From 54403391cd24b83c2f4fe35441985049d386c622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yo Robot Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2024 22:20:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-update week 35 --- africa/ag.json | 2 +- africa/cd.json | 10 +++++----- africa/ct.json | 2 +- africa/eg.json | 2 +- africa/ek.json | 2 +- africa/er.json | 2 +- africa/et.json | 4 ++-- africa/ng.json | 2 +- africa/ni.json | 2 +- africa/od.json | 2 +- africa/sf.json | 9 ++++----- africa/so.json | 2 +- africa/su.json | 2 +- africa/to.json | 6 +++--- africa/uv.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/kr.json | 4 ++-- australia-oceania/pc.json | 8 ++++---- central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json | 2 +- central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json | 2 +- central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json | 2 +- east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json | 2 +- east-n-southeast-asia/my.json | 2 +- east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json | 2 +- middle-east/gz.json | 2 +- middle-east/ir.json | 6 +++--- middle-east/is.json | 2 +- middle-east/le.json | 2 +- middle-east/mu.json | 6 ++++++ middle-east/tu.json | 2 +- south-america/ar.json | 2 +- south-america/co.json | 2 +- south-america/pe.json | 2 +- south-asia/af.json | 5 ++--- south-asia/io.json | 6 +++--- south-asia/pk.json | 2 +- world/xx.json | 6 +++--- 36 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/africa/ag.json b/africa/ag.json index 5c0ff874..4c675df4 100644 --- a/africa/ag.json +++ b/africa/ag.json @@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@ "note": "note: conscripts comprise an estimated 70% of the military" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the ANP is responsible for external defense but also has some internal security responsibilities; key areas of concern include border and maritime security, terrorism, regional instability, and tensions with Morocco; Algeria supports the pro-independence Polisario Front in Western Sahara and accuses Morocco of supporting the Algerian separatist Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK); border security and counterterrorism have received additional focus since the Arab Spring events of 2011 and the rise of terrorist threats emanating from Libya and the Sahel; the Army and Ministry of Defense (MND) paramilitary forces of the Gendarmerie and the border guards have beefed up their presence along the frontiers with Tunisia, Libya, Niger, and Mali to interdict and deter cross-border attacks by Islamic militant groups; the ANP and MND paramilitary forces have also increased counterterrorism cooperation with some neighboring countries, particularly Tunisia, including joint operations

the ANP has also played a large role in the country’s politics since independence in 1962, including coups in 1965 and 1991; it was a key backer of BOUTEFLIKA’s election in 1999 and remained a center of power during his 20-year rule; the military was instrumental in BOUTEFLIKA’s resignation in 2019, when it withdrew support and called for him to be removed from office (2023)" + "text": "the ANP is responsible for external defense but also has some internal security responsibilities; key areas of concern include border and maritime security, terrorism, regional instability, and tensions with Morocco; Algeria supports the pro-independence Polisario Front in Western Sahara and accuses Morocco of supporting the Algerian separatist Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK); border security and counterterrorism have received additional focus since the Arab Spring events of 2011 and the rise of terrorist threats emanating from Libya and the Sahel; the Army and Ministry of Defense (MND) paramilitary forces of the Gendarmerie and the border guards have beefed up their presence along the frontiers with Tunisia, Libya, Niger, and Mali to interdict and deter cross-border attacks by Islamist militant groups; the ANP and MND paramilitary forces have also increased counterterrorism cooperation with some neighboring countries, particularly Tunisia, including joint operations

the ANP has also played a large role in the country’s politics since independence in 1962, including coups in 1965 and 1991; it was a key backer of BOUTEFLIKA’s election in 1999 and remained a center of power during his 20-year rule; the military was instrumental in BOUTEFLIKA’s resignation in 2019, when it withdrew support and called for him to be removed from office (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/africa/cd.json b/africa/cd.json index c56870eb..e7cddd1a 100644 --- a/africa/cd.json +++ b/africa/cd.json @@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ }, "Diplomatic representation from the US": { "chief of mission": { - "text": "Ambassador Alexander LASKARIS (since 18 August 2022)" + "text": "Ambassador Alexander LASKARIS (since 19 August 2022)" }, "embassy": { "text": "Rond-Point Chagoua, B.P. 413, N’Djamena" @@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "primarily oil-based economy, vulnerable to competition and price shocks; increasing extreme poverty and minimal human capital capacities; one of the most environmentally disrupted economies; high maternal/infant mortality rates destabilizing labor force potential" + "text": "

oil-dependent economy challenged by market fluctuations, regional instability, refugee influx, and climate vulnerability; high levels of extreme poverty and food insecurity; recent growth driven by oil and agricultural recovery; debt-restructuring agreement under G20 Common Framework

" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2023": { @@ -903,8 +903,8 @@ "note": "note: top five import partners based on percentage share of imports" }, "Imports - commodities": { - "text": "vaccines, jewelry, electric generating sets, broadcasting equipment, packaged medicine (2022)", - "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" + "text": "vaccines, jewelry, electric generators, broadcasting equipment, packaged medicine (2022)", + "note": "note: top five import commodities based on value in dollars" }, "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": { "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold 2021": { @@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ "text": "Chad has committed approximately 1,000-1,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the ANT has considerable combat experience against insurgents and terrorist groups; it also has a tradition of deep involvement in domestic politics; over the past decade, the ANT has received substantial foreign military assistance, particularly from France, which maintains a military base in N’Djamena; the ANT's current operational focus is on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; it is engaged with the Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin area; in addition, the ANT conducts frequent operations against internal anti-government militias and armed dissident groups

several rebel groups operate in northern Chad from bases in southern Libya, including the FACT (Front pour le Changement et la Concorde au Tchad), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic le Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le salut de la République or CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (le Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement or UFDD), and the Union of Resistance Forces (le Union des Forces de la Résistance UFR); former Chadian President Idriss DEBY was killed in April 2021 during fighting in the northern part of the country between the FACT and the Chadian Army; some armed groups, including the UFDD and UFR, signed an accord in August 2022 in return for the release of prisoners, amnesty, and an end to hostilities between the Chadian Government and these armed factions; however, other armed groups, including the FACT and CCSMR, refused to join the accord (2023)" + "text": "the ANT has considerable combat experience against insurgents and terrorist groups; it also has a tradition of deep involvement in domestic politics; over the past decade, the ANT has received substantial foreign military assistance, particularly from France, which maintains a military base in N’Djamena; the ANT's current operational focus is on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; it is engaged with the Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin area; in addition, the ANT conducts frequent operations against internal anti-government militias and armed dissident groups

a number of rebel groups operate in northern Chad, some from bases in southern Libya, including the FACT (Front pour le Changement et la Concorde au Tchad), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic le Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le salut de la République or CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (le Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement or UFDD), and the Union of Resistance Forces (le Union des Forces de la Résistance UFR); former Chadian President Idriss DEBY was killed in April 2021 during fighting in the northern part of the country between the FACT and the Chadian Army (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/africa/ct.json b/africa/ct.json index 26eddd99..d7f3e84e 100644 --- a/africa/ct.json +++ b/africa/ct.json @@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ "text": "18 years of age for military service; no conscription although the constitution provides for the possibility of conscription in the event of an imminent threat to the country (2023)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; it has been estimated that only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and it has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since, despite considerable foreign assistance; considerable portions of the country remain outside state control and are ungoverned, with the presence of multiple armed actors creating insecurity in much of the country 

in late 2020 and early 2021, the Coalition des Patriotes pour le Change (CPC), a loose coalition of armed groups comprised largely of former Seleka and anti-Balaka fighters, attacked the capital Bangui; CAR Government forces, along with Russian private military contractors and Rwandan troops, repelled the attack while the CPC retreated to its rear bases and into neighboring countries and continued conducting attacks; as of 2023, the CAR Government claimed to have restored authority across much of the country, including the capital, although armed groups, including some not affiliated with CPC, continued to carry out violent activities in regions outside the capital, threatening local stability; forces on both sides have been accused of abuses and atrocities in the fighting 

in 2018, the UN Security Council approved Russian security assistance for the CAR to help train and advise FACA personnel, as well as transport them to operational areas, provide logistical support, and assist with medical evacuation; in addition to teams of military trainers, Russia sent private military contractors to provide assistance to the FACA; the Russians have also performed other security roles such as guarding mines and government officials; some Russian contractors and the CAR forces they supported have been accused of carrying out indiscriminate killings, using excessive force against civilians, and looting

the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; as of early 2024, MINUSCA had more than 16,000 military and police personnel 

the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016, providing advice, training, and educational programs to the country's security forces; the EU mission has trained five FACA territorial infantry battalions and one amphibious infantry battalion; France and Rwanda have also provided assistance to the FACA; France suspended its support in 2021 but Rwanda continued providing troops and military training as of 2024 (2024)" + "text": "the 2013 coup resulted in the institutional collapse of the FACA; its forces were overwhelmed and forced to flee to neighboring countries; it has been estimated that only 10% of the FACA returned after the coup, and the FACA has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since, despite significant foreign assistance; considerable portions of the country remain outside state control and are ungoverned, with the presence of multiple armed actors creating insecurity in much of the country 

in late 2020 and early 2021, the Coalition des Patriotes pour le Change (CPC), a loose coalition of armed groups comprised largely of former Seleka and anti-Balaka fighters, attacked the capital Bangui; CAR Government forces, along with Russian private military contractors and Rwandan troops, repelled the attack while the CPC retreated to its rear bases and into neighboring countries and continued conducting attacks; as of 2023, the CAR Government claimed to have restored authority across much of the country, including the capital, although armed groups, including some not affiliated with CPC, continued to carry out violent activities in regions outside the capital, threatening local stability; forces on both sides have been accused of abuses and atrocities in the fighting 

in 2018, the UN Security Council approved Russian security assistance for the CAR to help train and advise FACA personnel, as well as transport them to operational areas, provide logistical support, and assist with medical evacuation; in addition to teams of military trainers, Russia sent private military contractors to provide assistance to the FACA; the Russians have also performed other security roles such as guarding mines and government officials; some Russian contractors and the CAR forces they supported have been accused of carrying out indiscriminate killings, using excessive force against civilians, and looting

the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; as of early 2024, MINUSCA had more than 16,000 military and police personnel 

the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016, providing advice, training, and educational programs to the country's security forces; the EU mission has trained five FACA territorial infantry battalions and one amphibious infantry battalion; France and Rwanda have also provided assistance to the FACA; France suspended its support in 2021, but Rwanda continued providing troops and military training as of 2024 (2024)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/africa/eg.json b/africa/eg.json index 41f12648..a26d1205 100644 --- a/africa/eg.json +++ b/africa/eg.json @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ "text": "1,000 (plus nearly 200 police) Central African Republic (MINUSCA); also has about 350 police deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under MONUSCO (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) are responsible for external defense but also have an internal role assisting police and paramilitary security forces during emergencies and in anti-terrorism operations; the EAF also participates in foreign peacekeeping and other security missions, as well as both bilateral and multinational exercises; the military has considerable political power and independence; it has long had a crucial role in Egypt’s politics and has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing

the EAF is the largest and one of the best equipped militaries in the region; key areas of concern for the EAF include Islamic militant groups operating out of the Sinai Peninsula, regional challenges such as instability in Libya and Yemen, and maritime security; since 2011, the EAF has been conducting operations alongside other security forces in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; over the past decade, it has deployed large numbers of troops along Egypt's border with Libya and provided air support to the Saudi-led coalition's intervention in Yemen; the Navy in recent years has sought to modernize and expand its capabilities and profile in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, including the acquisition of helicopter carriers, modern frigates, and attack submarines; in 2020, the EAF inaugurated a large joint service military base on the Red Sea to secure the country’s southern coasts, protect economic investments and natural resources, and confront security challenges in the Red Sea region

Egypt is a major security partner of the US and one of the largest recipients of US military aid in the region; it also has Major Non-NATO Ally status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; it is composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US are the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2023)" + "text": "the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) are responsible for external defense but also have an internal role assisting police and paramilitary security forces during emergencies and in anti-terrorism operations; the EAF also participates in foreign peacekeeping and other security missions, as well as both bilateral and multinational exercises; the military has considerable political power and independence; it has long had a crucial role in Egypt’s politics and has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running banks, businesses, gas stations, shipping lines, and utilities, and producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing

the EAF is the largest and one of the best equipped militaries in the region; key areas of concern for the EAF include Islamic militant groups operating out of the Sinai Peninsula, regional challenges such as instability in Libya and Yemen, and maritime security; since 2011, the EAF has been conducting operations alongside other security forces in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); over the past decade, it has deployed large numbers of troops along Egypt's border with Libya and provided air support to the Saudi-led coalition's intervention in Yemen; the Navy in recent years has sought to modernize and expand its capabilities and profile in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea, including the acquisition of helicopter carriers, modern frigates, and attack submarines; in 2020, the EAF inaugurated a large joint service military base on the Red Sea to secure the country’s southern coasts, protect economic investments and natural resources, and confront security challenges in the Red Sea region

Egypt is a major security partner of the US and one of the largest recipients of US military aid in the region; it also has Major Non-NATO Ally status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between Egypt and Israel; it is composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries; Colombia, Fiji, and the US are the leading providers of troops to the MFO (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/africa/ek.json b/africa/ek.json index 37752471..b625568f 100644 --- a/africa/ek.json +++ b/africa/ek.json @@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ "Transnational Issues": { "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 2 Watch List — Equatorial Guinea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but it is making significant efforts to do so and was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/equatorial-guinea/

" + "text": "Tier 2 Watch List — Equatorial Guinea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but it is making significant efforts to do so and was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/equatorial-guinea/" } } } diff --git a/africa/er.json b/africa/er.json index 746189a6..e1be136c 100644 --- a/africa/er.json +++ b/africa/er.json @@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ "Transnational Issues": { "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 3 — Eritrea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Eritrea remained on Tier 3; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/eritrea/

" + "text": "Tier 3 — Eritrea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore Eritrea remained on Tier 3; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/eritrea/" } } } diff --git a/africa/et.json b/africa/et.json index cf7a75a5..0a7217ca 100644 --- a/africa/et.json +++ b/africa/et.json @@ -1210,10 +1210,10 @@ "text": "18-22 years of age for voluntary military service (although the military may, when necessary, recruit a person more than 22 years old); no compulsory military service, but the military can conduct callups when necessary and compliance is compulsory (2023)" }, "Military deployments": { - "text": "approximately 5-8,000 in Somalia (approximately 3,000 for ATMIS; the remainder under a bilateral agreement with the Somali Government; note - foreign troop contingents in Somalia under ATMIS are drawing down towards a final departure in December 2024); 1,500 South Sudan (UNMISS) (2024)" + "text": "as many as 10,000 troops in Somalia (approximately 3,000 for ATMIS; the remainder under a bilateral agreement with the Somali Government; note - foreign troop contingents in Somalia under ATMIS are drawing down towards a final departure in December 2024); 1,500 South Sudan (UNMISS) (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the ENDF is focused on both external threats emanating from its neighbors and internal threats from multiple internal armed groups; since 1998, the ENDF has engaged in several conventional and counterinsurgency operations, including border wars with Eritrea (1998-2000) and Somalia (2006-2008) and internal conflicts with the Tigray regional state (2020-2022), several insurgent groups and ethnic militias (including the ethnonationalist Amhara Fano), and the al-Shabaab terrorist group (see Appendix T); as of 2024, the ENDF was conducting counterinsurgency operations against anti-government militants in several states, including in Oromya (Oromia) against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), an insurgent group that claims to be fighting for greater autonomy for the Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group; in 2022, militants from the Somalia-based al-Shabaab terrorist group launched an incursion into Ethiopia's Somali (Sumale) regional state, attacking villages and security forces; the Ethiopian Government claimed that regional security forces killed hundreds of al-Shabaab fighters and subsequently deployed additional ENDF troops into Somalia’s Gedo region to prevent further incursions (2024)" + "text": "the ENDF has traditionally been one of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest, most experienced, and best equipped militaries, but it suffered heavy casualties and equipment losses during the 2020-2022 Tigray conflict; the ENDF is focused on both external threats emanating from its neighbors and internal threats from multiple internal armed groups; since 1998, the ENDF has engaged in several conventional and counterinsurgency operations, including border wars with Eritrea (1998-2000) and Somalia (2006-2008) and internal conflicts with the Tigray regional state (2020-2022), several insurgent groups and ethnic militias (including the ethnonationalist Amhara Fano), and the al-Shabaab terrorist group; as of 2024, the ENDF was conducting counterinsurgency operations against anti-government militants in several states, including in Oromya (Oromia) against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), an insurgent group that claims to be fighting for greater autonomy for the Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group; in 2022, militants from the Somalia-based al-Shabaab terrorist group launched an incursion into Ethiopia's Somali (Sumale) regional state, attacking villages and security forces; the Ethiopian Government claimed that regional security forces killed hundreds of al-Shabaab fighters and subsequently deployed additional ENDF troops into Somalia’s Gedo region to prevent further incursions (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/africa/ng.json b/africa/ng.json index 25151be7..904d73c9 100644 --- a/africa/ng.json +++ b/africa/ng.json @@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ "text": "Niger has committed about 1,000 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating in the general area of the Lake Chad Basin and along Nigeria's northeast border; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "while the FAN is responsible for ensuring external security, most of its focus is on internal counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations against terrorist groups operating in the areas bordering Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria, as well as much of northern Niger and the Diffa and Lake Chad regions; these groups include the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) in the Greater Sahara, Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

the FAN has conducted training and combat operations with foreign partners, including the French and US; the EU has also provided security assistance, particularly to the Gendarmerie (GN), National Guard (GNN), and the National Police; the FAN also conducts counterterrorism operations with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which coordinates the Lake Chad states’ operations against Boko Haram; it conducted counterinsurgency operations against Taureg rebels during the periods of 1990-95 and 2007-09

in recent years, Niger has focused on making its security services more mobile to improve their effectiveness in countering terrorism and protecting the country’s borders; with training support and material assistance from the US and the EU, each security service has created new units or reconfigured existing units with an emphasis on mobility, hybridization, and specialized training; since the 2010s, the Army has created a special operations command, several special intervention battalions, and an anti-terrorism unit known as the 1st Expeditionary Force of Niger (EFoN); the GN has created mobile units modeled on European gendarmerie forces known as the Rapid Action Group—Surveillance and Response in the Sahel (Groupe d'action Rapides—Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel or GAR-SI Sahel); the National Guard (GNN) has developed mobile Multipurpose Squadrons (Escadrons Polyvalentes de la Garde Nationale de Niger or EP-GNN), while the National Police have created Mobile Border Control Companies (Compagnie Mobile de Contrôle des Frontières or CMCF); Niger has also established training centers for special forces in Tillia and peacekeeping in Ouallam; meanwhile, the Air Force has received armed UAVs from Turkey

the Army was established in 1960 from French colonial forces, while the Air Force was formed as the Niger National Escadrille in 1961; the GN received its first Nigerien commander in 1962; since its establishment, Niger’s military has played a significant role in the country’s politics, conducting coups in 1974, 1996, 1999, and 2010, and ruling Niger for much of the period before 1999; it seized control of the government again in 2023 (2023)" + "text": "while the FAN is responsible for ensuring external security, most of its focus is on internal counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations against terrorist groups operating in the areas bordering Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria, as well as much of northern Niger and the Diffa and Lake Chad regions; these groups include the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

the FAN has conducted training and combat operations with foreign partners, including the French and US; the EU has also provided security assistance, particularly to the Gendarmerie (GN), National Guard (GNN), and the National Police; the FAN also conducts counterterrorism operations with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which coordinates the Lake Chad states’ operations against Boko Haram; it conducted counterinsurgency operations against Taureg rebels during the periods of 1990-95 and 2007-09

in recent years, Niger has focused on making its security services more mobile to improve their effectiveness in countering terrorism and protecting the country’s borders; with training support and material assistance from the US and the EU, each security service has created new units or reconfigured existing units with an emphasis on mobility, hybridization, and specialized training; since the 2010s, the Army has established a special operations command, several special intervention battalions, and an anti-terrorism unit known as the 1st Expeditionary Force of Niger (EFoN); the GN has created mobile units modeled on European gendarmerie forces known as the Rapid Action Group—Surveillance and Response in the Sahel (Groupe d'action Rapides—Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel or GAR-SI Sahel); the National Guard (GNN) has established mobile Multipurpose Squadrons (Escadrons Polyvalentes de la Garde Nationale de Niger or EP-GNN), while the National Police have created Mobile Border Control Companies (Compagnie Mobile de Contrôle des Frontières or CMCF); Niger has also established training centers for special forces in Tillia and peacekeeping in Ouallam; meanwhile, the Air Force has received armed UAVs from Turkey

the Army was established in 1960 from French colonial forces, while the Air Force was formed as the Niger National Escadrille in 1961; the GN received its first Nigerien commander in 1962; since its establishment, Niger’s military has played a significant role in the country’s politics, conducting coups in 1974, 1996, 1999, and 2010, and ruling Niger for much of the period before 1999; it seized control of the government again in 2023 (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/africa/ni.json b/africa/ni.json index 20533380..0367d269 100644 --- a/africa/ni.json +++ b/africa/ni.json @@ -1208,7 +1208,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN): Army, Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force

Ministry of Interior: Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC); Ministry of Police Affairs: Nigeria Police Force (NPF) (2024)", - "note": "note 1: the NSCDC is a paramilitary agency commissioned to assist the military in the management of threats to internal security, including attacks and natural disasters

note 2: the Office of the National Security Advisor is responsible for coordinating all security and enforcement agencies, including the Department of State Security (DSS), the NSCDC, the Ministry of Justice, and the NPF; border security responsibilities are shared among the NPF, the DSS, the NSCDC, Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration Service, and the AFN

note 3: some states have created local security forces akin to neighborhood watches in response to increased violence, insecurity, and criminality that have exceeded the response capacity of federal government security forces but as of January 2024, official security forces remained the constitutional perogative of the federal government" + "note": "note 1: the NSCDC is a paramilitary agency commissioned to assist the military in the management of threats to internal security, including attacks and natural disasters

note 2: the Office of the National Security Advisor is responsible for coordinating all security and enforcement agencies, including the Department of State Security (DSS), the NSCDC, the Ministry of Justice, and the Police; border security responsibilities are shared among the NPF, the DSS, the NSCDC, Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration Service, and the AFN

note 3: some states have created local security forces akin to neighborhood watches in response to increased violence, insecurity, and criminality that have exceeded the response capacity of federal government security forces, but official security forces remained the constitutional prerogative of the federal government; in 2023, the federal government began deploying thousands of \"agro rangers\" across 19 states and the Federal Capital Territory to help safeguard farmland and mediate conflicts, especially in areas hit by farmer-herder clashes " }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2023": { diff --git a/africa/od.json b/africa/od.json index de6cd42f..b06d0b88 100644 --- a/africa/od.json +++ b/africa/od.json @@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 3 — South Sudan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore, South Sudan remains on Tier 3; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/south-sudan/

" + "text": "Tier 3 — South Sudan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore, South Sudan remains on Tier 3; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/south-sudan/" } } } diff --git a/africa/sf.json b/africa/sf.json index 470a1ea1..bdafde34 100644 --- a/africa/sf.json +++ b/africa/sf.json @@ -127,8 +127,7 @@ }, "female": { "text": "30,778,259 (2024 est.)" - }, - "note": "note: South Africa's 2022 census has drawn widespread criticism for flawed methodology that may have affected the results; if the numbers are proven to be inaccurate, The World Factbook will revert to the previous census data" + } }, "Nationality": { "noun": { @@ -139,8 +138,8 @@ } }, "Ethnic groups": { - "text": "Black African 81.4%, Coloured 8.2%, White 7.3%, Indian/Asian 2.7%, other 0.4% (2022 est.)", - "note": "note: Coloured is a term used in South Africa, including on the national census, for persons of mixed race ancestry who developed a distinct cultural identity over several hundred years" + "text": "Black African 80.9%, Colored 8.8%, White 7.8%, Indian/Asian 2.6%  (2021 est.)", + "note": "note: Colored is a term used in South Africa, including on the national census, for persons of mixed race ancestry who developed a distinct cultural identity over several hundred years" }, "Languages": { "Languages": { @@ -152,7 +151,7 @@ "note": "note: data represent language spoken most often at home" }, "Religions": { - "text": "Christian 85.3%, African traditional 7.8%, Muslim 1.6%, Hindu 1.1%, other 1.3%, none 2.9% (2022 est.)" + "text": "Christian 86%, ancestral, tribal, animist, or other traditional African religions 5.4%, Muslim 1.9%, other 1.5%, nothing in particular 5.2% (2015 est.)" }, "Demographic profile": { "text": "

South Africa’s youthful population is gradually aging, as the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) has declined dramatically from about 6 children per woman in the 1960s to roughly 2.2 in 2014, and has remained at this level as of 2022. This pattern is similar to fertility trends in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, and sets South Africa apart from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average TFR remains higher than other regions of the world. Today, South Africa’s decreasing number of reproductive age women is having fewer children, as women increase their educational attainment, workforce participation, and use of family planning methods; delay marriage; and opt for smaller families.

As the proportion of working-age South Africans has grown relative to children and the elderly, South Africa has been unable to achieve a demographic dividend because persistent high unemployment and the prevalence of HIV/AIDs have created a larger-than-normal dependent population. HIV/AIDS was also responsible for South Africa’s average life expectancy plunging to less than 43 years in 2008; it has rebounded to 65 years as of 2022. HIV/AIDS continues to be a serious public health threat, although awareness-raising campaigns and the wider availability of anti-retroviral drugs is stabilizing the number of new cases, enabling infected individuals to live longer, healthier lives, and reducing mother-child transmissions.

Migration to South Africa began in the second half of the 17th century when traders from the Dutch East India Company settled in the Cape and started using slaves from South and southeast Asia (mainly from India but also from present-day Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia) and southeast Africa (Madagascar and Mozambique) as farm laborers and, to a lesser extent, as domestic servants. The Indian subcontinent remained the Cape Colony’s main source of slaves in the early 18th century, while slaves were increasingly obtained from southeast Africa in the latter part of the 18th century and into the 19th century under British rule.

After slavery was completely abolished in the British Empire in 1838, South Africa’s colonists turned to temporary African migrants and indentured labor through agreements with India and later China, countries that were anxious to export workers to alleviate domestic poverty and overpopulation. Of the more than 150,000 indentured Indian laborers hired to work in Natal’s sugar plantations between 1860 and 1911, most exercised the right as British subjects to remain permanently (a small number of Indian immigrants came freely as merchants). Because of growing resentment toward Indian workers, the 63,000 indentured Chinese workers who mined gold in Transvaal between 1904 and 1911 were under more restrictive contracts and generally were forced to return to their homeland.

In the late 19th century and nearly the entire 20th century, South Africa’s then British colonies’ and Dutch states’ enforced selective immigration policies that welcomed \"assimilable\" white Europeans as permanent residents but excluded or restricted other immigrants. Following the Union of South Africa’s passage of a law in 1913 prohibiting Asian and other non-white immigrants and its elimination of the indenture system in 1917, temporary African contract laborers from neighboring countries became the dominant source of labor in the burgeoning mining industries. Others worked in agriculture and smaller numbers in manufacturing, domestic service, transportation, and construction. Throughout the 20th century, at least 40% of South Africa’s miners were foreigners; the numbers peaked at over 80% in the late 1960s. Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana, and Eswatini were the primary sources of miners, and Malawi and Zimbabwe were periodic suppliers.

Under apartheid, a \"two gates\" migration policy focused on policing and deporting illegal migrants rather than on managing migration to meet South Africa’s development needs. The exclusionary 1991 Aliens Control Act limited labor recruitment to the highly skilled as defined by the ruling white minority, while bilateral labor agreements provided exemptions that enabled the influential mining industry and, to a lesser extent, commercial farms, to hire temporary, low-paid workers from neighboring states. Illegal African migrants were often tacitly allowed to work for low pay in other sectors but were always under threat of deportation.

The abolishment of apartheid in 1994 led to the development of a new inclusive national identity and the strengthening of the country’s restrictive immigration policy. Despite South Africa’s protectionist approach to immigration, the downsizing and closing of mines, and rising unemployment, migrants from across the continent believed that the country held work opportunities. Fewer African labor migrants were issued temporary work permits and, instead, increasingly entered South Africa with visitors’ permits or came illegally, which drove growth in cross-border trade and the informal job market. A new wave of Asian immigrants has also arrived over the last two decades, many operating small retail businesses.

In the post-apartheid period, increasing numbers of highly skilled white workers emigrated, citing dissatisfaction with the political situation, crime, poor services, and a reduced quality of life. The 2002 Immigration Act and later amendments were intended to facilitate the temporary migration of skilled foreign labor to fill labor shortages, but instead the legislation continues to create regulatory obstacles. Although the education system has improved and brain drain has slowed in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, South Africa continues to face skills shortages in several key sectors, such as health care and technology.

South Africa’s stability and economic growth has acted as a magnet for refugees and asylum seekers from nearby countries, despite the prevalence of discrimination and xenophobic violence. Refugees have included an estimated 350,000 Mozambicans during its 1980s civil war and, more recently, several thousand Somalis, Congolese, and Ethiopians. Nearly all of the tens of thousands of Zimbabweans who have applied for asylum in South Africa have been categorized as economic migrants and denied refuge.

" diff --git a/africa/so.json b/africa/so.json index 5c407d75..32d96043 100644 --- a/africa/so.json +++ b/africa/so.json @@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@ "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service for men and women; conscription of men aged 18-40 and women aged 18-30 is authorized, but not currently utilized (2023)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces are actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group; al-Shabaab controls large parts of southern and central Somalia (see Appendix T)

the SNA is a lightly armed force of more than a dozen brigades; its most effective units are assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2023, the Danab Brigade numbered about 2,000 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have up to 5,000 trained troops; SNA soldiers have also received training from Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the EU, Uganda, and the UK

the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; originally about 20,000-strong (civilians, military, and police), ATMIS began reducing its staffing levels in mid-2023; its planned departure from Somalia is the end of 2024

UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS (2024)" + "text": "the Somali National Army (SNA) and supporting security and militia forces are actively conducting operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group; al-Shabaab controls large parts of southern and central Somalia

the SNA is a lightly armed force of more than a dozen brigades; its most effective units are assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; as of 2023, the Danab Brigade numbered about 2,000 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have up to 5,000 trained troops; SNA soldiers have also received training from Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the EU, Uganda, and the UK

the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in April 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners in 2018 and updated in 2021 to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; originally about 20,000-strong (civilians, military, and police), ATMIS began reducing its staffing levels in mid-2023; its planned departure from Somalia is the end of 2024

UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community; the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to ATMIS, UNSOM, and the Somali security forces on joint operations with ATMIS (2024)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/africa/su.json b/africa/su.json index e361c959..8c7b50ea 100644 --- a/africa/su.json +++ b/africa/su.json @@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ }, "Economy": { "Economic overview": { - "text": "low-income Sahel economy; one of the world’s major agricultural exporters; shared oil pipeline exports with South Sudan; transitional government increasing human capital investment; food prices hit hard by COVID-19; ongoing Gezira Scheme irrigation project" + "text": "

low-income Sahel economy devastated by ongoing civil war; major impacts on rural income, basic commodity prices, industrial production, agricultural supply chain, communications and commerce; hyperinflation and currency depreciation worsening food access and humanitarian conditions

" }, "Real GDP (purchasing power parity)": { "Real GDP (purchasing power parity) 2023": { diff --git a/africa/to.json b/africa/to.json index ffcf2dea..89af2462 100644 --- a/africa/to.json +++ b/africa/to.json @@ -541,10 +541,10 @@ }, "Constitution": { "history": { - "text": "several previous; latest adopted 27 September 1992, effective 14 October 1992" + "text": "several previous; latest adopted 27 September 1992, effective 14 October 1992; revised 6 May 2024" }, "amendments": { - "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or supported by at least one fifth of the National Assembly membership; passage requires four-fifths majority vote by the Assembly; a referendum is required if approved by only two-thirds majority of the Assembly or if requested by the president; constitutional articles on the republican and secular form of government cannot be amended; amended 2002, 2007, last in 2023 " + "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or supported by at least one fifth of the National Assembly membership; passage requires four-fifths majority vote by the Assembly; a referendum is required if approved by only two-thirds majority of the Assembly or if requested by the president; constitutional articles on the republican and secular form of government cannot be amended; amended 2002, 2007, last in 2024 (reported as a revision)" } }, "International law organization participation": { @@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ "note": "note: as of 2022, about 7% of the military's personnel were women" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "since its creation in 1963, the Togolese military has had a history of interfering in the country’s politics with assassinations, coups, influence, and a large military crackdown in 2005 that killed hundreds; over the past decade, however, it has made some efforts to reform and professionalize, as well as increase its role in UN peacekeeping activities; Togo maintains a regional peacekeeping training center for military and police in Lome; the military participates in multinational exercises and has received training from foreign partners, including France and the US

the FAT’s current focuses are primarily terrorism and maritime security; in recent years, it has increased operations in the northern border region of the country to boost border security and prevent terrorist infiltrations from Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida-affiliated militant groups based in Mali that also operates in neighboring Burkina Faso; in 2022, the Togolese Government declared a state of emergency in the north due to the threat from JNIM following an attack on a Togolese military post that killed several soldiers; northern Togo has also had problems with banditry, as well as arms, drugs, fuel, and gold smuggling, which has aggravated local disputes and provided terrorist groups with financial resources; the Navy and Air Force have increased focus on combating piracy and smuggling in the Gulf of Guinea (2023)" + "text": "since its creation in 1963, the Togolese military has had a history of interfering in the country’s politics with assassinations, coups, influence, and a large military crackdown in 2005 that killed hundreds; over the past decade, however, it has made some efforts to reform and professionalize, as well as increase its role in UN peacekeeping activities; Togo maintains a regional peacekeeping training center for military and police in Lome; the military participates in multinational exercises and has received training from foreign partners, including France and the US

the FAT’s current focuses are primarily terrorism and maritime security; in recent years, it has increased operations in the northern border region of the country to boost border security and prevent terrorist infiltrations from Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida-affiliated militant groups based in Mali that also operates in neighboring Burkina Faso; in 2022, the Togolese Government declared a state of emergency in the north due to the threat from JNIM following an attack on a Togolese military post that killed several soldiers; northern Togo has also had problems with banditry, as well as arms, drugs, fuel, and gold smuggling, which has aggravated local disputes and provided terrorist groups with financial resources; the Navy and Air Force have increased focus on combating piracy and smuggling in the Gulf of Guinea (2024)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/africa/uv.json b/africa/uv.json index ca8942e8..080fffba 100644 --- a/africa/uv.json +++ b/africa/uv.json @@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ "Military and Security": { "Military and security forces": { "text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF; aka National Armed Forces (FAN), aka Defense and Security Forces (Forces de Défense et de Sécurité or FDS)): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso), National Gendarmerie, National Fire Brigade (Brigade Nationale de Sapeurs-Pompiers or BNSP); Homeland Defense Volunteers (Forcés de Volontaires de Défense pour la Patrie or VDP)

Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité): National Police (2024)", - "note": "note 1: the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security; Gendarmerie troops are typically integrated with Army forces in anti-terrorism operations; specialized counterterrorism units include the Army's special forces, the Special Legion of the National Gendarmerie, and the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of National Police

note 2: the VDP is a lightly-armed civilian defense/militia force established in 2019 to act as auxiliaries to the Army in the fight against militants; the volunteers receive two weeks of training and typically assist with carrying out surveillance, information-gathering, and escort duties, as well as local defense, and were to be based in each of the country's more than 300 municipalities; in 2022, the military government created a \"Patriotic Watch and Defense Brigade\" (La Brigade de Veille et de Défense Patriotique or BVDP) under the FABF to coordinate the VDP recruits" + "note": "note 1: the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security; the Gendarmerie's primary mission is counterterrorism; it is comprised of “legions” and mobile squadrons, including a Special Legion for combating organized crime and terrorism and providing security for high-level officials and government institutions; other government forces specializing in counterterrorism include the Army's Special Forces and the Multipurpose Intervention Unit of the National Police

note 2: the VDP is a lightly-armed civilian defense/militia force established in 2019 to act as auxiliaries to the Army in the fight against militants; the volunteers receive two weeks of training and typically assist with carrying out surveillance, information-gathering, and escort duties, as well as local defense, and were to be based in each of the country's more than 300 municipalities; in 2022, the military government created a \"Patriotic Watch and Defense Brigade\" (La Brigade de Veille et de Défense Patriotique or BVDP) under the FABF to coordinate the VDP recruits" }, "Military expenditures": { "Military Expenditures 2023": { @@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@ "note": "note: the military government implemented an emergency law in 2023 that allows the president extensive powers to combat terrorist groups operating in the country, including conscripting citizens into the security services" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the FABF has a history of interference in the country’s politics, having conducted eight coups since its formation in 1960-61, including the most recent in September of 2022; several combat units were disbanded in 2011 following mutinies; while the FABF is responsible for external defense, it has an internal security role and can be called out to assist internal security forces in restoring public order, combating crime, securing the border, and counterterrorism; indeed, for more than a decade, its focus has largely been counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and it is actively engaged in combat operations against terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), particularly in the northern and eastern regions; the FABF is struggling to contain the groups, however, and a large portion of the country—40% by some estimates—is not under government control

in the north, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups that act as al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Magreb's (AQIM) arm in the Sahel, has exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; in 2023, JNIM was active in 11 of the country's 13 provinces; the ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) terrorist group operates in the eastern part of the country (2024)" + "text": "the FABF has a history of interference in the country’s politics, having conducted eight coups since its formation in 1960-61, including the most recent in September 2022; several combat units were disbanded in 2011 following mutinies; while the FABF is responsible for external defense, it has an internal security role and can be called out to assist internal security forces in restoring public order, combating crime, securing the border, and counterterrorism; indeed, for more than a decade, its focus has largely been internal counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and it is actively engaged in combat operations against terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), particularly in the northern and eastern regions; the FABF has struggled to contain the groups, however, and a large portion of the country—40% by some estimates—is not under government control

in the north, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a coalition of al-Qa'ida linked militant groups that act as al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Magreb's (AQIM) arm in the Sahel, has exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; in 2023, JNIM was active in 11 of the country's 13 provinces; the ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) terrorist group operates in the eastern part of the country (2024)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/kr.json b/australia-oceania/kr.json index a50deb49..bb7678cc 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/kr.json +++ b/australia-oceania/kr.json @@ -530,10 +530,10 @@ "text": "unicameral House of Assembly or Maneaba Ni Maungatabu (45 seats; 44 members directly elected in single- and multi-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in two rounds if needed, and 1 member appointed by the Rabi Council of Leaders - representing Banaba Island; members serve 4-year terms)" }, "elections": { - "text": "legislative elections originally scheduled to be held in two rounds on 7 and 15 April 2020 but rescheduled for 14 and 21 April 2020 (next to be held in 2024)" + "text": "first round held on 14 August 2024; second round held on 19 August 2024 (next to be held in 2028)" }, "election results": { - "text": "percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - TKB 22, BKM 22, appointed 1; composition - 42 men, 3 women; percentage women 6.7%" + "text": "percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - 41 men, 4 women; percentage women 9% (as of August, 2024; note - newly elected House of Assembly members, which include 5 women, to be seated on 13 September 2024)" } }, "Judicial branch": { diff --git a/australia-oceania/pc.json b/australia-oceania/pc.json index 5782bceb..68a456c9 100644 --- a/australia-oceania/pc.json +++ b/australia-oceania/pc.json @@ -174,16 +174,16 @@ "text": "none (overseas territory of the UK)" }, "National holiday": { - "text": "Birthday of Queen ELIZABETH II, second Saturday in June (1926); Discovery Day (Pitcairn Day), 2 July (1767)" + "text": "Birthday of King CHARLES III, second Saturday in June (1948); Discovery Day (Pitcairn Day), 2 July (1767)" + }, + "Legal system": { + "text": "local island by-laws" }, "Constitution": { "history": { "text": "several previous; latest drafted 10 February 2010, presented 17 February 2010, effective 4 March 2010" } }, - "Legal system": { - "text": "local island by-laws" - }, "Citizenship": { "text": "see United Kingdom" }, diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json index 793bb186..b2ac996a 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor-General Cynthia A. PRATT (since 1 September 2023)" }, "head of government": { - "text": "Prime Minister Philip DAVIS (since 17 September 2021)" + "text": "Prime Minister Philip Edward DAVIS (since 17 September 2021)" }, "cabinet": { "text": "Cabinet appointed by governor-general on recommendation of prime minister" diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json index 05234d8c..2da7ea76 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json @@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ "Transnational Issues": { "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 3 — Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore, Cuba remained on Tier 3; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/cuba/

" + "text": "Tier 3 — Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore, Cuba remained on Tier 3; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/cuba/" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json index bc0cc9ce..5b335796 100644 --- a/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json +++ b/central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json @@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ "text": "men and women 18-25 may volunteer for the FAdH (2023)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "Haiti's military was disbanded in 1995 after it participated in multiple coups and was accused of other political interference and human rights violations; the military was reinstated by former President MOISE in 2017 after the UN ended its peacekeeping operation in Haiti; the reconstituted military established an Army command in 2018 and has received training assistance from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico; the military’s stated mission is to assist with natural disaster relief, border security, and combating transnational crime; in 2023, Prime Minister HENRY called upon the military to assist the National Police (PNH) in combating armed gangs, which have overwhelmed the PNH, killed hundreds of Haitians, and seized control of much of the capital Port-au-Prince since the assassination of President MOISE in 2021; as of early 2024, at least 300 criminal groups were operating in Haiti

in 2023, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a Kenya-led multinational security support 
mission (MSS) to help bring gang violence under control; the first contingent of MSS personnel from the Kenya National Police Service arrived in mid-2024; the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Chad, and Jamaica have also pledged forces (2024)" + "text": "Haiti's military was disbanded in 1995 after it participated in multiple coups and was accused of other political interference and human rights violations; the military was reinstated by former President MOISE in 2017 after the UN ended its peacekeeping operation in Haiti; the reconstituted military established an Army command in 2018 and has received training assistance from Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico; the military’s stated mission is to assist with natural disaster relief, border security, and combating transnational crime; in 2023, Prime Minister HENRY called upon the military to assist the National Police (PNH) in combating armed gangs, which have overwhelmed the PNH, killed hundreds of Haitians, and seized control of much of the capital Port-au-Prince since the assassination of President MOISE in 2021; as of 2024, at least 300 criminal groups were operating in Haiti

in 2023, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a Kenya-led multinational security support mission (MSS) to help bring gang violence under control; the first contingent of MSS personnel from the Kenya National Police Service arrived in mid-2024; the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Chad, and Jamaica have also pledged forces; the mission is slated to have a total of 2,500 personnel (2024)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json index 81ee1dde..2a41fa7b 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/bx.json @@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ "note": "note: the Gurkha Reserve Unit (GRU) employs about 500 Gurkhas from Nepal, the majority of whom are veterans of the British Army and the Singapore Police Force who have joined the GRU as a second career" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Royal Brunei Armed Forces were formed in 1961 with British support as the Brunei Malay Regiment; \"Royal\" was added as an honorary title in 1965 and its current name was given in 1984; the military is responsible for ensuring the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as countering outside aggression, terrorism, and insurgency 

Brunei has a long-standing defense relationship with the UK and hosts a British Army garrison, which includes a Gurkha battalion and a jungle warfare school; Brunei also hosts a Singaporean military training detachment (2023)" + "text": "the Royal Brunei Armed Forces were formed in 1961 with British support as the Brunei Malay Regiment; \"Royal\" was added as an honorary title in 1965 and its current name was given in 1984; the military is responsible for ensuring the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as countering outside aggression, terrorism, and insurgency 

Brunei has a long-standing defense relationship with the UK and hosts a British Army garrison, which includes a Gurkha battalion and a jungle warfare school; Brunei also hosts a Singaporean military training detachment (2024)" } }, "Transnational Issues": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json index 30df9e33..9fefbc2c 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/my.json @@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ "text": "830 Lebanon (UNIFIL) (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Malaysian military is primarily focused on internal and maritime security and responding to natural disasters; maritime security has received increased emphasis in recent years, particularly anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca and countering Chinese incursions in Malaysia’s Economic Exclusion Zone, as well as addressing identified shortfalls in maritime capabilities; as such, Malaysia has undertaken efforts to procure more modern ships, improve air and maritime surveillance, expand the Navy’s support infrastructure (particularly bases/ports) and domestic ship-building capacities, restructure naval command and control, and increase naval cooperation with regional and international partners; as of 2023, for example, the Navy had five frigates on order (due in 2026-2029), which would increase the number of operational frigates from two to seven, and complement its small inventory of littoral combat ships (comparable to light frigates in capabilities) and offshore patrol vessels; in addition, the Navy conducts air and naval patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines; it also cooperates with the US military, including on maritime surveillance and training

Malaysia is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily (2023)" + "text": "the Malaysian military is primarily focused on internal and maritime security and responding to natural disasters; while the Army has traditionally been the dominant service, maritime security has received increased emphasis in recent years, particularly anti-piracy operations in the Strait of Malacca and countering Chinese incursions in Malaysia’s Economic Exclusion Zone, as well as addressing identified shortfalls in maritime capabilities; as such, Malaysia has undertaken efforts to procure more modern ships, improve air and maritime surveillance, expand the Navy’s support infrastructure (particularly bases/ports) and domestic ship-building capacities, restructure naval command and control, and increase naval cooperation with regional and international partners; as of 2023, for example, the Navy had five frigates on order (due in 2026-2029), which would increase the number of operational frigates from two to seven, and complement its small inventory of littoral combat ships (comparable to light frigates in capabilities) and offshore patrol vessels; in addition, the Navy conducts air and naval patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines; it also cooperates with the US military, including on maritime surveillance and training

Malaysia is a member of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA), a series of mutual assistance agreements reached in 1971 embracing Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK; the FPDA commits the members to consult with one another in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the members and to mutually decide what measures should be taken, jointly or separately; there is no specific obligation to intervene militarily (2023)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json index eb4f8adb..010132cf 100644 --- a/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json +++ b/east-n-southeast-asia/rp.json @@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ "note": "note: as of 2020, women made up about 6% of the active military; women were allowed to enter the Philippine Military Academy and train as combat soldiers in 1993" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were formally organized during the American colonial period as the Philippine Army; they were established by the National Defense Act of 1935 and were comprised of both Filipinos and Americans

the US and Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty in 1951; in 2014, the two governments signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that established new parameters for military cooperation; under the EDCA, the Philippine Government may grant US troops access to Philippine military bases on a rotational basis “for security cooperation exercises, joint and combined military training activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities”; the Philippines has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the Philippine Government faces a number of internal threats from several armed separatists, terrorists, and criminal groups; as such, much of the AFP's operational focus is internal security, particularly in the south, where several separatist Islamic insurgent and terrorist groups operate and a considerable portion of the AFP is typically deployed; additional combat operations are conducted against the Communist People’s Party/New People’s Army, which is active mostly on Luzon, as well as the Visayas and areas of Mindanao; prior to a peace deal in 2014, the AFP fought a decades-long conflict against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a separatist organization based mostly on the island of Mindanao; the MILF's armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), had up to 40,000 fighters under arms

the AFP's naval forces are also involved in interdiction operations against terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups around the southern islands, including joint maritime patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in the Sulu Sea; rising tensions with China over disputed waters and land features in the South China Sea since 2012 has spurred the AFP to place more emphasis on blue-water naval capabilities, including acquiring larger warships such frigates, corvettes, offshore patrol vessels, and a landing platform dock (LPD) amphibious assault ship

the Philippines National Police (PNP) has an active role in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations alongside the AFP, particularly the Special Action Force, a PNP commando unit that specializes in urban counter-terrorism operations (2023)" + "text": "the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were formally organized during the American colonial period as the Philippine Army; they were established by the National Defense Act of 1935 and were comprised of both Filipinos and Americans

the US and Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty in 1951; in 2014, the two governments signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that established new parameters for military cooperation; under the EDCA, the Philippine Government may grant US troops access to Philippine military bases on a rotational basis “for security cooperation exercises, joint and combined military training activities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities”; the Philippines has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the Philippine Government faces a number of internal threats from several armed separatists, terrorists, and criminal groups; as such, much of the AFP's operational focus is internal security, particularly in the south, where several separatist Islamic insurgent and terrorist groups operate and a considerable portion of the AFP is typically deployed; additional combat operations are conducted against the Communist People’s Party/New People’s Army, which is active mostly on Luzon, as well as the Visayas and areas of Mindanao; prior to a peace deal in 2014, the AFP fought a decades-long conflict against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a separatist organization based mostly on the island of Mindanao; the MILF's armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), had up to 40,000 fighters under arms

the AFP's naval forces are also involved in interdiction operations against terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups around the southern islands, including joint maritime patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in the Sulu Sea; rising tensions with China over disputed waters and land features in the South China Sea since 2012 has spurred the AFP to place more emphasis on blue-water naval capabilities, including acquiring larger warships such frigates, corvettes, offshore patrol vessels, and a landing platform dock (LPD) amphibious assault ship

the Philippines National Police (PNP) has an active role in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations alongside the AFP, particularly the Special Action Force, a PNP commando unit that specializes in urban counter-terrorism operations (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/middle-east/gz.json b/middle-east/gz.json index f21727b5..6e8aff01 100644 --- a/middle-east/gz.json +++ b/middle-east/gz.json @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ "text": "the military wing is armed with light weapons, including an inventory of rocket, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, indirect fire (typically mortars), and armed UAV capabilities; HAMAS acquires its weapons through smuggling or local construction and receives significant military support from Iran (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, HAMAS has had repeated clashes with Israel, including armed conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and 2023; Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also operates in the Gaza Strip and has cooperated with HAMAS; see Appendix T for more details on HAMAS and PIJ (2023)" + "text": "since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the terrorist group HAMAS has had repeated clashes with Israel, including armed conflicts in 2008-09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and 2023-24; the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorist group also operates in the Gaza Strip and has cooperated with HAMAS (2024)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/middle-east/ir.json b/middle-east/ir.json index f410a745..27bef7a1 100644 --- a/middle-east/ir.json +++ b/middle-east/ir.json @@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ "text": "information varies; up to 600,000 active armed forces personnel; approximately 400,000 Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (350,000 Ground Forces; 18,000 Navy; 40,000 Air Force/Air Defense Forces); approximately 150-190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (100-150,000 Ground Forces; 20,000 Navy; 15,000 Aerospace Force; 5-15,000 Qods Force); estimated 90,000 active Basij Paramilitary Forces (2023)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { - "text": "the Iranian military's inventory includes a mix of domestically produced and mostly older foreign equipment largely of Chinese, Russian, Soviet, and US origin (US equipment acquired prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979); it also has some military equipment from North Korea, including midget submarines and ballistic missiles; in recent years, Iran has received some newer equipment from Russia; Iran has a defense industry with the capacity to develop, produce, support, and sustain air, land, missile, and naval weapons programs (2023)" + "text": "the Iranian military's inventory includes a mix of domestically produced and mostly older foreign equipment largely of Chinese, Russian, Soviet, and US origin (US equipment acquired prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979); it also has some military equipment from North Korea, including midget submarines and ballistic missiles; in recent years, Iran has received some newer equipment from Russia; Iran has a defense industry with the capacity to develop, produce, support, and sustain air, land, missile, and naval weapons programs (2024)" }, "Military service age and obligation": { "text": "military service is compulsory for all Iranian men 18/19 to approximately age 40; 16 for voluntary military service (may be as low as 15 for the Basij); conscript military service obligation is up to 24 months, depending on the location of service (soldiers serving in places of high security risk and deprived areas serve shorter terms); women exempted from military service (2023)", @@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ "note": "note: Iran has recruited, trained, and funded thousands of Syrian and foreign fighters to support the ASAD regime during the Syrian civil war" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formed in May 1979 in the immediate aftermath of Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s fall, as leftists, nationalists, and Islamists jockeyed for power; while the interim prime minister controlled the government and state institutions, such as the Army, followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI organized counterweights, including the IRGC, to protect the Islamic revolution; the IRGC’s command structure bypassed the elected president and went directly to KHOMEINI; the IRGC played a critical role in helping KHOMEINI consolidate power in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, and it ensured that KHOMEINI's Islamic revolutionary vision prevailed against domestic challenges from nationalists and leftist factions in the scramble for control after the Shah's departure

the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) transformed the IRGC into more of a conventional fighting force with its own ground, air, naval, and special forces, plus control over Iran’s strategic missile and rocket forces; today, the IRGC is a highly institutionalized and parallel military force to Iran’s regular armed forces (Artesh); it is heavily involved in internal security and has significant influence in the political and economic spheres of Iranian society, as well as Iran’s foreign policy; on the economic front, it owns factories and corporations and subsidiaries in banking, infrastructure, housing, airlines, tourism and other sectors; its special operations forces, known as the Qods/Quds Force, specialize in foreign missions and have provided advice, funding, guidance, material support, training, and weapons to militants in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as extremist groups, including HAMAS, Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (see Appendix T for additional details on the IRGC and Qods Force); the Qods Force also conducts intelligence and reconnaissance operations 

the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) is the senior-most body for formulating Iran’s foreign and security policy; it is formally chaired by the president, who also appoints the SCNS secretary; its members include the speaker of the Majles, the head of the judiciary, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (chief of defense or CHOD), the commanders of the Artesh (regular forces) and IRGC, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and intelligence; the SCNS reports to the supreme leader; the supreme leader is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces

the Iranian Armed Forces are divided between the regular forces (Artesh) and the IRGC; the Artesh primarily focuses on defending Iran’s borders and territorial waters from external threats, while the IRGC has a broader mission to defend the Iranian revolution from any foreign or domestic threat; in 1989, Iran established the Armed Forces General Staff to coordinate military action across both the Artesh and the IRGC; Iran also has a joint military headquarters, the Khatam ol-Anbia Central Headquarters, to command the Artesh and IRGC in wartime (2023)" + "text": "the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formed in May 1979 in the immediate aftermath of Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s fall, as leftists, nationalists, and Islamists jockeyed for power; while the interim prime minister controlled the government and state institutions, such as the Army, followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI organized counterweights, including the IRGC, to protect the Islamic revolution; the IRGC’s command structure bypassed the elected president and went directly to KHOMEINI; the IRGC played a critical role in helping KHOMEINI consolidate power in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, and it ensured that KHOMEINI's Islamic revolutionary vision prevailed against domestic challenges from nationalists and leftist factions in the scramble for control after the Shah's departure

the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) transformed the IRGC into more of a conventional fighting force with its own ground, air, naval, and special forces, plus control over Iran’s strategic missile and rocket forces; today, the IRGC is a highly institutionalized and parallel military force to Iran’s regular armed forces (Artesh); it is heavily involved in internal security and has significant influence in the political and economic spheres of Iranian society, as well as Iran’s foreign policy; on the economic front, it owns factories and corporations and subsidiaries in banking, infrastructure, housing, airlines, tourism and other sectors; its special operations forces, known as the Qods/Quds Force, specialize in foreign missions and have provided advice, funding, guidance, material support, training, and weapons to militants in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as extremist groups, including HAMAS, Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad; the Qods Force also conducts intelligence and reconnaissance operations; note - both the IRGC and the Qods Force have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the US 

the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) is the senior-most body for formulating Iran’s foreign and security policy; it is formally chaired by the president, who also appoints the SCNS secretary; its members include the speaker of the Majles, the head of the judiciary, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (chief of defense or CHOD), the commanders of the Artesh (regular forces) and IRGC, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and intelligence; the SCNS reports to the supreme leader; the supreme leader is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces

the Iranian Armed Forces are divided between the regular forces (Artesh) and the IRGC; the Artesh primarily focuses on defending Iran’s borders and territorial waters from external threats, while the IRGC has a broader mission to defend the Iranian revolution from any foreign or domestic threat; in 1989, Iran established the Armed Forces General Staff to coordinate military action across both the Artesh and the IRGC; Iran also has a joint military headquarters, the Khatam ol-Anbia Central Headquarters, to command the Artesh and IRGC in wartime (2024)" } }, "Space": { @@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 3 — Iran does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore, Iran remained on Tier 3; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/iran/

" + "text": "Tier 3 — Iran does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, therefore, Iran remained on Tier 3; for more details, go to:  https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/iran/" } }, "Illicit drugs": { diff --git a/middle-east/is.json b/middle-east/is.json index 5992f1ae..25331c12 100644 --- a/middle-east/is.json +++ b/middle-east/is.json @@ -1200,7 +1200,7 @@ "note": "note 1: women have served in the Israeli military since its establishment in 1948; as of 2021, women made up about 35% of IDF personnel; more than 90% of military specialties, including combat specialties, were open to women and more than 3,000 women were serving in combat units; the IDF's first mixed-gender infantry unit, the Caracal Battalion, was established in 2004

note 2: conscripts comprise about 70% of the IDF active-duty ground forces

note 3: the IDF recruits non-Israeli Jews and non-Jews with a minimum of one Jewish grandparent, as well as converts to Judaism; each year the IDF brings in about 800-1,000 foreign recruits from around the world" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the IDF is responsible for external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities; its primary operational focuses include the threat posed by Iran, instability in Syria, and terrorist organizations, including HAMAS and Hizballah, both of which are backed by Iran, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; it has considerable experience in conventional and unconventional warfare; since the country’s founding in 1948, the IDF has been in conflicts against one or more of its Arab neighbors in 1948-49, 1956, 1967, 1967-70 (“War of Attrition”), 1973, 1982, and 2006; it bombed nuclear sites in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, and since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, has conducted numerous air strikes in Syria against Iranian, Iranian-backed militia, and Hizballah forces, and Syrian Government targets; over the same period, the IDF has carried out strikes against Hizballah in Lebanon in response to attacks on Israeli territory; these strikes followed an Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, also to suppress Hizballah attacks; the IDF has conducted operations against HAMAS and PIJ, which operate out of the Gaza Strip and have launched numerous rocket attacks against Israel; HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in 2021, which ended in an informal truce, although sporadic clashes continued; in October 2023, HAMAS conducted a surprise ground assault into Israel, supported by rockets and armed drones, killing more than 1,000 Israelis and foreigners living in Israel; the attack sparked another war with Israel, including an IDF ground invasion of Gaza; the IDF also has conducted security operations against Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories of East Jerusalem and the West Bank 

since its creation from armed Jewish militias during the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948-49, the IDF, particularly the Ground Force, has been guided by a requirement to rapidly mobilize and defend the country’s territory from numerically superior neighboring countries

Israel’s primary security partner is the US; consistent with a 10-year (2019-2028) Memorandum of Understanding, the US annually provides over $3 billion in military financing and cooperative military programs, such as missile defense; the US also provides Israel access to US-produced military weapons systems including advanced fighter aircraft; Israel has Major Non-NATO Ally status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; UNDOF consists of about 1,000 military personnel (2023)" + "text": "the IDF is responsible for external defense but also has some domestic security responsibilities; its primary operational focuses include the threat posed by Iran, instability in Syria, and terrorist organizations, including HAMAS and Hizballah, both of which are backed by Iran, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); it has considerable experience in conventional and unconventional warfare; since the country’s founding in 1948, the IDF has been in conflicts against one or more of its Arab neighbors in 1948-49, 1956, 1967, 1967-70 (“War of Attrition”), 1973, 1982, and 2006; it bombed nuclear sites in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, and since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, has conducted numerous air strikes in Syria against Iranian, Iranian-backed militia, and Hizballah forces, and Syrian Government targets; over the same period, the IDF has carried out strikes against Hizballah in Lebanon in response to attacks on Israeli territory; the IDF has conducted operations against HAMAS and PIJ, which operate out of the Gaza Strip and have launched numerous rocket attacks against Israel; HAMAS and Israel fought an 11-day conflict in 2021, which ended in an informal truce, although sporadic clashes continued; in October 2023, HAMAS conducted a surprise ground assault into Israel, supported by rockets and armed drones, killing more than 1,000 Israelis and foreigners living in Israel; the attack resulted in an IDF ground invasion of Gaza where fighting continued into 2024; the IDF also has conducted security operations against Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories of East Jerusalem and the West Bank 

since its creation from armed Jewish militias during the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948-49, the IDF, particularly the Ground Force, has been guided by a requirement to rapidly mobilize and defend the country’s territory from numerically superior neighboring countries; the active duty military is backed up by a large force of trained reserves--approximately 300-400,000 personnel--that can be mobilized rapidly 

Israel’s primary security partner is the US; consistent with a 10-year (2019-2028) Memorandum of Understanding, the US annually provides over $3 billion in military financing and cooperative military programs, such as missile defense; the US also provides Israel access to US-produced military weapons systems including advanced fighter aircraft; Israel has Major Non-NATO Ally status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has operated in the Golan between Israel and Syria since 1974 to monitor the ceasefire following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and supervise the areas of separation between the two countries; UNDOF consists of about 1,000 military personnel (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/middle-east/le.json b/middle-east/le.json index 85f693c6..7e7bd664 100644 --- a/middle-east/le.json +++ b/middle-east/le.json @@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ "note": "note: women were allowed to volunteer for military service in the 1980s; as of 2023, they comprised about 5% of the active duty military" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the LAF’s primary responsibilities are defense against external attack, border security, protecting the country’s territorial waters, and assisting with internal security and development projects; on Lebanon’s eastern and northern borders with Syria, the LAF has conducted operations to prevent or eliminate infiltrations of militants linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and al-Qa’ida terrorist groups since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011; in the south, its focus is on maintaining stability along its volatile border with Israel where the LAF and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are separated by the \"Blue Line,\" a demarcation line established by the UN in 2000 following the withdrawal of the IDF, which had occupied southern Lebanon since invading in 1982; since the line’s establishment, the LAF and IDF have had periodic clashes, and IDF aircraft have routinely entered Lebanese air space; the Iranian-backed terrorist group Hizballah is based in south Lebanon and acts as a militia alongside the LAF; it has launched periodic cross-border attacks on Israel and threatened additional attacks, while the IDF has conducted air strikes on Hizballah positions and in 2006 launched a ground invasion into southern Lebanon to suppress the group; in 2022, Israeli and Lebanese officials agreed on a common demarcation of their maritime border after US mediation

the LAF’s domestic security responsibilities include countering narcotics trafficking and smuggling, managing protests, conducting search and rescue, and intervening to prevent violence between rival political factions; in recent years, the military has faced a financial crisis as government debt and national economic difficulties have undercut its ability to train and fully pay and supply personnel, which has sparked domestic and international fears that the armed forces may disintegrate; the UN, as well as countries such as France and the US have provided financial assistance 

the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) has operated in the country since 1978, originally under UNSCRs 425 and 426 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area; following the July-August 2006 war, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1701 enhancing UNIFIL and deciding that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities, support the LAF as they deployed throughout the south of Lebanon, and provide assistance for humanitarian access for civilians and the return of displaced persons; UNIFIL has approximately 9,500 military personnel deployed in the country and includes a maritime task force (2023)" + "text": "the primary responsibilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are defense against external attack, border security, protecting the country’s territorial waters, and assisting with internal security and development projects; on Lebanon’s eastern and northern borders with Syria, the LAF has conducted operations to prevent or eliminate infiltrations of militants linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and al-Qa’ida terrorist groups since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011; in the south, its focus is on maintaining stability along its volatile land border with Israel where the LAF and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are separated by the \"Blue Line,\" a demarcation line established by the UN in 2000 following the withdrawal of the IDF, which had occupied southern Lebanon since invading in 1982; since the line’s establishment, the LAF and IDF have had periodic clashes, and IDF aircraft have routinely entered Lebanese air space; the Iranian-backed terrorist group Hizballah is based in south Lebanon where it has significant influence and acts as a militia alongside the LAF; it has launched periodic cross-border attacks on Israel and threatened additional attacks, while the IDF has conducted air strikes on Hizballah positions and in 2006 launched a ground invasion into southern Lebanon to suppress the group; following the terrorist group HAMAS's attack on Israel from Gaza in October 2023 and subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza, Hizballah has sought to demonstrate solidarity with HAMAS by launching barrages of missiles, rockets, and armed drones into northern Israel; these attacks continued into 2024 and have been countered by numerous strikes from Israel on Hizballah targets in Lebanon 

the LAF’s domestic security responsibilities include countering narcotics trafficking and smuggling, managing protests, conducting search and rescue, and intervening to prevent violence between rival political factions; in recent years, the military has faced a financial crisis as government debt and national economic difficulties have undercut its ability to train and fully pay and supply personnel, which has sparked domestic and international fears that the armed forces may disintegrate; the UN, as well as countries such as France and the US have provided financial assistance 

the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) has operated in the country since 1978, originally under UNSCRs 425 and 426 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area; following the July-August 2006 war, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1701 enhancing UNIFIL and deciding that in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities, support the LAF as they deployed throughout the south of Lebanon, and provide assistance for humanitarian access for civilians and the return of displaced persons; UNIFIL has approximately 9,500 military personnel deployed in the country and includes a maritime task force (2024)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/middle-east/mu.json b/middle-east/mu.json index 5511c74d..6be9dc68 100644 --- a/middle-east/mu.json +++ b/middle-east/mu.json @@ -1138,6 +1138,12 @@ "text": "the SAF’s primary responsibility is external security; it is a small but well-equipped military that trains regularly, including with foreign partners such as the UK, US, and Gulf Cooperation Council countries; the SAF has a longstanding security relationship with the British military going back to the 18th century; the relationship was notable during the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-1976), when the British military provided considerable assistance to the SAF in their eventually successful counterinsurgency campaign; today, the SAF and the British maintain a joint training base in Oman and exercise together regularly; in 2017, Oman and the UK signed an agreement allowing the British military the use of facilities at Al Duqm Port; in 2019, the US obtained access to the port, expanding on previous military cooperation agreements in 2014, 2010, and 1980; Oman also allows other nations to use some of its maritime facilities, including China

Oman has a small but relatively modern navy that conducts maritime security operations along the country’s long coastline, including patrolling, ensuring freedom of navigation in the key naval chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz, and countering piracy and smuggling; while Oman is not a member of the US-led, multinational Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which operates task forces to counter piracy and smuggling, the Omani Navy has at times participated in CMF-led joint exercises (2023)" } }, + "Terrorism": { + "Terrorist group(s)": { + "text": "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)", + "note": "note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in the Terrorism reference guide" + } + }, "Transnational Issues": { "Refugees and internally displaced persons": { "refugees (country of origin)": { diff --git a/middle-east/tu.json b/middle-east/tu.json index 4b88d437..cddc796e 100644 --- a/middle-east/tu.json +++ b/middle-east/tu.json @@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ "note": "note: Turkey maintains significant military forces in both Iraq and Syria; size estimates vary as some forces are long-term deployments while others are deployed for specific operations; between 2016 and 2020, Turkey conducted four significant military ground campaigns in northern Syria with the stated purpose of securing its southern border; Turkey also has deployed troops into northern Iraq on numerous occasions to combat the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), including large operations involving thousands of troops in 2007, 2011, and 2018, and smaller-scale operations in 2021 and 2022; Turkey has also conducted numerous air strikes in both Iraq and Syria" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have a range of responsibilities, including defending and deterring against external threats, participating in international peacekeeping operations, fulfilling Turkey’s military commitments to NATO, providing disaster/humanitarian relief and assistance to domestic law enforcement if requested by civil authorities, and supporting Turkey’s overall national security interests; the TAF also has overall responsibility for the security of Turkey’s borders; Turkey is active in international peacekeeping and other security operations under the EU, NATO, and the UN, as well as under bilateral agreements with some countries; Turkey has established expeditionary military bases in northern Cyprus, Qatar, Somalia, and Sudan

Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and hosts a considerable NATO and US military presence, including the headquarters for a NATO Land Command and a Rapid Deployment Corps, multiple airbases for NATO and US aircraft, NATO air/missile defense systems, and training centers; the TAF is the second-largest military in NATO behind the US and exercises regularly with NATO partners

the TAF is a large, well-equipped force comprised of a mix of professionals and conscripts; it has considerable operational experience; in addition to peacekeeping and military assistance operations in recent years in such places as Afghanistan (NATO), Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU), Kosovo (NATO), Lebanon (UN), and Somalia (bilateral), it has conducted combat missions of varying duration and scale in Iraq, Libya, and Syria; since the 1980s, the TAF has been involved in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign against the US-designated terrorist group the Kurdistan Worker’s Party or PKK, a Kurdish militant political organization and armed guerrilla movement, which historically operated throughout Kurdistan but is now primarily based in the mountainous Kurdish-majority regions of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq; other key areas of concern for the TAF include tensions with fellow NATO member Greece over territorial disputes and Cyprus, tensions between neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan, threats from the terrorist groups al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham, and the Russia-Ukraine war; under a long-range (2033) strategic plan, the TAF continues a considerable effort to modernize its equipment and force structure

Turkey’s military has a rich history that it traces back to 200 B.C., although the modern TAF was formed following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923); the TAF has traditionally had a significant influence in the country as the “guardian” of Turkish politics, but its political role was largely lost after the failed 2016 coup attempt; the military has a substantial stake in Turkey's economy through a holding company that is involved in the automotive, energy, finance, and logistics sectors, as well as iron and steel production (2023)" + "text": "the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have a range of responsibilities, including defending and deterring against external threats, participating in international peacekeeping operations, fulfilling Turkey’s military commitments to NATO, providing disaster/humanitarian relief and assistance to domestic law enforcement if requested by civil authorities, and supporting Turkey’s overall national security interests; the TAF also has overall responsibility for the security of Turkey’s borders; Turkey is active in international peacekeeping and other security operations under the EU, NATO, and the UN, as well as under bilateral agreements with some countries; Turkey has established expeditionary military bases in northern Cyprus, Qatar, Somalia, and Sudan

Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and hosts a considerable NATO and US military presence, including the headquarters for a NATO Land Command and a Rapid Deployment Corps, multiple airbases for NATO and US aircraft, NATO air/missile defense systems, and training centers; the TAF is the second-largest military in NATO behind the US and exercises regularly with NATO partners

the TAF is a large, well-equipped force comprised of a mix of professionals and conscripts; it has considerable operational experience; in addition to peacekeeping and military assistance operations in recent years in such places as Afghanistan (NATO), Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU), Kosovo (NATO), Lebanon (UN), and Somalia (bilateral), it has conducted combat missions of varying duration and scale in Iraq, Libya, and Syria; since the 1980s, the TAF has been involved in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign against the US-designated terrorist group the Kurdistan Worker’s Party or PKK, a Kurdish militant political organization and armed guerrilla movement, which historically operated throughout Kurdistan but is now primarily based in the mountainous Kurdish-majority regions of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq; other key areas of concern for the TAF include tensions with fellow NATO member Greece over territorial disputes and Cyprus, tensions between neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan, threats from the terrorist groups al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham, and the Russia-Ukraine war; under a long-range (2033) strategic plan, the TAF continues a large effort to modernize its equipment and force structure

Turkey’s military has a rich history that it traces back to 200 B.C., although the modern TAF was formed following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923); the TAF has traditionally had a significant influence in the country as the “guardian” of Turkish politics, but its political role was largely lost after the failed 2016 coup attempt; the military has a substantial stake in Turkey's economy through a holding company that is involved in the automotive, energy, finance, and logistics sectors, as well as iron and steel production (2023)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/south-america/ar.json b/south-america/ar.json index 36a739d7..517e8f97 100644 --- a/south-america/ar.json +++ b/south-america/ar.json @@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ "text": "325 Cyprus (UNFICYP) (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Argentine military’s primary responsibilities are territorial defense and protecting the country’s sovereignty; other duties include border security, countering narcotics trafficking, and other internal missions, such as disaster response and infrastructure development; it also conducts support operations in Antarctica to promote an active presence in areas of national territory that are sparsely populated; the military participates in both bilateral and multinational training exercises and supports UN peacekeeping operations

Argentina participates in the Tripartite Command, an interagency security mechanism created by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to exchange information and combat transnational threats, including terrorism, in the Tri-Border Area; in addition, Argentina and Chile have a joint peacekeeping force known as the Combined Southern Cross Peacekeeping Force (FPC), designed to be made available to the UN; the FPC is made up of infantry, command and control, air, naval, and logistics support elements; Argentina has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the Army and Navy were both created in 1810 during the Argentine War of Independence, while the Air Force was established in 1945; the military conducted coups d'état in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976; the 1976 coup, aka the \"National Reorganization Process,\" marked the beginning of the so-called \"Dirty War,\" a period of state-sponsored terrorism that saw the deaths or disappearances of thousands of Argentinians; the defeat in the 1983 Falklands War led to the downfall of the military junta (2023)" + "text": "the Argentine military’s primary responsibilities are territorial defense and protecting the country’s sovereignty; other duties include border security, countering narcotics trafficking, and other internal missions, such as disaster response and infrastructure development; it also conducts support operations in Antarctica to promote an active presence in areas of national territory that are sparsely populated; the military participates in both bilateral and multinational training exercises and supports UN peacekeeping operations

Argentina participates in the Tripartite Command, an interagency security mechanism created by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to exchange information and combat transnational threats, including terrorism, in the Tri-Border Area; in addition, Argentina and Chile have a joint peacekeeping force known as the Combined Southern Cross Peacekeeping Force (FPC), designed to be made available to the UN; the FPC is made up of infantry, command and control, air, naval, and logistics support elements; Argentina has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation

the Army and Navy were both created in 1810 during the Argentine War of Independence, while the Air Force was established in 1945; the military conducted coups d'état in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976; the 1976 coup, aka the \"National Reorganization Process,\" marked the beginning of the so-called \"Dirty War,\" a period of state-sponsored terrorism that saw the deaths or disappearances of thousands of Argentinians; the defeat in the 1983 Falklands War led to the downfall of the military junta (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/south-america/co.json b/south-america/co.json index 02d0f48d..713e5591 100644 --- a/south-america/co.json +++ b/south-america/co.json @@ -1233,7 +1233,7 @@ "text": "275 Egypt (MFO) (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Colombian military is responsible for defending and maintaining the country’s independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity but also has a considerable internal security role, which includes protecting the civilian population, as well as private and state-owned assets, and ensuring a secure environment; the military’s primary focus is the conduct of counternarcotic, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency operations against drug traffickers, several factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the insurgent/terrorist group National Liberation Army (ELN); these operations are challenged by difficult topography and long and porous land borders

the Colombian Government signed a peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, but some former members (known as dissidents) have returned to fighting (note - these dissident groups include the US-designated foreign terrorist groups Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army or FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia; see Appendix T); since 2017, the Colombian Government has had periodic cease-fire and peace discussions with ELN and the FARC dissidents with varying degrees of success, including a 6-month cease-fire with the ELN in 2023

the military is also focused on the security challenges posed by its neighbor, Venezuela, where instability has attracted narcotics traffickers, and both the ELN and FARC dissidents operate openly; Colombia shares a 1,370-mile (2,200 km) border with Venezuela; ELN and FARC insurgents have also used neighboring Ecuador to rest, resupply, and shelter

Colombia has close security ties with the US, including joint training, military assistance, and designation in 2022 as a Major Non-NATO Ally, which provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense, trade, and security cooperation; it also has close ties with some regional neighbors, such as Argentina, Chile, and Peru; Colombian military and security forces have training programs with their counterparts from a variety of countries, mostly those from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; security ties with Ecuador and Venezuela have been challenged by the presence of narcotics traffickers, ELN, and FARC dissidents in the border regions (2023)" + "text": "the Colombian military is responsible for defending and maintaining the country’s independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity but also has a considerable internal security role, which includes protecting the civilian population, as well as private and state-owned assets, and ensuring a secure environment; the military’s primary focus is the conduct of counternarcotic, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency operations against drug traffickers, several factions of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the insurgent/terrorist group National Liberation Army (ELN); these operations are challenged by difficult topography and long and porous land borders

the Colombian Government signed a peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, but some former members (known as dissidents) have returned to fighting (note - these dissident groups include the US-designated foreign terrorist groups Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army or FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia); since 2017, the Colombian Government has had periodic cease-fire and peace discussions with ELN and the FARC dissidents with varying degrees of success, including a 6-month cease-fire with the ELN in 2023-2024

the military is also focused on the security challenges posed by its neighbor, Venezuela, where instability has attracted narcotics traffickers, and both the ELN and FARC dissidents operate openly; Colombia shares a 1,370-mile (2,200 km) border with Venezuela; ELN and FARC insurgents have also used neighboring Ecuador to rest, resupply, and shelter

Colombia has close security ties with the US, including joint training, military assistance, and designation in 2022 as a Major Non-NATO Ally, which provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense, trade, and security cooperation; it also has close ties with some regional neighbors, such as Argentina, Chile, and Peru; Colombian military and security forces have training programs with their counterparts from a variety of countries, mostly those from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; security ties with Ecuador and Venezuela have been challenged by the presence of narcotics traffickers, ELN, and FARC dissidents in the border regions (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/south-america/pe.json b/south-america/pe.json index 89255dbc..2f1ee072 100644 --- a/south-america/pe.json +++ b/south-america/pe.json @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ "text": "225 Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Peruvian Armed Forces (FAP) are responsible for external defense in addition to some domestic security responsibilities in designated emergency areas and in exceptional circumstances; key areas of focus include counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, disaster relief, and maritime security operations; the FAP has contributed to UN missions since 1958 and has ties to regional militaries, particularly Colombia, as well as those of numerous other countries such as China, Russia, Spain, and the US; the FAP’s last external conflict was a brief border war with Ecuador in 1995; the FAP supported the police during anti-government protests in early 2023 and was accused of human rights violations 

the Joint Command of the Armed Forces of Peru (Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas del Perú or CCFFAA) has responsibility for the planning, preparation, coordination, and direction of the military’s operations; the CCFFAA has oversight over commands for air, air defense, cyber, maritime, and special operations, as well as five regional commands (Amazonas, central, north, south, and Ucayali) and a Special Command of the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers (CE-VRAEM); CE-VRAEM is responsible for combating the remnants of the Shining Path terrorist group (aka Sendero Luminoso; see Appendix T) and includes several thousand air, ground, naval, police, and special forces personnel; the FAP also provides aircraft, vehicles, and logistical support to the command (2023)" + "text": "the Peruvian Armed Forces (FAP) are responsible for external defense in addition to some domestic security responsibilities in designated emergency areas and in exceptional circumstances; key areas of focus include counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, disaster relief, and maritime security operations; the FAP has contributed to UN missions since 1958 and has ties to regional militaries, particularly Colombia, as well as those of numerous other countries such as China, Russia, Spain, and the US; the FAP’s last external conflict was a brief border war with Ecuador in 1995; the FAP supported the police during anti-government protests in early 2023 and was accused of human rights violations 

the Joint Command of the Armed Forces of Peru (Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas del Perú or CCFFAA) has responsibility for the planning, preparation, coordination, and direction of the military’s operations; the CCFFAA has oversight over commands for air, air defense, cyber, maritime, and special operations, as well as five regional commands (Amazonas, central, north, south, and Ucayali) and a Special Command of the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers (CE-VRAEM); CE-VRAEM is responsible for combating the remnants of the Shining Path terrorist group (aka Sendero Luminoso) and includes several thousand air, ground, naval, police, and special forces personnel; the FAP also provides aircraft, vehicles, and logistical support to the command (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/south-asia/af.json b/south-asia/af.json index 4d41cfb6..604fb1a1 100644 --- a/south-asia/af.json +++ b/south-asia/af.json @@ -1088,8 +1088,7 @@ } }, "Military and security service personnel strengths": { - "text": "the Taliban claims that approximately 150,000 personnel had been recruited for a new National Army; it also claims that over 50,000 personnel had been trained for the police forces (2023)", - "note": "note: as of 2022, there were also up to 10,000 foreign fighters in Afghanistan, most of whom were aligned with the Taliban" + "text": "the Taliban claims that the defense forces have approximately 150,000 personnel; it also claims that over 50,000 personnel had been trained for the police forces (2024)" }, "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": { "text": "the Taliban military/security forces are armed largely with US-provided equipment captured from the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces  (2023)" @@ -1099,7 +1098,7 @@ "note": "note: the Taliban dismissed nearly all women from the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, except those serving in detention facilities and assisting with body searches" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Taliban’s primary security threats include ISIS-Khorasan and anti-Taliban resistance elements known as the National Resistance Front and Afghanistan Freedom Front (2023)" + "text": "the Taliban’s primary security threats include ISIS-Khorasan and anti-Taliban resistance elements  (2023)" } }, "Terrorism": { diff --git a/south-asia/io.json b/south-asia/io.json index 805ecf09..dc254408 100644 --- a/south-asia/io.json +++ b/south-asia/io.json @@ -154,14 +154,14 @@ "text": "UTC+6 (12 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)" } }, + "Legal system": { + "text": "the laws of the UK apply where applicable" + }, "Constitution": { "history": { "text": "British Indian Ocean Territory (Constitution) Order 2004" } }, - "Legal system": { - "text": "the laws of the UK apply where applicable" - }, "Executive branch": { "chief of state": { "text": "King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022)" diff --git a/south-asia/pk.json b/south-asia/pk.json index a09c49a6..56e9abe8 100644 --- a/south-asia/pk.json +++ b/south-asia/pk.json @@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ "text": "1,300 Central African Republic (MINUSCA); 290 South Sudan (UNMISS); 590 Sudan (UNISFA) (2024)" }, "Military - note": { - "text": "the Pakistan military operates largely independently and without effective civilian oversight; it has ruled the country for more than 30 years since independence in 1947 and continues to play a significant role in Pakistan's political arena; it also has a large stake in the country’s economic sector and is involved in a diverse array of commercial activities, including banking, construction of public projects, employment services, energy and power generation, fertilizer, food, housing, real estate, and security services

the military is responsible for external defense but also has a large role in domestic security; its chief external focus is on the perceived threat posed by India; the military is the lead security agency in many areas of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); it has considerable operational experience, having engaged in several conflicts with India and conducted counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations for decades against various militant groups in the former FATA; it is also one of the longest serving and largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions; China is its closest security partner

Pakistan and India have fought several conflicts since 1947, including the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and the Indo-Pakistan and Bangladesh War of Independence of 1971, as well as two clashes over the disputed region of Kashmir (First Kashmir War of 1947 and the Kargil Conflict of 1999); a fragile cease-fire in Kashmir was reached in 2003, revised in 2018, and reaffirmed in 2021, although the Line of Control remains contested, and India has accused Pakistan of backing armed separatists and terrorist organizations in Jammu and Kashmir; in addition, India and Pakistan have battled over the Siachen Glacier of Kashmir, which was seized by India in 1984 with Pakistan attempting to retake the area in 1985, 1987, and 1995; despite a cease-fire, as of 2023 both sides continued to maintain a permanent military presence there with outposts at altitudes above 20,000 feet (over 6,000 meters) where most casualties were due to extreme weather or the hazards of operating in the high mountain terrain of the world’s highest conflict, including avalanches, exposure, and altitude sickness

Pakistan has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation (2023)" + "text": "the Pakistan military operates largely independently and without effective civilian oversight; it has ruled the country for more than 30 years since independence in 1947 and continues to play a significant role in Pakistan's political arena; it also has a large stake in the country’s economic sector and is involved in a diverse array of commercial activities, including banking, construction of public projects, employment services, energy and power generation, fertilizer, food, housing, real estate, and security services

the military is responsible for external defense but also has a large role in domestic security; its chief external focus is on the perceived threat posed by India; the military is the lead security agency in many areas of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); it has considerable operational experience, having engaged in several conflicts with India and conducted counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations for decades against various internal militant groups; it is also one of the longest serving and largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions; China is its closest security partner

Pakistan and India have fought several conflicts since 1947, including the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and the Indo-Pakistan and Bangladesh War of Independence of 1971, as well as two clashes over the disputed region of Kashmir (First Kashmir War of 1947 and the Kargil Conflict of 1999); a fragile cease-fire in Kashmir was reached in 2003, revised in 2018, and reaffirmed in 2021, although the Line of Control remains contested, and India has accused Pakistan of backing armed separatists and terrorist organizations in Jammu and Kashmir; in addition, India and Pakistan have battled over the Siachen Glacier of Kashmir, which was seized by India in 1984 with Pakistan attempting to retake the area in 1985, 1987, and 1995; despite a cease-fire, both sides continue to maintain a permanent military presence there with outposts at altitudes above 20,000 feet (over 6,000 meters) where most casualties were due to extreme weather or the hazards of operating in the high mountain terrain of the world’s highest conflict, including avalanches, exposure, and altitude sickness

Pakistan has Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status with the US, a designation under US law that provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation (2024)" } }, "Space": { diff --git a/world/xx.json b/world/xx.json index 6554572d..14b57727 100644 --- a/world/xx.json +++ b/world/xx.json @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ } }, "Geography - note": { - "text": "

note 1: the World is now thought to be about 4.55 billion years old, just about one-third of the 13.8-billion-year age estimated for the universe; the earliest widely accepted date for life appearing on Earth is 3.48 billion years ago

note 2: although earthquakes can strike anywhere at any time, the vast majority occur in three large zones of the Earth; the world's greatest earthquake belt, the Circum-Pacific Belt (popularly referred to as the Ring of Fire), is the zone of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; about 90% of the World's earthquakes (81% of the largest earthquakes) and some 75% of the World's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire; the belt extends northward from Chile, along the South American coast, through Central America, Mexico, the western US, southern Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, to Japan, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, island groups in the southwestern Pacific, and New Zealand

the second prominent belt, the Alpide, extends from Java to Sumatra, northward along the mountains of Burma, then eastward through the Himalayas, the Mediterranean, and out into the Atlantic Ocean; it accounts for about 17% of the world's largest earthquakes; the third important belt follows the long Mid-Atlantic Ridge

note 3: information on the origin sites for many of the World's major food crops may be found in the \"Geography - note\" for the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States

" + "text": "

note 1: the World is now thought to be about 4.55 billion years old, just about one-third of the 13.8-billion-year age estimated for the universe; the earliest widely accepted date for life appearing on Earth is 3.48 billion years ago

note 2: although earthquakes can strike anywhere at any time, the vast majority occur in three large zones of the Earth; the world's greatest earthquake belt, the Circum-Pacific Belt (popularly referred to as the Ring of Fire), is the zone of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; about 90% of the world's earthquakes (81% of the largest earthquakes) and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire; the belt extends northward from Chile, along the South American coast, through Central America, Mexico, the western US, southern Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, to Japan, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, island groups in the southwestern Pacific, and New Zealand

the second prominent belt, the Alpide, extends from Java to Sumatra, northward along the mountains of Burma, then eastward through the Himalayas, the Mediterranean, and out into the Atlantic Ocean; it accounts for about 17% of the world's largest earthquakes; the third important belt follows the long Mid-Atlantic Ridge

note 3: information on the origin sites for many of the world's major food crops may be found in the \"Geography - note\" for the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, and the United States

" } }, "People and Society": { @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ "Government": { "Capital": { "time difference": { - "text": "there are 21 World entities (20 countries and 1 dependency) with multiple time zones: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, France, Greenland (part of the Danish Kingdom), Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Russia, Spain, United States

note 1: in some instances, the time zones pertain to portions of a country that lie overseas

note 2: in 1851, the British set their prime meridian (0° longitude) through the Royal Observatory at Greenwich, England; this meridian became the international standard in 1884 and thus the basis for the standard time zones of the world; today, GMT is officially known as Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) and is also referred to as \"Zulu time\"; UTC is the basis for all civil time, with the world divided into time zones expressed as positive or negative differences from UTC

note 3: each time zone is based on 15° starting from the prime meridian; in theory, there are 24 time zones based on the solar day, but there are now upward of 40 because of fractional hour offsets that adjust for various political and physical geographic realities; see the Standard Time Zones of the World map included with the World and Regional Maps" + "text": "there are 21 world entities (20 countries and 1 dependency) with multiple time zones: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, France, Greenland (part of the Danish Kingdom), Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Russia, Spain, United States

note 1: in some instances, the time zones pertain to portions of a country that lie overseas

note 2: in 1851, the British set their prime meridian (0° longitude) through the Royal Observatory at Greenwich, England; this meridian became the international standard in 1884 and thus the basis for the standard time zones of the world; today, GMT is officially known as Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) and is also referred to as \"Zulu time\"; UTC is the basis for all civil time, with the world divided into time zones expressed as positive or negative differences from UTC

note 3: each time zone is based on 15° starting from the prime meridian; in theory, there are 24 time zones based on the solar day, but there are now upward of 40 because of fractional hour offsets that adjust for various political and physical geographic realities; see the Standard Time Zones of the World map included with the World and Regional Maps" }, "daylight saving time": { "text": "some 67 countries -- including most of the world's leading industrialized nations -- use daylight savings time (DST) in at least a portion of the country; China, Japan, India, and Russia are major industrialized countries that do not use DST; Asia and Africa generally do not observe DST, and it is generally not observed near the equator, where sunrise and sunset times do not vary enough to justify it; some countries observe DST only in certain regions; only a minority of the world's population -- about 20% -- uses DST" @@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ }, "Trafficking in persons": { "tier rating": { - "text": "

Tier 2 Watch List: (26 countries) Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, Gabon, Haiti, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Montenegro, Mozambique, Serbia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Vanuatu, Vietnam (2023)

Tier 3: (24 countries) Afghanistan, Algeria, Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, Chad, People's Republic of China, Cuba, Curacao, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Macau, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sint Maarten, South Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Venezuela (2023)" + "text": "

Tier 2 Watch List: (32 countries) Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Curaçao, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe (2024)

Tier 3: (21 countries) Afghanistan, Belarus, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, People's Republic of China, Cuba, Djibouti, Eritrea, Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Macau, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sint Maarten, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Venezuela (2024)" } }, "Illicit drugs": {