mirror of
https://github.com/factbook/factbook.json.git
synced 2026-06-10 18:55:12 +02:00
auto-update week 25
This commit is contained in:
parent
5d3efed636
commit
1418e586bb
186 changed files with 416 additions and 419 deletions
|
|
@ -626,7 +626,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "ambassador (vacant); Chargé d’Affaires Gautam RANA (since 20 January 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Elizabeth Moore AUBIN (since 9 February 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "05 Chemin Cheikh Bachir, Ibrahimi, El-Biar 16030, Alger"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Algeria has a steadily developing telecom infrastructure through sound regulatory measures and government policies aimed at providing Internet connections across the country, including underserved areas; mobile penetration and LTE services are growing steadily; in common with other markets in the region, mobile connections account for the vast majority of Internet accesses; well served by satellite and submarine cable connections; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Algeria has a steadily developing telecom infrastructure with growth encouraged by supportive regulatory measures and by government policies aimed at delivering serviceable internet connections across the country; mobile broadband is largely based on 3G and LTE, and the data rates are also low in global terms; LTE is available in all provinces, investment is required from the MNOs to improve the quality of service; the state has previously been hesitant to commit to 5G, instead encouraging the MNOs to undertake upgrades to LTE infrastructure before investing in commercial 5G services; in March 2022, the state is in the process of freeing up the requisite spectrum to enable the MNOs to launch 5G services sometime this year; fixed internet speeds remain slow, and the country ranks poorly in international tables; the government has pressed Algérie Télécom in early 2021 to increase the minimum rate available from 4Mb/s to 10Mb/s. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "a limited network of fixed-lines with a teledensity of slightly less than 11 telephones per 100 persons has been offset by the rapid increase in mobile-cellular subscribership; mobile-cellular teledensity was approximately 104 telephones per 100 persons in 2020 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Nina Maria FITE (since 14 February 2018)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Tulinabo S. MUSHINGI, (since 9 March 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Rua Houari Boumedienne, #32, Luanda"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Angola’s telecom sector shows consistent recovery following political stability, encouraging foreign investment; while the government opened the telecom sector to new competitors, there has been slow progress in LTE network development; only a small proportion of the country is covered by the 3G network infrastructure; Internet and mobile phone penetration remains low, hindered by high costs and poor infrastructure that limits access, especially in rural areas; upgrading telecom will support e-commerce, and rural access to education and health care; AngoSat-2 satellite expected to be ready in 2021; government aims to connect an additional 160,000 people to free Wi-Fi; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Angola’s telecom sector in recent years has benefited from political stability, which has encouraged foreign investment in the sector; the government and regulator have also set in train mechanisms to open up the telecom sector to new competitors, with Africell having secured a universal license and in so doing becoming the country’s fourth MNO; following an extensive investment program, the company launched mobile services in April 2022; the MNOs were slow to develop LTE services, instead relying on their GSM and 3G network capabilities; Angola Telecom did not launch LTE services until mid-2018; there has been slow progress in LTE network development, with only a small proportion of the country covered by network infrastructure; some progress has been made with 5G; the Ministry of Telecommunications in early 2021 set up a 5G hub to assess 5G user cases, while Unitel and the new MNO Africell since mid-2021 have contracted vendors to provide 5G-ready transmission networks; the regulator in November 2021 granted licenses to Africell, Movicel, and Unitel to enable them to offer 5G services; the government has continued to develop telecom infrastructure to help diversify the country’s economy and lessen its dependence on offshore crude oil production; by extending and upgrading telecom networks the government expects businesses to become more efficient and for e-commerce to become a more prominent feature of economic growth; networks will facilitate rural access to education and health care. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "only about one fixed-line per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity about 45 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -635,7 +635,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Craig Lewis CLOUD (since 2 April 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Amanda S. JACOBSEN"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Embassy Drive, Government Enclave (off Khama Crescent), Gaborone"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to effective regulatory reform and active competition, Botswana’s telecom market is one of the most liberalized in the region; strategy to drive nationwide ICT penetration is slowed; one of the highest mobile penetration rates in Africa; operators developing 3G and LTE; Internet use rising due to lower prices; government has embraced digitalization, e-government and identity programs that require citizens to provide detailed personal information; previously dependent on satellites for international connectivity, country’s new submarine cable landings improved competition and tripled international Internet capacity; importer of broadcast equipment from Hong Kong and China (2020)</p> (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "effective regulatory reform has made Botswana’s telecom market one of the most liberalized in the region; there is a service-neutral licensing regime adapted to the convergence of technologies and services, and several operators now compete in all telecom sectors; Botswana has one of the highest mobile subscription rates in Africa, though with this growth in the number of subscribers has slowed sharply in recent years; the popular use of multiple SIM cards from different operators convinced that regulator that there was no need introduce mobile number portability, and although the government pursued the idea for some years, it accepted in April 2021 that it would not be implemented after all; in a bid to generate new revenue streams and secure market share, the three MNOs – Mascom Wireless (an affiliate of South Africa’s MTN), Orange Botswana (backed by Orange Group) and BTC – have entered the underdeveloped broadband sector by adopting of 3G, LTE, and WiMAX technologies; in the fixed-line broadband market they compete with a large number of ISPs, some of which have rolled out their own wireless access infrastructure; the landlocked country depends on satellites for international bandwidth, and on other countries for transit capacity to the landing points of international submarine cables; the landing of additional cables in the region in recent years has improved the competitive situation in this sector, while prices for connectivity have fallen dramatically; Paratus Teleco in mid-2021 completed the first stage of a private network covering the entire country, and linking to the company’s international cables (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity has declined in recent years and now stands at roughly 6 telephones per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 162 telephones per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Benin’s telecom market is restricted by poor fixed-line infrastructure; low use of fixed-line voice and Internet; mobile networks account for almost all Internet and voice traffic; progress on fiber infrastructure through World Bank and the government investment to extend broadband and develop Smart Government program; monopolized fixed-line Internet services access is limited; ICT development will provide telecom services to 80% of the country, mostly via mobile and DSL infrastructure; Benin Smart City construction has begun; improved international Internet connectivity supports growth of m-commerce and m-banking; submarine cable connectivity from African coast to Europe (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Benin’s telecom market continues to be restricted by the poor condition of the country’s fixed-line infrastructure; this has hampered the development of fixed-line voice and internet services, and there is negligible revenue derived from these sectors; mobile networks account for almost all internet connections, and also carry most voice traffic; there is promise for considerable change in the mobile sector, which has been a duopoly between Moov and MTN since the closure of services from Glo Mobile and Libercom in 2018; slow progress is being made in developing competition in the mobile sector; the national infrastructure provider SBIN has been licensed to provide mobile services, and in mid-2021 Sonatel Group was awarded a five-year contract to oversee progress; in May 2021 the government sought foreign companies unaffiliated with MTN Group or Maroc Telecom to bid for a fourth mobile license; improved international internet connectivity has contributed to a reduction in end-user pricing, and provided the potential to transform many areas of the country’s economy, bringing a greater proportion of the population into the orbit of internet commerce and connectivity; a 2,000km fiber project started in 2016 was finally completed in mid-2021, prompting the government to secure a loan to build additional fiber infrastructure connecting four of the country’s 12 departments. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity only about 1 per 100 persons; spurred by the presence of multiple mobile-cellular providers, cellular telephone subscribership has increased rapidly, nearing 92 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -489,7 +489,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to the effects of weather - about 1 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure between January and March 2022, due to livelihood losses and displacements caused by the rising water level of Lake Tanganyika and the overflow of rivers, sustained repatriation flows and the socio-economic impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to the effects of weather -</em> about 1 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure between January and March 2022, due to livelihood losses and displacements caused by the rising water level of Lake Tanganyika and the overflow of rivers, sustained repatriation flows and the socio-economic impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Burundi’s high population density and low telecom penetration rates make it an attractive market for investors; mobile operators have launched 3G and LTE to meet the demand for Internet; mobile subscription remains low; government/World Bank joint project to build a national broadband backbone connecting to submarine cable landings in Kenya and Tanzania; government launched e-health project (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Burundi provides an attractive telecom market given its high population density and existing low subscription rates for all services; one downside for investors is that the country has a very low economic output, disposable income is also very low, and fixed-line infrastructure is poor outside the main urban areas; this is a greater motivation for investors to focus on improving mobile networks than in expanding fixed-line infrastructure; to overcome difficulties associated with the poor telecom infrastructure, the government has supported a number of prominent telcos building a national fiber backbone network; this network offers onward connectivity to submarine cable infrastructure landings in Kenya and Tanzania; the first sections of this network were switched on in early 2014, and additional provinces have since been connected; in addition, the government in early 2018 kick-started the Burundi Broadband project, which aims to deliver national connectivity by 2025; based on this improved infrastructure the government and ITU have developed an ICT strategy to make use of telecoms to promote the country’s socio-economic development through to 2028; progress made by Tanzania with its own national backbone network has benefited Burundi, which has been provided with onward connectivity to most countries in the region; International bandwidth capacity has continued to increase in recent years, including a 38% increase in the nine months to September 2021, resulting in lower retail prices for consumers; two of the mobile operators have launched 3G and LTE services to capitalize on the growing demand for internet access; the number of mobile subscribers increased 7% in the third quarter of 2021, quarter-on-quarter; similar growth is expected for the next two years at least, which will help bring the mobile level closer to the average for the region. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "telephone density one of the lowest in the world; fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage is about 56 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "84,961 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "109,169 (some ethnic Tutsis remain displaced from intercommunal violence that broke out after the 1,993 coup and fighting between government forces and rebel groups; violence since April 2015) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "84,791 (some ethnic Tutsis remain displaced from intercommunal violence that broke out after the 1,993 coup and fighting between government forces and rebel groups; violence since April 2015) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "767 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity and shortfall in cereal production - according to the latest analysis, about 965 000 people were estimated to be in \"Crisis\" and above, between October and December 2021 due to persisting insecurity in Lac and Tibesti regions that disrupted livelihood activities and caused population displacements; domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021 due to adverse weather and the civil conflict; as a result, between June and August 2022, 1.74 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in cereal production -</em> according to the latest analysis, about 965 000 people were estimated to be in \"Crisis\" and above, between October and December 2021 due to persisting insecurity in Lac and Tibesti regions that disrupted livelihood activities and caused population displacements; domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021 due to adverse weather and the civil conflict; as a result, between June and August 2022, 1.74 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -671,7 +671,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires David GILMOUR (since December 2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Ellen THORBURN (since 8 November 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Rond-Point Chagoua, B.P. 413, N’Djamena"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Chad’s inadequate telecom infrastructure, corruption, and high taxes hinder penetration in fixed, mobile, and Internet sectors; with tax reform, operators are investing in voice and data infrastructure to 3G/4G; government approved telecom infrastructure upgrade; World Bank-funded Central African Backbone (CAB) project; Trans-Saharan Backbone project will link a fiber cable to Nigeria and Algeria (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom infrastructure is particularly poor; fixed, mobile and internet is well below African averages; Chad’s telecom market offers some potential for investors to develop services given the low starting base; the two main operators Moov Africa Chad and Airtel Chad have invested in infrastructure and have become the main providers of voice and data services; the mobile sector has developed steadily under the auspices of these two operators; the national telco and fixed-line operator Sotel Tchad operates the country’s third mobile network, as Salam Mobile, though it is mainly focused on voice services since it depends on GPRS and EDGE technologies (which can provide only basic mobile data services); the country’s first 3G/LTE mobile license was awarded in April 2014; Chad finally gained access to international fiber bandwidth in 2012 its national backbone infrastructure remains underdeveloped; the World Bank-funded Central African Backbone (CAB) project takes in Chad, while the country is also party to a Trans-Saharan Backbone project which will link a fiber cable to Nigeria and Algeria. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line connections less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership base of about 53 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1195,10 +1195,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "388,550 (Sudan), 122,958 (Central African Republic), 42,549 (Cameroon), 19,886 (Nigeria) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "392,168 (Sudan), 122,958 (Central African Republic), 42,518 (Cameroon), 19,886 (Nigeria) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "406,573 (majority are in the east) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "381,289 (majority are in the east) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to floods - on 29 November 2021, a state of emergency was declared due to floods in northern areas that caused crop and livestock losses, and displaced people, particularly in Likouala, Sangha, Cuvette and Plateaux departments; it is estimated that about 71,700 people have been affected, (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to floods -</em> on 29 November 2021, a state of emergency was declared due to floods in northern areas that caused crop and livestock losses, and displaced people, particularly in Likouala, Sangha, Cuvette and Plateaux departments; it is estimated that about 71,700 people have been affected, (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -668,7 +668,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Ellen B. THORBURN (since January 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Eugene S. YOUNG (since 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "70-83 Section D, Boulevard Denis Sassou N'Guesso, Brazzaville"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "29,090 (Central African Republic), 22,114 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "304,430 (multiple civil wars since 1992) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "159,830 (multiple civil wars since 1992) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -498,7 +498,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to internal conflict in eastern regions and economic downturn - according to a November 2021 analysis, 26 million people are projected to be severely food insecure, in \"Crisis\" or above, between January and June 2022; this is due to persisting conflict in eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, which continues to cause displacements, coupled with the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to internal conflict in eastern regions and economic downturn -</em> according to a November 2021 analysis, 26 million people are projected to be severely food insecure, in \"Crisis\" or above, between January and June 2022; this is due to persisting conflict in eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, which continues to cause displacements, coupled with the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "due to decades of conflict and poor infrastructure, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s telecom system is one of the least developed in the region; government aims to improve loose regulation through legislation; mobile networks are principal providers of telecom; LTE is geographically limited; investment from China and other foreign donors for fiber backbone; international bandwidth through WACS submarine cable; operator licensed to build landing station for submarine cable and tower upgrade that will provide competition in broadband, fixed, and mobile Internet services; operator added fiber link between Brazzaville and Kinshasa (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom system remains one of the least developed in the region; the government can only loosely regulate the sector, and since the national telco SCPT has little capital to invest, much of the investment made in infrastructure is derived from donor countries or from the efforts of foreign (particularly Chinese) companies and banks; efforts have been made to improve the regulation of the telecom sector; the limited fixed-line infrastructure has become the principal providers of basic telecom services; the development of the DRC’s internet and broadband market has been held back by the poorly developed national and international infrastructure; the country was finally connected to international bandwidth through the WACS submarine cable in 2013, while SCPT continues to roll out a fiber national backbone network with support from China; breakages in the WACS cable have exposed the vulnerability of international bandwidth, which is still limited; Liquid Intelligence Technologies has built a landing station for the Equiano submarine cable, and has also completed a 5,000km cable running through the DRC to link to cable systems landing in countries facing the Atlantic and Indian Oceans; the first commercial LTE networks were launched in May 2018 soon after LTE licenses were issued; mobile operators are keen to develop mobile data services, capitalizing on the growth of smartphones usage; there has been some progress with updating technologies, with Vodacom DRC having upgraded much of its GSM network to 3G by late 2021. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "inadequate fixed-line infrastructure with fixed-line connections less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriptions over 45 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "210,476 (Rwanda), 210,357 (Central African Republic), 56,356 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 40,522 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "210,094 (Rwanda), 209,495 (Central African Republic), 56,303 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 41,286 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "5.61 million (fighting between government forces and rebels since mid-1990s; conflict in Kasai region since 2016) (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -504,7 +504,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity and population displacements - according to October 2021 analysis, about 2.4 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure between October and December 2021; this mainly results from the impacts of Boko Haram incursions in Far North Region, the socio‑political unrest in Northwest and Southwest regions and COVID‑19‑related economic shocks, which disrupted trade flows and agricultural practices, deteriorated livelihoods and displaced people (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity and population displacements -</em> according to October 2021 analysis, about 2.4 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure between October and December 2021; this mainly results from the impacts of Boko Haram incursions in Far North Region, the socio‑political unrest in Northwest and Southwest regions and COVID‑19‑related economic shocks, which disrupted trade flows and agricultural practices, deteriorated livelihoods and displaced people (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -686,7 +686,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Deputy Chief of Mission (currently serving as Charge d'Affaires) Mary E. DASCHBACH"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Christopher J. LAMORA (since 21 March 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Avenue Rosa Parks, Yaoundé"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Cameroon’s 3G and LTE services are improving through growing competition and a government program to improve national connectivity and support digital economy; saturated use of transactions through m-commerce; developing broadband sector; improved submarine and terrestrial cable connectivity strengthened international bandwidth and lowered prices; pushing start of fiber link to Congo; fiber rollout continues with new government funding; operators opened new data center in 2020 and developed contracts for satellite broadband; government awarded contract to provide connectivity to universities (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Cameroon was for many years one of the few countries in Africa with only two competing mobile operators; after some delays, Viettel Cameroon launched a third network and has since grown its subscriber base rapidly; Camtel became the fourth mobile operator in early 2020 after securing three licenses, however it suspended the launch of services in early 2021; despite this, by the end of the year a launch under the Blue brand was imminent; the investment programs among operators over the next few years will considerably boost mobile broadband services in rural areas of the country, many of which are under served by fixed-line infrastructure; the ICT sector in Cameroon is making steady progress, enabling the country to make better use of the digital economy; about 95% of all electronic transactions are carried through the m-money services operated by MTN Cameroon and Orange Cameroon; the government has also been supportive, having launched its ‘Cameroon Digital 2020’ program, aimed at improving connectivity nationally. A large number of small ICT projects form part of the overall program; improved submarine and terrestrial cable connectivity has substantially increased international bandwidth, in turn leading to reductions in access prices for consumers; other projects such as Acceleration of the Digital Transformation of Cameroon are aimed at developing the digital economy, and accelerating the use of ICT in areas such as government services, agriculture, and commerce. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "only a little above 3 per 100 persons for fixed-line subscriptions; mobile-cellular usage has increased sharply, reaching a subscribership base of roughly 95 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -467,7 +467,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "due to internal conflict - persisting conflicts and displacements are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities and limit farmers’ access to crop growing areas and inputs, with a negative impact on 2022 crop production; in most prefectures, civil insecurity in 2021 continued to cause population displacements and widespread disruption of agricultural and marketing activities with negative consequences on food availability and access; the socio‑economic effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic, coupled with the high level of prices of some food staples, reduced substantially the households’ purchasing power (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to internal conflict -</em> persisting conflicts and displacements are expected to continue affecting agricultural activities and limit farmers’ access to crop growing areas and inputs, with a negative impact on 2022 crop production; in most prefectures, civil insecurity in 2021 continued to cause population displacements and widespread disruption of agricultural and marketing activities with negative consequences on food availability and access; the socio‑economic effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic, coupled with the high level of prices of some food staples, reduced substantially the households’ purchasing power (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -645,7 +645,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Lucy TAMLYN (since 11 January 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Patricia A. MAHONEY (since 8 April 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Avenue David Dacko, Bangui"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "5,702 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "652,036 (clashes between army and rebel groups since 2005; tensions between ethnic groups) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "658,265 (clashes between army and rebel groups since 2005; tensions between ethnic groups) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1092,13 +1092,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 1,200 personnel including about 100 in the Coast Guard (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 1,200 personnel including about 100 in the Coast Guard (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FACV has a limited amount of mostly dated and second-hand equipment, largely from China, European countries, and the former Soviet Union (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the FACV has a limited amount of mostly dated and second-hand equipment, largely from China, European countries, and the former Soviet Union (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-35 years of age for male and female selective compulsory military service; 2-years conscript service obligation; 17 years of age for voluntary service (with parental consent) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "18-35 years of age for male and female selective compulsory military service; 2-years conscript service obligation; 17 years of age for voluntary service (with parental consent) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2022, the FACV/National Guard was mostly a ground force with 2 infantry battalions and a small air component with a maritime patrol squadron; the Coast Guard had a few coastal patrol craft and patrol boats</p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to floods - about 194,000 people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the January‑August 2021 period, mainly due to livelihood losses caused by floods and landslides, and as a result of the socio‑economic impact of the pandemic on the livelihoods of vulnerable households; Cyclone Sagar struck the country on 19 and 20 May 2021, bringing torrential rains; the precipitation received, about 110 mm, was the equivalent of the average rainfall for an entire year and triggered heavy flooding, especially in the capital, Djibouti City and surrounding areas (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to floods -</em> about 194,000 people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the January‑August 2021 period, mainly due to livelihood losses caused by floods and landslides, and as a result of the socio‑economic impact of the pandemic on the livelihoods of vulnerable households; Cyclone Sagar struck the country on 19 and 20 May 2021, bringing torrential rains; the precipitation received, about 110 mm, was the equivalent of the average rainfall for an entire year and triggered heavy flooding, especially in the capital, Djibouti City and surrounding areas (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -976,7 +976,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Djibouti has a poor domestic infrastructure and a monopolized telecom system relying on microwave radio relay; rural areas connected via wireless local loop; mobile coverage limited to Djibouti city; despite challenges, foreign investment lends progress toward improvements; one of the best international fiber cables in the region, the Djibouti Internet Exchange, is a meeting point for cable systems passing between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean; national operator managed the Australia West Cable landing and signed an agreement for IP traffic through Paris and Marseille; international operator signed MoU for extension of cable from the Gulf to Djibouti (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Djibouti remains one of the last bastions where the national telco has a monopoly on all telecom services, including fixed lines, mobile, internet, and broadband; the lack of competition to Djibouti Telecom for such services has meant that the market has not lived up to its potential; despite the country benefiting from its location as a hub for international submarine cables, and with Djibouti Telecom being a partner in at least eight of them, prices for telecom services remain relatively high, and out of reach for a number of customers, weighing on market advancement; the government has long harbored plans to privatize Djibouti Telecom, though thus far such plans have been delayed repeatedly; it has been encouraged by the experience of neighboring Ethiopia, which recently licensed the Global Partnership for Ethiopia consortium (controlled by Safaricom) and so broke the monopoly held by Ethio Telecom; the Djibouti government is aiming to sell a minority stake in the incumbent telco (retaining some control of decisions) while securing the financial backing and the management acumen of a foreign operator; this is part of a larger plan to modernize the country’s economy more generally; the state expects to conduct of a sale of up to 40% of the company to an international investor by end-2022. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "about 4 per 100 fixed-line teledensity and nearly 44 per 100 mobile-cellular; Djibouti Telecom (DT) is the sole provider of telecommunications services and utilizes mostly a microwave radio relay network; fiber-optic cable is installed in the capital; rural areas connected via wireless local loop radio systems; mobile cellular coverage is primarily limited to the area in and around Djibouti city (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "with a large urbanized population and effective competition, Egypt has one of the largest fixed-line and mobile telecom markets in North Africa; investment has spurred broadband infrastructure and migration to digital economy; operator has ambitions for satellite/smart infrastructure based on 5G and fiber networks; Egypt’s geographical position enabled inexpensive bandwidth through fiber and cable connection to Europe, Middle East, and Asia; rural Internet connections continue to suffer from poor quality and low speeds; government disrupted service during political crises (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Egypt’s large telecom market is supported by a population of about 103 million and benefits from effective competition in most sectors; a liberal regulatory regime allows for unified licenses which permit operators to offer fixed-line as well as mobile services; in recent years the government has developed a number of digital migration projects aimed at increasing average broadband speeds, delivering fiber broadband to about 60% of the population, developing an in-house satellite program, and creating a knowledge-based economy through the greater adoption of ICTs; the New Administrative Capital being built is only one of more than a dozen smart city projects, which together are stimulating investment in 5G and fiber broadband, as well as the adoption of IoT and AI solutions; the country endeavor to be a significant ICT hub in the North Africa and Middle East regions; Egypt’s mature mobile market has one of the highest subscription rates in Africa; progress in the adoption of mobile data services has been hampered by the lack of sufficient spectrum; the regulator in September 2020 made available 60MHz in the 2.6GHz band, though the spectrum was not allocated until late 2021; the additional spectrum will go far to enabling the MNOs to improve the quality of mobile broadband services offered; further 5G trials are to be held later in 2022, focused on the New Administrative Capital; the international cable infrastructure remains an important asset for Egypt, which benefits from its geographical position; Telecom Egypt has become one of the largest concerns in this segment, being a participating member in numerous cable systems; in mid-2021 the telco announced plans to build the Hybrid African Ring Path system, connecting a number of landlocked countries in Africa with Italy, France, and Portugal; the system will partly use the company’s existing terrestrial and sub sea cable networks. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line roughly 10 per 100, mobile-cellular 93 per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -590,7 +590,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Susan N. STEVENSON (since 11 April 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador David R. GILMOUR (since 24 May 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Malabo II Highway (between the Headquarters of Sonagas and the offices of the United Nations), Malabo"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -952,7 +952,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "least developed telecommunications market in Africa, largely due to restrictions of state-owned telecom monopoly; most fixed-line telephones are in Asmara; cell phone use is limited by government control of SIM card issuance; low penetration of computer use and Internet; market ripe for competition and investment; direct phone service between Eritrea and Ethiopia restored in September 2018; government operator working on roll-out of 3G network (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Eritrea’s telecom sector operates under a state-owned monopoly for fixed and mobile services; the country has the least developed telecommunications market in Africa; mobile subscriptions stands at only about 20%, while fixed-line internet use barely registers; this is exacerbated by the very low use of computers, with only about 4% of households having a computer, and most of these being in the capital, Asmara; the provision of internet services is open to competition, about 2% of households have access to the internet; the national telco, the Eritrean Telecommunication Services Corporation (EriTel), continues to roll out a 3G network which provides basic internet access to the majority or Eritreans; considerable investment in telecom infrastructure is still required to improve the quality of services; the government has embarked on a work program aimed at extending services to remote areas, improving the quality of services, and ensuring that more telecoms infrastructure is supported by solar power to compensate for the poor state of the electricity network; additional foreign investment in telecom infrastructure, as well as introduction of more competition, would help transform what remains a virtually untapped market. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscribership is less than 2 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular is just over 20 per 100 (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -506,7 +506,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil conflict and drought - more than 16 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the May−June 2021 period; the high levels of food insecurity are mainly due to the lingering impact of the measures implemented in 2020 to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic, macro‑economic challenges resulting in high food prices, localized but significant locust‑induced crop and pasture losses, the negative impact on crop and livestock production of erratic rains in the first half of the year and to the intensification of inter‑communal violence since 2020 in several areas and the ongoing conflict in Tigray Region (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to civil conflict and drought -</em> more than 16 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in the May−June 2021 period; the high levels of food insecurity are mainly due to the lingering impact of the measures implemented in 2020 to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic, macro‑economic challenges resulting in high food prices, localized but significant locust‑induced crop and pasture losses, the negative impact on crop and livestock production of erratic rains in the first half of the year and to the intensification of inter‑communal violence since 2020 in several areas and the ongoing conflict in Tigray Region (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -700,7 +700,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Geeta PASI (since 1 March 2021)<br> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Ambassador Tracey Ann JACOBSON (since 25 February 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Entoto Street, P.O. Box 1014, Addis Ababa"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "telecom market challenged by political factionalism and reorganization of ruling party; despite some gains in access, Ethiopia remains one of the least-connected countries in the world; state-owned telecom held a monopoly over services until 2019 when government approved legislation and opened the market to competition and foreign investment; new expansion of LTE services; government reduced tariffs leading to increases in data and voice traffic; government launched mobile app as part of e-government initiative to build smart city; Huawei provides infrastructure to government operator and built data center in Addis Ababa; government disrupted service during political crises; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the slow process to open up Ethiopia’s telecom market was completed with the licensing of the Safaricom-led Global Partnership for Ethiopia consortium; the country had been one of the last in Africa to allow its national telco a monopoly on all telecom services including fixed, mobile, internet and data communications; this has stifled innovation, restricted network expansion, and limited the scope of services on offer; the consortium was in some respects a proxy for the wider influence over Ethiopia’s telecom sector between the interests of the US and China; only one of the two licenses on offer was secured, with uncertainty as to the timetable for issuing the second license; the government in mid-2021 began the process of selling a 45% stake in the incumbent telco Ethio Telecom; the World Bank in early 2021 provided a $200 million loan to help develop the country’s digital transformation, while the government has embarked on its 2020-2030 program as well as its Digital Ethiopia 2025 strategy, both aimed at making better use of digital technologies to promote socioeconomic development; the country’s mobile platform has mostly been provided by ZTE and Huawei, which have offered vendor financing; Ethio Telecom has placed the expansion of LTE services as a cornerstone of its investment program to 2022; the new licensee has been barred from contracting Chinese vendors, thus opening the door to western vendors. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions at about 1 per 100 while mobile-cellular stands at a little over 37 per 100; the number of mobile telephones is increasing steadily (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1244,11 +1244,10 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - in November 2021, the Ethiopian Government issued a nationwide state of emergency that enabled officials to order military-age citizens to undergo training and accept military duty in support of the Tigray conflict"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "5-10,000 Somalia (4,500 for ATMIS; the remainder under a bilateral agreement with Somalia; note - bilateral figures are prior to the conflict with Tigray); 250 Sudan (UNISFA); 1,500 South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - in August 2021, Sudan asked the UN to remove the Ethiopian troops from the UNISFA mission"
|
||||
"text": "5-10,000 Somalia (4,500 for ATMIS; the remainder under a bilateral agreement with Somalia; note - bilateral figures are prior to the conflict with Tigray); 250 Sudan (UNISFA); 1,500 South Sudan (UNMISS) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "each of the nine states has a regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security forces that report to regional civilian authorities; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP), and the Ethiopian military; the EFP reports to the Ministry of Peace, which was created in October of 2018<br><br>since November 2020, the Government of Ethiopia has been engaged in a protracted military conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former governing party of the Tigray Region; the government deemed a TPLF attack on Ethiopia military forces as a domestic terrorism incident and launched a military offensive in response; the TPLF asserted that its actions were self-defense in the face of planned Ethiopian Government action to remove it from the provincial government; the Ethiopian Government sent large elements of the ENDF into Tigray to remove the TPLF and invited militia and paramilitary forces from the states of Afar and Amara, as well as the military forces of Eritrea, to assist; the fighting included heavy civilian and military casualties with widespread abuses reported; in March 2022, the Ethiopian Government declared a truce to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid into the Tigray region; the TPLF reciprocated with a truce of its own; since the announcement, both sides have observed the truce and ceased hostilities, although tensions remained high, and Ethiopian military operations continued against the OLA in Oromia as of mid-2022<br><br>the military forces of the Tigray regional government are known as the Tigray Defense Force (TDF); the TDF is comprised of state paramilitary forces, local militia, and troops that defected from the ENDF; it reportedly had up to 250,000 fighters at the start of the conflict; in August 2021, the TPLF struck an alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)"
|
||||
"text": "each of the nine states has a regional and/or a \"special\" paramilitary security forces that report to regional civilian authorities; local militias operate across the country in loose and varying coordination with these regional security and police forces, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP), and the Ethiopian military; the EFP reports to the Ministry of Peace, which was created in October of 2018<br><br>since November 2020, the Government of Ethiopia has been engaged in a protracted military conflict with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the former governing party of the Tigray Region; the government deemed a TPLF attack on Ethiopia military forces as a domestic terrorism incident and launched a military offensive in response; the TPLF asserted that its actions were self-defense in the face of planned Ethiopian Government action to remove it from the provincial government; the Ethiopian Government sent large elements of the ENDF into Tigray to remove the TPLF and invited militia and paramilitary forces from the states of Afar and Amara, as well as the military forces of Eritrea, to assist; the fighting included heavy civilian and military casualties with widespread abuses reported; in March 2022, the Ethiopian Government declared a truce to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid into the Tigray region; the TPLF reciprocated with a truce of its own; since the announcement, both sides have reportedly observed the truce, although tensions remained high, and Ethiopian military operations continued against the OLA in Oromia as of mid-2022<br><br>the military forces of the Tigray regional government are known as the Tigray Defense Force (TDF); the TDF is comprised of state paramilitary forces, local militia, and troops that defected from the ENDF; it reportedly had up to 250,000 fighters at the start of the conflict; in August 2021, the TPLF struck an alliance with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1263,10 +1262,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "402,099 (South Sudan), 246,427 (Somalia), 159,369 (Eritrea), 47,179 (Sudan) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "402,099 (South Sudan), 246,427 (Somalia), 159,935 (Eritrea), 47,427 (Sudan) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1,990,168 (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "2,114,653 (includes conflict- and climate-induced IDPs, excluding unverified estimates from the Amhara region; border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000; ethnic clashes; and ongoing fighting between the Ethiopian military and separatist rebel groups in the Somali and Oromia regions; natural disasters; intercommunal violence; most IDPs live in Sumale state) (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Richard Carlton \"Carl\" PASCHALL (since 9 April 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Sharon L. CROMER (since 18 March 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Kairaba Avenue, Fajara, P.M.B. 19, Banjul"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "state-owned telecom partially privatized but retains a monopoly with fixed-line service; multiple mobile networks provide 2G to almost all citizens and above the African average; high poverty rates continue to limit access to the Internet, especially via fixed-line services in rural areas; weak political support for development of communications infrastructure, including National Broadband Network program; government depends on donors and loans from China and Islamic Development banks; two submarine cables provide international connectivity within African continent and Europe (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Gambia’s telecom market is dominated by the incumbent telco Gamtel, which retains a monopoly on fixed-line telephony services; there are five mobile networks providing effective competition, though Giraffe Telecom was only licensed in January 2022 and has not yet been allocated a frequency; the market leader is Africell, with about 62% of the market, while Comium and QCell compete closely for second and third place; Gamtel’s mobile unit Gamcel is by far the smallest network, having suffered from low investment in recent years; Comium has also suffered from financial difficulties: its failure to pay accumulated fees resulted in the government having sought a temporary suspension of its services in mid-2021; mobile subscriptions are well above the African average, itself a testament to the poor condition of the fixed-line infrastructure and the lack of availability of fixed services in many rural areas of the country; the incumbent has a relatively well-developed national fiber backbone network, low fixed-line subscriptions have hindered internet usage; there are only four licensed ISPs, which are small networks serving local areas, and so competition is minimal; their limited services are complemented by the fixed-wireless offerings of three of the MNOs; the government has embarked on a National Broadband Network program aimed at closing the digital divide affecting many parts of the country; Gamtel launched services based on this network in late 2019, though on a limited scale; despite efforts to improve internet connectivity, the country ranks among the lowest globally in terms of digital readiness. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions nearly 2 per 100 with one dominant company and mobile-cellular teledensity nearly 111 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -994,7 +994,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "politically stable and oil laden, Gabon is one of wealthiest nations in Africa; liberalized and competitive market led development of mobile broadband, data service, and tests of 5G; fixed-line sector underdeveloped due to the lack of competition and high prices; South Korean investment in fiber segments as part of Central African backbone; sufficient international bandwidth through submarine cable systems; government committed to backbone infrastructure and e-health services; efforts towards new legal and regulatory improvements (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom market was liberalized in 1999 when the government awarded three mobile telephony licenses and two ISP licenses and established an independent regulatory authority; Moov Gabon (known as Gabon Telecom before a rebranding exercise in January 2021), was privatized in 2007 when Maroc Telecom bought a 51% stake in the network; in June 2016 Maroc Telecom merged its two business in Gabon, thereby reducing the number of mobile networks from four to three; the 2009 entry of USAN (operated by Bintel Group under the brand name Azur) into a competitive market with high subscriptions triggered a price war that saw falling revenue and profits, forcing the networks to streamline their businesses and to look for new income streams; following more than a year of delays, a license to offer 3G mobile broadband services was awarded in late 2011; Azur failed and ceased trading in late 2017, encumbered by debts and fined by the regulator for failing to observe its quality of service obligations; in contrast with the mobile market, Gabon’s fixed-line and internet sectors have remained underdeveloped due to a lack of competition and high prices; the country has sufficient international bandwidth on the SAT-3/WASC/SAFE submarine cable but this facility is monopolized by Moov Gabon; the arrival of the ACE submarine cable, combined with progressing work on the CAB cable, has increased back haul capacity supporting mobile data traffic, and broke Moov Gabon’s monopoly on international internet traffic. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line is a little over 1 per 100 subscriptions; a growing mobile cellular network with multiple providers is making telephone service more widely available with mobile cellular teledensity at nearly 139 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -665,7 +665,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Stephanie S. SULLIVAN (since 23 January 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Virginia E. PALMER (since 16 June 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "No.24, Fourth Circular Road, Cantonments, Accra, P.O. Box 2288, Accra"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "challenged by unreliable electricity and shortage of skilled labor, Ghana seeks to extend telecom services nationally; investment in fiber infrastructure and off-grid solutions provide data coverage to over 23 million people; launch of LTE has improved mobile data services, including m-commerce and banking; moderately competitive Internet market, most through mobile networks; international submarine cables, and terrestrial cables have improved Internet capacity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "challenged by unreliable electricity and shortage of skilled labor, Ghana seeks to extend telecom services nationally; investment in fiber infrastructure and off-grid solutions provide data coverage to over 23 million people; launch of LTE has improved mobile data services, including m-commerce and banking; moderately competitive Internet market, most through mobile networks; international submarine cables, and terrestrial cables have improved Internet capacity; LTE services are widely available, only MTN Ghana has thus far signaled a willingness to invest in 5G; the relatively high cost of 5G-compatible devices also inhibits most subscribers from migrating from 3G and LTE platforms. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line data about 1 per 200 subscriptions; competition among multiple mobile-cellular providers has spurred growth with a voice subscribership of more than 130 per 100 persons (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1197,13 +1197,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 14,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,000 Air Force) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 14,000 active personnel (10,000 Army; 2,000 Navy; 2,000 Air Force) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the inventory of the Ghana Armed Forces is a mix of Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment; since 2010, China is the leading supplier of arms (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the inventory of the Ghana Armed Forces is a mix of Russian, Chinese, and Western equipment; since 2010, China is the leading supplier of arms (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service, with basic education certificate; no conscription (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service, with basic education certificate; no conscription (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "150 Mali (MINUSMA); 875 Lebanon (UNIFIL); 730 (plus about 300 police) South Sudan (UNMISS) (Jan 2022)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "5,779 (Cote d'Ivoire) (flight from 2010 post-election fighting) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "5,635 (Cote d'Ivoire) (flight from 2010 post-election fighting) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -483,7 +483,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes - about 740,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to reduced incomes -</em> about 740,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -567,7 +567,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Constitution": {
|
||||
"history": {
|
||||
"text": "currently suspended on September 5, 2021 via t coup d’etat. On September 27, 2021 the Transitional Charter was released. It supersedes the constitution until a new constitution is promulgated. previous 1958, 1990, and 2010"
|
||||
"text": "previous 1958, 1990; latest 2010, which was suspended on 5 September 2021 via a coup d’etat; on 27 September, the Transitional Charter was released, which supersedes the constitution until a new constitution is promulgated"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"amendments": {
|
||||
"text": "proposed by the National Assembly or by the president of the republic; consideration of proposals requires approval by simple majority vote by the Assembly; passage requires approval in referendum; the president can opt to submit amendments directly to the Assembly, in which case approval requires at least two-thirds majority vote; revised in 2020"
|
||||
|
|
@ -604,7 +604,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "formerly, Prime Minister Mohamed BEAVOGUI (since 6 October 2021); note - on 5 September 2021, Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA led a military coup in which President CONDE was arrested and detained, the constitution suspended, and the government of Prime Minister Ibrahima Kassory FOFANA dissolved"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cabinet": {
|
||||
"text": "formerly, the Council of Ministers appointed by the president; note: on 5 September 2021, Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA led a military coup on 5 September 2021 in which President CONDE was arrested and detained, the constitution suspended, and the government and legislature dissolved"
|
||||
"text": "formerly, the Council of Ministers appointed by the president; note: on 5 September 2021, Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA led a military coup in which President CONDE was arrested and detained, the constitution suspended, and the government and legislature dissolved"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "formerly, the president was directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term) and the prime minister appointed by the president; election last held on 18 October 2020; note - on 5 September 2021, Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA led a military coup in which President CONDE was arrested and detained, and on 1 October 2021,Col. Mamady DOUMBOUYA was sworn in as transitional president"
|
||||
|
|
@ -626,10 +626,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
"highest courts": {
|
||||
"text": "Supreme Court or Cour Supreme (organized into Administrative Chamber and Civil, Penal, and Social Chamber; court consists of the first president, 2 chamber presidents, 10 councilors, the solicitor general, and NA deputies)."
|
||||
"text": "Supreme Court or Cour Supreme (organized into Administrative Chamber and Civil, Penal, and Social Chamber; court consists of the first president, 2 chamber presidents, 10 councilors, the solicitor general, and NA deputies); Constitutional Court - suspended on 5 September 2021"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"judge selection and term of office": {
|
||||
"text": "Supreme Court first president appointed by the national president after consultation with the National Assembly; other members appointed by presidential decree; members serve until age 65; members serve single 9-year terms"
|
||||
"text": "Supreme Court first president appointed by the national president after consultation with the National Assembly; other members appointed by presidential decree; members serve 9-year terms until age 65"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"subordinate courts": {
|
||||
"text": "Court of Appeal or Cour d'Appel; High Court of Justice or Cour d'Assises; Court of Account (Court of Auditors); Courts of First Instance (Tribunal de Premiere Instance); labor court; military tribunal; justices of the peace; specialized courts"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Guinea’s mobile subscribership growing through investment of South African telecom operators and Chinese Huawei management; m-transactions supported commerce; broadband still limited and expensive though submarine cable and IXP improved reliability of infrastructure; 4G Wi-Fi in the capital; National Backbone Network will connect regional administrative centers; ECOWAS countries to launch free roaming; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Guinea’s telecom market is dominated by MTN and Orange; after the entry of these regional players, the number of mobile subscribers grew strongly while revenue also increased steadily; the debt-stricken incumbent fixed-line network Sotelgui provided a mobile service until it was closed down in late 2012, following a long period of mismanagement; the company itself was declared bankrupt in 2013, and stopped operating; the government since 2019 has sought to secure partners and investors to help launch a replacement operator, Guinea Telecom, but with no success; fixed broadband services are still very limited and expensive, though there have been some positive developments in recent years; the landing of the first international submarine cable in 2012, and the setting up of an IXP in mid-2013, increased the bandwidth available to the ISPs, and helped reduce the cost of internet services for end-users; a National Backbone Network was completed in mid-2020, connecting administrative centers across the country; almost all internet connections are made via mobile networks; GSM services account for a dwindling proportion of connections, in line with the greater reach of services based on 3G and LTE. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "there is national coverage and Conakry is reasonably well-served; coverage elsewhere remains inadequate but is improving; fixed-line teledensity is less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership is just over 100 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1177,13 +1177,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "Guinean National Armed Forces are comprised of approximately 12,000 active personnel <br>(9,000 Army; 400 Navy; 800 Air Force; 300 BASP; 1,500 Gendarmerie) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Guinean National Armed Forces are comprised of approximately 12,000 active personnel <br>(9,000 Army; 400 Navy; 800 Air Force; 300 BASP; 1,500 Gendarmerie) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of ageing and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; since 2010, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, Russia, and South Africa (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the inventory of the Guinean military consists largely of ageing and outdated (mostly Soviet-era) equipment; since 2010, it has received small amounts of equipment from China, France, Russia, and South Africa (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "Voluntary and selective conscripted service, 9-24 mos (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Voluntary and selective conscripted service, 9-24 mos (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "670 Mali (MINUSMA) (Jan 2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Côte d'Ivoire telecom systems continue to benefit from strong economic growth; fixed-line, Internet, and broadband sectors remain underdeveloped; mobile sector is strong; progress in national backbone network and connection to submarine cable that will increase Internet bandwidth; country is poised to develop broadband market and digital economy; government further tightened SIM card registration rules (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "in recent years the government of Ivory Coast has helped develop a competitive telecom sector focused on the provision of converged services, thus allowing operators to offer fixed-line and mobile services under a universal services license regime; there are two fixed network operators, the market is dominated by Orange Group’s local unit, Orange Côte d’Ivoire; the mobile market is more competitive, with Orange Côte d’Ivoire operating alongside MTN Côte d’Ivoire and Moov; over the years a number of alternative operators have either folded, had their licenses evoked, or failed to launch services; the fixed internet and broadband sectors remain underdeveloped; this is a legacy of poor international connectivity, which resulted in high wholesale prices, limited bandwidth, and a lack of access for alternative operators to international infrastructure; these limitations were addressed following the landing of a second cable in November 2011, and the end to the access monopoly held by Orange Côte d’Ivoire; Orange Group has also launched its 20,000km Djoliba cable system, reaching across eight countries in the region, while the 2Africa submarine cable is being developed by a consortium of companies; with a landing station providing connectivity to Côte d'Ivoire, the system is expected to be completed in late 2023. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "1 per 100 fixed-line teledensity; with multiple mobile-cellular service providers competing in the market, mobile subscriptions have increased to 152 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1212,19 +1212,19 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army, including about 2,000 Special Forces; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force); est. 5-10,000 Gendarmerie (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army, including about 2,000 Special Forces; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force); est. 5-10,000 Gendarmerie (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; since 2016, it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from a variety of countries (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the inventory of the FACI consists mostly of older or second-hand equipment, typically of French or Soviet-era origin; Cote d'Ivoire was under a partial UN arms embargo from 2004 to 2016; since 2016, it has received limited amounts of mostly second-hand equipment from a variety of countries (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary male and female military service; conscription is not enforced; voluntary recruitment of former rebels into the new national army is restricted to ages 22-29 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary male and female military service; conscription is not enforced; voluntary recruitment of former rebels into the new national army is restricted to ages 22-29 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "860 Mali (MINUSMA) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; as of 2022, the FACI was focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017"
|
||||
"text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; as of 2022, the FACI was focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and completed building a joint counter-terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2020<br><br>the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea remain a very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2021, there were 34 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region; although a significant decrease from the total number of 81 incidents in 2020, it included the one hijacking and three of five ships fired upon worldwide; while boarding and attempted boarding to steal valuables from ships and crews are the most common types of incidents, almost a third of all incidents involve a hijacking and/or kidnapping; in 2021, 57 crew members were kidnapped in seven separate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, representing 100% of kidnappings worldwide; Nigerian pirates in particular are well armed and very aggressive, operating as far as 200 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2022-001 - Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 4 January 2022, which states in part, \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom continue to serve as significant threats to US-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea\""
|
||||
|
|
@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "308,000 (post-election conflict in 2010-11, as well as civil war from 2002-04; land disputes; most pronounced in western and southwestern regions) (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "302,000 (post-election conflict in 2010-11, as well as civil war from 2002-04; land disputes; most pronounced in western and southwestern regions) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "952,969 (mid-year 2021); note - many Ivoirians lack documentation proving their nationality, which prevent them from accessing education and healthcare; birth on Ivorian soil does not automatically result in citizenship; disputes over citizenship and the associated rights of the large population descended from migrants from neighboring countries is an ongoing source of tension and contributed to the country's 2002 civil war; some observers believe the government's mass naturalizations of thousands of people over the last couple of years is intended to boost its electoral support base; the government in October 2013 acceded to international conventions on statelessness and in August 2013 reformed its nationality law, key steps to clarify the nationality of thousands of residents; since the adoption of the Abidjan Declaration to eradicate statelessness in West Africa in February 2015, 6,400 people have received nationality papers; in September 2020, Cote d'Ivoire adopted Africa's first statelessness determination procedure to regularize the status of stateless people"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -477,7 +477,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "due to drought conditions - about 3.1 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in February 2022 reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 that affected crop and livestock production, mainly in northern and eastern pastoral, agro-pastoral and marginal agricultural areas; the deterioration of the food security situation is mainly due to the negative impact of two consecutive poor rainy seasons since October 2020 on crop and livestock production and on on‑farm income‑earning opportunities; the impact of the measures implemented to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic on economic activities exacerbated food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to drought conditions -</em> about 3.1 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in February 2022 reflecting consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020 that affected crop and livestock production, mainly in northern and eastern pastoral, agro-pastoral and marginal agricultural areas; the deterioration of the food security situation is mainly due to the negative impact of two consecutive poor rainy seasons since October 2020 on crop and livestock production and on on‑farm income‑earning opportunities; the impact of the measures implemented to curb the spread of the COVID‑19 pandemic on economic activities exacerbated food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -668,7 +668,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Eric W. Kneedler (since 20 January 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Eric W. KNEEDLER (since 20 January 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "P.O. Box 606 Village Market, 00621 Nairobi"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1249,14 +1249,14 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005; as of March 2019, Kenya provides shelter to nearly 475,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including Ugandans who flee across the border periodically to seek protection from Lord's Resistance Army rebels; Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; the boundary that separates Kenya's and Sudan's sovereignty is unclear in the \"Ilemi Triangle,\" which Kenya has administered since colonial times<br><br><em>Uganda-Kenya:</em> Kenya and Uganda have begun a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021 </p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of March 2022, Kenya provides shelter to nearly 548,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including Ugandans who flee across the border periodically to seek protection from Lord's Resistance Army rebels</p> <p><em>Kenya-Ethiopia</em>: their border was demarcated in the 1950s and approved in 1970; in 2012, Kenya and Ethiopia agreed to redemarcate their boundary following disputes over beacons and crossborder crime</p> <p><em>Kenya-Somalia</em>: Kenya works hard to prevent the clan and militia fighting in Somalia from spreading across the border, which has long been open to nomadic pastoralists; in 2021, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave Somalia control over a disputed ocean area where the seabeds are believed to hold vasts oil and gas deposits; the ICJ ruling gives Somalia the rights to several offshore oil exploration blocks previously claimed by Kenya; Kenya did not recognize the court’s decision</p> <p><em>Kenya-South Sudan</em>: two thirds of the boundary that separates Kenya and South Sudan's sovereignty known as the Ilemi Triangle has been unclear since British colonial times; Kenya has administered the area since colonial times; officials from Kenya and South Sudan signed a M.o.U. on boundary delimitation and demarcation and agreed to set up a joint committee; as of July 2019, the demarcation process was to begin in 90 days, but was delayed due to a lack of funding</p> <p><em>Kenya-Sudan</em>: Kenya served as an important mediator in brokering Sudan's north-south separation in February 2005</p> <p><em>Kenya-Tanzania</em>: Kenya and Tanzania were conducting a joint reaffirmation process in November 2021 to ensure the border was visibly marked with pillars</p> <p><em>Kenya-Uganda:</em> Kenya and Uganda began a joint demarcation of the boundary in 2021 </p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "279,197 (Somalia), 142,113 (South Sudan), 21,001 (Ethiopia), 19,036 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 7,521 (Burundi) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "279,197 (Somalia), 142,113 (South Sudan), 21,047 (Ethiopia), 19,036 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 7,770 (Burundi), 5,011 (Sudan) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "190,000 (election-related violence, intercommunal violence, resource conflicts, al-Shabaab attacks in 2017 and 2018) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "16,820 (mid-year 2021); note - the stateless population consists of Nubians, Kenyan Somalis, and coastal Arabs; the Nubians are descendants of Sudanese soldiers recruited by the British to fight for them in East Africa more than a century ago; Nubians did not receive Kenyan citizenship when the country became independent in 1963; only recently have Nubians become a formally recognized tribe and had less trouble obtaining national IDs; Galjeel and other Somalis who have lived in Kenya for decades are included with more recent Somali refugees and denied ID cards"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -473,7 +473,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to high food prices - production of rice, a main staple food, was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, a factor that is expected to further aggravate food insecurity in 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to high food prices -</em> production of rice, a main staple food, was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, a factor that is expected to further aggravate food insecurity in 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1160,12 +1160,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>as the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) continues to drawdown prior to the 1 March 2018 closure date, the peacekeeping force is being reduced to 434 soldiers and two police units; some Liberian refugees still remain in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Ghana; Liberia shelters 7,811 Ivoirian refugees, as of February 2022</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "8,054 (Cote d'Ivoire) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Liberia-Guinea</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Liberia-Sierra Leone</em>: none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>not a significant transit country for illicit narcotics but proximity to major drug routes contribute to trafficking; not a significant producer of illicit narcotics; local drug use involves marijuana, heroin, cocaine, the synthetic opioid tramadol, and amphetamine-type stimulants</p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -460,7 +460,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to loss of income-generating activities - the number of people facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022 is estimated at 338,000, reflecting the effects of a slow economic recovery that has impinged on households’ economic capacity to access food (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to loss of income-generating activities -</em> the number of people facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022 is estimated at 338,000, reflecting the effects of a slow economic recovery that has impinged on households’ economic capacity to access food (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -611,7 +611,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation in the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d’Affaires Masopha Phoofolo Moses KAO, Counselor (28 May 2021)<br> <p> </p>"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d’Affaires Masopha Phoofolo Moses KAO, Counselor (28 May 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"chancery": {
|
||||
"text": "2511 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008"
|
||||
|
|
@ -628,7 +628,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Rebecca E. GONZALES (since 8 February 2018)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Maria E. BREWER (since 10 March 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "254 Kingsway Avenue, Maseru"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>South Africa has placed military units to assist police operations along the border of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to control smuggling, poaching, and illegal migration</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Lesotho-South Africa</em>: South Africa has placed military units to assist police operations along the border of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to control smuggling, poaching, and illegal migration</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"current situation": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -422,7 +422,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity, economic and political instability, and high food prices - an estimated 800,000 people, 10% of the population, need humanitarian assistance, of which 500,000 require food assistance (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity, economic and political instability, and high food prices -</em> an estimated 800,000 people, 10% of the population, need humanitarian assistance, of which 500,000 require food assistance (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1097,11 +1097,11 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Libya-Algeria:</em> dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km still reflected on its maps of southeastern Algeria<br><br><em>Libya-Chad:</em> various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region reside in southern Libya</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Libya-Algeria:</em> dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km still reflected on its maps of southeastern Algeria<br><br><em>Libya-Chad:</em> various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region reside in southern Libya; Libyan forces clashed with Chadian rebels in September 2021</p> <p><em>Libya-Egypt</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Libya-Niger</em>: the boundary is poorly defined but has never been disputed by either country</p> <p><em>Libya-Sudan</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Libya-Tunisia</em>: none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "18,675 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 14,919 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "19,348 (Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 15,207 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "168,011 (conflict between pro-QADHAFI and anti-QADHAFI forces in 2011; post-QADHAFI tribal clashes 2014) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to the effects of extreme weather events - cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in eastern regions, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase later in 2022; moreover, drought conditions continue to affect households in the south, which is likely to result in an increase in the severity and prevalence of food insecurity in these areas (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to the effects of extreme weather events -</em> cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in eastern regions, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase later in 2022; moreover, drought conditions continue to affect households in the south, which is likely to result in an increase in the severity and prevalence of food insecurity in these areas (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -653,7 +653,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Amy J. HYATT (since June 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Tobias H. GLUCKSMAN"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Lot 207A, Andranoro, Antehiroka, 105 Antananarivo"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>claims Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, and Juan de Nova Island (all administered by France); the vegetated drying cays of Banc du Geyser, which were claimed by Madagascar in 1976, also fall within the EEZ claims of the Comoros and France (Glorioso Islands, part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands)</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Madagascar-France</em>: claims Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, and Juan de Nova Island (all administered by France); the vegetated drying cays of Banc du Geyser, which were claimed by Madagascar in 1976, also fall within the EEZ claim of France</p> <p><em>Madagascar-Comoros</em>: the vegetated drying cays of Banc du Geyser, which were claimed by Madagascar in 1976, also fall within the EEZ claim of the Comoros</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "illicit producer of cannabis (cultivated and wild varieties) used mostly for domestic consumption; transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -481,7 +481,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes and shortfalls in cereal producation - an estimated 1.65 million people are facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022, underpinned by localized shortfalls in cereal production and the lingering impact of an economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic; the effects of poor rains at the start of the cropping season and tropical storm Ana in January 2022 are expected to cause an increase in humanitarian needs later in 2022, due to crop and livelihood losses (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to reduced incomes and shortfalls in cereal production -</em> an estimated 1.65 million people are facing \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between January and March 2022, underpinned by localized shortfalls in cereal production and the lingering impact of an economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic; the effects of poor rains at the start of the cropping season and tropical storm Ana in January 2022 are expected to cause an increase in humanitarian needs later in 2022, due to crop and livelihood losses (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -660,7 +660,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Charge d' Affaires Jeremy NEITZKE (26 October 2021 "
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador David YOUNG (since 5 May 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "16 Jomo Kenyatta Road, Lilongwe 3"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1198,11 +1198,11 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>dispute with Tanzania over the boundary in Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi) and the meandering Songwe River; Malawi contends that the entire lake up to the Tanzanian shoreline is its territory, while Tanzania claims the border is in the center of the lake; the conflict was reignited in 2012 when Malawi awarded a license to a British company for oil exploration in the lake</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Malawi-Mozambique</em>: the two countries have held exercises to reaffirm boundaries a number of times</p> <p><em>Malawi-Tanzania</em>: dispute with Tanzania over the boundary in Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi) and the meandering Songwe River; Malawi contends that the entire lake up to the Tanzanian shoreline is its territory, while Tanzania claims the border is in the center of the lake; the conflict was reignited in 2012 when Malawi awarded a license to a British company for oil exploration in the lake</p> <p><em>Malawi-Zambia</em>: border demarcation was completed in 2011; in 2018, the redemarcation exercise determined that some parts of Malawi actually belonged to Zambia</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "33,606 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 12,377 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers), 7,526 (Rwanda) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "33,606 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 12,530 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers), 7,596 (Rwanda) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in staple food production - between June and August 2022, 1.84 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity, driven in part by a shortfall in staple food production in 2021; sanctions imposed on the country, following the postponement of elections by the transitional military government, are likely to slow down economic activity and further weigh on households’ economic capacity to access food</p> (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>due to civil insecurity and shortfall in staple food production -</em> between June and August 2022, 1.84 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity, driven in part by a shortfall in staple food production in 2021; sanctions imposed on the country, following the postponement of elections by the transitional military government, are likely to slow down economic activity and further weigh on households’ economic capacity to access food</p> (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1206,14 +1206,14 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>demarcation is underway with Burkina Faso</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Mali-Burkina Faso</em>: demarcation is underway with Burkina Faso</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "17,124 (Burkina Faso), 14,951 (Mauritania), 12,845 (Niger) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "22,051 (Burkina Faso), 14,950 (Mauritania), 13,585 (Niger) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "350,110 (Tuareg rebellion since 2012) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "370,548 (Tuareg rebellion since 2012) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1249,7 +1249,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Morocco protests Spain's control over the coastal enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla, and Penon de Velez de la Gomera, the islands of Penon de Alhucemas and Islas Chafarinas, and surrounding waters; both countries claim Isla Perejil (Leila Island); discussions have not progressed on a comprehensive maritime delimitation, setting limits on resource exploration and refugee interdiction, since Morocco's 2002 rejection of Spain's unilateral designation of a median line from the Canary Islands; Morocco serves as one of the primary launching areas of illegal migration into Spain from North Africa; Algeria's border with Morocco remains an irritant to bilateral relations, each nation accusing the other of harboring militants and arms smuggling; the National Liberation Front's assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in southeastern Morocco is a dormant dispute</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Morocco-Algeria</em>: Algeria's border with Morocco remains an irritant to bilateral relations, each nation accusing the other of harboring militants and arms smuggling</p> <p><em>Morocco-Mauritania</em>: tensions arose in 2016 when Mauritanian soldiers were deployed to Lagouira, a city in the southernmost part of Morocco, and raised their flag</p> <p><em>Morocco-Spain</em>: Morocco protests Spain's control over the coastal enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla, and Penon de Velez de la Gomera, the islands of Penon de Alhucemas and Islas Chafarinas, and surrounding waters; both countries claim Isla Perejil (Leila Island); discussions have not progressed on a comprehensive maritime delimitation, setting limits on resource exploration and refugee interdiction, since Morocco's 2002 rejection of Spain's unilateral designation of a median line from the Canary Islands; Morocco serves as one of the primary launching areas of illegal migration into Spain from North Africa</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>one of the world’s largest cannabis-producing country with Europe as the main market; hashish is also smuggled to South America and the Caribbean where it is exchanged for cocaine which is distributed in Europe; MDMA (ecstasy), originating in Belgium and the Netherlands is smuggled into northern Morocco for sale on the domestic market</p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory); claims French-administered Tromelin Island</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory); claims French-administered Tromelin Island</p> <p><em>Mauritius-France</em>: Mauritius has claimed French-administered Tromelin Island (part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands) since 1976<br><br><em>Mauritius-UK</em>: Mauritius and Seychelles claim the Chagos Islands (UK-administered British Indian Ocean Territory)</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"current situation": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -487,7 +487,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to poor performance of cereal production - domestic cereal production declined in 2021 due to poor weather, which is likely to worsen conditions of the most vulnerable households; in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 660,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to poor performance of cereal production -</em> domestic cereal production declined in 2021 due to poor weather, which is likely to worsen conditions of the most vulnerable households; in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 660,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1218,11 +1218,11 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara remain dormant</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Mauritania-Algeria</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Mauritania-Mali</em>: there are no border disputes, but the border has not been demarcated; talks on demarcation were reportedly being held in February 2022</p> <p><em>Mauritania-Morocco</em>: Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara remain dormant; tensions arose in 2016 when Mauritanian soldiers were deployed to Lagouira, a city in the southernmost part of Morocco, and raised their flag</p> <p><em>Mauritania-Senegal</em>: none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "26,001 (Sahrawis) (mid-year 2021); 84,526 (Mali) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "26,001 (Sahrawis) (mid-year 2021); 85,083 (Mali) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>due to localized shortfalls in staple food production, insecurity in northern areas, extreme weather events - an estimated 1.9 million people require humanitarian assistance until at least March 2022, primarily due to shortfalls in food production and the impact of insecurity in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where populations are experiencing the severest levels of acute food insecurity; approximately 24,000 people are facing \"Emergency\" levels of food insecurity; cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in central provinces, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase in late 2022</p> (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>due to localized shortfalls in staple food production, insecurity in northern areas, and extreme weather events -</em> an estimated 1.9 million people require humanitarian assistance until at least March 2022, primarily due to shortfalls in food production and the impact of insecurity in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where populations are experiencing the severest levels of acute food insecurity; approximately 24,000 people are facing \"Emergency\" levels of food insecurity; cyclones and tropical storms in early 2022 have affected a large number of people, particularly in central provinces, and the number of food insecure people is expected to increase in late 2022</p> (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -664,7 +664,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Dennis Walter HEARNE (since 3 April 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Peter Hendrick VROOMAN (since 3 March 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Avenida Kenneth Kaunda, 193, Caixa Postal, 783, Maputo"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "information limited and varied; approximately 12,000 personnel (11,000 Army; 200 Navy; 800 Air Force) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "information limited and varied; approximately 12,000 personnel (11,000 Army and about 1,000 Air Force and Navy) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FADM's inventory consists primarily of Soviet-era equipment, although since 2010 it has received limited quantities of more modern equipment from a variety of countries, mostly as aid/donations (2021)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "registration for military service is mandatory for all males and females at 18 years of age; 18-35 years of age for selective compulsory military service; 18 years of age for voluntary service; 2-year service obligation; women may serve as officers or enlisted (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "the Government of Mozambique is facing an insurgency driven by militants with ties to the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS-Mozambique, which was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department in March 2021) in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, an area known for rich liquid natural gas deposits; insurgent attacks in the province began in 2017 and as of 2022, the fighting had left an estimated 3,000 dead and over 700,000 displaced; the FADM is widely assessed as lacking the training, equipment, and overall capabilities to address the insurgency; as of 2022, several countries from the Southern Africa Development Community and the European Union, as well as Rwanda and the US were providing various forms of military assistance; African countries have provided approximately 3,100 troops"
|
||||
"text": "the Government of Mozambique is facing an insurgency driven by militants with ties to the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS-Mozambique, which was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US State Department in March 2021) in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, an area known for rich liquid natural gas deposits; insurgent attacks in the province began in 2017 and as of 2022, the fighting had left an estimated 4,000 dead and over 700,000 displaced; the FADM is widely assessed as lacking the training, equipment, and overall capabilities to address the insurgency; as of 2022, several countries from the Southern Africa Development Community and the European Union, as well as Rwanda and the US were providing various forms of military assistance; African countries have provided approximately 3,100 troops (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1237,14 +1237,14 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>South Africa has placed military units to assist police operations along the border of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to control smuggling, poaching, and illegal migration</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Mozambique-Eswatini</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Mozambique-Malawi</em>: the two countries have held exercises to reaffirm boundaries a number of times</p> <p><em>Mozambique-South Africa</em>: South Africa has placed military units to assist police operations along the border of Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to control smuggling, poaching, and illegal migration</p> <p><em>Mozambique-Tanzania</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Mozambique-Zambia</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Mozambique-Zimbabwe</em>: none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "10,911 (Democratic Republic of Congo) (refugees and asylum seekers), 8,558 (Burundi) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "881,047 (violence between the government and an opposition group, violence associated with extremists groups in 2018, political violence 2019) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "744,949 (violence between the government and an opposition group, violence associated with extremists groups in 2018, political violence 2019) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -485,7 +485,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "due to internal conflict and shortfall in cereal production - as of January 2022, an estimated 265,000 people have been displaced due to civil conflict; in addition, domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, which is expected to further aggravate conditions; the aggregate cereal production in 2021 is officially estimated at 3.5 million mt, nearly 40% below the five‑year average; as a result, between June and August 2022, 3.64 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; this is a 40% increase compared to the current post‑harvest period, underpinned by the reduced cereal production in 2021, high food prices and the high likelihood of persisting disruptions of markets and agricultural activities amid increasing insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to internal conflict and shortfall in cereal production -</em> as of January 2022, an estimated 265,000 people have been displaced due to civil conflict; in addition, domestic cereal production was estimated at a below-average level in 2021, due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, which is expected to further aggravate conditions; the aggregate cereal production in 2021 is officially estimated at 3.5 million mt, nearly 40% below the five‑year average; as a result, between June and August 2022, 3.64 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; this is a 40% increase compared to the current post‑harvest period, underpinned by the reduced cereal production in 2021, high food prices and the high likelihood of persisting disruptions of markets and agricultural activities amid increasing insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 10,000 active troops (est. 6,000 Army; 200 Air Force; 4,000 Gendarmerie); est. 3,000 National Guard (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 12,000 active troops (est. 8,000 Army; 200 Air Force; 4,000 Gendarmerie); est. 3,000 National Guard (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FAN's inventory consists of a wide variety of older weapons; since 2010, the FAN has received small amounts of mostly second-hand equipment and donations from several countries with the US as the top provider (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1212,11 +1212,11 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Libya claims about 25,000 sq km in a currently dormant dispute in the Tommo region; location of Benin-Niger-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty that also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries; the dispute with Burkina Faso was referred to the ICJ in 2010</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Niger-Benin-Nigeria</em>: location of Niger-Benin-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved</p> <p><em>Niger-Burkina Faso</em>: the dispute with Burkina Faso was referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2010; the ICJ ruled in 2013 that 786 sq km should go to Burkina Faso and 277 sq km to Niger; the ruling was implemented in 2015 and 2016, with Burkina Faso gaining 14 towns and Niger 4</p> <p><em>Niger-Cameroon-Nigeria</em>: only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty that also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries</p> <p><em>Niger-Libya</em>: Libya claims about 25,000 sq km in a currently dormant dispute in the Tummo region</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "187,139 (Nigeria), 62,077 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "187,139 (Nigeria), 62,658 (Mali) (refugees and asylum seekers) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "264,257 (includes the regions of Diffa, Tillaberi, and Tahoua; unknown how many of the 11,000 people displaced by clashes between government forces and the Tuareg militant group, Niger Movement for Justice, in 2007 are still displaced; inter-communal violence; Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger, 2015) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -509,7 +509,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to persistent civil conflict in the northern areas - according to the latest analysis, between June and August 2022, the number of food insecure is projected to increase to 18 million people period as a result of worsening conflict that is driving new population displacements; the areas inaccessible to humanitarian interventions are facing the worst food insecurity conditions (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to persistent civil conflict in the northern areas -</em> according to the latest analysis, between June and August 2022, the number of food insecure is projected to increase to 18 million people period as a result of worsening conflict that is driving new population displacements; the areas inaccessible to humanitarian interventions are facing the worst food insecurity conditions (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -626,7 +626,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "Federal Executive Council appointed by the president but constrained constitutionally to include at least one member from each of the 36 states"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "president directly elected by qualified majority popular vote and at least 25% of the votes cast in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states; president elected for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 23 February 2019 (next to be held on 25 February 2023); note: the election was scheduled for 16 February 2019, but postponed on 16 February 2019"
|
||||
"text": "president directly elected by qualified majority popular vote and at least 25% of the votes cast in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states; president elected for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 23 February 2019 (next to be held on 25 February 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "Muhammadu BUHARI elected president; percent of vote - Muhammadu BUHARI (APC) 53%, Atiku ABUBAKAR (PDP) 39%, other 8%"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1250,13 +1250,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 135,000 active personnel (100,000 Army; 20,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 15,000 Air Force); est. 80,000 Security and Civil Defense Corps (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "information varies; approximately 135,000 active personnel (100,000 Army; 20,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 15,000 Air Force); est. 80,000 Security and Civil Defense Corps (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the Nigerian Armed Forces' inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; since 2010, Nigeria has undertaken a considerable military modernization program, and has received equipment from some 20 countries with China, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicles, and small-scale naval production (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the Nigerian Armed Forces' inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; since 2010, Nigeria has undertaken a considerable military modernization program, and has received equipment from some 20 countries with China, Russia, and the US as the leading suppliers; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicles, and small-scale naval production (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service (men and women); no conscription (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "18-26 years of age for voluntary military service (men and women); no conscription (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "200 Ghana (ECOMIG) (2022)",
|
||||
|
|
@ -1277,11 +1277,11 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including June 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately cedes sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phaseout of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries; location of Benin-Niger-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Nigeria-Benin</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Nigeria-Cameroon</em>: Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including June 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately ceded sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phaseout of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; demarcation of the Bakassi Peninsula and adjoining border areas should be finalized in 2022; as Lake Chad’s evaporation exposed dry land, only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries</p> <p><em>Nigeria-Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea</em>: the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation</p> <p><em>Nigeria-Niger</em>: none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "77,878 (Cameroon) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "78,077 (Cameroon) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "3,030,544 (northeast Nigeria; Boko Haram attacks and counterinsurgency efforts in northern Nigeria; communal violence between Christians and Muslims in the middle belt region, political violence; flooding; forced evictions; cattle rustling; competition for resources) (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -435,7 +435,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to economic downturn, civil insecurity, lingering impact of floods and prolonged conflict - despite sustained humanitarian assistance, food insecurity still affects large segments of the population, driven by insufficient food supplies, an economic downturn, high food prices and the lingering impact of widespread floods in 2020; particular concern exists for households in Jonglei, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states, and in neighbouring Pibor Administrative Area, where 60-85% of the population were estimated to be severely food insecure (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to economic downturn, civil insecurity, lingering impact of floods and prolonged conflict -</em> despite sustained humanitarian assistance, food insecurity still affects large segments of the population, driven by insufficient food supplies, an economic downturn, high food prices and the lingering impact of widespread floods in 2020; particular concern exists for households in Jonglei, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states, and in neighbouring Pibor Administrative Area, where 60-85% of the population were estimated to be severely food insecure (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -591,7 +591,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Deputy Chief of Mission Jon F. DANILOWICZ (since September 2020)<br>"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires William FLENS (since 4 June 2022)<br>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Kololo Road adjacent to the EU's compound, Juba"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "311,819 (Sudan), 18,407 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "1,436,000 (alleged coup attempt and ethnic conflict beginning in December 2013; information is lacking on those displaced in earlier years by: fighting in Abyei between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in May 2011; clashes between the SPLA and dissident militia groups in South Sudan; inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle; attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army; floods and drought) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "2,017,236 (alleged coup attempt and ethnic conflict beginning in December 2013; information is lacking on those displaced in earlier years by: fighting in Abyei between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in May 2011; clashes between the SPLA and dissident militia groups in South Sudan; inter-ethnic conflicts over resources and cattle; attacks from the Lord's Resistance Army; floods and drought) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "10,000 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -556,7 +556,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Executive branch": {
|
||||
"chief of state": {
|
||||
"text": "President Umaro Sissoko EMBALO (since 27 February 2020); note - President EMBALO was declared winner of the 29 December 2019 runoff presidential election by the electoral commission. In late February 2020, Embalo inaugurated himself with only military leadership present, even though the Supreme Court of Justice had yet to rule on an electoral litigation appeal lodged by his political rival Domingos Simoes PEREIRA."
|
||||
"text": "President Umaro Sissoko EMBALO (since 27 February 2020); note - President EMBALO was declared winner of the 29 December 2019 runoff presidential election by the electoral commission. In late February 2020, EMBALO inaugurated himself with only military leadership present, even though the Supreme Court of Justice had yet to rule on an electoral litigation appeal lodged by his political rival Domingos Simoes PEREIRA"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"head of government": {
|
||||
"text": "Prime Minister Nuno NABIAM (since 27 February 2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -606,7 +606,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "the US Embassy suspended operations on 14 June 1998; the US Ambassador to Senegal is accredited to Guinea-Bissau. U.S. diplomatic representation in Guinea-Bissau is conducted through the U.S. Embassy in Dakar and the Guinea-Bissau Liaison Office located in Bissau."
|
||||
"text": "the US Embassy suspended operations on 14 June 1998; the US Ambassador to Senegal is accredited to Guinea-Bissau; US diplomatic representation in Guinea-Bissau is conducted through the US Embassy in Dakar and the Guinea-Bissau Liaison Office located in Bissau"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mailing address": {
|
||||
"text": "2080 Bissau Place, Washington DC 20521-2080"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1069,16 +1069,16 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 4,000 total active troops, including a few hundred air and naval personnel (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 4,000 total active troops, including a few hundred air and naval personnel (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FARP is poorly armed with an inventory consisting of Soviet-era equipment, much of which is reportedly unserviceable; the only reported deliveries of military equipment since 2015 were patrol boats from Spain in 2017 and non-lethal equipment from China in 2015; Guinea-Bissau has also discussed acquiring military equipment with Indonesia (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the FARP is poorly armed with an inventory consisting of Soviet-era equipment, much of which is reportedly unserviceable; the only reported deliveries of military equipment since 2015 were patrol boats from Spain in 2017 and non-lethal equipment from China in 2015; Guinea-Bissau has also discussed acquiring military equipment with Indonesia (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-25 years of age for selective compulsory military service (Air Force service is voluntary); 16 years of age or younger, with parental consent, for voluntary service (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "18-25 years of age for selective compulsory military service (Air Force service is voluntary); 16 years of age or younger, with parental consent, for voluntary service (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>from 2012-2020, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) deployed a security force to Guinea-Bissau to manage the post-coup transition, including protecting key political figures and public buildings, restoring civil institutions, and re-establishing the rule of law; at the height of the deployment, the force, known as the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), deployed nearly 700 military and police personnel from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal</p>"
|
||||
"text": "from 2012-2020, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) deployed a security force to Guinea-Bissau to manage the post-coup transition, including protecting key political figures and public buildings, restoring civil institutions, and re-establishing the rule of law; at the height of the deployment, the force, known as the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), deployed nearly 700 military and police personnel from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -643,7 +643,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Peter H. VROOMAN (since 5 April 2018)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Deb MacLEAN (since February 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "2657 Avenue de la Gendarmerie (Kaciyiru), P. O. Box 28 Kigali"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -499,7 +499,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in cereal production - about 770,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity between June and August 2022, reflecting persisting food access constraints; mostly on account of localized shortfalls in cereal production and reduced incomes owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to localized shortfalls in cereal production -</em> about 770,000 people are projected to face severe food insecurity between June and August 2022, reflecting persisting food access constraints; mostly on account of localized shortfalls in cereal production and reduced incomes owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1205,13 +1205,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 19,000 active personnel (12,000 Army; 1,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 1,000 Air Force; 5,000 National Gendarmerie) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 19,000 active personnel (12,000 Army; 1,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 1,000 Air Force; 5,000 National Gendarmerie) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FAS inventory includes mostly older or second-hand equipment from a variety of countries, including France, South Africa, and Russia/former Soviet Union; in recent years, the FAS has undertaken a modernization program; since 2010, it has received newer equipment from nearly 15 countries, with France as the leading supplier (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the FAS inventory includes mostly older or second-hand equipment from a variety of countries, including France, South Africa, and Russia/former Soviet Union; in recent years, the FAS has undertaken a modernization program; since 2010, it has received newer equipment from nearly 15 countries, with France as the leading supplier (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service (men and women); 20 years of age for selective conscript service; 2-year service obligation; women have been accepted into military service since 2008 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service (men and women); 20 years of age for selective conscript service; 2-year service obligation; women have been accepted into military service since 2008 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "750 Gambia (ECOMIG); 970 Mali (MINUSMA); note - Senegal also has about 1,100 police deployed on various UN peacekeeping missions (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1231,10 +1231,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "18,375 (Mauritania) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "14,199 (Mauritania) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "8,400 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "8,400 (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to high food prices - about 1.45 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period on account of high food prices and low purchasing power, resulting in acute constraints on households’ economic access to food (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to high food prices -</em> about 1.45 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity in the upcoming June to August 2022 period on account of high food prices and low purchasing power, resulting in acute constraints on households’ economic access to food (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -608,7 +608,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "last held on 7 March 2018 (next to be held in March 2023)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - n/a; seats by party - APC 68, SLPP 49, C4C 8, other 7; composition - men 131, women 15, percent of women 10.3%"
|
||||
"text": "percent of vote by party - n/a; seats by party - APC 68, SLPP 49, C4C 8, other 7; composition - men 128, women 18, percent of women 12.3%"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Judicial branch": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1136,13 +1136,13 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) have approximately 9,000 personnel, mostly ground forces (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 9,000 personnel, mostly ground forces (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the RSLAF's small inventory includes a mix of Soviet-origin and other older foreign-supplied equipment; since 2010, it has received limited quantities of material (mostly donations of second-hand equipment) from China and South Africa (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the RSLAF's small inventory includes a mix of Soviet-origin and other older foreign-supplied equipment; since 2010, it has received limited quantities of material (mostly donations of second-hand equipment) from China and South Africa (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18-29 for voluntary military service; women are eligible to serve; no conscription (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "18-29 for voluntary military service; women are eligible to serve; no conscription (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "after the end of the civil war in 2002, the military was reduced in size and restructured with British military assistance; the RSLAF’s origins lie in the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the RWAFF fought in both World Wars (2022)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1154,7 +1154,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "5,500 (displacement caused by post-electoral violence in 2018 and clashes in the Pujehun region in 2019) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "5,500 (displacement caused by post-electoral violence in 2018 and clashes in the Pujehun region in 2019) (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -429,7 +429,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production/supplies": {
|
||||
"text": "due to drought conditions and internal conflict - an estimated 4.15 million people are facing severe food insecurity between February and March 2022, mainly as a result of consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020, which severely affected crop and livestock production, and due to heightened conflict since early 2021; two consecutive poor rainy seasons resulted in significant crop and livestock production shortfalls, while food access has been severely affected in recent months by declining employment opportunities in rural areas and by the escalation of conflict (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to drought conditions and internal conflict -</em> an estimated 4.15 million people are facing severe food insecurity between February and March 2022, mainly as a result of consecutive poor rainy seasons since late 2020, which severely affected crop and livestock production, and due to heightened conflict since early 2021; two consecutive poor rainy seasons resulted in significant crop and livestock production shortfalls, while food access has been severely affected in recent months by declining employment opportunities in rural areas and by the escalation of conflict (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -538,13 +538,13 @@
|
|||
"text": "President HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud (since 23 May 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"head of government": {
|
||||
"text": "Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein ROBLE (since 27 September 2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein ROBLE (since 27 September 2020); note - President HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud nominated Hamza Abdi BARRE on 15 June 2022 to replace ROBLE as Prime Minister but the nomination awaits Somali Federal Parliament approval"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cabinet": {
|
||||
"text": "Cabinet appointed by the prime minister, approved by the House of the People"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"elections/appointments": {
|
||||
"text": "president indirectly elected by the Federal Parliament by two-thirds majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a single 4-year term; election last held on 15 May 2022; prime minister appointed by the president, approved by the House of the People; note - elections were originally scheduled for 10 October 2021 but did not take place; on 13 April 2022, the election of the House of the People representatives was completed and the presidential election date was set for 15 May"
|
||||
"text": "president indirectly elected by the President HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud by two-thirds majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a single 4-year term; election last held on 15 May 2022; prime minister appointed by the president, approved by the House of the People; note - elections were originally scheduled for 10 October 2021 but did not take place; on 13 April 2022, the election of the House of the People representatives was completed and the presidential election date was set for 15 May"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"election results": {
|
||||
"text": "<br><em>2022:</em> an indirect election by Somalia's Federal Parliament was held on 15 May 2022 resulting in the defeat of former president Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed \"Farmaajo\"; HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud elected president in third round - Federal Parliament third round vote - HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud (PDP) 214, Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed \"Farmaajo\" (TPP) 110<br><br><em>2017:</em> Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed \"Farmaajo\" elected president in second round; Federal Parliament second round vote - Mohamed ABDULLAHI Mohamed \"Farmaajo\" (TPP) 184, HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud (PDP) 97, Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed (ARS) 46"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service; conscription is authorized, but not currently utilized (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2022, large parts of the country remained outside government control and under the control of the insurgent Islamist group al-Shabaab; al-Shabaab contested government control in some other areas (see Appendix T)<br><br>as of 2022, a significant portion of the SNA was comprised of militia forces that lacked the discipline, structure, weapons, and overall capabilities for effective military operations; of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; in 2020-2021, the Danab Brigade conducted most of the SNA’s offensive operations in Somalia and nearly all counterterrorism operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group; as of 2021, it numbered about 1,000 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have 4,500-5,000 trained troops</p> the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has operated in the country with the approval of the UN since 2007; its peacekeeping mission includes assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; as of early 2022, AMISOM had about 20,000 military troops from six African countries deployed in Somalia; note - as of April 2022, the UN Security Council had authorized the African Union (AU) to reconfigure AMISOM and replace it with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners to gradually transfer security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces<br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community<br><br>the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army, and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US and Turkey maintain separate unilateral military training missions in Somalia; the UAE also maintains a military presence in Somalia (Somaliland)"
|
||||
"text": "<p>as of 2022, large parts of the country remained outside government control and under the control of the insurgent Islamist group al-Shabaab; al-Shabaab contested government control in some other areas (see Appendix T)<br><br>as of 2022, a significant portion of the SNA was comprised of militia forces that lacked the discipline, structure, weapons, and overall capabilities for effective military operations; of the SNA’s approximately 13 brigades, the most effective were assessed to be the US-trained Danab (\"Lightning\") Advanced Infantry Brigade and those of the Turkish-trained Gorgor (\"Eagle\") Special Division; in 2020-2021, the Danab Brigade conducted most of the SNA’s offensive operations in Somalia and nearly all counterterrorism operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist group; as of 2021, it numbered about 1,000 troops with an eventual projected strength of 3,000, while the Gorgor Division was estimated to have 4,500-5,000 trained troops</p> the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operated in the country with the approval of the UN from 2007-2022; its peacekeeping mission included assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; in May 2022, AMISOM was reconfigured and replaced with the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the ATMIS mission is to support the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) in implementing the security objectives of the FGS's security transition plan, a comprehensive strategy developed by the FGS and its international partners to gradually transfer security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali security forces; ATMIS is projected to gradually reduce staffing from its 2022 level of about 20,000 personnel (civilians, military, and police) to zero by the end of 2024 <br><br>UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; established 2013) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the FGS to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community<br><br>the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; established 2015) is responsible for providing logistical field support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army, and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM<br><br>the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military; the US and Turkey maintain separate unilateral military training missions in Somalia; the UAE also maintains a military presence in Somalia (Somaliland)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Maritime threats": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) received one incident of piracy and armed robbery in 2021 for the Horn of Africa; while there were no recorded incidents, the IMB PRC warns that Somalia pirates continue to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean; in particular, the report warns that, \"Masters and crew must remain vigilant and cautious when transiting these waters.\"; the presence of several naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden and additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, contributed to the drop in incidents; the EU naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, continues its operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean through 2022; naval units from China, India, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, the US, and other countries also operate in conjunction with EU forces; China has established a logistical base in Djibouti to support its deployed naval units in the Horn of Africa</p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to conflict, civil insecurity, and soaring food prices - the number of severely food insecure people was estimated at 6 million between October 2021 and February 2022, mainly due to high food prices and inter-communal conflict (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to conflict, civil insecurity, and soaring food prices -</em> the number of severely food insecure people was estimated at 6 million between October 2021 and February 2022, mainly due to high food prices and inter-communal conflict (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1210,10 +1210,10 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "805,989 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 128,996 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,482 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 73,335 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 28,033 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "805,989 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 130,379 (Eritrea) (refugees and asylum seekers), 93,480 (Syria) (refugees and asylum seekers), 72,555 (Ethiopia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 28,033 (Central African Republic) (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "2,276,000 (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "3,036,593 (civil war 1983-2005; ongoing conflict in Darfur region; government and rebel fighting along South Sudan border; inter-tribal clashes) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -659,7 +659,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Eric W. STROHMAYER (since 11 April 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Elizabeth FITZSIMMONS (since 26 April 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Boulevard Eyadema, B.P. 852, Lome"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1164,8 +1164,8 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Military and Security": {
|
||||
"Military and security forces": {
|
||||
"text": "Togolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Togolaise, FAT): Togolese Army (l'Armee de Terre), Togolese Navy (Forces Naval Togolaises), Togolese Air Force (Armee de l’Air), National Gendarmerie (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - the Gendarmerie falls under the Ministry of the Armed Forces but also reports to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection on many matters involving law enforcement and internal security"
|
||||
"text": "Togolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Togolaise, FAT): Togolese Army (l'Armee de Terre), Togolese Navy (Forces Naval Togolaises), Togolese Air Force (Armee de l’Air), National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale Togolaise or GNT) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - the GNT falls under the Ministry of the Armed Forces but also reports to the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection on many matters involving law enforcement and internal security"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military expenditures": {
|
||||
"Military Expenditures 2021": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1185,13 +1185,14 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military and security service personnel strengths": {
|
||||
"text": "approximately 9,000 personnel, including about 8,000 Army (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "approximately 10-11,000 personnel (7,000 Army; 500 Air and Navy; 3,000 Gendarmerie) (2022)",
|
||||
"note": "note - in January 2022, the Togolese Government announced its intent to boost the size of the FAT to more than 20,000 by 2025"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
|
||||
"text": "the FAT's small inventory is a mix of older equipment from a variety of countries, including Brazil, France, Germany, Russia/former Soviet Union, the UK, and the US; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of newer--largely secondhand--equipment, such as patrol boats, from China, France, South Africa, and the US (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the FAT's small inventory is a mix of older equipment from a variety of countries, including Brazil, France, Germany, Russia/former Soviet Union, the UK, and the US; since 2010, it has received limited amounts of newer--largely secondhand--equipment, such as patrol boats, from China, France, South Africa, and the US (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military service age and obligation": {
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for military service; 2-year service obligation; no conscription; women have been able to serve since 2007 (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "18 years of age for military service; 2-year service obligation; no conscription; women have been able to serve since 2007 (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military deployments": {
|
||||
"text": "730 (plus about 300 police) Mali (MINUSMA) (Feb 2022)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -619,7 +619,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Donald A. BLOME (since 7 February 2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Natasha FRANCESCHI (since April 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Les Berges du Lac, 1053 Tunis"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -501,7 +501,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in staple food production - about 437,000 people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance between November 2021 and April 2022, mainly located in northeastern Mara, Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga regions, reflecting a reduced “Vuli” harvest due to poor rains (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to localized shortfalls in staple food production -</em> about 437,000 people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance between November 2021 and April 2022, mainly located in northeastern Mara, Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga regions, reflecting a reduced “Vuli” harvest due to poor rains (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "127,104 (Burundi), 80,599 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "127,330 (Burundi), 80,599 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "951,713 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 462,120 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 42,036 (Burundi), 56,894 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 25,915 (Rwanda), 22,505 (Eritrea) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "938,138 (South Sudan) (refugees and asylum seekers), 462,120 (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 41,766 (Burundi), 56,894 (Somalia) (refugees and asylum seekers), 25,915 (Rwanda), 22,505 (Eritrea) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -478,7 +478,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to civil insecurity in the north - in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 2.6 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; domestic cereal production in 2021 was estimated at a below-average level due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, further aggravating conditions; in Centre-Nord and Sahel regions, insecurity continues to cause population displacements, further deteriorating the food security situation; a coup d’état on January 2022 is an additional factor that could increase civil insecurity and further stress food insecurity conditions (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to civil insecurity in the north -</em> in the upcoming peak of the lean season, between June and August 2022, 2.6 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity; domestic cereal production in 2021 was estimated at a below-average level due to effects of adverse weather and the civil conflict, further aggravating conditions; in Centre-Nord and Sahel regions, insecurity continues to cause population displacements, further deteriorating the food security situation; a coup d’état on January 2022 is an additional factor that could increase civil insecurity and further stress food insecurity conditions (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Burkina Faso’s telecom services are some of the most expensive in the world, hindered by regulatory procedures, insufficient mobile spectrum, poor fixed-line networks; mobile telephony but below African average; Internet is provided by mobile operators; Internet penetration is low and expensive, despite improved international bandwidth via fiber links through submarine cables to adjacent countries; increased telecom tax; government infrastructure project largely completed; parliament launched inquiry on mobile network infrastructure coverage, pricing of services, and quality of service; government began computer subsidy program for university students; government progressed with large project to provide metropolitan fiber-optic infrastructure (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Burkina Faso’s telecom sector in recent years has made some gains in providing the necessary infrastructure and bandwidth to support telecom services; an IXP completed in September 2020 increased international bandwidth capacity by a third, while in mid-2021 the government was able to start the second phase of a national fiber backbone project; this will link the capital city to an addition 145 municipalities, and provide additional connectivity to terrestrial cables in neighboring countries; this new infrastructure is also making it possible for the government to trial tele medicine, and so address the very poor availability of medical services in almost all parts of the country; the activities of the militants in side areas of the country jeopardize overall security, and render it difficult for the telcos to safeguard their networks and equipment; Burkina Faso joins G5 Sahel countries to eliminate roaming fees (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage nearly 106 per 100, with multiple providers there is competition and the hope for growth from a low base; Internet penetration is 16% (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@
|
|||
"note": "note - Burkina Faso is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Military - note": {
|
||||
"text": "including the most recent in January 2022, the military has conducted 7 coups since 1960; as of 2022, the military was also actively engaged in combat operations with terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and ISIS, particularly in the northern and eastern regions; in the north, the terrorist groups Ansarul Islam and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) have exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; the east is reportedly a stronghold of the Islamic State-Greater Sahara (ISGS) (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "including the most recent in January 2022, the military has conducted 7 coups since 1960; as of 2022, the military was also actively engaged in combat operations with terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and ISIS, particularly in the northern and eastern regions; in the north, the terrorist groups Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has exploited ethnic tensions and perceptions of state neglect, as well as grievances over corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land disputes; the east is reportedly a stronghold of the Islamic State-Greater Sahara (ISGS) (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Terrorism": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -465,7 +465,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to localized shortfalls in cereal production - an estimated 750,000 people are projected to face \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between December 2021 and March 2022, as a result of localized areas that suffered from poor harvests in 2021 and the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily through income and job losses that constrained households’ access to food (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to localized shortfalls in cereal production -</em> an estimated 750,000 people are projected to face \"Crisis\" levels of food insecurity between December 2021 and March 2022, as a result of localized areas that suffered from poor harvests in 2021 and the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily through income and job losses that constrained households’ access to food (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>concerns from international experts and local populations over the Okavango Delta ecology in Botswana and human displacement scuttled Namibian plans to construct a hydroelectric dam on Popa Falls along the Angola-Namibia border; the governments of South Africa and Namibia have not signed or ratified the text of the 1994 Surveyor's General agreement placing the boundary in the middle of the Orange River; Namibia has supported, and in 2004 Zimbabwe dropped objections to, plans between Botswana and Zambia to build a bridge over the Zambezi River, thereby de facto recognizing a short, but not clearly delimited, Botswana-Zambia boundary in the river<br><br><em>Namibia-Angola: </em>None identified</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Namibia-Angola-Botswana</em>: concerns from international experts and local populations over the Okavango Delta ecology in Botswana and human displacement scuttled Namibian plans to construct a hydroelectric dam on Popa Falls along the Angola-Namibia border</p> <p><em>Namibia-Botswana-Zambia-Zimbabwe</em>: Namibia has supported, and in 2004 Zimbabwe dropped objections to, plans between Botswana and Zambia to build a bridge over the Zambezi River, thereby de facto recognizing a short, but not clearly delimited, Botswana-Zambia boundary in the river; the Kazungula Bridge opened to traffic in May 2021</p> <p><em>Namibia-South Africa</em>: the governments of South Africa and Namibia have not signed or ratified the text of the 1994 Surveyor's General agreement placing the boundary in the middle of the Orange River; Namibia claims a median line boundary, while South Africa supports the northern bank of the river</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -454,7 +454,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to economic downturn - nearly 336,000 people were assessed to be food insecure at least until March 2022, prior to the main harvest period, primarily due to food access constraints, underpinned by the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to economic downturn -</em> nearly 336,000 people were assessed to be food insecure at least until March 2022, prior to the main harvest period, primarily due to food access constraints, underpinned by the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -997,7 +997,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "earlier government monopoly in telecom market hindered growth; liberalized regulators aided expansion in the telecom sector; lack of fixed-line infrastructure and competition stymies development of DSL and backbone network; 2G, 3G, 4G, and LTE services with coverage to most of the population; landlocked country depends on neighbors for international bandwidth; operator completed terrestrial cable linking Maputo through Eswatini to Johannesburg; importer of broadcasting equipment from South Africa (2019)"
|
||||
"text": "Eswatini (or eSwatini) was one of the last countries in the world to open up its telecom market to competition; until 2011 the state-owned Eswatini Posts and Telecommunications also acted as the industry regulator and had a stake in the country’s sole mobile network, in an uneasy partnership with MTN Eswatini; a new independent regulatory authority was established in late 2013 and has since embarked on significant changes to the sector; Eswatini Telecom was provided with a unified license in early 2016, while MTN Eswatini secured spectrum in the 1800MHz band to provide LTE services; Eswatini Mobile has launched GSM, 3G and LTE services, supported by a network sharing agreement with MTN Eswatini; mobile market subscriptions have been affected by the common use among subscribers when they use SIM cards from different networks in order to access cheaper on-net calls; subscriber growth has slowed in recent years, but was expected to have reached 8% in 2021, as people adapted to the changing needs for connectivity caused by the pandemic; the internet sector has been open to competition with a small number of licensed ISPs; DSL services were introduced in 2008, development of the sector has been hampered by the limited fixed-line infrastructure and by a lack of competition in the access and backbone networks; Eswatini is landlocked and so depends on neighboring countries for international bandwidth; this has meant that access pricing is relatively high, and market subscriptions remains relatively low; prices have fallen recently in line with greater bandwidth availability resulting from several new submarine cable systems which have reached the region in recent years; in addition, Paratus in September 2020 completed a terrestrial cable linking Mozambique with Eswatini and South Africa. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "Eswatini has 2 mobile-cellular providers; communication infrastructure has a geographic coverage of about 90% and a rising subscriber base; fixed-line stands at nearly 4 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 94 telephones per 100 persons; telephone system consists of carrier-equipped, open-wire lines and low-capacity, microwave radio relay (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced incomes and localized shortfalls in cereal production - an estimated 1.58 million people are projected to need humanitarian assistance at least up until March 2022, down from 2 million assessed to be food insecure in the corresponding period in 2020/21; the overall large national agricultural output in 2021 helped to reduce the prevalence of food insecurity in early 2022, however, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which have constrained households’ economic access to food as well as localized shortfalls in crop production, have limited a larger improvement (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to reduced incomes and localized shortfalls in cereal production -</em> an estimated 1.58 million people are projected to need humanitarian assistance at least up until March 2022, down from 2 million assessed to be food insecure in the corresponding period in 2020/21; the overall large national agricultural output in 2021 helped to reduce the prevalence of food insecurity in early 2022, however, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which have constrained households’ economic access to food as well as localized shortfalls in crop production, have limited a larger improvement (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -652,7 +652,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires David J. YOUNG (since 2 March 2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Martin \"Marty\" DALE (since 2 November 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Eastern end of Kabulonga Road, Ibex Hill, Lusaka"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -484,7 +484,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to high food prices and economic downturn - an estimated 3 million people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance between January and March 2022, largely on account of poor food access due to prevailing high food prices and reduced incomes owing to the effects of an economic downturn; below-average rainfall and extreme weather events in 2021/22 are likely to result in a decrease in cereal production and heighten food insecurity later in 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to high food prices and economic downturn -</em> an estimated 3 million people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance between January and March 2022, largely on account of poor food access due to prevailing high food prices and reduced incomes owing to the effects of an economic downturn; below-average rainfall and extreme weather events in 2021/22 are likely to result in a decrease in cereal production and heighten food insecurity later in 2022 (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -658,7 +658,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Thomas R. HASTINGS (since August 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Thomas R. HASTINGS (since August 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "2 Lorraine Drive, Bluffhill, Harare"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "excellent domestic and international service with comprehensive population coverage through LTE; domestic satellite system; rapid growth of mobile and fixed-wireless broadband services through multi-technology architecture; emphasis on new technologies; diminished fixed-line market due to mobile and mobile broadband; in fixed broadband, shift to fiber networks through infrastructure build out; mobile network operators continue to work towards the launch of 5G; predicted to be one of the top markets driving the growth of 5G and data markets in Asia; fiber backbone to connect with submarine cables; Oman-Australia cable is estimated to be in service by mid-2022; two of Australia's major imports are broadcast equipment and computers from China (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "the Australian telecom market since 2020 has been impacted by the pandemic, which forced many people to school and work from home and thus adopt fixed-line broadband services; internet traffic, both fixed and mobile, increased substantially as a result; in the fixed sector, there is an ongoing migration from copper-based platforms to fiber; NBN Co increased the number of premises migrated from hybrid fiber/copper infrastructure to FttP; by the end of 2023 NBN Co is expected to deliver a 1Gb/s service across 75% of its fixed-line network; the extension of fixed wireless access will mean that up to 120,000 premises currently dependent on satellite broadband will be able to access 5G-based fixed services; the fixed-line market has been falling steadily over the past five years; in the Australian fixed broadband market, there is a dynamic shift among customers to fiber networks; this infrastructure is being built out by NBN Co (also known as nbn), the company responsible for deploying the national broadband network, which is based on a multi-technology mix including VDSL, fibre, HFC, fixed wireless, and satellite; the DSL sector is steadily shrinking as customers are migrated to the NBN, while subscribers on HFC infrastructure will continue to be provided by existing cable within the NBN’s multi-technology mix, with a steady migration to full fiber connectivity; the mobile market is dominated by the three MNOs Telstra, Optus, and TPG Telecom; these offer LTE services on a wholesale basis, thus encouraging growth in the LTE sector, while also deploying services based on 5G; Optus and (since mid-2022) Telstra provide 5G access to their MVNOs. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "roughly 24 per 100 fixed-line and 108 per 100 mobile-cellular; more subscribers to mobile services than there are people; 90% of all mobile device sales are now smartphones, growth in mobile traffic brisk (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -991,7 +991,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Fiji has a relatively sophisticated communications infrastructure with the highest mobile and Internet penetration in the Pacific Islands; aggressively developing LTE and 5G, though the pandemic negatively affected the economy, largely reliant on tourism; population is spread across more than 100 islands, yet most live on two main islands, with communications based on link by a submarine cable system; cables provide a secure link during natural disasters, protecting telecom connectivity; provider plans to expand fiber infrastructure to remote islands (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Fiji is the leading market to watch in terms of both LTE and 5G development in the region; the market boasts relatively sophisticated, advanced digital infrastructure, with telcos’ heavy investment resulting in the country having the highest mobile and internet subscriptions in the Pacific Islands region; LTE, LTE-A, and fiber technologies have received the most investment by the Fijian mobile operators, which include Digicel Fiji, Vodafone Fiji, and Telecom Fiji. Notably, LTE now accounts for the largest share of connections in the mobile segment; concentrating on the more highly populated areas, the operators are preparing for the next growth area of high-speed data; they also have 5G in mind, and are preparing their networks to be 5G-ready, anticipating an easier migration to the technology based on the relatively high LTE subscription rate; the sale of Digicel to Telstra also passed a major hurdle when the Fijian Competition and Consumer Commission approved the transaction in March 2022; Fiji presents a challenging geographic environment for infrastructure development due to its population being spread across more than 100 islands; the majority of Fijians live on the two main islands of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu; in July 2018, the two islands were linked by the Savusavu submarine cable system, which provides a more secure link in times of emergency weather events such as the regular tropical cyclones that often cause massive destruction to the area, including destroying essential infrastructure such as electricity and telecommunications equipment; notably, the December 2021 eruption of the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Ha'apai submarine volcano in Tonga damaged the Tonga Cable which connects Fiji, and Tonga blocking the latter off from internet services; cable theft and damage of critical communications infrastructure has also become a concern in Fiji, prompting authorities to establish a joint task force to tackle the issue. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 9 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 118 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -963,7 +963,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>none</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "major consumer of cannabis"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -832,7 +832,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "French Polynesia has one of the most advanced telecom infrastructures in the Pacific islands; high penetration of mobile broadband coverage; almost half of mobile connections on 3G, growing subscribership to 4G LTE; universal mobile penetration; host of uplink systems for the Galileo satellite network, creating hub for communications in the region and vastly improving international connectivity; submarine cable connections increase international bandwidth; additional domestic submarine cable will connect remote islands (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "French Polynesia has one of the most advanced telecoms infrastructures in the Pacific Islands region; the remoteness of the country with its scattering of 130 islands and atolls has made connectivity vital for its inhabitants; Office des Postes et Télécommunications is the primary provider of domestic telecom services, mobile telephony, and internet services, while its subsidiary, Tahiti Nui Telecommunications, provides international voice services and manages the submarine cable infrastructure; the first submarine cable was deployed in 2010 and since then additional cables have been connected to the islands, vastly improving French Polynesia’s international connectivity; an additional domestic submarine cable, the Natitua Sud, will connect more remote islands by the end of 2022; French Polynesia is also a hub for satellite communications in the region; it hosts one of the up link systems of the Galileo satellite network, the Kacific-1 satellite and the Intelsat satellite network, for example; with improved international connectivity, fixed broadband subscriptions have become the highest in the region; a considerable number of consumers access FttP-based services; with the first data center in French Polynesia on the cards, the quality and price of broadband services is expected to improve as content will be able to be cached locally, reducing costs for consumers; for 2022, fixed broadband subscriptions reached an estimated 22%; about 43% of the country’s mobile connections are on 3G networks, while LTE accounts for 12%; by 2025, LTE is expected to account for more than half of all connections; it is also estimated that 77% of mobile subscribers will have smart phones by 2025. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions nearly 22 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular density is roughly 104 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -786,7 +786,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "integrated with US facilities for direct dialing, including free use of 800 numbers (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Guam’s telecommunications companies provide important services that allow other businesses on island to operate; Guam plays a larger, and growing role, in global telecommunications infrastructure, the submarine fiber optic cables that land on Guam benefit island residents and the local economy; in the Asia-Pacific region the demand for 4G, 5G, and broadband access is rapidly increasing; Echo and Bifrost will support further growth for hundreds of millions of people and millions of businesses; the 11 submarine cables that currently land on Guam, connecting the U.S. to the Asia-Pacific region, are some of the more than 400 cables that are the backbone of global telecommunications, providing nearly all of the world’s internet and phone service. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "three major companies provide both fixed-line and mobile services, as well as access to the Internet; fixed-line subscriptions in 2018 were 42 per 100 and 62 per 100 mobile-cellular subscriptions in 2004 (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>none</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -950,7 +950,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Matthew and Hunter Islands east of New Caledonia claimed by France and Vanuatu</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>New Caledonia-France-Vanuatu</em>: Matthew and Hunter Islands east of New Caledonia claimed by France and Vanuatu</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -751,7 +751,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>none</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -559,7 +559,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>none</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -962,7 +962,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>none</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -600,7 +600,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Tom S. UDALL (since 1 December 2021) note - also accredited to Samoa"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Thomas Stewart UDALL (since 1 December 2021) note - also accredited to Samoa"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "29 Fitzherbert Terrace, Thorndon, Wellington 6011"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>asserts a territorial claim in Antarctica (Ross Dependency)</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>New Zealand-Antarctica</em>: asserts a territorial claim in Antarctica (Ross Dependency)</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "significant consumer of amphetamines"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>claims US territory of Wake Island</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Marshall Islands-US</em>: claims US territory of Wake Island; the Marshall Islands put its claim on record with the UN in 2016</p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"current situation": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -481,7 +481,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Political parties and leaders": {
|
||||
"text": "Accion21 [Miguel MANSUR]<br>Aruban People's Party or AVP [Michiel \"Mike\" EMAN]<br>Democratic Electoral Network or RED [L.R. CROES]<br>Movimiento Aruba Soberano or MAS [Marisol LOPEZ-TROMP]<br>People's Electoral Movement Party or MEP [Evelyn WEVER-CROES]<br>Pueblo Orguyoso y Respeta or POR [<u>Alan HOWELL</u>]<br>RAIZ (ROOTS) [Ursell ARENDS]"
|
||||
"text": "Accion21 [Miguel MANSUR]<br>Aruban People's Party or AVP [Michiel \"Mike\" EMAN]<br>Democratic Electoral Network or RED [L.R. CROES]<br>Movimiento Aruba Soberano or MAS [Marisol LOPEZ-TROMP]<br>People's Electoral Movement Party or MEP [Evelyn WEVER-CROES]<br>Pueblo Orguyoso y Respeta or POR [Alan Howell]<br>RAIZ (ROOTS) [Ursell ARENDS]"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"International organization participation": {
|
||||
"text": "Caricom (observer), FATF, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, ITUC (NGOs), UNESCO (associate), UNWTO (associate), UPU"
|
||||
|
|
@ -831,7 +831,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "modern fully automatic telecommunications system; increased competition through privatization has increased mobile-cellular teledensity; three mobile-cellular service providers are now licensed; MNO (mobile network operator) launched island-wide LTE services; MNP (mobile number portability) introduced (2018)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "ongoing changes in regulations and competition improving teledensity; approximately 34 per 100 fixed-line and 135 per 100 mobile-cellular (2018)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -872,7 +872,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "good automatic telephone system with fiber-optic lines; telecom sector contributes heavily to GDP; numerous mobile network competitors licensed, but small and local; govt. to spend EC80 million in 2019 to improve state-owned telecom market competitiveness; legislative amendments extend jurisdiction of its telecom regulator in Barbuda to include mobile services (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 25 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is about 193 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "modern internal telephone system with fiber-optic trunk lines; telecom sector provides a relatively high contribution to overall GDP; numerous competitors licensed, but small and localized; major growth sectors include the mobile telephony and data segments (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is about 42 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular teledensity is roughly 182 per 100 persons (2018)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -958,7 +958,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "island-wide automatic telephone system; telecom sector across the Caribbean region remains one of the key growth areas and contributors to the overall GDP; numerous competitors licensed, but small and localized (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity of roughly 45 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular telephone density about 115 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -896,7 +896,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector across the Caribbean continues to be a growth area, contributing to the country's overall GDP; totally automatic system; highly developed; operators focus investment on mobile networks; the activation of (mobile number portability) MNP in April 2017, allowing mobile subscribers to port their numbers between competing MNO (mobile network operators) has contributed to the competition and liberalization of the market (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "23 per 100 fixed-line, 109 per 100 mobile-cellular (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -591,7 +591,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d’Affaires Leyla MOSES-ONES(since August 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d’Affaires Leyla MOSES-ONES (since August 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Floral Park Road, Belmopan, Cayo"
|
||||
|
|
@ -979,7 +979,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Belize’s fixed-line tele-density and mobile penetration is lower than average for the region, due to insufficient competition, underinvestment in services, and lax standards; mobile accounts for 90% of all phones; operator aims to provide cheaper prices and customer retention through investment in broadband to over 80% of premises and LTE infrastructure; operator launched safe cities project to fight crime; government distributed tablets to students to promote e-learning; submarine cable to Ambergris Caye enables FttP service in San Pedro; importer of broadcast equipment from the United States (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Belize’s fixed-line teledensity and mobile subscriptions remain lower than average for the region, a legacy of insufficient market competition and low investment in telecoms services, exacerbated by lax managerial standards within the incumbent telco Digi; Digi has undertaken significant investment in infrastructure, launching an LTE-A service at the end of 2016 and in mid-2017 completing a submarine cable to Ambergris Caye, enabling it to launch an FttP service in San Pedro; loans secured since 2017 enabled the company to migrate its infrastructure from legacy copper to fiber; BTL invested BZ$93 million dollars to provide high speed broadband to 80% of residences across Belize; the telecom market was liberalized in 2003 yet Digi continues to hold a monopoly in fixed-line services, and it remains the dominant provider of mobile and broadband services; the government has undertaken some measures to improve competition, notably by obliging Digi in mid-2013 to open its networks to VoIP services. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "roughly 5 per 100 fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity of 65 per 100 persons; mobile sector accounting for over 90% of all phone subscriptions (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -236,7 +236,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>claimed by Haiti, source of subsistence fishing</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Navassa Island (US)-Haiti</em>: claimed by Haiti and is in Haiti’s constitution; the waters around Navassa island are a source of subsistence for Haitian fishermen</p>"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -790,7 +790,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "reasonably good overall telephone system with a high fixed-line teledensity; given the high dependence of tourism and activities such as fisheries and offshore financial services, the telecom sector provides a relatively high contribution to overall GDP; good competition in all sectors promotes advancement in mobile telephony and data segments (2017)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "introduction of competition in the mobile-cellular market in 2004 boosted subscriptions; nearly 55 per 100 fixed-line and 153 per 100 mobile-cellular (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Costa Rica has broad telecom coverage though geographical distribution of digital service is unequal; recent regulator liberalization spurred expansion in all sectors; broadband market is the most advanced and highest penetration in Central America yet lags behind many South American countries; operators investing in NGN technology; number portability and cheaper broadband costs will increase competition; government aims to subsidize tele-health and e-learning (2018)"
|
||||
"text": "in Aug 2021 Liberty Latin America (LLA) completed its acquisition of Telefónica Costa Rica (Movistar) — Costa Rica’s second-largest mobile network operator — for around $505 million; the deal followed on the heels of the failure of Millicom to buy Movistar earlier in the year, at a higher price; LLA’s local unit Cabletica will be able to combine its fixed telecom services with Movistar’s mobile offerings; a rebranding exercise is anticipated in 2022, with the Movistar brand likely to be phased out; the fixed broadband market is one of the few parts of Costa Rica’s telecom sector to experience solid growth in recent years, both in size and revenue; the country’s fiber network expanded by 56% in 2020, reaching about 176,200km; fixed-line broadband traffic volume also increased by more than 30%, year-on-year; other areas of the market have proven relatively lack luster, with slow or even negative growth; ome of this can be attributed to the economic and social impacts of the pandemic, but the fixed-line and mobile sectors have both been struggling to produce decent results since well before the start of the crisis; the rollout of 5G network infrastructure in Costa Rica is unlikely to occur to any scale before 2023, but this may be one of the few remaining areas of opportunity open to investors outside of fixed-line internet and pay TV services. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "roughly 11 per 100 fixed-line and 148 per 100 mobile-cellular; point-to-point and point-to-multi-point microwave, fiber-optic, and coaxial cable link rural areas; Internet service is available (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -994,7 +994,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "internet availability has increased substantially over the past few years, but only about 64 percent of Cubans have Internet access, and even fewer Cubans--about 60 percent of the population--have access to cell phone service; in 2021 the Cuban Government passed a decree that strengthened its authority to censor Internet and telephonic communications; state control of the telecom sector hinders development; Cuba has the lowest mobile phone and Internet penetration rates in the region; fixed-line density is also very low; thaw of US-Cuba relations encouraged access to services, such as Wi-Fi hotspots; access to sites is controlled and censored; DSL and Internet are available in Havana, though costs are too high for most Cubans; international investment and agreement to improve Internet access through cost-free and direct connection between networks (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "internet availability has increased substantially over the past few years, but only about 64 percent of Cubans have Internet access, and even fewer Cubans--about 60 percent of the population--have access to cell phone service; in 2021 the Cuban Government passed a decree that strengthened its authority to censor Internet and telephonic communications; state control of the telecom sector hinders development; Cuba has the lowest mobile phone and Internet subscription rates in the region; fixed-line density is also very low; thaw of US-Cuba relations encouraged access to services, such as Wi-Fi hot spots; access to sites is controlled and censored; DSL and Internet are available in Havana, though costs are too high for most Cubans; international investment and agreement to improve Internet access through cost-free and direct connection between networks (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line density remains low at a little over 13 per 100 inhabitants; mobile-cellular service has expanded to about 59 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -837,7 +837,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "fully automatic network; there are multiple competing operators licensed to provide services, most of them are small and localized; the telecom sector across the Caribbean region remains one of the key growth areas (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line connections continue to decline slowly with only two active operators providing about 4 fixed-line connections per 100 persons; subscribership among the three mobile-cellular providers is about 105 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "the Dominican Republic’s fixed-line tele-density is well below the Latin American average due to lack of infrastructure; distribution of telephony services is proportionate to income inequalities; small, localized operators provide services; telecom and mobile broadband growing with LTE available to most of the population; government program aims for universal access to broadband services, and development of a national backbone; 5G launch anticipated in 2021 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the Dominican Republic’s telecom sector continued its solid form throughout 2020 and into 2021, shrugging off the economic turmoil unleashed by the Covid-19 pandemic to maintain a decade-long run of low but positive growth across all areas of the market; the Dominican Republic remains behind most of its counterparts in the Latin American region, especially in terms of fixed-line network coverage; mobile subscriptions are on par with the regional average, but at subscription levels of around 88% there is still ample opportunity for growth; in terms of growth, the standout winner was once again the mobile broadband segment; the market is expected to see close to 8% growth in 2021, building further on the gains it already made in 2020 when lock downs and work-from-home rules encouraged many people to find ways to upgrade their internet access and performance; the limited coverage of fixed-line broadband networks makes mobile the first, if not only, choice for most people in the country. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity is about 11 per 100 persons; multiple providers of mobile-cellular service with a subscribership of nearly 83 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -624,7 +624,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Brendan O’BRIEN (since 24 November 2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Patrick H. VENTRELL"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Final Boulevard Santa Elena, Antiguo Cuscatlan, La Libertad, San Salvador"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "El Salvador’s telecom sector is challenged by low population, poor infrastructure, and unequal income distribution compounded by corruption and criminal influence; liberal regulation promotes mobile penetration in replacement of fixed-line density; operators testing 5G in 2020 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "El Salvador is the smallest country in central America geographically, it has the fourth largest economy in the region; the country’s telecom sector has been restricted by poor infrastructure and unequal income distribution; there have been organizational delays which have slowed the development of telecom services; El Salvador’s fixed-line teledensity is substantially lower than the Latin American and Caribbean average; there has been a significant drop in the number of fixed lines since 2010, particularly in 2017, largely due to the substitution for mobile-only alternatives; about 94% of all telephony lines in the country are on mobile networks; mobile subscriptions are remarkably high considering El Salvador’s economic indicators, being about a third higher than average for Latin America and the Caribbean; the country was one of the last in the region to provide LTE services, mainly due to the inadequate provision of suitable spectrum; the multi-spectrum auction conducted at the end of 2019 has allowed MNOs to improve the reach and quality of their service offerings; El Salvador’s telecom legislation is one of the more liberal in Latin America, encouraging competition in most areas and permitting foreign investment; there are no regulations which promote wholesale broadband, and thus in the DSL market leader Claro retains a virtual monopoly; the only effective cross-platform competition in the broadband market comes from the few cable operators; there has been some market consolidation in recent years, including Telemóvil’s acquisition of the regional cable TV provider Caribena Cable; in May 2019, the competition authority began assessing the sale of Telefónica El Salvador to América Móvil, which operates in the country under the Claro brand; Telefónica sold the unit in October 2021, though at a considerably reduced price. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line services, roughly 14 per 100, has slowed in the face of mobile-cellular competition now at 161 subscribers per 100 inhabitants (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -890,7 +890,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "adequate, island-wide telephone system; lack of local competition, but telecoms are a high contributors to overall GDP; growth sectors include the mobile telephony and data segments (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "interisland VHF and UHF radiotelephone links; 29 per 100 for fixed-line and 102 per 100 for mobile-cellular (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "due to years of underinvestment in infrastructure, has one of the lowest fixed-line tele densities in the region; rural areas rely on mobile services with little access to fixed-line access; mobile tele-density on par with region and is the most developed sector, with near universal phone connections; private investment to bring free Internet to parks; two submarine cables due for completion will support growth in fixed and mobile broadband (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Guatemala’s telecom infrastructure has suffered from years of under investment from state and provincial government; the poor state of fixed-line infrastructure has led to Guatemala having one of the lowest fixed-line teledensities in the region; in many rural regions of the country there is no fixed-line access available, and so mobile services are adopted by necessity; private investment has been supported by government and regulatory efforts, resulting in a steady growth in the number of fixed lines which has supported growth in the fixed broadband segment; delays in launching LTE services left the country lagging behind in the development of mobile broadband and the benefits which it can bring to the country's social and economic growth; two new submarine cables are due for completion by 2022; improved international connectivity should drive further uptake of both fixed and mobile broadband services; key players including Millicom (operating as Tigo Guatemala) and América Móvil are regional and global powerhouses which can tap into expertise and financial resources to bolster their Guatemalan businesses; the acquisition of Telefónica’s Guatemala business by América Móvil in 2019 created a strong competitor to Millicom, which dominates the mobile sector; intense competition among the networks has helped to improve services and lower prices for end-users; given the commercial impetus of networks, insufficient government financial investment has resulted in many regional areas remaining with poor or non-existent services; the country benefits from one of the most open regulatory frameworks, with all telecom sectors having been open to competition since 1996; América Móvil controls about 85.1% of the fixed-lines market through its subsidiaries Claro and Movistar; mobile telephony is the most developed telecom market sector in Guatemala, accounting for 90% of connections in the country; mobile subscriptions are on par with the regional average, though the slower growth in the mobile subscriber base suggests a level of market saturation, with the emphasis among networks being on generating revenue via mobile data services. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line teledensity roughly 13 per 100 persons; fixed-line investments are concentrating on improving rural connectivity; mobile-cellular teledensity about 114 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "242,000 (more than three decades of internal conflict that ended in 1996 displaced mainly the indigenous Maya population and rural peasants; ongoing drug cartel and gang violence) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "243,000 (more than three decades of internal conflict that ended in 1996 displaced mainly the indigenous Maya population and rural peasants; ongoing drug cartel and gang violence) (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -455,7 +455,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to reduced agricultural production and socio-political turmoil - about 4.56 million people are estimated to be facing severe acute food insecurity and in need of urgent food assistance between March and June 2022; the high levels of food insecurity are the result of consecutive reduced cereal harvests between 2018 and 2021, and elevated food prices, exacerbated by sociopolitical turmoil; two natural disasters (a 7.2 magnitude earthquake and a tropical storm) that struck in August 2021, destroyed productive assets and infrastructures, and caused losses of stored food, further aggravating conditions; the lack of income-earning opportunities amid worsening insecurity and difficult macroeconomic conditions is likely to heighten food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to reduced agricultural production and socio-political turmoil -</em> about 4.56 million people are estimated to be facing severe acute food insecurity and in need of urgent food assistance between March and June 2022; the high levels of food insecurity are the result of consecutive reduced cereal harvests between 2018 and 2021, and elevated food prices, exacerbated by sociopolitical turmoil; two natural disasters (a 7.2 magnitude earthquake and a tropical storm) that struck in August 2021, destroyed productive assets and infrastructures, and caused losses of stored food, further aggravating conditions; the lack of income-earning opportunities amid worsening insecurity and difficult macroeconomic conditions is likely to heighten food insecurity (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -994,7 +994,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "plagued by political and economic turmoil complicated by natural disasters, Haiti’s telecommunications infrastructure is among the least-developed in the world; it relies on satellite and wireless mobile technology due to poor fixed-line infrastructure; investment boosted broadband availability though customer base is poor and theft of equipment remains problematic; promotion of LTE will enable access to remote areas and e-money services; World Bank grant to provide digital preparation and response for any future crises (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Haiti is in desperate need of maintaining effective communication services to enable it to keep going through the countless natural disasters, the country’s telecoms sector is really only surviving on the back of international goodwill to repair and replace the systems destroyed in the latest upheaval; Haiti’s fixed-line infrastructure is now practically non-existent, having been torn apart by Hurricane Matthew in 2016; what aid and additional investment has been forthcoming has been directed towards mobile solutions; over half of the country can afford a mobile handset or the cost of a monthly subscription; and mobile broadband subscriptions is half of that again – an estimated 28% in 2022; international aid continues to flow in to try and help the country’s telecoms sector recover – the World Bank has released a further $120 million to go on top of the $60 million grant provided after the last major 7.2 earthquake in August 2021. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line is less than 1 per 100; mobile-cellular telephone services have expanded greatly in the last decade due to low-cost GSM (Global Systems for Mobile) phones and pay-as-you-go plans; mobile-cellular teledensity is nearly 61 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "17,105 (violence among armed gangs in the metropolitan area os Port-au-Prince) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "17,000 (violence among armed gangs in the metropolitan area os Port-au-Prince) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "2,992 (2018); note - individuals without a nationality who were born in the Dominican Republic prior to January 2010"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "<p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\">among the poorest countries in Central America, Honduras has a neglected telecom sector complicated by political stalemate and geographic challenges; mobile subscribership is growing; DSL and cable Internet available in urban areas but expensive; government proposed ICT master plan to boost e-government and business, including free Internet to households; US based network ready to deploy 5G <br></p> (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "<p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\">Honduras is among the poorest countries in Central America and has long been plagued by an unstable political framework which has rendered telecom sector reform difficult; fixed-line teledensity, at only 4.9%, is significantly lower than the Latin American and Caribbean average; poor fixed-line infrastructure has been exacerbated by low investment and topographical difficulties which have made investment in rural areas unattractive or uneconomical; the internet has been slow to develop; DSL and cable modem technologies are available but are relatively expensive, while higher speed services are largely restricted to the major urban centers; the demand for broadband is steadily increasing and there has been some investment in network upgrades to fiber-based infrastructure; these factors have encouraged consumer take-up of mobile services, a sector where there is lively competition supported by international investment; mobile subscriptions are substantially below the regional average; revenue growth from the mobile sector looks promising in coming years as companies invest in their networks, expand their reach and upgrade their capabilities to accommodate mobile broadband services; mobile data as a proportion of overall mobile revenue has increased steadily, though low-end SMS services will continue to account for the bulk of data revenue for some years; political developments during the last few years have not facilitated the much-needed reform of legislation governing the telecoms sector; regulator frees up 3.5GHz fequencies for mobile use; Tigo and Amazon Web Services partner to offer cloud services.</p> <p style=\"background: white; margin: 0in 0in 6.4pt 0in;\"> </p> (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "private sub-operators allowed to provide fixed lines in order to expand telephone coverage contributing to a fixed-line teledensity of slightly over 5 per 100; mobile-cellular subscribership is roughly 70 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "247,090 (violence, extortion, threats, forced recruitment by urban gangs between 2004 and 2018) (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "247,000 (violence, extortion, threats, forced recruitment by urban gangs between 2004 and 2018) (2021)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -984,7 +984,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "good domestic and international service; mobile sector dominates, accounting for majority of the Internet connections and half of telecom sector revenue; extensive LTE networks providing coverage to most of the island population; regulator encouraging competition with little success due to breach of license; government announced support of national broadband network to aid access to education, hospitals, police, and municipal institutions; operators provided customers with data plans to support educational platforms; US grant to fund New Kingston smart city program (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Jamaica’s telecom sector has for many years been propped up by the mobile sector, which accounts for the vast majority of internet connections and voice lines; it also accounts for just over half of telecom sector revenue; the merger between Digicel and Claro’s Jamaican business in 2012 strengthened Digicel’s position in the market, but in recent quarters Digicel Group’s financial difficulties have caused it considerable problems; the Group has considered selling off its units in the Pacific region, while it has renegotiated a number of bonds to reduce its debt to about $5.8 billion; assets have been placed under the management of a newly created holding company; both Digicel and its only rival, Flow (supported by its new owner Liberty Global), have extended their LTE networks across the island, particularly during the pandemic in response to a sharp increase in data traffic; the 700MHz licensee Symbiote Investments, trading as Caricel Jamaica, had its license revoked at the end of 2018 due to breaches of the terms of the Telecommunications Act. The UK-based Privy Council in August 2020 refused Caricel’s application for permission to appeal the revocation of its telecom licenses; to fill the gap in the market, a new operator, Rock Mobile, was licensed in May 2021, with obligations to provide 95% population coverage within two years; in December 2020, the government announced the rollout of a national broadband network costing up to $237 million; the funding will be spent on improving connectivity in under served areas, improving access to education, and deploying networks to public locations such as hospitals, municipal institutions, and police stations; to aid in this national broadband effort, the government received a donation of 650km of fiber cabling from local cable TV providers and the two main toll road operators; to encourage the use of digital channels as the country deals with the Covid-19 pandemic, companies such as Scotiabank have given their customers zero-rated data access to mobile banking applications, while Digicel Jamaica has subsidized data plans and zero-rated data access to some educational platforms and websites. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscriptions nearly 15 per 100, cellular-mobile roughly 97 per 100 subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>none</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "the largest Caribbean source of marijuana which is trafficked to other Caribbean countries for illegal weapons and other contraband; transit point for cocaine trafficked from South America to North America and other international markets"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -824,7 +824,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>none</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "transshipment point for South American narcotics destined for the US and Europe"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the 1992 ICJ ruling for El Salvador and Honduras advised a tripartite resolution to establish a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Fonseca, which considers Honduran access to the Pacific; Nicaragua and Costa Rica regularly file border dispute cases over the delimitations of the San Juan River and the northern tip of Calero Island to the ICJ; there is an ongoing case in the ICJ to determine Pacific and Atlantic ocean maritime borders as well as land borders; in 2009, the ICJ ruled that Costa Rican vessels carrying out police activities could not use the river, but official Costa Rican vessels providing essential services to riverside inhabitants and Costa Rican tourists could travel freely on the river; in 2011, the ICJ provisionally ruled that both countries must remove personnel from the disputed area; in 2013, the ICJ rejected Nicaragua's 2012 suit to halt Costa Rica's construction of a highway paralleling the river on the grounds of irreparable environmental damage; in 2013, the ICJ, regarding the disputed territory, ordered that Nicaragua should refrain from dredging or canal construction and refill and repair damage caused by trenches connecting the river to the Caribbean and upheld its 2010 ruling that Nicaragua must remove all personnel; in early 2014, Costa Rica brought Nicaragua to the ICJ over offshore oil concessions in the disputed region; Nicaragua filed a case against Colombia in 2013 over the delimitation of the Continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast, as well as over the alleged violation by Colombia of Nicaraguan maritime space in the Caribbean Sea</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Nicaragua-El Salvador-Honduras</em>: the 1992 ICJ ruling for El Salvador and Honduras advised a tripartite resolution to establish a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Fonseca, which considers Honduran access to the Pacific; the court ruled, rather, that the Gulf of Fonseca represents a condominium, with control being shared by El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua; the decision allowed for the possibility that the three nations could divide the waters at a later date if they wished to do so</p> <p><em>Nicaragua-Costa Rica</em><strong>: </strong>Nicaragua and Costa Rica regularly file border dispute cases with the ICJ over the delimitations of the San Juan River and the northern tip of Calero Island, virtually uninhabited areas claimed by both countries; there is an ongoing case in the ICJ to determine Pacific and Atlantic ocean maritime borders as well as land borders; in 2009, the ICJ ruled that Costa Rican vessels carrying out police activities could not use the river, but official Costa Rican vessels providing essential services to riverside inhabitants and Costa Rican tourists could travel freely on the river; in 2011, the ICJ provisionally ruled that both countries must remove personnel from the disputed area; in 2013, the ICJ rejected Nicaragua's 2012 suit to halt Costa Rica's construction of a highway paralleling the river on the grounds of irreparable environmental damage; in 2013, the ICJ, regarding the disputed territory, ordered that Nicaragua should refrain from dredging or canal construction and refill and repair damage caused by trenches connecting the river to the Caribbean and upheld its 2010 ruling that Nicaragua must remove all personnel; in early 2014, Costa Rica brought Nicaragua to the ICJ over offshore oil concessions in the disputed region; in 2018, the ICJ ruled that Nicaragua must remove a military base from a contested coastal area near the San Juan River, and that Costa Rica had sovereignty over the northern part of Isla Portillos, including the coast, but excluding Harbour Head Lagoon; additionally, Honduras was required to pay reparations for environmental damage to part of the wetlands at the mouth of the San Juan River</p> <p><em>Nicaragua-Colombia</em><strong>: </strong>Nicaragua filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Colombia in 2013 over the delimitation of the Continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast, as well as over the alleged violation by Colombia of Nicaraguan maritime space in the Caribbean Sea, which contains rich oil and fish resources; as of September 2021, Colombia refuses to abide by the ICJ ruling</p> <p><em>Nicaragua-Honduras</em>: none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"current situation": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -730,7 +730,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "good overall telephone service; major expansion sectors include the mobile telephony and data segments, which continue to appeal to operator investment; several operators licensed to provide services within individual markets, most of them are small and localized; telecommunication contributes to overall GDP (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the telecom sector has seen a decline in subscriber numbers (particularly for prepaid mobile services the mainstay of short term visitors) and revenue; fixed and mobile broadband services are two areas that have benefited from the crisis as employees and students have resorted to working from home; one major casualty may be the region’s second largest telco operator, Digicel; the company filed for bankruptcy in the US in April 2020; it continues to operate in all of its Caribbean markets as it seeks to refinance billions of dollars of debt; the other major telco, regional incumbent Cable & Wireless Communications (CWC), is experiencing similar drops in subscriber numbers and revenue; CWC is expanding and enhancing its fixed and mobile networks in many of the countries it serves around the Caribbean, despite many locations being small islands with very small populations; one area of the telecom market that is not prepared for growth is 5G mobile; governments, regulators, and even the mobile network operators have shown that they have not been investing in 5G opportunities at the present time; network expansion and enhancements remain concentrated around improving LTE coverage. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line connections exceed 24 per 100 persons and mobile cellular subscribership is roughly 116 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line declining as 4G LTE mobile is universally available; brief interruptions of service with security as pretext; ICT sector rocked by allegation of corruption in 2020; digital radio-relay stations and fiber-optic links; 5G in development; importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE and computers from China; Chinese Economic Corridor investment into domestic backbone; World Bank investment into digital infrastructure with aims to provide broadband Internet to 60% of the population; social disparity evident in pandemic as many school children could not attend classes on-line (2020 )"
|
||||
"text": "the country’s telecom sector (specifically the mobile segment) has likewise been able to prosper; ongoing political tension, increasing repression of the media and information, and continuing problems with corporate governance may be putting a strain on further growth by reducing the country’s appeal to much-needed foreign investors; Kyrgyzstan has been reasonably successful in its attempts to liberalize its economy and open up its telecom market to competition; the privatization of state-owned entities particularly the fixed-line incumbent provider Kyrgyztelecom and the mobile operator Alfa Telecom has been less well received, with government ownership continuing despite repeated attempts to offload its stakes in those companies; they simply haven’t been able to generate enough interest from the private sector; the mobile market has achieved high levels of penetration (140% in 2021) along with a fairly competitive operating environment with four major players; mobile broadband has come along strongly, reaching over 125% penetration in 2019 before falling back slightly during the Covid-19 crisis; slow-to-moderate growth is expected for both segments in coming years, supported by the anticipated rollout of 5G services starting from late 2022. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line penetration at nearly 5 per 100 persons remains low and concentrated in urban areas; mobile-cellular subscribership up to over 134 per 100 persons (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>disputes in Isfara Valley delay completion of delimitation with Tajikistan; delimitation of approximately 15% or 200 km of border with Uzbekistan is hampered by serious disputes over enclaves and other areas</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Kyrgyzstan-China</em>: a 2009 treaty settled a border dispute, with Kyrgyzstan receiving the Khan Tengri Peak and Kyrgyzstan ceding to China the Uzengi-Kush area</p> <p><em>Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan</em>: in January 2019, Kyrgyzstan ratified the 2017 agreement on the demarcation of the Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan border</p> <p><em>Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan</em>: as the last major Central Asian boundary dispute with lengthy undelimited sections, the lowland (NE part) of the Kyrgz-Tajik line seems intractable despite recent Kyrgyz-Uzbek compromises and agreements on delimitation and demarcation</p> <p><em>Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan</em>: delimitation of approximately 15% or 200 km of border with Uzbekistan is hampered by serious disputes over enclaves and other areas; Kyrgyz and Uzbek officials signed an agreement in March 2021 on the final delimitation and demarcation of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border; the accord included several land swaps that gave Kyrgyzstan more territory but was offset by Uzbekistan retaining use of reservoirs on Kyrgyz land; although a Kyrgyz official returned from the March 2021 meetings and said the decades-old border dispute was 100% resolved, his talks with residents in some affected areas showed that agreement had not been reached on all border segments</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "one of the most progressive telecom sectors in Central Asia; vast 4G network; low fixed-line and fixed-broadband penetration; moderate mobile broadband penetration and high mobile penetration depending on location; mobile market highly competitive and growth is slow due to saturation (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Kazakhstan has one of the most developed telecommunications sectors in the Central Asian region; this is especially true of the mobile segment, where widespread network coverage has enabled very high penetration rates reaching 180% as far back as 2012; the mobile and fixed-line segments have both pared back their subscriber numbers to more modest levels; the telcos have still been successful in terms of improving their margins and revenues by growing value-added services along with exploiting the capabilities of their higher speed networks (4G LTE as well as fiber) to drive significant increases in data usage; Kazakhstan has enjoyed a high fixed-line teledensity thanks to concerted efforts to invest in the fixed-line infrastructure as well as next-generation networks; demand for traditional voice services is on the wane as customers take a preference for the flexibility and ubiquity of the mobile platform for voice as well as data services; mobile clearly dominates the telecom sector in Kazakhstan, yet 2020 saw a sharp drop in subscriber numbers for both mobile voice and mobile broadband services as the Covid-19 crisis took hold; with the exception of fixed-line voice services, Kazakhstan’s telecom market is expected to return to moderate growth from 2022 onwards; the extensive deployment of LTE networks across the country (along with the prospect of 5G services being added to the mix in 2023) points towards an even greater uptake of lucrative mobile broadband services, in particular. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "intercity by landline and microwave radio relay; number of fixed-line connections is approximately 17 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscriber base 134 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1206,7 +1206,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>in January 2019, the Kyrgyz Republic ratified the demarcation agreement of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border; the demarcation of the Kazakh-Uzbek borders is ongoing; the ongoing demarcation with Russia began in 2007; demarcation with China completed in 2002</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Kazakhstan-China</em>: in 1998, Kazakhstan and China agreed to split two disputed border areas nearly evenly; demarcation with China completed in 2002</p> <p><em>Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan</em>: in January 2019, Kyrgyzstan ratified the 2017 agreement on the demarcation of the Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan border</p> <p><em>Kazakhstan-Russia</em>: Russia boundary delimitation was ratified on November 2005; field demarcation commenced in 2007 and was expected to be completed by 2013</p> <p><em>Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan</em>: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed a treaty on the delimitation and demarcation process in 2001; field demarcation of the boundaries with Kazakhstan commenced in 2005; Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to their border in the Caspian Sea in 2014</p> <p><em>Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan</em>: field demarcation of the boundaries with Kazakhstan commenced in 2004; disputed territory is held by Uzbekistan but the overwhelming majority of residents are ethnic Kazakhs; the two countries agreed on draft final demarcation documents in March 2022 and planned to hold another meeting in April 2022</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "telecom market is largest in Europe, centered in large cities; competition active in Moscow and St Petersburg; most users access Internet through mobile platforms; fiber broadband sector is growing, supported by government in aim to extend reach to outlying regions; tests of 5G with Moscow adopting smart city technology; government justifies censorship and website blocks under a range of laws and regulations; government program aims to provide 97% of households with fixed broadband by 2024; publicly accessible Internet connections in institutions such as hospitals, libraries, schools, and mass transit available in cities; in rural areas, the availability of public Internet connections remains limited; major importer of broadcasting equipment and computers from China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "telecom market is the largest in Europe, supported by a population approaching 147 million; the overall market is dominated by the western regions, particularly Moscow and St Petersburg which are the main cities and economic centres; all sectors of the market have been liberalised, with competition most prevalent in the two largest regional markets; the incumbent telco Rostelecom, which absorbed most of the regional players, in late 2019 acquired the remaining 55% of Tele2 Russia which it did not already own; Telcos continue to deploy and modernise fixed-line network infrastructure to offer improved broadband services as well as a range of IP-delivered content; tthe fibre broadband sector has shown considerable growth, supported by the government’s program to extend the reach of broadband to outlying regions; MegaFon is thus far the only MNO to provide commercial 5G services. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "cross-country digital trunk lines run from Saint Petersburg to Khabarovsk, and from Moscow to Novorossiysk; the telephone systems in 60 regional capitals have modern digital infrastructures; cellular services, both analog and digital, are available in many areas; in rural areas, telephone services are still outdated, inadequate, and low-density; nearly 19 per 100 for fixed-line and mobile-cellular a bit over 164 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"refugees (country of origin)": {
|
||||
"text": "1,136,243 (border crossings from Ukraine as of 9 June 2022)"
|
||||
"text": "1,230,800 (border crossings from Ukraine as of 16 June 2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "56,960 (mid-year 2021); note - Russia's stateless population consists of Roma, Meskhetian Turks, and ex-Soviet citizens from the former republics; between 2003 and 2010 more than 600,000 stateless people were naturalized; most Meskhetian Turks, followers of Islam with origins in Georgia, fled or were evacuated from Uzbekistan after a 1989 pogrom and have lived in Russia for more than the required five-year residency period; they continue to be denied registration for citizenship and basic rights by local Krasnodar Krai authorities on the grounds that they are temporary illegal migrants"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -996,7 +996,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Tajikistan’s telecom sector continues to struggle due to geographic isolation, lack of electricity, dysfunctional business climate, and impoverished citizenry; despite the launch of 4G/LTE services, one of the lowest fixed-line penetrations in Asia and one of the lowest broadband levels in the world; with help from foreign investment, mobile sector near saturation phase; Russian loans and Chinese investment in infrastructure through Economic Corridor initiatives; a few cities have 4G coverage; LTE-based smart city concept in Dushanbe; government restricts political rights and civil liberties, controlling information through media interruptions; government raised rates on Internet-based calls and Internet services in 2020, making price one of the highest in the world; importer of video displays and broadcasting equipment from China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "The nation of Tajikistan has had to struggle through a further two years of economic hardship following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic; the strain on financial resources inevitably means a continuation of the absence of any meaningful investment or development programs for telecommunications infrastructure; the fixed line telephony and fixed broadband markets continue to languish far behind the mobile sector in terms of teledensity and penetration; with only around 6,000 fixed broadband customers (0.07% penetration), there would appear to be massive growth potential but the limited fixed line infrastructure in the country suggests there’s little likelihood of that occurring any time soon; the size of Tajikistan’s mobile market dwarfs the fixed line segment, with an estimated penetration rate of nearly 120%; with a number of private sector companies active in the mobile market, there been more commitment to investment in network upgrades and expansion; three MNOs, MegaFon, Tcell, and ZET Mobile have all launched commercial 5G services, initially in areas of the capital city Dushanbe; the move towards higher speed mobile services should further underpin the growth in the nascent mobile broadband market, which is still estimated to be at a relatively low penetration level of 42% (at least relative to most other Asian nations) but is predicted to be a strong compound annual growth rate of more than 8% for at least the next five years. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed line availability has not changed significantly since 1998, while mobile cellular subscribership, aided by competition among multiple operators, has expanded; coverage now extends to all major cities and towns; fixed-line over 5 per 100 and mobile-cellular over 111 per 100 (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -972,7 +972,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "stagnant economy, rural geography, and authoritarian rule limit development of the telecom sector; in cooperation with Russian-based partners, operators have installed high-speed fiber-optic lines and upgraded most of the country's telephone switch centers with digital technology; some rural areas lack fixed-line coverage; mobile broadband is in the early stages of development; services are extremely slow, though Trans-Caspian cable will provide international Internet capacity and improvement in services; freedom of press and expression restricted through monitoring, media interruption, and removal of receivers from households; importer of broadcasting equipment from UAE (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "the nation of Turkmenistan, which rivals only North Korea for its isolationism, continues to keep its telecom sector along with the broader populace under tight control; the country inched up just one point off the bottom of the world rankings for press and internet freedom in the most recent report from Reporters Without Borders; most social networks in the country are blocked, although locals do have access to the government-developed Biz Byarde (We Are Here) platform released in 2019; all internet users, however, need to identify themselves before logging on, and strict censorship over what can be viewed is in force; the end result is that Turkmenistan has one of the lowest penetration rates for internet access in the world. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 12 per 100 and mobile-cellular teledensity is about 163 per 100 persons; first telecommunication satellite was launched in 2015 (2019)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -986,7 +986,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "land-locked, authoritarian state with government grip on ICT technology and no integrated plan; government plans to develop infrastructure to improve geographical disparities in service; increased investment in infrastructure, with aims of expanding subscriber base and rising revenue; some villages have no connectivity, and 70% have 2G with development of 3G and 4G; free WiFi spots across country to boost tourism; Russian operator invested in joint venture on mobile services; government in discussion with Huawei on additional ventures; digital exchanges in large cities and some rural areas; fixed-line is underdeveloped due to preeminence of mobile market; introduction of prepaid Internet has contributed to home Internet usage; consumers largely reliant on terrestrial links and VSAT networks; media controlled by state; importer of broadcasting equipment from China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Uzbekistan’s telecom markets both wireline and wireless have been playing \"catch up\" in terms of their development following the country's independence from the former Soviet Union; the government has formally adopted the principles of operating as a market economy, many elements of the old centrally planned economic model remain; this has had the effect of reducing the level of interest from foreign companies and investors in building out the necessary underlying infrastructure, which in turn has constrained the rate of growth in the country’s telecoms sector; the last five years has seen an upswing in prospects for the sector as fiber network roll outs continue beyond the main urban centers, while the mobile market experiences some consolidation for stronger, more efficient competitors; the fixed line market is dominated by the incumbent state owned provider Uztelecom, which has 98% of the market share; with teledensity at 11%, the fixed line segment remains relatively underdeveloped; Uztelecom has been diligently expanding its fiber footprint across the country, and so utilization is increasing as consumers are able to take on VoIP services as part of their fiber packages; growth is present in the fixed broadband segment thanks to that same network expansion with penetration projected to reach 24% by 2027 (a 5-year CAGR of 6.2%); despite the promising signs in the fixed markets, it is the mobile segment that continues to dominate Uzbekistan’s telecoms sector in terms of penetration, revenue, and growth; there are four major operators providing a modicum of competition; three of the four are government owned entities although private operator Beeline Uzbekistan has been able to capture up to a third of the market; the mobile market is expected to reach 100% penetration in 2023 a 50% increase in the last five years. (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line nearly 11 per 100 persons and mobile-cellular teledensity nearly 100 per 100 persons; the state-owned telecommunications company, Uzbek Telecom, owner of the fixed-line telecommunications system, has used loans from the Japanese government and the China Development Bank to upgrade fixed-line services including conversion to digital exchanges; mobile-cellular services are provided by 2 private and 3 state-owned operators with a total subscriber base of 22.8 million as of January 2018 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -493,7 +493,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"severe localized food insecurity": {
|
||||
"text": "due to conflict, political instability, and economic constraints - the political crisis, following the military takeover on 1 February 2021, resulted in increased tensions and unrest throughout the country; the current uncertain political situation may further compromise the fragile situation of vulnerable households and the Rohingya IDPs residing in the country; armed conflict between the military and non‑state armed groups led to population displacements, disrupted agricultural activities and limited access for humanitarian support especially in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Kayin, Kayah and Shan states; income losses and a decline in remittances, due to the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic, have affected the food security situation of vulnerable households (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to conflict, political instability, and economic constraints -</em> the political crisis, following the military takeover on 1 February 2021, resulted in increased tensions and unrest throughout the country; the current uncertain political situation may further compromise the fragile situation of vulnerable households and the Rohingya IDPs residing in the country; armed conflict between the military and non‑state armed groups led to population displacements, disrupted agricultural activities and limited access for humanitarian support especially in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Kayin, Kayah and Shan states; income losses and a decline in remittances, due to the impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic, have affected the food security situation of vulnerable households (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Waste and recycling": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "505,000 (government offensives against armed ethnic minority groups near its borders with China and Thailand, natural disasters, forced land evictions) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "671,011 (government offensives against armed ethnic minority groups near its borders with China and Thailand, natural disasters, forced land evictions) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "600,000 (mid-year 2021); note - Rohingya Muslims, living predominantly in Rakhine State, are Burma's main group of stateless people; the Burmese Government does not recognize the Rohingya as a \"national race\" and stripped them of their citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law, categorizing them as \"non-nationals\" or \"foreign residents\"; under the Rakhine State Action Plan drafted in October 2014, the Rohingya must demonstrate their family has lived in Burma for at least 60 years to qualify for a lesser naturalized citizenship and the classification of Bengali or be put in detention camps and face deportation; native-born but non-indigenous people, such as Indians, are also stateless; the Burmese Government does not grant citizenship to children born outside of the country to Burmese parents who left the country illegally or fled persecution, such as those born in Thailand; the number of stateless persons has decreased dramatically because hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh since 25 August 2017 to escape violence"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -945,7 +945,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Brunei is improving its national telecom network; telecommunications infrastructure and services are of high standard, due to healthy investment in networks and services; relatively mature telecom system compared to other Asian countries; mobile subscription increasing steadily to high penetration; launch of 5G pilot services in April 2021 aimed to increase awareness of the benefits of 5G and boost the mobile broadband sector; access to telecom services via the Kacific-1 satellite (2021)"
|
||||
"text": "Brunei Darussalam seemed poised to start its economic recovery from the double blow it received to its GDP in 2020 from the Covid-19 crisis and a global slump in oil prices; Brunei’s mobile market experienced a sharp a sharp drop-off in subscriber numbers in 2020; in 2022 there was a concerted effort to build out the fixed-line infrastructure while progressing towards introducing 5G mobile services; Brunei’s fixed-line market is one of the few countries in the world to have displayed significant growth rather than a decline in teledensity in the last few years; this upward trend is set to continue as the new Unified National Network (UNN) works diligently to expand and enhance the fixed-line infrastructure around the country; strong growth was also seen in the fixed broadband space, on the back of those same infrastructure developments that are part of the Brunei Vision 2035 initiative; fixed broadband is starting from a relatively low base by international standards and is still only at 18%, leaving lots of room for growth; mobile and mobile broadband, on the other hand, are still suffering from the market contractions first felt in 2020; rates for both segments were already extremely high so the decline may simply be a reflection of those users with services that were purely discretionary; Brunei’s 2G GSM network is shut down, with the spectrum to be reallocated to 3G, 4G, and potentially 5G use. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "every service available; nearly 24 per 100 fixed-line, 120 per 100 mobile-cellular (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Cambodia’s telecom infrastructure struggles with poor infrastructure and power outages; improvement through competition and foreign investment; fixed-line and fixed/mobile broadband penetration is still low compared to other Asian nations; government and operators preparing for 5G services through Huawei’s infrastructure that will drive mobile broadband through faster speeds; online Internet content subject to government restrictions (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Cambodia’s mobile-dominated telecoms sector spent much of 2020 battling two major challenges: the global pandemic, and the government’s retraction of trial licenses for the rollout of 5G; citing concerns about waste and inefficiency occurring if each operator built a separate 5G infrastructure in order to maximize their own network’s coverage (and, presumably, to capture greater market share), the regulator withdrew the licenses that the operators had been using for their 5G trials; this was despite all of the operators having already announced a successful completion of their trials; more than a year later, the market is still waiting on the government to release its 5G policy and roadmap, along with the allocation of spectrum and approvals to permit commercial operation; there is little expectation of any further progress happening before the start of 2022; the mobile network operators have maintained their focus and investment strategies on upgrading and expanding their existing LTE networks around the country, and to 5G-enable their base stations; when the 5G market eventually arrives, the underlying infrastructure will at least be ready to support a rapid adoption of the higher-value applications and services; the mobile market fell back slightly during 2020 and 2021 (in terms of total subscriber numbers) as the Covid-19 crisis wore on, but it remains in relatively good health as mobile users increased their data usage over the period; the mobile broadband market experienced a small but very rare contraction in 2020, although rates were already very high in this area; there is likely to be a quick rebound to previous levels once economic conditions stabilize, followed by a modest rates of growth over the next five years; the number of fixed telephony lines in service continues to fall sharply as customers migrate to mobile platforms for both voice and data; the lack of any widespread fixed-line infrastructure has had a flow-on effect in the fixed-line broadband market, a sector that also remains largely under-developed (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line connections stand at less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular usage, aided by competition among service providers, is about 130 per 100 persons (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
|
|
@ -895,7 +895,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "excellent domestic and international services; some of the highest peak average broadband speeds and penetration rates in the world; HK government helps subsidize 5G projects and aims to be among earliest adopters of 5G mobile technology; almost all households have access to high-speed broadband connectivity through fiber; high mobile subscribership reflects tourism and multiple-device culture; government has organized the development of smart city and digital economy to encourage social inclusion and economic development, including health care, education, and utilities; US prevented use of Pacific Light submarine cable network due to security issues (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Hong Kong’s telecommunications sector continues to stay near the top of world rankings for the industry; it has kept its #1 spot in the Asian region in terms of the maturity of its telecom market – a reflection of the high subscription rates across mobile, mobile broadband, and fixed broadband; fixed-line teledensity in Hong Kong is impressive at over 50%, although it too has started a gradual decline in keeping with most other telecom markets around the world, as consumers slowly transition over to the mobile platform for all of their communication needs; concerns over national security prompted the US Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense to prevent the branch line of the newly completed Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN) linking Los Angeles with Taiwan from being lit; and ongoing issues with the deployment of Huawei technology inside the core infrastructure of telecom networks (something that has been done extensively in Hong Kong, including in its 5G networks) means that the territory – along with its telecom sector – may become increasingly isolated from the rest of the world; Hong Kong is likely to drop back from its position as a regional and global leader in the telecom market. (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "microwave radio relay links and extensive fiber-optic network; fixed-line is over 52 per 100 and mobile-cellular is nearly 292 subscriptions per 100 (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -664,7 +664,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Diplomatic representation from the US": {
|
||||
"chief of mission": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Ambassador Sung Y. KIM (since 21 October 2020)</p>"
|
||||
"text": "Ambassador Sung Y. KIM (since 21 October 2020)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"embassy": {
|
||||
"text": "Jl. Medan Merdeka Selatan No. 3-5, Jakarta 10110"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "Indonesia’s telecom sector is based on 3G/LTE mobile infrastructure and inadequate fixed-line capacity; large population and disbursed island geography make upgrades difficult; market is attracting foreign investment, especially in data center and cloud based services; tests of 5G challenged by lack of spectrum; satellite improvements in 2020 (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Indonesia faces more than the usual number of obstacles in terms of enabling widespread access to quality telecommunications services for its population of more than 270 million; the geographical challenges have been further compounded by a variety of social, political, and economic problems over the years that have kept the country’s wealth distributed very thinly; the fixed-line (fiber) and mobile operators have continued to expand and upgrade their networks across the country; Indonesia’s 18,000 islands (many of which, however, are sparsely populated) makes the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure on a broad scale largely impractica; the relatively low subscription rate of 4.6% is also a by-product of years of under-investment by the previously state-owned incumbent Telkom; there has been renewed activity in fiber optic cable, but the bundling of fixed-line telephony with TV and internet services will see the country’s teledensity stabilize; mobile subscriptions have reached more than 130% and is projected to exceed 150% by 2026; with 4G LTE universally available, the major mobile companies have been busy launching 5G services in selected areas; Telkomsel was the first to go live in Jakarta in May 2021, followed by Indosat Ooredoo’s launch in the city of Solo a month later; the rollout of 5G will be hampered by the lack of availability of suitable frequencies; Telkomsel, for example, was forced to launch using limited frequencies in the 2.3-2.4GHz band, which is only supported by a small number of handsets; the 4G had to be reallocated from broadcasting services, and indications are that the same process is going to have to be followed in order to allow the expansion of 5G into its core frequency bands (3.3 to 4.2GHz). (2022)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "fixed-line subscribership roughly 3 per 100 and mobile-cellular 130 per 100 persons; coverage provided by existing network has been expanded by use of over 200,000 telephone kiosks many located in remote areas; mobile-cellular subscribership growing rapidly (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@
|
|||
"text": "5,792 (Afghanistan) (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
"text": "40,000 (inter-communal, inter-faith, and separatist violence between 1998 and 2004 in Aceh and Papua; religious attacks and land conflicts in 2007 and 2013; most IDPs in Aceh, Maluku, East Nusa Tengarra) (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "73,000 (inter-communal, inter-faith, and separatist violence between 1998 and 2004 in Aceh and Papua; religious attacks and land conflicts in 2007 and 2013; most IDPs in Aceh, Maluku, East Nusa Tengarra) (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
"text": "668 (mid-year 2021)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Telecommunication systems": {
|
||||
"general assessment": {
|
||||
"text": "excellent domestic and international service; exceedingly high mobile, mobile broadband, and fixed broadband penetration; in last decade, government policies supported delivery of fiber-optic broadband to over 90% of households; one of Japan's largest e-commerce companies planning to build its own nationwide stand-alone 5G mobile network; government to implement a telecom tax to pay for rural 5G network; fixed broadband subscriptions grow as DSL is phased out; major importer of integrated circuits from China (2020)"
|
||||
"text": "Japan has one of the best developed telecom markets globally, the fixed-line segment remains stagnant and the focus for growth is in the mobile sector; the MNOs have shifted their investment from LTE to 5G, and growth in 5G showed early promise although there have been recent setbacks; these have partly been attributed to the economic difficulties, the impact of restrictions imposed during the pandemic, and unfavourable investment climate (not helped by the delay of the Tokyo Olympics from 2020 to 2021), and to restrictions in the supply of 5G-enabled devices; the fixed broadband market is dominated by fiber, with a strong cable platform also evident; fiber will continue to increase its share of the fixed broadband market, largely at the expense of DSL; the mobile market is dominated by three MNOs (NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, and SoftBank Mobile), while Rakuten Mobile also has a presence; the company is building out its network, and while it is focused of providing 5G services in the major metro areas it relies on roaming agreements to offer services elsewhere; mobile broadband subscriber growth is expected to be relatively low over the next five years, partly due to the high existing subscriptions though growth has been stimulated by measures which have encouraged people to school and work from home; there has also been a boost in accessing entertainment via mobile devices since 2020; NTT DoCoMo becomes wholly owned by NTT Corp, plans to provide 55% population coverage with 5G by March 2022 and nationwide 5G coverage by 2023 (2021)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"domestic": {
|
||||
"text": "high level of modern technology and excellent service of every kind; 49 per 100 for fixed-line and 152 per 100 for mobile-cellular subscriptions (2020)"
|
||||
|
|
@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>the sovereignty dispute over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan, and the Habomai group, known in Japan as the \"Northern Territories\" and in Russia as the \"Southern Kuril Islands,\" occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, now administered by Russia and claimed by Japan, remains the primary sticking point to signing a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities; Japan and South Korea claim Liancourt Rocks (Take-shima/Tok-do) occupied by South Korea since 1954; the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands are also claimed by China and Taiwan</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Japan-China-Taiwan</em>: the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Tai) are also claimed by China and Taiwan; Senkaku-shoto is situated near key shipping lanes, rich fishing grounds, and possibly significant oil and natural gas reserves</p> <p><em>Japan-Russia</em>: the sovereignty dispute over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan, and the Habomai group, known in Japan as the \"Northern Territories\" and in Russia as the \"Southern Kuril Islands,\" occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, now administered by Russia and claimed by Japan, remains the primary sticking point to signing a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities</p> <p><em>Japan-South Korea</em>: Japan and South Korea claim Liancourt Rocks (Take-shima/Tok-do) occupied by South Korea since 1954</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -410,7 +410,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Food insecurity": {
|
||||
"widespread lack of access": {
|
||||
"text": "due to low food consumption levels, poor dietary diversity, and economic downturn - a large portion of the population suffers from low levels of food consumption and very poor dietary diversity; the economic constraints, particularly resulting from the global impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic, have increased the population’s vulnerability to food insecurity; the food gap is estimated at about 860,000 mt, equivalent to approximately 2-3 months of food use, if this gap is not adequately covered through commercial imports and/or food aid, households could experience a harsh lean period (2022)"
|
||||
"text": "<em>due to low food consumption levels, poor dietary diversity, and economic downturn -</em> a large portion of the population suffers from low levels of food consumption and very poor dietary diversity; the economic constraints, particularly resulting from the global impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic, have increased the population’s vulnerability to food insecurity; the food gap is estimated at about 860,000 mt, equivalent to approximately 2-3 months of food use, if this gap is not adequately covered through commercial imports and/or food aid, households could experience a harsh lean period (2022)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Total water withdrawal": {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>risking arrest, imprisonment, and deportation, tens of thousands of North Koreans cross into China to escape famine, economic privation, and political oppression; North Korea and China dispute the sovereignty of certain islands in Yalu and Tumen Rivers; Military Demarcation Line within the 4-km-wide Demilitarized Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953; periodic incidents in the Yellow Sea with South Korea which claims the Northern Limiting Line as a maritime boundary; North Korea supports South Korea in rejecting Japan's claim to Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima)</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>North Korea-China</em>: risking arrest, imprisonment, and deportation, tens of thousands of North Koreans cross into China to escape famine, economic privation, and political oppression; North Korea and China dispute the sovereignty of certain islands in Yalu and Tumen Rivers</p> <p><em>North Korea-Japan</em>: North Korea supports South Korea in rejecting Japan's claim to Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima)</p> <p><em>North Korea-South Korea</em>: Military Demarcation Line within the 4-km-wide Demilitarized Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953; periodic incidents in the Yellow Sea with South Korea which claims the Northern Limiting Line as a maritime boundary</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"IDPs": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Military Demarcation Line within the 4-km-wide Demilitarized Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953; periodic incidents with North Korea in the Yellow Sea over the Northern Limit Line, which South Korea claims as a maritime boundary; South Korea and Japan claim Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima), occupied by South Korea since 1954</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>South Korea-Japan</em>: South Korea and Japan claim Liancourt Rocks (Tok-do/Take-shima), occupied by South Korea since 1954</p> <p><em>South Korea-North Korea</em>: Military Demarcation Line within the 4-km-wide Demilitarized Zone has separated North from South Korea since 1953; periodic incidents with North Korea in the Yellow Sea over the Northern Limit Line, which South Korea claims as a maritime boundary</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
|
||||
"stateless persons": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>southeast Asian states have enhanced border surveillance to check the spread of avian flu; talks continue on completion of demarcation with Thailand but disputes remain over islands in the Mekong River; Cambodia and Laos have a longstanding border demarcation dispute; concern among Mekong River Commission members that China's construction of eight dams on the Upper Mekong River and construction of more dams on its tributaries will affect water levels, sediment flows, and fisheries; Cambodia and Vietnam are concerned about Laos' extensive plans for upstream dam construction for the same reasons</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p><em>Laos-Burma</em>: none identified</p> <p><em>Laos-Cambodia</em>: in 2021, the two countries agreed to increase efforts to combat drug trafficking and other transnational crimes and to complete the last 14% of their border demarcation</p> <p><em>Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam</em>: Cambodia and Vietnam are concerned about Laos' extensive plans for upstream dam construction and the potential harm it poses to fisheries and farming downstream</p> <p><em>Laos-China</em>: concern among Mekong River Commission members that China's construction of eight dams on the Upper Mekong River and construction of more dams on its tributaries will affect water levels, sediment flows, and fisheries</p> <p><em>Laos-Thailand</em>: talks continue as of 2018 on completion of demarcation with Thailand but disputes remain over islands in the Mekong River</p> <p>Laos-Vietnam: Laos and Vietnam completed border demarcation in 2016</p> <p> </p> <p> </p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Illicit drugs": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>Bokeo Province part of the “Golden Triangle,” a notorious drug production and transit area; remains a poppy cultivator and source of illicit opium and a transit hub for other illicit drugs such as amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) and chemical precursors; estimate of 4,925 ha of opium poppy cultivated in Laos in 2018</p>"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -926,7 +926,7 @@
|
|||
},
|
||||
"Transnational Issues": {
|
||||
"Disputes - international": {
|
||||
"text": "<p>none</p>"
|
||||
"text": "<p>none identified</p>"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Trafficking in persons": {
|
||||
"current situation": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show more
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue