicaragua does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Nicaragua remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including passing a new National Action Plan; however, the government continued to minimize the severity of the trafficking problem, did not have shelters, and did not allocate funding for victim services; authorities made negligible efforts to address labor trafficking—which remained a serious concern—and victim identification efforts remained inadequate; officials did not convict any traffickers and did not support Nicaraguan trafficking victims identified in foreign countries; the government did not cooperate with civil society to fund their work or refer victims to them for support (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Nicaragua and Nicaraguans abroad; women, children, and migrants are most at risk; women and children are subject to sex trafficking within the country and its two Caribbean autonomous regions, as well as in other Central American countries, Mexico, Spain, and the United States; traffickers used social media to recruit victims with promises of higher-paying jobs in restaurants, hotels, domestic service, construction, and security outside of Nicaragua where they are subjected to sex or labor trafficking; traffickers force children to participate in illegal drug production and trafficking, while others are forced to work in artisanal mines and quarries; children and persons with disabilities are subjected to forced begging; Nicaragua is a destination for child sex tourists from the United States, Canada, and Western Europe (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Nicaragua, as well as Nicaraguans abroad; women, children, and migrants in Nicaragua are most at risk; women and children are subject to sex trafficking within the country and in other Central American countries, Mexico, Spain, and the United States; victims’ families are often complicit; Nicaraguans who migrate or are forcibly displaced to other Central American countries and Europe risk sex and labor trafficking, both in transit and after reaching their destinations; traffickers use social media and other means to recruit victims with promises of higher-paying jobs in restaurants, hotels, domestic service, construction, and security outside of Nicaragua where they are subjected to sex or labor trafficking; victims often are recruited from rural areas or border regions, and children whose parents leave to work abroad often are exploited in sex and labor trafficking; Nicaraguan women and children are subjected to sex and labor trafficking in the two Caribbean autonomous regions, where the lack of strong law enforcement, rampant poverty, high crime rates, and the impacts of past natural disasters increase the vulnerability of the local population; traffickers force children to participate in illegal drug production and trafficking, while others are forced to work in artisanal mines and quarries; children and persons with disabilities are subjected to forced begging; Cuban nationals working in Nicaragua may have been forced to work by the Cuban government; Nicaragua is a destination for child sex tourists from the United States, Canada, and Western Europe (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json index 81c318bf..6f65149b 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/rn.json @@ -412,9 +412,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "17,300 (2008 est.)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "text": "85 directly or indirectly employed in tourist industry" - }, "Exports - partners": { "text": "United States 35%, Netherlands 26%, Antigua and Barbuda 21%, France 10% (2019)" }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json index d5fcfca6..fe9d19f0 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/uc.json @@ -793,10 +793,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Curacao does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Curacao was downgraded to Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including providing pre-trial support to three victims participating in legal proceedings against traffickers, awarding restitution to two victims, and extending the national action plan that expired in December 2021; however, authorities did not convict any traffickers or identify any victims, and continued to condition assistance to foreign victims on their cooperation with law enforcement in cases against traffickers; officials conflated trafficking with migrant smuggling, and the lack of funding remained a primary obstacle to anti-trafficking efforts; limited judiciary familiarity with trafficking contributed to frequent acquittals in trafficking cases (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Curacao does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Curacao remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including providing shelter and services to two victims, prosecuting two alleged traffickers, and adopting and funding a National Action Plan (NAP) to improve law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking; however, the new NAP did not include provisions to protect victims or prevent crime; the courts did not convict any traffickers, and the government continued to condition foreign victim assistance on cooperation in cases against traffickers; lack of funding remained a primary obstacle to anti-trafficking efforts; officials demonstrated limited familiarity with human trafficking and conflated it with migrant smuggling, hindering effective prosecution, prevention, and protection efforts; government coordination with civil society organizations and internally, across agencies, was inadequate (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Curacao; undocumented migrants, especially the substantial population of Venezuelans, are vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking; traffickers exploit women and girls, particularly from Curacao, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, in sex trafficking; migrants from other Caribbean countries, South America, China, and India are subject to forced labor in construction, domestic servitude, landscaping, minimarkets, retail, and restaurants (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Curacao; undocumented migrants, especially the substantial population of Venezuelans, are vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking; traffickers exploit women and girls, particularly from Curacao, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, among other countries, in sex trafficking; migrants from other Caribbean countries, South America, China, and India are subject to forced labor in domestic servitude, as well as in construction, landscaping, minimarkets, retail, and restaurants (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/central-asia/rs.json b/central-asia/rs.json index f03c8cde..c9d6c7f5 100644 --- a/central-asia/rs.json +++ b/central-asia/rs.json @@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "24 million (2021 est.)" + "text": "23,864,124 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "16 (2021 est.)" @@ -1351,10 +1351,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Russia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, is not making significant efforts to do, and remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking by prosecuting and convicting more traffickers, extending work and residence permits for foreign workers in response to the pandemic, and facilitating the return of Russian children from Iraq and Syria; however, there was a government policy or pattern of trafficking, including forced labor of North Korean workers; officials did not identify any trafficking victims and efforts to prosecute and convict traffickers remained weak; authorities penalized potential victims and prosecuted sex trafficking victims for crimes without screening for signs of trafficking; the government offered no funding or programs to provide services for trafficking victims and took steps to limit or ban such action by civil society groups; no national anti-trafficking strategy has been drafted, and government agencies have not been assigned roles or responsibilities; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created significant risks of trafficking for the millions of refugees fleeing Ukraine (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Russia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Russia remained on Tier 3; despite the lack of significant efforts, the government facilitated the return of Russian children from Syria, some of whom may have been trafficking victims; however, there was a government policy or pattern of trafficking of Ukrainian citizens and North Korean workers; officials reportedly forced, deceived, or coerced foreign national adults to fight in Russia’s was against Ukraine or subjected some to forced labor in detention; the government continued to perpetuate North Korea’s imposition of forced labor on North Korean worker and circumvented UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting North Korean overseas labor; officials did not identify any trafficking victims, and efforts to prosecute and convict traffickers decreased; the government offered no funding or programs to provide services for trafficking victims and routinely penalized victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; officials did not draft a national strategy or assign roles and responsibilities within the government to combat human trafficking; the governments forced transfer of thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia—including separating some children from parental figures—greatly increased their vulnerability to trafficking; Russia’s war against Ukraine has created millions of refugees fleeing Ukraine and internally displaced persons who are highly vulnerable to trafficking (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Russia, and Russians abroad; although labor trafficking is the predominant problem, sex trafficking also occurs; victims from Russia and other countries in Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, China, and North Korea are subjected to forced labor in Russia’s construction, manufacturing, agriculture, maritime, grocery and retail store, restaurant, and domestic services industries, as well as forced begging and drug manufacturing and trafficking; the government increased the use of convict labor to offset a shortage of labor migrants; Russian women and children were reported to be victims of sex trafficking in Russia, Northeast Asia, Europe, Central Asia, Africa, the United States, and the Middle East; Russian-led forces in Syria reportedly recruit Syrian children to fight in Libya, and Russian-led forces in Ukraine reportedly forcibly conscript adults to fight against their country and recruit children for fighting or support roles in eastern Ukraine; Ukrainians forcibly displaced to Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, and Ukrainians in Russian-controlled eastern Ukraine, are highly vulnerable to trafficking (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Russia, and Russians abroad; although labor trafficking is the predominant problem, sex trafficking also occurs; victims from Russia and other countries in Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, China, and North Korea are subjected to forced labor in Russia’s construction, manufacturing, textile, agriculture, farming, maritime, grocery and retail store, restaurant, and domestic services industries, among many other tasks; traffickers also exploit victims in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, facilitation of illegal migration, and production of counterfeit goods; undocumented migrants and refugees reportedly face particularly high risk of trafficking; the government increased the use of convict labor to offset a shortage of labor migrants; women and children from Europe (predominantly Ukraine and Moldova), Southeast Asia (primarily China and the Philippines), Africa (particularly Nigeria), and Central Asia are victims of sex trafficking in Russia; Russian women and children reportedly are victims of sex trafficking in Russia and abroad, including Northeast Asia, Europe, Central Asia, Africa, the US, and the Middle East; some corrupt officials facilitate victims’ entry into Russia, protect traffickers, and in some cases engage directly in trafficking crimes; observers note a growing use of non-labor visas to bring North Korean workers to Russia, where the North Korean government subjects many of these citizens to forced labor conditions; Russian-led forces in Ukraine reportedly forcibly conscript adults to fight against their country and recruit children for fighting or support roles in eastern Ukraine; Ukrainians forcibly displaced to Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, and Ukrainians in Russian-controlled eastern Ukraine, are highly vulnerable to forced labor; widespread reports indicate Russian authorities transported without consent Ukrainian orphans and foster children to Russia and gave them to Russian families; the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group reportedly recruited and used children in the Central African Republic, and Russian-led forces reportedly recruit Syrian child soldiers to guard installations and fight in Libya (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/central-asia/tx.json b/central-asia/tx.json index 990a25a3..3c8d7b94 100644 --- a/central-asia/tx.json +++ b/central-asia/tx.json @@ -1195,10 +1195,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Turkmenistan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore, Turkmenistan remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including participating in anti-trafficking awareness campaigns; however, there was a government policy or pattern of forced labor, including mobilization of adults and children for forced labor in annual harvest, public works, and other sectors; officials denied access to independent monitors seeking to observe the cotton harvest; the government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions, nor hold any officials accountable for complicity in forced labor crimes; authorities did not identify victims nor fund victim assistance programs (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Turkmenistan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Turkmenistan remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including granting access to an international organization to monitor the cotton harvest, providing support for anti-trafficking campaigns, and training officials in collaboration with international organizations; however, there was a government policy or pattern of forced labor, including mobilization of adults for forced labor in the annual cotton harvest, public works, and other sectors; the government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions, nor hold any officials accountable for complicity in forced labor crimes; authorities did not identify victims nor fund victim assistance programs (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic victims in Turkmenistan, and Turkmen men and women are exploited abroad; state policies continue to perpetuate government-compelled forced labor in the cotton sector, as well as in public works and community cleaning and beautification projects; officials reportedly force the homeless into agricultural work or domestic servitude in the homes of law enforcement families; children are reportedly forced to work in cotton and potato fields during summer educational camps; residents of rural areas are at highest risk for trafficking both in country and abroad; LGBTQI+ communities are vulnerable to police abuse, extortion, and coercion, as well as sex trafficking or forced labor; Turkmen men and women are subjected to forced labor after migrating abroad; some migrant men are forced into criminal drug trafficking, and some migrant women are exploited by sex traffickers; most Turkmen migrant victims are in Turkey, Russia, and India, as well as other countries in the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and Europe (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit Turkmen citizens in Turkmenistan and abroad; state policies continue to perpetuate government-compelled forced labor in the cotton sector, as well as in public works and community cleaning and beautification projects; police reportedly force the homeless into agricultural work or domestic servitude in the homes of law enforcement families; some children are reportedly forced to work in cotton and potato fields during summer educational camps; residents of rural areas are at highest risk for trafficking both in country and abroad; LGBTQI+ communities are vulnerable to police abuse, extortion, coercion, and possibly sex trafficking or forced labor; Turkmen men and women are subjected to forced labor abroad in textile, agricultural, construction, and domestic service sectors; some migrant men are forced into criminal drug trafficking, and some migrant women are exploited by sex traffickers; most Turkmen migrant victims are in Turkey, Russia, and India, as well as other countries in the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and Europe (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json index 0dbb9d5d..f7fba0c2 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bm.json @@ -581,13 +581,13 @@ "text": "Prime Minister, State Administration Council Chair, Sr. Gen. MIN AUNG HLAING (since 1 August 2021)" }, "cabinet": { - "text": "Cabinet appointments shared by the president and the commander-in-chief; note - after 1 February, the military junta replaced the Cabinet" + "text": "Cabinet appointments shared by the president and the commander-in-chief; note - after 1 February 2021, the military junta replaced the Cabinet" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "prior to the military takeover, president was indirectly elected by simple majority vote by the full Assembly of the Union from among 3 vice-presidential candidates nominated by the Presidential Electoral College (consists of members of the lower and upper houses and military members); the other 2 candidates become vice presidents (president elected for a 5-year term); election last held on 28 March 2018; the military junta pledged to hold new elections, but has repeatedly announced delays" + "text": "prior to the military takeover, president was indirectly elected by simple majority vote by the full Assembly of the Union from among 3 vice-presidential candidates nominated by the Presidential Electoral College (consists of members of the lower and upper houses and military members); the other 2 candidates become vice presidents (president elected for a 5-year term); general election last held on 8 November 2020; the military junta has pledged to hold new general elections, but has repeatedly announced delays" }, "election results": { - "text": "
2018: WIN MYINT elected president in an indirect by-election held on 28 March 2018 after the resignation of HTIN KYAW; Assembly of the Union vote - WIN MYINT (NLD) 403, MYINT SWE (USDP) 211, HENRY VAN THIO (NLD) 18, 4 votes canceled (636 votes cast); note - WIN MYINT and other key leaders of the ruling NLD party were placed under arrest following the military takeover on 1 February 2021

2016: Assembly of the Union vote - HTIN KYAW elected president; HTIN KYAW (NLD) 360, MYINT SWE (USDP) 213, HENRY VAN THIO (NLD) 79 (652 votes cast)" + "text": "2020: the NLD won a majority of seats and votes, taking 86 percent of the seats in the Assembly of the Union (235 in the House of Representatives and 135 in the House of Nationalities), which was more than the 67 percent supermajority needed to ensure that its preferred candidates would be elected president and second vice president in the Presidential Electoral College; however, on 1 February 2021 the military claimed the results of the election were illegitimate and launched a coup d'état that deposed State Counsellor AUNG SAN SUU KYI and President WIN MYINT of the NLD, causing military-affiliated Vice President MYINT SWE (USDP) to become Acting President; MYINT SWE subsequently handed power to coup leader MIN AUNG HLAING; WIN MYINT and other key leaders of the ruling NLD party were placed under arrest following the military takeover

2018: WIN MYINT elected president in an indirect by-election held on 28 March 2018 after the resignation of HTIN KYAW; Assembly of the Union vote for president - WIN MYINT (NLD) 403, MYINT SWE (USDP) 211, HENRY VAN THIO (NLD) 18, 4 votes canceled (636 votes cast)" }, "state counsellor": { "text": "State Counselor AUNG SAN SUU KYI (since 6 April 2016); note - under arrest since 1 February 2021; formerly served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for the Office of the President" @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "dissolved 1 February 2021; previously bicameral Assembly of the Union or Pyidaungsu consists of:
House of Nationalities or Amyotha Hluttaw, (224 seats; 168 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote with a second round if needed and 56 appointed by the military; members serve 5-year terms)
House of Representatives or Pyithu Hluttaw, (440 seats, currently 433; 330 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 110 appointed by the military; members serve 5-year terms); note - on 1 February 2021, the military dissolved the Assembly of the Union and was replaced by the State Administration Council" + "text": "dissolved 1 February 2021 by the coup led by Sr. General MIN AUNG HLAING; previously bicameral Assembly of the Union or Pyidaungsu consists of:
House of Nationalities or Amyotha Hluttaw, (224 seats; 168 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote with a second round if needed and 56 appointed by the military; members serve 5-year terms)
House of Representatives or Pyithu Hluttaw, (440 seats, currently 433; 330 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 110 appointed by the military; members serve 5-year terms); note - on 1 February 2021, the military dissolved the Assembly of the Union and was replaced by the State Administration Council" }, "elections": { "text": "House of Nationalities - last held on 8 November 2020 
House of Representatives - last held on 8 November 2020; note - the military junta overturned the results of the 8 November legislative elections" @@ -1211,6 +1211,9 @@ "note": "note 1: under the 2008 constitution, the Tatmadaw controls appointments of senior officials to lead the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Border Affairs, and the Ministry of Home Affairs; in March 2022, a new law gave the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw the authority to appoint or remove the head of the police force

note 2: the Burma Police Force is primarily responsible for internal security; the Border Guard Police is administratively part of the Burma Police Force but operationally distinct; both are under the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is led by an active-duty military general and itself subordinate to the military command" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2023": { + "text": "3.4% of GDP (2023 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2022": { "text": "3% of GDP (2022 est.)" }, @@ -1222,9 +1225,6 @@ }, "Military Expenditures 2019": { "text": "4.1% of GDP (2019 est.)" - }, - "Military Expenditures 2018": { - "text": "4.4% of GDP (2018 est.)" } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { @@ -1254,10 +1254,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Burma does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Burma remained on Tier 3; the military continued the use of children and adults for forced labor; the regime did not prosecute any military or deposed government officials for the forced labor, and it prevented civil society organizations from assisting trafficking victims; displacement resulting from military conflict, exacerbated by the February 2021 military coup that deposed the democratically elected government, made Rohingya and other ethnic groups more vulnerable to human trafficking (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Burma does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Burma remained on Tier 3; the regime reported investigating and convicting more traffickers, sentencing some to imprisonment, and conducting an awareness-raising event; the 2022 anti-trafficking law was enacted, criminalizing all forms of labor and sex trafficking; however, the regime did not identify or screen for any victims and, as a result, penalized victims for unlawful acts committed as a result of being trafficked; the military continued the use of children and adults for forced labor; the regime did not prosecute any military or deposed government officials despite continued reports of complicity in trafficking, and it prevented civil society organizations from assisting victims; displacement resulting from military conflict, exacerbated by the February 2021 military coup that deposed the democratically elected government, made Rohingya and other ethnic groups more vulnerable to human trafficking; efforts to combat trafficking continued to decline dramatically since the coup as the military regime shifted its focus from serving justice to persecuting pro-democracy opposition (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit men, women, and children through forced labor, and women and children in sex trafficking in Burma and abroad; Burmese men are forced to work domestically and abroad in fishing, manufacturing, forestry, agriculture, and construction; fishermen are lured into forced labor in remote waters and offshore by recruitment agencies in Burma and Southeast Asia; Burmese women increasingly are lured to China for marriage under false pretenses and are subjected to sex trafficking, forced concubinism and childbearing, and forced domestic labor; men, women, and children in ethnic minority areas are at increased risk of sex trafficking and forced labor in farming, manufacturing, and construction; men and boys are recruited locally by traffickers for forced labor in oil palm and rubber plantations, in mining, fishing, and bamboo, teak, and rice harvesting; some military personnel, civilian brokers, border guard officials, and ethnic armed groups continue to recruit child soldiers, particularly in conflict areas; discriminatory laws and hiring practices put LGBTQI+ individuals at higher risk for trafficking (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Burma, as well as Burmese victims abroad; Burmese men are forced to work domestically and abroad in fishing, manufacturing, forestry, agriculture, and construction; fishermen are lured into forced labor by recruitment agencies in Burma and Southeast Asia; Burmese women are lured to China for marriage under false pretenses and are subjected to sex trafficking, forced concubinism and childbearing, and forced domestic labor; men, women, and children in ethnic minority areas are at increased risk of sex trafficking and forced labor in farming, manufacturing, and construction; men and boys are recruited locally by traffickers for forced labor in oil palm and rubber plantations, mining, fishing, and bamboo, teak, and rice harvesting; some military personnel, civilian brokers, border guard officials, and ethnic armed groups continue to recruit child soldiers, particularly in conflict areas; men, women, and children are at risk of forced labor and sex trafficking along Burma’s borders with China and Thailand; discriminatory laws and hiring practices put LGBTQI+ individuals at higher risk for trafficking; Burmese women are subjected to forced domestic labor, including in the UAE; foreign traffickers, including Chinese nationals, reportedly are fraudulently recruiting men and women from South and Southeast Asia, as well as Brazil, Kenya, Uganda, and Uzbekistan, for forced labor in cyber scam operations along the border with Thailand (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json index ee4c6bad..44db59da 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/cb.json @@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ "note": "note: in December 2021, the US Government halted arms-related trade with Cambodia, citing deepening Chinese military influence, corruption, and human rights abuses by the government and armed forces; the policy of denial applied to licenses or other approvals for exports and imports of defense articles and defense services destined for or originating in Cambodia, with exceptions (on a case-by-case basis) related to conventional weapons destruction and humanitarian demining activities" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service (conscription only selectively enforced since 1993; service is for 18 months); women may volunteer (2023)", + "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service (conscription only selectively enforced since 1993; service is for 18 months); women may volunteer (2024)", "note": "note: as of 2018, women made up an estimated 6% of the active-duty military" }, "Military deployments": { @@ -1232,10 +1232,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Cambodia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Cambodia was downgraded to Tier 3; authorities took some steps to address trafficking, including continuing to arrest, prosecute and convict some traffickers, and identifying and assisting some victims; however, corruption continued to impede law enforcement efforts, legal actions, and provision of services to victims; authorities did not investigate or take legal action against any officials involved in the large majority of credible reports of complicity; officials failed to proactively identify victims among the highly vulnerable groups of men, women, and children subjected to human trafficking throughout the country; authorities did not provide adequate protection for victims domestically or overseas and relied heavily on foreign donors and NGOs to provide care (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Cambodia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Cambodia remained on Tier 3; authorities took some steps to address trafficking, including continuing to investigate, prosecute and convict more traffickers, creating a special working group to investigate reports of large-scale cyber scam operations involving possible forced labor, and identifying and assisting more victims; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking, including by senior officials, remained widespread, leading to selective and politically motivated enforcement of laws while inhibiting law enforcement efforts; authorities did not investigate or hold accountable any officials involved in the large number of credible reports of complicity; officials did not effectively address forced labor in cyber scam operations nor equitably screen or assist foreign workers removed from cyber scam operations; the government inappropriately penalized victims for crimes committed as a result of being trafficked, including holding victims until they paid bribes to police for release or were repatriated by their home country (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit Cambodian men, women, and children in forced labor and sex trafficking in Cambodia and abroad, and foreign nationals are trafficked in Cambodia; Cambodian adults and children migrate to other countries in the region or increasingly to the Middle East where traffickers force them to work in agriculture, fishing, construction, manufacturing, and domestic servitude; significant numbers of Cambodian men and boys are subject to forced labor on Thai ships in international waters and may experience physical abuse, nonpayment or underpayment of wages, and confinement at sea; brick kiln owners exploit thousands of Cambodians, including children, through debt-based coercion; children from poor families are vulnerable to forced labor, often with the complicity of their parents, in domestic servitude, forced begging, or street vending in Thailand and Vietnam; traffickers recruit Cambodian women and girls from rural areas under false pretenses, or sometimes through complicit parents, to travel to the PRC to marry PRC-national men where they are subject to sex trafficking or forced labor; Cambodian and ethnic Vietnamese women and girls from rural areas move to cities and tourist areas where they are sex trafficked (2022)" + "text": "

human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cambodia, as well as Cambodian victims abroad; Cambodian adults and children migrate to other countries in the region or increasingly to the Middle East where traffickers force them to work in agriculture, fishing, construction, manufacturing, and domestic servitude or exploit them in sex trafficking; significant numbers of Cambodian men and boys are subject to forced labor on Thai ships in international waters and may experience physical abuse, nonpayment or underpayment of wages, and confinement at sea; brick kiln owners exploit thousands of Cambodians, including children, through debt-based coercion; children from poor families are vulnerable to forced labor, often with the complicity of their parents, in domestic servitude, forced begging, or street vending in Thailand and Vietnam; traffickers recruit Cambodian women and girls from rural areas under false pretenses, or sometimes through complicit parents, to travel to China to marry Chinese-national men where they are subject to sex trafficking or forced labor; Cambodian and ethnic Vietnamese women and girls who move from rural areas to cities and tourist areas are subjected to sex trafficking; media reports indicate Chinese national-organized crime syndicates fraudulently recruit men, women, and children from Cambodia and other countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North and South America and force them into online gambling, internet, cryptocurrency, and telephone scams, primarily in large commercial compounds in Cambodia (2023)

" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json index 40a1d2a5..ef98ddb4 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ch.json @@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "People's Liberation Army (PLA): Ground Forces, Navy (PLAN, includes naval aviation), Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC), Air Force (PLAAF, includes airborne forces), Rocket Force (strategic missile force), and Strategic Support Force (information, electronic, and cyber warfare, as well as space forces); People's Armed Police (PAP, includes Coast Guard, Border Defense Force, Internal Security Forces); PLA Reserve Force (2023)", + "text": "People's Liberation Army (PLA): Ground Forces, Navy (PLAN, includes naval aviation), Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC), Air Force (PLAAF, includes airborne forces), Rocket Force (strategic missile force), and Strategic Support Force (information, electronic, and cyber warfare, as well as space forces); People's Armed Police (PAP, includes Coast Guard, Border Defense Force, Internal Security Forces); PLA Reserve Force (2024)", "note": "note 1: the Strategic Support Force includes the Space Systems Department, which is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking, and control, and space warfare

note 2: the PAP is a paramilitary police component of China’s armed forces that is under the dual authority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Central Military Commission and charged with internal security, law enforcement, counterterrorism, and maritime rights protection

note 3: in 2018, the Coast Guard was moved from the State Oceanic Administration to the PAP; in 2013, China merged four of its five major maritime law enforcement agencies – the China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Maritime Police, Fishery Law Enforcement (FLE), and Anti-Smuggling Police – into a unified coast guard" }, "Military expenditures": { @@ -1296,18 +1296,18 @@ "text": "approximately 2 million active-duty troops (approximately 1 million Ground; 250,000 Navy/Marines; 350-400,000 Air Force; 120,000 Rocket Forces; 150-175,000 Strategic Support Forces); estimated 600-650,000 People’s Armed Police (2023)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the PLA has a mix of some older and an increasing amount of modern, largely domestically produced systems heavily influenced by technology derived from other countries; Russia has been the top supplier of foreign military equipment in recent years; China has one of the world's largest defense-industrial sectors and is capable of producing advanced weapons systems across all military domains (2023)", + "text": "the PLA has a mix of some older and an increasing amount of modern, largely domestically produced systems heavily influenced by technology derived from other countries; Russia has been the top supplier of foreign military equipment in recent years; China has one of the world's largest defense-industrial sectors and is capable of producing advanced weapons systems across all military domains (2024)", "note": "note: the PLA is in the midst of a decades-long modernization effort; in 2017, President XI set three developmental goals for the force - becoming a mechanized force with increased information and strategic capabilities by 2020, a fully modernized force by 2035, and a world-class military by mid-century" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18-22 years of age for men for selective compulsory military service, with a 2-year service obligation; women 18-19 years of age who are high school graduates and meet requirements for specific military jobs are subject to conscription (2023)", + "text": "18-22 years of age for men for selective compulsory military service, with a 2-year service obligation; women 18-19 years of age who are high school graduates and meet requirements for specific military jobs are subject to conscription (2024)", "note": "note: the PLA’s conscription system functions as a levy; the PLA establishes the number of enlistees needed, which produces quotas for the provinces; each province provides a set number of soldiers or sailors; if the number of volunteers fails to meet quotas, the local governments may compel individuals to enter military service" }, "Military deployments": { "text": "225 Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); 420 Lebanon (UNIFIL); 1,050 South Sudan (UNMISS); 150 Sudan/South Sudan (UNISFA); up to 2,000 Djibouti (2023)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "established in 1927, the PLA is the military arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission; the Central Military Commission is China’s top military decision making body

the PLA is the World’s largest military; its primary responsibility is external security but it also has some domestic security duties; China’s stated defense policy includes safeguarding sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasizing a greater global role for the PLA; the PLA conducts air, counterspace, cyber, electronic warfare, joint, land, maritime, missile, nuclear, and space operations; it is a professional force that trains regularly, including multinational and multiservice exercises, deploys overseas, and participates in international peacekeeping missions 

the majority of the Ground Forces are organized into 13 group armies with approximately 80 subordinate combined arms brigades--some of which are amphibious units--that serve as the primary ground maneuver forces; each group army also controls artillery, air defense, aviation/air assault, special operations, engineer, and logistics brigades; there are also a several independent mechanized and motorized infantry divisions 

the Navy is numerically the largest in the World with an overall battle force of some 380 ships and submarines, including 2 aircraft carriers (with a third in trials), 8 cruisers, more than 80 destroyers and frigates, and approximately 60 submarines; it also has a large naval aviation force, as well as a growing Marine Corps comprised of 6 amphibious brigades supplemented by aviation and special operations forces
 
the combined aviation forces of the Air Force and Navy are the largest in the region and third largest in the World with nearly 3,000 total aircraft, of which more than 2,200 are combat aircraft, including fighter, bomber, ground attack, and multipurpose fighter aircraft; the Air Force also has an airborne/rapid reaction corps with a mix of airborne, air assault, special operations, and aviation brigades; the PLA's ground-based air defense forces operate surface-to-air missiles, air defense artillery, jammers, and a variety of sensors; the PLA Rocket Force manages the PRC’s land-based conventional and nuclear missile units

the PRC's internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the militia; the PLA support the internal security forces as necessary:

--the MPS controls the civilian national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order; its primary mission is domestic law enforcement and maintaining order, including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism

--the MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service

--the PAP is a paramilitary component (or adjunct) of the PLA; its primary missions include internal security, maintaining public order, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war; it is under the command of the Central Military Commission; the China Coast Guard (CCG) administratively falls under the PAP; the CCG has a variety of missions, such as maritime sovereignty enforcement, surveillance, resource protection, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement; it is the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world with approximately 150 large patrol craft

--the militia is an armed reserve of civilians which serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA upon mobilization, although it is distinct from the PLA’s reserve forces; militia units are organized around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission; they have dual civilian-military command structures; a key component of the militia are the local maritime forces, commonly referred to as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM); the PAFMM consists of mariners (and their vessels) who receive training, equipment, and other forms of support from the Navy and CCG (although the PAFMM remains separate from both) to perform tasks such as maritime patrolling, surveillance and reconnaissance, emergency/disaster response, transportation, search and rescue, and auxiliary tasks in support of naval operations in wartime; the PAFMM’s tasks are often conducted in conjunction or coordination with the Navy and the CCG; it has been used to assert Beijing's maritime claims in the Sea of Japan and South China Sea (2023)" + "text": "established in 1927, the PLA is the military arm of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which oversees the PLA through its Central Military Commission; the Central Military Commission is China’s top military decision making body

the PLA is the World’s largest military; its primary responsibility is external security but it also has some domestic security duties; China’s stated defense policy includes safeguarding sovereignty, security, and development interests while emphasizing a greater global role for the PLA; the PLA conducts air, counterspace, cyber, electronic warfare, joint, land, maritime, missile, nuclear, and space operations; it is a professional force that trains regularly, including multinational and multiservice exercises, deploys overseas, and participates in international peacekeeping missions 

the majority of the Ground Forces are organized into 13 group armies with approximately 80 subordinate combined arms brigades--some of which are amphibious units--that serve as the primary ground maneuver forces; each group army also controls artillery, air defense, aviation/air assault, special operations, engineer, and logistics brigades; there are also a several independent mechanized and motorized infantry divisions 

the Navy is numerically the largest in the World with an overall battle force of some 380 ships and submarines, including 2 aircraft carriers (with a third in trials), 8 cruisers, more than 80 destroyers and frigates, and approximately 60 submarines; it also has a large naval aviation force, as well as a growing Marine Corps comprised of 6 amphibious brigades supplemented by aviation and special operations forces
 
the combined aviation forces of the Air Force and Navy are the largest in the region and third largest in the World with nearly 3,000 total aircraft, of which more than 2,200 are combat aircraft, including fighter, bomber, ground attack, and multipurpose fighter aircraft; the Air Force also has an airborne/rapid reaction corps with a mix of airborne, air assault, special operations, and aviation brigades; the PLA's ground-based air defense forces operate surface-to-air missiles, air defense artillery, jammers, and a variety of sensors; the PLA Rocket Force manages the PRC’s land-based conventional and nuclear missile units

the PRC's internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the militia; the PLA support the internal security forces as necessary:

--the MPS controls the civilian national police, which serves as the first-line force for public order; its primary mission is domestic law enforcement and maintaining order, including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism

--the MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service

--the PAP is a paramilitary component (or adjunct) of the PLA; its primary missions include internal security, maintaining public order, maritime security, and assisting the PLA in times of war; it is under the command of the Central Military Commission; the China Coast Guard (CCG) administratively falls under the PAP; the CCG has a variety of missions, such as maritime sovereignty enforcement, surveillance, resource protection, anti-smuggling, and general law enforcement; it is the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world with approximately 150 large patrol craft

--the militia is an armed reserve of civilians which serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA upon mobilization, although it is distinct from the PLA’s reserve forces; militia units are organized around towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission; they have dual civilian-military command structures; a key component of the militia are the local maritime forces, commonly referred to as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM); the PAFMM consists of mariners (and their vessels) who receive training, equipment, and other forms of support from the Navy and CCG (although the PAFMM remains separate from both) to perform tasks such as maritime patrolling, surveillance and reconnaissance, emergency/disaster response, transportation, search and rescue, and auxiliary tasks in support of naval operations in wartime; the PAFMM’s tasks are often conducted in conjunction or coordination with the Navy and the CCG; it has been used to assert Beijing's maritime claims in the Sea of Japan and South China Sea (2024)" } }, "Space": { @@ -1336,10 +1336,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — China does not fully meet the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore China remained on Tier 3; the government initiated its first prosecution of a domestic trafficking case, approved a new national action plan for 2021-2030, and conducted some anti-trafficking training; however, there was a government policy or pattern of widespread forced labor, including continued mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other Turkic and Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; the government also implemented similar policies against other religious minorities and Tibetans in other provinces; Chinese nationals reportedly suffered forced labor in several countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe hosting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects; for the fifth consecutive year, the government did not report complete law enforcement data, nor did it identify any trafficking victims or refer them to protection services  (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — China does not fully meet the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore China remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including adopting a Women’s Rights and Interests Protection Law, cooperating with foreign law enforcement to extradite Chinese nationals suspected of human trafficking abroad, and awarding restitution to a trafficking victim; however, there was a government policy or pattern of widespread forced labor, including continued mass arbitrary detention of Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other ethnic and religious minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; the government also implemented similar policies against other religious minorities and Tibetans in other provinces; Chinese nationals reportedly suffered forced labor in countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East hosting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects; for the sixth consecutive year, the government did not report complete law enforcement data, nor did it identify any trafficking victims or refer them to protection services (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in China, as well as Chinese people abroad; Chinese men, women, and children are victims of forced labor and sex trafficking in more than 80 countries; traffickers also use China as a transit point to subject foreign individuals to trafficking in other countries throughout Asia and in international maritime industries; state-sponsored forced labor persists under the government’s mass detention and political indoctrination campaign against Muslim and Turkic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; authorities in some localities subject families of men arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang to forced labor; highly organized criminal syndicates and local gangs subject Chinese women and girls to sex trafficking within China; women and girls from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and several countries in Africa experience forced labor in domestic service, forced concubinism leading to forced childbearing, and sex trafficking via forced and fraudulent marriage to Chinese men; African and Asian men reportedly experience conditions indicative of forced labor aboard Chinese-flagged fishing vessels; many North Korean refugees and asylum-seekers living in China illegally are particularly vulnerable to trafficking, while some of the women are forced into commercial sex, forced marriage, or forced labor; North Korea exploits some of its citizens in forced labor in China as part of its proliferation finance system (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in China, as well as Chinese nationals abroad; state-sponsored forced labor persists under the government’s mass detention and political indoctrination campaign against Muslim and Turkic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; a small number of ethnic Han and members of other religious minority groups reportedly are detained in the same system; authorities in some localities subject families, and some older children, of men arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang to forced labor; traffickers target adults and children with developmental disabilities and children whose parents have left them with relatives – estimated at 6.4 million – and subject them to forced labor and begging; highly organized criminal syndicates and local gangs subject Chinese women and girls to sex trafficking within China and abroad; crime syndicates also subject Chinese and foreign victims into forced criminal activities in cyber scam operations in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos; traffickers use China as a transit point to subject foreign individuals to trafficking in other countries throughout Asia and in the international maritime industry; Chinese men, women, and children are victims of forced labor and sex trafficking in more than 80 countries; some Chinese nationals, host country nationals, and other migrants are subjected to conditions indicative of forced labor at Chinese government or Chinese national owned and operated Belt and Road Initiative or other China-affiliated construction projects, mining, and factories in African, Asian and Pacific, Caribbean, European, Latin American, and Middle Eastern countries; women and girls from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and several countries in Africa experience forced labor in domestic service, forced concubinage leading to childbearing, and sex trafficking via forced and fraudulent marriage to Chinese men; African and Asian men reportedly experience conditions indicative of forced labor aboard Chinese-flagged fishing vessels; many North Korean refugees and asylum-seekers living in China illegally are particularly vulnerable to trafficking, while some North Korean women are forced into commercial sex, forced marriage, or forced labor; North Korea exploits some of its citizens in forced labor in China as part of its system for financing weapons development programs (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json index e169228c..359c1038 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/hk.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "Introduction": { "Background": { - "text": "Seized by the UK in 1841, Hong Kong was formally ceded by China the following year at the end of the First Opium War; the Kowloon Peninsula was added in 1860 at the end of the Second Opium War, and was further extended when Britain obtained a 99-year lease of the New Territories in 1898. Pursuant to an agreement signed by China and the UK on 19 December 1984, Hong Kong became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China on 1 July 1997. In this agreement, China promised that, under its \"one country, two systems\" formula, China's socialist economic and strict political system would not be imposed on Hong Kong and that Hong Kong would enjoy a \"high degree of autonomy\" in all matters except foreign and defense affairs for the subsequent 50 years.

Since the turnover, Hong Kong has continued to enjoy success as an international financial center. However, dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong Government and growing Chinese political influence has been a central issue and led to considerable civil unrest, including large-scale pro-democracy demonstrations in 2019 after the HKSAR attempted to revise a local ordinance to allow extraditions to mainland China. In response, the governments of the HKSAR and China took several actions that reduced the city's autonomy and placed new restrictions on the rights of Hong Kong residents, moves that were widely criticized to be in direct contravention of obligations under the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Chief among these actions was a sweeping national security law for Hong Kong imposed by the Chinese Government in June 2020 that criminalized acts such as those interpreted as secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces. The law ushered in a widespread crackdown on public protests, criticism of authorities, and freedom of speech, and was used by authorities to target pro-democracy activists, organizations, and media companies. Democratic lawmakers and political figures were arrested, while others fled abroad. At the same time, dozens of civil society groups and several independent media outlets were closed or have disbanded. In March 2021, Beijing imposed a more restrictive electoral system, including restructuring the Legislative Council (LegCo) and allowing only government-approved candidates to run for office, claiming it was to ensure a system of \"patriots\" governed Hong Kong. The changes ensured that virtually all seats in the December 2021 LegCo election were won by pro-establishment candidates and effectively ended political opposition to Beijing in the territory." + "text": "Seized by the UK in 1841, Hong Kong was formally ceded by China the following year at the end of the First Opium War; the Kowloon Peninsula was added in 1860 at the end of the Second Opium War, and was further extended when Britain obtained a 99-year lease of the New Territories in 1898. Pursuant to an agreement signed by China and the UK on 19 December 1984, Hong Kong became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China on 1 July 1997. In this agreement, China promised that, under its \"one country, two systems\" formula, China's socialist economic and strict political system would not be imposed on Hong Kong and that Hong Kong would enjoy a \"high degree of autonomy\" in all matters except foreign and defense affairs for the subsequent 50 years.

Since the handover, Hong Kong has continued to enjoy success as an international financial center. However, dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong Government and growing Chinese political influence has been a central issue and led to considerable civil unrest, including large-scale pro-democracy demonstrations in 2019 after the HKSAR attempted to revise a local ordinance to allow extraditions to mainland China. In response, the governments of the HKSAR and China took several actions that reduced the city's autonomy and placed new restrictions on the rights of Hong Kong residents, moves that were widely criticized to be in direct contravention of obligations under the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Chief among these actions was a sweeping national security law for Hong Kong imposed by the Chinese Government in June 2020 that criminalized acts such as those interpreted as secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces. The law ushered in a widespread crackdown on public protests, criticism of authorities, and freedom of speech, and was used by authorities to target pro-democracy activists, organizations, and media companies. Democratic lawmakers and political figures were arrested, while others fled abroad. At the same time, dozens of civil society groups and several independent media outlets were closed or have disbanded. In March 2021, Beijing imposed a more restrictive electoral system, including restructuring the Legislative Council (LegCo) and allowing only government-approved candidates to run for office, claiming it was to ensure a system of \"patriots\" governed Hong Kong. The changes ensured that virtually all seats in the December 2021 LegCo election were won by pro-establishment candidates and effectively ended political opposition to Beijing in the territory." } }, "Geography": { @@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ "text": "President of China XI Jinping (since 14 March 2013)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Chief Executive John LEE Ka-chieu (since 1 July 2022)" + "text": "Chief Executive John LEE Ka-chiu (since 1 July 2022)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Executive Council or ExCo appointed by the chief executive" @@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ "election results": { "text": "

percent of vote by bloc: pro-Beijing 93%, non-establishment 7%; seats by block/party - pro-Beijing 89 (DAB 19, FTU 8, BPA 7, NPP 5, Liberal Party 4, FEW 2, FLU 2, other 46), non-establishment 1 (Third Side); composition - men 73, women 17, percent of women 18.9%; note - Hong Kong's leading pro-democracy political parties boycotted the 2021 election


 

" }, - "note": "note: in July 2023, Hong Kong lawmakers reduced the proportion of directly elected seats on local district councils from some 90% to about 20%; under the new law, the majority of the 470 seats would be filled by members appointed by the chief executive, rural committee chairpersons, and others elected by local committees that are packed with pro-establishment figures" + "note": "note: in July 2023, Hong Kong lawmakers reduced the proportion of directly elected seats on local district councils from some 90% to about 20%; under the new law, the majority of the 470 seats are now filled by members appointed by the chief executive, rural committee chairpersons, and others elected by local committees that are packed with pro-establishment figures" }, "Judicial branch": { "highest court(s)": { @@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "no regular indigenous military forces; Hong Kong Police Force (specialized units include the Police Counterterrorism Response Unit, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Bureau, the Special Duties Unit, the Airport Security Unit, and the VIP Protection Unit) (2023)", + "text": "no regular indigenous military forces; Hong Kong Police Force (specialized units include the Police Counterterrorism Response Unit, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Bureau, the Special Duties Unit, the Airport Security Unit, and the VIP Protection Unit) (2024)", "note": "note: the Hong Kong garrison of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) includes elements of the PLA Army, PLA Navy, and PLA Air Force; these forces are under the direct leadership of the Central Military Commission in Beijing and under administrative control of the adjacent Southern Theater Command" }, "Military - note": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json index f70e4699..9be0b222 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ja.json @@ -548,10 +548,10 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral National Diet or Kokkai consists of:
House of Councillors or Sangi-in (248 seats; 146 members directly elected in multi-seat districts by simple majority vote and 96 directly elected in a single national constituency by proportional representation vote; members serve 6-year terms with half the membership renewed every 3 years); note - the number of seats increased to 248 at the July 2022 election for renewal of half the membership
House of Representatives or Shugi-in (465 seats; 289 members directly elected in single-seat districts by simple majority vote and 176 directly elected in multi-seat districts by party-list proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)" + "text": "bicameral National Diet or Kokkai consists of:
House of Councillors or Sangi-in (248 seats; 148 members directly elected in multi-seat districts by simple majority vote and 100 directly elected in a single national constituency by proportional representation vote; members serve 6-year terms with half the membership renewed every 3 years)

House of Representatives or Shuugi-in (465 seats; 289 members directly elected in single-seat districts by simple majority vote and 176 directly elected in multi-seat districts by party-list proportional representation vote; members serve up to 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "House of Councillors - last held on 10 July 2022 (next to be held in July 2028)
House of Representatives - last held on 31 October 2021 (next to be held by October 2025)" + "text": "House of Councillors - last held on 10 July 2022 (next to be held in July 2025)
House of Representatives - last held on 31 October 2021 (next to be held by October 2025)" }, "election results": { "text": "House of Councillors - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - LDP 119, CDP 39, Komeito 27, JCP 11, Osaka Ishin no Kai (Initiatives from Osaka) 21, DPFP 10, Reiwa Shinsengumi 5, NHK 2, DIY 1, SDP 1, independent 12; composition - 184 men, 64 women; percent of women 25.8% 
House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - LDP 261, CDP 96, Ishin 41, Komeito 32, DPFP 11, JCP 10, Reiwa 3, SDP 1, independent 10; composition - 416 men, 48 women; percent women 10.3%; note - total National Diet percent of women 15.7%" @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan or CDP [Kenta IZUMI]
Democratic Party for the People Japan or DPFP [Yuichiro TAMAKI]
Group of Reformists [Sakihito OZAWA]
Japan Communist Party or JCP [Kazuo SHII]
Japan Innovation Party or Nippon Ishin no kai or Ishin [Ichiro MATSUI]
Komeito [Natsuo YAMAGUCHI]
Liberal Democratic Party or LDP [Fumio KISHIDA]
Liberal Party [Ichiro OZAWA] (formerly People's Life Party & Taro Yamamoto and Friends or PLPTYF)
Party of Hope or Kibo no To [Nariaki NAKAYAMA]
Reiwa Shinsengumi [Taro YAMAMOTO]
Seijika Joshi or NHK [Ayaka OTSU (de jure) Takashi TACHIBANA (de facto)]
Sanseitō or DIY [Sohei KAMIYA]
Social Democratic Party or SDP [Mizuho FUKUSHIMA]" + "text": "Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan or CDP [Kenta IZUMI]
Democratic Party for the People Japan or DPFP [Yuichiro TAMAKI]
Japan Communist Party or JCP [Kazuo SHII]
Japan Innovation Party or Nippon Ishin no kai or Ishin [Nobuyuki BABA]
Komeito [Natsuo YAMAGUCHI]
Liberal Democratic Party or LDP [Fumio KISHIDA]
Reiwa Shinsengumi [Taro YAMAMOTO]
Minna de Tsukurui or Collaborative Party [Ayaka OTSU (de jure) Takashi TACHIBANA (de facto)]
Sanseitō or DIY [Sohei KAMIYA]
Social Democratic Party or SDP [Mizuho FUKUSHIMA]" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ADB, AfDB (nonregional member), APEC, Arctic Council (observer), ARF, ASEAN (dialogue partner), Australia Group, BIS, CD, CE (observer), CERN (observer), CICA (observer), CP, CPLP (associate), EAS, EBRD, EITI (implementing country), FAO, FATF, G-5, G-7, G-8, G-10, G-20, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD (partners), IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAIA (observer), MIGA, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, OPCW, OSCE (partner), Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club, PCA, PIF (partner), Quad, SAARC (observer), SELEC (observer), SICA (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHRC, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNOOSA, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, Wassenaar Arrangement, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC" @@ -1215,12 +1215,15 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF): Ground Self-Defense Force (Rikujou Jieitai, GSDF; includes aviation), Maritime Self-Defense Force (Kaijou Jieitai, MSDF; includes naval aviation), Air Self-Defense Force (Koukuu Jieitai, ASDF) (2023)", + "text": "Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF): Ground Self-Defense Force (Rikujou Jieitai, GSDF; includes aviation), Maritime Self-Defense Force (Kaijou Jieitai, MSDF; includes naval aviation), Air Self-Defense Force (Koukuu Jieitai, ASDF) (2024)", "note": "note: the Coast Guard is under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; it is barred by law from operating as a military force, but in times of conflict Article 80 of the 1954 Self-Defense Forces Act permits the transfer of control of the coast guard to the Ministry of Defense with Cabinet approval" }, "Military expenditures": { + "Military Expenditures 2024": { + "text": "1.4% of GDP (2024 est.)" + }, "Military Expenditures 2023": { - "text": "1.1% of GDP (2023 est.)" + "text": "1.3% of GDP (2023)" }, "Military Expenditures 2022": { "text": "1.1% of GDP (2022)" @@ -1231,10 +1234,7 @@ "Military Expenditures 2020": { "text": "1% of GDP (2020)" }, - "Military Expenditures 2019": { - "text": "0.9% of GDP (2019)" - }, - "note": "note: the Japanese Government in 2022 pledged to increase defense expenditures to 2% of GDP in line with NATO standards by 2028; if the planned increase occurs, Japan would have one of the world's largest defense budgets" + "note": "note: the Japanese Government in 2022 pledged to increase defense expenditures to 2% of GDP in line with NATO standards by March 2028; if the planned increase occurs, Japan would have the world's third largest defense budget" }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { "text": "approximately 230-240,000 active personnel (145-150,000 Ground; 40-45,000 Maritime; 40-45,000 Air); 14,000 Coast Guard (2023)" @@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ "text": "the JSDF is equipped with a mix of imported and domestically produced equipment; Japan has a robust defense industry and is capable of producing a wide range of air, ground, and naval weapons systems; the majority of its weapons imports are from the US and some domestically produced weapons are US-origin and manufactured under license (2023)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18-32 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2023)", + "text": "18-32 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women; no conscription (2024)", "note": "note: as of 2023, women made up about 9% of the military's full-time personnel" }, "Military deployments": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json index 9e3ee8a5..1a7270fb 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/kn.json @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "major parties:
Korean Workers' Party or KWP (formally known as Workers' Party of Korea) [KIM Jong Un, general secretary]
General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) [HO Chong Man]
minor parties:
Chondoist Chongu Party [RI Myong Chol] (under KWP control)
Social Democratic Party or KSDP [PAK Yong Il] (under KWP control)" + "text": "major parties:
Korean Workers' Party or KWP (formally known as Workers' Party of Korea) [KIM Jong Un, general secretary]
General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) [HO Chong Man]
minor parties:
Chondoist Chongu Party [RI Myong Chol] (under KWP control)
Social Democratic Party or KSDP [KIM Ho Chol] (under KWP control)" }, "International organization participation": { "text": "ARF, FAO, G-77, ICAO, ICRM, IFAD, IFRCS, IHO, IMO, IMSO, IOC, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, NAM, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO" @@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Korean People's Army (KPA): KPA Ground Forces, KPA Navy, KPA Air Force and Air Defense Forces, KPA Strategic Forces (missile forces), KPA Special Forces (special operations forces); Security Guard Command (aka Bodyguard Command); Military Security Command

Ministry of Social Security (formerly Ministry of Public Security): Border Guard General Bureau, civil security forces; Ministry of State Security: internal security, investigations (2023)", + "text": "Korean People's Army (KPA): KPA Ground Forces, KPA Navy, KPA Air Force and Air Defense Forces, KPA Strategic Forces (missile forces), KPA Special Forces (special operations forces); Security Guard Command (aka Bodyguard Command); Military Security Command

Ministry of Social Security (formerly Ministry of Public Security): Border Guard General Bureau, civil security forces; Ministry of State Security: internal security, investigations (2024)", "note": "note 1: North Korea employs a systematic and intentional overlap of powers and responsibilities among its multiple internal security organizations to prevent any potential subordinate consolidation of power and assure that each unit provided a check and balance on the other

note 2: the Security Guard Command protects the Kim family, other senior leadership figures, and government facilities

note 3: the North also has a large paramilitary/militia force organized into the Worker Peasant Red Guard and Red Youth Guard; these organizations are present at all levels of government (province, county, ward) and are under the control of the Korean Workers' Party in peacetime, but revert to KPA control in crisis or war; they are often mobilized for domestic projects, such as road building and agricultural support" }, "Military expenditures": { @@ -1062,11 +1062,11 @@ "text": "information varies; estimated 1-1.2 million active-duty troops; estimated 200,000 internal security forces (2023)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the KPA is equipped with older weapon systems originally acquired from the former Soviet Union, Russia, and China, and some domestically produced equipment; North Korea produces a diverse array of military hardware, including small arms, munitions, light armored vehicles, tanks, naval vessels and submarines, and some advanced weapons systems, such as cruise and ballistic missiles; most are copies or upgrades of older foreign supplied equipment (2023)", - "note": "note: since 2006, the UN Security Council has passed nearly a dozen resolutions sanctioning North Korea for developing nuclear weapons and related activities, starting with Resolution 1718, which condemned the North's first nuclear test and placed sanctions on the supply of heavy weaponry (including tanks, armored combat vehicles, large calibre artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers), missile technology and material, and select luxury goods; additional resolutions have expanded to include all arms, including small arms and light weapons; the US and other countries have also imposed unilateral sanctions" + "text": "the KPA is equipped with older weapon systems originally acquired from the former Soviet Union, Russia, and China, and some domestically produced equipment; North Korea produces a diverse array of military hardware, including small arms, munitions, light armored vehicles, tanks, naval vessels and submarines, and some advanced weapons systems, such as cruise and ballistic missiles; most are copies or upgrades of older foreign supplied equipment (2024)", + "note": "note: since 2006, the UN Security Council has passed nearly a dozen resolutions sanctioning North Korea for developing nuclear weapons and related activities, starting with Resolution 1718, which condemned the North's first nuclear test and placed sanctions on the supply of heavy weaponry (including tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers), missile technology and material, and select luxury goods; additional resolutions have expanded to include all arms, including small arms and light weapons; the US and other countries have also imposed unilateral sanctions" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "17 years of age for compulsory military service for men and women; service obligation varies from 5-13 years; reportedly up to 10 years (7 for women) for those serving in combat units and 13 years (7 for women) for specialized combat units, such as missile forces (2023)", + "text": "17 years of age for compulsory military service for men and women; service obligation varies from 5-13 years; reportedly up to 10 years (7 for women) for those serving in combat units and 13 years (7 for women) for specialized combat units, such as missile forces (2024)", "note": "note: the bulk of the KPA is made up of conscripts; as many as 20% of North Korean males between the ages of 16 and 54 are in the military at a given time and possibly up to 30 percent of males between the ages of 18 and 27, not counting the reserves or paramilitary units; women comprise about 20% of the military by some estimates" }, "Military - note": { @@ -1096,10 +1096,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — the government of North Korea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government did not demonstrate any efforts to address human trafficking; during this reporting period there was a government policy or pattern of human trafficking in prison camps, in labor training centers, in massed mobilizations of adults and children, and through forced labor by North Korean overseas workers; proceeds from state-sponsored forced labor funded government functions and illicit activities (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — the government of North Korea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore North Korea remained on Tier 3; the government did not demonstrate any efforts to address human trafficking; during the reporting period, there was a government policy or pattern of human trafficking in prison camps, in labor training centers, in massed mobilizations of adults and children, and through forced labor by North Korean workers overseas; proceeds from state-sponsored forced labor funded government operations (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers—including government officials—exploit North Koreans at home and abroad; women and children are exploited in sex trafficking within North Korea; forced labor is part of an established system of political repression and a pillar of the economic system; children in prison camps are subject to forced labor for up to 12 hours per day; officials forcibly mobilize adults and school children to work in factories, agriculture, logging, mining, infrastructure work, information technology, and construction sectors; North Koreans sent to work abroad, including through bilateral agreements with foreign businesses or governments, face forced labor conditions; NGOs report overseas workers are managed as a matter of state policy; the government often appropriates and deposits worker salaries into government-controlled accounts; in 2017, the UN Security Council prohibited members from issuing or renewing work authorizations for North Koreans and, with limited exceptions, required repatriation; nonetheless, an estimated 20,000-100,000 North Koreans are working in China, primarily in restaurants and factories; North Korean women and girls lured by promises of jobs in China are forced into prostitution, marriage, or exploitative labor arrangements; many North Koreans continue to work or enter Russia, and some workers are reportedly working in African, Middle Eastern, an Southeast Asian countries (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers—including government officials—exploit North Koreans at home and abroad; forced labor is part of an established system of political repression and a pillar of the economic system; the government subjects its nationals to forced labor in prison and labor camps, through mass mobilizations, and in overseas work; prisoners are subject to forced labor in logging, mining, manufacturing, farming, and other areas for long hours under harsh conditions; many prisoners do not survive; some children in prison camps face forced labor for up to 12 hours per day; traffickers exploit women and children in sex trafficking within North Korea; officials forcibly mobilize adults and school children to work in various sectors, including factories, agriculture, logging, mining, infrastructure, information technology, and construction; North Koreans sent to work abroad, including through bilateral agreements with foreign businesses or governments, face forced labor conditions; NGOs report overseas workers are managed as a matter of state policy and are under constant surveillance by government security agents; the government often appropriates and deposits worker salaries into government-controlled accounts; in 2017, the UN Security Council prohibited members from issuing or renewing work authorizations for North Koreans and, with limited exceptions, required repatriation; nonetheless, an estimated 20,000-100,000 North Koreans are working in China, primarily in restaurants and factories; North Korean women, lured by promises of jobs in China, are subjected to commercial sex, forced labor, abuse, or forced marriages; many North Koreans also continue to enter Russia to work informally, and some North Koreans are reportedly working in dozens of countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json index 5d0db69e..f5d0becb 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/ks.json @@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ "text": "last held on 15 April 2020 (next to be held on 10 April 2024)" }, "election results": { - "text": "percent of vote by party/coalition - DPK/Platform Party 49.9%, United Future Party 41.5%, JP 1.7%; seats by party - DPK/Platform Party 180, United Future Party (now PPP) 103, JP 6, ODP 3, PP 3, independent 5; composition as of April 2022 - men 240, women 55, percent of women 18.6%" + "text": "percent of vote by party/coalition - DPK/Platform Party 49.9%, United Future Party 41.5%, JP 1.7%; seats by party - DPK/Platform Party 180, United Future Party (now PPP) 103, JP 6, ODP 3, PP 3, independent 5; composition as of April 2022 - men 242, women 57, percent of women 19.1%" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Basic Income Party [SHIN Ji-hye] 
Democratic Party of Korea or DPK [LEE Jae-myung] (renamed from Minjoo Party of Korea or MPK in October 2016); includes the former Open Democratic Party [CHOI Kong-wook], which merged with the DP in January 2022 and the Together Citizens' Party or Platform Party [WOO Hee-jong, CHOI Bae-geun], which merged with the DP in May 2022)
Hope of Korea [Yang Hyang-ja]
Justice Party or JP [LEE Jeong-mi]
People Power Party or PPP [YUN Jae-ok (acting)] (renamed from United Future Party in September 2020, formerly Liberty Korea Party)
Transition Korea [CHO Jung-hun]", + "text": "Basic Income Party [SHIN Ji-hye] 
Democratic Party of Korea or DPK [LEE Jae-myung] (renamed from Minjoo Party of Korea or MPK in October 2016); includes the former Open Democratic Party [CHOI Kong-wook], which merged with the DP in January 2022 and the Together Citizens' Party or Platform Party [WOO Hee-jong, CHOI Bae-geun], which merged with the DP in May 2022)
Hope of Korea [Yang Hyang-ja]
Justice Party or JP [LEE Jeong-mi]
People Power Party or PPP [HAN Dong-hoon] (renamed from United Future Party in September 2020, formerly Liberty Korea Party)
Transition Korea [CHO Jung-hun]", "note": "note: the DPK is South Korea’s largest party and its main progressive party; the People Power Party (PPP) is a conservative grouping and is South Korea’s second-largest party" }, "International organization participation": { @@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "23,213,189 (2021 est.)" + "text": "22,809,806 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "45 (2021 est.)" @@ -1224,10 +1224,10 @@ "text": "approximately 500,000 active-duty personnel (365,000 Army; 70,000 Navy, including about 30,000 Marines; 65,000 Air Force) (2023)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the South Korean military is equipped with a mix of domestically produced and imported weapons systems; South Korea has a robust defense industry and production includes armored fighting vehicles, artillery, aircraft, naval ships, and missiles; its weapons are designed to be compatible with US and NATO systems; in recent years the top foreign weapons supplier has been the US, and some domestically produced systems are built under US license (2023)" + "text": "the South Korean military is equipped with a mix of domestically produced and imported weapons systems; South Korea has a robust defense industry and production includes armored fighting vehicles, artillery, aircraft, naval ships, and missiles; its weapons are designed to be compatible with US and NATO systems; in recent years the top foreign weapons supplier has been the US, and some domestically produced systems are built under US license (2024)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18-35 years of age for compulsory military service for all men; minimum conscript service obligation varies by service - 18 months (Army, Marines, auxiliary police), 20 months (Navy, conscripted firefighters), 21 months (Air Force, social service), 36 months for alternative service; 18-29 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (2023)", + "text": "18-35 years of age for compulsory military service for all men; minimum conscript service obligation varies by service - 18 months (Army, Marines, auxiliary police), 20 months (Navy, conscripted firefighters), 21 months (Air Force, social service), 36 months for alternative service; 18-29 years of age for voluntary military service for men and women (2024)", "note": "note 1: women, in service since 1950, are able to serve in all branches and as of 2022 some 15,000 served in the armed forces, including about 9% of the non-commissioned and commissioned officers

note 2: the military brings on over 200,000 conscripts each year" }, "Military deployments": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json index 16d346b2..5254269a 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mc.json @@ -936,10 +936,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Macau does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Macau was downgraded to Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including investigating one potential case, disseminating awareness-raising materials, and maintaining guidelines for identifying and referring victims to services; however, for the third consecutive year officials did not identify or provide services to any victims, nor initiate any prosecutions; Macau has not convicted a trafficker since 2019 and has never identified a victim of forced labor (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Macau does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Macau remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including investigating five suspected cases of traffickers using Macau residents in cyber scams in Southeast Asia, training police officers on anti-trafficking efforts, and initiating one prosecution; however, the government did not report proactively screening at-risk populations, such as commercial sex workers, for trafficking indicators; for the fourth consecutive year, officials did not identify or provide services to any victims; Macau has not convicted a trafficker since 2019 and has never identified a victim of forced labor exploitation in Macau (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Macau; traffickers recruit most victims from mainland China, Russia, and Southeast Asia using false job offers; adult and child victims are forced into commercial sex in casinos, hotels, and private homes, and sometimes have their documents confiscated; Casinos and other establishments reportedly allow staff to partner with criminal networks to facilitate sex trafficking; migrant construction and domestic workers, primarily from mainland China, Indonesia, and the Philippines may be vulnerable to forced labor in Macau (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Macau and may exploit victims from Macau abroad; traffickers recruit most victims from China, Russia, and Southeast Asia using false job offers; adult and child victims are forced into commercial sex in massage parlors, illegal brothels, nightclubs, casinos, hotels, and private homes, where they are monitored, threatened with violence, forced to work long hours, and sometimes have their documents confiscated; Casinos and other establishments reportedly allow staff to partner with criminal networks to facilitate sex trafficking; migrant construction and domestic workers, primarily from China, Indonesia, and the Philippines, may be vulnerable to forced labor in Macau; traffickers operating cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia may recruit and exploit Macau victims in forced labor (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json index f5ff186f..6b21d02f 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/mg.json @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ "text": "President Ukhnaagiin KHURELSUKH (since 25 June 2021)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Luvsannamsrai OYUN-ERDENE (since 27 January 2021); Deputy Prime Minister Sainbuyen AMARSAIKHAN (since 8 September 2022)" + "text": "Prime Minister Luvsannamsrai OYUN-ERDENE (since 27 January 2021); Deputy Prime Ministers Sainbuyen AMARSAIKHAN (since 8 September 2022) and Chimed KHURELBAATAR (since 5 January 2023)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "directly appointed by the prime minister following a constitutional amendment ratified in November 2019; prior to the amendment, the cabinet was nominated by the prime minister in consultation with the president and confirmed by the State Great Hural (parliament)" @@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ "text": "presidential candidates nominated by political parties represented in the State Great Hural and directly elected by simple majority popular vote for one 6-year term; election last held on 9 June 2021 (next election in 2027); following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party or majority coalition is usually elected prime minister by the State Great Hural" }, "election results": { - "text": "Ukhnaagiin KHURELSUKH elected president in first round; percent of vote - Ukhnaagiin KHURELSUKH (MPP) 72%, Dangaasuren ENKHBAT (RPEC) 21.6%, Sodnomzundui ERDENE (DP) 6.4%" + "text": "Ukhnaagiin KHURELSUKH elected president in first round; percent of vote - Ukhnaagiin KHURELSUKH (MPP) 68%, Dangaasuren ENKHBAT (RPEC) 20.1%, Sodnomzundui ERDENE (DP) 6%" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -1186,10 +1186,10 @@ "text": "information varies; approximately 9,000 active duty troops (2023)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the MAF's inventory is comprised of Soviet-era and Russian equipment (2023)" + "text": "the MAF's inventory is comprised largely of Soviet-era and Russian equipment (2024)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "18-27 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service (can enter military schools at age 17); 12-month conscript service obligation for men in the army, air forces, or police (can be extended 3 months under special circumstances); conscription service can be exchanged for a 24‐month stint in the civil service or a cash payment determined by the Mongolian Government; after conscription, soldiers can contract into military service for 2 or 4 years; volunteer military service for men and women is 24 months, which can be extended for another two years up to the age of 31 (2023)" + "text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary military service (can enter military schools at age 17); 12-month conscript service obligation for men in the army, air forces, or police (can be extended 3 months under special circumstances); conscription service can be exchanged for a 24‐month stint in the civil service or a cash payment determined by the Mongolian Government; after conscription, soldiers can contract into military service for 2 or 4 years; volunteer military service for men and women is 24 months, which can be extended for another two years up to the age of 31 (2024)" }, "Military deployments": { "text": "860 South Sudan (UNMISS) (2023)", diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json index 9b9938e4..8c8a2d73 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json @@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ }, "Transnational Issues": { "Disputes - international": { - "text": "

piracy remains a problem in the Malacca Strait

Malaysia-Brunei: per Letters of Exchange signed in 2009, Malaysia in 2010 ceded two hydrocarbon concession blocks to Brunei; in 2009, the media reported that Brunei had dropped its claims to the Limbang corridor, but Brunei responded that the subject had never been discussed during recent talks between the two countries

Malaysia-China-Philippines-Vietnam: while the 2002 \"Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea\" has eased tensions over the Spratly Islands, it is not the legally binding \"code of conduct\" sought by some parties, which is currently being negotiated between China and ASEAN; Malaysia was not party to the March 2005 joint accord among the national oil companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam on conducting marine seismic activities in the Spratly Islands

Malaysia-Indonesia: land and maritime negotiations with Indonesia are ongoing, and disputed areas include the controversial Tanjung Datu and Camar Wulan border area in Borneo and the maritime boundary in the Ambalat oil block in the Celebes Sea

Malaysia-Philippines: Philippines retains a dormant claim to the eastern part of Malaysia's Sabah State in northern Borneo

Malaysia-Singapore: disputes continue over deliveries of fresh water to Singapore, Singapore's land reclamation, bridge construction, and maritime boundaries in the Johor and Singapore Straits; in 2008, the International Court of Justice awarded sovereignty of Pedra Branca (Pulau Batu Puteh/Horsburgh Island) to Singapore, and Middle Rocks to Malaysia but did not rule on maritime regimes, boundaries, or disposition of South Ledge

Malaysia-Thailand: in 2008, separatist violence in Thailand's predominantly Muslim southern provinces prompts Malaysia to take measures to close and to monitor the border with Thailand to stem terrorist activities

 

 

" + "text": "

Malaysia-Brunei: per Letters of Exchange signed in 2009, Malaysia in 2010 ceded two hydrocarbon concession blocks to Brunei; in 2009, the media reported that Brunei had dropped its claims to the Limbang corridor, but Brunei responded that the subject had never been discussed during recent talks between the two countries

Malaysia-China-Philippines-Vietnam: while the 2002 \"Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea\" has eased tensions over the Spratly Islands, it is not the legally binding \"code of conduct\" sought by some parties, which is currently being negotiated between China and ASEAN; Malaysia was not party to the March 2005 joint accord among the national oil companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam on conducting marine seismic activities in the Spratly Islands

Malaysia-Indonesia: land and maritime negotiations with Indonesia are ongoing, and disputed areas include the controversial Tanjung Datu and Camar Wulan border area in Borneo and the maritime boundary in the Ambalat oil block in the Celebes Sea

Malaysia-Philippines: Philippines retains a dormant claim to the eastern part of Malaysia's Sabah State in northern Borneo

Malaysia-Singapore: disputes continue over deliveries of fresh water to Singapore, Singapore's land reclamation, bridge construction, and maritime boundaries in the Johor and Singapore Straits; in 2008, the International Court of Justice awarded sovereignty of Pedra Branca (Pulau Batu Puteh/Horsburgh Island) to Singapore, and Middle Rocks to Malaysia but did not rule on maritime regimes, boundaries, or disposition of South Ledge

Malaysia-Thailand: in 2008, separatist violence in Thailand's predominantly Muslim southern provinces prompts Malaysia to take measures to close and to monitor the border with Thailand to stem terrorist activities

 

 

" }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json index a5dd8430..998e4372 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/pp.json @@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "170,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "166,000 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "2 (2021 est.)" @@ -1203,10 +1203,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Papua New Guinea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so; for the first time in four years, the government initiated prosecutions against four alleged traffickers, and identified and provided protective services to a child sex trafficking victim; however, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous year; officials did not convict any traffickers, nor provide shelter or services to victims or help NGOs do so; endemic corruption and complicity, particularly in the logging and fishing sectors, left foreigners and locals vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor; the lack of resources for anti-trafficking efforts, low awareness among officials and the public, and lack of training activities continued to hinder progress; the government did not update standard operating procedures for victim identification or allocate funding to its national action plan; therefore, Papua New Guinea remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Papua New Guinea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Papua New Guinea was downgraded to Tier 3; officials took some steps such as investigating government complicity in a sex trafficking syndicate; however, the government did not prosecute or convict any traffickers or identify and assist victims, and it often deported potential victims without screening them; endemic corruption and complicity among officials, particularly in the logging and fishing sectors, left foreigners and locals vulnerable to trafficking; the lack of resources for anti-trafficking efforts, low awareness among officials and the public, and lack of training and awareness activities continued to hinder progress (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Papua New Guinea, and Papua New Guineans are exploited abroad; traffickers use Papua New Guinea as a transit point to exploit foreign victims in other countries; foreign and local women and children are exploited in sex trafficking and in forced labor in domestic service, the tourism sector, manual labor, begging, and street vending; families or tribe members reportedly exploit children in sex trafficking or forced labor; some parents force their daughters in to marriages or child sex trafficking to resolve debts or disputes; Chinese, Malaysian, and local men are forced to work in logging and mining camps; migrant women from Malaysia, Thailand, China, and the Philippines are subjected to sex trafficking and domestic servitude at logging and mining camps, fisheries, and entertainment sites (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Papua New Guinea, and Papua New Guineans are exploited abroad; traffickers use Papua New Guinea as a transit point to exploit foreign victims in other countries; foreign and local women and children are exploited in sex trafficking and in forced labor in domestic service, the tourism sector, manual labor, begging, and street vending; families or tribe members reportedly exploit children in sex trafficking or forced labor; some parents force their daughters into marriages or child sex trafficking to resolve debts or disputes, or force children to beg or sell goods on the street; young women and girls face exploitation in sex trafficking and domestic service as part of marriages that involve a “bride price” of money or chattel; traffickers force some children into criminal gold panning; adolescent boys are increasingly involved in intercommunal armed conflict, possibly via forced recruitment by local leaders; LGBTQI+ individuals are vulnerable to trafficking; asylum seekers detained in Papua New Guinea while attempting to reach Australia may face increased vulnerability to forced labor or sex trafficking; Chinese, Malaysian, and local men are forced to work in logging and mining camps; migrant women from China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are recruited by Chinese and Malaysian-based logging companies and subjected to sex trafficking and domestic servitude at logging and mining camps, fisheries, and entertainment sites; local and foreign men and boys seeking work on fishing vessels are at risk of debt bondage, harsh working and living conditions, and physical violence; government officials reportedly facilitate trafficking by accepting bribes or ignoring trafficking in return for political favors (2023) " } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json index d840e6c0..c77dcd35 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/tw.json @@ -420,16 +420,16 @@ "text": "President TSAI Ing-wen (since 20 May 2016); Vice President LAI Ching-te (since 20 May 2020)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Premier CHEN Chien-jen (President of the Executive Yuan) (since 25 January 2023); Vice Premier CHENG Wen-tsan (Vice President of the Executive Yuan) (since 25 January 2023)" + "text": "Premier CHEN Chien-jen (President of the Executive Yuan) (since 31 January 2023); Vice Premier CHENG Wen-tsan (Vice President of the Executive Yuan) (since 31 January 2023)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Executive Yuan - ministers appointed by president on recommendation of premier" }, "elections/appointments": { - "text": "president and vice president directly elected on the same ballot by simple majority popular vote for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 11 January 2020 (next to be held on 13 January 2024); premier appointed by the president; vice premiers appointed by the president on the recommendation of the premier" + "text": "president and vice president directly elected on the same ballot by simple majority popular vote for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 13 January 2024 (next to be held in 2028); premier appointed by the president; vice premiers appointed by the president on the recommendation of the premier" }, "election results": { - "text": "2020: TSAI Ing-wen reelected president; percent of vote - TSAI Ing-wen (DPP) 57.1%, HAN Kuo-yu (KMT) 38.6%, James SOONG (PFP) 4.2%; note - TSAI is the first woman elected president of Taiwan

2016: TSAI Ing-wen elected president; percent of vote - TSAI Ing-wen (DPP) 56.1%, Eric CHU (KMT) 31%, James SOONG (PFP) 12.8%" + "text": "2023: LAI Ching-te (DPP) 40.1%, HOU Yu-ih (KMT) 33.5%, KO Wen-je (TPP) 26.5%; note - LAI takes office on 20 May 2024

2020: TSAI Ing-wen reelected president; percent of vote - TSAI Ing-wen (DPP) 57.1%, HAN Kuo-yu (KMT) 38.6%, James SOONG (PFP) 4.3%; note - TSAI is the first woman elected president of Taiwan


" } }, "Legislative branch": { @@ -437,10 +437,10 @@ "text": "unicameral Legislative Yuan (113 seats; 73 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote, 34 directly elected in a single island-wide constituency by proportional representation vote, and 6 directly elected in multi-seat aboriginal constituencies by proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "last held on 11 January 2020 (next to be held on 13 January 2024)" + "text": "last held on 13 January 2024 (next to be held in 2028)" }, "election results": { - "text": "percent of vote by party - Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 34.0%, Kuomintang (KMT) 33.4%, Taiwan People's Party (TPP) 11.2%, New Power Party (NPP) 7.5%; seats by party - DPP 61, KMT 38, TPP 5, NPP 3; composition as of early 2020 - men 64, women 48, percent of women 42.5%" + "text": "percent of vote by party - DPP 40.6%, KMT 37.2%, TPP 12.6%, other 5.7%, independent 3.9%; seats by party - KMT 52, DPP 51, TPP 8, independent 2; composition - men 66, women 47, percent of women 41.6%" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ } }, "Political parties and leaders": { - "text": "Democratic Progressive Party or DPP [LAI Ching-te]
Kuomintang or KMT (Nationalist Party) [Eric CHU Chi-luan]
New Power Party or NPP [CHEN Jiau-hua]
People First Party or PFP [James SOONG]
Taiwan People's Party or TPP [KO Wen-je]
Taiwan Statebuilding Party or TSP [CHEN Yi-chi]", + "text": "Democratic Progressive Party or DPP [LAI Ching-te]
Kuomintang or KMT (Nationalist Party) [Eric CHU Li-luan]
Taiwan People's Party or TPP [KO Wen-je]", "note": "note: the DPP and the KMT are the two major political parties; there are hundreds of registered minor parties" }, "International organization participation": { @@ -1024,12 +1024,12 @@ }, "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { - "text": "Taiwan Armed Forces: Army, Navy (includes Marine Corps), Air Force

Ocean Affairs Council: Coast Guard Administration (CGA)

Ministry of Interior: National Police (2023)", + "text": "Taiwan Armed Forces: Army, Navy (includes Marine Corps), Air Force

Ocean Affairs Council: Coast Guard Administration (CGA)

Ministry of Interior: National Police (2024)", "note": "note: the CGA is a law enforcement organization with homeland security functions during peacetime and national defense missions during wartime; it was established in 2000 from the integration of the Coast Guard Command (formerly under the Ministry of Defense), the Marine Police Bureau (formerly under the National Police), and several cutters from the Taiwan Directorate General of Customs (Ministry of Finance)" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2023": { - "text": "2.1% of GDP (2023 est.)" + "text": "2.4% of GDP (2023 est.)" }, "Military Expenditures 2022": { "text": "2.1% of GDP (2022)" @@ -1045,15 +1045,15 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "approximately 170,000 active-duty troops (90,000 Army; 40,000 Navy, including approximately 10,000 marines; 40,000 Air Force) (2023)", + "text": "approximately 180,000 active-duty troops (95,000 Army; 45,000 Navy, including approximately 10,000 marines; 40,000 Air Force) (2023)", "note": "note: Taiwan trains about 120,000 reservists annually, but in 2022 announced intentions to increase that figure to 260,000" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the military is armed mostly with secondhand weapons and equipment provided by the US, and the US has continued to be the largest provider of arms in recent years; Taiwan also has a domestic defense industry capable of building and upgrading a range of weapons systems, including surface ships and submarines (2023)" + "text": "the military is armed with a mix of secondhand weapons and equipment provided by the US, as well as capabilities procured through the US Foreign Military Sales process; the US is the largest provider of arms to Taiwan; Taiwan also has a domestic defense industry capable of building and upgrading some weapons systems, including surface ships and submarines (2024)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { - "text": "starting with those born in 1994, men 18-36 years of age may volunteer or must complete 4 months of compulsory military service; civil service can be substituted for military service in some cases; men born before December 1993 are required to complete compulsory service for 12 months (military or civil); men are subject to training recalls up to four times for periods not to exceed 20 days for 8 years after discharge; women may enlist but are restricted to noncombat roles in most cases; as part of its transition to an all-volunteer military, the last cohort of 12-month military conscripts completed their service obligations in December 2018 (2023)", - "note": "note 1: compulsory service is 5 weeks of basic training followed by 11 weeks of specialized training with field units; in 2022, the Taiwan announced that compulsory service would be extended from 4 to 12 months beginning in January 2024 for men born in 2005

note 2: as of 2023, women made up about 15% of the active-duty military" + "text": "starting with those born in 1994, men 18-36 years of age may volunteer or must complete 4 months of compulsory military service; civil service can be substituted for military service in some cases; men born before December 1993 are required to complete compulsory service for 12 months (military or civil); men are subject to training recalls up to four times for periods not to exceed 20 days for 8 years after discharge; women may enlist but are restricted to noncombat roles in most cases; as part of its transition to an all-volunteer military, the last cohort of 12-month military conscripts completed their service obligations in December 2018 (2024)", + "note": "note 1: compulsory service is 5 weeks of basic training followed by 11 weeks of specialized training with field units; in 2022, Taiwan announced that compulsory service would be extended from 4 to 12 months beginning in January 2024 for men born in 2005 and thereafter

note 2: as of 2023, women made up about 15% of the active-duty military" }, "Military - note": { "text": "the military’s primary responsibility is external security, including the defense of the country’s sovereignty and territory, and the protection of Taiwan’s air space, maritime claims, and sea lanes of communication; its main focus is the challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China; the military trains regularly and conducts multiservice exercises; the Army’s primary combat forces include nine mechanized or motorized infantry brigades, four armored brigades, and three artillery brigades; it also has an aviation and special forces command that includes several squadrons of attack helicopters; the Air Force has nearly 300 fighter and multipurpose fighter aircraft organized, plus squadrons for anti-submarine and electronic warfare, early warning, and surveillance; the Navy’s warship inventory includes four destroyers, 22 frigates, more than 40 corvettes, patrol vessels, and missile-armed attack craft, and two combat-capable attack submarines; it also has three marine infantry brigades 

the US Taiwan Relations Act of April 1979 states that the US shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and shall maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan (2023)" diff --git a/europe/bo.json b/europe/bo.json index a4a251c3..2b768c59 100644 --- a/europe/bo.json +++ b/europe/bo.json @@ -1243,10 +1243,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Belarus does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Belarus was downgraded to Tier 3; nonetheless, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including conducting investigations and prosecutions and identifying and referring victims to services; however, the government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting traffickers under its trafficking statute nor provide adequate protection to victims; officials reportedly returned many migrants and asylum seekers to their countries of origin without comprehensively screening them for trafficking; the government did not report conducting awareness activities, and its efforts to prevent labor trafficking remained inadequate; for the 5th consecutive year, Belarus did not report investigating or filing charges related to illegal recruitment of migrant workers (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Belarus does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Belarus remained on Tier 3; the government decreased trafficking-related investigations and prosecutions; fewer victims were identified and referred to services; officials did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting any traffickers under its trafficking statute nor provide adequate protection to victims; officials reportedly returned many migrants and asylum seekers to their countries of origin without screening them for indicators of trafficking; similarly, there were no reports of screening Ukrainian refugees; the government did not report conducting awareness-raising activities, and its efforts to prevent labor trafficking remained inadequate; for the sixth consecutive year, Belarus did not report investigating or filing charges related to illegal recruitment of migrant workers (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims and exploit Belarusians abroad; the majority of trafficking victims are men subjected to forced labor, primarily in Russia; most Belarusian victims are trafficked in Belarus and Russia, but also in Poland, Turkey, and other European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern countries; some Belarusian women traveling for foreign employment in the adult entertainment and hotel industries are subjected to sex trafficking; most traffickers are Belarusian citizens, and traffickers increasingly use online methods to coerce victims into forced labor and sex trafficking (2022)" + "text": "Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Belarus and exploit Belarusians abroad; the majority of trafficking victims are men subjected to forced labor, primarily in Belarus and Russia, but also in Poland, Turkey, and other European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern countries; some Belarusian women traveling for foreign employment in the adult entertainment and hotel industries are subjected to sex trafficking; most traffickers are Belarusian citizens, and traffickers increasingly use online methods to coerce victims into forced labor and sex trafficking; the government has identified Belarusian, Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, and Vietnamese victims in Belarus; Belarusian authorities continue to facilitate entry into Belarus of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers, mostly from Iraq but also from other Middle Eastern countries, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia under a government-orchestrated migration crisis that began in 2021; officials facilitate onward travel to the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland where migrants are encouraged, and sometimes forced, to attempt irregular border crossings; these migrants remain vulnerable to trafficking (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/europe/da.json b/europe/da.json index 5138ee3c..a02bdfe5 100644 --- a/europe/da.json +++ b/europe/da.json @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "Queen MARGRETHE II (since 14 January 1972); Heir Apparent Crown Prince FREDERIK (elder son of the monarch, born on 26 May 1968)" + "text": "King FREDERIK X (since 14 January 2024); Heir Apparent Crown Prince CHRISTIAN (son of the king, born 15 October 2005) (2024)" }, "head of government": { "text": "Prime Minister Mette FREDERIKSEN (since 27 June 2019)" @@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "706,604 (2021 est.)" + "text": "711,500 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "12 (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/fo.json b/europe/fo.json index 5045870b..281c6127 100644 --- a/europe/fo.json +++ b/europe/fo.json @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "Queen MARGRETHE II of Denmark (since 14 January 1972), represented by High Commissioner Lene Moyell JOHANSEN, chief administrative officer (since 15 May 2017)" + "text": "King FREDERIK X of Denmark (since 14 January 2024), represented by High Commissioner Lene Moyell JOHANSEN, chief administrative officer (since 15 May 2017) (2024)" }, "head of government": { "text": "Prime Minister Aksel V. JOHANNESEN (since 22 December 2022)" diff --git a/europe/gk.json b/europe/gk.json index 63293f46..cb5eb617 100644 --- a/europe/gk.json +++ b/europe/gk.json @@ -252,17 +252,6 @@ "female": { "text": "NA" } - }, - "Youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24)": { - "total": { - "text": "15.8% (2021 est.)" - }, - "male": { - "text": "15.9%" - }, - "female": { - "text": "15.6%" - } } }, "Environment": { diff --git a/europe/im.json b/europe/im.json index 824b8490..e49e2151 100644 --- a/europe/im.json +++ b/europe/im.json @@ -288,17 +288,6 @@ "female": { "text": "NA" } - }, - "Youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24)": { - "total": { - "text": "10.1% (2011 est.)" - }, - "male": { - "text": "11.8%" - }, - "female": { - "text": "8.2%" - } } }, "Environment": { @@ -566,44 +555,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "41,790 (2006)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "manufacturing": { - "text": "5% (2006 est.)" - }, - "construction": { - "text": "8% (2006 est.)" - }, - "tourism": { - "text": "1% (2006 est.)" - }, - "transport and communications": { - "text": "9% (2006 est.)" - }, - "agriculture, forestry, and fishing": { - "text": "2% (2006 est.)" - }, - "gas, electricity, and water": { - "text": "1% (2006 est.)" - }, - "wholesale and retail distribution": { - "text": "11% (2006 est.)" - }, - "professional and scientific services": { - "text": "20% (2006 est.)" - }, - "public administration": { - "text": "7% (2006 est.)" - }, - "banking and finance": { - "text": "23% (2006 est.)" - }, - "entertainment and catering": { - "text": "5% (2006 est.)" - }, - "miscellaneous services": { - "text": "8% (2006 est.)" - } - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2017": { "text": "1.1% (2017 est.)" diff --git a/europe/je.json b/europe/je.json index 9d910631..f641af7c 100644 --- a/europe/je.json +++ b/europe/je.json @@ -279,17 +279,6 @@ "female": { "text": "NA" } - }, - "Youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24)": { - "total": { - "text": "15.8% (2021 est.)" - }, - "male": { - "text": "15.9%" - }, - "female": { - "text": "15.6%" - } } }, "Environment": { @@ -537,17 +526,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "86,800 (2021 est.)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "agriculture": { - "text": "3%" - }, - "industry": { - "text": "12%" - }, - "services": { - "text": "85% (2014 est.)" - } - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2021": { "text": "7.37% (2021 est.)" diff --git a/europe/sp.json b/europe/sp.json index f3152b39..3db7bf71 100644 --- a/europe/sp.json +++ b/europe/sp.json @@ -1073,18 +1073,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "19,075,931 (2021 est.)" + "text": "18,687,040 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "40 (2021 est.)" + "text": "39 (2022 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "56,805,348 (2021 est.)" + "text": "59,019,998 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "120 (2021 est.)" + "text": "124 (2022 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ "text": "Spain’s telecom sector has tracked the performance of the overall economy, which has been one of the most heavily impacted by the pandemic in all of Europe; GDP dropped by 10.8% in 2020, while telecom revenue reversed the previous five years’ positive results by falling 5.3%; fixed-line services were the hardest hit, with revenue falling 13.7%; mobile voice services did not fare much better, falling 4.7%; this is despite relatively small shifts in the number of subscribers, though the harsh lockdown conditions resulted in a significant drop in usage; it had appeared that a return to growth might be possible in 2021 following lifting the state of emergency in May, but the most recent surge in cases and the continued restrictions on travel may once again put the brakes on growth until at least 2022; Spain’s fixed-line broadband market managed to extend its decade-long pattern of steady growth into 2020, with a slight increase in demand caused by the need for fast internet access to support working and learning from home; while most of Spain’s larger telcos delivered negative revenue and profit in 2020 (2021)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line is 40 per 100 and mobile-cellular 120 telephones per 100 persons (2021)" + "text": "fixed-line is 39 per 100 and mobile-cellular 124 telephones per 100 persons (2022)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 34; landing points for the MAREA, Tata TGN-Western Europe, Pencan-9, SAT-3/WASC, Canalink, Atlantis-2, Columbus -111, Estepona-Tetouan, FLAG Europe-Asia (FEA), Balalink, ORVAL and PENBAL-5 submarine cables providing connectivity to Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South America, Asia, Southeast Asia and the US; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean), Eutelsat; tropospheric scatter to adjacent countries (2019)" @@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Spanish Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas de España): Army (Ejército de Tierra), Spanish Navy (Armada Espanola; includes Marine Corps), Air and Space Force (Ejército del Aire y del Espacio), Emergency Response Unit (Unidad Militar de Emergencias); Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) (2023)", - "note": "note 1: the Civil Guard is a military force with police duties (including coast guard) under both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior; it also responds to the needs of the Ministry of Finance

note 2: the Emergency Response Unit was established in 2006 as a separate branch of service for responding to natural disasters and providing disaster relief both domestically and abroad; it has personnel from all the other military services

note 3: the Spanish National Police ( Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, CNP) and the Civil Guard maintain internal security as well as migration and border enforcement under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior; the regional police under the authority of the Catalan and the Basque Country regional governments and municipal police throughout the country also support domestic security 

note 4: the military has a Common Corps of four specialized corps that provide professional services to all the branches of the Armed Forces and the Civil Guard, including comptroller, legal, medical, and music services

note 5: the Royal Guard is an independent regiment of the military dedicated to the protection of the King and members of the royal family; it is made up of members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Common Corps" + "note": "note 1: the Civil Guard is a military force with police duties (including coast guard) under both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior; it also responds to the needs of the Ministry of Finance

note 2: the Emergency Response Unit was established in 2006 as a separate branch of service for responding to natural disasters and providing disaster relief both domestically and abroad; it has personnel from all the other military services

note 3: the Spanish National Police (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía, CNP) and the Civil Guard maintain internal security as well as migration and border enforcement under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior; the regional police under the authority of the Catalan and the Basque Country regional governments and municipal police throughout the country also support domestic security 

note 4: the military has a Common Corps of four specialized corps that provide professional services to all the branches of the Armed Forces and the Civil Guard, including comptroller, legal, medical, and music services

note 5: the Royal Guard is an independent regiment of the military dedicated to the protection of the King and members of the royal family; it is made up of members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Common Corps" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2023": { @@ -1247,12 +1247,12 @@ "note": "note 1: as of 2023, up to 3,000 Spanish soldiers and civil guards were deployed on 17 missions on four continents 

note 2: in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, some NATO countries, including Spain, have sent additional troops and equipment to the battlegroups deployed in NATO territory in eastern Europe" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Spanish Armed Forces are a modern and professional military with a wide variety of responsibilities, including protecting the country’s national interests, sovereignty, and territory, providing support during natural disasters, and fulfilling Spain’s responsibilities to European and international security; the military conducts operations worldwide, and its air, ground, and naval forces participate in a variety of EU-, NATO-, and UN-led missions; Spain joined NATO in 1982 and is fully integrated into the NATO structure; it routinely conducts exercises with EU and NATO partners, and hosts one of NATO’s two combined air operations centers 

the military is organized into commands for aerospace, cyberspace, joint, land, and maritime operations; it also has a separate Emergency Response Unit, a permanent joint service force designed to respond to catastrophes and emergencies in both domestic and overseas environments; the Army is the largest service and has two divisional headquarters with several subordinate brigades of mechanized infantry and one of paratroopers; there are also separate commands for air defense, artillery, aviation, mountain troops, and special operations forces, as well as for the garrison units in the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla

the basic structure of the Navy’s operational units includes surface and action forces, aviation and submarine flotillas, and a marine corps; the Surface Combat Force includes amphibious, mine warfare, surface warship, and escort squadrons and groups, while the Maritime Action Force is generally made up of units and assets whose main task is to conduct maritime security and surveillance operations in geographically based areas such as the Balearic and Canary islands, Cadiz, and Cartagena; the Navy’s principal warships include 11 frigates, four attack submarines, and three large helicopter-capable amphibious assault ships; it also has squadrons of multirole fighters and anti-submarine warfare aircraft; the 5,500-strong Marine Corps (aka Marine Infantry or Infantería de Armada) has amphibious, garrison, and special operations forces

the Air Force is organized into an Air Combat Command, home to the air combat squadrons, a General Air Command, and a Canary Islands Air Command; it has approximately 400 aircraft, including about 170 modern European- and US-made fighters and multirole fighter aircraft; in addition to traditional military operations, the Air Force supports such missions as medical operations, delivering humanitarian aid, evacuations, search and rescue, firefighting, and surveillance

the Spanish military has a rich history that goes back to the 13th century; the Army has an infantry regiment, formed in the 13th century, that is considered the oldest still active military unit in the Western world; the Marine Corps, which traces its roots back to 1537, is the oldest naval infantry force in the World; Spain created a Spanish Legion for foreigners in 1920, but early on the Legion was primarily filled by native Spaniards due to difficulties in recruiting foreigners, and most of its foreign members were from the Republic of Cuba; it was modeled after the French Foreign Legion and its purpose was to provide a corps of professional troops to fight in Spain's colonial campaigns in North Africa; in more recent years, it has been used in NATO peacekeeping deployments; today’s Legion includes a mix of native Spaniards and foreigners with Spanish residency (2023)" + "text": "the Spanish Armed Forces are a modern and professional military with a wide variety of responsibilities, including protecting the country’s national interests, sovereignty, and territory, providing support during natural disasters, and fulfilling Spain’s responsibilities to European and international security; the military conducts operations worldwide, and its air, ground, and naval forces participate in a variety of EU-, NATO-, and UN-led missions; Spain joined NATO in 1982 and is fully integrated into the NATO structure; it routinely conducts exercises with EU and NATO partners, and hosts one of NATO’s two combined air operations centers 

the military is organized into commands for air, cyberspace, joint, land, maritime, and space operations; it also has a separate Emergency Response Unit, a permanent joint service force designed to respond to catastrophes and emergencies in both domestic and overseas environments; the Army is the largest service and has two divisional headquarters with several subordinate brigades of mechanized infantry and one of paratroopers; there are also separate commands for air defense, artillery, aviation, mountain troops, and special operations forces, as well as for the garrison units in the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla

the basic structure of the Navy’s operational units includes surface and action forces, aviation and submarine flotillas, and a marine corps; the Surface Combat Force includes amphibious, mine warfare, surface warship, and escort squadrons and groups, while the Maritime Action Force is generally made up of units and assets whose main task is to conduct maritime security and surveillance operations in geographically based areas such as the Balearic and Canary islands, Cadiz, and Cartagena; the Navy’s principal warships include 11 frigates, four attack submarines, and three large helicopter-capable amphibious assault ships; it also has squadrons of multirole fighters and anti-submarine warfare aircraft; the 5,500-strong Marine Corps (aka Marine Infantry or Infantería de Armada) has amphibious, garrison, and special operations forces

the Air Force is organized into an Air Combat Command, home to the air combat squadrons, a General Air Command, and a Canary Islands Air Command; it has approximately 400 aircraft, including about 170 modern European- and US-made fighters and multirole fighter aircraft; in addition to traditional military operations, the Air Force supports such missions as medical operations, delivering humanitarian aid, evacuations, search and rescue, firefighting, and surveillance

the Spanish military has a rich history that goes back to the 13th century; the Army has an infantry regiment, formed in the 13th century, that is considered the oldest still active military unit in the Western world; the Marine Corps, which traces its roots back to 1537, is the oldest naval infantry force in the World; Spain created a Spanish Legion for foreigners in 1920, but early on the Legion was primarily filled by native Spaniards due to difficulties in recruiting foreigners, and most of its foreign members were from the Republic of Cuba; it was modeled after the French Foreign Legion and its purpose was to provide a corps of professional troops to fight in Spain's colonial campaigns in North Africa; in more recent years, it has been used in NATO peacekeeping deployments; today’s Legion includes a mix of native Spaniards and foreigners with Spanish residency (2023)" } }, "Space": { "Space agency/agencies": { - "text": "Spanish Space Agency (became operational in April 2023); previously, the National Institute of Aerospace Technology (Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial or INTA, established 1942), a public research organization that depends on the Ministry of Defense, acted as Spain’s space agency; Center for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI); Catalan Space Agency (established 2021); Valencian Space Consortium (established 2009) (2023)" + "text": "Spanish Space Agency (became operational in April 2023); previously, the National Institute of Aerospace Technology (Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial or INTA, established 1942), a public research organization that depends on the Ministry of Defense, acted as Spain’s space agency; Space Command (Mando del Espacio or MESPA; established January 2024); Center for the Development of Industrial Technology (CDTI); Catalan Space Agency (established 2021); Valencian Space Consortium (established 2009) (2024)" }, "Space launch site(s)": { "text": "El Arenosillo Experiment Center/Range (Andalusia); private launch site (Teruel province) (2023)" diff --git a/middle-east/ir.json b/middle-east/ir.json index 19b80fcd..593cd953 100644 --- a/middle-east/ir.json +++ b/middle-east/ir.json @@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "29,306,782 (2021 est.)" + "text": "29,342,060 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "33 (2021 est.)" @@ -1246,10 +1246,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Iran does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Iran remained in Tier 3; the government took some steps to address trafficking, including forming an anti-trafficking committee to develop strategies and programs to combat trafficking; however, the government continued a policy of recruiting and using child soldiers and coercing adults to fight for Iranian-led militias in Syria; officials continued to perpetrate and condone trafficking crimes; authorities failed to identify and protect trafficking victims among vulnerable populations and continued to treat trafficking victims as criminals; victims continued to face severe punishment or death for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit (2022)" + "text": "

Tier 3 — Iran does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Iran remained on Tier 3; the government took some steps that may prevent trafficking of some vulnerable populations, including providing access to schools, basic services, and temporary immigration relief for some Afghan children and adult refugees or migrants who registered for the government’s headcount initiative; however, the government continued a policy or pattern of employing or recruiting child soldiers and facilitating human trafficking; officials continued to perpetrate and condone trafficking crimes with impunity, both in Iran and overseas; the government did not report law enforcement efforts to address trafficking, and it brought spurious charges against LGBTQI+ activists; officials did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting officials complicit in the recruiting and use of child soldiers coerced to fight for Iranian-led militias in Syria; the government forced or coerced children to join Iranian security and anti-riot forces to suppress ongoing political protests, and coerced former Afghan Special Forces members to fight for Iranian-backed militia in Yemen; authorities failed to identify and protect trafficking victims among vulnerable populations and continued to deport or detain Afghan adults and children without screening for trafficking indicators (2023)

" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Iran, and Iranians are exploited abroad; the continuing decline of the Iranian economy has significantly exacerbated human trafficking, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups such as ethnic minorities, refugee and migrants, women, and children; women and girls, as well as some men, are highly vulnerable to sex trafficking in Iran; Iranian and Afghan boys and girls are forced into prostitution domestically; Iranian women, boys, and girls are vulnerable to sex trafficking in Afghanistan, Armenia, Georgia, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; Iranian and Afghan refugee and migrant children, orphans, and homeless children increasingly are vulnerable to forced labor in Iran; criminal groups reportedly play a significant role in human trafficking in Iran, including kidnaping or purchasing Iranian and migrant children for forced labor and sexual exploitation; Afghan refugees and migrants, as well as Pakistani migrants, are vulnerable to abuse and labor exploitation (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Iran, and Iranians are exploited abroad; the continuing decline of the Iranian economy has significantly exacerbated human trafficking, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups such as ethnic minorities, refugees and migrants, LGBTQI+ persons, women, and children; Iranian and some foreign women and girls, as well as some men and LGBTQI+ persons, are highly vulnerable to sex trafficking in Iran; Although commercial sex is illegal, the government reportedly condones and sometimes directly facilitates commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking of adults and children, endemic throughout the country; Iranian, Iraqi, Saudi, Bahraini, and Lebanese women are highly vulnerable to sex trafficking in large urban centers; Iranian women, boys, and girls are vulnerable to sex trafficking in Afghanistan, Armenia, Georgia, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; Iranian and Afghan refugee and migrant children, orphans, and homeless children are highly vulnerable to forced labor in Iran; criminal groups reportedly play a significant role in human trafficking in Iran, including kidnaping or purchasing Iranian and migrant—especially Afghan—children for forced labor and sexual exploitation; foreign workers, including Pakistani migrants and Afghans, are highly vulnerable to abuse and forced labor in Iran; Iranian authorities continue to force and coerce Afghans, including children, as well as Pakistani migrants, Syrian nationals, and Iranian children, into armed groups to fight in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen or serve in Iran in paramilitary forces (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/middle-east/jo.json b/middle-east/jo.json index f77ddad0..0a9b70d7 100644 --- a/middle-east/jo.json +++ b/middle-east/jo.json @@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "2.4 million (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 12,866 (Yemen), 6,013 Sudan (2021); 33,951 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 651,329 (Syria) (2023)" + "text": "2.4 million (Palestinian refugees) (2020); 12,866 (Yemen), 6,013 Sudan (2021); 33,951 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022) (2022); 649,091 (Syria) (2023)" }, "stateless persons": { "text": "64 (2022)" diff --git a/middle-east/sy.json b/middle-east/sy.json index a20b379f..f7a9f4a6 100644 --- a/middle-east/sy.json +++ b/middle-east/sy.json @@ -1167,14 +1167,14 @@ "stateless persons": { "text": "160,000 (2022); note - Syria's stateless population consists of Kurds and Palestinians; stateless persons are prevented from voting, owning land, holding certain jobs, receiving food subsidies or public healthcare, enrolling in public schools, or being legally married to Syrian citizens; in 1962, some 120,000 Syrian Kurds were stripped of their Syrian citizenship, rendering them and their descendants stateless; in 2011, the Syrian Government granted citizenship to thousands of Syrian Kurds as a means of appeasement; however, resolving the question of statelessness is not a priority given Syria's ongoing civil war" }, - "note": "note: the ongoing civil war has resulted in nearly 5.2 million registered Syrian refugees - dispersed mainly in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - as of October 2023" + "note": "note: the ongoing civil war has resulted in more than 5.1 million registered Syrian refugees - dispersed mainly in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey - as of January 2024" }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Syria does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Syria remained on Tier 3; during the reporting period, there was a government policy or pattern of human trafficking and employing or recruiting child soldiers; Syrians were exploited in forced labor under compulsory military service for indefinite periods under threat of torture, familial reprisal, or death; the government did not hold any traffickers criminally accountable nor identify or protect any victims; government and pro-Syrian militias continued to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers; the government did not prevent armed opposition forces and designated terrorist organizations from recruiting children; authorities continued to arrest, detain, and severely abuse trafficking victims, including child soldiers, and punished them for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Syria does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Syria remained on Tier 3; there was a government policy or pattern of human trafficking and employing or recruiting child soldiers; Syrians were exploited in forced labor under compulsory military service for indefinite periods under threat of detention, torture, familial reprisal, or death; the government did not hold any traffickers criminally accountable nor identify or protect any victims; government actions directly contributed to the population’s vulnerability to trafficking, and it continued to perpetrate human trafficking crimes; government and pro-Syrian militias forcibly recruited and used child soldiers; the government did not prevent armed opposition forces and designated terrorist organizations from recruiting children; authorities continued to arrest, detain, and severely abuse trafficking victims, including child soldiers, and punished them for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Syria, as well as Syrians abroad; more than half of Syria’s pre-war population of 23 million have been internally displaced or are refugees in other countries and extremely vulnerable to traffickers; children are vulnerable to forced marriages, sexual slavery, and forced labor; armed groups, community members, and criminal gangs exploit women, girls, and boys in Syria in sex trafficking; Syrian government forces, pro-regime militias, and opposition forces use Syrian children in combat and support roles and as human shields; foreign domestic workers from Southeast Asian countries are subject to forced labor; terrorist groups reportedly force, coerce, or fraudulently recruit foreigners, including migrants from Central Asia and Western and other women, who are vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking; Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, particularly Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey, are highly vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Syria, as well as Syrians abroad; more than half of Syria’s pre-war population of 23 million have been internally displaced or are refugees in other countries and extremely vulnerable to traffickers; the government continues to force military conscripts to serve indefinitely or risk detention, torture, familial reprisal, or death; children are vulnerable to forced marriages—including by terrorist groups such as ISIS—which can lead to sexual slavery and forced labor; armed groups, community members, and criminal gangs exploit women, girls, and boys in Syria—particularly populations such as IDPs or disabled individuals—in sex trafficking in exchange for food or money; foreign domestic workers from Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia and the Philippines, are subject to forced labor and in some cases victims of fraudulent recruitment; Syrian government forces, pro-regime militias, and opposition forces use Syrian children in combat and support roles, and sometimes as human shields; terrorist groups reportedly force, coerce, or fraudulently recruit foreigners to join them, including migrants from Central Asia and Western and other women, who are vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor; Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, particularly Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey, are highly vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor; Syrian women, girls, and boys are vulnerable to sex trafficking in Turkey by commercial sex rings or traffickers (2023)" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/middle-east/tu.json b/middle-east/tu.json index 97202a2d..2ee2b293 100644 --- a/middle-east/tu.json +++ b/middle-east/tu.json @@ -1087,18 +1087,18 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "12 million (2021 est.)" + "text": "11,197,979 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "15 (2021 est.)" + "text": "14 (2022 est.)" } }, "Telephones - mobile cellular": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "86 million (2021 est.)" + "text": "90,297,565 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { - "text": "100 (2021 est.)" + "text": "106 (2022 est.)" } }, "Telecommunication systems": { @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ "text": "Turkey continues to develop its capabilities within its telecom sector, becoming one of the relatively few countries able to build and develop its own communications satellites; with the successful launch of the Turksat 5A and 5B satellites in 2021, the country has vastly increased its bandwidth capacity; these satellites will be joined by the Turksat 6A in 2023; the country’s telcos have invested in fiber infrastructure; deployment of fiber-based broadband networks are well established, with fiber accounting for 26.7% of all fixed broadband connections as of early 2022; the DSL sector still dominates, accounting for about 63% of connections, but its share is steadily declining, year-on-year, while the number of fiber connections has grown strongly; improved fixed and mobile infrastructure is underpinning the country’s initiatives relating to Smart City concepts, which have become a key area of focus for the emerging digital economy and the transformation to a knowledge-based economy; Turkey’s National Smart Cities Strategy and Action Plan runs through to 2023 (2022)" }, "domestic": { - "text": "fixed-line nearly 15 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is 100 telephones per 100 persons (2021)" + "text": "fixed-line nearly 14 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is 106 telephones per 100 persons (2022)" }, "international": { "text": "country code - 90; landing points for the SeaMeWe-3 & -5, MedNautilus Submarine System, Turcyos-1 & -2 submarine cables providing connectivity to Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Southeast Asia and Australia ; satellite earth stations - 12 Intelsat; mobile satellite terminals - 328 in the Inmarsat and Eutelsat systems (2020)" @@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ }, "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { - "text": "10,244 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 3,274,059 (Syria), 42,720 (Ukraine) (as of 23 November 2023) (2023)" + "text": "10,244 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 42,720 (Ukraine) (as of 23 November 2023) (2023); 3,199,927 (Syria) (2024)" }, "IDPs": { "text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2022)" diff --git a/north-america/gl.json b/north-america/gl.json index d80a14ac..0fa4dc4a 100644 --- a/north-america/gl.json +++ b/north-america/gl.json @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { - "text": "Queen MARGRETHE II of Denmark (since 14 January 1972), represented by High Commissioner Mikaela ENGELL (since April 2011)" + "text": "King FREDERIK X of Denmark (since 14 January 2024), represented by High Commissioner Mikaela ENGELL (since April 2011) (2024)" }, "head of government": { "text": "Premier Mute B. EGEDE (since 23 April 2021)" diff --git a/south-america/fk.json b/south-america/fk.json index c6ec3ba2..d9611bdb 100644 --- a/south-america/fk.json +++ b/south-america/fk.json @@ -495,17 +495,6 @@ "Labor force": { "text": "1,850 (2016 est.)" }, - "Labor force - by occupation": { - "agriculture": { - "text": "41%" - }, - "industry": { - "text": "24.5%" - }, - "services": { - "text": "34.5% (2015 est.)" - } - }, "Unemployment rate": { "Unemployment rate 2016": { "text": "1% (2016 est.)" diff --git a/south-america/ve.json b/south-america/ve.json index a0a76ba0..54f92b04 100644 --- a/south-america/ve.json +++ b/south-america/ve.json @@ -1197,10 +1197,10 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 — Venezuela does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making any efforts to do so, therefore Venezuela remained on Tier 3; the Maduro regime (which is not recognized by the United States) took some steps to address trafficking, arresting some complicit individuals and issuing a decree to develop a national action plan; however, the regime did not report assisting victims or prosecuting or convicting traffickers; the regime continued to provide support and a permissive environment to non-state armed groups that recruited and used child soldiers and engaged in sex trafficking and forced labor with impunity; representatives did not make sufficient efforts to curb forced recruitment of children by non-state armed groups (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Venezuela does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making any efforts to do so, therefore Venezuela remained on Tier 3; the Maduro regime (which is not recognized by the United States) took some steps to address trafficking, arresting some traffickers and identifying some victims; however, the regime did not report assisting victims or prosecuting or convicting traffickers; the Maduro regime continued to provide support and a permissive environment for non-state armed groups and other armed groups that forcibly recruited and used children for armed conflict or forced criminality; the armed groups also engaged in sex trafficking and forced labor while operating with impunity; the regime did not make sufficient efforts to curb the armed groups’ forced recruitment and use of children (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Venezuela, as well as Venezuelans abroad; more than six million Venezuelans, facing deteriorating economic conditions at home, have fled to neighboring countries are at risk of human trafficking; traffickers exploit Venezuelans in Aruba, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Macau, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Spain, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago; Venezuelan women and girls are at risk of sex trafficking in Colombia, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago; women, including transgender women, have been lured to Spain and Germany with fraudulent employment offers and exploited in commercial sex; men are exploited in forced labor in other countries, including Aruba and Curacao; Venezuelan women and girls are subjected to sex trafficking and child sex tourism; children are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor, including in farming, domestic service, construction, mining, and criminal groups; non-state armed groups—including illegal Colombian groups near border regions—force some Venezuelans into criminal acts, forced labor, sex trafficking, and use as child soldiers, which is reportedly tolerated by the Maduro regime; sex and labor trafficking victims from South America, Caribbean, Asian, and African countries have been reported in Venezuela; the Cuban government may be exploiting Cuban workers in medical missions in Venezuela (2022)" + "text": "

human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Venezuela, as well as Venezuelans abroad; more than six million Venezuelans, facing continued economic, political, and humanitarian crises, have fled to neighboring countries and are at risk of human trafficking; traffickers exploit Venezuelans in Aruba, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Curacao, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Macau, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Spain, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay; Venezuelan women and girls are particularly at risk of sex trafficking in neighboring countries; women, including transgender women, have been lured to Spain and Germany with fraudulent employment offers and subjected to forced surgical procedures before being exploited in commercial sex; Venezuelan men are exploited in forced labor in other countries, including Aruba and Curacao; within Venezuela, Venezuelan women and girls are subjected to sex trafficking and child sex tourism; children are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor, including in farming, domestic service, construction, mining, and criminal groups; non-state armed groups—including illegal Colombian groups near border regions—force some Venezuelans into criminal acts and use as child soldiers, and engage in sex trafficking and forced labor; members of the Maduro regime most likely tolerate or sometimes collude with the armed groups’ trafficking; sex and labor trafficking victims from South American, Caribbean, Asian, and African countries have been reported in Venezuela; the Cuban government may be exploiting Cuban workers in medical missions in Venezuela (2023)

" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/south-asia/af.json b/south-asia/af.json index babd7282..a7b26c0e 100644 --- a/south-asia/af.json +++ b/south-asia/af.json @@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "150,000 (2021 est.)" + "text": "145,787 (2021 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "(2021 est.) less than 1" @@ -1176,12 +1176,12 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "Tier 3 - Afghanistan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore, Afghanistan remains on Tier 3; substantial personnel turnover and closing of some ministries after the August 15, 2021 Taliban takeover hindered Afghanistan's ability to maintain consistent anti-trafficking efforts; although the pre-August 15 government took some training and awareness steps to address trafficking, it employed or recruited child soldiers and sexual slaves in government compounds; after August 15, the Taliban continued recruiting or employing child soldiers and did not investigate, prosecute, or convict any traffickers; the Taliban shut down shelters for victims, did not identify or protect victims, and did not make any efforts to prevent trafficking; Taliban undermining the rights of women, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, further exacerbated vulnerabilities to trafficking (2022)" + "text": "Tier 3 — Afghanistan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Afghanistan remained on Tier 3; there was a pattern of the Taliban employing or recruiting child soldiers and sex slaves (including bacha bazi – a practice where men, particular community leaders, government officials, and armed groups, exploit boys for social and sexual entertainment); the Taliban made no efforts to address or prevent labor and sex trafficking, nor did they identify or protect any victims; the Taliban continued to undermine the rights of women, minorities, and other vulnerable populations, and hindered the work of NGOs, further exacerbating trafficking (2023)" }, "trafficking profile": { - "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Afghanistan and exploit Afghan victims abroad; internal trafficking is more prevalent than transnational trafficking; since the Taliban takeover, vulnerabilities to exploitation have intensified; traffickers exploit men, women, and a large number of children domestically; victims are subjected to forced labor in agriculture, brick kilns, carpet weaving, domestic servitude, commercial sex, begging, poppy cultivation and harvesting, salt mining, transnational drug smuggling, and truck driving; the Taliban and non-state armed groups, such as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), continue to unlawfully recruit and use child soldiers; sexual exploitation of boys remains pervasive nationwide, and traffickers subject some boys to sexual exploitation abroad; after the Taliban takeover, restrictions on the movement of women and girls, and severely diminished access to employment and education, increased their vulnerability to trafficking; LGBTQI+ individuals are among the most vulnerable groups in Afghanistan under the Taliban (2022)" + "text": "human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Afghanistan and exploit Afghan victims abroad; most Afghan trafficking victims are children forced to work in carpet making, brick kilns, domestic servitude, sex trafficking, herding, begging, opium production and trade, salt mining, weapons trafficking, and truck driving; international experts indicate child labor increased after the Taliban takeover and estimate 25 percent of children are involved in child labor; some children are forced to migrate for work to other parts of Afghanistan or to Iran, Pakistan, or Turkey to support their families, and some are “sold” to traffickers to work as indentured servants; some families marry off underage daughters to receive a dowry payment, force children into labor with physical violence, or “sell” their children into sex trafficking; the Taliban and non-state armed groups, including ISIS-K, continue to recruit and use children in combat and support roles; the Taliban have detention facilities where they force detainees, including child and adult sex trafficking victims charged with “moral crimes,” into forced labor; sexual exploitation of boys, including bacha bazi, remains pervasive nationwide, and traffickers subject some boys to such exploitation abroad; restrictions on the movement of women and girls, and severely diminished access to employment and education, increase their vulnerability to trafficking; LGBTQI+ individuals are among the most vulnerable groups in Afghanistan under the Taliban; members of ethnic and religious minorities also are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation; Afghan men, women, and children seeking employment abroad, primarily in Iran, Pakistan, and Europe, are at risk of labor or sex trafficking; Afghan women and girls sold into marriage in Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Pakistan are exploited in sex trafficking and domestic servitude by their husbands (2023)" }, - "note": "note: The United States has not recognized the Taliban or another entity as the government of Afghanistan. On August 15, 2021, the Taliban culminated its takeover of Kabul, and on September 7, 2021, the Taliban announced a so-called interim government. As of December 2021, the Taliban had not outlined steps or a timeline to establish a new permanent government. All references to “the pre-August 15 government” refer to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. References to the Taliban reflect events both prior to and after August 15." + "note": "note:  The United States has not recognized the Taliban or another entity as the government of Afghanistan. All references to “the pre-August 15, 2021 government” refer to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. References to the Taliban do not denote or imply that the United States recognizes the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. (2023)" }, "Illicit drugs": { "text": "the world’s largest supplier of opiates, but it is not a major supplier to the United States; 233,000 hectares (ha) of opium poppy cultivated in Afghanistan in 2022; opium from poppies used to produce morphine and heroin; also produces large quantities of methamphetamine, cannabis, and cannabis products such as hashish; one of the world’s largest populations suffering from substance abuse; major source of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics. (2022)" diff --git a/south-asia/bt.json b/south-asia/bt.json index d0dbe927..815c7b53 100644 --- a/south-asia/bt.json +++ b/south-asia/bt.json @@ -504,13 +504,13 @@ }, "Legislative branch": { "description": { - "text": "bicameral Parliament or Chi Tshog consists of:
non-partisan National Council or Gyelyong Tshogde (25 seats; 20 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 5 members appointed by the king; members serve 5-year terms)
National Assembly or Tshogdu (46 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies in a two-round system; in the primary round, contesting political parties are directly selected by simple majority vote; in the main round, the two top parties in the primary round field candidates who are directly elected by simple majority vote; members serve 5-year terms)  " + "text": "bicameral Parliament or Chi Tshog consists of:
non-partisan National Council or Gyelyong Tshogde (25 seats; 20 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 5 members appointed by the king; members serve 5-year terms)
National Assembly or Tshogdu (47 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies in a two-round system; in the primary round, contesting political parties are directly selected by simple majority vote; in the main round, the two top parties in the primary round field candidates who are directly elected by simple majority vote; members serve 5-year terms)  " }, "elections": { - "text": "
National Council - last held on 20 April 2023 (next to be held in 2028)

National Assembly - first round held on 30 November 2023 and second round to be held on 9 January 2024 (next to be held in 2028)

2018: National Assembly - primary round held on 15 September 2018 and main round held on 18 October 2018 (next primary round be held on 30 November 2023 and second round to be held on 9 January 2024)" + "text": "
National Council - last held on 20 April 2023 (next to be held in 2028)

National Assembly - first round held on 30 November 2023 and second round held on 9 January 2024 (next to be held in 2028)

2018: National Assembly - first round held on 15 September 2018 and second round held on 18 October 2018 (next primary round be held on 30 November 2023 and second round to be held on 9 January 2024)" }, "election results": { - "text": "
National Council - seats by party - independent 20 (all candidates ran as independents) and 5 appointed by the king; composition as of October 2023 - men 22, women 3, percent of women 12%

National Assembly - percent of vote by party in first round - PDP 42.5%, BTP 19.6%, DPT 14.9%, DNT 13.1% DTT 9.8%; composition NA; second round to be held on 9 January 2024" + "text": "
National Council - seats by party - independent 20 (all candidates ran as independents) and 5 appointed by the king; composition as of October 2023 - men 22, women 3, percent of women 12%

National Assembly - percent of vote by party (first round) - PDP 42.5%, BTP 19.6%, DPT 14.9%, DNT 13.1% DTT 9.8%; percent of vote (second round) - NA; seats by party (second round) PDP 30, BTP 17" } }, "Judicial branch": { @@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ "Communications": { "Telephones - fixed lines": { "total subscriptions": { - "text": "19,680 (2021 est.)" + "text": "19,566 (2022 est.)" }, "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": { "text": "3 (2021 est.)"