mirror of
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auto-update week 27
This commit is contained in:
Yo Robot
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@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@
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}
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "except for the many organizations now operating in media free zones in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, most TV and radio stations remain government-owned; widespread use of satellite dishes provides access to pan-Arab and other international broadcasts; restrictions since June 2017 on some satellite channels and websites originating from or otherwise linked to Qatar (2018)"
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"text": "except for the many organizations now operating in media free zones in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, most TV and radio stations remain government-owned; widespread use of satellite dishes provides access to pan-Arab and other international broadcasts; restrictions since June 2017 on some satellite channels and websites originating from or otherwise linked to Qatar, but in early 2023 Abu Dhabi unblocked several sites, including Al Jazeera (2022)"
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},
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"Internet country code": {
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"text": ".ae"
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@ -558,7 +558,7 @@
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"text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds (if needed) for a 7-year term; a single individual is eligible for unlimited terms; election last held on 11 April 2018 (next to be held in 2025); prime minister and first deputy prime minister appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly; note - a constitutional amendment approved in a September 2016 referendum extended the presidential term from 5 to 7 years; a separate constitutional amendment approved in the same referendum also introduced the post of first vice-president and additional vice-presidents, who are directly appointed by the president; however, no additional vice-presidents have been appointed since the constitutional amendment was passed"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": "Ilham ALIYEV reelected president (11 April 2018) in first round; percent of vote - Ilham ALIYEV (YAP) 86%, Zahid ORUJ (independent) 3.1%, other 10.9%"
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"text": "Ilham ALIYEV reelected president in first round; percent of vote - Ilham ALIYEV (YAP) 86%, Zahid ORUJ (independent) 3.1%, other 10.9%"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> OSCE observers noted shortcomings in the election, including a restrictive political environment, limits on fundamental freedoms, a lack of genuine competition, and ballot box stuffing"
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},
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@ -1132,7 +1132,21 @@
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"text": "23 (2021)"
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},
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"Airports - with paved runways": {
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"text": "30",
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"total": {
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"text": "30"
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},
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"civil airports": {
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"text": "4"
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},
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"military airports": {
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"text": "5"
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},
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"joint use (civil-military) airports": {
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"text": "1"
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},
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"other airports": {
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"text": "20"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> paved runways have a concrete or asphalt surface but not all have facilities for refueling, maintenance, or air traffic control; the length of a runway required for aircraft to safely operate depends on a number of factors including the type of aircraft, the takeoff weight (including passengers, cargo, and fuel), engine types, flap settings, landing speed, elevation of the airport, and average maximum daily air temperature; paved runways can reach a length of 5,000 m (16,000 ft.), but the “typical” length of a commercial airline runway is between 2,500-4,000 m (8,000-13,000 ft.)"
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},
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"Airports - with unpaved runways": {
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@ -1175,7 +1189,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Azerbaijan Armed Forces: Land Forces, Air Forces, Navy Forces, State Border Service, Coast Guard; Ministry of Internal Affairs: Internal Troops, local police forces; Special State Protection Service (SSPS): National Guard (2023)",
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"text": "Azerbaijan Armed Forces: Land Forces, Air Forces, Navy Forces, State Border Service, Coast Guard<br><br>Ministry of Internal Affairs: Internal Troops, local police forces; Special State Protection Service (SSPS): National Guard (2023)",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service (intelligence, counterterrorism) are responsible for internal security; the SSPS is under the president and provides protective services to senior officials, foreign missions, significant state assets, government buildings, etc; the National Guard also serves as a reserve for the Army"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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@ -556,10 +556,10 @@
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"text": "Council of Ministers appointed by the prime minister"
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},
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"elections/appointments": {
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"text": "president indirectly elected by the National Assembly in 3 rounds if needed for a single 7-year term; election last held on 2-3 March 2022; prime minister elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by the National Assembly; election last held 20 June 2021; the next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Armenia by 2026"
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"text": "president indirectly elected by the National Assembly in 3 rounds if needed for a single 7-year term; election last held on 2-3 March 2022; prime minister indirectly elected by majority vote in 2 rounds if needed by the National Assembly"
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},
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"election results": {
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"text": " <em>2022: </em>Vahagn KHACHATURYAN elected president in second round; note - Vahagn KHACHATURYAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 71-0<em><br><br>2018:</em> Armen SARKISSIAN elected president in first round; note - Armen SARKISSIAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 90-10"
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"text": " <em><br>2022: </em>Vahagn KHACHATURYAN elected president in second round; note - Vahagn KHACHATURYAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 71-0<em><br>2018:</em> Armen SARKISSIAN elected president in first round; note - Armen SARKISSIAN ran unopposed and won the Assembly vote 90-10"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> Nikol PASHINYAN was first elected prime minister on 8 May 2018 and reelected on January 2019; in response to a political crisis that followed Armenia's defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in late 2020, PASHINYAN called an early legislative election for June 2021; his party won the election and PASHINYAN was elected to the prime ministership for a third time; his election was confirmed by the president on 2 August 2021, and he was sworn in on 10 September 2021"
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},
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@ -1136,7 +1136,21 @@
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"text": "7 (2021)"
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},
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"Airports - with paved runways": {
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"text": "10",
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"total": {
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"text": "10"
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},
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"civil airports": {
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"text": "2"
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},
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"military airports": {
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"text": "0"
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},
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"joint use (civil-military) airports": {
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"text": "1"
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},
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"other airports": {
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"text": "7"
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},
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> paved runways have a concrete or asphalt surface but not all have facilities for refueling, maintenance, or air traffic control; the length of a runway required for aircraft to safely operate depends on a number of factors including the type of aircraft, the takeoff weight (including passengers, cargo, and fuel), engine types, flap settings, landing speed, elevation of the airport, and average maximum daily air temperature; paved runways can reach a length of 5,000 m (16,000 ft.), but the “typical” length of a commercial airline runway is between 2,500-4,000 m (8,000-13,000 ft.)"
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},
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"Airports - with unpaved runways": {
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@ -1147,8 +1147,8 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Bahrain Defense Force (BDF): Royal Bahraini Army (includes the Royal Guard), Royal Bahraini Navy, Royal Bahraini Air Force; Ministry of Interior: National Guard, Special Security Forces Command (SSFC), Coast Guard<br> (2022)",
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> the Royal Guard is officially under the command of the Army, but exercises considerable autonomy; the National Guard's primary mission is to guard critical infrastructure such as the airport and oil fields; while the Guard is under the Ministry of Interior, it reports directly to the king"
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"text": "Bahrain Defense Force (BDF): Royal Bahraini Army (includes the Royal Guard), Royal Bahraini Navy, Royal Bahraini Air Force<br><br>Ministry of Interior: National Guard, Special Security Forces Command (SSFC), Coast Guard<br> (2022)",
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Royal Guard is officially under the command of the Army, but exercises considerable autonomy; the National Guard's primary mission is to guard critical infrastructure such as the airport and oil fields and is a back-up to the police; while the Guard is under the Ministry of Interior, it reports directly to the king<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Ministry of Interior is responsible for internal security and oversees police and specialized security units responsible for maintaining internal order"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2022": {
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@ -805,7 +805,7 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "HAMAS does not have a conventional military in the Gaza Strip but maintains security forces in addition to its military wing, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; the military wing reports to the HAMAS Political Bureau; there are several other militant groups operating in the Gaza Strip, most notably the Al-Quds Brigades of Palestine Islamic Jihad, which are usually but not always beholden to HAMAS's authority (2022)"
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"text": "HAMAS does not have a conventional military in the Gaza Strip but maintains security forces in addition to its military wing, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; the military wing reports to the HAMAS Political Bureau; there are several other militant groups operating in the Gaza Strip, most notably the Al-Quds Brigades of Palestine Islamic Jihad, which are usually but not always beholden to HAMAS's authority (2023)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"text": "not available"
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}
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},
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"Broadcast media": {
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"text": "state-run broadcast media with no private, independent broadcasters; Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the state-run TV broadcaster, operates 19 nationwide channels including a news channel, about 34 provincial channels, and several international channels; about 20 foreign Persian-language TV stations broadcasting on satellite TV are capable of being seen in Iran; satellite dishes are illegal and, while their use is subjectively tolerated, authorities confiscate satellite dishes from time to time; IRIB operates 16 nationwide radio networks, a number of provincial stations, and an external service; most major international broadcasters transmit to Iran (2019)"
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"text": "state-run broadcast media with no private, independent broadcasters; Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the state-run TV broadcaster, operates more than 60 television channels, more than 50 radio stations, and dozens of newspapers and websites; about 20 foreign Persian-language TV stations broadcasting on satellite TV are capable of being seen in Iran; satellite dishes are illegal and, while their use is subjectively tolerated, authorities confiscate satellite dishes from time to time; most major international broadcasters transmit to Iran (2023)"
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},
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"Internet country code": {
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"text": ".ir"
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@ -1184,8 +1184,8 @@
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "the military forces of Iran are divided between the Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah)<br><br>Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces or Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Sepah): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces; Ministry of Interior: Law Enforcement Command; Ministry of Intelligence and Security (2023)",
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group under the IRGC with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit for the IRGC; it is formally known as the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed; it is also known as the Popular Mobilization Army<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and law enforcement forces under the Interior Ministry, which report to the president, and the IRGC, which reports to the supreme leader, share responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order<br><br><strong>note 4:</strong> the Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA) is the uniformed police of Iran and includes branches for public security, traffic control, anti-narcotics, special forces (riot control, counterterrorism, hostage rescue, etc), intelligence, and criminal investigations; it has responsibility for border security (Border Guard Command)"
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"text": "the military forces of Iran are divided between the Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah); Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces or Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Air Force, Air Defense Forces; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Sepah): Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (controls strategic missile force), Qods Force (aka Quds Force; special operations), Cyber Electronic Command, Basij Paramilitary Forces<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Law Enforcement Command; Ministry of Intelligence and Security (2023)",
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Artesh Navy operates Iran’s larger warships and operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and deep waters in the region and beyond; the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in waters of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Basij is a volunteer paramilitary group under the IRGC with local organizations across the country, which sometimes acts as an auxiliary law enforcement unit for the IRGC; it is formally known as the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed; it is also known as the Popular Mobilization Army<br><br><strong>note 3: </strong>the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and law enforcement forces under the Interior Ministry, which report to the president, and the IRGC, which reports to the supreme leader, share responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order<br><br><strong>note 4:</strong> the Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA) is the uniformed police of Iran and includes branches for public security, traffic control, anti-narcotics, special forces (riot control, counterterrorism, hostage rescue, etc), intelligence, and criminal investigations; it has responsibility for border security (Border Guard Command)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2022": {
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "Israel’s developed economy largely revolves around high technology products, primarily used in the medical, biotechnology, agricultural, materials, and military industries; the country also attracts investment in its cyber-security industry, and has established itself as a hub for thousands of start-up companies; to underpin these developments, Israel has developed a robust telecoms sector; household broadband subscriptions is high, with a focus on fiber-network deployment; LTE services are almost universally available, while the August 2020 multi-frequency bands also enabled the MNOs to provide services based on 5G; 5G will be supported by moves to close down GSM and 3G networks in stages through to the end of 2025, with the physical assets and frequencies to be repurposed for LTE and 5G use (2022)"
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"text": "Israel’s developed economy largely revolves around high technology products and services, primarily used in the medical, biotechnology, agricultural, materials, and military industries; the country also attracts investment in its cyber-security industry, and has established itself as a hub for thousands of start-up companies; to underpin these developments, Israel has developed a robust telecoms sector; household broadband subscriptions is high, with a focus on fiber-network deployment; LTE services are almost universally available, while the August 2020 multi-frequency bands also enabled the MNOs to provide services based on 5G; 5G will be supported by moves to close down GSM and 3G networks in stages through to the end of 2025, with the physical assets and frequencies to be repurposed for LTE and 5G use (2023)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "fixed-line nearly 39 per 100 and nearly 140 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2021)"
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Israel Defense Forces (IDF): Ground Forces, Israel Naval Force (IN, includes commandos), Israel Air Force (IAF, includes air defense); Ministry of Public Security: Border Police, Immigration Police; Israeli Security Agency (2023)",
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Border Police is a unit within the Israel Police with its own organizational and command structure; it works both independently as well as in cooperation with or in support of the Israel Police and the IDF<br><br>note 2: the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) is charged with combating terrorism and espionage in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip; it is under the authority of the Prime Minister; ISA forces operating in the West Bank fall under the IDF for operations and operational debriefing"
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"text": "Israel Defense Forces (IDF): Ground Forces, Israel Naval Force (IN, includes commandos), Israel Air Force (IAF, includes air defense) (2023)",
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"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the national police, including the border police and the immigration police, are under the authority of the Ministry of Public Security<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) is charged with combating terrorism and espionage in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip; it is under the authority of the Prime Minister; ISA forces operating in the West Bank fall under the IDF for operations and operational debriefing"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2022": {
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "Iraq continues to face a number of political and economic challenges, though increasing civil stability has made it easier for mobile and fixed-line operators to rebuild telecom services and infrastructure damaged during the last few years; the government extended the licenses held by the MNOs for an additional three years to compensate for the chaos and destruction caused between 2014 and 2017 when Islamic State held sway in many areas of the country; the companies have struggled to develop LTE services; most services are still based on GSM and 3G, except in the Kurdish region where LTE is more widely available (2022)"
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"text": "civil stability has made it easier for mobile and fixed-line operators to rebuild telecom services and infrastructure damaged during previous periods of violence; the government extended the licenses held by the MNOs for an additional three years to compensate for the chaos and destruction caused between 2014 and 2017 when Islamic State controlled many areas of the country; the companies have struggled to develop LTE services; most services are still based on GSM and 3G, except in Iraq's Kurdistan region where LTE is more widely available (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "about 7 per 100 for fixed-line and 86 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2021)"
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},
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"Military and Security": {
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"Military and security forces": {
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"text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)<br><br>National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS; reports to the Prime Minister), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades--Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police;<br>Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate<br><br>Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests<br><br>the two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), each maintain an independent security apparatus; the federal constitution provides the Kurdistan Regional Government the right to maintain internal security forces, but the KDP and the PUK separately controlled additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control; the constitution also allows for a centralized, separate internal security/intelligence (Asayish) service; however, the KDP and PUK also each maintain Asayish forces<br><br>Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades; Unit (or Division) 70 Forces and Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) of the PUK; Unit (or Division) 80 Forces and Counterterrorism Directorate (CTD) of the KDP; Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: internal security forces include the Zeravani (KDP) and Emergency Response Forces (PUK) (2023)"
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"text": "Ministry of Defense: Iraqi Army, Army Aviation Command, Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Air Defense Command, Special Forces Command, Special Security Division (Green Zone protection)<br><br>National-Level Security Forces: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS; reports to the Prime Minister), Prime Minister's Special Forces Division, Presidential Brigades<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Federal Police Forces Command, Border Guard Forces Command, Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency, Emergency Response Division, Facilities Protection Directorate, and Provincial Police<br><br>Ministry of Oil: Energy Police Directorate<br><br>Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC): Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Tribal Mobilization Forces (TMF); the PMF and TMF are a collection of approximately 60 militias of widely varied sizes and political interests<br><br>the two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), each maintain an independent security apparatus; the federal constitution provides the Kurdistan Regional Government the right to maintain internal security forces, but the KDP and the PUK separately controlled additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control; the constitution also allows for a centralized, separate internal security/intelligence (Asayish) service; however, the KDP and PUK also each maintain Asayish forces<br><br>Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Peshmerga: Regional Guard Brigades; Unit (or Division) 70 Forces and Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) of the PUK; Unit (or Division) 80 Forces and Counterterrorism Directorate (CTD) of the KDP; Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior: internal security forces include the Zeravani (KDP) and Emergency Response Forces (PUK) (2023)"
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},
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"Military expenditures": {
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"Military Expenditures 2021": {
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"note": "<strong>note:</strong> service in the armed forces was mandatory in Iraq from 1935 up until 2003"
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},
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"Military - note": {
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"text": "Iraqi security forces (ISF), including conventional air and ground forces, are primarily focused on internal security duties; they are actively conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq; the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), a highly regarded force comprised of 3 special forces brigades, is the ISF's principal operational unit against ISIS<br><br>Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, aka Peshmerga) also conducted operations against ISIS; the KSF were formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the country’s constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; since 2021, the ISF and the KSF have conducted joint counter-ISIS operations in an area known as the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL), a swath of disputed territory in northern Iraq claimed by both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central Iraqi Government; the KSF/Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense<br><br>Popular Mobilization Commission and Affiliated Forces (PMF or PMC), also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or al-Hashd al-Sha’abi in Arabic), tribal militia units have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraq’s other security forces and act under the Iraqi Government’s direct control; the Iraqi Government funds the PMF, and the prime minister legally commands it, but many of the militia units take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US; the PMF/PMU is an umbrella organization comprised of many different militias, the majority of which are Shia: <br><br>--Shia militias backed by Iran; they are considered the most active and capable, and include such groups as the Badr Organization (Saraya al-Sala), Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah <br><br>--Shia militias affiliated with Shia political parties, but not aligned with Iran, such as the Peace Brigades (Saray al-Salam) <br><br>--Shia militias not connected with political parties, but affiliated with the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI (Iraq’s supreme Shia cleric), such as the Hawza militias<br><br>--other PMF/PMU militias include Sunni Tribal Mobilization militias, or Hashd al-Asha’iri; some of these militias take orders from the ISF and local authorities while others respond to orders from the larger Shia PMU militias; still other militias include Yazidi and Christian militias and the Turkmen brigades; the links of these forces to the PMU is not always clear-cut and may be loosely based on financial, legal, or political incentives<br><br>at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission for the Iraqi military in October 2018; as of 2022, the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) had about 500 troops; in December 2021, the task force that leads the defeat ISIS mission in Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), transitioned from a combat role to an advise, assist, and enable role (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "Iraqi security forces (ISF), including conventional air and ground forces, are primarily focused on internal security duties; they are actively conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) terrorist group, particularly in northern and western Iraq; the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), a highly regarded force comprised of three special forces brigades, is the ISF's principal operational unit against ISIS<br><br>Kurdish Security Forces (KSF, aka Peshmerga) also conducted operations against ISIS; the KSF were formally recognized as a legitimate Iraqi military force under the country’s constitution and have operated jointly with the Iraqi military against ISIS militants, but they also operate outside of Iraqi military command structure; since 2021, the ISF and the KSF have conducted joint counter-ISIS operations in an area known as the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL), a swath of disputed territory in northern Iraq claimed by both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central Iraqi Government; the KSF/Peshmerga report to the Kurdistan Regional Government or Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties instead of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense<br><br>Popular Mobilization Commission and Affiliated Forces (PMF or PMC), also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU, or al-Hashd al-Sha’abi in Arabic), tribal militia units have fought alongside the Iraqi military against ISIS since 2014, but the majority of these forces continue to largely ignore the 2016 Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which mandated that armed militias must be regulated in a fashion similar to Iraq’s other security forces and act under the Iraqi Government’s direct control; the Iraqi Government funds the PMF, and the prime minister legally commands it, but many of the militia units take orders from associated political parties and/or other government officials, including some with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and some that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the US; the PMF/PMU is an umbrella organization comprised of many different militias, the majority of which are Shia: <br><br>--Shia militias backed by Iran; they are considered the most active and capable, and include such groups as the Badr Organization (Saraya al-Sala), Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah <br><br>--Shia militias affiliated with Shia political parties, but not aligned with Iran, such as the Peace Brigades (Saray al-Salam) <br><br>--Shia militias not connected with political parties, but affiliated with the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI (Iraq’s supreme Shia cleric), such as the Hawza militias<br><br>--other PMF/PMU militias include Sunni Tribal Mobilization militias, or Hashd al-Asha’iri; some of these militias take orders from the ISF and local authorities while others respond to orders from the larger Shia PMU militias; still other militias include Yazidi and Christian militias and the Turkmen brigades; the links of these forces to the PMU is not always clear-cut and may be loosely based on financial, legal, or political incentives<br><br>at the request of the Iraqi government, NATO agreed to establish an advisory, training and capacity-building mission for the Iraqi military in October 2018; as of 2022, the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) had about 500 troops; in December 2021, the task force that leads the defeat ISIS mission in Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), transitioned from a combat role to an advise, assist, and enable role (2023)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "7,864 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 274,724 (Syria), 8,479 (Iran), 8,221 (Turkey) (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "7,864 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2022); 274,724 (Syria), 8,582 (Iran), 8,187 (Turkey) (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1.17 million (displacement in central and northern Iraq since January 2014) (2023)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1142,8 +1142,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Kuwaiti Armed Forces (KAF): Kuwaiti Land Forces (KLF), Kuwaiti Navy, Kuwaiti Air Force (Al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Kuwaitiya; includes Kuwaiti Air Defense Force, KADF), 25th Commando Brigade, and the Kuwait Emiri Guard Authority; Kuwaiti National Guard (KNG); Ministry of Interior: police, Kuwait State Security, Coast Guard (2023)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Emiri Guard Authority and the 25th Commando Brigade exercise independent command authority within the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, although activities such as training and equipment procurement are often coordinated with the other services; the 25th Commando Brigade is Kuwait's leading special forces unit; the Emiri Guard Authority (aka Emiri Guard Brigade) is responsible for protecting Kuwait's heads of state<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Kuwaiti National Guard reports directly to the prime minister and the amir and possesses an independent command structure, equipment inventory, and logistics corps separate from the Ministry of Defense, the regular armed services, and the Ministry of Interior; it is responsible for protecting critical infrastructure and providing support for the Ministries of Interior and Defense as required"
|
||||
"text": "Kuwaiti Armed Forces (KAF): Kuwaiti Land Forces (KLF), Kuwaiti Navy, Kuwaiti Air Force (Al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Kuwaitiya; includes Kuwaiti Air Defense Force, KADF), 25th Commando Brigade, and the Kuwait Emiri Guard Authority; Kuwaiti National Guard (KNG) (2023)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the Emiri Guard Authority and the 25th Commando Brigade exercise independent command authority within the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, although activities such as training and equipment procurement are often coordinated with the other services; the 25th Commando Brigade is Kuwait's leading special forces unit; the Emiri Guard Authority (aka Emiri Guard Brigade) is responsible for protecting Kuwait's heads of state<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Kuwaiti National Guard reports directly to the prime minister and the amir and possesses an independent command structure, equipment inventory, and logistics corps separate from the Ministry of Defense, the regular armed services, and the Ministry of Interior; it is responsible for protecting critical infrastructure and providing support for the Ministries of Interior and Defense as required<br><br><strong>note 3:</strong> the police, Kuwait State Security, and Coast Guard are under the Ministry of Interior"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "approximately 17,000 active duty armed forces personnel (12,500 Army, including the Amiri Guard and 25th Commando Brigade; 2,000 Navy; 2,500 Air Force); approximately 6,500 National Guard (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the military's inventory consists of weapons from a wide variety of sources, including Western Europe, Russia, and the US; the US has been the leading supplier of arms to Kuwait (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the military's inventory consists of weapons from a wide variety of sources, including Western Europe, Russia, and the US; the US has been the leading supplier of arms to Kuwait (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service; Kuwait reintroduced 12-month mandatory service for men aged 18-35 in May 2017 after having suspended conscription in 2001; mandatory service is divided in two phases – 4 months for training and 8 months for military service; women were allowed to volunteer in 2021 (2023)",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Lebanon’s economic crisis has had a dire effect on the country’s telecom services; although some progress has been made with developing 5G, the poor economic conditions have contributed to an erratic electricity supply and a lack of fuel to maintain generators; this has meant that internet services to areas of the country are not available on a regular basis, frustrating all those who depend on stable connectivity, and stalling business growth; adding to the difficulties are the combined stresses of the pandemic and the political crisis; a caretaker cabinet in September 2021 made way for a new government though there is little confidence on the ground that sectarian-based political horse-trading will give way to responsible governing to improve the lot of the stressed populace (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Lebanon’s economic crisis has had a dire effect on the country’s telecom services; although some progress has been made with developing 5G, the poor economic conditions have contributed to an erratic electricity supply and a lack of fuel to maintain generators; this has meant that internet services to areas of the country are not available on a regular basis, frustrating all those who depend on stable connectivity, and stalling business growth; adding to the difficulties is the political crisis; the cabinet went into caretaker status after the National Assembly election in May 2022 meaning it can only engage in routine decision making; there is little confidence on the ground that sectarian-based political horse-trading will give way to responsible governing to improve the lot of the stressed populace (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line is 16 per 100 and 77 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): Army Command (includes Presidential Guard Brigade, Land Border Regiments), Naval Forces, Air Forces; Ministry of Interior: Internal Security Forces Directorate (law enforcement; includes Mobile Gendarmerie), Directorate for General Security (DGS; border control, some domestic security duties); Parliamentary Police Force (2023)",
|
||||
"text": "Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): Army Command (includes Presidential Guard Brigade, Land Border Regiments), Naval Forces, Air Forces<br><br>Ministry of Interior: Internal Security Forces Directorate (law enforcement; includes Mobile Gendarmerie), Directorate for General Security (DGS; border control, some domestic security duties); Parliamentary Police Force (2023)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> the commander of the LAF is also the commander of the Army; the LAF patrols external borders, while official border checkpoints are under the authority of Directorate for General Security<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> the Parliamentary Police Force reports to the speaker of parliament and has responsibility for protecting parliament premises and the speaker’s residence; both the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces provide units to the Parliamentary Police Force"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1206,7 +1206,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "approximately 80,000 active troops (77,000 Army; 1,500 Navy; 1,500 Air Force) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the LAF inventory includes a wide mix of mostly older equipment from a diverse array of countries; in recent years, the US has been the leading supplier of armaments (mostly second-hand equipment) to Lebanon (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "the LAF inventory includes a wide mix of mostly older equipment from a diverse array of countries; in recent years, the US has been the leading supplier of armaments (mostly second-hand) to Lebanon (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "17-25 years of age for men and women for voluntary military service; no conscription (2022)",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Turkey continues to develop its capabilities within its telecom sector, becoming one of the relatively few countries able to build and develop its own communications satellites; with the successful launch of the Turksat 5A and 5B satellites in 2021, the country has vastly increased its bandwidth capacity; these satellites will be joined by the Turksat 6A in early 2023; the country’s telcos have invested in fiber infrastructure; deployment of fiber-based broadband networks are well established, with fiber accounting for 26.7% of all fixed broadband connections as of early 2022; the DSL sector still dominates, accounting for about 63% of connections, but its share is steadily declining, year-on-year, while the number of fiber connections has grown strongly; improved fixed and mobile infrastructure is underpinning the country’s initiatives relating to Smart City concepts, which have become a key area of focus for the emerging digital economy and the transformation to a knowledge-based economy; Turkey’s National Smart Cities Strategy and Action Plan runs through to 2023 (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "Turkey continues to develop its capabilities within its telecom sector, becoming one of the relatively few countries able to build and develop its own communications satellites; with the successful launch of the Turksat 5A and 5B satellites in 2021, the country has vastly increased its bandwidth capacity; these satellites will be joined by the Turksat 6A in 2023; the country’s telcos have invested in fiber infrastructure; deployment of fiber-based broadband networks are well established, with fiber accounting for 26.7% of all fixed broadband connections as of early 2022; the DSL sector still dominates, accounting for about 63% of connections, but its share is steadily declining, year-on-year, while the number of fiber connections has grown strongly; improved fixed and mobile infrastructure is underpinning the country’s initiatives relating to Smart City concepts, which have become a key area of focus for the emerging digital economy and the transformation to a knowledge-based economy; Turkey’s National Smart Cities Strategy and Action Plan runs through to 2023 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 15 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is 100 telephones per 100 persons (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> in 2019, a new law cut the men’s mandatory military service period in half, as well as making paid military service permanent; with the new system, the period of conscription was reduced from 12 months to 6 months for privates and non-commissioned soldiers (the service term for reserve officers chosen among university or college graduates remained 12 months); after completing 6 months of service, if a conscripted soldier wants to and is suitable for extending his military service, he may do so for an additional 6 months in return for a monthly salary; under the new law, all male Turkish citizens over the age of 20 are required to undergo a 1 month military training period, but they can obtain an exemption from the remaining 5 months of their mandatory service by paying a fee<br><strong><br>note 2:</strong> as of 2019, women made up about 0.3% of the military's full-time personnel"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 150 (Azerbaijan; monitoring cease-fire, clearing mines); 250 Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR); approximately 30,000 Cyprus; estimated 5,000 Iraq; 300 Kosovo (NATO/KFOR); 110 Lebanon (UNIFIL); estimated 500 Libya; up to 5,000 Qatar; approximately 200 Somalia (training mission); estimated 5,000-10,000 Syria (2022)",
|
||||
"text": "approximately 150 (Azerbaijan; monitoring cease-fire, clearing mines); 250 Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR); approximately 30,000 Cyprus; estimated 5,000 Iraq; 780 Kosovo (NATO/KFOR); 190 Lebanon (UNIFIL); estimated 500 Libya; up to 5,000 Qatar; approximately 200 Somalia (training mission); estimated 5,000-10,000 Syria (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note 1:</strong> between 2016 and 2020, Turkey conducted four significant military ground campaigns in northern Syria; Turkey also has deployed troops into northern Iraq on numerous occasions to combat the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), including large operations involving thousands of troops in 2007, 2011, and 2018, and smaller-scale operations in 2021 and 2022; Turkey has also conducted numerous air strikes in both Iraq and Syria; in October of 2021, Turkey’s parliament extended the military’s mandate to launch cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria by two more years<br><br><strong>note 2:</strong> in 2020, Turkey deployed hundreds of Turkish troops and as many as 5,000 Syrian fighters to Libya to support the Libyan Government of National Accord"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "10,244 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 3,358,813 (Syria) (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "10,244 (Iraq) (mid-year 2022); 3,351,582 (Syria) (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "46,596 (Somalia), 18,460 (Ethiopia) (2023)"
|
||||
"text": "46,596 (Somalia), 17,812 (Ethiopia) (2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "4.52 million (conflict in Sa'ada Governorate; clashes between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and government forces) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue