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4
africa/ag.json
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@ -626,7 +626,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "ambassador (vacant); Chargé d’Affaires Gautam RANA (since 20 January 2021)"
"text": "Ambassador Elizabeth Moore AUBIN (since 9 February 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "05 Chemin Cheikh Bachir, Ibrahimi, El-Biar 16030, Alger"
@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Algeria has a steadily developing telecom infrastructure through sound regulatory measures and government policies aimed at providing Internet connections across the country, including underserved areas; mobile penetration and LTE services are growing steadily; in common with other markets in the region, mobile connections account for the vast majority of Internet accesses; well served by satellite and submarine cable connections; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2021)"
"text": "Algeria has a steadily developing telecom infrastructure with growth encouraged by supportive regulatory measures and by government policies aimed at delivering serviceable internet connections across the country; mobile broadband is largely based on 3G and LTE, and the data rates are also low in global terms; LTE is available in all provinces, investment is required from the MNOs to improve the quality of service; the state has previously been hesitant to commit to 5G, instead encouraging the MNOs to undertake upgrades to LTE infrastructure before investing in commercial 5G services; in March 2022, the state is in the process of freeing up the requisite spectrum to enable the MNOs to launch 5G services sometime this year; fixed internet speeds remain slow, and the country ranks poorly in international tables; the government has pressed Algérie Télécom in early 2021 to increase the minimum rate available from 4Mb/s to 10Mb/s. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "a limited network of fixed-lines with a teledensity of slightly less than 11 telephones per 100 persons has been offset by the rapid increase in mobile-cellular subscribership; mobile-cellular teledensity was approximately 104 telephones per 100 persons in 2020 (2020)"

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africa/ao.json
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@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Nina Maria FITE (since 14 February 2018)"
"text": "Ambassador Tulinabo S. MUSHINGI, (since 9 March 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Rua Houari Boumedienne, #32, Luanda"
@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Angola’s telecom sector shows consistent recovery following political stability, encouraging foreign investment; while the government opened the telecom sector to new competitors, there has been slow progress in LTE network development; only a small proportion of the country is covered by the 3G network infrastructure; Internet and mobile phone penetration remains low, hindered by high costs and poor infrastructure that limits access, especially in rural areas; upgrading telecom will support e-commerce, and rural access to education and health care; AngoSat-2 satellite expected to be ready in 2021; government aims to connect an additional 160,000 people to free Wi-Fi; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2021)"
"text": "Angola’s telecom sector in recent years has benefited from political stability, which has encouraged foreign investment in the sector; the government and regulator have also set in train mechanisms to open up the telecom sector to new competitors, with Africell having secured a universal license and in so doing becoming the country’s fourth MNO; following an extensive investment program, the company launched mobile services in April 2022; the MNOs were slow to develop LTE services, instead relying on their GSM and 3G network capabilities; Angola Telecom did not launch LTE services until mid-2018; there has been slow progress in LTE network development, with only a small proportion of the country covered by network infrastructure; some progress  has been made with 5G; the Ministry of Telecommunications in early 2021 set up a 5G hub to assess 5G user cases, while Unitel and the new MNO Africell since mid-2021 have contracted vendors to provide 5G-ready transmission networks; the regulator in November 2021 granted licenses to Africell, Movicel, and Unitel to enable them to offer 5G services; the government has continued to develop telecom infrastructure to help diversify the country’s economy and lessen its dependence on offshore crude oil production; by extending and upgrading telecom networks the government expects businesses to become more efficient and for e-commerce to become a more prominent feature of economic growth; networks will facilitate rural access to education and health care. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "only about one fixed-line per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity about 45 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"

4
africa/bc.json
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@ -635,7 +635,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Craig Lewis CLOUD (since 2 April 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Amanda S. JACOBSEN"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Embassy Drive, Government Enclave (off Khama Crescent), Gaborone"
@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "<p>due to effective regulatory reform and active competition, Botswana’s telecom market is one of the most liberalized in the region; strategy to drive nationwide ICT penetration is slowed; one of the highest mobile penetration rates in Africa; operators developing 3G and LTE; Internet use rising due to lower prices; government has embraced digitalization, e-government and identity programs that require citizens to provide detailed personal information; previously dependent on satellites for international connectivity, country’s new submarine cable landings improved competition and tripled international Internet capacity; importer of broadcast equipment from Hong Kong and China (2020)</p> (2020)"
"text": "effective regulatory reform has made Botswana&rsquo;s telecom market one of the most liberalized in the region; there is a service-neutral licensing regime adapted to the convergence of technologies and services, and several operators now compete in all telecom sectors; Botswana has one of the highest mobile subscription rates in Africa, though with this growth in the number of subscribers has slowed sharply in recent years; the popular use of multiple SIM cards from different operators convinced that regulator that there was no need introduce mobile number portability, and although the government pursued the idea for some years, it accepted in April 2021 that it would not be implemented after all; in a bid to generate new revenue streams and secure market share, the three MNOs &ndash; Mascom Wireless (an affiliate of South Africa&rsquo;s MTN), Orange Botswana (backed by Orange Group) and BTC &ndash; have entered the underdeveloped broadband sector by adopting of 3G, LTE, and WiMAX technologies;&nbsp; in the fixed-line broadband market they compete with a large number of ISPs, some of which have rolled out their own wireless access infrastructure; the landlocked country depends on satellites for international bandwidth, and on other countries for transit capacity to the landing points of international submarine cables; the landing of additional cables in the region in recent years has improved the competitive situation in this sector, while prices for connectivity have fallen dramatically; Paratus Teleco in mid-2021 completed the first stage of a private network covering the entire country, and linking to the company&rsquo;s international cables (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity has declined in recent years and now stands at roughly 6 telephones per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 162 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"

2
africa/bn.json
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@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Benin&rsquo;s telecom market is restricted by poor fixed-line infrastructure; low use of fixed-line voice and Internet; mobile networks account for almost all Internet and voice traffic; progress on fiber infrastructure through World Bank and the government investment to extend broadband and develop Smart Government program; monopolized fixed-line Internet services access is limited; ICT development will provide telecom services to 80% of the country, mostly via mobile and DSL infrastructure; Benin Smart City construction has begun; improved international Internet connectivity supports growth of m-commerce and m-banking; submarine cable connectivity from African coast to Europe (2020)"
"text": "Benin&rsquo;s telecom market continues to be restricted by the poor condition of the country&rsquo;s fixed-line infrastructure;&nbsp; this has hampered the development of fixed-line voice and internet services, and there is negligible revenue derived from these sectors; mobile networks account for almost all internet connections, and also carry most voice traffic; there is promise for considerable change in the mobile sector, which has been a duopoly between Moov and MTN since the closure of services from Glo Mobile and Libercom in 2018; slow progress is being made in developing competition in the mobile sector; the national infrastructure provider SBIN has been licensed to provide mobile services, and in mid-2021 Sonatel Group was awarded a five-year contract to oversee progress; in May 2021 the government sought foreign companies unaffiliated with MTN Group or Maroc Telecom to bid for a fourth mobile license; improved international internet connectivity has contributed to a reduction in end-user pricing, and provided the potential to transform many areas of the country&rsquo;s economy, bringing a greater proportion of the population into the orbit of internet commerce and connectivity; a 2,000km fiber project started in 2016 was finally completed in mid-2021, prompting the government to secure a loan to build additional fiber infrastructure connecting four of the country&rsquo;s 12 departments.&nbsp; (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line teledensity only about 1 per 100 persons; spurred by the presence of multiple mobile-cellular providers, cellular telephone subscribership has increased rapidly, nearing 92 per 100 persons (2020)"

6
africa/by.json
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@ -489,7 +489,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"widespread lack of access": {
"text": "due to the effects of weather - about 1 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure between January and March 2022, due to livelihood losses and displacements caused by the rising water level of Lake Tanganyika and the overflow of rivers, sustained repatriation flows and the socio-economic impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to the effects of weather -</em> about 1 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure between January and March 2022, due to livelihood losses and displacements caused by the rising water level of Lake Tanganyika and the overflow of rivers, sustained repatriation flows and the socio-economic impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Burundi&rsquo;s high population density and low telecom penetration rates make it an attractive market for investors; mobile operators have launched 3G and LTE to meet the demand for Internet; mobile subscription remains low; government/World Bank joint project to build a national broadband backbone connecting to submarine cable landings in Kenya and Tanzania; government launched e-health project (2020)"
"text": "Burundi provides an attractive telecom market given its high population density and existing low subscription rates for all services; one downside for investors is that the country has a very low economic output, disposable income is also very low, and fixed-line infrastructure is poor outside the main urban areas; this is a greater motivation for investors to focus on improving mobile networks than in expanding fixed-line infrastructure; to overcome difficulties associated with the poor telecom infrastructure, the government has supported a number of prominent telcos building a national fiber backbone network; this network offers onward connectivity to submarine cable infrastructure landings in Kenya and Tanzania; the first sections of this network were switched on in early 2014, and additional provinces have since been connected; in addition, the government in early 2018 kick-started the Burundi Broadband project, which aims to deliver national connectivity by 2025; based on this improved infrastructure the government and ITU have developed an ICT strategy to make use of telecoms to promote the country&rsquo;s socio-economic development through to 2028; progress made by Tanzania with its own national backbone network has benefited Burundi, which has been provided with onward connectivity to most countries in the region; International bandwidth capacity has continued to increase in recent years, including a 38% increase in the nine months to September 2021, resulting in lower retail prices for consumers; two of the mobile operators have launched 3G and LTE services to capitalize on the growing demand for internet access; the number of mobile subscribers increased 7% in the third quarter of 2021, quarter-on-quarter; similar growth is expected for the next two years at least, which will help bring the mobile level closer to the average for the region. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "telephone density one of the lowest in the world; fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage is about 56 per 100 persons (2020)"
@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@
"text": "84,961 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "109,169 (some ethnic Tutsis remain displaced from intercommunal violence that broke out after the 1,993 coup and fighting between government forces and rebel groups; violence since April 2015) (2021)"
"text": "84,791 (some ethnic Tutsis remain displaced from intercommunal violence that broke out after the 1,993 coup and fighting between government forces and rebel groups; violence since April 2015) (2022)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "767 (mid-year 2021)"

10
africa/cd.json
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@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"widespread lack of access": {
"text": "due to civil insecurity and shortfall in cereal production - according to the latest analysis, about 965 000 people were estimated to be in \"Crisis\" and above, between October and December 2021 due to persisting insecurity in Lac and Tibesti regions that disrupted livelihood activities and caused population displacements; domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021 due to adverse weather and the civil conflict; as a result, between June and August 2022, 1.74 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in cereal production -</em> according to the latest analysis, about 965 000 people were estimated to be in \"Crisis\" and above, between October and December 2021 due to persisting insecurity in Lac and Tibesti regions that disrupted livelihood activities and caused population displacements; domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021 due to adverse weather and the civil conflict; as a result, between June and August 2022, 1.74 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -671,7 +671,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires David GILMOUR (since December 2020)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Ellen THORBURN (since 8 November 2021)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Rond-Point Chagoua, B.P. 413, N&rsquo;Djamena"
@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Chad&rsquo;s inadequate telecom infrastructure, corruption, and high taxes hinder penetration in fixed, mobile, and Internet sectors; with tax reform, operators are investing in voice and data infrastructure to 3G/4G; government approved telecom infrastructure upgrade; World Bank-funded Central African Backbone (CAB) project; Trans-Saharan Backbone project will link a fiber cable to Nigeria and Algeria (2020)"
"text": "the telecom infrastructure is particularly poor; fixed, mobile and internet is well below African averages; Chad&rsquo;s telecom market offers some potential for investors to develop services given the low starting base; the two main operators Moov Africa Chad and Airtel Chad have invested in infrastructure and have become the main providers of voice and data services; the mobile sector has developed steadily under the auspices of these two operators; the national telco and fixed-line operator Sotel Tchad operates the country&rsquo;s third mobile network, as Salam Mobile, though it is mainly focused on voice services since it depends on GPRS and EDGE technologies (which can provide only basic mobile data services); the country&rsquo;s first 3G/LTE mobile license was awarded in April 2014; Chad finally gained access to international fiber bandwidth in 2012 its national backbone infrastructure remains underdeveloped; the World Bank-funded Central African Backbone (CAB) project takes in Chad, while the country is also party to a Trans-Saharan Backbone project which will link a fiber cable to Nigeria and Algeria. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line connections less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership base of about 53 per 100 persons (2020)"
@ -1195,10 +1195,10 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "388,550 (Sudan), 122,958 (Central African Republic), 42,549 (Cameroon), 19,886 (Nigeria) (2022)"
"text": "392,168 (Sudan), 122,958 (Central African Republic), 42,518 (Cameroon), 19,886 (Nigeria) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "406,573 (majority are in the east) (2022)"
"text": "381,289 (majority are in the east) (2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {

6
africa/cf.json
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@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to floods - on 29 November 2021, a state of emergency was declared due to floods in northern areas that caused crop and livestock losses, and displaced people, particularly in Likouala, Sangha, Cuvette and Plateaux departments; it is estimated that about 71,700 people have been affected, (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to floods -</em> on 29 November 2021, a state of emergency was declared due to floods in northern areas that caused crop and livestock losses, and displaced people, particularly in Likouala, Sangha, Cuvette and Plateaux departments; it is estimated that about 71,700 people have been affected, (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -668,7 +668,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Ellen B. THORBURN (since January 2021)"
"text": "Ambassador Eugene S. YOUNG (since 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "70-83 Section D, Boulevard Denis Sassou N'Guesso, Brazzaville"
@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@
"text": "29,090 (Central African Republic), 22,114 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "304,430 (multiple civil wars since 1992) (2021)"
"text": "159,830 (multiple civil wars since 1992) (2022)"
}
}
}

6
africa/cg.json
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@ -498,7 +498,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"widespread lack of access": {
"text": "due to internal conflict in eastern regions and economic downturn - according to a November 2021 analysis, 26 million people are projected to be severely food insecure, in \"Crisis\" or above, between January and June 2022; this is due to persisting conflict in eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, which continues to cause displacements, coupled with the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to internal conflict in eastern regions and economic downturn -</em> according to a November 2021 analysis, 26 million people are projected to be severely food insecure, in \"Crisis\" or above, between January and June 2022; this is due to persisting conflict in eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, which continues to cause displacements, coupled with the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "due to decades of conflict and poor infrastructure, the Democratic Republic of Congo&rsquo;s telecom system is one of the least developed in the region; government aims to improve loose regulation through legislation; mobile networks are principal providers of telecom; LTE is geographically limited; investment from China and other foreign donors for fiber backbone; international bandwidth through WACS submarine cable; operator licensed to build landing station for submarine cable and tower upgrade that will provide competition in broadband, fixed, and mobile Internet services; operator added fiber link between Brazzaville and Kinshasa (2020)"
"text": "the telecom system remains one of the least developed in the region; the government can only loosely regulate the sector, and since the national telco SCPT has little capital to invest, much of the investment made in infrastructure is derived from donor countries or from the efforts of foreign (particularly Chinese) companies and banks; efforts have been made to improve the regulation of the telecom sector; the limited fixed-line infrastructure has become the principal providers of basic telecom services; the development of the DRC&rsquo;s internet and broadband market has been held back by the poorly developed national and international infrastructure; the country was finally connected to international bandwidth through the WACS submarine cable in 2013, while SCPT continues to roll out a fiber national backbone network with support from China; breakages in the WACS cable have exposed the vulnerability of international bandwidth, which is still limited; Liquid Intelligence Technologies has built a landing station for the Equiano submarine cable, and has also completed a 5,000km cable running through the DRC to link to cable systems landing in countries facing the Atlantic and Indian Oceans; the first commercial LTE networks were launched in May 2018 soon after LTE licenses were issued; mobile operators are keen to develop mobile data services, capitalizing on the growth of smartphones usage; there has been some progress with updating technologies, with Vodacom DRC having upgraded much of its GSM network to 3G by late 2021.&nbsp; (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "inadequate fixed-line infrastructure with fixed-line connections less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriptions over 45 per 100 persons (2019)"
@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "210,476 (Rwanda), 210,357 (Central African Republic), 56,356 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,522 (Burundi) (2022)"
"text": "210,094 (Rwanda), 209,495 (Central African Republic), 56,303 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 41,286 (Burundi) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "5.61 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2021)"

6
africa/cm.json
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@ -504,7 +504,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to civil insecurity and population displacements - according to October 2021 analysis, about 2.4 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure between October and December 2021; this mainly results from the impacts of Boko Haram incursions in Far North Region, the socio‑political unrest in Northwest and Southwest regions and COVID‑19‑related economic shocks, which disrupted trade flows and agricultural practices, deteriorated livelihoods and displaced people (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity and population displacements -</em> according to October 2021 analysis, about 2.4 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure between October and December 2021; this mainly results from the impacts of Boko Haram incursions in Far North Region, the socio‑political unrest in Northwest and Southwest regions and COVID‑19‑related economic shocks, which disrupted trade flows and agricultural practices, deteriorated livelihoods and displaced people (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -686,7 +686,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador (vacant);&nbsp; Deputy Chief of Mission (currently serving as Charge d'Affaires) Mary E. DASCHBACH"
"text": "Ambassador Christopher J. LAMORA (since 21 March 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Avenue Rosa Parks, Yaound&eacute;"
@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Cameroon&rsquo;s 3G and LTE services are improving through growing competition and a government program to improve national connectivity and support digital economy; saturated use of transactions through m-commerce; developing broadband sector; improved submarine and terrestrial cable connectivity strengthened international bandwidth and lowered prices; pushing start of fiber link to Congo; fiber rollout continues with new government funding; operators opened new data center in 2020 and developed contracts for satellite broadband; government awarded contract to provide connectivity to universities (2020)"
"text": "Cameroon was for many years one of the few countries in Africa with only two competing mobile operators; after some delays, Viettel Cameroon launched a third network and has since grown its subscriber base rapidly; Camtel became the fourth mobile operator in early 2020 after securing three licenses, however it suspended the launch of services in early 2021; despite this, by the end of the year a launch under the Blue brand was imminent; the investment programs among operators over the next few years will considerably boost mobile broadband services in rural areas of the country, many of which are under served by fixed-line infrastructure; the ICT sector in Cameroon is making steady progress, enabling the country to make better use of the digital economy; about 95% of all electronic transactions are carried through the m-money services operated by MTN Cameroon and Orange Cameroon; the government has also been supportive, having launched its &lsquo;Cameroon Digital 2020&rsquo; program, aimed at improving connectivity nationally. A large number of small ICT projects form part of the overall program; improved submarine and terrestrial cable connectivity has substantially increased international bandwidth, in turn leading to reductions in access prices for consumers; other projects such as Acceleration of the Digital Transformation of Cameroon are aimed at developing the digital economy, and accelerating the use of ICT in areas such as government services, agriculture, and commerce.&nbsp; (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "only a little above 3 per 100 persons for fixed-line subscriptions; mobile-cellular usage has increased sharply, reaching a subscribership base of roughly 95 per 100 persons (2020)"

6
africa/ct.json
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@ -467,7 +467,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
"text": "due to internal conflict - persisting conflicts and displacements are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities and limit farmers&rsquo; access to crop growing areas and inputs, with a negative impact on 2022 crop production; in most prefectures, civil insecurity in 2021 continued to cause population displacements and widespread disruption of agricultural and marketing activities with negative consequences on food availability and access; the socio‑economic effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic, coupled with the high level of prices of some food staples, reduced substantially the households&rsquo; purchasing power (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to internal conflict -</em> persisting conflicts and displacements are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities and limit farmers’ access to crop growing areas and inputs, with a negative impact on 2022 crop production; in most prefectures, civil insecurity in 2021 continued to cause population displacements and widespread disruption of agricultural and marketing activities with negative consequences on food availability and access; the socio‑economic effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic, coupled with the high level of prices of some food staples, reduced substantially the households’ purchasing power (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -645,7 +645,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Lucy TAMLYN (since 11 January 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador Patricia A. MAHONEY (since 8 April 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Avenue David Dacko, Bangui"
@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@
"text": "5,702 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "652,036 (clashes between army and rebel groups since 2005; tensions between ethnic groups) (2022)"
"text": "658,265 (clashes between army and rebel groups since 2005; tensions between ethnic groups) (2022)"
}
}
}

6
africa/cv.json
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@ -1092,13 +1092,13 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "approximately 1,200 personnel including about 100 in the Coast Guard (2021)"
"text": "approximately 1,200 personnel including about 100 in the Coast Guard (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FACV has a limited amount of mostly dated and second-hand equipment, largely from China, European countries, and the former Soviet Union (2021)"
"text": "the FACV has a limited amount of mostly dated and second-hand equipment, largely from China, European countries, and the former Soviet Union (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-35 years of age for male and female selective compulsory military service; 2-years conscript service obligation; 17 years of age for voluntary service (with parental consent) (2021)"
"text": "18-35 years of age for male and female selective compulsory military service; 2-years conscript service obligation; 17 years of age for voluntary service (with parental consent) (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>as of 2022, the FACV/National Guard was mostly a ground force with 2 infantry battalions and a small air component with a maritime patrol squadron; the Coast Guard had a few coastal patrol craft and patrol boats</p>"

4
africa/dj.json
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@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"widespread lack of access": {
"text": "due to floods - about 194,000 people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the January‑August 2021 period, mainly due to livelihood losses caused by floods and landslides, and as a result of the socio‑economic impact of the pandemic on the livelihoods of vulnerable households; Cyclone Sagar struck the country on 19 and 20 May 2021, bringing torrential rains; the precipitation received, about 110 mm, was the equivalent of the average rainfall for an entire year and triggered heavy flooding, especially in the capital, Djibouti City and surrounding areas (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to floods -</em> about 194,000 people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the January‑August 2021 period, mainly due to livelihood losses caused by floods and landslides, and as a result of the socio‑economic impact of the pandemic on the livelihoods of vulnerable households; Cyclone Sagar struck the country on 19 and 20 May 2021, bringing torrential rains; the precipitation received, about 110 mm, was the equivalent of the average rainfall for an entire year and triggered heavy flooding, especially in the capital, Djibouti City and surrounding areas (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -976,7 +976,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Djibouti has a poor domestic infrastructure and a monopolized telecom system relying on microwave radio relay; rural areas connected via wireless local loop; mobile coverage limited to Djibouti city; despite challenges, foreign investment lends progress toward improvements; one of the best international fiber cables in the region, the Djibouti Internet Exchange, is a meeting point for cable systems passing between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean; national operator managed the Australia West Cable landing and signed an agreement for IP traffic through Paris and Marseille; international operator signed MoU for extension of cable from the Gulf to Djibouti (2020)"
"text": "Djibouti remains one of the last bastions where the national telco has a monopoly on all telecom services, including fixed lines, mobile, internet, and broadband; the lack of competition to Djibouti Telecom for such services has meant that the market has not lived up to its potential; despite the country benefiting from its location as a hub for international submarine cables, and with Djibouti Telecom being a partner in at least eight of them, prices for telecom services remain relatively high, and out of reach for a number of customers, weighing on market advancement; the government has long harbored plans to privatize Djibouti Telecom, though thus far such plans have been delayed repeatedly; it has been encouraged by the experience of neighboring Ethiopia, which recently licensed the Global Partnership for Ethiopia consortium (controlled by Safaricom) and so broke the monopoly held by Ethio Telecom; the Djibouti government is aiming to sell a minority stake in the incumbent telco (retaining some control of decisions) while securing the financial backing and the management acumen of a foreign operator; this is part of a larger plan to modernize the country&rsquo;s economy more generally; the state expects to conduct of a sale of up to 40% of the company to an international investor by end-2022.&nbsp; (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "about 4 per 100 fixed-line teledensity and nearly 44 per 100 mobile-cellular; Djibouti Telecom (DT) is the sole provider of telecommunications services and utilizes mostly a microwave radio relay network; fiber-optic cable is installed in the capital; rural areas connected via wireless local loop radio systems; mobile cellular coverage is primarily limited to the area in and around Djibouti city (2020)"

2
africa/eg.json
View file

@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "with a large urbanized population and effective competition, Egypt has one of the largest fixed-line and mobile telecom markets in North Africa; investment has spurred broadband infrastructure and migration to digital economy; operator has ambitions for satellite/smart infrastructure based on 5G and fiber networks; Egypt&rsquo;s geographical position enabled inexpensive bandwidth through fiber and cable connection to Europe, Middle East, and Asia; rural Internet connections continue to suffer from poor quality and low speeds; government disrupted service during political crises (2020)"
"text": "Egypt&rsquo;s large telecom market is supported by a population of about 103 million and benefits from effective competition in most sectors; a liberal regulatory regime allows for unified licenses which permit operators to offer fixed-line as well as mobile services; in recent years the government has developed a number of digital migration projects aimed at increasing average broadband speeds, delivering fiber broadband to about 60% of the population, developing an in-house satellite program, and creating a knowledge-based economy through the greater adoption of ICTs; the New Administrative Capital being built is only one of more than a dozen smart city projects, which together are stimulating investment in 5G and fiber broadband, as well as the adoption of IoT and AI solutions; the country endeavor to be a significant ICT hub in the North Africa and Middle East regions; Egypt&rsquo;s mature mobile market has one of the highest subscription rates in Africa; progress in the adoption of mobile data services has been hampered by the lack of sufficient spectrum; the regulator in September 2020 made available 60MHz in the 2.6GHz band, though the spectrum was not allocated until late 2021; the additional spectrum will go far to enabling the MNOs to improve the quality of mobile broadband services offered; further 5G trials are to be held later in 2022, focused on the New Administrative Capital; the international cable infrastructure remains an important asset for Egypt, which benefits from its geographical position; Telecom Egypt has become one of the largest concerns in this segment, being a participating member in numerous cable systems; in mid-2021 the telco announced plans to build the Hybrid African Ring Path system, connecting a number of landlocked countries in Africa with Italy, France, and Portugal; the system will partly use the company&rsquo;s existing terrestrial and sub sea cable networks. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line roughly 10 per 100, mobile-cellular 93 per 100 (2020)"

2
africa/ek.json
View file

@ -590,7 +590,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Susan N. STEVENSON (since 11 April 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador David R. GILMOUR (since 24 May 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Malabo II Highway (between the Headquarters of Sonagas and the offices of the United Nations), Malabo"

2
africa/er.json
View file

@ -952,7 +952,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "least developed telecommunications market in Africa, largely due to restrictions of state-owned telecom monopoly; most fixed-line telephones are in Asmara; cell phone use is limited by government control of SIM card issuance; low penetration of computer use and Internet; market ripe for competition and investment; direct phone service between Eritrea and Ethiopia restored in September 2018; government operator working on roll-out of 3G network (2020)"
"text": "Eritrea&rsquo;s telecom sector operates under a state-owned monopoly for fixed and mobile services; the country has the least developed telecommunications market in Africa; mobile subscriptions stands at only about 20%, while fixed-line internet use barely registers; this is exacerbated by the very low use of computers, with only about 4% of households having a computer, and most of these being in the capital, Asmara; the provision of internet services is open to competition, about 2% of households have access to the internet; the national telco, the Eritrean Telecommunication Services Corporation (EriTel), continues to roll out a 3G network which provides basic internet access to the majority or Eritreans; considerable investment in telecom infrastructure is still required to improve the quality of services; the government has embarked on a work program aimed at extending services to remote areas, improving the quality of services, and ensuring that more telecoms infrastructure is supported by solar power to compensate for the poor state of the electricity network; additional foreign investment in telecom infrastructure, as well as introduction of more competition, would help transform what remains a virtually untapped market. (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscribership is less than 2 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular is just over 20 per 100 (2019)"

15
africa/et.json
View file

@ -506,7 +506,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"widespread lack of access": {
"text": "due to civil conflict and drought - more than 16 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the May&minus;June 2021 period; the high levels of food insecurity are mainly due to the lingering impact of the measures implemented in 2020 to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic, macro‑economic challenges resulting in high food prices, localized but significant locust‑induced crop and pasture losses, the negative impact on crop and livestock production of erratic rains in the first half of the year and to the intensification of inter‑communal violence since 2020 in several areas and the ongoing conflict in Tigray Region (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to civil conflict and drought -</em> more than 16 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the May−June 2021 period; the high levels of food insecurity are mainly due to the lingering impact of the measures implemented in 2020 to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic, macro‑economic challenges resulting in high food prices, localized but significant locust‑induced crop and pasture losses, the negative impact on crop and livestock production of erratic rains in the first half of the year and to the intensification of inter‑communal violence since 2020 in several areas and the ongoing conflict in Tigray Region (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -700,7 +700,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Geeta PASI (since 1 March 2021)<br> <p> </p>"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Ambassador Tracey Ann JACOBSON (since 25 February 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Entoto Street, P.O. Box 1014, Addis Ababa"
@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "telecom market challenged by political factionalism and reorganization of ruling party; despite some gains in access, Ethiopia remains one of the least-connected countries in the world; state-owned telecom held a monopoly over services until 2019 when government approved legislation and opened the market to competition and foreign investment; new expansion of LTE services; government reduced tariffs leading to increases in data and voice traffic; government launched mobile app as part of e-government initiative to build smart city; Huawei provides infrastructure to government operator and built data center in Addis Ababa; government disrupted service during political crises; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2020)"
"text": "the slow process to open up Ethiopia&rsquo;s telecom market was completed with the licensing of the Safaricom-led Global Partnership for Ethiopia consortium; the country had been one of the last in Africa to allow its national telco a monopoly on all telecom services including fixed, mobile, internet and data communications; this has stifled innovation, restricted network expansion, and limited the scope of services on offer; the consortium was in some respects a proxy for the wider influence over Ethiopia&rsquo;s telecom sector between the interests of the US and China; only one of the two licenses on offer was secured, with uncertainty as to the timetable for issuing the second license; the government in mid-2021 began the process of selling a 45% stake in the incumbent telco Ethio Telecom; the World Bank in early 2021 provided a $200 million loan to help develop the country&rsquo;s digital transformation, while the government has embarked on its 2020-2030 program as well as its Digital Ethiopia 2025 strategy, both aimed at making better use of digital technologies to promote socioeconomic development; the country&rsquo;s mobile platform has mostly been provided by ZTE and Huawei, which have offered vendor financing; Ethio Telecom has placed the expansion of LTE services as a cornerstone of its investment program to 2022; the new licensee has been barred from contracting Chinese vendors, thus opening the door to western vendors.&nbsp; (2021)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions at about 1 per 100 while mobile-cellular stands at a little over 37 per 100; the number of mobile telephones is increasing steadily (2019)"
@ -1244,11 +1244,10 @@
"note": "note - in November 2021, the Ethiopian Government issued a nationwide state of emergency that enabled officials to order military-age citizens to undergo training and accept military duty in support of the Tigray conflict"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "5-10,000 Somalia (4,500 for ATMIS; the remainder under a bilateral agreement with Somalia; note - bilateral figures are prior to the conflict with Tigray); 250 Sudan (UNISFA); 1,500 South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)",
"note": "note - in August 2021, Sudan asked the UN to remove the Ethiopian troops from the UNISFA mission"
"text": "5-10,000 Somalia (4,500 for ATMIS; the remainder under a bilateral agreement with Somalia; note - bilateral figures are prior to the conflict with Tigray); 250 Sudan (UNISFA); 1,500 South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "each of the nine states has a regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security forces that report to regional civilian authorities; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP), and the Ethiopian military; the EFP reports to the Ministry of Peace, which was created in October of 2018<br><br>since November 2020, the Government of Ethiopia has been engaged in a protracted military conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former governing party of the Tigray Region; the government deemed a TPLF attack on Ethiopia military forces as a domestic terrorism incident and launched a military offensive in response; the TPLF asserted that its actions were self-defense in the face of planned Ethiopian Government action to remove it from the provincial government; the Ethiopian Government sent large elements of the ENDF into Tigray to remove the TPLF and invited militia and paramilitary forces from the states of Afar and Amara, as well as the military forces of Eritrea, to assist; the fighting included heavy civilian and military casualties with widespread abuses reported; in March 2022, the Ethiopian Government declared a  truce to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid into the Tigray region; the TPLF reciprocated with a truce of its own; since the announcement, both sides have observed the truce and ceased hostilities, although tensions remained high, and Ethiopian military operations continued against the OLA in Oromia as of mid-2022<br><br>the military forces of the Tigray regional government are known as the Tigray Defense Force (TDF); the TDF is comprised of state paramilitary forces, local militia, and troops that defected from the ENDF; it reportedly had up to 250,000 fighters at the start of the conflict; in August 2021, the TPLF struck an alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)"
"text": "each of the nine states has a regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security forces that report to regional civilian authorities; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP), and the Ethiopian military; the EFP reports to the Ministry of Peace, which was created in October of 2018<br><br>since November 2020, the Government of Ethiopia has been engaged in a protracted military conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former governing party of the Tigray Region; the government deemed a TPLF attack on Ethiopia military forces as a domestic terrorism incident and launched a military offensive in response; the TPLF asserted that its actions were self-defense in the face of planned Ethiopian Government action to remove it from the provincial government; the Ethiopian Government sent large elements of the ENDF into Tigray to remove the TPLF and invited militia and paramilitary forces from the states of Afar and Amara, as well as the military forces of Eritrea, to assist; the fighting included heavy civilian and military casualties with widespread abuses reported; in March 2022, the Ethiopian Government declared a  truce to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid into the Tigray region; the TPLF reciprocated with a truce of its own; since the announcement, both sides have reportedly observed the truce, although tensions remained high, and Ethiopian military operations continued against the OLA in Oromia as of mid-2022<br><br>the military forces of the Tigray regional government are known as the Tigray Defense Force (TDF); the TDF is comprised of state paramilitary forces, local militia, and troops that defected from the ENDF; it reportedly had up to 250,000 fighters at the start of the conflict; in August 2021, the TPLF struck an alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {
@ -1263,10 +1262,10 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "402,099 (South Sudan), 246,427 (Somalia), 159,369 (Eritrea), 47,179 (Sudan) (2022)"
"text": "402,099 (South Sudan), 246,427 (Somalia), 159,935 (Eritrea), 47,427 (Sudan) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "1,990,168 (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2021)"
"text": "2,114,653 (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2021)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {

4
africa/ga.json
View file

@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Richard Carlton \"Carl\" PASCHALL (since 9 April 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador Sharon L. CROMER (since 18 March 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Kairaba Avenue, Fajara, P.M.B. 19, Banjul"
@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "state-owned telecom partially privatized but retains a monopoly with fixed-line service; multiple mobile networks provide 2G to almost all citizens and above the African average; high poverty rates continue to limit access to the Internet, especially via fixed-line services in rural areas; weak political support for development of communications infrastructure, including National Broadband Network program; government depends on donors and loans from China and Islamic Development banks; two submarine cables provide international connectivity within African continent and Europe (2020)"
"text": "Gambia&rsquo;s telecom market is dominated by the incumbent telco Gamtel, which retains a monopoly on fixed-line telephony services; there are five mobile networks providing effective competition, though Giraffe Telecom was only licensed in January 2022 and has not yet been allocated a frequency; the market leader is Africell, with about 62% of the market, while Comium and QCell compete closely for second and third place; Gamtel&rsquo;s mobile unit Gamcel is by far the smallest network, having suffered from low investment in recent years; Comium has also suffered from financial difficulties: its failure to pay accumulated fees resulted in the government having sought a temporary suspension of its services in mid-2021; mobile subscriptions are well above the African average, itself a testament to the poor condition of the fixed-line infrastructure and the lack of availability of fixed services in many rural areas of the country; the incumbent has a relatively well-developed national fiber backbone network, low fixed-line subscriptions have hindered internet usage; there are only four licensed ISPs, which are small networks serving local areas, and so competition is minimal; their limited services are complemented by the fixed-wireless offerings of three of the MNOs; the government has embarked on a National Broadband Network program aimed at closing the digital divide affecting many parts of the country; Gamtel launched services based on this network in late 2019, though on a limited scale; despite efforts to improve internet connectivity, the country ranks among the lowest globally in terms of digital readiness. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions nearly 2 per 100 with one dominant company and mobile-cellular teledensity nearly 111 per 100 persons (2020)"

2
africa/gb.json
View file

@ -994,7 +994,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "politically stable and oil laden, Gabon is one of wealthiest nations in Africa; liberalized and competitive market led development of mobile broadband, data service, and tests of 5G; fixed-line sector underdeveloped due to the lack of competition and high prices; South Korean investment in fiber segments as part of Central African backbone; sufficient international bandwidth through submarine cable systems; government committed to backbone infrastructure and e-health services; efforts towards new legal and regulatory improvements (2020)"
"text": "the telecom market was liberalized in 1999 when the government awarded three mobile telephony licenses and two ISP licenses and established an independent regulatory authority; Moov Gabon (known as Gabon Telecom before a rebranding exercise in January 2021), was privatized in 2007 when Maroc Telecom bought a 51% stake in the network; in June 2016 Maroc Telecom merged its two business in Gabon, thereby reducing the number of mobile networks from four to three; the 2009 entry of USAN (operated by Bintel Group under the brand name Azur) into a competitive market with high subscriptions triggered a price war that saw falling revenue and profits, forcing the networks to streamline their businesses and to look for new income streams; following more than a year of delays, a license to offer 3G mobile broadband services was awarded in late 2011; Azur failed and ceased trading in late 2017, encumbered by debts and fined by the regulator for failing to observe its quality of service obligations; in contrast with the mobile market, Gabon&rsquo;s fixed-line and internet sectors have remained underdeveloped due to a lack of competition and high prices; the country has sufficient international bandwidth on the SAT-3/WASC/SAFE submarine cable but this facility is monopolized by Moov Gabon; the arrival of the ACE submarine cable, combined with progressing work on the CAB cable, has increased back haul capacity supporting mobile data traffic, and broke Moov Gabon&rsquo;s monopoly on international internet traffic. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line is a little over 1 per 100 subscriptions; a growing mobile cellular network with multiple providers is making telephone service more widely available with mobile cellular teledensity at nearly 139 per 100 persons (2020)"

12
africa/gh.json
View file

@ -665,7 +665,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Stephanie S. SULLIVAN (since 23 January 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador Virginia E. PALMER (since 16 June 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "No.24, Fourth Circular Road, Cantonments, Accra, P.O. Box 2288, Accra"
@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "challenged by unreliable electricity and shortage of skilled labor, Ghana seeks to extend telecom services nationally; investment in fiber infrastructure and off-grid solutions provide data coverage to over 23 million people; launch of LTE has improved mobile data services, including m-commerce and banking; moderately competitive Internet market, most through mobile networks; international submarine cables, and terrestrial cables have improved Internet capacity (2022)"
"text": "challenged by unreliable electricity and shortage of skilled labor, Ghana seeks to extend telecom services nationally; investment in fiber infrastructure and off-grid solutions provide data coverage to over 23 million people; launch of LTE has improved mobile data services, including m-commerce and banking; moderately competitive Internet market, most through mobile networks; international submarine cables, and terrestrial cables have improved Internet capacity; LTE services are widely available, only MTN Ghana has thus far signaled a willingness to invest in 5G; the relatively high cost of 5G-compatible devices also inhibits most subscribers from migrating from 3G and LTE platforms. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line data about 1 per 200 subscriptions; competition among multiple mobile-cellular providers has spurred growth with a voice subscribership of more than 130 per 100 persons (2022)"
@ -1197,13 +1197,13 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "approximately 14,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,000 Air Force) (2021)"
"text": "approximately 14,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,000 Air Force) (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the inventory of the Ghana Armed Forces is a mix of Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment; since 2010, China is the leading supplier of arms (2021)"
"text": "the inventory of the Ghana Armed Forces is a mix of Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment; since 2010, China is the leading supplier of arms (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service, with basic education certificate; no conscription (2021)"
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service, with basic education certificate; no conscription (2022)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "150 Mali (MINUSMA); 875 Lebanon (UNIFIL); 730 (plus about 300 police) South Sudan (UNMISS) (Jan 2022)"
@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "5,779 (Cote d'Ivoire) (flight from 2010 post-election fighting) (2022)"
"text": "5,635 (Cote d'Ivoire) (flight from 2010 post-election fighting) (2022)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {

18
africa/gv.json
View file

@ -483,7 +483,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to reduced incomes - about 740,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to reduced incomes -</em> about 740,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -567,7 +567,7 @@
},
"Constitution": {
"history": {
"text": "currently suspended on September 5, 2021 via t coup d&rsquo;etat. On September 27, 2021 the Transitional Charter was released.&nbsp; It supersedes the constitution until a new constitution is promulgated. previous 1958, 1990, and 2010"
"text": "previous 1958, 1990; latest 2010, which was suspended on 5 September 2021 via a coup d&rsquo;etat; on 27 September, the Transitional Charter was released, which supersedes the constitution until a new constitution is promulgated"
},
"amendments": {
"text": "proposed by the National Assembly or by the president of the republic; consideration of proposals requires approval by simple majority vote by the Assembly; passage requires approval in referendum; the president can opt to submit amendments directly to the Assembly, in which case approval requires at least two-thirds majority vote; revised in 2020"
@ -604,7 +604,7 @@
"text": "formerly, Prime Minister Mohamed BEAVOGUI (since 6 October 2021); note - on 5 September 2021, Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA led a military coup in which President CONDE was arrested and detained, the constitution suspended, and the government of Prime Minister Ibrahima Kassory FOFANA dissolved"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "formerly, the Council of Ministers appointed by the president; note: on 5 September 2021, Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA led a military coup on 5 September 2021 in which President CONDE was arrested and detained, the constitution suspended, and the government and legislature dissolved"
"text": "formerly, the Council of Ministers appointed by the president; note: on 5 September 2021, Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA led a military coup in which President CONDE was arrested and detained, the constitution suspended, and the government and legislature dissolved"
},
"elections/appointments": {
"text": "formerly, the president was directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term) and the prime minister appointed by the president; election last held on 18 October 2020; note - on 5 September 2021, Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA led a military coup in which President CONDE was arrested and detained, and on 1 October 2021,Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA was sworn in as transitional president"
@ -626,10 +626,10 @@
},
"Judicial branch": {
"highest courts": {
"text": "Supreme Court or Cour Supreme (organized into Administrative Chamber and Civil, Penal, and Social Chamber; court consists of the first president, 2 chamber presidents, 10 councilors, the solicitor general, and NA deputies)."
"text": "Supreme Court or Cour Supreme (organized into Administrative Chamber and Civil, Penal, and Social Chamber; court consists of the first president, 2 chamber presidents, 10 councilors, the solicitor general, and NA deputies); Constitutional Court - suspended on 5 September 2021"
},
"judge selection and term of office": {
"text": "Supreme Court first president appointed by the national president after consultation with the National Assembly; other members appointed by presidential decree; members serve until age 65; members serve single 9-year terms"
"text": "Supreme Court first president appointed by the national president after consultation with the National Assembly; other members appointed by presidential decree; members serve 9-year terms until age 65"
},
"subordinate courts": {
"text": "Court of Appeal or Cour d'Appel; High Court of Justice or Cour d'Assises; Court of Account (Court of Auditors); Courts of First Instance (Tribunal de Premiere Instance); labor court; military tribunal; justices of the peace; specialized courts"
@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Guinea&rsquo;s mobile subscribership growing through investment of South African telecom operators and Chinese Huawei management; m-transactions supported commerce; broadband still limited and expensive though submarine cable and IXP improved reliability of infrastructure; 4G Wi-Fi in the capital; National Backbone Network will connect regional administrative centers; ECOWAS countries to launch free roaming; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2020)"
"text": "Guinea&rsquo;s telecom market is dominated by MTN and Orange; after the entry of these regional players, the number of mobile subscribers grew strongly while revenue also increased steadily; the debt-stricken incumbent fixed-line network Sotelgui provided a mobile service until it was closed down in late 2012, following a long period of mismanagement; the company itself was declared bankrupt in 2013, and stopped operating; the government since 2019 has sought to secure partners and investors to help launch a replacement operator, Guinea Telecom, but with no success; fixed broadband services are still very limited and expensive, though there have been some positive developments in recent years; the landing of the first international submarine cable in 2012, and the setting up of an IXP in mid-2013, increased the bandwidth available to the ISPs, and helped reduce the cost of internet services for end-users; a National Backbone Network was completed in mid-2020, connecting administrative centers across the country; almost all internet connections are made via mobile networks; GSM services account for a dwindling proportion of connections, in line with the greater reach of services based on 3G and LTE.&nbsp; (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "there is national coverage and Conakry is reasonably well-served; coverage elsewhere remains inadequate but is improving; fixed-line teledensity is less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership is just over 100 per 100 persons (2019)"
@ -1177,13 +1177,13 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "Guinean National Armed Forces are comprised of approximately 12,000 active personnel <br>(9,000 Army; 400 Navy; 800 Air Force; 300 BASP; 1,500 Gendarmerie) (2021)"
"text": "Guinean National Armed Forces are comprised of approximately 12,000 active personnel <br>(9,000 Army; 400 Navy; 800 Air Force; 300 BASP; 1,500 Gendarmerie) (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of ageing and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; since 2010, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, Russia, and South Africa (2021)"
"text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of ageing and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; since 2010, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, Russia, and South Africa (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "Voluntary and selective conscripted service, 9-24 mos (2021)"
"text": "Voluntary and selective conscripted service, 9-24 mos (2022)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "670 Mali (MINUSMA) (Jan 2022)"

12
africa/iv.json
View file

@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "C&ocirc;te d'Ivoire telecom systems continue to benefit from strong economic growth; fixed-line, Internet, and broadband sectors remain underdeveloped; mobile sector is strong; progress in national backbone network and connection to submarine cable that will increase Internet bandwidth; country is poised to develop broadband market and digital economy; government further tightened SIM card registration rules (2020)"
"text": "in recent years the government of Ivory Coast has helped develop a competitive telecom sector focused on the provision of converged services, thus allowing operators to offer fixed-line and mobile services under a universal services license regime; there are two fixed network operators, the market is dominated by Orange Group&rsquo;s local unit, Orange C&ocirc;te d&rsquo;Ivoire; the mobile market is more competitive, with Orange C&ocirc;te d&rsquo;Ivoire operating alongside MTN C&ocirc;te d&rsquo;Ivoire and Moov; over the years a number of alternative operators have either folded, had their licenses evoked, or failed to launch services; the fixed internet and broadband sectors remain underdeveloped; this is a legacy of poor international connectivity, which resulted in high wholesale prices, limited bandwidth, and a lack of access for alternative operators to international infrastructure; these limitations were addressed following the landing of a second cable in November 2011, and the end to the access monopoly held by Orange C&ocirc;te d&rsquo;Ivoire; Orange Group has also launched its 20,000km Djoliba cable system, reaching across eight countries in the region, while the 2Africa submarine cable is being developed by a consortium of companies; with a landing station providing connectivity to C&ocirc;te d'Ivoire, the system is expected to be completed in late 2023.&nbsp; (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "1 per 100 fixed-line teledensity; with multiple mobile-cellular service providers competing in the market, mobile subscriptions have increased to 152 per 100 persons (2020)"
@ -1212,19 +1212,19 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army, including about 2,000 Special Forces; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force); est. 5-10,000 Gendarmerie (2021)"
"text": "approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army, including about 2,000 Special Forces; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force); est. 5-10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; since 2016, it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from a variety of countries (2021)"
"text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; since 2016, it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from a variety of countries (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary male and female military service; conscription is not enforced; voluntary recruitment of former rebels into the new national army is restricted to ages 22-29 (2021)"
"text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary male and female military service; conscription is not enforced; voluntary recruitment of former rebels into the new national army is restricted to ages 22-29 (2022)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "860 Mali (MINUSMA) (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; as of 2022, the FACI was focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017"
"text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; as of 2022, the FACI was focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2022)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"IDPs": {
"text": "308,000 (post-election conflict in 2010-11, as well as civil war from 2002-04; land disputes; most pronounced in western and southwestern regions) (2019)"
"text": "302,000 (post-election conflict in 2010-11, as well as civil war from 2002-04; land disputes; most pronounced in western and southwestern regions) (2021)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "952,969 (mid-year 2021); note - many Ivoirians lack documentation proving their nationality, which prevent them from accessing education and healthcare; birth on Ivorian soil does not automatically result in citizenship; disputes over citizenship and the associated rights of the large population descended from migrants from neighboring countries is an ongoing source of tension and contributed to the country's 2002 civil war; some observers believe the government's mass naturalizations of thousands of people over the last couple of years is intended to boost its electoral support base; the government in October 2013 acceded to international conventions on statelessness and in August 2013 reformed its nationality law, key steps to clarify the nationality of thousands of residents; since the adoption of the Abidjan Declaration to eradicate statelessness in West Africa in February 2015, 6,400 people have received nationality papers; in September 2020, Cote d'Ivoire adopted Africa's first statelessness determination procedure to regularize the status of stateless people"

10
africa/ke.json
View file

@ -477,7 +477,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
"text": "due to drought conditions - about 3.1 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in February 2022 reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 that affected crop and livestock production, mainly in northern and eastern pastoral, agro-pastoral and marginal agricultural areas; the deterioration of the food security situation is mainly due to the negative impact of two consecutive poor rainy seasons since October 2020 on crop and livestock production and on on‑farm income‑earning opportunities; the impact of the measures implemented to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic on economic activities exacerbated food insecurity (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to drought conditions -</em> about 3.1 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in February 2022 reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 that affected crop and livestock production, mainly in northern and eastern pastoral, agro-pastoral and marginal agricultural areas; the deterioration of the food security situation is mainly due to the negative impact of two consecutive poor rainy seasons since October 2020 on crop and livestock production and on on‑farm income‑earning opportunities; the impact of the measures implemented to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic on economic activities exacerbated food insecurity (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -668,7 +668,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Eric W. Kneedler (since 20 January 2021)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Eric W. KNEEDLER (since 20 January 2021)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "P.O. Box 606 Village Market, 00621 Nairobi"
@ -1249,14 +1249,14 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005; as of March 2019, Kenya provides shelter to nearly 475,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including Ugandans who flee across the border periodically to seek protection from Lord's Resistance Army rebels; Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; the boundary that separates Kenya's and Sudan's sovereignty is unclear in the \"Ilemi Triangle,\" which Kenya has administered since colonial times<br><br><em>Uganda-Kenya:</em> Kenya and Uganda have begun a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021 </p>"
"text": "<p>as of March 2022, Kenya provides shelter to nearly 548,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including Ugandans who flee across the border periodically to seek protection from Lord's Resistance Army rebels</p> <p><em>Kenya-Ethiopia</em>: their border was demarcated in the 1950s and approved in 1970; in 2012, Kenya and Ethiopia agreed to redemarcate their boundary following disputes over beacons and crossborder crime</p> <p><em>Kenya-Somalia</em>: Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; in 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave Somalia control over a disputed ocean area where the seabeds are believed to hold vasts oil and gas deposits; the ICJ ruling gives Somalia the rights to several offshore oil exploration blocks previously claimed by Kenya; Kenya did not recognize the court’s decision</p> <p><em>Kenya-South Sudan</em>: two thirds of the boundary that separates Kenya and South Sudan's sovereignty known as the Ilemi Triangle has been unclear since British colonial times; Kenya has administered the area since colonial times; officials from Kenya and South Sudan signed a M.o.U. on boundary delimitation and demarcation and agreed to set up a joint committee; as of July 2019, the demarcation process was to begin in 90 days, but was delayed due to a lack of funding</p> <p><em>Kenya-Sudan</em>: Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005</p> <p><em>Kenya-Tanzania</em>: Kenya and Tanzania were conducting a joint reaffirmation process in November 2021 to ensure the border was visibly marked with pillars</p> <p><em>Kenya-Uganda:</em> Kenya and Uganda began a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021 </p> <p> </p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "279,197 (Somalia), 142,113 (South Sudan), 21,001 (Ethiopia), 19,036 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 7,521 (Burundi) (2022)"
"text": "279,197 (Somalia), 142,113 (South Sudan), 21,047 (Ethiopia), 19,036 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 7,770 (Burundi), 5,011 (Sudan) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2020)"
"text": "190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2021)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "16,820 (mid-year 2021); note - the stateless population consists of Nubians, Kenyan Somalis, and coastal Arabs; the Nubians are descendants of Sudanese soldiers recruited by the British to fight for them in East Africa more than a century ago; Nubians did not receive Kenyan citizenship when the country became independent in 1963; only recently have Nubians become a formally recognized tribe and had less trouble obtaining national IDs; Galjeel and other Somalis who have lived in Kenya for decades are included with more recent Somali refugees and denied ID cards"

9
africa/li.json
View file

@ -473,7 +473,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to high food prices - production of rice, a main staple food, was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, a factor that is expected to further aggravate food insecurity in 2022 (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to high food prices -</em> production of rice, a main staple food, was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, a factor that is expected to further aggravate food insecurity in 2022 (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1160,12 +1160,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>as the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) continues to drawdown prior to the 1 March 2018 closure date, the peacekeeping force is being reduced to 434 soldiers and two police units; some Liberian refugees still remain in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Ghana; Liberia shelters 7,811 Ivoirian refugees, as of February 2022</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "8,054 (Cote d'Ivoire) (2022)"
}
"text": "<p><em>Liberia-Guinea</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Liberia-Sierra Leone</em>: none identified</p>"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>not a significant transit country for illicit narcotics but proximity to major drug routes contribute to trafficking; not a significant producer of illicit narcotics; local drug use involves marijuana, heroin, cocaine, the synthetic opioid tramadol, and amphetamine-type stimulants</p>"

8
africa/lt.json
View file

@ -460,7 +460,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to loss of income-generating activities -&nbsp; the number of people facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022 is estimated at 338,000, reflecting the effects of a slow economic recovery that has impinged on households&rsquo; economic capacity to access food (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to loss of income-generating activities -</em>  the number of people facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022 is estimated at 338,000, reflecting the effects of a slow economic recovery that has impinged on households’ economic capacity to access food (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -611,7 +611,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d’Affaires Masopha Phoofolo Moses KAO, Counselor (28 May 2021)<br> <p> </p>"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d&rsquo;Affaires Masopha Phoofolo Moses KAO, Counselor (28 May 2021)"
},
"chancery": {
"text": "2511 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008"
@ -628,7 +628,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Rebecca E. GONZALES (since 8 February 2018)"
"text": "Ambassador Maria E. BREWER (since 10 March 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "254 Kingsway Avenue, Maseru"
@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>South Africa has placed military units to assist police operations along the border of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to control smuggling, poaching, and illegal migration</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Lesotho-South Africa</em>: South Africa has placed military units to assist police operations along the border of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to control smuggling, poaching, and illegal migration</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"current situation": {

6
africa/ly.json
View file

@ -422,7 +422,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to civil insecurity, economic and political instability, and high food prices - an estimated 800,000 people, 10% of the population, need humanitarian assistance, of which 500,000 require food assistance (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity, economic and political instability, and high food prices -</em> an estimated 800,000 people, 10% of the population, need humanitarian assistance, of which 500,000 require food assistance (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1097,11 +1097,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p><em>Libya-Algeria:</em> dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km still reflected on its maps of southeastern Algeria<br><br><em>Libya-Chad:</em> various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region reside in southern Libya</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Libya-Algeria:</em> dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km still reflected on its maps of southeastern Algeria<br><br><em>Libya-Chad:</em> various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region reside in southern Libya; Libyan forces clashed with Chadian rebels in September 2021</p> <p><em>Libya-Egypt</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Libya-Niger</em>: the boundary is poorly defined but has never been disputed by either country</p> <p><em>Libya-Sudan</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Libya-Tunisia</em>: none identified</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "18,675 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 14,919 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
"text": "19,348 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,207 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "168,011 (conflict between pro-QADHAFI and anti-QADHAFI forces in 2011; post-QADHAFI tribal clashes 2014) (2022)"

6
africa/ma.json
View file

@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to the effects of extreme weather events - cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in eastern regions, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase later in 2022; moreover, drought conditions continue to affect households in the south, which is likely to result in an increase in the severity and prevalence of food insecurity in these areas (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to the effects of extreme weather events -</em> cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in eastern regions, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase later in 2022; moreover, drought conditions continue to affect households in the south, which is likely to result in an increase in the severity and prevalence of food insecurity in these areas (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -653,7 +653,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Amy J. HYATT (since June 2021)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Tobias H. GLUCKSMAN"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Lot 207A, Andranoro, Antehiroka, 105 Antananarivo"
@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>claims Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, and Juan de Nova Island (all administered by France); the vegetated drying cays of Banc du Geyser, which were claimed by Madagascar in 1976, also fall within the EEZ claims of the Comoros and France (Glorioso Islands, part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands)</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Madagascar-France</em>: claims Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, and Juan de Nova Island (all administered by France); the vegetated drying cays of Banc du Geyser, which were claimed by Madagascar in 1976, also fall within the EEZ claim of France</p> <p><em>Madagascar-Comoros</em>: the vegetated drying cays of Banc du Geyser, which were claimed by Madagascar in 1976, also fall within the EEZ claim of the Comoros</p>"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "illicit producer of cannabis (cultivated and wild varieties) used mostly for domestic consumption; transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin"

8
africa/mi.json
View file

@ -481,7 +481,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to reduced incomes and shortfalls in cereal producation - an estimated 1.65 million people are facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022, underpinned by localized shortfalls in cereal production and the lingering impact of an economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic; the effects of poor rains at the start of the cropping season and tropical storm Ana in January 2022 are expected to cause an increase in humanitarian needs later in 2022, due to crop and livelihood losses (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to reduced incomes and shortfalls in cereal production -</em> an estimated 1.65 million people are facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022, underpinned by localized shortfalls in cereal production and the lingering impact of an economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic; the effects of poor rains at the start of the cropping season and tropical storm Ana in January 2022 are expected to cause an increase in humanitarian needs later in 2022, due to crop and livelihood losses (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -660,7 +660,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Charge d' Affaires Jeremy NEITZKE (26 October 2021&nbsp;"
"text": "Ambassador David YOUNG (since 5 May 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "16 Jomo Kenyatta Road, Lilongwe 3"
@ -1198,11 +1198,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>dispute with Tanzania over the boundary in Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi) and the meandering Songwe River; Malawi contends that the entire lake up to the Tanzanian shoreline is its territory, while Tanzania claims the border is in the center of the lake; the conflict was reignited in 2012 when Malawi awarded a license to a British company for oil exploration in the lake</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Malawi-Mozambique</em>: the two countries have held exercises to reaffirm boundaries a number of times</p> <p><em>Malawi-Tanzania</em>: dispute with Tanzania over the boundary in Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi) and the meandering Songwe River; Malawi contends that the entire lake up to the Tanzanian shoreline is its territory, while Tanzania claims the border is in the center of the lake; the conflict was reignited in 2012 when Malawi awarded a license to a British company for oil exploration in the lake</p> <p><em>Malawi-Zambia</em>: border demarcation was completed in 2011; in 2018, the redemarcation exercise determined that some parts of Malawi actually belonged to Zambia</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "33,606 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 12,377 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers), 7,526 (Rwanda) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
"text": "33,606 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 12,530 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers), 7,596 (Rwanda) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
}
}
}

8
africa/ml.json
View file

@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "<p>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in staple food production - between June and August 2022, 1.84 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity, driven in part by a shortfall in staple food production in 2021; sanctions imposed on the country, following the postponement of elections by the transitional military government, are likely to slow down economic activity and further weigh on households’ economic capacity to access food</p> (2022)"
"text": "<p><em>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in staple food production -</em> between June and August 2022, 1.84 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity, driven in part by a shortfall in staple food production in 2021; sanctions imposed on the country, following the postponement of elections by the transitional military government, are likely to slow down economic activity and further weigh on households’ economic capacity to access food</p> (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1206,14 +1206,14 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>demarcation is underway with Burkina Faso</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Mali-Burkina Faso</em>: demarcation is underway with Burkina Faso</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "17,124 (Burkina Faso), 14,951 (Mauritania), 12,845 (Niger) (2022)"
"text": "22,051 (Burkina Faso), 14,950 (Mauritania), 13,585 (Niger) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "350,110 (Tuareg rebellion since 2012) (2021)"
"text": "370,548 (Tuareg rebellion since 2012) (2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {

2
africa/mo.json
View file

@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Morocco protests Spain's control over the coastal enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla, and Penon de Velez de la Gomera, the islands of Penon de Alhucemas and Islas Chafarinas, and surrounding waters; both countries claim Isla Perejil (Leila Island); discussions have not progressed on a comprehensive maritime delimitation, setting limits on resource exploration and refugee interdiction, since Morocco's 2002 rejection of Spain's unilateral designation of a median line from the Canary Islands; Morocco serves as one of the primary launching areas of illegal migration into Spain from North Africa; Algeria's border with Morocco remains an irritant to bilateral relations, each nation accusing the other of harboring militants and arms smuggling; the National Liberation Front's assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in southeastern Morocco is a dormant dispute</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Morocco-Algeria</em>: Algeria's border with Morocco remains an irritant to bilateral relations, each nation accusing the other of harboring militants and arms smuggling</p> <p><em>Morocco-Mauritania</em>: tensions arose in 2016 when Mauritanian soldiers were deployed to Lagouira, a city in the southernmost part of Morocco, and raised their flag</p> <p><em>Morocco-Spain</em>: Morocco protests Spain's control over the coastal enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla, and Penon de Velez de la Gomera, the islands of Penon de Alhucemas and Islas Chafarinas, and surrounding waters; both countries claim Isla Perejil (Leila Island); discussions have not progressed on a comprehensive maritime delimitation, setting limits on resource exploration and refugee interdiction, since Morocco's 2002 rejection of Spain's unilateral designation of a median line from the Canary Islands; Morocco serves as one of the primary launching areas of illegal migration into Spain from North Africa</p>"
},
"Illicit drugs": {
"text": "<p>one of the world’s largest cannabis-producing country with Europe as the main  market; hashish is also smuggled to South America and the Caribbean where it is exchanged for cocaine which is distributed in Europe; MDMA (ecstasy), originating in Belgium and the Netherlands is smuggled into northern Morocco for sale on the domestic market</p>"

2
africa/mp.json
View file

@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory); claims French-administered Tromelin Island</p>"
"text": "<p>Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory); claims French-administered Tromelin Island</p> <p><em>Mauritius-France</em>: Mauritius has claimed French-administered Tromelin Island (part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands) since 1976<br><br><em>Mauritius-UK</em>: Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory)</p>"
},
"Trafficking in persons": {
"current situation": {

6
africa/mr.json
View file

@ -487,7 +487,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to poor performance of cereal production - domestic cereal production declined in 2021 due to poor weather, which is likely to worsen conditions of the most vulnerable households; in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 660,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to poor performance of cereal production -</em> domestic cereal production declined in 2021 due to poor weather, which is likely to worsen conditions of the most vulnerable households; in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 660,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1218,11 +1218,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara remain dormant</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Mauritania-Algeria</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Mauritania-Mali</em>: there are no border disputes, but the border has not been demarcated; talks on demarcation were reportedly being held in February 2022</p> <p><em>Mauritania-Morocco</em>: Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara remain dormant; tensions arose in 2016 when Mauritanian soldiers were deployed to Lagouira, a city in the southernmost part of Morocco, and raised their flag</p> <p><em>Mauritania-Senegal</em>: none identified</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "26,001 (Sahrawis) (mid-year 2021); 84,526 (Mali) (2022)"
"text": "26,001 (Sahrawis) (mid-year 2021); 85,083 (Mali) (2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {

12
africa/mz.json
View file

@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "<p>due to localized shortfalls in staple food production, insecurity in northern areas, extreme weather events - an estimated 1.9 million people require humanitarian assistance until at least March 2022, primarily due to shortfalls in food production and the impact of insecurity in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where populations are experiencing the severest levels of acute food insecurity; approximately 24,000 people are facing \"Emergency\" levels of food insecurity; cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in central provinces, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase in late 2022</p> (2022)"
"text": "<p><em>due to localized shortfalls in staple food production, insecurity in northern areas, and extreme weather events -</em> an estimated 1.9 million people require humanitarian assistance until at least March 2022, primarily due to shortfalls in food production and the impact of insecurity in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where populations are experiencing the severest levels of acute food insecurity; approximately 24,000 people are facing \"Emergency\" levels of food insecurity; cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in central provinces, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase in late 2022</p> (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -664,7 +664,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Dennis Walter HEARNE (since 3 April 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador Peter Hendrick VROOMAN (since 3 March 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Avenida Kenneth Kaunda, 193, Caixa Postal, 783, Maputo"
@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "information limited and varied; approximately 12,000 personnel (11,000 Army; 200 Navy; 800 Air Force) (2021)"
"text": "information limited and varied; approximately 12,000 personnel (11,000 Army and about 1,000 Air Force and Navy) (2021)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FADM's inventory consists primarily of Soviet-era equipment, although since 2010 it has received limited quantities of more modern equipment from a variety of countries, mostly as aid/donations (2021)"
@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@
"text": "registration for military service is mandatory for all males and females at 18 years of age; 18-35 years of age for selective compulsory military service; 18 years of age for voluntary service; 2-year service obligation; women may serve as officers or enlisted (2021)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "the Government of Mozambique is facing an insurgency driven by militants with ties to the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS-Mozambique, which was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department in March 2021) in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, an area known for rich liquid natural gas deposits; insurgent attacks in the province began in 2017 and as of 2022, the fighting had left an estimated 3,000 dead and over 700,000 displaced; the FADM is widely assessed as lacking the training, equipment, and overall capabilities to address the insurgency; as of 2022, several countries from the Southern Africa Development Community and the European Union, as well as Rwanda and the US were providing various forms of military assistance; African countries have provided approximately 3,100 troops"
"text": "the Government of Mozambique is facing an insurgency driven by militants with ties to the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS-Mozambique, which was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department in March 2021) in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, an area known for rich liquid natural gas deposits; insurgent attacks in the province began in 2017 and as of 2022, the fighting had left an estimated 4,000 dead and over 700,000 displaced; the FADM is widely assessed as lacking the training, equipment, and overall capabilities to address the insurgency; as of 2022, several countries from the Southern Africa Development Community and the European Union, as well as Rwanda and the US were providing various forms of military assistance; African countries have provided approximately 3,100 troops (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {
@ -1237,14 +1237,14 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>South Africa has placed military units to assist police operations along the border of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to control smuggling, poaching, and illegal migration</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Mozambique-Eswatini</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Mozambique-Malawi</em>:  the two countries have held exercises to reaffirm boundaries a number of times</p> <p><em>Mozambique-South Africa</em>: South Africa has placed military units to assist police operations along the border of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to control smuggling, poaching, and illegal migration</p> <p><em>Mozambique-Tanzania</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Mozambique-Zambia</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Mozambique-Zimbabwe</em>: none identified</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "10,911 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 8,558 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "881,047 (violence between the government and an opposition group, violence associated with extremists groups in 2018, political violence 2019) (2022)"
"text": "744,949 (violence between the government and an opposition group, violence associated with extremists groups in 2018, political violence 2019) (2022)"
}
},
"Illicit drugs": {

8
africa/ng.json
View file

@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
"text": "due to internal conflict and shortfall in cereal production - as of January 2022, an estimated 265,000 people have been displaced due to civil conflict; in addition, domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, which is expected to further aggravate conditions; the aggregate cereal production in 2021 is officially estimated at 3.5 million mt, nearly 40% below the five‑year average; as a result, between June and August 2022, 3.64 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; this is a 40% increase compared to the current post‑harvest period, underpinned by the reduced cereal production in 2021, high food prices and the high likelihood of persisting disruptions of markets and agricultural activities amid increasing insecurity (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to internal conflict and shortfall in cereal production -</em> as of January 2022, an estimated 265,000 people have been displaced due to civil conflict; in addition, domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, which is expected to further aggravate conditions; the aggregate cereal production in 2021 is officially estimated at 3.5 million mt, nearly 40% below the five‑year average; as a result, between June and August 2022, 3.64 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; this is a 40% increase compared to the current post‑harvest period, underpinned by the reduced cereal production in 2021, high food prices and the high likelihood of persisting disruptions of markets and agricultural activities amid increasing insecurity (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "information varies; approximately 10,000 active troops (est. 6,000 Army; 200 Air Force; 4,000 Gendarmerie); est. 3,000 National Guard (2022)"
"text": "information varies; approximately 12,000 active troops (est. 8,000 Army; 200 Air Force; 4,000 Gendarmerie); est. 3,000 National Guard (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FAN's inventory consists of a wide variety of older weapons; since 2010, the FAN has received small amounts of mostly second-hand equipment and donations from several countries with the US as the top provider (2022)"
@ -1212,11 +1212,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Libya claims about 25,000 sq km in a currently dormant dispute in the Tommo region; location of Benin-Niger-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty that also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries; the dispute with Burkina Faso was referred to the ICJ in 2010</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Niger-Benin-Nigeria</em>: location of Niger-Benin-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved</p> <p><em>Niger-Burkina Faso</em>: the dispute with Burkina Faso was referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2010; the ICJ ruled in 2013 that 786 sq km should go to Burkina Faso and 277 sq km to Niger; the ruling was implemented in 2015 and 2016, with Burkina Faso gaining 14 towns and Niger 4</p> <p><em>Niger-Cameroon-Nigeria</em>: only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty that also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries</p> <p><em>Niger-Libya</em>: Libya claims about 25,000 sq km in a currently dormant dispute in the Tummo region</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "187,139 (Nigeria), 62,077 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
"text": "187,139 (Nigeria), 62,658 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "264,257 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2022)"

14
africa/ni.json
View file

@ -509,7 +509,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"widespread lack of access": {
"text": "due to persistent civil conflict in the northern areas - according to the latest analysis, between June and August 2022, the number of food insecure is projected to increase to 18 million people period as a result of worsening conflict that is driving new population displacements; the areas inaccessible to humanitarian interventions are facing the worst food insecurity conditions (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to persistent civil conflict in the northern areas -</em> according to the latest analysis, between June and August 2022, the number of food insecure is projected to increase to 18 million people period as a result of worsening conflict that is driving new population displacements; the areas inaccessible to humanitarian interventions are facing the worst food insecurity conditions (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -626,7 +626,7 @@
"text": "Federal Executive Council appointed by the president but constrained constitutionally to include at least one member from each of the 36 states"
},
"elections/appointments": {
"text": "president directly elected by qualified majority popular vote and at least 25% of the votes cast in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states; president elected for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 23 February 2019 (next to be held on 25 February 2023); note: the election was scheduled for 16 February 2019, but postponed on 16 February 2019"
"text": "president directly elected by qualified majority popular vote and at least 25% of the votes cast in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states; president elected for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 23 February 2019 (next to be held on 25 February 2023)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "Muhammadu BUHARI elected president; percent of vote - Muhammadu BUHARI (APC) 53%, Atiku ABUBAKAR (PDP) 39%, other 8%"
@ -1250,13 +1250,13 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "information varies; approximately 135,000 active personnel (100,000 Army; 20,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 15,000 Air Force); est. 80,000 Security and Civil Defense Corps (2021)"
"text": "information varies; approximately 135,000 active personnel (100,000 Army; 20,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 15,000 Air Force); est. 80,000 Security and Civil Defense Corps (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the Nigerian Armed Forces' inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; since 2010, Nigeria has undertaken a considerable military modernization program, and has received equipment from some 20 countries with China, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicles, and small-scale naval production (2021)"
"text": "the Nigerian Armed Forces' inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; since 2010, Nigeria has undertaken a considerable military modernization program, and has received equipment from some 20 countries with China, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicles, and small-scale naval production (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service (men and women); no conscription (2021)"
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service (men and women); no conscription (2022)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "200 Ghana (ECOMIG) (2022)",
@ -1277,11 +1277,11 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including June 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately cedes sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phaseout of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries; location of Benin-Niger-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Nigeria-Benin</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Nigeria-Cameroon</em>: Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including June 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately ceded sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phaseout of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; demarcation of the Bakassi Peninsula and adjoining border areas should be finalized in 2022; as Lake Chad’s evaporation exposed dry land, only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries</p> <p><em>Nigeria-Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea</em>: the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation</p> <p><em>Nigeria-Niger</em>: none identified</p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "77,878 (Cameroon) (2022)"
"text": "78,077 (Cameroon) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "3,030,544 (northeast Nigeria; Boko Haram attacks and counterinsurgency efforts in northern Nigeria; communal violence between Christians and Muslims in the middle belt region, political violence; flooding; forced evictions; cattle rustling; competition for resources) (2022)"

6
africa/od.json
View file

@ -435,7 +435,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"widespread lack of access": {
"text": "due to economic downturn, civil insecurity, lingering impact of floods and prolonged conflict - despite sustained humanitarian assistance, food insecurity still affects large segments of the population, driven by insufficient food supplies, an economic downturn, high food prices and the lingering impact of widespread floods in 2020; particular concern exists for households in Jonglei, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states, and in neighbouring Pibor Administrative Area, where 60-85% of the population were estimated to be severely food insecure (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to economic downturn, civil insecurity, lingering impact of floods and prolonged conflict -</em> despite sustained humanitarian assistance, food insecurity still affects large segments of the population, driven by insufficient food supplies, an economic downturn, high food prices and the lingering impact of widespread floods in 2020; particular concern exists for households in Jonglei, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states, and in neighbouring Pibor Administrative Area, where 60-85% of the population were estimated to be severely food insecure (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -591,7 +591,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Deputy Chief of Mission Jon F. DANILOWICZ (since September 2020)<br>"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires William FLENS (since 4 June 2022)<br>"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Kololo Road adjacent to the EU's compound, Juba"
@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@
"text": "311,819 (Sudan), 18,407 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "1,436,000 (alleged coup attempt and ethnic conflict beginning in December 2013; information is lacking on those displaced in earlier years by: fighting in Abyei between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in May 2011; clashes between the SPLA and dissident militia groups in South Sudan; inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle; attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army; floods and drought) (2020)"
"text": "2,017,236 (alleged coup attempt and ethnic conflict beginning in December 2013; information is lacking on those displaced in earlier years by: fighting in Abyei between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in May 2011; clashes between the SPLA and dissident militia groups in South Sudan; inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle; attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army; floods and drought) (2022)"
},
"stateless persons": {
"text": "10,000 (mid-year 2021)"

12
africa/pu.json
View file

@ -556,7 +556,7 @@
},
"Executive branch": {
"chief of state": {
"text": "President Umaro Sissoko EMBALO (since 27 February 2020); note - President EMBALO was declared winner of the 29 December 2019 runoff presidential election by the electoral commission. In late February 2020, Embalo inaugurated himself with only military leadership present, even though the Supreme Court of Justice had yet to rule on an electoral litigation appeal lodged by his political rival Domingos Simoes PEREIRA."
"text": "President Umaro Sissoko EMBALO (since 27 February 2020); note - President EMBALO was declared winner of the 29 December 2019 runoff presidential election by the electoral commission. In late February 2020, EMBALO inaugurated himself with only military leadership present, even though the Supreme Court of Justice had yet to rule on an electoral litigation appeal lodged by his political rival Domingos Simoes PEREIRA"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Prime Minister Nuno NABIAM (since 27 February 2020)"
@ -606,7 +606,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"embassy": {
"text": "the US Embassy suspended operations on 14 June 1998; the US Ambassador to Senegal is accredited to Guinea-Bissau. U.S. diplomatic representation in Guinea-Bissau is conducted through the U.S. Embassy in Dakar and the Guinea-Bissau Liaison Office located in Bissau."
"text": "the US Embassy suspended operations on 14 June 1998; the US Ambassador to Senegal is accredited to Guinea-Bissau; US diplomatic representation in Guinea-Bissau is conducted through the US Embassy in Dakar and the Guinea-Bissau Liaison Office located in Bissau"
},
"mailing address": {
"text": "2080 Bissau Place, Washington DC&nbsp; 20521-2080"
@ -1069,16 +1069,16 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "approximately 4,000 total active troops, including a few hundred air and naval personnel (2021)"
"text": "approximately 4,000 total active troops, including a few hundred air and naval personnel (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FARP is poorly armed with an inventory consisting of Soviet-era equipment, much of which is reportedly unserviceable; the only reported deliveries of military equipment since 2015 were patrol boats from Spain in 2017 and non-lethal equipment from China in 2015; Guinea-Bissau has also discussed acquiring military equipment with Indonesia (2021)"
"text": "the FARP is poorly armed with an inventory consisting of Soviet-era equipment, much of which is reportedly unserviceable; the only reported deliveries of military equipment since 2015 were patrol boats from Spain in 2017 and non-lethal equipment from China in 2015; Guinea-Bissau has also discussed acquiring military equipment with Indonesia (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-25 years of age for selective compulsory military service (Air Force service is voluntary); 16 years of age or younger, with parental consent, for voluntary service (2021)"
"text": "18-25 years of age for selective compulsory military service (Air Force service is voluntary); 16 years of age or younger, with parental consent, for voluntary service (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>from 2012-2020, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) deployed a security force to Guinea-Bissau to manage the post-coup transition, including protecting key political figures and public buildings, restoring civil institutions, and re-establishing the rule of law; at the height of the deployment, the force, known as the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), deployed nearly 700 military and police personnel from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal</p>"
"text": "from 2012-2020, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) deployed a security force to Guinea-Bissau to manage the post-coup transition, including protecting key political figures and public buildings, restoring civil institutions, and re-establishing the rule of law; at the height of the deployment, the force, known as the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), deployed nearly 700 military and police personnel from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal (2022)"
}
},
"Transnational Issues": {

2
africa/rw.json
View file

@ -643,7 +643,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Peter H. VROOMAN (since 5 April 2018)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Deb MacLEAN (since February 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "2657 Avenue de la Gendarmerie (Kaciyiru), P. O. Box 28 Kigali"

12
africa/sg.json
View file

@ -499,7 +499,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in cereal production - about 770,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity between June and August 2022, reflecting persisting food access constraints; mostly on account of localized shortfalls in cereal production and reduced incomes owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to localized shortfalls in cereal production -</em> about 770,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity between June and August 2022, reflecting persisting food access constraints; mostly on account of localized shortfalls in cereal production and reduced incomes owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1205,13 +1205,13 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "approximately 19,000 active personnel (12,000 Army; 1,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 1,000 Air Force; 5,000 National Gendarmerie) (2021)"
"text": "approximately 19,000 active personnel (12,000 Army; 1,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 1,000 Air Force; 5,000 National Gendarmerie) (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FAS inventory includes mostly older or second-hand equipment from a variety of countries, including France, South Africa, and Russia/former Soviet Union; in recent years, the FAS has undertaken a modernization program; since 2010, it has received newer equipment from nearly 15 countries, with France as the leading supplier (2021)"
"text": "the FAS inventory includes mostly older or second-hand equipment from a variety of countries, including France, South Africa, and Russia/former Soviet Union; in recent years, the FAS has undertaken a modernization program; since 2010, it has received newer equipment from nearly 15 countries, with France as the leading supplier (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service (men and women); 20 years of age for selective conscript service; 2-year service obligation; women have been accepted into military service since 2008 (2021)"
"text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service (men and women); 20 years of age for selective conscript service; 2-year service obligation; women have been accepted into military service since 2008 (2022)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "750 Gambia (ECOMIG); 970 Mali (MINUSMA); note - Senegal also has about 1,100 police deployed on various UN peacekeeping missions (2022)"
@ -1231,10 +1231,10 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "18,375 (Mauritania) (2022)"
"text": "14,199 (Mauritania) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "8,400 (2020)"
"text": "8,400 (2021)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {

12
africa/sl.json
View file

@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to high food prices - about 1.45 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period on account of high food prices and low purchasing power, resulting in acute constraints on households&rsquo; economic access to food (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to high food prices -</em> about 1.45 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period on account of high food prices and low purchasing power, resulting in acute constraints on households’ economic access to food (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -608,7 +608,7 @@
"text": "last held on 7 March 2018 (next to be held in March 2023)"
},
"election results": {
"text": "percent of vote by party - n/a; seats by party - APC 68, SLPP 49, C4C 8, other 7; composition - men 131, women 15, percent of women 10.3%"
"text": "percent of vote by party - n/a; seats by party - APC 68, SLPP 49, C4C 8, other 7; composition - men 128, women 18, percent of women 12.3%"
}
},
"Judicial branch": {
@ -1136,13 +1136,13 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) have approximately 9,000 personnel, mostly ground forces (2021)"
"text": "approximately 9,000 personnel, mostly ground forces (2022)"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the RSLAF's small inventory includes a mix of Soviet-origin and other older foreign-supplied equipment; since 2010, it has received limited quantities of material (mostly donations of second-hand equipment) from China and South Africa (2021)"
"text": "the RSLAF's small inventory includes a mix of Soviet-origin and other older foreign-supplied equipment; since 2010, it has received limited quantities of material (mostly donations of second-hand equipment) from China and South Africa (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18-29 for voluntary military service; women are eligible to serve; no conscription (2021)"
"text": "18-29 for voluntary military service; women are eligible to serve; no conscription (2022)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "after the end of the civil war in 2002, the military was reduced in size and restructured with British military assistance; the RSLAF&rsquo;s origins lie in the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the RWAFF fought in both World Wars (2022)"
@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"IDPs": {
"text": "5,500 (displacement caused by post-electoral violence in 2018 and clashes in the Pujehun region in 2019) (2020)"
"text": "5,500 (displacement caused by post-electoral violence in 2018 and clashes in the Pujehun region in 2019) (2021)"
}
}
}

8
africa/so.json
View file

@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
"text": "due to drought conditions and internal conflict - an estimated 4.15 million people are facing severe food insecurity between February and March 2022, mainly as a result of consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020, which severely affected crop and livestock production, and due to heightened conflict since early 2021; two consecutive poor rainy seasons resulted in significant crop and livestock production shortfalls, while food access has been severely affected in recent months by declining employment opportunities in rural areas and by the escalation of conflict (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to drought conditions and internal conflict -</em> an estimated 4.15 million people are facing severe food insecurity between February and March 2022, mainly as a result of consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020, which severely affected crop and livestock production, and due to heightened conflict since early 2021; two consecutive poor rainy seasons resulted in significant crop and livestock production shortfalls, while food access has been severely affected in recent months by declining employment opportunities in rural areas and by the escalation of conflict (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -538,13 +538,13 @@
"text": "President HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud (since 23 May 2022)"
},
"head of government": {
"text": "Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein ROBLE (since 27 September 2020)"
"text": "Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein ROBLE (since 27 September 2020); note - President HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud nominated Hamza Abdi BARRE on 15 June 2022 to replace ROBLE as Prime Minister but the nomination awaits Somali Federal Parliament approval"
},
"cabinet": {
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the prime minister, approved by the House of the People"
},
"elections/appointments": {
"text": "president indirectly elected by the Federal Parliament by two-thirds majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a single 4-year term; election last held on 15 May 2022; prime minister appointed by the president, approved by the House of the People; note - elections were originally scheduled for 10 October 2021 but did not take place; on 13 April 2022, the election of the House of the People representatives was completed and the presidential election date was set for 15 May"
"text": "president indirectly elected by the President HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud by two-thirds majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a single 4-year term; election last held on 15 May 2022; prime minister appointed by the president, approved by the House of the People; note - elections were originally scheduled for 10 October 2021 but did not take place; on 13 April 2022, the election of the House of the People representatives was completed and the presidential election date was set for 15 May"
},
"election results": {
"text": "<br><em>2022:</em> an indirect election by Somalia's Federal Parliament was held on 15 May 2022 resulting in the defeat of former president Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed \"Farmaajo\"; HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud elected president in third round - Federal Parliament third round vote - HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud (PDP) 214, Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed \"Farmaajo\" (TPP) 110<br><br><em>2017:</em> Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed \"Farmaajo\" elected president in second round; Federal Parliament second round vote - Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed \"Farmaajo\" (TPP) 184, HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud (PDP) 97, Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed (ARS) 46"
@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@
"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscription is authorized, but not currently utilized (2021)"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "<p>as of 2022, large parts of the country remained outside government control and under the control of the insurgent Islamist group al-Shabaab; al-Shabaab contested government control in some other areas (see Appendix T)<br><br>as of 2022, a significant portion of the SNA was comprised of militia forces that lacked the discipline, structure, weapons, and overall capabilities for effective military operations; of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; in 2020-2021, the Danab Brigade conducted most of the SNA’s offensive operations in Somalia and nearly all counterterrorism operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group; as of 2021, it numbered about 1,000 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have 4,500-5,000 trained troops</p> the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has operated in the country with the approval of the UN since 2007; its peacekeeping mission includes assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; as of early 2022, AMISOM had about 20,000 military troops from six African countries deployed in Somalia; note - as of April 2022, the UN Security Council had authorized the African Union (AU) to reconfigure AMISOM and replace it with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners to gradually transfer security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces<br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community<br><br>the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army, and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US and Turkey maintain separate unilateral military training missions in Somalia; the UAE also maintains a military presence in Somalia (Somaliland)"
"text": "<p>as of 2022, large parts of the country remained outside government control and under the control of the insurgent Islamist group al-Shabaab; al-Shabaab contested government control in some other areas (see Appendix T)<br><br>as of 2022, a significant portion of the SNA was comprised of militia forces that lacked the discipline, structure, weapons, and overall capabilities for effective military operations; of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; in 2020-2021, the Danab Brigade conducted most of the SNA’s offensive operations in Somalia and nearly all counterterrorism operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group; as of 2021, it numbered about 1,000 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have 4,500-5,000 trained troops</p> the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in May 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community<br><br>the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army, and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US and Turkey maintain separate unilateral military training missions in Somalia; the UAE also maintains a military presence in Somalia (Somaliland)"
},
"Maritime threats": {
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) received one incident of piracy and armed robbery in 2021 for the Horn of Africa; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warns that Somalia pirates continue to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warns that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2022; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces; China has established a logistical base in Djibouti to support its deployed naval units in the Horn of Africa</p>"

6
africa/su.json
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@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to conflict, civil insecurity, and soaring food prices - the number of severely food insecure people was estimated at 6 million between October 2021 and February 2022, mainly due to high food prices and inter-communal conflict (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to conflict, civil insecurity, and soaring food prices -</em> the number of severely food insecure people was estimated at 6 million between October 2021 and February 2022, mainly due to high food prices and inter-communal conflict (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1210,10 +1210,10 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "805,989 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 128,996 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,482 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 73,335 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 28,033 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
"text": "805,989 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 130,379 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,480 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 72,555 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 28,033 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
},
"IDPs": {
"text": "2,276,000 (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2020)"
"text": "3,036,593 (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {

13
africa/to.json
View file

@ -659,7 +659,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Eric W. STROHMAYER (since 11 April 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador Elizabeth FITZSIMMONS (since 26 April 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Boulevard Eyadema, B.P. 852, Lome"
@ -1164,8 +1164,8 @@
},
"Military and Security": {
"Military and security forces": {
"text": "Togolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Togolaise, FAT): Togolese Army (l'Armee de Terre), Togolese Navy (Forces Naval Togolaises), Togolese Air Force (Armee de l’Air), National Gendarmerie (2022)",
"note": "note - the Gendarmerie falls under the Ministry of the Armed Forces but also reports to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection on many matters involving law enforcement and internal security"
"text": "Togolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Togolaise, FAT): Togolese Army (l'Armee de Terre), Togolese Navy (Forces Naval Togolaises), Togolese Air Force (Armee de l’Air), National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale Togolaise or GNT) (2022)",
"note": "note - the GNT falls under the Ministry of the Armed Forces but also reports to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection on many matters involving law enforcement and internal security"
},
"Military expenditures": {
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
@ -1185,13 +1185,14 @@
}
},
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
"text": "approximately 9,000 personnel, including about 8,000 Army (2021)"
"text": "approximately 10-11,000 personnel (7,000 Army; 500 Air and Navy; 3,000 Gendarmerie) (2022)",
"note": "note - in January 2022, the Togolese Government announced its intent to boost the size of the FAT to more than 20,000 by 2025"
},
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
"text": "the FAT's small inventory is a mix of older equipment from a variety of countries, including Brazil, France, Germany, Russia/former Soviet Union, the UK, and the US; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of newer--largely secondhand--equipment, such as patrol boats, from China, France, South Africa, and the US (2021)"
"text": "the FAT's small inventory is a mix of older equipment from a variety of countries, including Brazil, France, Germany, Russia/former Soviet Union, the UK, and the US; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of newer--largely secondhand--equipment, such as patrol boats, from China, France, South Africa, and the US (2022)"
},
"Military service age and obligation": {
"text": "18 years of age for military service; 2-year service obligation; no conscription; women have been able to serve since 2007 (2021)"
"text": "18 years of age for military service; 2-year service obligation; no conscription; women have been able to serve since 2007 (2022)"
},
"Military deployments": {
"text": "730 (plus about 300 police) Mali (MINUSMA) (Feb 2022)"

2
africa/ts.json
View file

@ -619,7 +619,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Donald A. BLOME (since 7 February 2019)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Natasha FRANCESCHI (since April 2022)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Les Berges du Lac, 1053 Tunis"

4
africa/tz.json
View file

@ -501,7 +501,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in staple food production - about 437,000 people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance between November 2021 and April 2022, mainly located in northeastern Mara, Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga regions, reflecting a reduced &ldquo;Vuli&rdquo; harvest due to poor rains (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to localized shortfalls in staple food production -</em> about 437,000 people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance between November 2021 and April 2022, mainly located in northeastern Mara, Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga regions, reflecting a reduced “Vuli” harvest due to poor rains (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "127,104 (Burundi), 80,599 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
"text": "127,330 (Burundi), 80,599 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {

2
africa/ug.json
View file

@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {
"text": "951,713 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 462,120 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 42,036 (Burundi), 56,894 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 25,915 (Rwanda), 22,505 (Eritrea) (2022)"
"text": "938,138 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 462,120 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 41,766 (Burundi), 56,894 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 25,915 (Rwanda), 22,505 (Eritrea) (2022)"
}
},
"Trafficking in persons": {

6
africa/uv.json
View file

@ -478,7 +478,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to civil insecurity in the north - in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 2.6 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; domestic cereal production in 2021 was estimated at a below-average level due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, further aggravating conditions; in Centre-Nord and Sahel regions, insecurity continues to cause population displacements, further deteriorating the food security situation; a coup d&rsquo;&eacute;tat on January 2022 is an additional factor that could increase civil insecurity and further stress food insecurity conditions (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity in the north -</em> in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 2.6 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; domestic cereal production in 2021 was estimated at a below-average level due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, further aggravating conditions; in Centre-Nord and Sahel regions, insecurity continues to cause population displacements, further deteriorating the food security situation; a coup d’état on January 2022 is an additional factor that could increase civil insecurity and further stress food insecurity conditions (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "Burkina Faso&rsquo;s telecom services are some of the most expensive in the world, hindered by regulatory procedures, insufficient mobile spectrum, poor fixed-line networks; mobile telephony but below African average; Internet is provided by mobile operators; Internet penetration is low and expensive, despite improved international bandwidth via fiber links through submarine cables to adjacent countries; increased telecom tax; government infrastructure project largely completed; parliament launched inquiry on mobile network infrastructure coverage, pricing of services, and quality of service; government began computer subsidy program for university students; government progressed with large project to provide metropolitan fiber-optic infrastructure (2020)"
"text": "Burkina Faso&rsquo;s telecom sector in recent years has made some gains in providing the necessary infrastructure and bandwidth to support telecom services; an IXP completed in September 2020 increased international bandwidth capacity by a third, while in mid-2021 the government was able to start the second phase of a national fiber backbone project; this will link the capital city to an addition 145 municipalities, and provide additional connectivity to terrestrial cables in neighboring countries; this new infrastructure is also making it possible for the government to trial tele medicine, and so address the very poor availability of medical services in almost all parts of the country; the activities of the militants in side areas of the country jeopardize overall security, and render it difficult for the telcos to safeguard their networks and equipment; Burkina Faso joins G5 Sahel countries to eliminate roaming fees (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage nearly 106 per 100, with multiple providers there is competition and the hope for growth from a low base; Internet penetration is 16% (2020)"
@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@
"note": "note - Burkina Faso is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries"
},
"Military - note": {
"text": "including the most recent in January 2022, the military has conducted 7 coups since 1960; as of 2022, the military was also actively engaged in combat operations with terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and ISIS, particularly in the northern and eastern regions; in the north, the terrorist groups Ansarul Islam and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) have exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; the east is reportedly a stronghold of the Islamic State-Greater Sahara (ISGS) (2022)"
"text": "including the most recent in January 2022, the military has conducted 7 coups since 1960; as of 2022, the military was also actively engaged in combat operations with terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and ISIS, particularly in the northern and eastern regions; in the north, the terrorist groups Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; the east is reportedly a stronghold of the Islamic State-Greater Sahara (ISGS) (2022)"
}
},
"Terrorism": {

4
africa/wa.json
View file

@ -465,7 +465,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in cereal production - an estimated 750,000 people are projected to face \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between December 2021 and March 2022, as a result of localized areas that suffered from poor harvests in 2021 and the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily through income and job losses that constrained households&rsquo; access to food (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to localized shortfalls in cereal production -</em> an estimated 750,000 people are projected to face \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between December 2021 and March 2022, as a result of localized areas that suffered from poor harvests in 2021 and the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily through income and job losses that constrained households’ access to food (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@
},
"Transnational Issues": {
"Disputes - international": {
"text": "<p>concerns from international experts and local populations over the Okavango Delta ecology in Botswana and human displacement scuttled Namibian plans to construct a hydroelectric dam on Popa Falls along the Angola-Namibia border; the governments of South Africa and Namibia have not signed or ratified the text of the 1994 Surveyor's General agreement placing the boundary in the middle of the Orange River; Namibia has supported, and in 2004 Zimbabwe dropped objections to, plans between Botswana and Zambia to build a bridge over the Zambezi River, thereby de facto recognizing a short, but not clearly delimited, Botswana-Zambia boundary in the river<br><br><em>Namibia-Angola: </em>None identified</p>"
"text": "<p><em>Namibia-Angola-Botswana</em>: concerns from international experts and local populations over the Okavango Delta ecology in Botswana and human displacement scuttled Namibian plans to construct a hydroelectric dam on Popa Falls along the Angola-Namibia border</p> <p><em>Namibia-Botswana-Zambia-Zimbabwe</em>: Namibia has supported, and in 2004 Zimbabwe dropped objections to, plans between Botswana and Zambia to build a bridge over the Zambezi River, thereby de facto recognizing a short, but not clearly delimited, Botswana-Zambia boundary in the river; the Kazungula Bridge opened to traffic in May 2021</p> <p><em>Namibia-South Africa</em>: the governments of South Africa and Namibia have not signed or ratified the text of the 1994 Surveyor's General agreement placing the boundary in the middle of the Orange River; Namibia claims a median line boundary, while South Africa supports the northern bank of the river</p> <p> </p>"
},
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
"refugees (country of origin)": {

4
africa/wz.json
View file

@ -454,7 +454,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to economic downturn - nearly 336,000 people were assessed to be food insecure at least until March 2022, prior to the main harvest period, primarily due to food access constraints, underpinned by the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to economic downturn -</em> nearly 336,000 people were assessed to be food insecure at least until March 2022, prior to the main harvest period, primarily due to food access constraints, underpinned by the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -997,7 +997,7 @@
},
"Telecommunication systems": {
"general assessment": {
"text": "earlier government monopoly in telecom market hindered growth; liberalized regulators aided expansion in the telecom sector; lack of fixed-line infrastructure and competition stymies development of DSL and backbone network; 2G, 3G, 4G, and LTE services with coverage to most of the population; landlocked country depends on neighbors for international bandwidth; operator completed terrestrial cable linking Maputo through Eswatini to Johannesburg; importer of broadcasting equipment from South Africa (2019)"
"text": "Eswatini (or eSwatini) was one of the last countries in the world to open up its telecom market to competition; until 2011 the state-owned Eswatini Posts and Telecommunications also acted as the industry regulator and had a stake in the country&rsquo;s sole mobile network, in an uneasy partnership with MTN Eswatini; a new independent regulatory authority was established in late 2013 and has since embarked on significant changes to the sector;&nbsp; Eswatini Telecom was provided with a unified license in early 2016, while MTN Eswatini secured spectrum in the 1800MHz band to provide LTE services; Eswatini Mobile has launched GSM, 3G and LTE services, supported by a network sharing agreement with MTN Eswatini; mobile market subscriptions have been affected by the common use among subscribers when they use SIM cards from different networks in order to access cheaper on-net calls; subscriber growth has slowed in recent years, but was expected to have reached 8% in 2021, as people adapted to the changing needs for connectivity caused by the pandemic; the internet sector has been open to competition with a small number of licensed ISPs; DSL services were introduced in 2008, development of the sector has been hampered by the limited fixed-line infrastructure and by a lack of competition in the access and backbone networks; Eswatini is landlocked and so depends on neighboring countries for international bandwidth; this has meant that access pricing is relatively high, and market subscriptions remains relatively low; prices have fallen recently in line with greater bandwidth availability resulting from several new submarine cable systems which have reached the region in recent years; in addition, Paratus in September 2020 completed a terrestrial cable linking Mozambique with Eswatini and South Africa. (2022)"
},
"domestic": {
"text": "Eswatini has 2 mobile-cellular providers; communication infrastructure has a geographic coverage of about 90% and a rising subscriber base; fixed-line stands at nearly 4 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 94 telephones per 100 persons; telephone system consists of carrier-equipped, open-wire lines and low-capacity, microwave radio relay (2019)"

4
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View file

@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"severe localized food insecurity": {
"text": "due to reduced incomes and localized shortfalls in cereal production - an estimated 1.58 million people are projected to need humanitarian assistance at least up until March 2022, down from 2 million assessed to be food insecure in the corresponding period in 2020/21; the overall large national agricultural output in 2021 helped to reduce the prevalence of food insecurity in early 2022, however, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which have constrained households&rsquo; economic access to food as well as localized shortfalls in crop production, have limited a larger improvement (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to reduced incomes and localized shortfalls in cereal production -</em> an estimated 1.58 million people are projected to need humanitarian assistance at least up until March 2022, down from 2 million assessed to be food insecure in the corresponding period in 2020/21; the overall large national agricultural output in 2021 helped to reduce the prevalence of food insecurity in early 2022, however, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which have constrained households’ economic access to food as well as localized shortfalls in crop production, have limited a larger improvement (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -652,7 +652,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires David J. YOUNG (since 2 March 2020)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Martin \"Marty\" DALE (since 2 November 2021)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "Eastern end of Kabulonga Road, Ibex Hill, Lusaka"

4
africa/zi.json
View file

@ -484,7 +484,7 @@
},
"Food insecurity": {
"widespread lack of access": {
"text": "due to high food prices and economic downturn - an estimated 3 million people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance between January and March 2022, largely on account of poor food access due to prevailing high food prices and reduced incomes owing to the effects of an economic downturn; below-average rainfall and extreme weather events in 2021/22 are likely to result in a decrease in cereal production and heighten food insecurity later in 2022 (2022)"
"text": "<em>due to high food prices and economic downturn -</em> an estimated 3 million people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance between January and March 2022, largely on account of poor food access due to prevailing high food prices and reduced incomes owing to the effects of an economic downturn; below-average rainfall and extreme weather events in 2021/22 are likely to result in a decrease in cereal production and heighten food insecurity later in 2022 (2022)"
}
},
"Waste and recycling": {
@ -658,7 +658,7 @@
},
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
"chief of mission": {
"text": "Ambassador Thomas R. HASTINGS (since August 2021)"
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Thomas R. HASTINGS (since August 2021)"
},
"embassy": {
"text": "2 Lorraine Drive, Bluffhill, Harare"