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auto-update week 25
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Yo Robot
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@ -609,7 +609,7 @@
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},
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"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
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"chief of mission": {
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"text": "ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Sean MURPHY (since January 2021)"
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"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Sean MURPHY (since January 2021)"
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},
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"embassy": {
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"text": "Embassies District, Plot 38, Sector W59-02, Street No. 4, Abu Dhabi"
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@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "a landlocked country with historically poor infrastructure; state control of telecom systems; progress with Digital Hub project despite economic contraction in 2020; government launched e-school and e-service programs; risk of delays in infrastructure and launch of new technologies, including 5G due to slow market demand; LTE supports most data traffic while mobile broadband subscribership grows rapidly; fixed-line broadband market has slight upward trend; Internet access is expensive and suffers from outages and intentional government disruption; importer of broadcasting equipment from Russia (2020)"
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"text": "in spite of the telecom sector being one of the major contributors to Azerbaijan’s non-oil GDP, overall development, growth, and investment in the sector has been held back by years of political and civil unrest coupled with endemic corruption; mobile subscription rates reached 100% as far back as 2011, but have largely stagnated since then; the MNOs are slowly extending the reach of their LTE networks around the country, and this increased coverage (along with access to faster data-based services) is expected to produce a moderate resurgence for both mobile and mobile broadband over the next few years as customers migrate from 3G to 4G; 5G services are still some ways off, as the demand for high-speed data and fast broadband can easily be met by existing capacity on LTE networks; fixed-line teledensity continues to drop down each year as customers consolidate their telecommunications services around the mobile platform; the rate of decline is comparatively slow to other countries, since Azerbaijan has a relatively high proportion of (87%) of fixed-line broadband customers still on DSL; fibre (12% of fixed broadband connections) is gradually being rolled out in urban areas, and this makes up the bulk of the (limited) growth being seen in the overall fixed broadband market. DSL’s predominance, however, will serve to keep Azerbaijan’s average access speeds in the sub-10Mbps range for the future. (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "teledensity of some 16 fixed-lines per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity of 102 telephones per 100 persons; satellite service connects Baku to a modern switch in its exclave of Naxcivan (Nakhchivan) (2020)"
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@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@
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"text": "5,062 (Ukraine) (as of 31 May 2022)"
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},
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"IDPs": {
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"text": "735,000 (conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh; IDPs are mainly ethnic Azerbaijanis but also include ethnic Kurds, Russians, and Turks predominantly from occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh; includes IDPs' descendants, returned IDPs, and people living in insecure areas and excludes people displaced by natural disasters; around half the IDPs live in the capital Baku) (2020)"
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"text": "655,000 (conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh; IDPs are mainly ethnic Azerbaijanis but also include ethnic Kurds, Russians, and Turks predominantly from occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh; includes IDPs' descendants, returned IDPs, and people living in insecure areas and excludes people displaced by natural disasters; around half the IDPs live in the capital Baku) (2021)"
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},
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"stateless persons": {
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"text": "3,585 (mid-year 2021)"
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@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "telecom market struggles to provide an effective national telecom service; country remains dependent on the economic health of Russian and EU economies; fixed-line penetration falling, driven by growth in mobile and fixed-line broadband; growth of 4G networks and falling prices due to growing competition; fixed broadband is growing but remains low by international comparisons; flat mobile market; strong growth predicted for mobile broadband market; government participating in a project to ensure eventual nationwide 5G network; government approved plans for a new data center built via public-private partnership; communication technologies sectors have attracted foreign investment; top importer of broadcast equipment from China (2020)"
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"text": "the telecom sector was still able to post modest gains at least in the mobile and broadband segments; the fixed-line penetration continues to slide downwards, only buttressed by the rollout of fiber networks which have encouraged the take up of bundled services; the fixed broadband market remains undeveloped, being somewhat hamstrung by the lack of underlying infrastructure outside the main cities; the one bright spot for the sector is mobile broadband, which is expected reach 130% subscriptions rate by 2026, at a CAGR of more than 8.6%, this is subject to the country managing to avoid conflict. (2021)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "roughly 14 per 100 fixed-line and 118 per 100 mobile-cellular; reliable fixed-line and mobile-cellular services are available across Yerevan and in major cities and towns; mobile-cellular coverage available in most rural areas (2020)"
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@ -544,7 +544,7 @@
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"text": "King HAMAD bin Isa Al-Khalifa (since 6 March 1999)"
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},
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"head of government": {
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"text": "Prime minister SALMAN bin Hamad Al-Khalifa (since 11 November 2020); first deputy prime minister (vacant); Deputy Prime Ministers MUHAMMAD bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa (since September 2005), Jawad bin Salim al-ARAIDH, ALI bin Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa (since 11 December 2006), KHALID bin Abdallah Al-Khalifa (since November 2010); note - KHALIFA ibn Salman Al Khalifa, who served as prime minister since Bahrain's independence in 1971, died on 11 November 2020"
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"text": "Prime Minister SALMAN bin Hamad Al-Khalifa (since 11 November 2020); first deputy prime minister (vacant); Deputy Prime Ministers MUHAMMAD bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa (since September 2005), Jawad bin Salim al-ARAIDH, ALI bin Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa (since 11 December 2006), KHALID bin Abdallah Al-Khalifa (since November 2010); note - KHALIFA ibn Salman Al Khalifa, who served as prime minister since Bahrain's independence in 1971, died on 11 November 2020"
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},
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"cabinet": {
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"text": "Cabinet appointed by the monarch"
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@ -984,7 +984,7 @@
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "Bahrain is one of the most technically advanced and connected countries in the world; NGN for increased mobile and Wi-Fi traffic; mobile infrastructure and fiber-optic Internet allows greater Internet penetration and competitive prices; government provides free Internet in schools and public areas, and national broadband with sole control over network; regulator controlled by monarchy; Internet freedom restricted through blocks; well served by satellite and submarine cable access; importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE (2020)"
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"text": "Bahrain continues to develop its telecoms sector in a bid to develop its long-term Economic Vision 2030 strategy; this is a multi-faceted strategy aimed at developing a digital transformation across numerous sectors, including e-government, e-health, e-commerce, and e-banking; the major telcos including Batelco, STC Bahrain, and Zain Bahrain have been supported by the government and regulator to develop services and network infrastructure to facilitate implementing the strategy; 5G services have become widely available since they were launched in 2020; the national broadband network operator BNET was also financially separated from Batelco in mid-2021, in a bid to improve its responsibilities as a neutral wholesale access provider; Bahrain’s telecom sector by the Fourth National Telecommunications Plan (initiated in 2016) which focuses on fiber optic infrastructure deployment and establishing affordable prices for high-speed access. (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "approximately 16 per 100 fixed-line and 103 per 100 mobile-cellular; modern fiber-optic integrated services; digital network with rapidly expanding mobile-cellular telephones (2020)"
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@ -1006,10 +1006,10 @@
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "despite economic challenges, the telecom market is one of Georgia's fastest growth sectors; LTE services cover the majority of citizens; regulators have strategy to introduce 5G; fixed-line telecommunications network has limited coverage outside Tbilisi; multiple mobile-cellular providers provide services to an increasing subscribership throughout the country; broadband subscribers steadily increasing; with investment in infrastructure, customers are moving from copper to fiber networks (2020)"
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"text": "the telecom sector has been attempting for many years to overcome the decades of under-investment in its fixed-line infrastructure during the Soviet era; concerted efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises and open up the telecom market have been mostly successful, with a large number of networks now competing in both the fixed-line and the mobile segments; more needs to be done, however, to give investors the confidence to enter a market that has barely moved in terms of revenue growth over the last decade, and where regulatory overreach has sometimes come perilously close to arresting further development; Georgia’s government moved fast following the collapse of the Soviet Union to liberalize the country’s telecom market; this resulted in a relatively high number of networks competing in the under-developed fixed-line segment as well as in the emerging mobile market; both segments remain dominated by just a few companies, with SilkNet and MagtiCom holding the lion’s share. (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "fixed-line subscriptions over 9 per 100, cellular telephone networks cover the entire country; mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 128 per 100 persons; intercity facilities include a fiber-optic line between T'bilisi and K'ut'aisi (2020)"
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"text": "fixed-line subscriptions over 9 per 100, cellular telephone networks cover the entire country; mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 128 per 100 persons; intercity facilities include a fiber-optic line between T'bilisi and K'ut'aisi; the mobile and mobile broadband segments have both demonstrated solid growth in 2021, (2020)"
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},
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"international": {
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"text": "country code - 995; landing points for the Georgia-Russia, Diamond Link Global, and Caucasus Cable System fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to Russia, Romania and Bulgaria; international service is available by microwave, landline, and satellite through the Moscow switch; international electronic mail and telex service are available (2019)"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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"text": "19,690 (Ukraine) (as of 22 May 2022)"
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"text": "20,386 (Ukraine) (as of 6 June 2022)"
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},
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"IDPs": {
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"text": "304,000 (displaced in the 1990s as a result of armed conflict in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; displaced in 2008 by fighting between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia) (2019)"
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"text": "305,000 (displaced in the 1990s as a result of armed conflict in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; displaced in 2008 by fighting between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia) (2021)"
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},
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"stateless persons": {
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"text": "534 (mid-year 2021)"
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@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "challenged by censorship and international sanctions; large, youthful, tech-savvy demographic with unmet demand; state-owned operators provided special offerings for services during pandemic, driving mobile broadband and deployment of 4G to nearly all of the population; government expanding fiber network and preparing for 5G to grow digital economy and smart city infrastructure; importer of broadcasting and computer equipment from UAE and China (2020)"
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"text": "Iran’s telecom infrastructure has suffered from sanctions in recent years, which prevented the import of equipment and devices and encouraged widespread smuggling, with a consequent loss of tax revenue; to address this, the government introduced a device registration scheme, and bolstered the capacity for domestically manufactured mobile phones; companies have invested in broadening the reach of their LTE networks, which has increased network capacity and improved the quality of mobile broadband services; the country is also looking to 5G, with services having been launched by MCI and MTN Irancell in early 2021; the sector is still limited by low frequency bands; the government is addressing this with plans to reallocate the 3.5GHz band for 5G use; Iran is keen to grow its Iran’s digital economy and the National Internet Network (NIN) is pivotal to Iran’s fixed broadband infrastructure plans and overall Smart City progress; from a broad perspective, Iran offers significant opportunities for growth in the telecoms sector; the country has one of the largest populations in the Middle East, and there is a high proportion of youthful, tech savvy users having considerable demand for both fixed and mobile telecom services; companies are offering national roaming to improve services in rural areas; TCI is allowing infrastructure sharing of its fiber network with competitors; (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "approximately 35 per 100 for fixed-line and 152 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions; investment by Iran's state-owned telecom company has greatly improved and expanded both the fixed-line and mobile cellular networks; a huge percentage of the cell phones in the market have been smuggled into the country (2020)"
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@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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"Disputes - international": {
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"text": "<p>Iran protests Afghanistan's limiting flow of dammed Helmand River tributaries during drought; Iraq's lack of a maritime boundary with Iran prompts jurisdiction disputes beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab in the Persian Gulf; Iran and UAE dispute Tunb Islands and Abu Musa Island, which are occupied by Iran; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea; Afghan and Iranian commissioners have discussed boundary monument densification and resurvey</p>"
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"text": "<p><em>Iran-Afghanistan</em>: Iran protests Afghanistan's limiting flow of dammed Helmand River tributaries during drought; Afghan and Iranian commissioners have discussed boundary monument densification and resurvey</p> <p><em>Iran-Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Russia</em>: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia ratified a Caspian seabed delimitation treaty in 2018 based on equidistance, while Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea</p> <p><em>Iran-Iraq</em>: Iraq's lack of a maritime boundary with Iran prompts jurisdiction disputes beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab in the Persian Gulf</p> <p><em>Iran-UAE</em>: Iran and UAE dispute Tunb Islands and Abu Musa Island, which are occupied by Iran; the dispute was rehashed at the September 2021 UN General Assembly meeting; Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corp opened an airport on Greater Tunb in February 2022</p>"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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@ -625,7 +625,7 @@
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},
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"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
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"chief of mission": {
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"text": "ambassador Thomas NIDES (since 29 November 2021)"
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"text": "ambassador Thomas NIDES (since 5 December 2021)"
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},
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"embassy": {
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"text": "14 David Flusser Street, Jerusalem, 9378322"
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "Israel has a highly developed economy with focus on technology products; investment in cyber-security industry and hub for start-ups; near universal broadband delivery to households and mobile penetration; LTE coverage, expanded fiber network with plans for 5G; emergency law allows mobile tracking; importer of broadcast equipment, integrated circuits, and computers from China; submarine cable connectivity to Europe (2020)"
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"text": "Israel’s developed economy largely revolves around high technology products, primarily used in the medical, biotechnology, agricultural, materials, and military industries; the country also attracts investment in its cyber-security industry, and has established itself as a hub for thousands of start-up companies; to underpin these developments, Israel has developed a robust telecoms sector; household broadband subscriptions is high, with a focus on fiber-network deployment; Bezeq offers FttP services with data rates of up to 2.5Gb/s; LTE services are almost universally available, while the August 2020 multi-frequency bands also enabled the MNOs to provide services based on 5G; 5G will be supported by moves to close down GSM and 3G networks in stages through to the end of 2025, with the physical assets and frequencies to be repurposed for LTE and 5G use. (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "good system of coaxial cable and microwave radio relay; all systems are digital; competition among both fixed-line and mobile cellular providers results in good coverage countrywide; fixed-line nearly 36 per 100 and nearly 132 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
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@ -1214,7 +1214,7 @@
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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"Disputes - international": {
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"text": "<p>West Bank is Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement - permanent status to be determined through further negotiation; in 2002, Israel began construction of a \"seam line\" separation barrier along parts of the Green Line and within the West Bank; as of mid-2020, plans were to continue barrier construction; Israel withdrew its settlers and military from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the West Bank in August 2005; Golan Heights is Israeli-controlled (Lebanon claims the Shab'a Farms area of Golan Heights); in March 2019, the US Government recognized Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights; since 1948, about 350 peacekeepers from the UN Truce Supervision Organization headquartered in Jerusalem monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating, and assist other UN personnel in the region</p>"
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"text": "<p><em>Israel-West Bank</em>: West Bank is Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement - permanent status to be determined through further negotiation; in 2002, Israel began construction of a \"seam line\" separation barrier along parts of the Green Line and within the West Bank; as of mid-2020, plans were to continue barrier construction</p> <p><em>Israel-Gaza Strip</em>: Israel withdrew its settlers and military from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the West Bank in August 2005</p> <p><em>Israel-Syria</em>: Golan Heights is Israeli-controlled (Lebanon claims the Shab'a Farms area of Golan Heights); in March 2019, the US Government recognized Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights; since 1948, about 350 peacekeepers from the UN Truce Supervision Organization headquartered in Jerusalem monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating, and assist other UN personnel in the region</p>"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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},
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"Food insecurity": {
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"severe localized food insecurity": {
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"text": "due to civil conflict, low oil prices, and economic slowdown - the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview identified 2.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, of which 0.96 million have acute humanitarian needs; while the number of people in need remained similar to the previous year, the severity of those needs increased, largely due to the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic on top of an existing humanitarian crisis, leading to a 35% increase in the number of people in acute need; more than half of these are concentrated in the governorates of Nineveh and Anbar; the number of severely food insecure people is estimated at about 435,000, while 731,000 are vulnerable to food insecurity (2022)"
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"text": "<em>due to civil conflict and economic slowdown -</em> the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview identified 2.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, of which 0.96 million have acute humanitarian needs; while the number of people in need remained similar to the previous year, the severity of those needs increased, largely due to the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic on top of an existing humanitarian crisis, leading to a 35% increase in the number of people in acute need; more than half of these are concentrated in the governorates of Nineveh and Anbar; the number of severely food insecure people is estimated at about 435,000, while 731,000 are vulnerable to food insecurity (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Waste and recycling": {
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},
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"Telecommunication systems": {
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"general assessment": {
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"text": "the 2003 liberation of Iraq severely disrupted telecommunications throughout the country; widespread government efforts to rebuild domestic and international communications have slowed due to political unrest; recent efforts create stability and developments in 4G and 5G technologies; operators focus on installations of new fiber-optic cables and growth in mobile broadband subscribers; the most popular plans are pre-paid; operators focused on fixing and replacing networks (2020)"
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"text": "Iraq continues to face a number of political and economic challenges, though increasing civil stability has made it easier for mobile and fixed-line operators to rebuild telecom services and infrastructure damaged during the last few years; the government extended the licenses held by the MNOs for an additional three years to compensate for the chaos and destruction caused between 2014 and 2017 when Islamic State held sway in many areas of the country; the three major MNOs are Zain Iraq, Asiacell, and Korek Telecom, which together control over 90% of the mobile market; the companies have struggled to develop LTE services; with LTE services being very low, there is little chance for 5G to be available in the short term; most services are still based on GSM and 3G, except in the Kurdish region where LTE is more widely available. (2022)"
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},
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"domestic": {
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"text": "3G services offered by three major mobile operators; 4G offered by one operator in Iraqi; conflict has destroyed infrastructure in areas; about 10 per 100 for fixed-line and 92 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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"Disputes - international": {
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"text": "<p>Iraq's lack of a maritime boundary with Iran prompts jurisdiction disputes beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab in the Persian Gulf; Turkey has expressed concern over the autonomous status of Kurds in Iraq</p>"
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"text": "<p><em>Iraq-Iran</em>: Iraq's lack of a maritime boundary with Iran prompts jurisdiction disputes beyond the mouth of the Shatt al Arab in the Persian Gulf</p> <p><em>Iraq-Turkey</em>: Turkey has expressed concern over the autonomous status of Kurds in Iraq</p>"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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"text": "15,272 (Turkey), 7,881 (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (mid-year 2021); 260,686 (Syria) (2022)"
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},
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"IDPs": {
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"text": "1,198,940 (displacement in central and northern Iraq since January 2014) (2021)"
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"text": "1,184,818 (displacement in central and northern Iraq since January 2014) (2022)"
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},
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"stateless persons": {
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"text": "47,253 (mid-year 2021); note - in the 1970s and 1980s under SADDAM Husayn's regime, thousands of Iraq's Faili Kurds, followers of Shia Islam, were stripped of their Iraqi citizenship, had their property seized by the government, and many were deported; some Faili Kurds had their citizenship reinstated under the 2,006 Iraqi Nationality Law, but others lack the documentation to prove their Iraqi origins; some Palestinian refugees persecuted by the SADDAM regime remain stateless"
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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"Disputes - international": {
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"text": "<p>2004 Agreement settles border dispute with Syria pending demarcation</p>"
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"text": "<p><em>Jordan-Iraq</em>: the two countries signed a border agreement in 1984; Jordan has ratified the treaty, but it has not been confirmed that Iraq has ratified it; as of 2010, the agreement had not been registered with the UN</p> <p><em>Jordan-Israel</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Jordan-Saudi Arabia</em>: Jordan and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to demarcate their maritime borders in 2007</p> <p><em>Jordan-Syria</em>: the two countries signed an agreement in 2005 to settle the border dispute based on a 1931 demarcation accord; the two countries began demarcation in 2006</p> <p><em>Jordan-West Bank</em>: none identified</p>"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"refugees (country of origin)": {
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},
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"Transnational Issues": {
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"Disputes - international": {
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"text": "<p>Kuwait and Saudi Arabia continue negotiating a joint maritime boundary with Iran; no maritime boundary exists with Iraq in the Persian Gulf</p>"
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"text": "<p><em>Kuwait-Iraq</em>: no maritime boundary exists with Iraq in the Persian Gulf</p> <p><em>Kuwait-Saudi Arabia</em>: their maritime boundary was established in 2000 and has a neutral zone but its extension to Iran’s maritime boundary has not been negotiated</p> <p> </p>"
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},
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"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
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"stateless persons": {
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},
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"Food insecurity": {
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"widespread lack of access": {
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"text": "due to the ongoing financial and economic crisis - the World Food Program (WFP) estimates that, as a result of the ongoing economic crisis, over 1.3 million Lebanese citizens, about 36% of the total population, were food insecure by the end of September 2021; the number of Lebanese households with serious food access constraints reached 57% in September 2021, up from 40% in September 2020; domestic cereal production covers, on average, less than 20% of the consumption needs and the country depends heavily on imports (2022)"
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"text": "<em>due to the ongoing financial and economic crisis -</em> the World Food Program (WFP) estimates that, as a result of the ongoing economic crisis, over 1.3 million Lebanese citizens, about 36% of the total population, were food insecure by the end of September 2021; the number of Lebanese households with serious food access constraints reached 57% in September 2021, up from 40% in September 2020; domestic cereal production covers, on average, less than 20% of the consumption needs and the country depends heavily on imports (2022)"
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}
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},
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"Waste and recycling": {
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},
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"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
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"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Dorothy SHEA (since 11 March 2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Dorothy C. SHEA (since 11 March 2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Awkar-Facing the Municipality, Main Street, Beirut"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>lacking a treaty or other documentation describing the boundary, portions of the Lebanon-Syria boundary are unclear with several sections in dispute; since 2000, Lebanon has claimed Shab'a Farms area in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights; the roughly 2,000-strong UN Interim Force in Lebanon has been in place since 1978</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Lebanon-Syria</em>: lacking a treaty or other documentation describing the boundary, portions of the Lebanon-Syria boundary are unclear with several sections in dispute; in March 2021, Syria signed a contract with a Russian company for oil and gas exploration in a maritime area Lebanon claims as its own based on a 2011 map sent to the UN</p> <p><em>Lebanon-Israel</em>: Lebanon has claimed Shab'a Farms area in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights; Lebanon and Israel resumed negotiations over their maritime border in 2020, but their efforts were derailed when Lebanon argued that the map the UN was using needed modifications</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>boundary agreement reportedly signed and ratified with UAE in 2003 for entire border, including Oman's Musandam Peninsula and Al Madhah exclave, but details of the alignment have not been made public</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Oman-Saudi Arabia</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Oman-UAE</em>: boundary agreement reportedly signed and ratified with UAE in 2003 for entire border, including Oman's Musandam Peninsula and Al Madhah exclave, but details of the alignment have not been made public; Oman and UAE signed the final demarcation of their land border in 2008</p> <p><em>Oman-Yemen</em>: Oman and Yemen signed a border agreement in 1992; demarcation of their border was completed in 1995</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
|
|||
"etymology": {
|
||||
"text": "the origin of the name is uncertain, but it dates back at least 2,000 years since a term \"Catharrei\" was used to describe the inhabitants of the peninsula by Pliny the Elder (1st century A.D.), and a \"Catara\" peninsula is depicted on a map by Ptolemy (2nd century A.D.)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> closest approximation of the native pronunciation is gattar or cottar"
|
||||
"note": "<strong>note:</strong> closest approximation of the native pronunciation is gat-tar or cot-tar"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Government type": {
|
||||
"text": "absolute monarchy"
|
||||
|
|
@ -605,7 +605,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>chief of mission: ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Natalie A. BAKER (since October 2021)</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Evyenia SIDEREAS<br><br></p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "22 February Street, Al Luqta District, P.O. Box 2399, Doha"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -422,7 +422,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil conflict and a stagnant economy - battered by ten years of conflict and spill‑over effects from the financial crisis in Lebanon which used to act as a financial intermediary, the national economy continues to weaken; a nationwide food security assessment estimates that about 12.4 million people (60% of the overall population) are now food insecure in 2021, mostly due to constrained livelihood opportunities and a rapidly worsening economy (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to civil conflict and a stagnant economy -</em> battered by ten years of conflict and spill‑over effects from the financial crisis in Lebanon which used to act as a financial intermediary, the national economy continues to weaken; a nationwide food security assessment estimates that about 12.4 million people (60% of the overall population) are now food insecure in 2021, mostly due to constrained livelihood opportunities and a rapidly worsening economy (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "strategic location controlling the Turkish Straits (Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, Dardanelles) that link the Black and Aegean Seas; the 3% of Turkish territory north of the Straits lies in Europe and goes by the names of European Turkey, Eastern Thrace, or Turkish Thrace; the 97% of the country in Asia is referred to as Anatolia; Istanbul, which straddles the Bosporus, is the only metropolis in the world located on two continents; Mount Ararat, the legendary landing place of Noah's ark, is in the far eastern portion of the country"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Map description": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Turkey map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries and the Mediterranean and Black Seas.</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Turkey (Turkiye) map showing major cities as well as parts of surrounding countries and the Mediterranean and Black Seas.</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"People and Society": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1237,10 +1237,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "3,763,864 (Syria) (2022); 85,000 (Ukraine) (as of 25 April 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "3,724,240 (Syria) (2022); 145,000 (Ukraine) (as of 19 May 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "1.099 million (displaced from 1984-2005 because of fighting between the Kurdish PKK and Turkish military; most IDPs are Kurds from eastern and southeastern provinces; no information available on persons displaced by development projects) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "117 (2018)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -473,7 +473,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to conflict, poverty, floods, high food and fuel prices - between January and June 2021, the number of food insecure was projected to increase by nearly 3 million to 16.2 million people; out of these, an estimated 11 million people will likely be in \"Crisis,\" 5 million in \"Emergency,\" and the number of those in \"Catastrophe\" will likely increase to 47,000; economic conditions in the country remain dire; the conflict is further hampering the already constrained livelihood activities and humanitarian access; income earning opportunities have declined due to COVID‑19‑related business disruptions (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to conflict, poverty, floods, high food and fuel prices -</em> between January and June 2021, the number of food insecure was projected to increase by nearly 3 million to 16.2 million people; out of these, an estimated 11 million people will likely be in \"Crisis,\" 5 million in \"Emergency,\" and the number of those in \"Catastrophe\" will likely increase to 47,000; economic conditions in the country remain dire; the conflict is further hampering the already constrained livelihood activities and humanitarian access; income earning opportunities have declined due to COVID‑19‑related business disruptions (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -645,7 +645,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Chargé d’Affaires Cathy WESTLEY (since 23 May 2021); note - the embassy closed in March 2015; Yemen Affairs Unit currently operates out of US Embassy Riyadh"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Steven H. FAGIN (since 1 June 2022); note - the embassy closed in March 2015; Yemen Affairs Unit currently operates out of US Embassy Riyadh"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "previously - Sa'awan Street, Sanaa"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue