up

africa/ag.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Algeria has known many empires and dynasties starting with the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Berber dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. It was under the latter that the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping beginning in roughly 1500, peaking in the early to mid-17th century, until finally subdued by the French capture of Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of the entirety of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. The country was heavily colonized by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962. Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative elections led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths - many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. The government in 2011 introduced some political reforms in response to the Arab Spring, including lifting the 19-year-old state of emergency restrictions and increasing women's quotas for elected assemblies, while also increasing subsidies to the populace. Since 2014, Algeria’s reliance on hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of declining oil prices. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA’s decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned on 2 April 2019, and the speaker of the upper house of parliament, Abdelkader BENSALAH, became interim head of state on 9 April. BENSALAH remained in office beyond the 90-day constitutional limit until Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president in December 2019."
+      "text": "Algeria has known many empires and dynasties starting with the ancient Numidians (3rd century B.C.), Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, over a dozen different Arab and Berber dynasties, Spaniards, and Ottoman Turks. It was under the latter that the Barbary pirates operated from North Africa and preyed on shipping beginning in roughly 1500, peaking in the early to mid-17th century, until finally subdued by the French capture of Algiers in 1830. The French southward conquest of the entirety of Algeria proceeded throughout the 19th century and was marked by many atrocities. The country was heavily colonized by the French in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A bloody eight-year struggle culminated in Algerian independence in 1962. ++ Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative elections led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths - many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000. ++ Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. The government in 2011 introduced some political reforms in response to the Arab Spring, including lifting the 19-year-old state of emergency restrictions and increasing women's quotas for elected assemblies, while also increasing subsidies to the populace. Since 2014, Algeria's reliance on hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of declining oil prices. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA's decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned on 2 April 2019, and the speaker of the upper house of parliament, Abdelkader BENSALAH, became interim head of state on 9 April. BENSALAH remained in office beyond the 90-day constitutional limit until Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president in December 2019."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim (official; predominantly Sunni) 99%, other (includes Christian and Jewish) <1% (2012 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "For the first two thirds of the 20th century, Algeria's high fertility rate caused its population to grow rapidly. However, about a decade after independence from France in 1962, the total fertility rate fell dramatically from 7 children per woman in the 1970s to about 2.4 in 2000, slowing Algeria's population growth rate by the late 1980s. The lower fertility rate was mainly the result of women's rising age at first marriage (virtually all Algerian children being born in wedlock) and to a lesser extent the wider use of contraceptives. Later marriages and a preference for smaller families are attributed to increases in women's education and participation in the labor market; higher unemployment; and a shortage of housing forcing multiple generations to live together. The average woman's age at first marriage increased from about 19 in the mid-1950s to 24 in the mid-1970s to 30.5 in the late 1990s. Algeria's fertility rate experienced an unexpected upturn in the early 2000s, as the average woman's age at first marriage dropped slightly. The reversal in fertility could represent a temporary fluctuation in marriage age or, less likely, a decrease in the steady rate of contraceptive use. Thousands of Algerian peasants - mainly Berber men from the Kabylia region - faced with land dispossession and economic hardship under French rule migrated temporarily to France to work in manufacturing and mining during the first half of the 20th century. This movement accelerated during World War I, when Algerians filled in for French factory workers or served as soldiers. In the years following independence, low-skilled Algerian workers and Algerians who had supported the French (known as Harkis) emigrated en masse to France. Tighter French immigration rules and Algiers' decision to cease managing labor migration to France in the 1970s limited legal emigration largely to family reunification. Not until Algeria's civil war in the 1990s did the country again experience substantial outmigration. Many Algerians legally entered Tunisia without visas claiming to be tourists and then stayed as workers. Other Algerians headed to Europe seeking asylum, although France imposed restrictions. Sub-Saharan African migrants came to Algeria after its civil war to work in agriculture and mining. In the 2000s, a wave of educated Algerians went abroad seeking skilled jobs in a wider range of destinations, increasing their presence in North America and Spain. At the same time, legal foreign workers principally from China and Egypt came to work in Algeria's construction and oil sectors. Illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Malians, Nigeriens, and Gambians, continue to come to Algeria in search of work or to use it as a stepping stone to Libya and Europe. Since 1975, Algeria also has been the main recipient of Sahrawi refugees from the ongoing conflict in Western Sahara. More than 1000,000 Sahrawis are estimated to be living in five refugee camps in southwestern Algeria near Tindouf."
+      "text": "For the first two thirds of the 20th century, Algeria's high fertility rate caused its population to grow rapidly. However, about a decade after independence from France in 1962, the total fertility rate fell dramatically from 7 children per woman in the 1970s to about 2.4 in 2000, slowing Algeria's population growth rate by the late 1980s. The lower fertility rate was mainly the result of women's rising age at first marriage (virtually all Algerian children being born in wedlock) and to a lesser extent the wider use of contraceptives. Later marriages and a preference for smaller families are attributed to increases in women's education and participation in the labor market; higher unemployment; and a shortage of housing forcing multiple generations to live together. The average woman's age at first marriage increased from about 19 in the mid-1950s to 24 in the mid-1970s to 30.5 in the late 1990s. ++ Algeria's fertility rate experienced an unexpected upturn in the early 2000s, as the average woman's age at first marriage dropped slightly. The reversal in fertility could represent a temporary fluctuation in marriage age or, less likely, a decrease in the steady rate of contraceptive use. ++ Thousands of Algerian peasants - mainly Berber men from the Kabylia region - faced with land dispossession and economic hardship under French rule migrated temporarily to France to work in manufacturing and mining during the first half of the 20th century. This movement accelerated during World War I, when Algerians filled in for French factory workers or served as soldiers. In the years following independence, low-skilled Algerian workers and Algerians who had supported the French (known as Harkis) emigrated en masse to France. Tighter French immigration rules and Algiers' decision to cease managing labor migration to France in the 1970s limited legal emigration largely to family reunification. ++ Not until Algeria's civil war in the 1990s did the country again experience substantial outmigration. Many Algerians legally entered Tunisia without visas claiming to be tourists and then stayed as workers. Other Algerians headed to Europe seeking asylum, although France imposed restrictions. Sub-Saharan African migrants came to Algeria after its civil war to work in agriculture and mining. In the 2000s, a wave of educated Algerians went abroad seeking skilled jobs in a wider range of destinations, increasing their presence in North America and Spain. At the same time, legal foreign workers principally from China and Egypt came to work in Algeria's construction and oil sectors. Illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Malians, Nigeriens, and Gambians, continue to come to Algeria in search of work or to use it as a stepping stone to Libya and Europe. ++ Since 1975, Algeria also has been the main recipient of Sahrawi refugees from the ongoing conflict in Western Sahara. More than 1000,000 Sahrawis are estimated to be living in five refugee camps in southwestern Algeria near Tindouf."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -255,14 +255,11 @@
       "text": "57.1% (2012/13)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99.2% of population / rural: 97.4% of population / total: 98.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "2.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.8% of population / rural: 2.1% of population / total: 1.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "1.9 beds/1,000 population (2015)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 96.9% of population / rural: 93.4% of population / total: 96% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "6.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 3.1% of population / rural: 6.6% of population / total: 4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -389,7 +383,7 @@
         "text": "several previous; latest approved by referendum 23 February 1989"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or through the president with the support of three fourths of the members of both houses of Parliament in joint session; passage requires approval by both houses, approval by referendum, and promulgation by the president; the president can forego a referendum if the Constitutional Council determines the proposed amendment does not conflict with basic constitutional principles; articles including the republican form of government, the integrity and unity of the country, and fundamental citizens’ liberties and rights cannot be amended; amended 2002, 2008, 2016"
+        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or through the president with the support of three fourths of the members of both houses of Parliament in joint session; passage requires approval by both houses, approval by referendum, and promulgation by the president; the president can forego a referendum if the Constitutional Council determines the proposed amendment does not conflict with basic constitutional principles; articles including the republican form of government, the integrity and unity of the country, and fundamental citizens' liberties and rights cannot be amended; amended 2002, 2008, 2016"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -434,13 +428,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Council of the Nation (upper house with 144 seats; one-third of members appointed by the president, two-thirds indirectly elected by simple majority vote by an electoral college composed of local council members; members serve 6-year terms with one-half of the membership renewed every 3 years)National People's Assembly (lower house with 462 seats including 8 seats for Algerians living abroad); members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Council of the Nation (upper house with 144 seats; one-third of members appointed by the president, two-thirds indirectly elected by simple majority vote by an electoral college composed of local council members; members serve 6-year terms with one-half of the membership renewed every 3 years) ++ National People's Assembly (lower house with 462 seats including 8 seats for Algerians living abroad); members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Council of the Nation - last held on 29 December 2018 (next to be held in December 2021)National People's Assembly - last held on 4 May 2017 (next to be held in 2022)"
+        "text": "Council of the Nation - last held on 29 December 2018 (next to be held in December 2021) ++ National People's Assembly - last held on 4 May 2017 (next to be held in 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Council of the Nation - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 137, women 7, percent of women 5% National People's Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - FLN 164, RND 97, MSP-FC 33, TAJ 19, Ennahda-FJD 15, FFS 14, El Mostakbel 14, MPA 13, PT 11, RCD 9, ANR 8, MEN 4, other 33, independent 28; composition - men 343, women 119, percent of women 25.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women 20.8%"
+        "text": "Council of the Nation - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 137, women 7, percent of women 5%  ++ National People's Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - FLN 164, RND 97, MSP-FC 33, TAJ 19, Ennahda-FJD 15, FFS 14, El Mostakbel 14, MPA 13, PT 11, RCD 9, ANR 8, MEN 4, other 33, independent 28; composition - men 343, women 119, percent of women 25.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women 20.8%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -455,7 +449,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Algerian National Front or FNA [Moussa TOUATI]Algerian Popular Movement or MPA [Amara BENYOUNES]Algerian Rally or RA [Ali ZAGHDOUD]Algeria's Hope Rally or TAJ [Amar GHOUL]Democratic and Social Movement or MDS [Hamid FERHI]Dignity or El Karama [Aymene HARKATI]Ennour El Djazairi Party (Algerian Radiance Party) or PED [Badreddine BELBAZ]Front for Justice and Development or El Adala [Abdallah DJABALLAH]Future Front or El Mostakbel [Abdelaziz BELAID]Islamic Renaissance Movement or Ennahda Movement [Mohamed DOUIBI]Justice and Development Front or FJD [Abdellah DJABALLAH]Movement of National Construction (Harakat El-Binaa El-Watani) [Abdelkader BENGRINA]Movement of National Understanding or MENMovement for National Reform or Islah [Filali GHOUINI]Movement of Society for Peace or MSP [Abderrazak MOKRI]National Democratic Rally (Rassemblement National Democratique) or RND [Ahmed OUYAHIA]National Front for Social Justice or FNJS [Khaled BOUNEDJEMA]National Liberation Front or FLN [Mohamed DJEMAI]National Party for Solidarity and Development or PNSD [Dalila YALAQUI]National Reform Movement or Islah [Djahid YOUNSI]National Republican Alliance or ANR [Belkacem SAHLI]New Dawn Party or PFJ [Tahar BENBAIBECHE]New Generation or Jil Jadid [Soufiane DJILALI]Oath of 1954 or Ahd 54 [Ali Fawzi REBAINE]Party of Justice and Liberty [Mohammed SAID]Rally for Culture and Democracy or RCD [Mohcine BELABBAS]Socialist Forces Front or FFS [Hakim BELAHCEL]Union for Change and Progress or UCP [Zoubida Assoul]Union of Democratic and Social Forces or UFDS [Noureddine BAHBOUH]Vanguard of Freedoms (Talaie El Houriat) [Ali BENFLIS]Youth Party or PJ [Hamana BOUCHARMA]Workers Party or PT [Louisa HANOUNE]",
+      "text": "Algerian National Front or FNA [Moussa TOUATI] ++ Algerian Popular Movement or MPA [Amara BENYOUNES] ++ Algerian Rally or RA [Ali ZAGHDOUD] ++ Algeria's Hope Rally or TAJ [Amar GHOUL] ++ Democratic and Social Movement or MDS [Hamid FERHI] ++ Dignity or El Karama [Aymene HARKATI] ++ Ennour El Djazairi Party (Algerian Radiance Party) or PED [Badreddine BELBAZ] ++ Front for Justice and Development or El Adala [Abdallah DJABALLAH] ++ Future Front or El Mostakbel [Abdelaziz BELAID] ++ Islamic Renaissance Movement or Ennahda Movement [Mohamed DOUIBI] ++ Justice and Development Front or FJD [Abdellah DJABALLAH] ++ Movement of National Construction (Harakat El-Binaa El-Watani) [Abdelkader BENGRINA] ++ Movement of National Understanding or MEN ++ Movement for National Reform or Islah [Filali GHOUINI] ++ Movement of Society for Peace or MSP [Abderrazak MOKRI] ++ National Democratic Rally (Rassemblement National Democratique) or RND [Ahmed OUYAHIA] ++ National Front for Social Justice or FNJS [Khaled BOUNEDJEMA] ++ National Liberation Front or FLN [Mohamed DJEMAI] ++ National Party for Solidarity and Development or PNSD [Dalila YALAQUI] ++ National Reform Movement or Islah [Djahid YOUNSI] ++ National Republican Alliance or ANR [Belkacem SAHLI] ++ New Dawn Party or PFJ [Tahar BENBAIBECHE] ++ New Generation or Jil Jadid [Soufiane DJILALI] ++ Oath of 1954 or Ahd 54 [Ali Fawzi REBAINE] ++ Party of Justice and Liberty [Mohammed SAID] ++ Rally for Culture and Democracy or RCD [Mohcine BELABBAS] ++ Socialist Forces Front or FFS [Hakim BELAHCEL] ++ Union for Change and Progress or UCP [Zoubida Assoul] ++ Union of Democratic and Social Forces or UFDS [Noureddine BAHBOUH] ++ Vanguard of Freedoms (Talaie El Houriat) [Ali BENFLIS] ++ Youth Party or PJ [Hamana BOUCHARMA] ++ Workers Party or PT [Louisa HANOUNE]",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: a law banning political parties based on religion was enacted in March 1997"
       }
@@ -517,7 +511,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Algeria's economy remains dominated by the state, a legacy of the country's socialist post-independence development model. In recent years the Algerian Government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy, pursuing an explicit import substitution policy. Hydrocarbons have long been the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 30% of GDP, 60% of budget revenues, and nearly 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the 10th-largest reserves of natural gas in the world - including the 3rd-largest reserves of shale gas - and is the 6th-largest gas exporter. It ranks 16th in proven oil reserves. Hydrocarbon exports enabled Algeria to maintain macroeconomic stability, amass large foreign currency reserves, and maintain low external debt while global oil prices were high. With lower oil prices since 2014, Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves have declined by more than half and its oil stabilization fund has decreased from about $20 billion at the end of 2013 to about $7 billion in 2017, which is the statutory minimum. Declining oil prices have also reduced the government’s ability to use state-driven growth to distribute rents and fund generous public subsidies, and the government has been under pressure to reduce spending. Over the past three years, the government has enacted incremental increases in some taxes, resulting in modest increases in prices for gasoline, cigarettes, alcohol, and certain imported goods, but it has refrained from reducing subsidies, particularly for education, healthcare, and housing programs. Algiers has increased protectionist measures since 2015 to limit its import bill and encourage domestic production of non-oil and gas industries. Since 2015, the government has imposed additional restrictions on access to foreign exchange for imports, and import quotas for specific products, such as cars. In January 2018 the government imposed an indefinite suspension on the importation of roughly 850 products, subject to periodic review. President BOUTEFLIKA announced in fall 2017 that Algeria intends to develop its non-conventional energy resources. Algeria has struggled to develop non-hydrocarbon industries because of heavy regulation and an emphasis on state-driven growth. Algeria has not increased non-hydrocarbon exports, and hydrocarbon exports have declined because of field depletion and increased domestic demand."
+      "text": "Algeria's economy remains dominated by the state, a legacy of the country's socialist post-independence development model. In recent years the Algerian Government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy, pursuing an explicit import substitution policy. ++ Hydrocarbons have long been the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 30% of GDP, 60% of budget revenues, and nearly 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the 10th-largest reserves of natural gas in the world - including the 3rd-largest reserves of shale gas - and is the 6th-largest gas exporter. It ranks 16th in proven oil reserves. Hydrocarbon exports enabled Algeria to maintain macroeconomic stability, amass large foreign currency reserves, and maintain low external debt while global oil prices were high. With lower oil prices since 2014, Algeria's foreign exchange reserves have declined by more than half and its oil stabilization fund has decreased from about $20 billion at the end of 2013 to about $7 billion in 2017, which is the statutory minimum. ++ Declining oil prices have also reduced the government's ability to use state-driven growth to distribute rents and fund generous public subsidies, and the government has been under pressure to reduce spending. Over the past three years, the government has enacted incremental increases in some taxes, resulting in modest increases in prices for gasoline, cigarettes, alcohol, and certain imported goods, but it has refrained from reducing subsidies, particularly for education, healthcare, and housing programs. ++ Algiers has increased protectionist measures since 2015 to limit its import bill and encourage domestic production of non-oil and gas industries. Since 2015, the government has imposed additional restrictions on access to foreign exchange for imports, and import quotas for specific products, such as cars. In January 2018 the government imposed an indefinite suspension on the importation of roughly 850 products, subject to periodic review. ++ President BOUTEFLIKA announced in fall 2017 that Algeria intends to develop its non-conventional energy resources. Algeria has struggled to develop non-hydrocarbon industries because of heavy regulation and an emphasis on state-driven growth. Algeria has not increased non-hydrocarbon exports, and hydrocarbon exports have declined because of field depletion and increased domestic demand."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$630 billion (2017 est.) / $621.3 billion (2016 est.) / $602 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -934,7 +928,7 @@
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
     "Disputes - international": {
-      "text": "Algeria and many other states reject Moroccan administration of Western Sahara; the Polisario Front, exiled in Algeria, represents the \"Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic\" which Algeria recognizes; the Algerian-Moroccan land border remains closed; dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km of southeastern Algeria and the National Liberation Front's (FLN) assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in southeastern Morocco.  "
+      "text": "Algeria and many other states reject Moroccan administration of Western Sahara; the Polisario Front, exiled in Algeria, represents the \"Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic\" which Algeria recognizes; the Algerian-Moroccan land border remains closed; dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km of southeastern Algeria and the National Liberation Front's (FLN) assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in southeastern Morocco. ++  "
     },
     "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
       "refugees (country of origin)": {

africa/ao.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "From the late 14th to the mid 19th century a Kingdom of Kongo stretched across central Africa from present-day northern Angola into the current Congo republics. It traded heavily with the Portuguese who, beginning in the 16th century, established coastal colonies and trading posts and introduced Christianity. By the 19th century, Portuguese settlement had spread to the interior; in 1914, Portugal abolished the last vestiges of the Kongo Kingdom and Angola became a Portuguese colony. Angola scores low on human development indexes despite using its large oil reserves to rebuild since the end of a 27-year civil war in 2002. Fighting between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Jose Eduardo DOS SANTOS, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas SAVIMBI, followed independence from Portugal in 1975. Peace seemed imminent in 1992 when Angola held national elections, but fighting picked up again in 1993. Up to 1.5 million lives may have been lost - and 4 million people displaced - during the more than a quarter century of fighting. SAVIMBI's death in 2002 ended UNITA's insurgency and cemented the MPLA's hold on power. DOS SANTOS stepped down from the presidency in 2017, having led the country since 1979. He pushed through a new constitution in 2010. Joao LOURENCO was elected president in August 2017 and became president of the MPLA in September 2018."
+      "text": "From the late 14th to the mid 19th century a Kingdom of Kongo stretched across central Africa from present-day northern Angola into the current Congo republics. It traded heavily with the Portuguese who, beginning in the 16th century, established coastal colonies and trading posts and introduced Christianity. By the 19th century, Portuguese settlement had spread to the interior; in 1914, Portugal abolished the last vestiges of the Kongo Kingdom and Angola became a Portuguese colony. ++ Angola scores low on human development indexes despite using its large oil reserves to rebuild since the end of a 27-year civil war in 2002. Fighting between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Jose Eduardo DOS SANTOS, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas SAVIMBI, followed independence from Portugal in 1975. Peace seemed imminent in 1992 when Angola held national elections, but fighting picked up again in 1993. Up to 1.5 million lives may have been lost - and 4 million people displaced - during the more than a quarter century of fighting. SAVIMBI's death in 2002 ended UNITA's insurgency and cemented the MPLA's hold on power. DOS SANTOS stepped down from the presidency in 2017, having led the country since 1979. He pushed through a new constitution in 2010. Joao LOURENCO was elected president in August 2017 and became president of the MPLA in September 2018."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 41.1%, Protestant 38.1%, other 8.6%, none 12.3% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "More than a decade after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 40 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 45% are under the age of 15 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate. Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries."
+      "text": "More than a decade after the end of Angola's 27-year civil war, the country still faces a variety of socioeconomic problems, including poverty, high maternal and child mortality, and illiteracy. Despite the country's rapid post-war economic growth based on oil production, about 40 percent of Angolans live below the poverty line and unemployment is widespread, especially among the large young-adult population. Only about 70% of the population is literate, and the rate drops to around 60% for women. The youthful population - about 45% are under the age of 15 - is expected to continue growing rapidly with a fertility rate of more than 5 children per woman and a low rate of contraceptive use. Fewer than half of women deliver their babies with the assistance of trained health care personnel, which contributes to Angola's high maternal mortality rate. ++ Of the estimated 550,000 Angolans who fled their homeland during its civil war, most have returned home since 2002. In 2012, the UN assessed that conditions in Angola had been stable for several years and invoked a cessation of refugee status for Angolans. Following the cessation clause, some of those still in exile returned home voluntarily through UN repatriation programs, and others integrated into host countries."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -267,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "13.7% (2015/16)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 18.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 81.7% of population / rural: 36.6% of population / total: 65.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "63.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "34.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 18.3% of population / rural: 63.4% of population / total: 34.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -284,14 +281,11 @@
       "text": "0.21 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 7.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 92.2% of population / rural: 29.2% of population / total: 70.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "70.8% of population (2 est.)"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "29.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 7.8% of population / rural: 70.8% of population (2 est.) / total: 29.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -487,7 +481,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola Electoral Coalition or CASA-CE [Andre Mendes de CARVALHO]National Front for the Liberation of Angola or FNLA; note - party has two factions; one led by Lucas NGONDA; the other by Ngola KABANGUNational Union for the Total Independence of Angola or UNITA [Isaias SAMAKUVA] (largest opposition party)Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola or MPLA [Joao LOURENCO]; note - Jose Eduardo DOS SANTOS stepped down 8 Sept 2018 ruling party in power since 1975Social Renewal Party or PRS [Benedito DANIEL]"
+      "text": "Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola Electoral Coalition or CASA-CE [Andre Mendes de CARVALHO] ++ National Front for the Liberation of Angola or FNLA; note - party has two factions; one led by Lucas NGONDA; the other by Ngola KABANGU ++ National Union for the Total Independence of Angola or UNITA [Isaias SAMAKUVA] (largest opposition party) ++ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola or MPLA [Joao LOURENCO]; note - Jose Eduardo DOS SANTOS stepped down 8 Sept 2018 ruling party in power since 1975 ++ Social Renewal Party or PRS [Benedito DANIEL]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CEMAC, CPLP, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OPEC, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -546,7 +540,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Angola's economy is overwhelmingly driven by its oil sector. Oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 50% of GDP, more than 70% of government revenue, and more than 90% of the country's exports; Angola is an OPEC member and subject to its direction regarding oil production levels. Diamonds contribute an additional 5% to exports. Subsistence agriculture provides the main livelihood for most of the people, but half of the country's food is still imported. Increased oil production supported growth averaging more than 17% per year from 2004 to 2008. A postwar reconstruction boom and resettlement of displaced persons led to high rates of growth in construction and agriculture as well. Some of the country's infrastructure is still damaged or undeveloped from the 27-year-long civil war (1975-2002). However, the government since 2005 has used billions of dollars in credit from China, Brazil, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the EU to help rebuild Angola's public infrastructure. Land mines left from the war still mar the countryside, and as a result, the national military, international partners, and private Angolan firms all continue to remove them. The global recession that started in 2008 stalled Angola’s economic growth and many construction projects stopped because Luanda accrued billions in arrears to foreign construction companies when government revenue fell. Lower prices for oil and diamonds also resulted in GDP falling 0.7% in 2016. Angola formally abandoned its currency peg in 2009 but reinstituted it in April 2016 and maintains an overvalued exchange rate. In late 2016, Angola lost the last of its correspondent relationships with foreign banks, further exacerbating hard currency problems. Since 2013 the central bank has consistently spent down reserves to defend the kwanza, gradually allowing a 40% depreciation since late 2014. Consumer inflation declined from 325% in 2000 to less than 9% in 2014, before rising again to above 30% from 2015-2017. Continued low oil prices, the depreciation of the kwanza, and slower than expected growth in non-oil GDP have reduced growth prospects, although several major international oil companies remain in Angola. Corruption, especially in the extractive sectors, is a major long-term challenge that poses an additional threat to the economy."
+      "text": "Angola's economy is overwhelmingly driven by its oil sector. Oil production and its supporting activities contribute about 50% of GDP, more than 70% of government revenue, and more than 90% of the country's exports; Angola is an OPEC member and subject to its direction regarding oil production levels. Diamonds contribute an additional 5% to exports. Subsistence agriculture provides the main livelihood for most of the people, but half of the country's food is still imported. ++ Increased oil production supported growth averaging more than 17% per year from 2004 to 2008. A postwar reconstruction boom and resettlement of displaced persons led to high rates of growth in construction and agriculture as well. Some of the country's infrastructure is still damaged or undeveloped from the 27-year-long civil war (1975-2002). However, the government since 2005 has used billions of dollars in credit from China, Brazil, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and the EU to help rebuild Angola's public infrastructure. Land mines left from the war still mar the countryside, and as a result, the national military, international partners, and private Angolan firms all continue to remove them. ++ The global recession that started in 2008 stalled Angola's economic growth and many construction projects stopped because Luanda accrued billions in arrears to foreign construction companies when government revenue fell. Lower prices for oil and diamonds also resulted in GDP falling 0.7% in 2016. Angola formally abandoned its currency peg in 2009 but reinstituted it in April 2016 and maintains an overvalued exchange rate. In late 2016, Angola lost the last of its correspondent relationships with foreign banks, further exacerbating hard currency problems. Since 2013 the central bank has consistently spent down reserves to defend the kwanza, gradually allowing a 40% depreciation since late 2014. Consumer inflation declined from 325% in 2000 to less than 9% in 2014, before rising again to above 30% from 2015-2017. ++ Continued low oil prices, the depreciation of the kwanza, and slower than expected growth in non-oil GDP have reduced growth prospects, although several major international oil companies remain in Angola. Corruption, especially in the extractive sectors, is a major long-term challenge that poses an additional threat to the economy."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$193.6 billion (2017 est.) / $198.6 billion (2016 est.) / $203.9 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/bc.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Seeking to stop the incorporation of their land into Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) or the Union of South Africa, in 1885, three tribal chiefs traveled to Great Britain and successfully lobbied the British Government to put \"Bechuanaland\" under UK protection. Upon independence in 1966, the British protectorate of Bechuanaland adopted the new name of Botswana. More than five decades of uninterrupted civilian leadership, progressive social policies, and significant capital investment have created one of the most stable economies in Africa. The ruling Botswana Democratic Party has won every national election since independence; President Mokgweetsi Eric MASISI assumed the presidency in April 2018 following the retirement of former President Ian KHAMA due to constitutional term limits. MASISI won his first election as president in October 2019, and he is Botswana’s fifth president since independence. Mineral extraction, principally diamond mining, dominates economic activity, though tourism is a growing sector due to the country's conservation practices and extensive nature preserves. Botswana has one of the world's highest rates of HIV/AIDS infection, but also one of Africa's most progressive and comprehensive programs for dealing with the disease."
+      "text": "Seeking to stop the incorporation of their land into Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) or the Union of South Africa, in 1885, three tribal chiefs traveled to Great Britain and successfully lobbied the British Government to put \"Bechuanaland\" under UK protection. Upon independence in 1966, the British protectorate of Bechuanaland adopted the new name of Botswana. More than five decades of uninterrupted civilian leadership, progressive social policies, and significant capital investment have created one of the most stable economies in Africa. The ruling Botswana Democratic Party has won every national election since independence; President Mokgweetsi Eric MASISI assumed the presidency in April 2018 following the retirement of former President Ian KHAMA due to constitutional term limits. MASISI won his first election as president in October 2019, and he is Botswana's fifth president since independence. Mineral extraction, principally diamond mining, dominates economic activity, though tourism is a growing sector due to the country's conservation practices and extensive nature preserves. Botswana has one of the world's highest rates of HIV/AIDS infection, but also one of Africa's most progressive and comprehensive programs for dealing with the disease."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 79.1%, Badimo 4.1%, other 1.4% (includes Baha'i, Hindu, Muslim, Rastafarian), none 15.2%, unspecified 0.3% (2011 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate has fallen from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s.\nToday Botswana has the third highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world at approximately 22%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed.\nBatswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana’s economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana’s male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana’s economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home.\nMost Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana’s prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe."
+      "text": "Botswana has experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. The total fertility rate has fallen from more than 5 children per woman in the mid 1980s to approximately 2.4 in 2013. The fertility reduction has been attributed to a host of factors, including higher educational attainment among women, greater participation of women in the workforce, increased contraceptive use, later first births, and a strong national family planning program. Botswana was making significant progress in several health indicators, including life expectancy and infant and child mortality rates, until being devastated by the HIV/AIDs epidemic in the 1990s. ++ Today Botswana has the third highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the world at approximately 22%, however comprehensive and effective treatment programs have reduced HIV/AIDS-related deaths. The combination of declining fertility and increasing mortality rates because of HIV/AIDS is slowing the population aging process, with a narrowing of the youngest age groups and little expansion of the oldest age groups. Nevertheless, having the bulk of its population (about 60%) of working age will only yield economic benefits if the labor force is healthy, educated, and productively employed. ++ Batswana have been working as contract miners in South Africa since the 19th century. Although Botswana's economy improved shortly after independence in 1966 with the discovery of diamonds and other minerals, its lingering high poverty rate and lack of job opportunities continued to push workers to seek mining work in southern African countries. In the early 1970s, about a third of Botswana's male labor force worked in South Africa (lesser numbers went to Namibia and Zimbabwe). Not until the 1980s and 1990s, when South African mining companies had reduced their recruitment of foreign workers and Botswana's economic prospects had improved, were Batswana increasingly able to find job opportunities at home. ++ Most Batswana prefer life in their home country and choose cross-border migration on a temporary basis only for work, shopping, visiting family, or tourism. Since the 1970s, Botswana has pursued an open migration policy enabling it to recruit thousands of foreign workers to fill skilled labor shortages. In the late 1990s, Botswana's prosperity and political stability attracted not only skilled workers but small numbers of refugees from neighboring Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -252,14 +252,11 @@
       "text": "67.4% (2017)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.2% of population / rural: 94% of population / total: 96.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "3.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "3.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.8% of population / rural: 3.1% of population / total: 3.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -272,14 +269,11 @@
       "text": "1.8 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 7.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 92.9% of population / rural: 60.8% of population / total: 82.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "39.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "17.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 7.1% of population / rural: 39.2% of population / total: 17.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -459,11 +453,11 @@
         "text": "Court of Appeal and High Court chief justices appointed by the president and other judges appointed by the president upon the advice of the Judicial Service Commission; all judges appointed to serve until age 70"
       },
       "subordinate courts": {
-        "text": "Industrial Court (with circuits scheduled monthly in the capital city and in 3 districts); Magistrates Courts (1 in each district); Customary Court of Appeal; Paramount Chief's Court/Urban Customary Court; Senior Chief's Representative Court; Chief's Representative’s Court; Headman's Court"
+        "text": "Industrial Court (with circuits scheduled monthly in the capital city and in 3 districts); Magistrates Courts (1 in each district); Customary Court of Appeal; Paramount Chief's Court/Urban Customary Court; Senior Chief's Representative Court; Chief's Representative's Court; Headman's Court"
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance of Progressives or AP [Ndaba GAOLATHE]Botswana Congress Party or BCP [Dumelang SALESHANDO]Botswana Democratic Party or BDP [Mokgweetsi MASISI]Botswana Movement for Democracy or BMD [Sidney PILANE]Botswana National Front or BNF [Duma BOKO]Botswana Patriotic Front or BPF [Biggie BUTALE]Botswana Peoples Party or BPP [Motlatsi MOLAPISI]Real Alternative Party or RAP [Gaontebale MOKGOSI]Umbrella for Democratic Change or UDC [Duma BOKO] (various times the collation has included the BMD, BPP, BCP and BNF) (2019)"
+      "text": "Alliance of Progressives or AP [Ndaba GAOLATHE] ++ Botswana Congress Party or BCP [Dumelang SALESHANDO] ++ Botswana Democratic Party or BDP [Mokgweetsi MASISI] ++ Botswana Movement for Democracy or BMD [Sidney PILANE] ++ Botswana National Front or BNF [Duma BOKO] ++ Botswana Patriotic Front or BPF [Biggie BUTALE] ++ Botswana Peoples Party or BPP [Motlatsi MOLAPISI] ++ Real Alternative Party or RAP [Gaontebale MOKGOSI] ++ Umbrella for Democratic Change or UDC [Duma BOKO] (various times the collation has included the BMD, BPP, BCP and BNF) (2019)"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CD, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, SACU, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -522,7 +516,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Until the beginning of the global recession in 2008, Botswana maintained one of the world's highest economic growth rates since its independence in 1966. Botswana recovered from the global recession in 2010, but only grew modestly until 2017, primarily due to a downturn in the global diamond market, though water and power shortages also played a role. Through fiscal discipline and sound management, Botswana has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the world five decades ago into a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of approximately $18,100 in 2017. Botswana also ranks as one of the least corrupt and best places to do business in Sub-Saharan Africa.   Because of its heavy reliance on diamond exports, Botswana’s economy closely follows global price trends for that one commodity. Diamond mining fueled much of Botswana’s past economic expansion and currently accounts for one-quarter of GDP, approximately 85% of export earnings, and about one-third of the government's revenues. In 2017, Diamond exports increased to the highest levels since 2013 at about 22 million carats of output, driving Botswana’s economic growth to about 4.5% and increasing foreign exchange reserves to about 45% of GDP. De Beers, a major international diamond company, signed a 10-year deal with Botswana in 2012 and moved its rough stone sorting and trading division from London to Gaborone in 2013. The move was geared to support the development of Botswana's nascent downstream diamond industry.   Tourism is a secondary earner of foreign exchange and many Batswana engage in tourism-related services, subsistence farming, and cattle rearing. According to official government statistics, unemployment is around 20%, but unofficial estimates run much higher. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS is second highest in the world and threatens the country's impressive economic gains."
+      "text": "Until the beginning of the global recession in 2008, Botswana maintained one of the world's highest economic growth rates since its independence in 1966. Botswana recovered from the global recession in 2010, but only grew modestly until 2017, primarily due to a downturn in the global diamond market, though water and power shortages also played a role. Through fiscal discipline and sound management, Botswana has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the world five decades ago into a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of approximately $18,100 in 2017. Botswana also ranks as one of the least corrupt and best places to do business in Sub-Saharan Africa. ++   ++ Because of its heavy reliance on diamond exports, Botswana's economy closely follows global price trends for that one commodity. Diamond mining fueled much of Botswana's past economic expansion and currently accounts for one-quarter of GDP, approximately 85% of export earnings, and about one-third of the government's revenues. In 2017, Diamond exports increased to the highest levels since 2013 at about 22 million carats of output, driving Botswana's economic growth to about 4.5% and increasing foreign exchange reserves to about 45% of GDP. De Beers, a major international diamond company, signed a 10-year deal with Botswana in 2012 and moved its rough stone sorting and trading division from London to Gaborone in 2013. The move was geared to support the development of Botswana's nascent downstream diamond industry. ++   ++ Tourism is a secondary earner of foreign exchange and many Batswana engage in tourism-related services, subsistence farming, and cattle rearing. According to official government statistics, unemployment is around 20%, but unofficial estimates run much higher. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS is second highest in the world and threatens the country's impressive economic gains."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$39.01 billion (2017 est.) / $38.11 billion (2016 est.) / $36.54 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -898,7 +892,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Botswana is a source, transit, and destination country for women and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor; young Batswana serving as domestic workers, sometimes sent by their parents, may be denied education and basic necessities or experience confinement and abuse indicative of forced labor; Batswana girls and women also are forced into prostitution domestically; adults and children of San ethnicity were reported to be in forced labor on farms and at cattle posts in the country’s rural west"
+        "text": "Botswana is a source, transit, and destination country for women and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor; young Batswana serving as domestic workers, sometimes sent by their parents, may be denied education and basic necessities or experience confinement and abuse indicative of forced labor; Batswana girls and women also are forced into prostitution domestically; adults and children of San ethnicity were reported to be in forced labor on farms and at cattle posts in the country's rural west"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Botswana does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; an anti-trafficking act was passed at the beginning of 2014, but authorities did not investigate, prosecute, or convict any offenders or government officials complicit in trafficking or operationalize victim identification and referral procedures based on the new law; the government sponsored a radio campaign to familiarize the public with the issue of human trafficking (2015)"

africa/bn.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Present day Benin was the site of Dahomey, a West African kingdom that rose to prominence in about 1600 and over the next two and a half centuries became a regional power, largely based on its slave trade. France began to control the coastal areas of Dahomey in the second half of the 19th century; the entire kingdom was conquered by 1894. French Dahomey achieved independence in 1960; it changed its name to the Republic of Benin in 1975. A succession of military governments ended in 1972 with the rise to power of Mathieu KEREKOU and the establishment of a government based on Marxist-Leninist principles. A move to representative government began in 1989. Two years later, free elections ushered in former Prime Minister Nicephore SOGLO as president, marking the first successful transfer of power in Africa from a dictatorship to a democracy. KEREKOU was returned to power by elections held in 1996 and 2001, though some irregularities were alleged. KEREKOU stepped down at the end of his second term in 2006 and was succeeded by Thomas YAYI Boni, a political outsider and independent, who won a second five-year term in March 2011. Patrice TALON, a wealthy businessman, took office in 2016 after campaigning to restore public confidence in the government."
+      "text": "Present day Benin was the site of Dahomey, a West African kingdom that rose to prominence in about 1600 and over the next two and a half centuries became a regional power, largely based on its slave trade. France began to control the coastal areas of Dahomey in the second half of the 19th century; the entire kingdom was conquered by 1894. French Dahomey achieved independence in 1960; it changed its name to the Republic of Benin in 1975. ++ A succession of military governments ended in 1972 with the rise to power of Mathieu KEREKOU and the establishment of a government based on Marxist-Leninist principles. A move to representative government began in 1989. Two years later, free elections ushered in former Prime Minister Nicephore SOGLO as president, marking the first successful transfer of power in Africa from a dictatorship to a democracy. KEREKOU was returned to power by elections held in 1996 and 2001, though some irregularities were alleged. KEREKOU stepped down at the end of his second term in 2006 and was succeeded by Thomas YAYI Boni, a political outsider and independent, who won a second five-year term in March 2011. Patrice TALON, a wealthy businessman, took office in 2016 after campaigning to restore public confidence in the government."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 27.7%, Roman Catholic 25.5%, Protestant 13.5% (Celestial 6.7%, Methodist 3.4%, other Protestant 3.4%), Vodoun 11.6%, other Christian 9.5%, other traditional religions 2.6%, other 2.6%, none 5.8% (2013 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Benin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates. Benin’s total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 4.8 in 2016. Benin’s low contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric care.\nPoverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than 40%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Of the less than 1% of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France, Benin’s former colonial ruler.\nWith about 40% of the population living below the poverty line, many desperate parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural people move to the coast, farmers from Benin’s densely populated southern and northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and porous borders."
+      "text": "Benin has a youthful age structure – almost 65% of the population is under the age of 25 – which is bolstered by high fertility and population growth rates. Benin's total fertility has been falling over time but remains high, declining from almost 7 children per women in 1990 to 4.8 in 2016. Benin's low contraceptive use and high unmet need for contraception contribute to the sustained high fertility rate. Although the majority of Beninese women use skilled health care personnel for antenatal care and delivery, the high rate of maternal mortality indicates the need for more access to high quality obstetric care. ++ Poverty, unemployment, increased living costs, and dwindling resources increasingly drive the Beninese to migrate. An estimated 4.4 million, more than 40%, of Beninese live abroad. Virtually all Beninese emigrants move to West African countries, particularly Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. Of the less than 1% of Beninese emigrants who settle in Europe, the vast majority live in France, Benin's former colonial ruler. ++ With about 40% of the population living below the poverty line, many desperate parents resort to sending their children to work in wealthy households as domestic servants (a common practice known as vidomegon), mines, quarries, or agriculture domestically or in Nigeria and other neighboring countries, often under brutal conditions. Unlike in other West African countries, where rural people move to the coast, farmers from Benin's densely populated southern and northwestern regions move to the historically sparsely populated central region to pursue agriculture. Immigrants from West African countries came to Benin in increasing numbers between 1992 and 2002 because of its political stability and porous borders."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -264,14 +264,11 @@
       "text": "15.5% (2017/18)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 18.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 81.2% of population / rural: 72.2% of population / total: 76.4% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "27.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "23.6% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 18.8% of population / rural: 27.8% of population / total: 23.6% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -284,14 +281,11 @@
       "text": "0.5 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 41.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 58.7% of population / rural: 16% of population / total: 36% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "84% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "64% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 41.3% of population / rural: 84% of population / total: 64% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -484,7 +478,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for a Triumphant Benin or ABT [Abdoulaye BIO TCHANE]African Movement for Development and Progress or MADEP [Sefou FAGBOHOUN]Benin Renaissance or RB [Lehady SOGLO]Cowrie Force for an Emerging Benin or FCBE [Yayi BONI]Democratic Renewal Party or PRD [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI]National Alliance for Development and Democracy or AND [Valentin Aditi HOUDE]New Consciousness Rally or NC [Pascal KOUPAKI]Patriotic Awakening or RP [Janvier YAHOUEDEOU]Social Democrat Party or PSD [Emmanuel GOLOU]Sun Alliance or AS [Sacca LAFIA]Union Makes the Nation or UN [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI] (includes PRD, MADEP)United Democratic Forces or FDU [Mathurin NAGO]",
+      "text": "Alliance for a Triumphant Benin or ABT [Abdoulaye BIO TCHANE] ++ African Movement for Development and Progress or MADEP [Sefou FAGBOHOUN] ++ Benin Renaissance or RB [Lehady SOGLO] ++ Cowrie Force for an Emerging Benin or FCBE [Yayi BONI] ++ Democratic Renewal Party or PRD [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI] ++ National Alliance for Development and Democracy or AND [Valentin Aditi HOUDE] ++ New Consciousness Rally or NC [Pascal KOUPAKI] ++ Patriotic Awakening or RP [Janvier YAHOUEDEOU] ++ Social Democrat Party or PSD [Emmanuel GOLOU] ++ Sun Alliance or AS [Sacca LAFIA] ++ Union Makes the Nation or UN [Adrien HOUNGBEDJI] (includes PRD, MADEP) ++ United Democratic Forces or FDU [Mathurin NAGO]",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: approximately 20 additional minor parties"
       }
@@ -546,7 +540,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The free market economy of Benin has grown consecutively for four years, though growth slowed in 2017, as its close trade links to Nigeria expose Benin to risks from volatile commodity prices. Cotton is a key export commodity, with export earnings significantly impacted by the price of cotton in the broader market. The economy began deflating in 2017, with the consumer price index falling 0.8%. During the first two years of President TALON’s administration, which began in April 2016, the government has followed an ambitious action plan to kickstart development through investments in infrastructure, education, agriculture, and governance. Electricity generation, which has constrained Benin’s economic growth, has increased and blackouts have been considerably reduced. Private foreign direct investment is small, and foreign aid accounts for a large proportion of investment in infrastructure projects. Benin has appealed for international assistance to mitigate piracy against commercial shipping in its territory, and has used equipment from donors effectively against such piracy. Pilferage has significantly dropped at the Port of Cotonou, though the port is still struggling with effective implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Projects included in Benin's $307 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) first compact (2006-11) were designed to increase investment and private sector activity by improving key institutional and physical infrastructure. The four projects focused on access to land, access to financial services, access to justice, and access to markets (including modernization of the port). The Port of Cotonou is a major contributor to Benin’s economy, with revenues projected to account for more than 40% of Benin’s national budget. Benin will need further efforts to upgrade infrastructure, stem corruption, and expand access to foreign markets to achieve its potential. In September 2015, Benin signed a second MCC Compact for $375 million that entered into force in June 2017 and is designed to strengthen the national utility service provider, attract private sector investment, fund infrastructure investments in electricity generation and distribution, and develop off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. As part of the Government of Benin’s action plan to spur growth, Benin passed public private partnership legislation in 2017 to attract more foreign investment, place more emphasis on tourism, facilitate the development of new food processing systems and agricultural products, encourage new information and communication technology, and establish Independent Power Producers. In April 2017, the IMF approved a three year $150.4 million Extended Credit Facility agreement to maintain debt sustainability and boost donor confidence."
+      "text": "The free market economy of Benin has grown consecutively for four years, though growth slowed in 2017, as its close trade links to Nigeria expose Benin to risks from volatile commodity prices. Cotton is a key export commodity, with export earnings significantly impacted by the price of cotton in the broader market. The economy began deflating in 2017, with the consumer price index falling 0.8%. ++ During the first two years of President TALON's administration, which began in April 2016, the government has followed an ambitious action plan to kickstart development through investments in infrastructure, education, agriculture, and governance. Electricity generation, which has constrained Benin's economic growth, has increased and blackouts have been considerably reduced. Private foreign direct investment is small, and foreign aid accounts for a large proportion of investment in infrastructure projects. ++ Benin has appealed for international assistance to mitigate piracy against commercial shipping in its territory, and has used equipment from donors effectively against such piracy. Pilferage has significantly dropped at the Port of Cotonou, though the port is still struggling with effective implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Projects included in Benin's $307 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) first compact (2006-11) were designed to increase investment and private sector activity by improving key institutional and physical infrastructure. The four projects focused on access to land, access to financial services, access to justice, and access to markets (including modernization of the port). The Port of Cotonou is a major contributor to Benin's economy, with revenues projected to account for more than 40% of Benin's national budget. ++ Benin will need further efforts to upgrade infrastructure, stem corruption, and expand access to foreign markets to achieve its potential. In September 2015, Benin signed a second MCC Compact for $375 million that entered into force in June 2017 and is designed to strengthen the national utility service provider, attract private sector investment, fund infrastructure investments in electricity generation and distribution, and develop off-grid electrification for poor and unserved households. As part of the Government of Benin's action plan to spur growth, Benin passed public private partnership legislation in 2017 to attract more foreign investment, place more emphasis on tourism, facilitate the development of new food processing systems and agricultural products, encourage new information and communication technology, and establish Independent Power Producers. In April 2017, the IMF approved a three year $150.4 million Extended Credit Facility agreement to maintain debt sustainability and boost donor confidence."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$25.39 billion (2017 est.) / $24.04 billion (2016 est.) / $23.12 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -932,7 +926,7 @@
   },
   "Terrorism": {
     "Terrorist group(s)": {
-      "text": "al-Qa’ida (Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (2020)",
+      "text": "al-Qa'ida (Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (2020)",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
       }

africa/by.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Burundi is a small country in Central-East Africa bordered by Tanzania, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Lake Tanganyika. Created in the 17th century, a Burundi Kingdom was preserved under German colonial rule in the late 19th and early 20th century, and then by Belgium after World War I. Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in 1962 as the Kingdom of Burundi, but the monarchy was overthrown in 1966 and a republic established. Political violence and non-democratic transfers of power have marked much of its history; Burundi's first democratically elected president, a Hutu, was assassinated in October 1993 after only 100 days in office. The internationally brokered Arusha Agreement, signed in 2000, and subsequent ceasefire agreements with armed movements ended the 1993-2005 civil war. Burundi’s second democratic elections were held in 2005. Pierre NKURUNZIZA was elected president in 2005 and 2010, and again in a controversial election in 2015. Burundi continues to face many economic and political challenges."
+      "text": "Burundi is a small country in Central-East Africa bordered by Tanzania, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Lake Tanganyika. Created in the 17th century, a Burundi Kingdom was preserved under German colonial rule in the late 19th and early 20th century, and then by Belgium after World War I. Burundi gained its independence from Belgium in 1962 as the Kingdom of Burundi, but the monarchy was overthrown in 1966 and a republic established. Political violence and non-democratic transfers of power have marked much of its history; Burundi's first democratically elected president, a Hutu, was assassinated in October 1993 after only 100 days in office. The internationally brokered Arusha Agreement, signed in 2000, and subsequent ceasefire agreements with armed movements ended the 1993-2005 civil war. Burundi's second democratic elections were held in 2005. Pierre NKURUNZIZA was elected president in 2005 and 2010, and again in a controversial election in 2015. Burundi continues to face many economic and political challenges."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 62.1%, Protestant 23.9% (includes Adventist 2.3% and other Protestant 21.6%), Muslim 2.5%, other 3.6%, unspecified 7.9% (2008 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate, factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less productive plots. Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has prevented a significant reduction in Burundi’s maternal mortality and fertility rates, which are both among the world’s highest. With two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 6 children per woman, Burundi’s population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come, putting additional strain on a poor country.\nHistorically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries, mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions have deteriorated since renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda."
+      "text": "Burundi is a densely populated country with a high population growth rate, factors that combined with land scarcity and poverty place a large share of its population at risk of food insecurity. About 90% of the population relies on subsistence agriculture. Subdivision of land to sons, and redistribution to returning refugees, results in smaller, overworked, and less productive plots. Food shortages, poverty, and a lack of clean water contribute to a 60% chronic malnutrition rate among children. A lack of reproductive health services has prevented a significant reduction in Burundi's maternal mortality and fertility rates, which are both among the world's highest. With two-thirds of its population under the age of 25 and a birth rate of about 6 children per woman, Burundi's population will continue to expand rapidly for decades to come, putting additional strain on a poor country. ++ Historically, migration flows into and out of Burundi have consisted overwhelmingly of refugees from violent conflicts. In the last decade, more than a half million Burundian refugees returned home from neighboring countries, mainly Tanzania. Reintegrating the returnees has been problematic due to their prolonged time in exile, land scarcity, poor infrastructure, poverty, and unemployment. Repatriates and existing residents (including internally displaced persons) compete for limited land and other resources. To further complicate matters, international aid organizations reduced their assistance because they no longer classified Burundi as a post-conflict country. Conditions have deteriorated since renewed violence erupted in April 2015, causing another outpouring of refugees. In addition to refugee out-migration, Burundi has hosted thousands of refugees from neighboring countries, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and lesser numbers from Rwanda."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "28.5% (2016/17)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: -1.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.6% of population / rural: 77.8% of population / total: 80.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "22.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "19.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: -1.1% of population / rural: 22.2% of population / total: 19.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "0.8 beds/1,000 population (2014)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 14.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 85.2% of population / rural: 53.4% of population / total: 57.4% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "46.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "42.6% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 14.8% of population / rural: 46.6% of population / total: 42.6% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -460,13 +454,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of:Senate or Inama Nkenguzamateka (39 seats in the July 2020 election); 36 members indirectly elected by an electoral college of provincial councils using a three-round voting system, which requires a two-thirds majority vote in the first two rounds and simple majority vote for the two leading candidates in the final round; 3 seats reserved for Twas, and 30% of all votes reserved for women; members serve 5-year terms)National Assembly or Inama Nshingamateka (123 seats in the May 2020 election; 100 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 23 co-opted members; 60% of seats allocated to Hutu and 40% to Tutsi; 3 seats reserved for Twas; 30% of total seats reserved for women; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of: Senate or Inama Nkenguzamateka (39 seats in the July 2020 election); 36 members indirectly elected by an electoral college of provincial councils using a three-round voting system, which requires a two-thirds majority vote in the first two rounds and simple majority vote for the two leading candidates in the final round; 3 seats reserved for Twas, and 30% of all votes reserved for women; members serve 5-year terms) ++ National Assembly or Inama Nshingamateka (123 seats in the May 2020 election; 100 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 23 co-opted members; 60% of seats allocated to Hutu and 40% to Tutsi; 3 seats reserved for Twas; 30% of total seats reserved for women; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 20 July 2020 (next to be held in 2025)National Assembly - last held on 20 May 2020 (next to be held in 2025)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 20 July 2020 (next to be held in 2025) ++ National Assembly - last held on 20 May 2020 (next to be held in 2025)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - CNDD-FDD 87.2%, Twa 7.7%, CNL 2.6%, UPRONA 2.6%; seats by party - CNDD-FDD 34, CNL 1, UPRONA 1, Twa 3; composition - men 23, women 16, percent of women 37.2% National Assembly - percent of vote by party - CNDD-FDD 70.9%, CNL 23.4%, UPRONA 2.5%, other (co-opted Twa) 3.2%; seats by party - CNDD-FDD 86, CNL 32, UPRONA 2, Twa 3; composition - men 76, women 47, percent of women 38.2%; note - total Parliament percent of women 38%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - CNDD-FDD 87.2%, Twa 7.7%, CNL 2.6%, UPRONA 2.6%; seats by party - CNDD-FDD 34, CNL 1, UPRONA 1, Twa 3; composition - men 23, women 16, percent of women 37.2% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - CNDD-FDD 70.9%, CNL 23.4%, UPRONA 2.5%, other (co-opted Twa) 3.2%; seats by party - CNDD-FDD 86, CNL 32, UPRONA 2, Twa 3; composition - men 76, women 47, percent of women 38.2%; note - total Parliament percent of women 38%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -481,7 +475,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Front for Democracy in Burundi-Nyakuri or FRODEBU-Nyakuri [Keffa NIBIZI]Front for Democracy in Burundi-Sahwanya or FRODEBU-Sahwanya [Pierre Claver NAHIMANA]National Congress for Liberty or CNL [Agathon RWASA]National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Front for the Defense of Democracy or CNDD-FDD [Evariste NDAYISHIMIYE]National Liberation Forces or FNL [Jacques BIGITIMANA]Union for National Progress (Union pour le Progress Nationale) or UPRONA [Abel GASHATSI]"
+      "text": "Front for Democracy in Burundi-Nyakuri or FRODEBU-Nyakuri [Keffa NIBIZI] ++ Front for Democracy in Burundi-Sahwanya or FRODEBU-Sahwanya [Pierre Claver NAHIMANA] ++ National Congress for Liberty or CNL [Agathon RWASA] ++ National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Front for the Defense of Democracy or CNDD-FDD [Evariste NDAYISHIMIYE] ++ National Liberation Forces or FNL [Jacques BIGITIMANA] ++ Union for National Progress (Union pour le Progress Nationale) or UPRONA [Abel GASHATSI]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CEMAC, CEPGL, CICA, COMESA, EAC, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -502,7 +496,7 @@
     },
     "Diplomatic representation from the US": {
       "chief of mission": {
-        "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d’Affaires Eunice S. REDDICK (since May 2019)"
+        "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Eunice S. REDDICK (since May 2019)"
       },
       "telephone": {
         "text": "[257] 22-207-000"
@@ -537,7 +531,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor country with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector. Agriculture accounts for over 40% of GDP and employs more than 90% of the population. Burundi's primary exports are coffee and tea, which account for more than half of foreign exchange earnings, but these earnings are subject to fluctuations in weather and international coffee and tea prices, Burundi is heavily dependent on aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as foreign exchange earnings from participation in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Foreign aid represented 48% of Burundi's national income in 2015, one of the highest percentages in Sub-Saharan Africa, but this figure decreased to 33.5% in 2016 due to political turmoil surrounding President NKURUNZIZA’s bid for a third term. Burundi joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2009. Burundi faces several underlying weaknesses – low governmental capacity, corruption, a high poverty rate, poor educational levels, a weak legal system, a poor transportation network, and overburdened utilities – that have prevented the implementation of planned economic reforms. The purchasing power of most Burundians has decreased as wage increases have not kept pace with inflation, which reached approximately 18% in 2017. Real GDP growth dropped precipitously following political events in 2015 and has yet to recover to pre-conflict levels. Continued resistance by donors and the international community will restrict Burundi’s economic growth as the country deals with a large current account deficit."
+      "text": "Burundi is a landlocked, resource-poor country with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector. Agriculture accounts for over 40% of GDP and employs more than 90% of the population. Burundi's primary exports are coffee and tea, which account for more than half of foreign exchange earnings, but these earnings are subject to fluctuations in weather and international coffee and tea prices, Burundi is heavily dependent on aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as foreign exchange earnings from participation in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Foreign aid represented 48% of Burundi's national income in 2015, one of the highest percentages in Sub-Saharan Africa, but this figure decreased to 33.5% in 2016 due to political turmoil surrounding President NKURUNZIZA's bid for a third term. Burundi joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2009. ++ Burundi faces several underlying weaknesses – low governmental capacity, corruption, a high poverty rate, poor educational levels, a weak legal system, a poor transportation network, and overburdened utilities – that have prevented the implementation of planned economic reforms. The purchasing power of most Burundians has decreased as wage increases have not kept pace with inflation, which reached approximately 18% in 2017. ++ Real GDP growth dropped precipitously following political events in 2015 and has yet to recover to pre-conflict levels. Continued resistance by donors and the international community will restrict Burundi's economic growth as the country deals with a large current account deficit."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$8.007 billion (2017 est.) / $8.007 billion (2016 est.) / $8.091 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/cd.json

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
     },
     "Geography - note": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "note 1: Chad is the largest of Africa's 16 landlocked countries note 2: not long ago - geologically speaking - what is today the Sahara was green savannah teeming with wildlife; during the African Humid Period, roughly 11,000 to 5,000 years ago, a vibrant animal community, including elephants, giraffes, hippos, and antelope lived there; the last remnant of the \"Green Sahara\" exists in the Lakes of Ounianga (oo-nee-ahn-ga) in northern Chad, a series of 18 interconnected freshwater, saline, and hypersaline lakes now protected as a World Heritage site note 3: Lake Chad, the most significant water body in the Sahel, is a remnant of a former inland sea, paleolake Mega-Chad; at its greatest extent, sometime before 5000 B.C., Lake Mega-Chad was the largest of four Saharan paleolakes that existed during the African Humid Period; it covered an area of about 400,000 sq km (150,000 sq mi), roughly the size of today's Caspian Sea"
+        "text": "note 1: Chad is the largest of Africa's 16 landlocked countries ++ note 2: not long ago - geologically speaking - what is today the Sahara was green savannah teeming with wildlife; during the African Humid Period, roughly 11,000 to 5,000 years ago, a vibrant animal community, including elephants, giraffes, hippos, and antelope lived there; the last remnant of the \"Green Sahara\" exists in the Lakes of Ounianga (oo-nee-ahn-ga) in northern Chad, a series of 18 interconnected freshwater, saline, and hypersaline lakes now protected as a World Heritage site ++ note 3: Lake Chad, the most significant water body in the Sahel, is a remnant of a former inland sea, paleolake Mega-Chad; at its greatest extent, sometime before 5000 B.C., Lake Mega-Chad was the largest of four Saharan paleolakes that existed during the African Humid Period; it covered an area of about 400,000 sq km (150,000 sq mi), roughly the size of today's Caspian Sea"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 52.1%, Protestant 23.9%, Roman Catholic 20%, animist 0.3%, other Christian 0.2%, none 2.8%, unspecified 0.7% (2014-15 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Despite the start of oil production in 2003, 40% of Chad’s population lives below the poverty line. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country’s very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of the populace is under the age of 25 – although the mortality rate is high and life expectancy is low. Chad has the world’s third highest maternal mortality rate. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected. To improve women’s reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will need to increase women’s educational attainment, job participation, and knowledge of and access to family planning. Only about a quarter of women are literate, less than 5% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting.\nAs of October 2017, more than 320,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 75,000 from the Central African Republic strain Chad’s limited resources and create tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left nearly 60,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country."
+      "text": "Despite the start of oil production in 2003, 40% of Chad's population lives below the poverty line. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country's very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – more than 65% of the populace is under the age of 25 – although the mortality rate is high and life expectancy is low. Chad has the world's third highest maternal mortality rate. Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anemia, rural habitation, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected. To improve women's reproductive health and reduce fertility, Chad will need to increase women's educational attainment, job participation, and knowledge of and access to family planning. Only about a quarter of women are literate, less than 5% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting. ++ As of October 2017, more than 320,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 75,000 from the Central African Republic strain Chad's limited resources and create tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region, but past fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left nearly 60,000 of its citizens displaced in the eastern part of the country."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -257,14 +257,11 @@
       "text": "5.7% (2014/15)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 13.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 86.7% of population / rural: 46.6% of population / total: 55.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "53.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "44.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 13.3% of population / rural: 53.4% of population / total: 44.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -274,14 +271,11 @@
       "text": "0.04 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 43.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 56.5% of population / rural: 3.1% of population / total: 15.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "96.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "84.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 43.5% of population / rural: 96.9% of population / total: 84.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -469,7 +463,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Chadian Convention for Peace and Development or CTPD [Laoukein Kourayo MEDAR]Federation Action for the Republic or FAR [Ngarledjy YORONGAR]Framework of Popular Action for Solidarity and Unity of the Republic or CAP-SUR [Joseph Djimrangar DADNADJI]National Rally for Development and Progress or Viva-RNDP [Dr. Nouradine Delwa Kassire COUMAKOYE]National Union for Democracy and Renewal or UNDR [Saleh KEBZABO]Party for Liberty and Development or PLD [Ahmat ALHABO]Party for Unity and ReconciliationPatriotic Salvation Movement or MPS [Idriss DEBY]Rally for Democracy and Progress or RDP [Mahamat Allahou TAHER]RNDT/Le Reveil [Albert Pahimi PADACKE]Social Democratic Party for a Change-over of Power or PDSA [Malloum YOBODA]Union for Renewal and Democracy or URD [Felix Romadoumngar NIALBE]"
+      "text": "Chadian Convention for Peace and Development or CTPD [Laoukein Kourayo MEDAR] ++ Federation Action for the Republic or FAR [Ngarledjy YORONGAR] ++ Framework of Popular Action for Solidarity and Unity of the Republic or CAP-SUR [Joseph Djimrangar DADNADJI] ++ National Rally for Development and Progress or Viva-RNDP [Dr. Nouradine Delwa Kassire COUMAKOYE] ++ National Union for Democracy and Renewal or UNDR [Saleh KEBZABO] ++ Party for Liberty and Development or PLD [Ahmat ALHABO] ++ Party for Unity and Reconciliation ++ Patriotic Salvation Movement or MPS [Idriss DEBY] ++ Rally for Democracy and Progress or RDP [Mahamat Allahou TAHER]RNDT/Le Reveil [Albert Pahimi PADACKE] ++ Social Democratic Party for a Change-over of Power or PDSA [Malloum YOBODA] ++ Union for Renewal and Democracy or URD [Felix Romadoumngar NIALBE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, BDEAC, CEMAC, EITI (compliant country), FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -496,7 +490,7 @@
         "text": "[235] 2251-5017"
       },
       "embassy": {
-        "text": "US Embassy N’Djamena, B.P. 413, N’Djamena"
+        "text": "US Embassy N'Djamena, B.P. 413, N'Djamena"
       },
       "mailing address": {
         "text": "B. P. 413, N'Djamena"
@@ -528,7 +522,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Chad’s landlocked location results in high transportation costs for imported goods and dependence on neighboring countries. Oil and agriculture are mainstays of Chad’s economy. Oil provides about 60% of export revenues, while cotton, cattle, livestock, and gum arabic provide the bulk of Chad's non-oil export earnings. The services sector contributes less than one-third of GDP and has attracted foreign investment mostly through telecommunications and banking. Nearly all of Chad’s fuel is provided by one domestic refinery, and unanticipated shutdowns occasionally result in shortages. The country regulates the price of domestic fuel, providing an incentive for black market sales. Although high oil prices and strong local harvests supported the economy in the past, low oil prices now stress Chad’s fiscal position and have resulted in significant government cutbacks. Chad relies on foreign assistance and foreign capital for most of its public and private sector investment. Investment in Chad is difficult due to its limited infrastructure, lack of trained workers, extensive government bureaucracy, and corruption. Chad obtained a three-year extended credit facility from the IMF in 2014 and was granted debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in April 2015. In 2018, economic policy will be driven by efforts that started in 2016 to reverse the recession and to repair damage to public finances and exports. The government is implementing an emergency action plan to counterbalance the drop in oil revenue and to diversify the economy. Chad’s national development plan (NDP) cost just over $9 billion with a financing gap of $6.7 billion. The NDP emphasized the importance of private sector participation in Chad’s development, as well as the need to improve the business environment, particularly in priority sectors such as mining and agriculture. The Government of Chad reached a deal with Glencore and four other banks on the restructuring of a $1.45 billion oil-backed loan in February 2018, after a long negotiation. The new terms include an extension of the maturity to 2030 from 2022, a two-year grace period on principal repayments, and a lower interest rate of the London Inter-bank Offer Rate (Libor) plus 2% - down from Libor plus 7.5%. The original Glencore loan was to be repaid with crude oil assets, however, Chad's oil sales were hit by the downturn in the price of oil. Chad had secured a $312 million credit from the IMF in June 2017, but release of those funds hinged on restructuring the Glencore debt. Chad had already cut public spending to try to meet the terms of the IMF program, but that prompted strikes and protests in a country where nearly 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. Multinational partners, such as the African Development Bank, the EU, and the World Bank are likely to continue budget support in 2018, but Chad will remain at high debt risk, given its dependence on oil revenue and pressure to spend on subsidies and security."
+      "text": "Chad's landlocked location results in high transportation costs for imported goods and dependence on neighboring countries. Oil and agriculture are mainstays of Chad's economy. Oil provides about 60% of export revenues, while cotton, cattle, livestock, and gum arabic provide the bulk of Chad's non-oil export earnings. The services sector contributes less than one-third of GDP and has attracted foreign investment mostly through telecommunications and banking. ++ Nearly all of Chad's fuel is provided by one domestic refinery, and unanticipated shutdowns occasionally result in shortages. The country regulates the price of domestic fuel, providing an incentive for black market sales. ++ Although high oil prices and strong local harvests supported the economy in the past, low oil prices now stress Chad's fiscal position and have resulted in significant government cutbacks. Chad relies on foreign assistance and foreign capital for most of its public and private sector investment. Investment in Chad is difficult due to its limited infrastructure, lack of trained workers, extensive government bureaucracy, and corruption. Chad obtained a three-year extended credit facility from the IMF in 2014 and was granted debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in April 2015. ++ In 2018, economic policy will be driven by efforts that started in 2016 to reverse the recession and to repair damage to public finances and exports. The government is implementing an emergency action plan to counterbalance the drop in oil revenue and to diversify the economy. Chad's national development plan (NDP) cost just over $9 billion with a financing gap of $6.7 billion. The NDP emphasized the importance of private sector participation in Chad's development, as well as the need to improve the business environment, particularly in priority sectors such as mining and agriculture. ++ The Government of Chad reached a deal with Glencore and four other banks on the restructuring of a $1.45 billion oil-backed loan in February 2018, after a long negotiation. The new terms include an extension of the maturity to 2030 from 2022, a two-year grace period on principal repayments, and a lower interest rate of the London Inter-bank Offer Rate (Libor) plus 2% - down from Libor plus 7.5%. The original Glencore loan was to be repaid with crude oil assets, however, Chad's oil sales were hit by the downturn in the price of oil. Chad had secured a $312 million credit from the IMF in June 2017, but release of those funds hinged on restructuring the Glencore debt. Chad had already cut public spending to try to meet the terms of the IMF program, but that prompted strikes and protests in a country where nearly 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. Multinational partners, such as the African Development Bank, the EU, and the World Bank are likely to continue budget support in 2018, but Chad will remain at high debt risk, given its dependence on oil revenue and pressure to spend on subsidies and security."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$28.62 billion (2017 est.) / $29.55 billion (2016 est.) / $31.58 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -898,7 +892,7 @@
       "text": "20 is the legal minimum age for compulsory military service, with a 3-year service obligation; 18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary service; no minimum age restriction for volunteers with consent from a parent or guardian; women are subject to 1 year of compulsory military or civic service at age 21; while provisions for military service have not been repealed, they have never been fully implemented (2015)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the ANT is chiefly focused on counterinsurgency/counter-terrorist operations against Boko Haram (BH) and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) in the Lake Chad Basin area (primarily the Lac Province) and countering the terrorist threat in the Sahel; in 2020, it conducted a large military operation against BH in the Lake Chad region; also in 2020, Chad sent troops to the tri-border area with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to combat ISWA militantsChad is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; Chad has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane; Chad hosts the headquarters of Operation Barkhane in N’DjamenaChad has committed approximately 1,000-1,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically; in 2019, Chad sent more than 1,000 troops to Nigeria’s Borno State to fight BH as part of the MNJTF mission (2020)"
+      "text": "the ANT is chiefly focused on counterinsurgency/counter-terrorist operations against Boko Haram (BH) and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) in the Lake Chad Basin area (primarily the Lac Province) and countering the terrorist threat in the Sahel; in 2020, it conducted a large military operation against BH in the Lake Chad region; also in 2020, Chad sent troops to the tri-border area with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to combat ISWA militants ++ Chad is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; Chad has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane; Chad hosts the headquarters of Operation Barkhane in N'Djamena ++ Chad has committed approximately 1,000-1,500 troops to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically; in 2019, Chad sent more than 1,000 troops to Nigeria's Borno State to fight BH as part of the MNJTF mission (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {

africa/cf.json

@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "30.1% (2014/15)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.5% of population / rural: 56.4% of population / total: 83.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "43.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "16.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.5% of population / rural: 43.6% of population / total: 16.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "0.16 physicians/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 26.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 73.4% of population / rural: 15.1% of population / total: 53.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "84.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "46.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 26.6% of population / rural: 84.9% of population / total: 46.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -401,7 +395,7 @@
         "text": "several previous; latest approved by referendum 25 October 2015"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by Parliament; passage of presidential proposals requires Supreme Court review followed by approval in a referendum; such proposals may also be submitted directly to Parliament, in which case passage requires at least three-quarters majority vote of both houses in joint session; proposals by Parliament require three-fourths majority vote of both houses in joint session; constitutional articles including those affecting the country’s territory, republican form of government, and secularity of the state are not amendable"
+        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by Parliament; passage of presidential proposals requires Supreme Court review followed by approval in a referendum; such proposals may also be submitted directly to Parliament, in which case passage requires at least three-quarters majority vote of both houses in joint session; proposals by Parliament require three-fourths majority vote of both houses in joint session; constitutional articles including those affecting the country's territory, republican form of government, and secularity of the state are not amendable"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -446,13 +440,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of:Senate (72 seats; members indirectly elected by regional councils by simple majority vote to serve 6-year terms with one-half of membership renewed every 3 years) National Assembly (151 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of: Senate (72 seats; members indirectly elected by regional councils by simple majority vote to serve 6-year terms with one-half of membership renewed every 3 years) ++ National Assembly (151 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "  Senate - last held on 31 August 2017 for expiry of half the seats (next to be held in 2020) National Assembly - last held on 16 and 30 July 2017 (next to be held in July 2022)"
+        "text": "  ++ Senate - last held on 31 August 2017 for expiry of half the seats (next to be held in 2020) ++ National Assembly - last held on 16 and 30 July 2017 (next to be held in July 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "  Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PCT 46, independent 12, MAR 2, RDPS 2, UPADS 2, DRD 1, FP 1, MCDDI 1, PRL 1, Pulp 1, PUR 1, RC 1; composition - men 58, women 14, percent of women 19.4% National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PCT 96, UPADS 8, MCDDI 4, other 23 (less than 4 seats) independent 20; composition - men 134, women 17, percent of women 11.3%; note - total Parliament percent of women 13.9%"
+        "text": "  ++ Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PCT 46, independent 12, MAR 2, RDPS 2, UPADS 2, DRD 1, FP 1, MCDDI 1, PRL 1, Pulp 1, PUR 1, RC 1; composition - men 58, women 14, percent of women 19.4% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PCT 96, UPADS 8, MCDDI 4, other 23 (less than 4 seats) independent 20; composition - men 134, women 17, percent of women 11.3%; note - total Parliament percent of women 13.9% ++"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -467,7 +461,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Action Movement for Renewal or MAR [Roland BOUITI-VIAUDO]Citizen's Rally or RC [Claude Alphonse NSILOU]Congolese Labour Party or PCT [Denis SASSOU-NGUESSO]Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development or MCDDI [Guy Price Parfait KOLELAS]Movement for Unity, Solidarity, and Work or MUST [Claudine MUNARI]Pan-African Union for Social Development or UPADS [Pascal Tsaty MABIALA]Party for the Unity of the Republic or PURPatriotic Union for Democracy and Progress or UPDP [Auguste-Celestin GONGARD NKOUA]Prospects and Realities Club or CPRRally for Democracy and Social Progress or RDPS [Bernard BATCHI]Rally of the Presidential Majority or RMPRepublican and Liberal Party or PRL [Bonaventure MIZIDY]Union for the Republic or URUnion of Democratic Forces or UDFUnion for Democracy and Republic or UDRmany smaller parties"
+      "text": "Action Movement for Renewal or MAR [Roland BOUITI-VIAUDO] ++ Citizen's Rally or RC [Claude Alphonse NSILOU] ++ Congolese Labour Party or PCT [Denis SASSOU-NGUESSO] ++ Congolese Movement for Democracy and Integral Development or MCDDI [Guy Price Parfait KOLELAS] ++ Movement for Unity, Solidarity, and Work or MUST [Claudine MUNARI] ++ Pan-African Union for Social Development or UPADS [Pascal Tsaty MABIALA] ++ Party for the Unity of the Republic or PUR ++ Patriotic Union for Democracy and Progress or UPDP [Auguste-Celestin GONGARD NKOUA] ++ Prospects and Realities Club or CPR ++ Rally for Democracy and Social Progress or RDPS [Bernard BATCHI] ++ Rally of the Presidential Majority or RMP ++ Republican and Liberal Party or PRL [Bonaventure MIZIDY] ++ Union for the Republic or UR ++ Union of Democratic Forces or UDF ++ Union for Democracy and Republic or UDR ++ many smaller parties"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, BDEAC, CEMAC, EITI (compliant country), FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -523,7 +517,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The Republic of the Congo’s economy is a mixture of subsistence farming, an industrial sector based largely on oil and support services, and government spending. Oil has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy, providing a major share of government revenues and exports. Natural gas is increasingly being converted to electricity rather than being flared, greatly improving energy prospects. New mining projects, particularly iron ore, which entered production in late 2013, may add as much as $1 billion to annual government revenue. The Republic of the Congo is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and shares a common currency – the Central African Franc – with five other member states in the region. The current administration faces difficult economic challenges of stimulating recovery and reducing poverty. The drop in oil prices that began in 2014 has constrained government spending; lower oil prices forced the government to cut more than $1 billion in planned spending. The fiscal deficit amounted to 11% of GDP in 2017. The government’s inability to pay civil servant salaries has resulted in multiple rounds of strikes by many groups, including doctors, nurses, and teachers. In the wake of a multi-year recession, the country reached out to the IMF in 2017 for a new program; the IMF noted that the country’s continued dependence on oil, unsustainable debt, and significant governance weakness are key impediments to the country’s economy. In 2018, the country’s external debt level will approach 120% of GDP. The IMF urged the government to renegotiate debts levels to sustainable levels before it agreed to a new macroeconomic adjustment package."
+      "text": "The Republic of the Congo's economy is a mixture of subsistence farming, an industrial sector based largely on oil and support services, and government spending. Oil has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy, providing a major share of government revenues and exports. Natural gas is increasingly being converted to electricity rather than being flared, greatly improving energy prospects. New mining projects, particularly iron ore, which entered production in late 2013, may add as much as $1 billion to annual government revenue. The Republic of the Congo is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and shares a common currency – the Central African Franc – with five other member states in the region. ++ The current administration faces difficult economic challenges of stimulating recovery and reducing poverty. The drop in oil prices that began in 2014 has constrained government spending; lower oil prices forced the government to cut more than $1 billion in planned spending. The fiscal deficit amounted to 11% of GDP in 2017. The government's inability to pay civil servant salaries has resulted in multiple rounds of strikes by many groups, including doctors, nurses, and teachers. In the wake of a multi-year recession, the country reached out to the IMF in 2017 for a new program; the IMF noted that the country's continued dependence on oil, unsustainable debt, and significant governance weakness are key impediments to the country's economy. In 2018, the country's external debt level will approach 120% of GDP. The IMF urged the government to renegotiate debts levels to sustainable levels before it agreed to a new macroeconomic adjustment package."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$29.39 billion (2017 est.) / $30.33 billion (2016 est.) / $31.22 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/cg.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The Kingdom of Kongo ruled the area around the mouth of the Congo River from the 14th to 19th centuries. To the center and east, the Kingdoms of Luba and Lunda ruled from the 16th and 17th centuries to the 19th century. in the 1870s, European exploration of the Congo Basin, sponsored by King Leopold II of Belgium, eventually allowed the ruler to acquire rights to the Congo territory and to make it his private property under the name of the Congo Free State. During the Free State, the king's colonial military forced the local population to produce rubber. From 1885 to 1908, millions of Congolese people died as a result of disease and exploitation. International condemnation finally forced Leopold to cede the land to Belgium, creating the Belgian Congo.The Republic of the Congo gained its independence from Belgium in 1960, but its early years were marred by political and social instability. Col. Joseph MOBUTU seized power and declared himself president in a November 1965 coup. He subsequently changed his name - to MOBUTU Sese Seko - as well as that of the country - to Zaire. MOBUTU retained his position for 32 years through several sham elections, as well as through brutal force. Ethnic strife and civil war, touched off by a massive inflow of refugees in 1994 from conflict in Rwanda and Burundi, led in May 1997 to the toppling of the MOBUTU regime by a rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda and fronted by Laurent KABILA. KABILA renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but in August 1998 his regime was itself challenged by a second insurrection again backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Troops from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe intervened to support KABILA's regime. In January 2001, KABILA was assassinated and his son, Joseph KABILA, was named head of state. In October 2002, the new president was successful in negotiating the withdrawal of Rwandan forces occupying the eastern DRC; two months later, the Pretoria Accord was signed by all remaining warring parties to end the fighting and establish a government of national unity. Presidential, National Assembly, and provincial legislatures took place in 2006, with Joseph KABILA elected to office. National elections were held in November 2011 and disputed results allowed Joseph KABILA to be reelected to the presidency. While the DRC constitution barred President KABILA from running for a third term, the DRC Government delayed national elections originally slated for November 2016, to 30 December 2018. This failure to hold elections as scheduled fueled significant civil and political unrest, with sporadic street protests by KABILA’s opponents and exacerbation of tensions in the tumultuous eastern DRC regions. Presidential, legislative, and provincial elections were held in late December 2018 and early 2019 across most of the country. The DRC Government canceled presidential elections in the cities of Beni and Butembo (citing concerns over an ongoing Ebola outbreak in the region) as well as Yumbi (which had recently experienced heavy violence). Opposition candidate Felix TSHISEKEDI was announced the election winner on 10 January 2019 and inaugurated two weeks later. This was the first transfer of power to an opposition candidate without significant violence or a coup since the DRC's independence.  The DRC, particularly in the East, continues to experience violence perpetrated by more than 100 armed groups active in the region, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and assorted Mai Mai militias. The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has operated in the region since 1999 and is the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping mission in the world.  "
+      "text": "The Kingdom of Kongo ruled the area around the mouth of the Congo River from the 14th to 19th centuries. To the center and east, the Kingdoms of Luba and Lunda ruled from the 16th and 17th centuries to the 19th century. in the 1870s, European exploration of the Congo Basin, sponsored by King Leopold II of Belgium, eventually allowed the ruler to acquire rights to the Congo territory and to make it his private property under the name of the Congo Free State. During the Free State, the king's colonial military forced the local population to produce rubber. From 1885 to 1908, millions of Congolese people died as a result of disease and exploitation. International condemnation finally forced Leopold to cede the land to Belgium, creating the Belgian Congo. ++ The Republic of the Congo gained its independence from Belgium in 1960, but its early years were marred by political and social instability. Col. Joseph MOBUTU seized power and declared himself president in a November 1965 coup. He subsequently changed his name - to MOBUTU Sese Seko - as well as that of the country - to Zaire. MOBUTU retained his position for 32 years through several sham elections, as well as through brutal force. Ethnic strife and civil war, touched off by a massive inflow of refugees in 1994 from conflict in Rwanda and Burundi, led in May 1997 to the toppling of the MOBUTU regime by a rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda and fronted by Laurent KABILA. KABILA renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but in August 1998 his regime was itself challenged by a second insurrection again backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Troops from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe intervened to support KABILA's regime. In January 2001, KABILA was assassinated and his son, Joseph KABILA, was named head of state. In October 2002, the new president was successful in negotiating the withdrawal of Rwandan forces occupying the eastern DRC; two months later, the Pretoria Accord was signed by all remaining warring parties to end the fighting and establish a government of national unity. Presidential, National Assembly, and provincial legislatures took place in 2006, with Joseph KABILA elected to office. ++ National elections were held in November 2011 and disputed results allowed Joseph KABILA to be reelected to the presidency. While the DRC constitution barred President KABILA from running for a third term, the DRC Government delayed national elections originally slated for November 2016, to 30 December 2018. This failure to hold elections as scheduled fueled significant civil and political unrest, with sporadic street protests by KABILA's opponents and exacerbation of tensions in the tumultuous eastern DRC regions. Presidential, legislative, and provincial elections were held in late December 2018 and early 2019 across most of the country. The DRC Government canceled presidential elections in the cities of Beni and Butembo (citing concerns over an ongoing Ebola outbreak in the region) as well as Yumbi (which had recently experienced heavy violence). ++ Opposition candidate Felix TSHISEKEDI was announced the election winner on 10 January 2019 and inaugurated two weeks later. This was the first transfer of power to an opposition candidate without significant violence or a coup since the DRC's independence.  ++ The DRC, particularly in the East, continues to experience violence perpetrated by more than 100 armed groups active in the region, including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and assorted Mai Mai militias. The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) has operated in the region since 1999 and is the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping mission in the world. ++  "
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
       "text": "urban clusters are spread throughout the country, particularly in the northeast along the boarder with Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi; the largest city is the capital, Kinshasha, located in the west along the Congo River; the south is least densely populated as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "periodic droughts in south; Congo River floods (seasonal); active volcanoes in the east along the Great Rift Valley\nvolcanism: Nyiragongo (3,470 m), which erupted in 2002 and is experiencing ongoing activity, poses a major threat to the city of Goma, home to a quarter million people; the volcano produces unusually fast-moving lava, known to travel up to 100 km /hr; Nyiragongo has been deemed a Decade Volcano by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to its explosive history and close proximity to human populations; its neighbor, Nyamuragira, which erupted in 2010, is Africa's most active volcano; Visoke is the only other historically active volcano"
+      "text": "periodic droughts in south; Congo River floods (seasonal); active volcanoes in the east along the Great Rift Valley ++ volcanism: Nyiragongo (3,470 m), which erupted in 2002 and is experiencing ongoing activity, poses a major threat to the city of Goma, home to a quarter million people; the volcano produces unusually fast-moving lava, known to travel up to 100 km /hr; Nyiragongo has been deemed a Decade Volcano by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to its explosive history and close proximity to human populations; its neighbor, Nyamuragira, which erupted in 2010, is Africa's most active volcano; Visoke is the only other historically active volcano"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "poaching threatens wildlife populations; water pollution; deforestation (forests endangered by fires set to clean the land for agricultural purposes; forests also used as a source of fuel); soil erosion; mining (diamonds, gold, coltan - a mineral used in creating capacitors for electronic devices) causing environmental damage"
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
     },
     "Geography - note": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "note 1: second largest country in Africa (after Algeria) and largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa; straddles the equator; dense tropical rain forest in central river basin and eastern highlands; the narrow strip of land that controls the lower Congo River is the DRC's only outlet to the South Atlantic Ocean note 2: because of its speed, cataracts, rapids, and turbulence the Congo River, most of which flows through the DRC, has never been accurately measured along much of its length; nonetheless, it is conceded to be the deepest river in the world; estimates of its greatest depth vary between 220 and 250 meters"
+        "text": "note 1: second largest country in Africa (after Algeria) and largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa; straddles the equator; dense tropical rain forest in central river basin and eastern highlands; the narrow strip of land that controls the lower Congo River is the DRC's only outlet to the South Atlantic Ocean ++ note 2: because of its speed, cataracts, rapids, and turbulence the Congo River, most of which flows through the DRC, has never been accurately measured along much of its length; nonetheless, it is conceded to be the deepest river in the world; estimates of its greatest depth vary between 220 and 250 meters"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 29.9%, Protestant 26.7%, Kimbanguist 2.8%, other Christian 36.5%, Muslim 1.3%, other (includes syncretic sects and indigenous beliefs) 1.2%, none 1.3%, unspecified .2% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food insecurity; almost 30 percent of children under the age of 5 are malnourished. The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation, and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at almost 5 children per woman and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the cultural preference for larger families.\nThe DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 540,000 Congolese refugees remained abroad as of year-end 2015. In addition, an estimated 3.9 million Congolese were internally displaced as of October 2017, the vast majority fleeing violence between rebel group and Congolese armed forces. Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including Rwanda, the Central African Republic, and Burundi."
+      "text": "Despite a wealth of fertile soil, hydroelectric power potential, and mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) struggles with many socioeconomic problems, including high infant and maternal mortality rates, malnutrition, poor vaccination coverage, lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation, and frequent and early fertility. Ongoing conflict, mismanagement of resources, and a lack of investment have resulted in food insecurity; almost 30 percent of children under the age of 5 are malnourished. The overall coverage of basic public services – education, health, sanitation, and potable water – is very limited and piecemeal, with substantial regional and rural/urban disparities. Fertility remains high at almost 5 children per woman and is likely to remain high because of the low use of contraception and the cultural preference for larger families. ++ The DRC is a source and host country for refugees. Between 2012 and 2014, more than 119,000 Congolese refugees returned from the Republic of Congo to the relative stability of northwest DRC, but more than 540,000 Congolese refugees remained abroad as of year-end 2015. In addition, an estimated 3.9 million Congolese were internally displaced as of October 2017, the vast majority fleeing violence between rebel group and Congolese armed forces. Thousands of refugees have come to the DRC from neighboring countries, including Rwanda, the Central African Republic, and Burundi."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -263,14 +263,11 @@
       "text": "20.4% (2013/14)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 15.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 84.3% of population / rural: 32.4% of population / total: 55.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "67.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "44.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 15.7% of population / rural: 67.6% of population / total: 44.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -280,14 +277,11 @@
       "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (201)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 44.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 54.7% of population / rural: 29.8% of population / total: 40.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "70.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "59.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 44.5% of population / rural: 70.2% of population / total: 59.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -316,7 +310,7 @@
         "text": "rabies"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "note - on 18 October 2019, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a Travel Health Notice for an Ebola outbreak in the South Kivu (Kivu Sud), North Kivu (Kivu Nord), and Ituri provinces in the northeastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; travelers to this area could be infected with Ebola if they come into contact with an infected person’s blood or other body fluids; travelers should seek medical care immediately if they develop fever, muscle pain, sore throat, diarrhea, weakness, vomiting, stomach pain, or unexplained bleeding or bruising during or after travel"
+        "text": "note - on 18 October 2019, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a Travel Health Notice for an Ebola outbreak in the South Kivu (Kivu Sud), North Kivu (Kivu Nord), and Ituri provinces in the northeastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; travelers to this area could be infected with Ebola if they come into contact with an infected person's blood or other body fluids; travelers should seek medical care immediately if they develop fever, muscle pain, sore throat, diarrhea, weakness, vomiting, stomach pain, or unexplained bleeding or bruising during or after travel"
       }
     },
     "Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -403,7 +397,7 @@
         "text": "UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "note: the DRC has two time zonesetymology: founded as a trading post in 1881 and named Leopoldville in honor of King Leopold II of the Belgians, who controlled the Congo Free State, the vast central African territory that became the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1960; in 1966, Leopoldville was renamed Kinshasa, after a village of that name that once stood near the site"
+        "text": "note: the DRC has two time zones ++ etymology: founded as a trading post in 1881 and named Leopoldville in honor of King Leopold II of the Belgians, who controlled the Congo Free State, the vast central African territory that became the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1960; in 1966, Leopoldville was renamed Kinshasa, after a village of that name that once stood near the site ++ ++"
       }
     },
     "Administrative divisions": {
@@ -465,13 +459,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of:Senate (108 seats; members indirectly elected by provincial assemblies by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms) National Assembly (500 seats; 439 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 61 directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of: Senate (108 seats; members indirectly elected by provincial assemblies by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms) ++ National Assembly (500 seats; 439 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 61 directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 19 January 2007 (follow-on election has been delayed) National Assembly - last held on 30 December 2018"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 19 January 2007 (follow-on election has been delayed) ++ National Assembly - last held on 30 December 2018"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PPRD 22, MLC 14, FR 7, RCD 7, PDC 6, CDC 3, MSR 3, PALU 2, other 18, independent 26; composition - men 103, women 5, percent of women 4.6% National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PPRD 62, UDPS 41, PPPD 29, MSR 27, MLC 22, PALU 19, UNC 17, ARC 16, AFDC 15, ECT 11, RRC 11, other 214 (includes numerous political parties that won 10 or fewer seats and 2 constituencies where voting was halted), independent 16; composition - men 456, women 44, percent of women  8.8%; total Parliament percent of women 8.1%;note - the November 2011 election was marred by violence including the destruction of ballots in 2 constituencies resulting in the closure of polling sites; election results were delayed 3 months, strongly contested, and continue to be unresolved"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PPRD 22, MLC 14, FR 7, RCD 7, PDC 6, CDC 3, MSR 3, PALU 2, other 18, independent 26; composition - men 103, women 5, percent of women 4.6% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PPRD 62, UDPS 41, PPPD 29, MSR 27, MLC 22, PALU 19, UNC 17, ARC 16, AFDC 15, ECT 11, RRC 11, other 214 (includes numerous political parties that won 10 or fewer seats and 2 constituencies where voting was halted), independent 16; composition - men 456, women 44, percent of women  8.8%; total Parliament percent of women 8.1%;note - the November 2011 election was marred by violence including the destruction of ballots in 2 constituencies resulting in the closure of polling sites; election results were delayed 3 months, strongly contested, and continue to be unresolved"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -486,7 +480,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Christian Democrat Party or PDC [Jose ENDUNDO]Congolese Rally for Democracy or RCD [Azarias RUBERWA]Convention of Christian Democrats or CDCEngagement for Citizenship and Development or ECiDe [Martin FAYULU]Forces of Renewal or FR [Mbusa NYAMWISI]Lamuka coalition [Martin FAYULU] (includes ECiDe, MLC, Together for Change, CNB, and, Nouvel Elan)Movement for the Liberation of the Congo or MLC [Jean-Pierre BEMBA]Nouvel Elan [Adolphe MUZITO]Our Congo or CNB (\"Congo Na Biso\") [Freddy MATUNGULU]People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy or PPRD [Henri MOVA Sakanyi]Social Movement for Renewal or MSR [Pierre LUMBI]Together for Change (Ensemble\") [Moise KATUMBI]Unified Lumumbist Party or PALU [Antoine GIZENGA]Union for the Congolese Nation or UNC [Vital KAMERHE]Union for Democracy and Social Progress or UDPS [Felix TSHISEKEDI]"
+      "text": "Christian Democrat Party or PDC [Jose ENDUNDO] ++ Congolese Rally for Democracy or RCD [Azarias RUBERWA] ++ Convention of Christian Democrats or CDC ++ Engagement for Citizenship and Development or ECiDe [Martin FAYULU] ++ Forces of Renewal or FR [Mbusa NYAMWISI] ++ Lamuka coalition [Martin FAYULU] (includes ECiDe, MLC, Together for Change, CNB, and, Nouvel Elan) ++ Movement for the Liberation of the Congo or MLC [Jean-Pierre BEMBA] ++ Nouvel Elan [Adolphe MUZITO] ++ Our Congo or CNB (\"Congo Na Biso\") [Freddy MATUNGULU] ++ People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy or PPRD [Henri MOVA Sakanyi] ++ Social Movement for Renewal or MSR [Pierre LUMBI] ++ Together for Change (Ensemble\") [Moise KATUMBI] ++ Unified Lumumbist Party or PALU [Antoine GIZENGA] ++ Union for the Congolese Nation or UNC [Vital KAMERHE] ++ Union for Democracy and Social Progress or UDPS [Felix TSHISEKEDI]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CEMAC, CEPGL, COMESA, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -545,7 +539,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a nation endowed with vast natural resource wealth - continues to perform poorly. Systemic corruption since independence in 1960, combined with countrywide instability and intermittent conflict that began in the early-90s, has reduced national output and government revenue, and increased external debt. With the installation of a transitional government in 2003 after peace accords, economic conditions slowly began to improve as the government reopened relations with international financial institutions and international donors, and President KABILA began implementing reforms. Progress on implementing substantive economic reforms remains slow because of political instability, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and patronage, which also dampen international investment prospects. Renewed activity in the mining sector, the source of most export income, boosted Kinshasa's fiscal position and GDP growth until 2015, but low commodity prices have led to slower growth, volatile inflation, currency depreciation, and a growing fiscal deficit. An uncertain legal framework, corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policy are long-term problems for the large mining sector and for the economy as a whole. Much economic activity still occurs in the informal sector and is not reflected in GDP data. Poverty remains widespread in DRC, and the country failed to meet any Millennium Development Goals by 2015. DRC also concluded its program with the IMF in 2015. The price of copper – the DRC’s primary export - plummeted in 2015 and remained at record lows during 2016-17, reducing government revenues, expenditures, and foreign exchange reserves, while inflation reached nearly 50% in mid-2017 – its highest level since the early 2000s."
+      "text": "The economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo - a nation endowed with vast natural resource wealth - continues to perform poorly. Systemic corruption since independence in 1960, combined with countrywide instability and intermittent conflict that began in the early-90s, has reduced national output and government revenue, and increased external debt. With the installation of a transitional government in 2003 after peace accords, economic conditions slowly began to improve as the government reopened relations with international financial institutions and international donors, and President KABILA began implementing reforms. Progress on implementing substantive economic reforms remains slow because of political instability, bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and patronage, which also dampen international investment prospects. ++ Renewed activity in the mining sector, the source of most export income, boosted Kinshasa's fiscal position and GDP growth until 2015, but low commodity prices have led to slower growth, volatile inflation, currency depreciation, and a growing fiscal deficit. An uncertain legal framework, corruption, and a lack of transparency in government policy are long-term problems for the large mining sector and for the economy as a whole. Much economic activity still occurs in the informal sector and is not reflected in GDP data. ++ Poverty remains widespread in DRC, and the country failed to meet any Millennium Development Goals by 2015. DRC also concluded its program with the IMF in 2015. The price of copper – the DRC's primary export - plummeted in 2015 and remained at record lows during 2016-17, reducing government revenues, expenditures, and foreign exchange reserves, while inflation reached nearly 50% in mid-2017 – its highest level since the early 2000s."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$68.6 billion (2017 est.) / $66.33 billion (2016 est.) / $64.78 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -985,7 +979,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a source, destination, and possibly a transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; the majority of this trafficking is internal, and much of it is perpetrated by armed groups and rogue government forces outside official control in the country's unstable eastern provinces; Congolese adults are subjected to forced labor, including debt bondage, in unlicensed mines, and women may be forced into prostitution; Congolese women and girls are subjected to forced marriages where they are vulnerable to domestic servitude or sex trafficking, while children are forced to work in agriculture, mining, mineral smuggling, vending, portering, and begging; Congolese women and children migrate to countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe where some are subjected to forced prostitution, domestic servitude, and forced labor in agriculture and diamond mining; indigenous and foreign armed groups, including the Lord’s Resistance Army, abduct and forcibly recruit Congolese adults and children to serve as laborers, porters, domestics, combatants, and sex slaves; some elements of the Congolese national army (FARDC) also forced adults to carry supplies, equipment, and looted goods, but no cases of the FARDC recruiting child soldiers were reported in 2014 – a significant change"
+        "text": "The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a source, destination, and possibly a transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; the majority of this trafficking is internal, and much of it is perpetrated by armed groups and rogue government forces outside official control in the country's unstable eastern provinces; Congolese adults are subjected to forced labor, including debt bondage, in unlicensed mines, and women may be forced into prostitution; Congolese women and girls are subjected to forced marriages where they are vulnerable to domestic servitude or sex trafficking, while children are forced to work in agriculture, mining, mineral smuggling, vending, portering, and begging; Congolese women and children migrate to countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe where some are subjected to forced prostitution, domestic servitude, and forced labor in agriculture and diamond mining; indigenous and foreign armed groups, including the Lord's Resistance Army, abduct and forcibly recruit Congolese adults and children to serve as laborers, porters, domestics, combatants, and sex slaves; some elements of the Congolese national army (FARDC) also forced adults to carry supplies, equipment, and looted goods, but no cases of the FARDC recruiting child soldiers were reported in 2014 – a significant change"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 2 Watch List - The Democratic Republic of the Congo does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; the government took significant steps to hold military and police officials complicit in human trafficking accountable with convictions for sex slavery and arrests of armed group commanders for the recruitment and use of child soldiers; the government appears to have ceased the recruitment of child soldiers through the implementation of a UN-backed action plan; little effort was made to address labor and sex trafficking crimes committed by persons other than officials, or to identify the victims, or to provide or refer the victims to care services; awareness of various forms of trafficking is limited among law enforcement personnel and training and resources are inadequate to conduct investigations (2015)"

africa/cm.json

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
       "text": "population concentrated in the west and north, with the interior of the country sparsely populated as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "volcanic activity with periodic releases of poisonous gases from Lake Nyos and Lake Monoun volcanoes\nvolcanism: Mt. Cameroon (4,095 m), which last erupted in 2000, is the most frequently active volcano in West Africa; lakes in Oku volcanic field have released fatal levels of gas on occasion, killing some 1,700 people in 1986"
+      "text": "volcanic activity with periodic releases of poisonous gases from Lake Nyos and Lake Monoun volcanoes ++ volcanism: Mt. Cameroon (4,095 m), which last erupted in 2000, is the most frequently active volcano in West Africa; lakes in Oku volcanic field have released fatal levels of gas on occasion, killing some 1,700 people in 1986"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "waterborne diseases are prevalent; deforestation and overgrazing result in erosion, desertification, and reduced quality of pastureland; poaching; overfishing; overhunting"
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 38.3%, Protestant 25.5%, other Christian 6.9%, Muslim 24.4%, animist 2.2%, other 0.5%, none 2.2% (2018 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon’s high rate of poverty. International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon’s limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 420,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of September 2020. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria."
+      "text": "Cameroon has a large youth population, with more than 60% of the populace under the age of 25. Fertility is falling but remains at a high level, especially among poor, rural, and uneducated women, in part because of inadequate access to contraception. Life expectancy remains low at about 55 years due to the prevalence of HIV and AIDs and an elevated maternal mortality rate, which has remained high since 1990. Cameroon, particularly the northern region, is vulnerable to food insecurity largely because of government mismanagement, corruption, high production costs, inadequate infrastructure, and natural disasters. Despite economic growth in some regions, poverty is on the rise, and is most prevalent in rural areas, which are especially affected by a shortage of jobs, declining incomes, poor school and health care infrastructure, and a lack of clean water and sanitation. Underinvestment in social safety nets and ineffective public financial management also contribute to Cameroon's high rate of poverty. ++ International migration has been driven by unemployment (including fewer government jobs), poverty, the search for educational opportunities, and corruption. The US and Europe are preferred destinations, but, with tighter immigration restrictions in these countries, young Cameroonians are increasingly turning to neighboring states, such as Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa, other parts of Africa, and the Near and Far East. Cameroon's limited resources make it dependent on UN support to host more than 420,000 refugees and asylum seekers as of September 2020. These refugees and asylum seekers are primarily from the Central African Republic and Nigeria."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "19.3% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 94% of population / rural: 54.6% of population / total: 76.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "45.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "23.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 6% of population / rural: 45.3% of population / total: 23.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "1.3 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 16.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 83.3% of population / rural: 25.6% of population / total: 57.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "74.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "42.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 16.7% of population / rural: 74.4% of population / total: 42.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -418,7 +412,7 @@
         "text": "several previous; latest effective 18 January 1996"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by Parliament; amendment drafts require approval of at least one third of the membership in either house of Parliament; passage requires absolute majority vote of the Parliament membership; passage of drafts requested by the president for a second reading in Parliament requires two-thirds majority vote of its membership; the president can opt to submit drafts to a referendum, in which case passage requires a simple majority; constitutional articles on Cameroon’s unity and territorial integrity and its democratic principles cannot be amended; amended 2008"
+        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic or by Parliament; amendment drafts require approval of at least one third of the membership in either house of Parliament; passage requires absolute majority vote of the Parliament membership; passage of drafts requested by the president for a second reading in Parliament requires two-thirds majority vote of its membership; the president can opt to submit drafts to a referendum, in which case passage requires a simple majority; constitutional articles on Cameroon's unity and territorial integrity and its democratic principles cannot be amended; amended 2008"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -463,13 +457,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of:Senate or Senat (100 seats; 70 members indirectly elected by regional councils and 30 appointed by the president; members serve 5-year terms) National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (180 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of: Senate or Senat (100 seats; 70 members indirectly elected by regional councils and 30 appointed by the president; members serve 5-year terms) ++ National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (180 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 25 March 2018 (next to be held in 2023) National Assembly - last held on 9 February 2020 (current term extended by President); note - the constitutional court has ordered a partial rerun of elections in the English speaking areas; date to be determined"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 25 March 2018 (next to be held in 2023) ++ National Assembly - last held on 9 February 2020 (current term extended by President); note - the constitutional court has ordered a partial rerun of elections in the English speaking areas; date to be determined"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - CDPM 81.1%, SDF 8.6%, UNDP 5.8%, UDC 1.16%, other 2.8%; seats by party - CPDM 63, SDF 7 National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - CPDM 139, UNDP 7, SDF 5, PCRN 5, UDC 4, FSNC 3, MDR 2, Union of Socialist Movements 2; 13 vacant; composition - NA"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - CDPM 81.1%, SDF 8.6%, UNDP 5.8%, UDC 1.16%, other 2.8%; seats by party - CPDM 63, SDF 7 ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - CPDM 139, UNDP 7, SDF 5, PCRN 5, UDC 4, FSNC 3, MDR 2, Union of Socialist Movements 2; 13 vacant; composition - NA"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -484,7 +478,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for Democracy and DevelopmentCameroon People's Democratic Movement or CPDM [Paul BIYA]Cameroon People's Party or CPP [Edith Kah WALLA]Cameroon Renaissance Movement or MRC [Maurice KAMTO]Cameroonian Democratic Union or UDC [Adamou Ndam NJOYA]Cameroonian Party for National Reconciliation or PCRN [Cabral LIBII]Front for the National Salvation of Cameroon or FSNC [Issa Tchiroma BAKARY]Movement for the Defense of the Republic or MDR [Dakole DAISSALA]Movement for the Liberation and Development of Cameroon or MLDC [Marcel YONDO]National Union for Democracy and Progress or UNDP [Maigari BELLO BOUBA]Progressive Movement or MP [Jean-Jacques EKINDI]Social Democratic Front or SDF [John FRU NDI]Union of Peoples of Cameroon or UPC [Provisionary Management Bureau]Union of Socialist Movements"
+      "text": "Alliance for Democracy and Development ++ Cameroon People's Democratic Movement or CPDM [Paul BIYA] ++ Cameroon People's Party or CPP [Edith Kah WALLA] ++ Cameroon Renaissance Movement or MRC [Maurice KAMTO] ++ Cameroonian Democratic Union or UDC [Adamou Ndam NJOYA] ++ Cameroonian Party for National Reconciliation or PCRN [Cabral LIBII] ++ Front for the National Salvation of Cameroon or FSNC [Issa Tchiroma BAKARY] ++ Movement for the Defense of the Republic or MDR [Dakole DAISSALA] ++ Movement for the Liberation and Development of Cameroon or MLDC [Marcel YONDO] ++ National Union for Democracy and Progress or UNDP [Maigari BELLO BOUBA] ++ Progressive Movement or MP [Jean-Jacques EKINDI] ++ Social Democratic Front or SDF [John FRU NDI] ++ Union of Peoples of Cameroon or UPC [Provisionary Management Bureau] ++ Union of Socialist Movements"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, BDEAC, C, CEMAC, EITI (compliant country), FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -546,7 +540,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Cameroon’s market-based, diversified economy features oil and gas, timber, aluminum, agriculture, mining and the service sector. Oil remains Cameroon’s main export commodity, and despite falling global oil prices, still accounts for nearly 40% of exports. Cameroon’s economy suffers from factors that often impact underdeveloped countries, such as stagnant per capita income, a relatively inequitable distribution of income, a top-heavy civil service, endemic corruption, continuing inefficiencies of a large parastatal system in key sectors, and a generally unfavorable climate for business enterprise. Since 1990, the government has embarked on various IMF and World Bank programs designed to spur business investment, increase efficiency in agriculture, improve trade, and recapitalize the nation's banks. The IMF continues to press for economic reforms, including increased budget transparency, privatization, and poverty reduction programs. The Government of Cameroon provides subsidies for electricity, food, and fuel that have strained the federal budget and diverted funds from education, healthcare, and infrastructure projects, as low oil prices have led to lower revenues. Cameroon devotes significant resources to several large infrastructure projects currently under construction, including a deep seaport in Kribi and the Lom Pangar Hydropower Project. Cameroon’s energy sector continues to diversify, recently opening a natural gas-powered electricity generating plant. Cameroon continues to seek foreign investment to improve its inadequate infrastructure, create jobs, and improve its economic footprint, but its unfavorable business environment remains a significant deterrent to foreign investment."
+      "text": "Cameroon's market-based, diversified economy features oil and gas, timber, aluminum, agriculture, mining and the service sector. Oil remains Cameroon's main export commodity, and despite falling global oil prices, still accounts for nearly 40% of exports. Cameroon's economy suffers from factors that often impact underdeveloped countries, such as stagnant per capita income, a relatively inequitable distribution of income, a top-heavy civil service, endemic corruption, continuing inefficiencies of a large parastatal system in key sectors, and a generally unfavorable climate for business enterprise. ++ Since 1990, the government has embarked on various IMF and World Bank programs designed to spur business investment, increase efficiency in agriculture, improve trade, and recapitalize the nation's banks. The IMF continues to press for economic reforms, including increased budget transparency, privatization, and poverty reduction programs. The Government of Cameroon provides subsidies for electricity, food, and fuel that have strained the federal budget and diverted funds from education, healthcare, and infrastructure projects, as low oil prices have led to lower revenues. ++ Cameroon devotes significant resources to several large infrastructure projects currently under construction, including a deep seaport in Kribi and the Lom Pangar Hydropower Project. Cameroon's energy sector continues to diversify, recently opening a natural gas-powered electricity generating plant. Cameroon continues to seek foreign investment to improve its inadequate infrastructure, create jobs, and improve its economic footprint, but its unfavorable business environment remains a significant deterrent to foreign investment."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$89.54 billion (2017 est.) / $86.47 billion (2016 est.) / $82.63 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/cn.json

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
       "text": "the capital city of Maroni, located on the western side of the island of Grande Comore, is the country's largest city; however, of the three islands that comprise Comoros, it is Anjouan that is the most densely populated as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "cyclones possible during rainy season (December to April); volcanic activity on Grand Comore\nvolcanism: Karthala (2,361 m) on Grand Comore Island last erupted in 2007; a 2005 eruption forced thousands of people to be evacuated and produced a large ash cloud"
+      "text": "cyclones possible during rainy season (December to April); volcanic activity on Grand Comore ++ volcanism: Karthala (2,361 m) on Grand Comore Island last erupted in 2007; a 2005 eruption forced thousands of people to be evacuated and produced a large ash cloud"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation; soil degradation and erosion results from forest loss and from crop cultivation on slopes without proper terracing; marine biodiversity affected as soil erosion leads to the silting of coral reefs"
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Comoros’ population is a melange of Arabs, Persians, Indonesians, Africans, and Indians, and the much smaller number of Europeans that settled on the islands between the 8th and 19th centuries, when they served as a regional trade hub. The Arab and Persian influence is most evident in the islands’ overwhelmingly Muslim majority – about 98% of Comorans are Sunni Muslims. The country is densely populated, averaging nearly 350 people per square mile, although this varies widely among the islands, with Anjouan being the most densely populated.\nGiven the large share of land dedicated to agriculture and Comoros’ growing population, habitable land is becoming increasingly crowded. The combination of increasing population pressure on limited land and resources, widespread poverty, and poor job prospects motivates thousands of Comorans each year to attempt to illegally migrate using small fishing boats to the neighboring island of Mayotte, which is a French territory. The majority of legal Comoran migration to France came after Comoros’ independence from France in 1975, with the flow peaking in the mid-1980s.\nAt least 150,000 to 200,000 people of Comoran citizenship or descent live abroad, mainly in France, where they have gone seeking a better quality of life, job opportunities, higher education (Comoros has no universities), advanced health care, and to finance elaborate traditional wedding ceremonies (aada). Remittances from the diaspora are an economic mainstay, in 2013 representing approximately 25% of Comoros’ GDP and significantly more than the value of its exports of goods and services (only 15% of GDP). Grand Comore, Comoros’ most populous island, is both the primary source of emigrants and the main recipient of remittances. Most remittances are spent on private consumption, but this often goes toward luxury goods and the aada and does not contribute to economic development or poverty reduction. Although the majority of the diaspora is now French-born with more distant ties to Comoros, it is unclear whether they will sustain the current level of remittances."
+      "text": "Comoros' population is a melange of Arabs, Persians, Indonesians, Africans, and Indians, and the much smaller number of Europeans that settled on the islands between the 8th and 19th centuries, when they served as a regional trade hub. The Arab and Persian influence is most evident in the islands' overwhelmingly Muslim majority – about 98% of Comorans are Sunni Muslims. The country is densely populated, averaging nearly 350 people per square mile, although this varies widely among the islands, with Anjouan being the most densely populated. ++ Given the large share of land dedicated to agriculture and Comoros' growing population, habitable land is becoming increasingly crowded. The combination of increasing population pressure on limited land and resources, widespread poverty, and poor job prospects motivates thousands of Comorans each year to attempt to illegally migrate using small fishing boats to the neighboring island of Mayotte, which is a French territory. The majority of legal Comoran migration to France came after Comoros' independence from France in 1975, with the flow peaking in the mid-1980s. ++ At least 150,000 to 200,000 people of Comoran citizenship or descent live abroad, mainly in France, where they have gone seeking a better quality of life, job opportunities, higher education (Comoros has no universities), advanced health care, and to finance elaborate traditional wedding ceremonies (aada). Remittances from the diaspora are an economic mainstay, in 2013 representing approximately 25% of Comoros' GDP and significantly more than the value of its exports of goods and services (only 15% of GDP). Grand Comore, Comoros' most populous island, is both the primary source of emigrants and the main recipient of remittances. Most remittances are spent on private consumption, but this often goes toward luxury goods and the aada and does not contribute to economic development or poverty reduction. Although the majority of the diaspora is now French-born with more distant ties to Comoros, it is unclear whether they will sustain the current level of remittances."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -253,14 +253,11 @@
       "text": "19.4% (2012)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.4% of population / rural: 88.5% of population / total: 91% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "11.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "8.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.6% of population / rural: 11.5% of population / total: 8.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -273,14 +270,11 @@
       "text": "2.2 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 37.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 62.4% of population / rural: 43.6% of population / total: 49% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "56.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "51% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 37.6% of population / rural: 56.4% of population / total: 51% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -441,7 +435,7 @@
         "text": "last held on 19 January 2020 with a runoff on 23 February 2020 (next to be held in 2025) (2020)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "seats by party -1st round - Boycotting parties 16, Independent 3, CRC 2, RDC 2, RADHI 1, Orange party 0; note -  9 additional seats filled by the 3 island assemblies; 2nd round - CRC 20, Orange Party 2, Independents 2; composition as of 23 January 2020 men 20, women 4, percent of women 16.7%   (2019)"
+        "text": "seats by party -1st round - Boycotting parties 16, Independent 3, CRC 2, RDC 2, RADHI 1, Orange party 0; note -  9 additional seats filled by the 3 island assemblies; 2nd round - CRC 20, Orange Party 2, Independents 2; composition as of 23 January 2020 men 20, women 4, percent of women 16.7% ++   (2019)"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -455,11 +449,11 @@
         "text": "Court of Appeals (in Moroni); Tribunal de premiere instance; island village (community) courts; religious courts"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "   "
+        "text": "++   ++  "
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros or CRC [AZALI Assoumani]Democratic Rally of the Comoros or RDC [Mouigni BARAKA]Independent Party [N/A]Juwa Party or PJ [[Ahmed Abdallah SAMBI, Mahamoudou AHAMADA]Orange Party [Mohamed DAOUDOU]Party for the Comorian Agreement (Partie Pour l'Entente Commorienne) or PEC [Fahmi Said IBRAHIM]Rally for an Alternative of Harmonious and Integrated Development or RADHI [Houmed MSAIDIE, Abdou SOEFO]Rally with a Development Initiative for Enlightened Youth or RIDJA [Said LARIFOU]Union for the Development of the Comoros or UPDC [Mohamed HALIFA] (2018)"
+      "text": "Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros or CRC [AZALI Assoumani] ++ Democratic Rally of the Comoros or RDC [Mouigni BARAKA] ++ Independent Party [N/A] ++ Juwa Party or PJ [[Ahmed Abdallah SAMBI, Mahamoudou AHAMADA] ++ Orange Party [Mohamed DAOUDOU] ++ Party for the Comorian Agreement (Partie Pour l'Entente Commorienne) or PEC [Fahmi Said IBRAHIM] ++ Rally for an Alternative of Harmonious and Integrated Development or RADHI [Houmed MSAIDIE, Abdou SOEFO] ++ Rally with a Development Initiative for Enlightened Youth or RIDJA [Said LARIFOU] ++ Union for the Development of the Comoros or UPDC [Mohamed HALIFA] (2018)"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AMF, AOSIS, AU, CAEU (candidates), COMESA, FAO, FZ, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, InOC, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
@@ -504,7 +498,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "One of the world's poorest and smallest economies, the Comoros is made up of three islands that are hampered by inadequate transportation links, a young and rapidly increasing population, and few natural resources. The low educational level of the labor force contributes to a subsistence level of economic activity and a heavy dependence on foreign grants and technical assistance. Agriculture, including fishing, hunting, and forestry, accounts for about 50% of GDP, employs a majority of the labor force, and provides most of the exports. Export income is heavily reliant on the three main crops of vanilla, cloves, and ylang ylang (perfume essence); and the Comoros' export earnings are easily disrupted by disasters such as fires and extreme weather. Despite agriculture’s importance to the economy, the country imports roughly 70% of its food; rice, the main staple, and other dried vegetables account for more than 25% of imports. Remittances from about 300,000 Comorans contribute about 25% of the country’s GDP. France, Comoros’s colonial power, remains a key trading partner and bilateral donor. Comoros faces an education system in need of upgrades, limited opportunities for private commercial and industrial enterprises, poor health services, limited exports, and a high population growth rate. Recurring political instability, sometimes initiated from outside the country, and an ongoing electricity crisis have inhibited growth. The government, elected in mid-2016, has moved to improve revenue mobilization, reduce expenditures, and improve electricity access, although the public sector wage bill remains one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In mid-2017, Comoros joined the Southern African Development Community with 15 other regional member states."
+      "text": "One of the world's poorest and smallest economies, the Comoros is made up of three islands that are hampered by inadequate transportation links, a young and rapidly increasing population, and few natural resources. The low educational level of the labor force contributes to a subsistence level of economic activity and a heavy dependence on foreign grants and technical assistance. Agriculture, including fishing, hunting, and forestry, accounts for about 50% of GDP, employs a majority of the labor force, and provides most of the exports. Export income is heavily reliant on the three main crops of vanilla, cloves, and ylang ylang (perfume essence); and the Comoros' export earnings are easily disrupted by disasters such as fires and extreme weather. Despite agriculture's importance to the economy, the country imports roughly 70% of its food; rice, the main staple, and other dried vegetables account for more than 25% of imports. Remittances from about 300,000 Comorans contribute about 25% of the country's GDP. France, Comoros's colonial power, remains a key trading partner and bilateral donor. ++ Comoros faces an education system in need of upgrades, limited opportunities for private commercial and industrial enterprises, poor health services, limited exports, and a high population growth rate. Recurring political instability, sometimes initiated from outside the country, and an ongoing electricity crisis have inhibited growth. The government, elected in mid-2016, has moved to improve revenue mobilization, reduce expenditures, and improve electricity access, although the public sector wage bill remains one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In mid-2017, Comoros joined the Southern African Development Community with 15 other regional member states."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$1.319 billion (2017 est.) / $1.284 billion (2016 est.) / $1.257 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/ct.json

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "The Central African Republic’s (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since a coup in March 2013. CAR’s high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR’s diamond mining region, which is impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR’s weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country’s ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers are displaced by violence. Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR’s March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 600,000 are displaced internally as of October 2019. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness. (2019)"
+      "text": "The Central African Republic's (CAR) humanitarian crisis has worsened since a coup in March 2013. CAR's high mortality rate and low life expectancy are attributed to elevated rates of preventable and treatable diseases (including malaria and malnutrition), an inadequate health care system, precarious food security, and armed conflict. Some of the worst mortality rates are in western CAR's diamond mining region, which is impoverished because of government attempts to control the diamond trade and the fall in industrial diamond prices. To make matters worse, the government and international donors have reduced health funding in recent years. The CAR's weak educational system and low literacy rate have also suffered as a result of the country's ongoing conflict. Schools are closed, qualified teachers are scarce, infrastructure, funding, and supplies are lacking and subject to looting, and many students and teachers are displaced by violence. ++ Rampant poverty, human rights violations, unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security and stability have led to forced displacement internally and externally. Since the political crisis that resulted in CAR's March 2013 coup began in December 2012, approximately 600,000 people have fled to Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and other neighboring countries, while another estimated 600,000 are displaced internally as of October 2019. The UN has urged countries to refrain from repatriating CAR refugees amid the heightened lawlessness. (2019)"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -255,14 +255,11 @@
       "text": "15.2% (2010/11)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 10.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 89.6% of population / rural: 54.4% of population / total: 68.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "45.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "31.5% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 10.4% of population / rural: 45.6% of population / total: 31.5% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "1 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 56.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 43.6% of population / rural: 7.2% of population / total: 21.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "92.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "78.2% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 56.4% of population / rural: 92.8% of population / total: 78.2% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -473,7 +467,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Action Party for Development or PAD [El Hadj Laurent NGON-BABA]Alliance for Democracy and Progress or ADP [Clement BELIBANGA]Central African Democratic Rally or RDC [Desire Nzanga KOLINGBA]Movement for Democracy and Development or MDD [Louis PAPENIAH]Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People or MLPC [Martin ZIGUELE]National Convergence (also known as Kwa Na Kwa) or KNK [Francois BOZIZE]National Union for Democracy and Progress or UNDP [Amine MICHEL]New Alliance for Progress or NAP [Jean-Jacques DEMAFOUTH]Social Democratic Party or PSD [Enoch LAKOUE]Union for Central African Renewal or URCA [Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE]"
+      "text": "Action Party for Development or PAD [El Hadj Laurent NGON-BABA] ++ Alliance for Democracy and Progress or ADP [Clement BELIBANGA] ++ Central African Democratic Rally or RDC [Desire Nzanga KOLINGBA] ++ Movement for Democracy and Development or MDD [Louis PAPENIAH] ++ Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People or MLPC [Martin ZIGUELE] ++ National Convergence (also known as Kwa Na Kwa) or KNK [Francois BOZIZE] ++ National Union for Democracy and Progress or UNDP [Amine MICHEL] ++ New Alliance for Progress or NAP [Jean-Jacques DEMAFOUTH] ++ Social Democratic Party or PSD [Enoch LAKOUE] ++ Union for Central African Renewal or URCA [Anicet-Georges DOLOGUELE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, BDEAC, CEMAC, EITI (compliant country) (suspended), FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIC (observer), OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -529,7 +523,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Subsistence agriculture, together with forestry and mining, remains the backbone of the economy of the Central African Republic (CAR), with about 60% of the population living in outlying areas. The agricultural sector generates more than half of estimated GDP, although statistics are unreliable in the conflict-prone country. Timber and diamonds account for most export earnings, followed by cotton. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR's landlocked geography, poor transportation system, largely unskilled work force, and legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies. Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is highly unequal and grants from the international community can only partially meet humanitarian needs. CAR shares a common currency with the Central African Monetary Union. The currency is pegged to the Euro. Since 2009, the IMF has worked closely with the government to institute reforms that have resulted in some improvement in budget transparency, but other problems remain. The government's additional spending in the run-up to the 2011 election worsened CAR's fiscal situation. In 2012, the World Bank approved $125 million in funding for transport infrastructure and regional trade, focused on the route between CAR's capital and the port of Douala in Cameroon. In July 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended credit facility valued at $116 million; in mid-2017, the IMF completed a review of CAR’s fiscal performance and broadly approved of the government’s management, although issues with revenue collection, weak government capacity, and transparency remain. The World Bank in late 2016 approved a $20 million grant to restore basic fiscal management, improve transparency, and assist with economic recovery. Participation in the Kimberley Process, a commitment to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, led to a partially lifted the ban on diamond exports from CAR in 2015, but persistent insecurity is likely to constrain real GDP growth."
+      "text": "Subsistence agriculture, together with forestry and mining, remains the backbone of the economy of the Central African Republic (CAR), with about 60% of the population living in outlying areas. The agricultural sector generates more than half of estimated GDP, although statistics are unreliable in the conflict-prone country. Timber and diamonds account for most export earnings, followed by cotton. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR's landlocked geography, poor transportation system, largely unskilled work force, and legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies. Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is highly unequal and grants from the international community can only partially meet humanitarian needs. CAR shares a common currency with the Central African Monetary Union. The currency is pegged to the Euro. ++ Since 2009, the IMF has worked closely with the government to institute reforms that have resulted in some improvement in budget transparency, but other problems remain. The government's additional spending in the run-up to the 2011 election worsened CAR's fiscal situation. In 2012, the World Bank approved $125 million in funding for transport infrastructure and regional trade, focused on the route between CAR's capital and the port of Douala in Cameroon. In July 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended credit facility valued at $116 million; in mid-2017, the IMF completed a review of CAR's fiscal performance and broadly approved of the government's management, although issues with revenue collection, weak government capacity, and transparency remain. The World Bank in late 2016 approved a $20 million grant to restore basic fiscal management, improve transparency, and assist with economic recovery. ++ Participation in the Kimberley Process, a commitment to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, led to a partially lifted the ban on diamond exports from CAR in 2015, but persistent insecurity is likely to constrain real GDP growth."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$3.39 billion (2017 est.) / $3.249 billion (2016 est.) / $3.108 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -888,7 +882,7 @@
       "text": "18 years of age for military service; no conscription (2019)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the FACA is currently assessed as unable to provide adequate internal security for the country; the military was dissolved following the 2013 rebel seizure of the government and has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; France, Russia, the UN, and the European Union are providing various levels of security assistance the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its peacekeeping mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country’s fragile transitional government; in November 2019, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission another year; as of March 2020, MINUSCA had approximately 13,200 total personnel, including about 10,700 troops and 2,000 policethe European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016; the EUTM-RCA contributes to the restructuring of the country's military and defense sector through advice, training, and educational programs (2020)"
+      "text": "the FACA is currently assessed as unable to provide adequate internal security for the country; the military was dissolved following the 2013 rebel seizure of the government and has struggled to rebuild in the years of instability since; France, Russia, the UN, and the European Union are providing various levels of security assistance ++ the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has operated in the country since 2014; its peacekeeping mission includes providing security, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and supporting the country's fragile transitional government; in November 2019, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission another year; as of March 2020, MINUSCA had approximately 13,200 total personnel, including about 10,700 troops and 2,000 police ++ the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) has operated in the country since 2016; the EUTM-RCA contributes to the restructuring of the country's military and defense sector through advice, training, and educational programs (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
@@ -905,7 +899,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Central African Republic (CAR) is a source, transit, and destination country for children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking, women subjected to forced prostitution, and adults subjected to forced labor; most victims appear to be CAR citizens exploited within the country, with a smaller number transported back and forth between the CAR and nearby countries; armed groups operating in the CAR, including those aligned with the former SELEKA Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army, continue to recruit and re-recruit children for military activities and labor; children are also subject to domestic servitude, commercial sexual exploitation, and forced labor in agriculture, mines, shops, and street vending; women and girls are subject to domestic servitude, sexual slavery, commercial sexual exploitation, and forced marriage"
+        "text": "Central African Republic (CAR) is a source, transit, and destination country for children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking, women subjected to forced prostitution, and adults subjected to forced labor; most victims appear to be CAR citizens exploited within the country, with a smaller number transported back and forth between the CAR and nearby countries; armed groups operating in the CAR, including those aligned with the former SELEKA Government and the Lord's Resistance Army, continue to recruit and re-recruit children for military activities and labor; children are also subject to domestic servitude, commercial sexual exploitation, and forced labor in agriculture, mines, shops, and street vending; women and girls are subject to domestic servitude, sexual slavery, commercial sexual exploitation, and forced marriage"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 3 – the Central African Republic does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government conducted a limited number of investigations and prosecutions of cases of suspected human trafficking in 2014 but did not identify, provide protection to, or refer to care providers any trafficking victims; the government did not directly provide reintegration programs for demobilized child soldiers, leaving victims vulnerable to further exploitation or retrafficking by armed groups, including those affiliated with the government; in 2014, an NGO and the government began drafting a national action plan against trafficking but no efforts were reported to establish a policy against child soldiering or to raise awareness about existing laws prohibiting the use of children in the armed forces (2015)"

africa/cv.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The uninhabited islands were discovered and colonized by the Portuguese in the 15th century; Cabo Verde subsequently became a trading center for African slaves and later an important coaling and resupply stop for whaling and transatlantic shipping. The fusing of European and various African cultural traditions is reflected in Cabo Verde’s Krioulo language, music, and pano textiles. Following independence in 1975, and a tentative interest in unification with Guinea-Bissau, a one-party system was established and maintained until multi-party elections were held in 1990. Cabo Verde continues to sustain one of Africa's most stable democratic governments and one of its most stable economies, maintaining a currency formerly pegged to the Portuguese escudo and then the euro since 1998. Repeated droughts during the second half of the 20th century caused significant hardship and prompted heavy emigration. As a result, Cabo Verde's expatriate population - concentrated in Boston and Western Europe - is greater than its domestic one. Most Cabo Verdeans have both African and Portuguese antecedents. Cabo Verde’s population descends from its first permanent inhabitants in the late 15th-century – a preponderance of West African slaves, a small share of Portuguese colonists, and even fewer Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese Jews. Among the nine inhabited islands, population distribution is variable. Islands in the east are very dry and are home to the country's growing tourism industry. The more western islands receive more precipitation and support larger populations, but agriculture and livestock grazing have damaged their soil fertility and vegetation. For centuries, the country’s overall population size has fluctuated significantly, as recurring periods of famine and epidemics have caused high death tolls and emigration."
+      "text": "The uninhabited islands were discovered and colonized by the Portuguese in the 15th century; Cabo Verde subsequently became a trading center for African slaves and later an important coaling and resupply stop for whaling and transatlantic shipping. The fusing of European and various African cultural traditions is reflected in Cabo Verde's Krioulo language, music, and pano textiles. Following independence in 1975, and a tentative interest in unification with Guinea-Bissau, a one-party system was established and maintained until multi-party elections were held in 1990. Cabo Verde continues to sustain one of Africa's most stable democratic governments and one of its most stable economies, maintaining a currency formerly pegged to the Portuguese escudo and then the euro since 1998. Repeated droughts during the second half of the 20th century caused significant hardship and prompted heavy emigration. As a result, Cabo Verde's expatriate population - concentrated in Boston and Western Europe - is greater than its domestic one. Most Cabo Verdeans have both African and Portuguese antecedents. Cabo Verde's population descends from its first permanent inhabitants in the late 15th-century – a preponderance of West African slaves, a small share of Portuguese colonists, and even fewer Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese Jews. Among the nine inhabited islands, population distribution is variable. Islands in the east are very dry and are home to the country's growing tourism industry. The more western islands receive more precipitation and support larger populations, but agriculture and livestock grazing have damaged their soil fertility and vegetation. For centuries, the country's overall population size has fluctuated significantly, as recurring periods of famine and epidemics have caused high death tolls and emigration."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
       "text": "among the nine inhabited islands, population distribution is variable; islands in the east are very dry and are only sparsely settled to exploit their extensive salt deposits; the more southerly islands receive more precipitation and support larger populations, but agriculture and livestock grazing have damaged the soil fertility and vegetation; approximately half of the population lives on Sao Tiago Island, which is the location of the capital of Praia; Mindelo, on the northern island of Sao Vicente, also has a large urban population as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "prolonged droughts; seasonal harmattan wind produces obscuring dust; volcanically and seismically active\nvolcanism: Fogo (2,829 m), which last erupted in 1995, is Cabo Verde's only active volcano"
+      "text": "prolonged droughts; seasonal harmattan wind produces obscuring dust; volcanically and seismically active ++ volcanism: Fogo (2,829 m), which last erupted in 1995, is Cabo Verde's only active volcano"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation due to demand for firewood; water shortages; prolonged droughts and improper use of land (overgrazing, crop cultivation on hillsides lead to desertification and erosion); environmental damage has threatened several species of birds and reptiles; illegal beach sand extraction; overfishing"
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 77.3%, Protestant 4.6% (includes Church of the Nazarene 1.7%, Adventist 1.5%, Assembly of God 0.9%, Universal Kingdom of God 0.4%, and God and Love 0.1%), other Christian 3.4% (includes Christian Rationalism 1.9%, Jehovah's Witness 1%, and New Apostolic 0.5%), Muslim 1.8%, other 1.3%, none 10.8%, unspecified 0.7% (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Cabo Verde’s population descends from its first permanent inhabitants in the late 15th-century – a preponderance of West African slaves, a small share of Portuguese colonists, and even fewer Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese Jews. Over the centuries, the country’s overall population size has fluctuated significantly, as recurring periods of famine and epidemics have caused high death tolls and emigration.\nLabor migration historically reduced Cabo Verde’s population growth and still provides a key source of income through remittances. Expatriates probably outnumber Cabo Verde’s resident population, with most families having a member abroad. Cabo Verdeans have settled in the US, Europe, Africa, and South America. The largest diaspora community in New Bedford, Massachusetts, dating to the early 1800s, is a byproduct of the transatlantic whaling industry. Cabo Verdean men fleeing poverty at home joined the crews of US whaling ships that stopped in the islands. Many settled in New Bedford and stayed in the whaling or shipping trade, worked in the textile or cranberry industries, or operated their own transatlantic packet ships that transported compatriots to the US. Increased Cabo Verdean emigration to the US coincided with the gradual and eventually complete abolition of slavery in the archipelago in 1878.\nDuring the same period, Portuguese authorities coerced Cabo Verdeans to go to Sao Tome and Principe and other Portuguese colonies in Africa to work as indentured laborers on plantations. In the 1920s, when the US implemented immigration quotas, Cabo Verdean emigration shifted toward Portugal, West Africa (Senegal), and South America (Argentina). Growing numbers of Cabo Verdean labor migrants headed to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. They filled unskilled jobs in Portugal, as many Portuguese sought out work opportunities in the more prosperous economies of northwest Europe. Cabo Verdeans eventually expanded their emigration to the Netherlands, where they worked in the shipping industry. Migration to the US resumed under relaxed migration laws. Cabo Verdean women also began migrating to southern Europe to become domestic workers, a trend that continues today and has shifted the gender balance of Cabo Verdean emigration.\nEmigration has declined in more recent decades due to the adoption of more restrictive migration policies in destination countries. Reduced emigration along with a large youth population, decreased mortality rates, and increased life expectancies, has boosted population growth, putting further pressure on domestic employment and resources. In addition, Cabo Verde has attracted increasing numbers of migrants in recent decades, consisting primarily of people from West Africa, Portuguese-speaking African countries, Portugal, and China. Since the 1990s, some West African migrants have used Cabo Verde as a stepping stone for illegal migration to Europe."
+      "text": "Cabo Verde's population descends from its first permanent inhabitants in the late 15th-century – a preponderance of West African slaves, a small share of Portuguese colonists, and even fewer Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese Jews. Over the centuries, the country's overall population size has fluctuated significantly, as recurring periods of famine and epidemics have caused high death tolls and emigration. ++ Labor migration historically reduced Cabo Verde's population growth and still provides a key source of income through remittances. Expatriates probably outnumber Cabo Verde's resident population, with most families having a member abroad. Cabo Verdeans have settled in the US, Europe, Africa, and South America. The largest diaspora community in New Bedford, Massachusetts, dating to the early 1800s, is a byproduct of the transatlantic whaling industry. Cabo Verdean men fleeing poverty at home joined the crews of US whaling ships that stopped in the islands. Many settled in New Bedford and stayed in the whaling or shipping trade, worked in the textile or cranberry industries, or operated their own transatlantic packet ships that transported compatriots to the US. Increased Cabo Verdean emigration to the US coincided with the gradual and eventually complete abolition of slavery in the archipelago in 1878. ++ During the same period, Portuguese authorities coerced Cabo Verdeans to go to Sao Tome and Principe and other Portuguese colonies in Africa to work as indentured laborers on plantations. In the 1920s, when the US implemented immigration quotas, Cabo Verdean emigration shifted toward Portugal, West Africa (Senegal), and South America (Argentina). Growing numbers of Cabo Verdean labor migrants headed to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. They filled unskilled jobs in Portugal, as many Portuguese sought out work opportunities in the more prosperous economies of northwest Europe. Cabo Verdeans eventually expanded their emigration to the Netherlands, where they worked in the shipping industry. Migration to the US resumed under relaxed migration laws. Cabo Verdean women also began migrating to southern Europe to become domestic workers, a trend that continues today and has shifted the gender balance of Cabo Verdean emigration. ++ Emigration has declined in more recent decades due to the adoption of more restrictive migration policies in destination countries. Reduced emigration along with a large youth population, decreased mortality rates, and increased life expectancies, has boosted population growth, putting further pressure on domestic employment and resources. In addition, Cabo Verde has attracted increasing numbers of migrants in recent decades, consisting primarily of people from West Africa, Portuguese-speaking African countries, Portugal, and China. Since the 1990s, some West African migrants have used Cabo Verde as a stepping stone for illegal migration to Europe."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -247,14 +247,11 @@
       "text": "2.16 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 89.1% of population / total: 96.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "10.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "3.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 10.9% of population / total: 3.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -267,14 +264,11 @@
       "text": "2.1 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 12.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 87.8% of population / rural: 64.9% of population / total: 79.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "35.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "20.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 12.2% of population / rural: 35.1% of population / total: 20.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -444,7 +438,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "rz African Party for Independence of Cabo Verde or PAICV [Janira Hopffer ALMADA]Democratic and Independent Cabo Verdean Union or UCID [Antonio MONTEIRO]Democratic Christian Party or PDC [Manuel RODRIGUES]Democratic Renovation Party or PRD [Victor FIDALGO]Movement for Democracy or MPD [Ulisses CORREIA E SILVA]Party for Democratic Convergence or PCD [Dr. Eurico MONTEIRO]Party of Work and Solidarity or PTS [Anibal MEDINA]Social Democratic Party or PSD [Joao ALEM]"
+      "text": "rz African Party for Independence of Cabo Verde or PAICV [Janira Hopffer ALMADA] ++ Democratic and Independent Cabo Verdean Union or UCID [Antonio MONTEIRO] ++ Democratic Christian Party or PDC [Manuel RODRIGUES] ++ Democratic Renovation Party or PRD [Victor FIDALGO] ++ Movement for Democracy or MPD [Ulisses CORREIA E SILVA] ++ Party for Democratic Convergence or PCD [Dr. Eurico MONTEIRO] ++ Party of Work and Solidarity or PTS [Anibal MEDINA] ++ Social Democratic Party or PSD [Joao ALEM]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AOSIS, AU, CD, CPLP, ECOWAS, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -503,7 +497,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Cabo Verde’s economy depends on development aid, foreign investment, remittances, and tourism. The economy is service-oriented with commerce, transport, tourism, and public services accounting for about three-fourths of GDP. Tourism is the mainstay of the economy and depends on conditions in the euro-zone countries. Cabo Verde annually runs a high trade deficit financed by foreign aid and remittances from its large pool of emigrants; remittances as a share of GDP are one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although about 40% of the population lives in rural areas, the share of food production in GDP is low. The island economy suffers from a poor natural resource base, including serious water shortages, exacerbated by cycles of long-term drought, and poor soil for growing food on several of the islands, requiring it to import most of what it consumes. The fishing potential, mostly lobster and tuna, is not fully exploited. Economic reforms are aimed at developing the private sector and attracting foreign investment to diversify the economy and mitigate high unemployment. The government’s elevated debt levels have limited its capacity to finance any shortfalls."
+      "text": "Cabo Verde's economy depends on development aid, foreign investment, remittances, and tourism. The economy is service-oriented with commerce, transport, tourism, and public services accounting for about three-fourths of GDP. Tourism is the mainstay of the economy and depends on conditions in the euro-zone countries. Cabo Verde annually runs a high trade deficit financed by foreign aid and remittances from its large pool of emigrants; remittances as a share of GDP are one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. ++ Although about 40% of the population lives in rural areas, the share of food production in GDP is low. The island economy suffers from a poor natural resource base, including serious water shortages, exacerbated by cycles of long-term drought, and poor soil for growing food on several of the islands, requiring it to import most of what it consumes. The fishing potential, mostly lobster and tuna, is not fully exploited. ++ Economic reforms are aimed at developing the private sector and attracting foreign investment to diversify the economy and mitigate high unemployment. The government's elevated debt levels have limited its capacity to finance any shortfalls."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$3.777 billion (2017 est.) / $3.631 billion (2016 est.) / $3.468 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/dj.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The region of present-day Djibouti was the site of the medieval Ifat and Adal Sultanates. In the late 19th century, treaties signed by the ruling Somali and Afar sultans with the French allowed the latter to establish the colony of French Somaliland. The designation continued in use until 1967, when the name was changed to the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas. Upon independence in 1977, the country was named after its capital city of Djibouti. Hassan Gouled APTIDON installed an authoritarian one-party state and proceeded to serve as president until 1999. Unrest among the Afar minority during the 1990s led to a civil war that ended in 2001 with a peace accord between Afar rebels and the Somali Issa-dominated government. In 1999, Djibouti's first multiparty presidential election resulted in the election of Ismail Omar GUELLEH as president; he was reelected to a second term in 2005 and extended his tenure in office via a constitutional amendment, which allowed him to serve a third term in 2011 and begin a fourth term in 2016. Djibouti occupies a strategic geographic location at the intersection of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Its ports handle 95% of Ethiopia’s trade. Djibouti’s ports also service transshipments between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The government holds longstanding ties to France, which maintains a military presence in the country, as does the US, Japan, Italy, Germany, Spain, and China."
+      "text": "The region of present-day Djibouti was the site of the medieval Ifat and Adal Sultanates. In the late 19th century, treaties signed by the ruling Somali and Afar sultans with the French allowed the latter to establish the colony of French Somaliland. The designation continued in use until 1967, when the name was changed to the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas. Upon independence in 1977, the country was named after its capital city of Djibouti. Hassan Gouled APTIDON installed an authoritarian one-party state and proceeded to serve as president until 1999. Unrest among the Afar minority during the 1990s led to a civil war that ended in 2001 with a peace accord between Afar rebels and the Somali Issa-dominated government. In 1999, Djibouti's first multiparty presidential election resulted in the election of Ismail Omar GUELLEH as president; he was reelected to a second term in 2005 and extended his tenure in office via a constitutional amendment, which allowed him to serve a third term in 2011 and begin a fourth term in 2016. Djibouti occupies a strategic geographic location at the intersection of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Its ports handle 95% of Ethiopia's trade. Djibouti's ports also service transshipments between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The government holds longstanding ties to France, which maintains a military presence in the country, as does the US, Japan, Italy, Germany, Spain, and China."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
       "text": "most densely populated areas are in the east; the largest city is Djibouti, with a population over 600,000; no other city in the country has a total population over 50,000 as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "earthquakes; droughts; occasional cyclonic disturbances from the Indian Ocean bring heavy rains and flash floods\nvolcanism: experiences limited volcanic activity; Ardoukoba (298 m) last erupted in 1978; Manda-Inakir, located along the Ethiopian border, is also historically active"
+      "text": "earthquakes; droughts; occasional cyclonic disturbances from the Indian Ocean bring heavy rains and flash floods ++ volcanism: experiences limited volcanic activity; Ardoukoba (298 m) last erupted in 1978; Manda-Inakir, located along the Ethiopian border, is also historically active"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "inadequate supplies of potable water; water pollution; limited arable land; deforestation (forests threatened by agriculture and the use of wood for fuel); desertification; endangered species"
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Sunni Muslim 94% (nearly all Djiboutians), Christian 6% (mainly foreign-born residents)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Djibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. More than 75% of the population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti). The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80% of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of female genital cutting reflects Djibouti’s lack of gender equality and is a major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been enforced.\nBecause of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the Gulf States and beyond. Each year some hundred thousand people, mainly Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in March 2015, with almost 20,000 arriving by August 2017. Most Yemenis remain unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of Djibouti’s three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages, and unemployment."
+      "text": "Djibouti is a poor, predominantly urban country, characterized by high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and childhood malnutrition. More than 75% of the population lives in cities and towns (predominantly in the capital, Djibouti). The rural population subsists primarily on nomadic herding. Prone to droughts and floods, the country has few natural resources and must import more than 80% of its food from neighboring countries or Europe. Health care, particularly outside the capital, is limited by poor infrastructure, shortages of equipment and supplies, and a lack of qualified personnel. More than a third of health care recipients are migrants because the services are still better than those available in their neighboring home countries. The nearly universal practice of female genital cutting reflects Djibouti's lack of gender equality and is a major contributor to obstetrical complications and its high rates of maternal and infant mortality. A 1995 law prohibiting the practice has never been enforced. ++ Because of its political stability and its strategic location at the confluence of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, Djibouti is a key transit point for migrants and asylum seekers heading for the Gulf States and beyond. Each year some hundred thousand people, mainly Ethiopians and some Somalis, journey through Djibouti, usually to the port of Obock, to attempt a dangerous sea crossing to Yemen. However, with the escalation of the ongoing Yemen conflict, Yemenis began fleeing to Djibouti in March 2015, with almost 20,000 arriving by August 2017. Most Yemenis remain unregistered and head for Djibouti City rather than seeking asylum at one of Djibouti's three spartan refugee camps. Djibouti has been hosting refugees and asylum seekers, predominantly Somalis and lesser numbers of Ethiopians and Eritreans, at camps for 20 years, despite lacking potable water, food shortages, and unemployment."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -255,14 +255,11 @@
       "text": "19% (2012)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99.3% of population / rural: 59.1% of population / total: 90.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "40.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "9.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.7% of population / rural: 40.9% of population / total: 9.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "1.4 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 16% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 84% of population / rural: 21.5% of population / total: 70.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "78.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "29.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 16% of population / rural: 78.5% of population / total: 29.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -444,7 +438,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Center for United Democrats or CDU [Ahmed Mohamed YOUSSOUF, chairman]Democratic Renewal Party or PRD [Abdillahi HAMARITEH]Djibouti Development Party or PDD [Mohamed Daoud CHEHEM]Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy (Front pour la Restauration de l'Unite Democratique) or FRUD [Ali Mohamed DAOUD]Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development [Daher Ahmed FARAH]Movement for Development and Liberty or MoDel [Ismail Ahmed WABERI]National Democratic Party or PND [Aden Robleh AWALEH]People's Rally for Progress or RPP [Ismail Omar GUELLEH] (governing party)Peoples Social Democratic Party or PPSD [Hasna Moumin BAHDON]Republican Alliance for Democracy or ARD [Aden Mohamed ABDOU, interim president]Union for a Presidential Majority or UMP (coalition includes RPP, FRUD, PND, PPSD)Union for Democracy and Justice or UDJ [Ilya Ismail GUEDI Hared]"
+      "text": "Center for United Democrats or CDU [Ahmed Mohamed YOUSSOUF, chairman] ++ Democratic Renewal Party or PRD [Abdillahi HAMARITEH] ++ Djibouti Development Party or PDD [Mohamed Daoud CHEHEM] ++ Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy (Front pour la Restauration de l'Unite Democratique) or FRUD [Ali Mohamed DAOUD] ++ Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development [Daher Ahmed FARAH] ++ Movement for Development and Liberty or MoDel [Ismail Ahmed WABERI] ++ National Democratic Party or PND [Aden Robleh AWALEH] ++ People's Rally for Progress or RPP [Ismail Omar GUELLEH] (governing party) ++ Peoples Social Democratic Party or PPSD [Hasna Moumin BAHDON] ++ Republican Alliance for Democracy or ARD [Aden Mohamed ABDOU, interim president] ++ Union for a Presidential Majority or UMP (coalition includes RPP, FRUD, PND, PPSD) ++ Union for Democracy and Justice or UDJ [Ilya Ismail GUEDI Hared]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AU, CAEU (candidates), COMESA, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, MINURSO, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -500,7 +494,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Djibouti's economy is based on service activities connected with the country's strategic location as a deepwater port on the Red Sea. Three-fourths of Djibouti's inhabitants live in the capital city; the remainder are mostly nomadic herders. Scant rainfall and less than 4% arable land limits crop production to small quantities of fruits and vegetables, and most food must be imported. Djibouti provides services as both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and refueling center. Imports, exports, and reexports represent 70% of port activity at Djibouti's container terminal. Reexports consist primarily of coffee from landlocked neighbor Ethiopia. Djibouti has few natural resources and little industry. The nation is, therefore, heavily dependent on foreign assistance to support its balance of payments and to finance development projects. An official unemployment rate of nearly 40% - with youth unemployment near 80% - continues to be a major problem. Inflation was a modest 3% in 2014-2017, due to low international food prices and a decline in electricity tariffs. Djibouti’s reliance on diesel-generated electricity and imported food and water leave average consumers vulnerable to global price shocks, though in mid-2015 Djibouti passed new legislation to liberalize the energy sector. The government has emphasized infrastructure development for transportation and energy and Djibouti – with the help of foreign partners, particularly China – has begun to increase and modernize its port capacity. In 2017, Djibouti opened two of the largest projects in its history, the Doraleh Port and Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, funded by China as part of the \"Belt and Road Initiative,\" which will increase the country’s ability to capitalize on its strategic location."
+      "text": "Djibouti's economy is based on service activities connected with the country's strategic location as a deepwater port on the Red Sea. Three-fourths of Djibouti's inhabitants live in the capital city; the remainder are mostly nomadic herders. Scant rainfall and less than 4% arable land limits crop production to small quantities of fruits and vegetables, and most food must be imported. ++ Djibouti provides services as both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and refueling center. Imports, exports, and reexports represent 70% of port activity at Djibouti's container terminal. Reexports consist primarily of coffee from landlocked neighbor Ethiopia. Djibouti has few natural resources and little industry. The nation is, therefore, heavily dependent on foreign assistance to support its balance of payments and to finance development projects. An official unemployment rate of nearly 40% - with youth unemployment near 80% - continues to be a major problem. Inflation was a modest 3% in 2014-2017, due to low international food prices and a decline in electricity tariffs. ++ Djibouti's reliance on diesel-generated electricity and imported food and water leave average consumers vulnerable to global price shocks, though in mid-2015 Djibouti passed new legislation to liberalize the energy sector. The government has emphasized infrastructure development for transportation and energy and Djibouti – with the help of foreign partners, particularly China – has begun to increase and modernize its port capacity. In 2017, Djibouti opened two of the largest projects in its history, the Doraleh Port and Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway, funded by China as part of the \"Belt and Road Initiative,\" which will increase the country's ability to capitalize on its strategic location."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$3.64 billion (2017 est.) / $3.411 billion (2016 est.) / $3.203 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/eg.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The regularity and richness of the annual Nile River flood, coupled with semi-isolation provided by deserts to the east and west, allowed for the development of one of the world's great civilizations. A unified kingdom arose circa 3200 B.C., and a series of dynasties ruled in Egypt for the next three millennia. The last native dynasty fell to the Persians in 341 B.C., who in turn were replaced by the Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines. It was the Arabs who introduced Islam and the Arabic language in the 7th century and who ruled for the next six centuries. A local military caste, the Mamluks took control about 1250 and continued to govern after the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1517. Completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 elevated Egypt as an important world transportation hub. Ostensibly to protect its investments, Britain seized control of Egypt's government in 1882, but nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Empire continued until 1914. Partially independent from the UK in 1922, Egypt acquired full sovereignty from Britain in 1952. The completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1971 and the resultant Lake Nasser have reaffirmed the time-honored place of the Nile River in the agriculture and ecology of Egypt. A rapidly growing population (the largest in the Arab world), limited arable land, and dependence on the Nile all continue to overtax resources and stress society. The government has struggled to meet the demands of Egypt's fast-growing population as it implements far-reaching economic reforms, including the reduction of select subsidies, large-scale infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, and foreign direct investment appeals. Inspired by the 2010 Tunisian revolution, Egyptian opposition groups led demonstrations and labor strikes countrywide, culminating in President Hosni MUBARAK's ouster in 2011. Egypt's military assumed national leadership until a new legislature was in place in early 2012; later that same year, Muhammad MURSI won the presidential election. Following protests throughout the spring of 2013 against MURSI's government and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Armed Forces intervened and removed MURSI from power in July 2013 and replaced him with interim president Adly MANSOUR. Simultaneously, the government began enacting laws to limit freedoms of assembly and expression. In January 2014, voters approved a new constitution by referendum and in May 2014 elected former defense minister Abdelfattah ELSISI president. Egypt elected a new legislature in December 2015, its first Hose of Representatives since 2012. ELSISI was reelected to a second four-year term in March 2018. In April 2019, Egypt approved via national referendum a set of constitutional amendments extending ELSISI’s term in office through 2024 and possibly through 2030 if re-elected for a third term. The amendments would also allow future presidents up to two consecutive six-year terms in office, re-establish an upper legislative house, allow for one or more vice presidents, establish a 25% quota for female legislators, reaffirm the military’s role as guardian of Egypt, and expand presidential authority to appoint the heads of judicial councils.    "
+      "text": "The regularity and richness of the annual Nile River flood, coupled with semi-isolation provided by deserts to the east and west, allowed for the development of one of the world's great civilizations. A unified kingdom arose circa 3200 B.C., and a series of dynasties ruled in Egypt for the next three millennia. The last native dynasty fell to the Persians in 341 B.C., who in turn were replaced by the Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines. It was the Arabs who introduced Islam and the Arabic language in the 7th century and who ruled for the next six centuries. A local military caste, the Mamluks took control about 1250 and continued to govern after the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Turks in 1517. Completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 elevated Egypt as an important world transportation hub. Ostensibly to protect its investments, Britain seized control of Egypt's government in 1882, but nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Empire continued until 1914. Partially independent from the UK in 1922, Egypt acquired full sovereignty from Britain in 1952. The completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1971 and the resultant Lake Nasser have reaffirmed the time-honored place of the Nile River in the agriculture and ecology of Egypt. A rapidly growing population (the largest in the Arab world), limited arable land, and dependence on the Nile all continue to overtax resources and stress society. The government has struggled to meet the demands of Egypt's fast-growing population as it implements far-reaching economic reforms, including the reduction of select subsidies, large-scale infrastructure projects, energy cooperation, and foreign direct investment appeals. ++ Inspired by the 2010 Tunisian revolution, Egyptian opposition groups led demonstrations and labor strikes countrywide, culminating in President Hosni MUBARAK's ouster in 2011. Egypt's military assumed national leadership until a new legislature was in place in early 2012; later that same year, Muhammad MURSI won the presidential election. Following protests throughout the spring of 2013 against MURSI's government and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Armed Forces intervened and removed MURSI from power in July 2013 and replaced him with interim president Adly MANSOUR. Simultaneously, the government began enacting laws to limit freedoms of assembly and expression. In January 2014, voters approved a new constitution by referendum and in May 2014 elected former defense minister Abdelfattah ELSISI president. Egypt elected a new legislature in December 2015, its first Hose of Representatives since 2012. ELSISI was reelected to a second four-year term in March 2018. In April 2019, Egypt approved via national referendum a set of constitutional amendments extending ELSISI's term in office through 2024 and possibly through 2030 if re-elected for a third term. The amendments would also allow future presidents up to two consecutive six-year terms in office, re-establish an upper legislative house, allow for one or more vice presidents, establish a 25% quota for female legislators, reaffirm the military's role as guardian of Egypt, and expand presidential authority to appoint the heads of judicial councils. ++   ++  "
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10% (2015 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third most populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt’s land area. Egypt’s rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.\nAlthough the country’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt’s TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and has plateaued the last few years. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum).\nNevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt’s public sphere.\nPopulation pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men.\nBetween 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered.\nIn the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada).\nDuring the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards."
+      "text": "Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the third most populous country in Africa, behind Nigeria and Ethiopia. Most of the country is desert, so about 95% of the population is concentrated in a narrow strip of fertile land along the Nile River, which represents only about 5% of Egypt's land area. Egypt's rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – stresses limited natural resources, jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care. ++ Although the country's total fertility rate (TFR) fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over 3 in the late 1990s, largely as a result of state-sponsored family planning programs, the population growth rate dropped more modestly because of decreased mortality rates and longer life expectancies. During the last decade, Egypt's TFR decline stalled for several years and then reversed, reaching 3.6 in 2011, and has plateaued the last few years. Contraceptive use has held steady at about 60%, while preferences for larger families and early marriage may have strengthened in the wake of the recent 2011 revolution. The large cohort of women of or nearing childbearing age will sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future (an effect called population momentum). ++ Nevertheless, post-MUBARAK governments have not made curbing population growth a priority. To increase contraceptive use and to prevent further overpopulation will require greater government commitment and substantial social change, including encouraging smaller families and better educating and empowering women. Currently, literacy, educational attainment, and labor force participation rates are much lower for women than men. In addition, the prevalence of violence against women, the lack of female political representation, and the perpetuation of the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continue to keep women from playing a more significant role in Egypt's public sphere. ++ Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to migrate internally from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the north, while a much smaller number migrated to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. Waves of forced internal migration also resulted from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the floods caused by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970. Limited numbers of students and professionals emigrated temporarily prior to the early 1970s, when economic problems and high unemployment pushed the Egyptian Government to lift restrictions on labor migration. At the same time, high oil revenues enabled Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and other Gulf states, as well as Libya and Jordan, to fund development projects, creating a demand for unskilled labor (mainly in construction), which attracted tens of thousands of young Egyptian men. ++ Between 1970 and 1974 alone, Egyptian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from approximately 70,000 to 370,000. Egyptian officials encouraged legal labor migration both to alleviate unemployment and to generate remittance income (remittances continue to be one of Egypt's largest sources of foreign currency and GDP). During the mid-1980s, however, depressed oil prices resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, decreased demand for low-skilled labor, competition from less costly South Asian workers, and efforts to replace foreign workers with locals significantly reduced Egyptian migration to the Gulf States. The number of Egyptian migrants dropped from a peak of almost 3.3 million in 1983 to about 2.2 million at the start of the 1990s, but numbers gradually recovered. ++ In the 2000s, Egypt began facilitating more labor migration through bilateral agreements, notably with Arab countries and Italy, but illegal migration to Europe through overstayed visas or maritime human smuggling via Libya also rose. The Egyptian Government estimated there were 6.5 million Egyptian migrants in 2009, with roughly 75% being temporary migrants in other Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) and 25% being predominantly permanent migrants in the West (US, UK, Italy, France, and Canada). ++ During the 2000s, Egypt became an increasingly important transit and destination country for economic migrants and asylum seekers, including Palestinians, East Africans, and South Asians and, more recently, Iraqis and Syrians. Egypt draws many refugees because of its resettlement programs with the West; Cairo has one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. Many East African migrants are interned or live in temporary encampments along the Egypt-Israel border, and some have been shot and killed by Egyptian border guards."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -267,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "58.5% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 98.8% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "1.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0.6% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 1.2% of population / total: 0.6% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -287,14 +284,11 @@
       "text": "1.4 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99.8% of population / rural: 97.6% of population / total: 98.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "2.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.2% of population / rural: 2.4% of population / total: 1.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -463,13 +457,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (Majlis Al-Shiyoukh) (300 seats; 100 members elected in single seat constituencies, 100 elected by closed party-list system, and 100 appointed by the president; note - the upper house, previously the Shura Council, was eliminated in the 2014 constitution, reestablished as the Senate, following passage in a 2019 constitutional referendum and approved by the House of Representatives in June 2020 House of Representatives (Majlis Al-Nowaab) (596 seats; 448 members directly elected by individual candidacy system, 120 members - with quotas for women, youth, Christians and workers - elected in party-list constituencies by simple majority popular vote, and 28 members appointed by the president; members of both houses serve 5-year terms"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (Majlis Al-Shiyoukh) (300 seats; 100 members elected in single seat constituencies, 100 elected by closed party-list system, and 100 appointed by the president; note - the upper house, previously the Shura Council, was eliminated in the 2014 constitution, reestablished as the Senate, following passage in a 2019 constitutional referendum and approved by the House of Representatives in June 2020 ++ House of Representatives (Majlis Al-Nowaab) (596 seats; 448 members directly elected by individual candidacy system, 120 members - with quotas for women, youth, Christians and workers - elected in party-list constituencies by simple majority popular vote, and 28 members appointed by the president; members of both houses serve 5-year terms"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - first round held on 11-12 August 2020 (9-10 August for diaspora); second round to be held on 8-9 September (6-7 September for diaspora) (next to be held in 2025)House of Representatives - last held from 17 October to 2 December 2015 (next to be held 24-25 October and 7-8 November 2020)"
+        "text": "Senate - first round held on 11-12 August 2020 (9-10 August for diaspora); second round to be held on 8-9 September (6-7 September for diaspora) (next to be held in 2025) ++ House of Representatives - last held from 17 October to 2 December 2015 (next to be held 24-25 October and 7-8 November 2020)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate first round results - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Nation's Future Party 100, independent 100; composition - NA  House of Representatives (2015) - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Free Egyptians Party 65, Future of the Nation 53, New Wafd Party 36, Homeland's Protector Party 18, Republican People's Party 13, Congress Party 12, Al-Nour Party 11, Conservative Party 6, Democratic Peace Party 5, Egyptian National Movement 4, Egyptian Social Democratic Party 4, Modern Egypt Party 4, Freedom Party 3, My Homeland Egypt Party 3, Reform and Development Party 3, National Progressive Unionist Party 2, Arab Democratic Nasserist Party 1, El Serh El Masry el Hor 1, Revolutionary Guards Party 1, independent 351; composition - men 507, women 89, percent of women 14.9%"
+        "text": "Senate first round results - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Nation's Future Party 100, independent 100; composition - NA  ++ House of Representatives (2015) - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Free Egyptians Party 65, Future of the Nation 53, New Wafd Party 36, Homeland's Protector Party 18, Republican People's Party 13, Congress Party 12, Al-Nour Party 11, Conservative Party 6, Democratic Peace Party 5, Egyptian National Movement 4, Egyptian Social Democratic Party 4, Modern Egypt Party 4, Freedom Party 3, My Homeland Egypt Party 3, Reform and Development Party 3, National Progressive Unionist Party 2, Arab Democratic Nasserist Party 1, El Serh El Masry el Hor 1, Revolutionary Guards Party 1, independent 351; composition - men 507, women 89, percent of women 14.9%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -484,7 +478,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Al-Nour [Yunis MAKHYUN]Arab Democratic Nasserist Party [Dr. Mohamed ABDUL ELLA ]Congress Party [Omar Al-Mokhtar SEMIDA]Conservative Party [Akmal KOURTAM]Democratic Peace Party [Ahmed FADALY]Egyptian National Movement Party [Gen. Raouf EL SAYED]Egyptian Social Democratic Party [Farid ZAHRAN]El Ghad Party [Moussa Mostafa MOUSSA]El Serh El Masry el Hor [Tarek Ahmed Abbas NADIM]Freedom Party [Salah HASSABALAH]Free Egyptians Party [Essam KHALIL]Homeland’s Protector Party [Lt. Gen. (retired) Galal AL-HARIDI]Modern Egypt Party [Nabil DEIBIS]Nation's Future Party (Mostaqbal Watan) [Mohamed Ashraf RASHAD]My Homeland Egypt Party [Gen. Seif El Islam ABDEL BARY ]National Progressive Unionist (Tagammu) Party [Sayed Abdel AAL]Reform and Development Party [Mohamad Anwar al-SADAT]Republican People’s Party [Hazim AMR]Revolutionary Guards Party [Magdy EL-SHARIF]Wafd Party note - party chairman Bahaa ABU SHOKA resigned in late September 2020"
+      "text": "Al-Nour [Yunis MAKHYUN] ++ Arab Democratic Nasserist Party [Dr. Mohamed ABDUL ELLA ] ++ Congress Party [Omar Al-Mokhtar SEMIDA] ++ Conservative Party [Akmal KOURTAM] ++ Democratic Peace Party [Ahmed FADALY] ++ Egyptian National Movement Party [Gen. Raouf EL SAYED] ++ Egyptian Social Democratic Party [Farid ZAHRAN] ++ El Ghad Party [Moussa Mostafa MOUSSA] ++ El Serh El Masry el Hor [Tarek Ahmed Abbas NADIM] ++ Freedom Party [Salah HASSABALAH] ++ Free Egyptians Party [Essam KHALIL] ++ Homeland's Protector Party [Lt. Gen. (retired) Galal AL-HARIDI] ++ Modern Egypt Party [Nabil DEIBIS] ++ Nation's Future Party (Mostaqbal Watan) [Mohamed Ashraf RASHAD] ++ My Homeland Egypt Party [Gen. Seif El Islam ABDEL BARY ] ++ National Progressive Unionist (Tagammu) Party [Sayed Abdel AAL] ++ Reform and Development Party [Mohamad Anwar al-SADAT] ++ Republican People's Party [Hazim AMR] ++ Revolutionary Guards Party [Magdy EL-SHARIF] ++ Wafd Party note - party chairman Bahaa ABU SHOKA resigned in late September 2020"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AU, BSEC (observer), CAEU, CD, CICA, COMESA, D-8, EBRD, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OAPEC, OAS (observer), OIC, OIF, OSCE (partner), PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -546,7 +540,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Occupying the northeast corner of the African continent, Egypt is bisected by the highly fertile Nile valley where most economic activity takes place. Egypt's economy was highly centralized during the rule of former President Gamal Abdel NASSER but opened up considerably under former Presidents Anwar EL-SADAT and Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK. Agriculture, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, tourism, and other service sectors drove the country’s relatively diverse economic activity. Despite Egypt’s mixed record for attracting foreign investment over the past two decades, poor living conditions and limited job opportunities have contributed to public discontent. These socioeconomic pressures were a major factor leading to the January 2011 revolution that ousted MUBARAK. The uncertain political, security, and policy environment since 2011 has restricted economic growth and failed to alleviate persistent unemployment, especially among the young. In late 2016, persistent dollar shortages and waning aid from its Gulf allies led Cairo to turn to the IMF for a 3-year, $12 billion loan program. To secure the deal, Cairo floated its currency, introduced new taxes, and cut energy subsidies - all of which pushed inflation above 30% for most of 2017, a high that had not been seen in a generation. Since the currency float, foreign investment in Egypt’s high interest treasury bills has risen exponentially, boosting both dollar availability and central bank reserves. Cairo will be challenged to obtain foreign and local investment in manufacturing and other sectors without a sustained effort to implement a range of business reforms."
+      "text": "Occupying the northeast corner of the African continent, Egypt is bisected by the highly fertile Nile valley where most economic activity takes place. Egypt's economy was highly centralized during the rule of former President Gamal Abdel NASSER but opened up considerably under former Presidents Anwar EL-SADAT and Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK. Agriculture, hydrocarbons, manufacturing, tourism, and other service sectors drove the country's relatively diverse economic activity. ++ Despite Egypt's mixed record for attracting foreign investment over the past two decades, poor living conditions and limited job opportunities have contributed to public discontent. These socioeconomic pressures were a major factor leading to the January 2011 revolution that ousted MUBARAK. The uncertain political, security, and policy environment since 2011 has restricted economic growth and failed to alleviate persistent unemployment, especially among the young. ++ In late 2016, persistent dollar shortages and waning aid from its Gulf allies led Cairo to turn to the IMF for a 3-year, $12 billion loan program. To secure the deal, Cairo floated its currency, introduced new taxes, and cut energy subsidies - all of which pushed inflation above 30% for most of 2017, a high that had not been seen in a generation. Since the currency float, foreign investment in Egypt's high interest treasury bills has risen exponentially, boosting both dollar availability and central bank reserves. Cairo will be challenged to obtain foreign and local investment in manufacturing and other sectors without a sustained effort to implement a range of business reforms."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$1.204 trillion (2017 est.) / $1.155 trillion (2016 est.) / $1.107 trillion (2015 est.)",
@@ -959,12 +953,12 @@
       "text": "18-30 years of age for male conscript military service; service obligation - 18-36 months, followed by a 9-year reserve obligation; voluntary enlistment possible from age 15 (2017)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of early 2020, Egypt reportedly had over 40,000 troops plus thousands of police and other security personnel deployed to the Sinai for internal security duties where more than 1,000 have been killedthe military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running businesses, producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing developments the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel; it is composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries (2020)"
+      "text": "since 2011, the Egyptian Armed Forces, police, and other security forces have been actively engaged in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the North Sinai governorate against several militant groups, particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; as of early 2020, Egypt reportedly had over 40,000 troops plus thousands of police and other security personnel deployed to the Sinai for internal security duties where more than 1,000 have been killed ++ the military has a large stake in the civilian economy, including running businesses, producing consumer and industrial goods, importing commodities, and building and managing infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, hospitals, and housing developments the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) has operated in the Sinai since 1982 as a peacekeeping and monitoring force to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace; the MFO is an independent international organization, created by agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel; it is composed of about 1,150 troops from 13 countries (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {
     "Terrorist group(s)": {
-      "text": "Army of Islam; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; al-Qa’ida (2019)",
+      "text": "Army of Islam; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Sinai Province; Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; al-Qa'ida (2019)",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
       }
@@ -984,7 +978,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Egypt is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor; Egyptian children, including the large population of street children are vulnerable to forced labor in domestic service, begging and agriculture or may be victims of sex trafficking or child sex tourism, which occurs in Cairo, Alexandria, and Luxor; some Egyptian women and girls are sold into \"temporary\" or \"summer\" marriages with Gulf men, through the complicity of their parents or marriage brokers, and are exploited for prostitution or forced labor; Egyptian men are subject to forced labor in neighboring countries, while adults from South and Southeast Asia and East Africa – and increasingly Syrian refugees – are forced to work in domestic service, construction, cleaning, and begging in Egypt; women and girls, including migrants and refugees, from Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East are sex trafficked in Egypt; the Egyptian military cracked down on criminal group’s smuggling, abducting, trafficking, and extorting African migrants in the Sinai Peninsula, but the practice has reemerged along Egypt’s western border with Libya"
+        "text": "Egypt is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor; Egyptian children, including the large population of street children are vulnerable to forced labor in domestic service, begging and agriculture or may be victims of sex trafficking or child sex tourism, which occurs in Cairo, Alexandria, and Luxor; some Egyptian women and girls are sold into \"temporary\" or \"summer\" marriages with Gulf men, through the complicity of their parents or marriage brokers, and are exploited for prostitution or forced labor; Egyptian men are subject to forced labor in neighboring countries, while adults from South and Southeast Asia and East Africa – and increasingly Syrian refugees – are forced to work in domestic service, construction, cleaning, and begging in Egypt; women and girls, including migrants and refugees, from Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East are sex trafficked in Egypt; the Egyptian military cracked down on criminal group's smuggling, abducting, trafficking, and extorting African migrants in the Sinai Peninsula, but the practice has reemerged along Egypt's western border with Libya"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Egypt does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; the government gathered data nationwide on trafficking cases to better allocate and prioritize anti-trafficking efforts, but overall it did not demonstrate increased progress; prosecutions increased in 2014, but no offenders were convicted for the second consecutive year; fewer trafficking victims were identified in 2014, which represents a significant and ongoing decrease from the previous two reporting periods; the government relied on NGOs and international organizations to identify and refer victims to protective services, and focused on Egyptian victims and refused to provide some services to foreign victims, at times including shelter (2015)"

africa/ek.json

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
       "text": "only two large cities over 30,000 people (Bata on the mainland, and the capital Malabo on the island of Bioko); small communities are scattered throughout the mainland and the five inhabited islands as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "violent windstorms; flash floods\nvolcanism: Santa Isabel (3,007 m), which last erupted in 1923, is the country's only historically active volcano; Santa Isabel, along with two dormant volcanoes, form Bioko Island in the Gulf of Guinea"
+      "text": "violent windstorms; flash floods ++ volcanism: Santa Isabel (3,007 m), which last erupted in 1923, is the country's only historically active volcano; Santa Isabel, along with two dormant volcanoes, form Bioko Island in the Gulf of Guinea"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation (forests are threatened by agricultural expansion, fires, and grazing); desertification; water pollution (tap water is non-potable); wildlife preservation"
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "nominally Christian and predominantly Roman Catholic, Muslim, Baha'i, animist, indigenous"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea’s main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line.\nEquatorial Guinea’s large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence."
+      "text": "Equatorial Guinea is one of the smallest and least populated countries in continental Africa and is the only independent African country where Spanish is an official language. Despite a boom in oil production in the 1990s, authoritarianism, corruption, and resource mismanagement have concentrated the benefits among a small elite. These practices have perpetuated income inequality and unbalanced development, such as low public spending on education and health care. Unemployment remains problematic because the oil-dominated economy employs a small labor force dependent on skilled foreign workers. The agricultural sector, Equatorial Guinea's main employer, continues to deteriorate because of a lack of investment and the migration of rural workers to urban areas. About three-quarters of the population lives below the poverty line. ++ Equatorial Guinea's large and growing youth population – about 60% are under the age of 25 – is particularly affected because job creation in the non-oil sectors is limited, and young people often do not have the skills needed in the labor market. Equatorial Guinean children frequently enter school late, have poor attendance, and have high dropout rates. Thousands of Equatorial Guineans fled across the border to Gabon in the 1970s to escape the dictatorship of MACIAS NGUEMA; smaller numbers have followed in the decades since. Continued inequitable economic growth and high youth unemployment increases the likelihood of ethnic and regional violence."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -252,14 +252,11 @@
       "text": "12.6% (2011)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 18.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 81.7% of population / rural: 32.1% of population / total: 67.6% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "67.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "32.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 18.3% of population / rural: 67.9% of population / total: 32.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -272,14 +269,11 @@
       "text": "2.1 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 18.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 81.2% of population / rural: 63.4% of population / total: 76.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "36.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "23.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 18.8% of population / rural: 36.6% of population / total: 23.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -426,13 +420,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral National Assembly or Asemblea Nacional consists of:Senate or Senado (70 seats; 55 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote and 15 appointed by the president) Chamber of Deputies or Camara de los Diputados (100 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed paryt-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral National Assembly or Asemblea Nacional consists of: Senate or Senado (70 seats; 55 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed party-list proportional representation vote and 15 appointed by the president) ++ Chamber of Deputies or Camara de los Diputados (100 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed paryt-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 12 November 2017 (next to be held in 2022/2023) Chamber of Deputies - last held on 12 November 2017 (next to be held in 2022/2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 12 November 2017 (next to be held in 2022/2023) ++ Chamber of Deputies - last held on 12 November 2017 (next to be held in 2022/2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PDGE and aligned coalition 70; composition - men 60, women 10, percent of women 14.3% Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PDGE 99, CI 1; composition - men 78, women 22, percent of women 22%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 18.8%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PDGE and aligned coalition 70; composition - men 60, women 10, percent of women 14.3% ++ Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PDGE 99, CI 1; composition - men 78, women 22, percent of women 22%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 18.8%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -447,7 +441,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Citizens for Innovation or CI [Gabriel Nse Obiang OBONO]Convergence Party for Social Democracy or CPDS [Andres ESONO ONDO]Democratic Party for Equatorial Guinea or PDGE [Teodoro Obiang NGUEMA MBASOGO]Electoral Coalition or ECJuntos Podemos (coalition includes CPDS, FDR, UDC)National Congress of Equatorial Guinea [Agustin MASOKO ABEGUE]National Democratic Party [Benedicto OBIANG MANGUE]National Union for Democracy [Thomas MBA MONABANG]Popular Action of Equatorial Guinea or APGE [Carmelo MBA BACALE]Popular Union or UP [Daniel MARTINEZ AYECABA]Union for the Center right or UDC [Avelino MOCACHE MEHENGA]not officially registered parties:Democratic Republican Force or FDR [Guillermo NGUEMA ELA]Party for Progress of Equatorial Guinea or PPGE [Severo MOTO]"
+      "text": "Citizens for Innovation or CI [Gabriel Nse Obiang OBONO] ++ Convergence Party for Social Democracy or CPDS [Andres ESONO ONDO] ++ Democratic Party for Equatorial Guinea or PDGE [Teodoro Obiang NGUEMA MBASOGO] ++ Electoral Coalition or EC ++ Juntos Podemos (coalition includes CPDS, FDR, UDC) ++ National Congress of Equatorial Guinea [Agustin MASOKO ABEGUE] ++ National Democratic Party [Benedicto OBIANG MANGUE] ++ National Union for Democracy [Thomas MBA MONABANG] ++ Popular Action of Equatorial Guinea or APGE [Carmelo MBA BACALE] ++ Popular Union or UP [Daniel MARTINEZ AYECABA] ++ Union for the Center right or UDC [Avelino MOCACHE MEHENGA] ++ not officially registered parties: Democratic Republican Force or FDR [Guillermo NGUEMA ELA] ++ Party for Progress of Equatorial Guinea or PPGE [Severo MOTO]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, BDEAC, CEMAC, CPLP (associate), FAO, FZ, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IPU, ITSO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UN Security Council (temporary), UNWTO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WTO (observer)"
@@ -503,7 +497,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Exploitation of oil and gas deposits, beginning in the 1990s, has driven economic growth in Equatorial Guinea; a recent rebasing of GDP resulted in an upward revision of the size of the economy by approximately 30%. Forestry and farming are minor components of GDP. Although preindependence Equatorial Guinea counted on cocoa production for hard currency earnings, the neglect of the rural economy since independence has diminished the potential for agriculture-led growth. Subsistence farming is the dominant form of livelihood. Declining revenue from hydrocarbon production, high levels of infrastructure expenditures, lack of economic diversification, and corruption have pushed the economy into decline in recent years and limited improvements in the general population’s living conditions. Equatorial Guinea’s real GDP growth has been weak in recent years, averaging -0.5% per year from 2010 to 2014, because of a declining hydrocarbon sector. Inflation remained very low in 2016, down from an average of 4% in 2014. As a middle income country, Equatorial Guinea is now ineligible for most low-income World Bank and the IMF funding. The government has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and misuse of oil revenues and has attempted to address this issue by working toward compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. US foreign assistance to Equatorial Guinea is limited in part because of US restrictions pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Equatorial Guinea hosted two economic diversification symposia in 2014 that focused on attracting investment in five sectors: agriculture and animal ranching, fishing, mining and petrochemicals, tourism, and financial services. Undeveloped mineral resources include gold, zinc, diamonds, columbite-tantalite, and other base metals. In 2017 Equatorial Guinea signed a preliminary agreement with Ghana to sell liquefied natural gas (LNG); as oil production wanes, the government believes LNG could provide a boost to revenues, but it will require large investments and long lead times to develop."
+      "text": "Exploitation of oil and gas deposits, beginning in the 1990s, has driven economic growth in Equatorial Guinea; a recent rebasing of GDP resulted in an upward revision of the size of the economy by approximately 30%. Forestry and farming are minor components of GDP. Although preindependence Equatorial Guinea counted on cocoa production for hard currency earnings, the neglect of the rural economy since independence has diminished the potential for agriculture-led growth. Subsistence farming is the dominant form of livelihood. Declining revenue from hydrocarbon production, high levels of infrastructure expenditures, lack of economic diversification, and corruption have pushed the economy into decline in recent years and limited improvements in the general population's living conditions. Equatorial Guinea's real GDP growth has been weak in recent years, averaging -0.5% per year from 2010 to 2014, because of a declining hydrocarbon sector. Inflation remained very low in 2016, down from an average of 4% in 2014. ++ As a middle income country, Equatorial Guinea is now ineligible for most low-income World Bank and the IMF funding. The government has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and misuse of oil revenues and has attempted to address this issue by working toward compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. US foreign assistance to Equatorial Guinea is limited in part because of US restrictions pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. ++ Equatorial Guinea hosted two economic diversification symposia in 2014 that focused on attracting investment in five sectors: agriculture and animal ranching, fishing, mining and petrochemicals, tourism, and financial services. Undeveloped mineral resources include gold, zinc, diamonds, columbite-tantalite, and other base metals. In 2017 Equatorial Guinea signed a preliminary agreement with Ghana to sell liquefied natural gas (LNG); as oil production wanes, the government believes LNG could provide a boost to revenues, but it will require large investments and long lead times to develop."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$31.52 billion (2017 est.) / $32.57 billion (2016 est.) / $35.62 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/er.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "After independence from Italian colonial control in 1941 and 10 years of British administrative control, the UN established Eritrea as an autonomous region within the Ethiopian federation in 1952. Ethiopia's full annexation of Eritrea as a province 10 years later sparked a violent 30-year struggle for independence that ended in 1991 with Eritrean rebels defeating government forces. Eritreans overwhelmingly approved independence in a 1993 referendum. ISAIAS Afwerki has been Eritrea's only president since independence; his rule, particularly since 2001, has been highly autocratic and repressive. His government has created a highly militarized society by pursuing an unpopular program of mandatory conscription into national service – divided between military and civilian service – of indefinite length. A two-and-a-half-year border war with Ethiopia that erupted in 1998 ended under UN auspices in December 2000. A subsequent 2007 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) demarcation was rejected by Ethiopia. More than a decade of a tense “no peace, no war” stalemate ended in 2018 after the newly elected Ethiopian prime minister accepted the EEBC’s 2007 ruling, and the two countries signed declarations of peace and friendship. Following the July 2018 peace agreement with Ethiopia, Eritrean leaders engaged in intensive diplomacy around the Horn of Africa, bolstering regional peace, security, and cooperation, as well as brokering rapprochements between governments and opposition groups. In November 2018, the UN Security Council lifted an arms embargo that had been imposed on Eritrea since 2009, after the UN Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group reported they had not found evidence of Eritrean support in recent years for Al-Shabaab. The country’s rapprochement with Ethiopia has led to a steady resumption of economic ties, with increased air transport, trade, tourism, and port activities, but the economy remains agriculture-dependent, and Eritrea is still one of Africa’s poorest nations. Despite the country's improved relations with its neighbors, ISAIAS has not let up on repression and conscription and militarization continue."
+      "text": "After independence from Italian colonial control in 1941 and 10 years of British administrative control, the UN established Eritrea as an autonomous region within the Ethiopian federation in 1952. Ethiopia's full annexation of Eritrea as a province 10 years later sparked a violent 30-year struggle for independence that ended in 1991 with Eritrean rebels defeating government forces. Eritreans overwhelmingly approved independence in a 1993 referendum. ISAIAS Afwerki has been Eritrea's only president since independence; his rule, particularly since 2001, has been highly autocratic and repressive. His government has created a highly militarized society by pursuing an unpopular program of mandatory conscription into national service – divided between military and civilian service – of indefinite length. A two-and-a-half-year border war with Ethiopia that erupted in 1998 ended under UN auspices in December 2000. A subsequent 2007 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) demarcation was rejected by Ethiopia. More than a decade of a tense “no peace, no war” stalemate ended in 2018 after the newly elected Ethiopian prime minister accepted the EEBC's 2007 ruling, and the two countries signed declarations of peace and friendship. Following the July 2018 peace agreement with Ethiopia, Eritrean leaders engaged in intensive diplomacy around the Horn of Africa, bolstering regional peace, security, and cooperation, as well as brokering rapprochements between governments and opposition groups. In November 2018, the UN Security Council lifted an arms embargo that had been imposed on Eritrea since 2009, after the UN Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group reported they had not found evidence of Eritrean support in recent years for Al-Shabaab. The country's rapprochement with Ethiopia has led to a steady resumption of economic ties, with increased air transport, trade, tourism, and port activities, but the economy remains agriculture-dependent, and Eritrea is still one of Africa's poorest nations. Despite the country's improved relations with its neighbors, ISAIAS has not let up on repression and conscription and militarization continue."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
       "text": "density is highest in the center of the country in and around the cities of Asmara (capital) and Keren; smaller settlements exist in the north and south as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "frequent droughts, rare earthquakes and volcanoes; locust swarms\nvolcanism: Dubbi (1,625 m), which last erupted in 1861, was the country's only historically active volcano until Nabro (2,218 m) came to life on 12 June 2011"
+      "text": "frequent droughts, rare earthquakes and volcanoes; locust swarms ++ volcanism: Dubbi (1,625 m), which last erupted in 1861, was the country's only historically active volcano until Nabro (2,218 m) came to life on 12 June 2011"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation; desertification; soil erosion; overgrazing"
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Sunni Muslim, Coptic Christian, Roman Catholic, Protestant"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others. Education and human capital formation are national priorities for facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end, Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was estimated to be almost 74% in 2015; more work needs to be done to raise female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea’s growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land, overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription and displacement. The government’s emphasis on spending on defense over agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also contribute to food insecurity.\nEritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the 1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea’s large diaspora has been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and providing 30% of the country’s GDP annually since it became independent.\nIn the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps or crossing Eritrea’s borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report."
+      "text": "Eritrea is a persistently poor country that has made progress in some socioeconomic categories but not in others. Education and human capital formation are national priorities for facilitating economic development and eradicating poverty. To this end, Eritrea has made great strides in improving adult literacy – doubling the literacy rate over the last 20 years – in large part because of its successful adult education programs. The overall literacy rate was estimated to be almost 74% in 2015; more work needs to be done to raise female literacy and school attendance among nomadic and rural communities. Subsistence farming fails to meet the needs of Eritrea's growing population because of repeated droughts, dwindling arable land, overgrazing, soil erosion, and a shortage of farmers due to conscription and displacement. The government's emphasis on spending on defense over agriculture and its lack of foreign exchange to import food also contribute to food insecurity. ++ Eritrea has been a leading refugee source country since at least the 1960s, when its 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia began. Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritreans have continued migrating to Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Egypt, or Israel because of a lack of basic human rights or political freedom, educational and job opportunities, or to seek asylum because of militarization. Eritrea's large diaspora has been a source of vital remittances, funding its war for independence and providing 30% of the country's GDP annually since it became independent. ++ In the last few years, Eritreans have increasingly been trafficked and held hostage by Bedouins in the Sinai Desert, where they are victims of organ harvesting, rape, extortion, and torture. Some Eritrean trafficking victims are kidnapped after being smuggled to Sudan or Ethiopia, while others are kidnapped from within or around refugee camps or crossing Eritrea's borders. Eritreans composed approximately 90% of the conservatively estimated 25,000-30,000 victims of Sinai trafficking from 2009-2013, according to a 2013 consultancy firm report."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "8.4% (2010)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 26.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 73.2% of population / rural: 53.3% of population / total: 57.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "46.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "42.2% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 26.8% of population / rural: 46.7% of population / total: 42.2% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "0.7 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 55.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 44.5% of population / rural: 7.3% of population / total: 15.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "92.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "84.3% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 55.5% of population / rural: 92.7% of population / total: 84.3% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -520,7 +514,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Since formal independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has faced many economic problems, including lack of financial resources and chronic drought. Eritrea has a command economy under the control of the sole political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Like the economies of many African nations, a large share of the population - nearly 80% in Eritrea - is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but the sector only produces a small share of the country's total output. Mining accounts for the lion's share of output. The government has strictly controlled the use of foreign currency by limiting access and availability; new regulations in 2013 aimed at relaxing currency controls have had little economic effect. Few large private enterprises exist in Eritrea and most operate in conjunction with government partners, including a number of large international mining ventures, which began production in 2013. In late 2015, the Government of Eritrea introduced a new currency, retaining the name nakfa, and restricted the amount of hard currency individuals could withdraw from banks per month. The changeover has resulted in exchange fluctuations and the scarcity of hard currency available in the market. While reliable statistics on Eritrea are difficult to obtain, erratic rainfall and the large percentage of the labor force tied up in military service continue to interfere with agricultural production and economic development. Eritrea's harvests generally cannot meet the food needs of the country without supplemental grain purchases. Copper, potash, and gold production are likely to continue to drive limited economic growth and government revenue over the next few years, but military spending will continue to compete with development and investment plans."
+      "text": "Since formal independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has faced many economic problems, including lack of financial resources and chronic drought. Eritrea has a command economy under the control of the sole political party, the People's Front for Democracy and Justice. Like the economies of many African nations, a large share of the population - nearly 80% in Eritrea - is engaged in subsistence agriculture, but the sector only produces a small share of the country's total output. Mining accounts for the lion's share of output. ++ The government has strictly controlled the use of foreign currency by limiting access and availability; new regulations in 2013 aimed at relaxing currency controls have had little economic effect. Few large private enterprises exist in Eritrea and most operate in conjunction with government partners, including a number of large international mining ventures, which began production in 2013. In late 2015, the Government of Eritrea introduced a new currency, retaining the name nakfa, and restricted the amount of hard currency individuals could withdraw from banks per month. The changeover has resulted in exchange fluctuations and the scarcity of hard currency available in the market. ++ While reliable statistics on Eritrea are difficult to obtain, erratic rainfall and the large percentage of the labor force tied up in military service continue to interfere with agricultural production and economic development. Eritrea's harvests generally cannot meet the food needs of the country without supplemental grain purchases. Copper, potash, and gold production are likely to continue to drive limited economic growth and government revenue over the next few years, but military spending will continue to compete with development and investment plans."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$9.402 billion (2017 est.) / $8.953 billion (2016 est.) / $8.791 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -888,7 +882,7 @@
       "text": "Eritrean Defense Forces: Eritrean Ground Forces, Eritrean Navy, Eritrean Air Force (includes Air Defense Force) (2019)"
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
-      "text": "the Eritrean Defense Forces are comprised of approximately 200,000 personnel (est. 200,000 Army; 1,500 Naval; 500 Air); note – it is unclear how many of the Army’s 200,000 are on active duty; reportedly, some units are manned only with cadres during peacetime while many conscripts are not under arms (2019 est.)"
+      "text": "the Eritrean Defense Forces are comprised of approximately 200,000 personnel (est. 200,000 Army; 1,500 Naval; 500 Air); note – it is unclear how many of the Army's 200,000 are on active duty; reportedly, some units are manned only with cadres during peacetime while many conscripts are not under arms (2019 est.)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
       "text": "the Eritrean Defense Forces inventory is comprised primarily of Soviet-era systems; Eritrea was under a UN arms embargo from 2009 to 2018; prior to 2009, Belarus, Bulgaria, and Russia were the leading arms suppliers (2019 est.)"
@@ -903,7 +897,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Eritrea is a source country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor domestically and, to a lesser extent, sex and labor trafficking abroad; the country’s national service program is often abused, with conscripts detained indefinitely and subjected to forced labor; Eritrean migrants, often fleeing national service, face strict exit control procedures and limited access to passports and visas, making them vulnerable to trafficking; Eritrean secondary school children are required to take part in public works projects during their summer breaks and must attend military and educational camp in their final year to obtain a high school graduation certificate and to gain access to higher education and some jobs; some Eritreans living in or near refugee camps, particularly in Sudan, are kidnapped by criminal groups and held for ransom in the Sinai Peninsula and Libya, where they are subjected to forced labor and abuse"
+        "text": "Eritrea is a source country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor domestically and, to a lesser extent, sex and labor trafficking abroad; the country's national service program is often abused, with conscripts detained indefinitely and subjected to forced labor; Eritrean migrants, often fleeing national service, face strict exit control procedures and limited access to passports and visas, making them vulnerable to trafficking; Eritrean secondary school children are required to take part in public works projects during their summer breaks and must attend military and educational camp in their final year to obtain a high school graduation certificate and to gain access to higher education and some jobs; some Eritreans living in or near refugee camps, particularly in Sudan, are kidnapped by criminal groups and held for ransom in the Sinai Peninsula and Libya, where they are subjected to forced labor and abuse"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 3 – Eritrea does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government failed to investigate or prosecute any trafficking offenses or to identify or protect any victims; while the government continued to warn citizens of the dangers of human trafficking through awareness-raising events and poster campaigns, authorities lacked an understanding of the crime, conflating trafficking with transnational migration; Eritrea is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol (2015)"

africa/et.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Unique among African countries, the ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation from 1936-41. In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor Haile SELASSIE (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A constitution was adopted in 1994, and Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were held in 1995. A border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. In November 2007, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) issued specific coordinates as virtually demarcating the border and pronounced its work finished. Alleging that the EEBC acted beyond its mandate in issuing the coordinates, Ethiopia did not accept them and maintained troops in previously contested areas pronounced by the EEBC as belonging to Eritrea. This intransigence resulted in years of heightened tension between the two countries. In August 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in February 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office in April 2018 as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In June 2018, ABIY announced Ethiopia would accept the border ruling of 2000, prompting rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement in July 2018 and a reopening of the border in September 2018. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition - the EPRDF - merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party, however, one of the four constituent parties refused to join."
+      "text": "Unique among African countries, the ancient Ethiopian monarchy maintained its freedom from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation from 1936-41. In 1974, a military junta, the Derg, deposed Emperor Haile SELASSIE (who had ruled since 1930) and established a socialist state. Torn by bloody coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and massive refugee problems, the regime was finally toppled in 1991 by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A constitution was adopted in 1994, and Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were held in 1995. ++ A border war with Eritrea in the late 1990s ended with a peace treaty in December 2000. In November 2007, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) issued specific coordinates as virtually demarcating the border and pronounced its work finished. Alleging that the EEBC acted beyond its mandate in issuing the coordinates, Ethiopia did not accept them and maintained troops in previously contested areas pronounced by the EEBC as belonging to Eritrea. This intransigence resulted in years of heightened tension between the two countries. In August 2012, longtime leader Prime Minister MELES Zenawi died in office and was replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister HAILEMARIAM Desalegn, marking the first peaceful transition of power in decades. Following a wave of popular dissent and anti-government protest that began in 2015, HAILEMARIAM resigned in February 2018 and ABIY Ahmed Ali took office in April 2018 as Ethiopia's first ethnic Oromo prime minister. In June 2018, ABIY announced Ethiopia would accept the border ruling of 2000, prompting rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was marked with a peace agreement in July 2018 and a reopening of the border in September 2018. In November 2019, Ethiopia's nearly 30-year ethnic-based ruling coalition - the EPRDF - merged into a single unity party called the Prosperity Party, however, one of the four constituent parties refused to join."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
       "text": "highest density is found in the highlands of the north and middle areas of the country, particularly around the centrally located capital city of Addis Ababa; the far east and southeast are sparsely populated as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "geologically active Great Rift Valley susceptible to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions; frequent droughts\nvolcanism: volcanic activity in the Great Rift Valley; Erta Ale (613 m), which has caused frequent lava flows in recent years, is the country's most active volcano; Dabbahu became active in 2005, forcing evacuations; other historically active volcanoes include Alayta, Dalaffilla, Dallol, Dama Ali, Fentale, Kone, Manda Hararo, and Manda-Inakir"
+      "text": "geologically active Great Rift Valley susceptible to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions; frequent droughts ++ volcanism: volcanic activity in the Great Rift Valley; Erta Ale (613 m), which has caused frequent lava flows in recent years, is the country's most active volcano; Dabbahu became active in 2005, forcing evacuations; other historically active volcanoes include Alayta, Dalaffilla, Dallol, Dama Ali, Fentale, Kone, Manda Hararo, and Manda-Inakir"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification; loss of biodiversity; water shortages in some areas from water-intensive farming and poor management; industrial pollution and pesticides contribute to air, water, and soil pollution"
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
     },
     "Geography - note": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "note 1: landlocked - entire coastline along the Red Sea was lost with the de jure independence of Eritrea on 24 May 1993; Ethiopia is, therefore, the most populous landlocked country in the world; the Blue Nile, the chief headstream of the Nile by water volume, rises in T'ana Hayk (Lake Tana) in northwest Ethiopianote 2: three major crops are believed to have originated in Ethiopia: coffee, grain sorghum, and castor bean"
+        "text": "note 1: landlocked - entire coastline along the Red Sea was lost with the de jure independence of Eritrea on 24 May 1993; Ethiopia is, therefore, the most populous landlocked country in the world; the Blue Nile, the chief headstream of the Nile by water volume, rises in T'ana Hayk (Lake Tana) in northwest Ethiopia ++ note 2: three major crops are believed to have originated in Ethiopia: coffee, grain sorghum, and castor bean"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
       "text": "Ethiopian Orthodox 43.8%, Muslim 31.3%, Protestant 22.8%, Catholic 0.7%, traditional .6%, other 0.8% (2016 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country – more than 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall rate is still quite low.\nEthiopia’s rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages. With more than 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of over 5 children per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend in the coming decades.\nPoverty, drought, political repression, and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia’s internal and external migration since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees. Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians have migrated to escape violence among some of the country’s myriad ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and prostitution is a growing problem."
+      "text": "Ethiopia is a predominantly agricultural country – more than 80% of the population lives in rural areas – that is in the early stages of demographic transition. Infant, child, and maternal mortality have fallen sharply over the past decade, but the total fertility rate has declined more slowly and the population continues to grow. The rising age of marriage and the increasing proportion of women remaining single have contributed to fertility reduction. While the use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has increased significantly from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012, the overall rate is still quite low. ++ Ethiopia's rapid population growth is putting increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages. With more than 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 and a fertility rate of over 5 children per woman (and even higher in rural areas), Ethiopia will have to make further progress in meeting its family planning needs if it is to achieve the age structure necessary for reaping a demographic dividend in the coming decades. ++ Poverty, drought, political repression, and forced government resettlement have driven Ethiopia's internal and external migration since the 1960s. Before the 1974 revolution, only small numbers of the Ethiopian elite went abroad to study and then returned home, but under the brutal Derg regime thousands fled the country, primarily as refugees. Between 1982 and 1991 there was a new wave of migration to the West for family reunification. Since the defeat of the Derg in 1991, Ethiopians have migrated to escape violence among some of the country's myriad ethnic groups or to pursue economic opportunities. Internal and international trafficking of women and children for domestic work and prostitution is a growing problem."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -263,14 +263,11 @@
       "text": "40.1% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97% of population / rural: 61.7% of population / total: 68.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "38.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "31.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 3% of population / rural: 38.3% of population / total: 31.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -283,14 +280,11 @@
       "text": "0.3 beds/1,000 population (2016)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 50.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 49.7% of population / rural: 5.7% of population / total: 14.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "94.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "85.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 50.3% of population / rural: 94.3% of population / total: 85.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -471,13 +465,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:House of Federation or Yefedereshein Mikir Bete (153 seats; members indirectly elected by state assemblies to serve 5-year terms)House of People's Representatives or Yehizb Tewokayoch Mekir Bete (547 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote; 22 seats reserved for minorities; all members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: House of Federation or Yefedereshein Mikir Bete (153 seats; members indirectly elected by state assemblies to serve 5-year terms) ++ House of People's Representatives or Yehizb Tewokayoch Mekir Bete (547 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote; 22 seats reserved for minorities; all members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "House of Federation - last held 24 May 2015 (next originally scheduled on 29 August 2020 but postponed a year due to the COVID-19 pandemic)House of People's Representatives - last held on 24 May 2015 (next originally scheduled on 29 August 2020 but postponed to 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic)"
+        "text": "House of Federation - last held 24 May 2015 (next originally scheduled on 29 August 2020 but postponed a year due to the COVID-19 pandemic) ++ House of People's Representatives - last held on 24 May 2015 (next originally scheduled on 29 August 2020 but postponed to 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "House of Federation - percent of vote by coalition/party - NA; seats by coalition/party - NA; composition - men 104, women 49, percent of women 32%House of Representatives - percent of vote by coalition/party - NA; seats by coalition/party - EPRDF 501, SPDP 24, BGPDUP 9, ANDP 8, GPUDM 3, APDO 1, HNL 1; composition - men 335, women 212, percent of women  38.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women 37.3%"
+        "text": "House of Federation - percent of vote by coalition/party - NA; seats by coalition/party - NA; composition - men 104, women 49, percent of women 32% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by coalition/party - NA; seats by coalition/party - EPRDF 501, SPDP 24, BGPDUP 9, ANDP 8, GPUDM 3, APDO 1, HNL 1; composition - men 335, women 212, percent of women  38.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women 37.3%"
       },
       "note": {
         "text": "note: House of Federation is responsible for interpreting the constitution and federal-regional issues and the House of People's Representatives is responsible for passing legislation"
@@ -495,7 +489,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Afar National Democratic Party or ANDP [Taha AHMED]Argoba People Democratic Organization or APDOBenishangul Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Party or BGPDUPEthiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum or MEDREK or FORUM [Beyene PETROS] (includes ESD-SCUP, OFC, SLM, and UTDS)Ethiopia Citizens for Social Justice or ECSJ Party (formed in May 2019 from 7 other parties, including Patriotic Genbot 7, Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), All Ethiopian Democratic Party (AEDP), Semayawi Party, New Generation Party, Gambella Regional Movement (GRM), Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) Party [Berhanu Negu])Prosperity Party or PP [ABIY Ahmed] (created in November 2019 from member parties of the former Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front or EPRDF, which included the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM),  Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement  (SEPDM), Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), plus other ERPRF allies Ethiopian Social Democracy-Southern Coalition Unity Party or ESD-SCUPGambella Peoples Unity Democratic Movement or GPUDMHarari National League or HNL [Murad ABDULHADI]Oromo Fderalist Congress or OFCSidama Liberaton Movement or SLMSomali People's Democratic Party or SPDPUnion of Tigraians for Democracy & Sovergnty or UTDSTigray Independence Party [Girmay BERHE] (2020)"
+      "text": "Afar National Democratic Party or ANDP [Taha AHMED] ++ Argoba People Democratic Organization or APDO ++ Benishangul Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Party or BGPDUP ++ Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum or MEDREK or FORUM [Beyene PETROS] (includes ESD-SCUP, OFC, SLM, and UTDS) ++ Ethiopia Citizens for Social Justice or ECSJ Party (formed in May 2019 from 7 other parties, including Patriotic Genbot 7, Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), All Ethiopian Democratic Party (AEDP), Semayawi Party, New Generation Party, Gambella Regional Movement (GRM), Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) Party [Berhanu Negu]) ++ Prosperity Party or PP [ABIY Ahmed] (created in November 2019 from member parties of the former Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front or EPRDF, which included the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM),  Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement  (SEPDM), Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), plus other ERPRF allies ++ Ethiopian Social Democracy-Southern Coalition Unity Party or ESD-SCUP ++ Gambella Peoples Unity Democratic Movement or GPUDM ++ Harari National League or HNL [Murad ABDULHADI] ++ Oromo Fderalist Congress or OFC ++ Sidama Liberaton Movement or SLM ++ Somali People's Democratic Party or SPDP ++ Union of Tigraians for Democracy & Sovergnty or UTDS ++ Tigray Independence Party [Girmay BERHE] (2020)"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, COMESA, EITI (candidate country), FAO, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMIL, UN Security Council (temporary), UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
@@ -560,7 +554,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Ethiopia - the second most populous country in Africa - is a one-party state with a planned economy. For more than a decade before 2016, GDP grew at a rate between 8% and 11% annually – one of the fastest growing states among the 188 IMF member countries. This growth was driven by government investment in infrastructure, as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. More than 70% of Ethiopia’s population is still employed in the agricultural sector, but services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP. Ethiopia has the lowest level of income-inequality in Africa and one of the lowest in the world, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the Scandinavian countries. Yet despite progress toward eliminating extreme poverty, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, due both to rapid population growth and a low starting base. Changes in rainfall associated with world-wide weather patterns resulted in the worst drought in 30 years in 2015-16, creating food insecurity for millions of Ethiopians. The state is heavily engaged in the economy. Ongoing infrastructure projects include power production and distribution, roads, rails, airports and industrial parks. Key sectors are state-owned, including telecommunications, banking and insurance, and power distribution. Under Ethiopia's constitution, the state owns all land and provides long-term leases to tenants. Title rights in urban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, are poorly regulated, and subject to corruption. Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings are led by the services sector - primarily the state-run Ethiopian Airlines - followed by exports of several commodities. While coffee remains the largest foreign exchange earner, Ethiopia is diversifying exports, and commodities such as gold, sesame, khat, livestock and horticulture products are becoming increasingly important. Manufacturing represented less than 8% of total exports in 2016, but manufacturing exports should increase in future years due to a growing international presence. The banking, insurance, telecommunications, and micro-credit industries are restricted to domestic investors, but Ethiopia has attracted roughly $8.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from China, Turkey, India and the EU; US FDI is $567 million. Investment has been primarily in infrastructure, construction, agriculture/horticulture, agricultural processing, textiles, leather and leather products. To support industrialization in sectors where Ethiopia has a comparative advantage, such as textiles and garments, leather goods, and processed agricultural products, Ethiopia plans to increase installed power generation capacity by 8,320 MW, up from a capacity of 2,000 MW, by building three more major dams and expanding to other sources of renewable energy. In 2017, the government devalued the birr by 15% to increase exports and alleviate a chronic foreign currency shortage in the country."
+      "text": "Ethiopia - the second most populous country in Africa - is a one-party state with a planned economy. For more than a decade before 2016, GDP grew at a rate between 8% and 11% annually – one of the fastest growing states among the 188 IMF member countries. This growth was driven by government investment in infrastructure, as well as sustained progress in the agricultural and service sectors. More than 70% of Ethiopia's population is still employed in the agricultural sector, but services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP. ++ Ethiopia has the lowest level of income-inequality in Africa and one of the lowest in the world, with a Gini coefficient comparable to that of the Scandinavian countries. Yet despite progress toward eliminating extreme poverty, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, due both to rapid population growth and a low starting base. Changes in rainfall associated with world-wide weather patterns resulted in the worst drought in 30 years in 2015-16, creating food insecurity for millions of Ethiopians. ++ The state is heavily engaged in the economy. Ongoing infrastructure projects include power production and distribution, roads, rails, airports and industrial parks. Key sectors are state-owned, including telecommunications, banking and insurance, and power distribution. Under Ethiopia's constitution, the state owns all land and provides long-term leases to tenants. Title rights in urban areas, particularly Addis Ababa, are poorly regulated, and subject to corruption. ++ Ethiopia's foreign exchange earnings are led by the services sector - primarily the state-run Ethiopian Airlines - followed by exports of several commodities. While coffee remains the largest foreign exchange earner, Ethiopia is diversifying exports, and commodities such as gold, sesame, khat, livestock and horticulture products are becoming increasingly important. Manufacturing represented less than 8% of total exports in 2016, but manufacturing exports should increase in future years due to a growing international presence. ++ The banking, insurance, telecommunications, and micro-credit industries are restricted to domestic investors, but Ethiopia has attracted roughly $8.5 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly from China, Turkey, India and the EU; US FDI is $567 million. Investment has been primarily in infrastructure, construction, agriculture/horticulture, agricultural processing, textiles, leather and leather products. ++ To support industrialization in sectors where Ethiopia has a comparative advantage, such as textiles and garments, leather goods, and processed agricultural products, Ethiopia plans to increase installed power generation capacity by 8,320 MW, up from a capacity of 2,000 MW, by building three more major dams and expanding to other sources of renewable energy. In 2017, the government devalued the birr by 15% to increase exports and alleviate a chronic foreign currency shortage in the country."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$200.6 billion (2017 est.) / $181 billion (2016 est.) / $167.6 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -933,7 +927,7 @@
     "Military and security forces": {
       "text": "Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF): Ground Forces, Ethiopian Air Force (Ye Ityopya Ayer Hayl, ETAF) (2020)",
       "note": {
-        "text": "note: in January 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which was disbanded in 1996; in March 2019 Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navyin 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard for protecting senior officials; the Republican Guard is a military unit accountable to the Prime Minister"
+        "text": "note: in January 2020 the Ethiopian Government announced it had re-established a navy, which was disbanded in 1996; in March 2019 Ethiopia signed a defense cooperation agreement with France which stipulated that France would support the establishment of an Ethiopian navy ++ in 2018, Ethiopia established a Republican Guard for protecting senior officials; the Republican Guard is a military unit accountable to the Prime Minister"
       }
     },
     "Military expenditures": {

africa/ga.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The Gambia gained its independence from the UK in 1965. Geographically surrounded by Senegal, it formed a short-lived Confederation of Senegambia between 1982 and 1989. In 1991, the two nations signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, although tensions flared up intermittently during the regime of Yahya JAMMEH. JAMMEH led a military coup in 1994 that overthrew the president and banned political activity. A new constitution and presidential election in 1996, followed by parliamentary balloting in 1997, completed a nominal return to civilian rule. JAMMEH was elected president in all subsequent elections including most recently in late 2011. After 22 years of increasingly authoritarian rule, President JAMMEH was defeated in free and fair elections in December 2016. Due to The Gambia’s poor human rights record under JAMMEH, international development partners had distanced themselves, and substantially reduced aid to the country. These channels have now reopened under the administration of President Adama BARROW, who took office in January 2017. The US and The Gambia currently enjoy improved relations. US assistance to the country has supported military education and training programs, as well as various capacity building and democracy strengthening activities.    "
+      "text": "The Gambia gained its independence from the UK in 1965. Geographically surrounded by Senegal, it formed a short-lived Confederation of Senegambia between 1982 and 1989. In 1991, the two nations signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, although tensions flared up intermittently during the regime of Yahya JAMMEH. JAMMEH led a military coup in 1994 that overthrew the president and banned political activity. A new constitution and presidential election in 1996, followed by parliamentary balloting in 1997, completed a nominal return to civilian rule. JAMMEH was elected president in all subsequent elections including most recently in late 2011. After 22 years of increasingly authoritarian rule, President JAMMEH was defeated in free and fair elections in December 2016. Due to The Gambia's poor human rights record under JAMMEH, international development partners had distanced themselves, and substantially reduced aid to the country. These channels have now reopened under the administration of President Adama BARROW, who took office in January 2017. The US and The Gambia currently enjoy improved relations. US assistance to the country has supported military education and training programs, as well as various capacity building and democracy strengthening activities.   ++  "
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 95.7%, Christian 4.2%, none 0.1%, no response 0.1% (2013 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "The Gambia’s youthful age structure – almost 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – is likely to persist because the country’s total fertility rate remains strong at nearly 4 children per woman. The overall literacy rate is around 55%, and is significantly lower for women than for men. At least 70% of the populace are farmers who are reliant on rain-fed agriculture and cannot afford improved seeds and fertilizers. Crop failures caused by droughts between 2011 and 2013 have increased poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition.\nThe Gambia is a source country for migrants and a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees. Since the 1980s, economic deterioration, drought, and high unemployment, especially among youths, have driven both domestic migration (largely urban) and migration abroad (legal and illegal). Emigrants are largely skilled workers, including doctors and nurses, and provide a significant amount of remittances. The top receiving countries for Gambian emigrants are Spain, the US, Nigeria, Senegal, and the UK. While the Gambia and Spain do not share historic, cultural, or trade ties, rural Gambians have migrated to Spain in large numbers because of its proximity and the availability of jobs in its underground economy (this flow slowed following the onset of Spain’s late 2007 economic crisis).\nThe Gambia’s role as a host country to refugees is a result of wars in several of its neighboring West African countries. Since 2006, refugees from the Casamance conflict in Senegal have replaced their pattern of flight and return with permanent settlement in The Gambia, often moving in with relatives along the Senegal-Gambia border. The strain of providing for about 7,400 Casamance refugees has increased poverty among Gambian villagers."
+      "text": "The Gambia's youthful age structure – almost 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – is likely to persist because the country's total fertility rate remains strong at nearly 4 children per woman. The overall literacy rate is around 55%, and is significantly lower for women than for men. At least 70% of the populace are farmers who are reliant on rain-fed agriculture and cannot afford improved seeds and fertilizers. Crop failures caused by droughts between 2011 and 2013 have increased poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition. ++ The Gambia is a source country for migrants and a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees. Since the 1980s, economic deterioration, drought, and high unemployment, especially among youths, have driven both domestic migration (largely urban) and migration abroad (legal and illegal). Emigrants are largely skilled workers, including doctors and nurses, and provide a significant amount of remittances. The top receiving countries for Gambian emigrants are Spain, the US, Nigeria, Senegal, and the UK. While the Gambia and Spain do not share historic, cultural, or trade ties, rural Gambians have migrated to Spain in large numbers because of its proximity and the availability of jobs in its underground economy (this flow slowed following the onset of Spain's late 2007 economic crisis). ++ The Gambia's role as a host country to refugees is a result of wars in several of its neighboring West African countries. Since 2006, refugees from the Casamance conflict in Senegal have replaced their pattern of flight and return with permanent settlement in The Gambia, often moving in with relatives along the Senegal-Gambia border. The strain of providing for about 7,400 Casamance refugees has increased poverty among Gambian villagers."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -270,14 +270,11 @@
       }
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 8.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 91.4% of population / rural: 80.4% of population / total: 87.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "19.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "12.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 8.6% of population / rural: 19.6% of population / total: 12.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -290,14 +287,11 @@
       "text": "1.1 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 19.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 80.4% of population / rural: 44.5% of population / total: 66.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "55.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "33.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 19.6% of population / rural: 55.5% of population / total: 33.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -484,7 +478,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction or APRC [Fabakary JATTA]Coalition 2016 [collective leadership] (electoral coalition includes UDP, PDOIS, NRP, GMC, GDC, PPP, and GPDP)Gambia Democratic Congress or GDC [Mama KANDEH]Gambia Moral Congress or GMC [Mai FATTY]Gambia Party for Democracy and Progress or GPDP [Sarja JARJOU]National Convention Party or NCP [Yaya  SANYANG and Majanko SAMUSA (both claiming leadership)]National Democratic Action Movement or NDAM [Lamin Yaa JUARA]National People's Party or NPP [Adama BARROW]National Reconciliation Party or NRP [Hamat BAH]People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism or PDOIS [Sidia JATTA]People's Progressive Party or PPP [Yaya CEESAY)]United Democratic Party or UDP [Ousainou DARBOE]"
+      "text": "Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction or APRC [Fabakary JATTA] ++ Coalition 2016 [collective leadership] (electoral coalition includes UDP, PDOIS, NRP, GMC, GDC, PPP, and GPDP) ++ Gambia Democratic Congress or GDC [Mama KANDEH] ++ Gambia Moral Congress or GMC [Mai FATTY] ++ Gambia Party for Democracy and Progress or GPDP [Sarja JARJOU] ++ National Convention Party or NCP [Yaya  SANYANG and Majanko SAMUSA (both claiming leadership)] ++ National Democratic Action Movement or NDAM [Lamin Yaa JUARA] ++ National People's Party or NPP [Adama BARROW] ++ National Reconciliation Party or NRP [Hamat BAH] ++ People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism or PDOIS [Sidia JATTA] ++ People's Progressive Party or PPP [Yaya CEESAY)] ++ United Democratic Party or UDP [Ousainou DARBOE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, ECOWAS, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -540,7 +534,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The government has invested in the agriculture sector because three-quarters of the population depends on the sector for its livelihood and agriculture provides for about one-third of GDP, making The Gambia largely reliant on sufficient rainfall. The agricultural sector has untapped potential - less than half of arable land is cultivated and agricultural productivity is low. Small-scale manufacturing activity features the processing of cashews, groundnuts, fish, and hides. The Gambia's reexport trade accounts for almost 80% of goods exports and China has been its largest trade partner for both exports and imports for several years. The Gambia has sparse natural resource deposits. It relies heavily on remittances from workers overseas and tourist receipts. Remittance inflows to The Gambia amount to about one-fifth of the country’s GDP. The Gambia's location on the ocean and proximity to Europe has made it one of the most frequented tourist destinations in West Africa, boosted by private sector investments in eco-tourism and facilities. Tourism normally brings in about 20% of GDP, but it suffered in 2014 from tourists’ fears of Ebola virus in neighboring West African countries. Unemployment and underemployment remain high. Economic progress depends on sustained bilateral and multilateral aid, on responsible government economic management, and on continued technical assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. International donors and lenders were concerned about the quality of fiscal management under the administration of former President Yahya JAMMEH, who reportedly stole hundreds of millions of dollars of the country’s funds during his 22 years in power, but anticipate significant improvements under the new administration of President Adama BARROW, who assumed power in early 2017. As of April 2017, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the African Development Bank were all negotiating with the new government of The Gambia to provide financial support in the coming months to ease the country’s financial crisis. The country faces a limited availability of foreign exchange, weak agricultural output, a border closure with Senegal, a slowdown in tourism, high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and a high domestic debt burden that has crowded out private sector investment and driven interest rates to new highs. The government has committed to taking steps to reduce the deficit, including through expenditure caps, debt consolidation, and reform of state-owned enterprises."
+      "text": "The government has invested in the agriculture sector because three-quarters of the population depends on the sector for its livelihood and agriculture provides for about one-third of GDP, making The Gambia largely reliant on sufficient rainfall. The agricultural sector has untapped potential - less than half of arable land is cultivated and agricultural productivity is low. Small-scale manufacturing activity features the processing of cashews, groundnuts, fish, and hides. The Gambia's reexport trade accounts for almost 80% of goods exports and China has been its largest trade partner for both exports and imports for several years. ++ The Gambia has sparse natural resource deposits. It relies heavily on remittances from workers overseas and tourist receipts. Remittance inflows to The Gambia amount to about one-fifth of the country's GDP. The Gambia's location on the ocean and proximity to Europe has made it one of the most frequented tourist destinations in West Africa, boosted by private sector investments in eco-tourism and facilities. Tourism normally brings in about 20% of GDP, but it suffered in 2014 from tourists' fears of Ebola virus in neighboring West African countries. Unemployment and underemployment remain high. ++ Economic progress depends on sustained bilateral and multilateral aid, on responsible government economic management, and on continued technical assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors. International donors and lenders were concerned about the quality of fiscal management under the administration of former President Yahya JAMMEH, who reportedly stole hundreds of millions of dollars of the country's funds during his 22 years in power, but anticipate significant improvements under the new administration of President Adama BARROW, who assumed power in early 2017. As of April 2017, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the African Development Bank were all negotiating with the new government of The Gambia to provide financial support in the coming months to ease the country's financial crisis. ++ The country faces a limited availability of foreign exchange, weak agricultural output, a border closure with Senegal, a slowdown in tourism, high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and a high domestic debt burden that has crowded out private sector investment and driven interest rates to new highs. The government has committed to taking steps to reduce the deficit, including through expenditure caps, debt consolidation, and reform of state-owned enterprises."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$5.556 billion (2017 est.) / $5.314 billion (2016 est.) / $5.292 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/gb.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Following, independence from France in 1960, El Hadj Omar BONGO Ondimba - one of the longest-ruling heads of state in the world - dominated the country's political scene for four decades (1967-2009). President BONGO introduced a nominal multiparty system and a new constitution in the early 1990s. However, allegations of electoral fraud during local elections in December 2002 and the presidential election in 2005 exposed the weaknesses of formal political structures in Gabon. Following President BONGO's death in 2009, a new election brought his son, Ali BONGO Ondimba, to power. Despite constrained political conditions, Gabon's small population, abundant natural resources, and considerable foreign support have helped make it one of the more stable African countries.\nPresident Ali BONGO Ondimba’s controversial August 2016 reelection sparked unprecedented opposition protests that resulted in the burning of the parliament building. The election was contested by the opposition after fraudulent results were flagged by international election observers. Gabon’s Constitutional Court reviewed the election results but ruled in favor of President BONGO, upholding his win and extending his mandate to 2023."
+      "text": "Following, independence from France in 1960, El Hadj Omar BONGO Ondimba - one of the longest-ruling heads of state in the world - dominated the country's political scene for four decades (1967-2009). President BONGO introduced a nominal multiparty system and a new constitution in the early 1990s. However, allegations of electoral fraud during local elections in December 2002 and the presidential election in 2005 exposed the weaknesses of formal political structures in Gabon. Following President BONGO's death in 2009, a new election brought his son, Ali BONGO Ondimba, to power. Despite constrained political conditions, Gabon's small population, abundant natural resources, and considerable foreign support have helped make it one of the more stable African countries. ++ President Ali BONGO Ondimba's controversial August 2016 reelection sparked unprecedented opposition protests that resulted in the burning of the parliament building. The election was contested by the opposition after fraudulent results were flagged by international election observers. Gabon's Constitutional Court reviewed the election results but ruled in favor of President BONGO, upholding his win and extending his mandate to 2023."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 42.3%, Protestant 12.3%, other Christian 27.4%, Muslim 9.8%, animist 0.6%, other 0.5%, none/no answer 7.1% (2012 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Gabon’s oil revenues have given it one of the highest per capita income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the wealth is not evenly distributed and poverty is widespread. Unemployment is especially prevalent among the large youth population; more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. With a fertility rate still averaging more than 4 children per woman, the youth population will continue to grow and further strain the mismatch between Gabon’s supply of jobs and the skills of its labor force.\nGabon has been a magnet to migrants from neighboring countries since the 1960s because of the discovery of oil, as well as the country’s political stability and timber, mineral, and natural gas resources. Nonetheless, income inequality and high unemployment have created slums in Libreville full of migrant workers from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in West Africa. In 2011, Gabon declared an end to refugee status for 9,500 remaining Congolese nationals to whom it had granted asylum during the Republic of the Congo’s civil war between 1997 and 2003. About 5,400 of these refugees received permits to reside in Gabon."
+      "text": "Gabon's oil revenues have given it one of the highest per capita income levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the wealth is not evenly distributed and poverty is widespread. Unemployment is especially prevalent among the large youth population; more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. With a fertility rate still averaging more than 4 children per woman, the youth population will continue to grow and further strain the mismatch between Gabon's supply of jobs and the skills of its labor force. ++ Gabon has been a magnet to migrants from neighboring countries since the 1960s because of the discovery of oil, as well as the country's political stability and timber, mineral, and natural gas resources. Nonetheless, income inequality and high unemployment have created slums in Libreville full of migrant workers from Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, and elsewhere in West Africa. In 2011, Gabon declared an end to refugee status for 9,500 remaining Congolese nationals to whom it had granted asylum during the Republic of the Congo's civil war between 1997 and 2003. About 5,400 of these refugees received permits to reside in Gabon."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -264,14 +264,11 @@
       "text": "31.1% (2012)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97% of population / rural: 68% of population / total: 93.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "32% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "6.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.3% of population / rural: 32% of population / total: 6.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -284,14 +281,11 @@
       "text": "6.3 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 22.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 77.7% of population / rural: 51.9% of population / total: 74.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "48.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "25.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 22.3% of population / rural: 48.1% of population / total: 25.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -404,7 +398,7 @@
         "text": "previous 1961; latest drafted May 1990, adopted 15 March 1991, promulgated 26 March 1991"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic, by the Council of Ministers, or by one third of either house of Parliament; passage requires Constitutional Court evaluation, at least two-thirds majority vote of two thirds of the Parliament membership convened in joint session, and approval in a referendum; constitutional articles on Gabon’s democratic form of government cannot be amended; amended several times, last in 2011"
+        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic, by the Council of Ministers, or by one third of either house of Parliament; passage requires Constitutional Court evaluation, at least two-thirds majority vote of two thirds of the Parliament membership convened in joint session, and approval in a referendum; constitutional articles on Gabon's democratic form of government cannot be amended; amended several times, last in 2011"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -449,13 +443,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of:Senate or Senat (102 seats; members indirectly elected by municipal councils and departmental assemblies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 6-year terms)National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (143 seats; members elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of: Senate or Senat (102 seats; members indirectly elected by municipal councils and departmental assemblies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 6-year terms) ++ National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (143 seats; members elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 13 December 2014 (next to be held on 31 December 2020)National Assembly - held in 2 rounds on 6 and 27 October 2018 (next to be held in 2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 13 December 2014 (next to be held on 31 December 2020) ++ National Assembly - held in 2 rounds on 6 and 27 October 2018 (next to be held in 2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PDG 81, CLR 7, PSD 2, ADERE-UPG 1, UPG 1, PGCI 1, independent 7; composition - men 84, women 18, percent of women 17.6%National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PDG 98, The Democrats or LD 11, RV 8, Social Democrats of Gabon 5, RH&M 4, other 9, independent 8; composition - men 123, women 20, percent of women 14%; note - total Parliament percent of women 15.5%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PDG 81, CLR 7, PSD 2, ADERE-UPG 1, UPG 1, PGCI 1, independent 7; composition - men 84, women 18, percent of women 17.6% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PDG 98, The Democrats or LD 11, RV 8, Social Democrats of Gabon 5, RH&M 4, other 9, independent 8; composition - men 123, women 20, percent of women 14%; note - total Parliament percent of women 15.5%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -470,7 +464,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Circle of Liberal Reformers or CLR [Gen. Jean-Boniface ASSELE]Democratic and Republican Alliance or ADERE [DIDJOB Divungui di Ndinge]Gabonese Democratic Party or PDG [Ali BONGO Ondimba]Independent Center Party of Gabon or PGCI [Luccheri GAHILA]Legacy and Modernity Party or RH&MRally for Gabon or RPGRestoration of Republican Values or RVSocial Democratic Party or PSD [Pierre Claver MAGANGA-MOUSSAVOU]Social Democrats of GabonThe Democrats or LDUnion for the New Republic or UPRN [Louis Gaston MAYILA]Union of Gabonese People or UPG [Richard MOULOMBA]Union of Forces for Change or UFC [Jean PING]"
+      "text": "Circle of Liberal Reformers or CLR [Gen. Jean-Boniface ASSELE] ++ Democratic and Republican Alliance or ADERE [DIDJOB Divungui di Ndinge] ++ Gabonese Democratic Party or PDG [Ali BONGO Ondimba] ++ Independent Center Party of Gabon or PGCI [Luccheri GAHILA] ++ Legacy and Modernity Party or RH&M ++ Rally for Gabon or RPG ++ Restoration of Republican Values or RV ++ Social Democratic Party or PSD [Pierre Claver MAGANGA-MOUSSAVOU] ++ Social Democrats of Gabon ++ The Democrats or LD ++ Union for the New Republic or UPRN [Louis Gaston MAYILA] ++ Union of Gabonese People or UPG [Richard MOULOMBA] ++ Union of Forces for Change or UFC [Jean PING]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, BDEAC, CEMAC, FAO, FZ, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -526,7 +520,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Gabon enjoys a per capita income four times that of most Sub-Saharan African nations, but because of high income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Gabon relied on timber and manganese exports until oil was discovered offshore in the early 1970s. From 2010 to 2016, oil accounted for approximately 80% of Gabon’s exports, 45% of its GDP, and 60% of its state budget revenues. Gabon faces fluctuating international prices for its oil, timber, and manganese exports. A rebound of oil prices from 2001 to 2013 helped growth, but declining production, as some fields passed their peak production, has hampered Gabon from fully realizing potential gains. GDP grew nearly 6% per year over the 2010-14 period, but slowed significantly from 2014 to just 1% in 2017 as oil prices declined. Low oil prices also weakened government revenue and negatively affected the trade and current account balances. In the wake of lower revenue, Gabon signed a 3-year agreement with the IMF in June 2017. Despite an abundance of natural wealth, poor fiscal management and over-reliance on oil has stifled the economy. Power cuts and water shortages are frequent. Gabon is reliant on imports and the government heavily subsidizes commodities, including food, but will be hard pressed to tamp down public frustration with unemployment and corruption."
+      "text": "Gabon enjoys a per capita income four times that of most Sub-Saharan African nations, but because of high income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Gabon relied on timber and manganese exports until oil was discovered offshore in the early 1970s. From 2010 to 2016, oil accounted for approximately 80% of Gabon's exports, 45% of its GDP, and 60% of its state budget revenues. ++ Gabon faces fluctuating international prices for its oil, timber, and manganese exports. A rebound of oil prices from 2001 to 2013 helped growth, but declining production, as some fields passed their peak production, has hampered Gabon from fully realizing potential gains. GDP grew nearly 6% per year over the 2010-14 period, but slowed significantly from 2014 to just 1% in 2017 as oil prices declined. Low oil prices also weakened government revenue and negatively affected the trade and current account balances. In the wake of lower revenue, Gabon signed a 3-year agreement with the IMF in June 2017. ++ Despite an abundance of natural wealth, poor fiscal management and over-reliance on oil has stifled the economy. Power cuts and water shortages are frequent. Gabon is reliant on imports and the government heavily subsidizes commodities, including food, but will be hard pressed to tamp down public frustration with unemployment and corruption."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$36.66 billion (2017 est.) / $36.5 billion (2016 est.) / $35.75 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -930,7 +924,7 @@
         "text": "Gabon is primarily a destination and transit country for adults and children from West and Central African countries subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; boys are forced to work as street vendors, mechanics, or in the fishing sector, while girls are subjected to domestic servitude or forced to work in markets or roadside restaurants; West African women are forced into domestic servitude or prostitution; men are reportedly forced to work on cattle farms; some foreign adults end up in forced labor in Gabon after initially seeking the help of human smugglers to help them migrate clandestinely; traffickers operate in loose, ethnic-based criminal networks, with female traffickers recruiting and facilitating the transport of victims from source countries; in some cases, families turn child victims over to traffickers, who promise paid jobs in Gabon"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Gabon does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; Gabon’s existing laws do not prohibit all forms of trafficking, and the government failed to pass a legal amendment drafted in 2013 to criminalize the trafficking of adults; anti-trafficking law enforcement decreased in 2014, dropping from 50 investigations to 16, and the only defendant to face prosecution fled the country; government efforts to identify and refer victims to protective services declined from 50 child victims in 2013 to just 3 in 2014, none of whom was referred to a care facility; the government provided support to four centers offering services to orphans and vulnerable children – 14 child victims identified by an NGO received government assistance; no adult victims have been identified since 2009 (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Gabon does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; Gabon's existing laws do not prohibit all forms of trafficking, and the government failed to pass a legal amendment drafted in 2013 to criminalize the trafficking of adults; anti-trafficking law enforcement decreased in 2014, dropping from 50 investigations to 16, and the only defendant to face prosecution fled the country; government efforts to identify and refer victims to protective services declined from 50 child victims in 2013 to just 3 in 2014, none of whom was referred to a care facility; the government provided support to four centers offering services to orphans and vulnerable children – 14 child victims identified by an NGO received government assistance; no adult victims have been identified since 2009 (2015)"
       }
     }
   }

africa/gh.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Formed from the merger of the British colony of the Gold Coast and the Togoland trust territory, Ghana in 1957 became the first Sub-Saharan country in colonial Africa to gain its independence. Ghana endured a series of coups before Lt. Jerry RAWLINGS took power in 1981 and banned political parties. After approving a new constitution and restoring multiparty politics in 1992, RAWLINGS won presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 but was constitutionally prevented from running for a third term in 2000. John KUFUOR of the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) succeeded him and was reelected in 2004. John Atta MILLS of the National Democratic Congress won the 2008 presidential election and took over as head of state. MILLS died in July 2012 and was constitutionally succeeded by his vice president, John Dramani MAHAMA, who subsequently won the December 2012 presidential election. In 2016, Nana Addo Dankwa AKUFO-ADDO of the NPP defeated MAHAMA, marking the third time that Ghana’s presidency has changed parties since the return to democracy."
+      "text": "Formed from the merger of the British colony of the Gold Coast and the Togoland trust territory, Ghana in 1957 became the first Sub-Saharan country in colonial Africa to gain its independence. Ghana endured a series of coups before Lt. Jerry RAWLINGS took power in 1981 and banned political parties. After approving a new constitution and restoring multiparty politics in 1992, RAWLINGS won presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 but was constitutionally prevented from running for a third term in 2000. John KUFUOR of the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) succeeded him and was reelected in 2004. John Atta MILLS of the National Democratic Congress won the 2008 presidential election and took over as head of state. MILLS died in July 2012 and was constitutionally succeeded by his vice president, John Dramani MAHAMA, who subsequently won the December 2012 presidential election. In 2016, Nana Addo Dankwa AKUFO-ADDO of the NPP defeated MAHAMA, marking the third time that Ghana's presidency has changed parties since the return to democracy."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 71.2% (Pentecostal/Charismatic 28.3%, Protestant 18.4%, Catholic 13.1%, other 11.4%), Muslim 17.6%, traditional 5.2%, other 0.8%, none 5.2% (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Ghana has a young age structure, with approximately 57% of the population under the age of 25. Its total fertility rate fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s but has stalled at around four children per woman for the last few years. Fertility remains higher in the northern region than the Greater Accra region. On average, desired fertility has remained stable for several years; urban dwellers want fewer children than rural residents. Increased life expectancy, due to better health care, nutrition, and hygiene, and reduced fertility have increased Ghana’s share of elderly persons; Ghana’s proportion of persons aged 60+ is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty has declined in Ghana, but it remains pervasive in the northern region, which is susceptible to droughts and floods and has less access to transportation infrastructure, markets, fertile farming land, and industrial centers. The northern region also has lower school enrollment, higher illiteracy, and fewer opportunities for women.\nGhana was a country of immigration in the early years after its 1957 independence, attracting labor migrants largely from Nigeria and other neighboring countries to mine minerals and harvest cocoa – immigrants composed about 12% of Ghana’s population in 1960. In the late 1960s, worsening economic and social conditions discouraged immigration, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, mostly Nigerians, were expelled.\nDuring the 1970s, severe drought and an economic downturn transformed Ghana into a country of emigration; neighboring Cote d’Ivoire was the initial destination. Later, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work in its booming oil industry, but most were deported in 1983 and 1985 as oil prices plummeted. Many Ghanaians then turned to more distant destinations, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, but the majority continued to migrate within West Africa. Since the 1990s, increased emigration of skilled Ghanaians, especially to the US and the UK, drained the country of its health care and education professionals. Internally, poverty and other developmental disparities continue to drive Ghanaians from the north to the south, particularly to its urban centers."
+      "text": "Ghana has a young age structure, with approximately 57% of the population under the age of 25. Its total fertility rate fell significantly during the 1980s and 1990s but has stalled at around four children per woman for the last few years. Fertility remains higher in the northern region than the Greater Accra region. On average, desired fertility has remained stable for several years; urban dwellers want fewer children than rural residents. Increased life expectancy, due to better health care, nutrition, and hygiene, and reduced fertility have increased Ghana's share of elderly persons; Ghana's proportion of persons aged 60+ is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty has declined in Ghana, but it remains pervasive in the northern region, which is susceptible to droughts and floods and has less access to transportation infrastructure, markets, fertile farming land, and industrial centers. The northern region also has lower school enrollment, higher illiteracy, and fewer opportunities for women. ++ Ghana was a country of immigration in the early years after its 1957 independence, attracting labor migrants largely from Nigeria and other neighboring countries to mine minerals and harvest cocoa – immigrants composed about 12% of Ghana's population in 1960. In the late 1960s, worsening economic and social conditions discouraged immigration, and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, mostly Nigerians, were expelled. ++ During the 1970s, severe drought and an economic downturn transformed Ghana into a country of emigration; neighboring Cote d'Ivoire was the initial destination. Later, hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria to work in its booming oil industry, but most were deported in 1983 and 1985 as oil prices plummeted. Many Ghanaians then turned to more distant destinations, including other parts of Africa, Europe, and North America, but the majority continued to migrate within West Africa. Since the 1990s, increased emigration of skilled Ghanaians, especially to the US and the UK, drained the country of its health care and education professionals. Internally, poverty and other developmental disparities continue to drive Ghanaians from the north to the south, particularly to its urban centers."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -270,14 +270,11 @@
       "text": "30.8% (2017)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.4% of population / rural: 80.6% of population / total: 89.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "19.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "10.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.6% of population / rural: 19.4% of population / total: 10.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -290,14 +287,11 @@
       "text": "0.9 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 15.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 84.2% of population / rural: 49.5% of population / total: 68.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "50.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "31.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 15.8% of population / rural: 50.5% of population / total: 31.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -551,7 +545,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Ghana has a market-based economy with relatively few policy barriers to trade and investment in comparison with other countries in the region, and Ghana is endowed with natural resources. Ghana's economy was strengthened by a quarter century of relatively sound management, a competitive business environment, and sustained reductions in poverty levels, but in recent years has suffered the consequences of loose fiscal policy, high budget and current account deficits, and a depreciating currency. Agriculture accounts for about 20% of GDP and employs more than half of the workforce, mainly small landholders. Gold, oil, and cocoa exports, and individual remittances, are major sources of foreign exchange. Expansion of Ghana’s nascent oil industry has boosted economic growth, but the fall in oil prices since 2015 reduced by half Ghana’s oil revenue. Production at Jubilee, Ghana's first commercial offshore oilfield, began in mid-December 2010. Production from two more fields, TEN and Sankofa, started in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The country’s first gas processing plant at Atuabo is also producing natural gas from the Jubilee field, providing power to several of Ghana’s thermal power plants. As of 2018, key economic concerns facing the government include the lack of affordable electricity, lack of a solid domestic revenue base, and the high debt burden. The AKUFO-ADDO administration has made some progress by committing to fiscal consolidation, but much work is still to be done. Ghana signed a $920 million extended credit facility with the IMF in April 2015 to help it address its growing economic crisis. The IMF fiscal targets require Ghana to reduce the deficit by cutting subsidies, decreasing the bloated public sector wage bill, strengthening revenue administration, boosting tax revenues, and improving the health of Ghana’s banking sector. Priorities for the new administration include rescheduling some of Ghana’s $31 billion debt, stimulating economic growth, reducing inflation, and stabilizing the currency. Prospects for new oil and gas production and follow through on tighter fiscal management are likely to help Ghana’s economy in 2018."
+      "text": "Ghana has a market-based economy with relatively few policy barriers to trade and investment in comparison with other countries in the region, and Ghana is endowed with natural resources. Ghana's economy was strengthened by a quarter century of relatively sound management, a competitive business environment, and sustained reductions in poverty levels, but in recent years has suffered the consequences of loose fiscal policy, high budget and current account deficits, and a depreciating currency. ++ Agriculture accounts for about 20% of GDP and employs more than half of the workforce, mainly small landholders. Gold, oil, and cocoa exports, and individual remittances, are major sources of foreign exchange. Expansion of Ghana's nascent oil industry has boosted economic growth, but the fall in oil prices since 2015 reduced by half Ghana's oil revenue. Production at Jubilee, Ghana's first commercial offshore oilfield, began in mid-December 2010. Production from two more fields, TEN and Sankofa, started in 2016 and 2017 respectively. The country's first gas processing plant at Atuabo is also producing natural gas from the Jubilee field, providing power to several of Ghana's thermal power plants. ++ As of 2018, key economic concerns facing the government include the lack of affordable electricity, lack of a solid domestic revenue base, and the high debt burden. The AKUFO-ADDO administration has made some progress by committing to fiscal consolidation, but much work is still to be done. Ghana signed a $920 million extended credit facility with the IMF in April 2015 to help it address its growing economic crisis. The IMF fiscal targets require Ghana to reduce the deficit by cutting subsidies, decreasing the bloated public sector wage bill, strengthening revenue administration, boosting tax revenues, and improving the health of Ghana's banking sector. Priorities for the new administration include rescheduling some of Ghana's $31 billion debt, stimulating economic growth, reducing inflation, and stabilizing the currency. Prospects for new oil and gas production and follow through on tighter fiscal management are likely to help Ghana's economy in 2018."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$134 billion (2017 est.) / $123.6 billion (2016 est.) / $119.2 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -957,7 +951,7 @@
         "text": "Ghana is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; the trafficking of Ghanians, particularly children, internally is more common than the trafficking of foreign nationals; Ghanian children are subjected to forced labor in fishing, domestic service, street hawking, begging, portering, mining, quarrying, herding, and agriculture, with girls, and to a lesser extent boys, forced into prostitution; Ghanian women, sometimes lured with legitimate job offers, and girls are sex trafficked in West Africa, the Middle East, and Europe; Ghanian men fraudulently recruited for work in the Middle East are subjected to forced labor or prostitution, and a few Ghanian adults have been identified as victims of false labor in the US; women and girls from Vietnam, China, and neighboring West African countries are sex trafficked in Ghana; the country is also a transit point for sex trafficking from West Africa to Europe"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List - Ghana does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; Ghana continued to investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses but was unable to ramp up its anti-trafficking efforts in 2014 because the government failed to provide law enforcement or protection agencies with operating budgets; victim protection efforts decreased in 2014, with significantly fewer victims identified; most child victims were referred to NGO-run facilities, but care for adults was lacking because the government did not provide any support to the country’s Human Trafficking Fund for victim services or its two shelters; anti-trafficking prevention measures increased modestly, including reconvening of the Human Trafficking Management Board, public awareness campaigns on child labor and trafficking, and anti-trafficking TV and radio programs (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List - Ghana does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; Ghana continued to investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses but was unable to ramp up its anti-trafficking efforts in 2014 because the government failed to provide law enforcement or protection agencies with operating budgets; victim protection efforts decreased in 2014, with significantly fewer victims identified; most child victims were referred to NGO-run facilities, but care for adults was lacking because the government did not provide any support to the country's Human Trafficking Fund for victim services or its two shelters; anti-trafficking prevention measures increased modestly, including reconvening of the Human Trafficking Management Board, public awareness campaigns on child labor and trafficking, and anti-trafficking TV and radio programs (2015)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

africa/gv.json

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 89.1%, Christian 6.8%, animist 1.6%, other .1%, none 2.4% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Guinea’s strong population growth is a result of declining mortality rates and sustained elevated fertility. The population growth rate was somewhat tempered in the 2000s because of a period of net outmigration. Although life expectancy and mortality rates have improved over the last two decades, the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continues to contribute to high infant and maternal mortality rates. Guinea’s total fertility remains high at about 5 children per woman because of the ongoing preference for larger families, low contraceptive usage and availability, a lack of educational attainment and empowerment among women, and poverty. A lack of literacy and vocational training programs limit job prospects for youths, but even those with university degrees often have no option but to work in the informal sector. About 60% of the country’s large youth population is unemployed.\nTensions and refugees have spilled over Guinea’s borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire. During the 1990s Guinea harbored as many as half a million refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, more refugees than any other African country for much of that decade. About half sought refuge in the volatile \"Parrot’s Beak\" region of southwest Guinea, a wedge of land jutting into Sierra Leone near the Liberian border. Many were relocated within Guinea in the early 2000s because the area suffered repeated cross-border attacks from various government and rebel forces, as well as anti-refugee violence."
+      "text": "Guinea's strong population growth is a result of declining mortality rates and sustained elevated fertility. The population growth rate was somewhat tempered in the 2000s because of a period of net outmigration. Although life expectancy and mortality rates have improved over the last two decades, the nearly universal practice of female genital cutting continues to contribute to high infant and maternal mortality rates. Guinea's total fertility remains high at about 5 children per woman because of the ongoing preference for larger families, low contraceptive usage and availability, a lack of educational attainment and empowerment among women, and poverty. A lack of literacy and vocational training programs limit job prospects for youths, but even those with university degrees often have no option but to work in the informal sector. About 60% of the country's large youth population is unemployed. ++ Tensions and refugees have spilled over Guinea's borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire. During the 1990s Guinea harbored as many as half a million refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, more refugees than any other African country for much of that decade. About half sought refuge in the volatile \"Parrot's Beak\" region of southwest Guinea, a wedge of land jutting into Sierra Leone near the Liberian border. Many were relocated within Guinea in the early 2000s because the area suffered repeated cross-border attacks from various government and rebel forces, as well as anti-refugee violence."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "10.9% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.9% of population / rural: 69.8% of population / total: 79.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "27.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "20.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.1% of population / rural: 27.6% of population / total: 20.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "0.3 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 14.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 85.6% of population / rural: 34.8% of population / total: 53% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "65.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "47% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 14.4% of population / rural: 65.2% of population / total: 47% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -484,9 +478,9 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Bloc Liberal or BL [Faya MILLIMONO]National Party for Hope and Development or PEDN [Lansana KOUYATE]Rally for the Guinean People or RPG [Alpha CONDE]Union for the Progress of Guinea or UPGUnion of Democratic Forces of Guinea or UFDG [Cellou Dalein DIALLO]Union of Republican Forces or UFR [Sidya TOURE]",
+      "text": "Bloc Liberal or BL [Faya MILLIMONO] ++ National Party for Hope and Development or PEDN [Lansana KOUYATE] ++ Rally for the Guinean People or RPG [Alpha CONDE] ++ Union for the Progress of Guinea or UPG ++ Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea or UFDG [Cellou Dalein DIALLO] ++ Union of Republican Forces or UFR [Sidya TOURE]",
       "note": {
-        "text": "Ruling party Rally of the Guinean People (Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen, RPG) Opposition parties African Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti démocratique africain de Guinée) Party of Unity and Progress (Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès, PUP) Union for Progress and Renewal (Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau, UPR) Union for Progress of Guinea (Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée, UPG) Democratic Party of Guinea-African Democratic Rally (Parti Démocratique de Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, PDG-RDA) National Alliance for Progress (Alliance Nationale pour le Progrès, ANP) Party of the Union for Development (Parti de l’Union pour le Développement, PUD) Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea ( Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée, UFDG ), led by Cellou Dalein Diallo Union of Republican Forces (Union des Forces Républicaines, UFR) the Party of Democrats for Hope (\" PADES\") Led by Dr Ousmane Kaba"
+        "text": "Ruling party Rally of the Guinean People (Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen, RPG) Opposition parties African Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti démocratique africain de Guinée) Party of Unity and Progress (Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès, PUP) Union for Progress and Renewal (Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau, UPR) Union for Progress of Guinea (Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée, UPG) Democratic Party of Guinea-African Democratic Rally (Parti Démocratique de Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, PDG-RDA) National Alliance for Progress (Alliance Nationale pour le Progrès, ANP) Party of the Union for Development (Parti de l'Union pour le Développement, PUD) Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea ( Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée, UFDG ), led by Cellou Dalein Diallo Union of Republican Forces (Union des Forces Républicaines, UFR) the Party of Democrats for Hope (\" PADES\") Led by Dr Ousmane Kaba"
       }
     },
     "International organization participation": {
@@ -546,7 +540,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Guinea is a poor country of approximately 12.9 million people in 2016 that possesses the world's largest reserves of bauxite and largest untapped high-grade iron ore reserves, as well as gold and diamonds. In addition, Guinea has fertile soil, ample rainfall, and is the source of several West African rivers, including the Senegal, Niger, and Gambia. Guinea's hydro potential is enormous and the country could be a major exporter of electricity. The country also has tremendous agriculture potential. Gold, bauxite, and diamonds are Guinea’s main exports. International investors have shown interest in Guinea's unexplored mineral reserves, which have the potential to propel Guinea's future growth. Following the death of long-term President Lansana CONTE in 2008 and the coup that followed, international donors, including the G-8, the IMF, and the World Bank, significantly curtailed their development programs in Guinea. However, the IMF approved a 3-year Extended Credit Facility arrangement in 2012, following the December 2010 presidential elections. In September 2012, Guinea achieved Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point status. Future access to international assistance and investment will depend on the government’s ability to be transparent, combat corruption, reform its banking system, improve its business environment, and build infrastructure. In April 2013, the government amended its mining code to reduce taxes and royalties. In 2014, Guinea complied with requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by publishing its mining contracts. Guinea completed its program with the IMF in October 2016 even though some targeted reforms have been delayed. Currently Guinea is negotiating a new IMF program which will be based on Guinea’s new five-year economic plan, focusing on the development of higher value-added products, including from the agro-business sector and development of the rural economy. Political instability, a reintroduction of the Ebola virus epidemic, low international commodity prices, and an enduring legacy of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of government transparency are factors that could impact Guinea’s future growth. Economic recovery will be a long process while the government adjusts to lower inflows of international donor aid following the surge of Ebola-related emergency support. Ebola stalled promising economic growth in the 2014-15 period and impeded several projects, such as offshore oil exploration and the Simandou iron ore project. The economy, however, grew by 6.6% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017, mainly due to growth from bauxite mining and thermal energy generation as well as the resiliency of the agricultural sector. The 240-megawatt Kaleta Dam, inaugurated in September 2015, has expanded access to electricity for residents of Conakry. An combined with fears of Ebola virus, continue to undermine Guinea's economic viability. Guinea’s iron ore industry took a hit in 2016 when investors in the Simandou iron ore project announced plans to divest from the project. In 2017, agriculture output and public investment boosted economic growth, while the mining sector continued to play a prominent role in economic performance. Successive governments have failed to address the country's crumbling infrastructure. Guinea suffers from chronic electricity shortages; poor roads, rail lines and bridges; and a lack of access to clean water - all of which continue to plague economic development. The present government, led by President Alpha CONDE, is working to create an environment to attract foreign investment and hopes to have greater participation from western countries and firms in Guinea's economic development."
+      "text": "Guinea is a poor country of approximately 12.9 million people in 2016 that possesses the world's largest reserves of bauxite and largest untapped high-grade iron ore reserves, as well as gold and diamonds. In addition, Guinea has fertile soil, ample rainfall, and is the source of several West African rivers, including the Senegal, Niger, and Gambia. Guinea's hydro potential is enormous and the country could be a major exporter of electricity. The country also has tremendous agriculture potential. Gold, bauxite, and diamonds are Guinea's main exports. International investors have shown interest in Guinea's unexplored mineral reserves, which have the potential to propel Guinea's future growth. ++ Following the death of long-term President Lansana CONTE in 2008 and the coup that followed, international donors, including the G-8, the IMF, and the World Bank, significantly curtailed their development programs in Guinea. However, the IMF approved a 3-year Extended Credit Facility arrangement in 2012, following the December 2010 presidential elections. In September 2012, Guinea achieved Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point status. Future access to international assistance and investment will depend on the government's ability to be transparent, combat corruption, reform its banking system, improve its business environment, and build infrastructure. In April 2013, the government amended its mining code to reduce taxes and royalties. In 2014, Guinea complied with requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by publishing its mining contracts. Guinea completed its program with the IMF in October 2016 even though some targeted reforms have been delayed. Currently Guinea is negotiating a new IMF program which will be based on Guinea's new five-year economic plan, focusing on the development of higher value-added products, including from the agro-business sector and development of the rural economy. ++ Political instability, a reintroduction of the Ebola virus epidemic, low international commodity prices, and an enduring legacy of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of government transparency are factors that could impact Guinea's future growth. Economic recovery will be a long process while the government adjusts to lower inflows of international donor aid following the surge of Ebola-related emergency support. Ebola stalled promising economic growth in the 2014-15 period and impeded several projects, such as offshore oil exploration and the Simandou iron ore project. The economy, however, grew by 6.6% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017, mainly due to growth from bauxite mining and thermal energy generation as well as the resiliency of the agricultural sector. The 240-megawatt Kaleta Dam, inaugurated in September 2015, has expanded access to electricity for residents of Conakry. An combined with fears of Ebola virus, continue to undermine Guinea's economic viability. ++ Guinea's iron ore industry took a hit in 2016 when investors in the Simandou iron ore project announced plans to divest from the project. In 2017, agriculture output and public investment boosted economic growth, while the mining sector continued to play a prominent role in economic performance. ++ Successive governments have failed to address the country's crumbling infrastructure. Guinea suffers from chronic electricity shortages; poor roads, rail lines and bridges; and a lack of access to clean water - all of which continue to plague economic development. The present government, led by President Alpha CONDE, is working to create an environment to attract foreign investment and hopes to have greater participation from western countries and firms in Guinea's economic development."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$27.97 billion (2017 est.) / $25.84 billion (2016 est.) / $23.39 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -927,7 +921,7 @@
         "text": "Guinea is a source, transit, and, to a lesser extent, a destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; the majority of trafficking victims are Guinean children, and trafficking is more prevalent among Guineans than foreign national migrants; Guinean girls are subjected to domestic servitude and commercial sexual exploitation, while boys are forced to beg or to work as street vendors, shoe shiners, or miners; Guinea is a source country and transit point for West African children forced to work as miners in the region; Guinean women and girls are subjected to domestic servitude and sex trafficking in West Africa, the Middle East, the US, and increasingly Europe, while Thai, Chinese, and Vietnamese women are forced into prostitution and some West Africans are forced into domestic servitude in Guinea"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Guinea does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, Guinea was granted a waiver from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented would constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; no new investigations were conducted in 2014, and the one ongoing case led to the prosecution of four offenders for forced child labor, three of whom were convicted but given inadequate sentences for the crime; the government did not identify or provide protective services to victims and did not support NGOs that assisted victims but continued to refer child victims to NGOs on an ad hoc basis; Guinean law does not prohibit all forms of trafficking, excluding, for example, debt bondage; the 2014 Ebolavirus outbreak negatively affected Guinea’s ability to address human trafficking (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Guinea does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, Guinea was granted a waiver from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented would constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; no new investigations were conducted in 2014, and the one ongoing case led to the prosecution of four offenders for forced child labor, three of whom were convicted but given inadequate sentences for the crime; the government did not identify or provide protective services to victims and did not support NGOs that assisted victims but continued to refer child victims to NGOs on an ad hoc basis; Guinean law does not prohibit all forms of trafficking, excluding, for example, debt bondage; the 2014 Ebolavirus outbreak negatively affected Guinea's ability to address human trafficking (2015)"
       }
     }
   }

africa/iv.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Close ties to France following independence in 1960, the development of cocoa production for export, and foreign investment all made Cote d'Ivoire one of the most prosperous of the West African states but did not protect it from political turmoil. In December 1999, a military coup - the first ever in Cote d'Ivoire's history - overthrew the government. Junta leader Robert GUEI attempted to rig the elections held in late 2000 and declared himself the winner. Popular protest forced him to step aside and an election brought Laurent GBAGBO into power. Ivoirian dissidents and disaffected members of the military launched a failed coup attempt in September 2002 that developed into a rebellion and then a civil war. In 2003, a cease-fire resulted in the country being divided with the rebels holding the north, the government the south, and peacekeeping forces a buffer zone between the two. In March 2007, President GBAGBO and former New Forces rebel leader Guillaume SORO signed an agreement in which SORO joined GBAGBO's government as prime minister and the two agreed to reunite the country by dismantling the buffer zone, integrating rebel forces into the national armed forces, and holding elections. Difficulties in preparing electoral registers delayed balloting until 2010. In November 2010, Alassane Dramane OUATTARA won the presidential election over GBAGBO, but GBAGBO refused to hand over power, resulting in a five-month resumption of violent conflict. In April 2011, after widespread fighting, GBAGBO was formally forced from office by armed OUATTARA supporters with the help of UN and French forces. OUATTARA won a second term in 2015 and is focused on rebuilding the country's economy and infrastructure while reforming the security forces. The UN peacekeeping mission departed in June 2017. GBAGBO was in The Hague on trial for crimes against humanity, but was acquitted in January 2019. Côte d’Ivoire is scheduled to hold presidential elections in November 2020.  "
+      "text": "Close ties to France following independence in 1960, the development of cocoa production for export, and foreign investment all made Cote d'Ivoire one of the most prosperous of the West African states but did not protect it from political turmoil. In December 1999, a military coup - the first ever in Cote d'Ivoire's history - overthrew the government. Junta leader Robert GUEI attempted to rig the elections held in late 2000 and declared himself the winner. Popular protest forced him to step aside and an election brought Laurent GBAGBO into power. Ivoirian dissidents and disaffected members of the military launched a failed coup attempt in September 2002 that developed into a rebellion and then a civil war. In 2003, a cease-fire resulted in the country being divided with the rebels holding the north, the government the south, and peacekeeping forces a buffer zone between the two. In March 2007, President GBAGBO and former New Forces rebel leader Guillaume SORO signed an agreement in which SORO joined GBAGBO's government as prime minister and the two agreed to reunite the country by dismantling the buffer zone, integrating rebel forces into the national armed forces, and holding elections. Difficulties in preparing electoral registers delayed balloting until 2010. In November 2010, Alassane Dramane OUATTARA won the presidential election over GBAGBO, but GBAGBO refused to hand over power, resulting in a five-month resumption of violent conflict. In April 2011, after widespread fighting, GBAGBO was formally forced from office by armed OUATTARA supporters with the help of UN and French forces. OUATTARA won a second term in 2015 and is focused on rebuilding the country's economy and infrastructure while reforming the security forces. The UN peacekeeping mission departed in June 2017. GBAGBO was in The Hague on trial for crimes against humanity, but was acquitted in January 2019. Côte d'Ivoire is scheduled to hold presidential elections in November 2020.  "
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Cote d’Ivoire’s population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25, the total fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and contraceptive use is under 20%. The country will need to improve education, health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for months, access to education was poor, especially for women. As of 2015, only 53% of men and 33% of women were literate. The lack of educational attainment contributes to Cote d’Ivoire’s high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence.\nFollowing its independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s stability and the blossoming of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998.\nOngoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY’s death in 1993 ushered in the politics of \"Ivoirite,\" institutionalizing an Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a 2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees, and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force people from their homes."
+      "text": "Cote d'Ivoire's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future because almost 60% of the populace is younger than 25, the total fertility rate is holding steady at about 3.5 children per woman, and contraceptive use is under 20%. The country will need to improve education, health care, and gender equality in order to turn its large and growing youth cohort into human capital. Even prior to 2010 unrest that shuttered schools for months, access to education was poor, especially for women. As of 2015, only 53% of men and 33% of women were literate. The lack of educational attainment contributes to Cote d'Ivoire's high rates of unskilled labor, adolescent pregnancy, and HIV/AIDS prevalence. ++ Following its independence in 1960, Cote d'Ivoire's stability and the blossoming of its labor-intensive cocoa and coffee industries in the southwest made it an attractive destination for migrants from other parts of the country and its neighbors, particularly Burkina Faso. The HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY administration continued the French colonial policy of encouraging labor immigration by offering liberal land ownership laws. Foreigners from West Africa, Europe (mainly France), and Lebanon composed about 25% of the population by 1998. ++ Ongoing economic decline since the 1980s and the power struggle after HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY's death in 1993 ushered in the politics of \"Ivoirite,\" institutionalizing an Ivoirian identity that further marginalized northern Ivoirians and scapegoated immigrants. The hostile Muslim north-Christian south divide snowballed into a 2002 civil war, pushing tens of thousands of foreign migrants, Liberian refugees, and Ivoirians to flee to war-torn Liberia or other regional countries and more than a million people to be internally displaced. Subsequently, violence following the contested 2010 presidential election prompted some 250,000 people to seek refuge in Liberia and other neighboring countries and again internally displaced as many as a million people. By July 2012, the majority had returned home, but ongoing inter-communal tension and armed conflict continue to force people from their homes."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -267,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "23.3% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 9.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 90.4% of population / rural: 67.8% of population / total: 79.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "32.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "20.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 9.6% of population / rural: 32.2% of population / total: 20.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -284,14 +281,11 @@
       "text": "0.23 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 24.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 75.9% of population / rural: 32.7% of population / total: 54.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "67.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "45.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 24.1% of population / rural: 67.3% of population / total: 45.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -407,7 +401,7 @@
         "text": "UTC 0 (5 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "etymology: Yamoussoukro is named after Queen YAMOUSSOU, who ruled in the village of N'Gokro in 1929 at the time of French colonization; the village was renamed Yamoussoukro, the suffix \"-kro\" meaning \"town\" in the native Baoule language; Abidjan's name supposedly comes from a misunderstanding; tradition states that an old man carrying branches met a European explorer who asked for the name of the nearest village; the man, not understanding and terrified by this unexpected encounter, fled shouting \"min-chan m’bidjan,\" which in the Ebrie language means: \"I return from cutting leaves\"; the explorer, thinking that his question had been answered, recorded the name of the locale as Abidjan; a different version has the first colonists asking native women the name of the place and getting a similar response"
+        "text": "etymology: Yamoussoukro is named after Queen YAMOUSSOU, who ruled in the village of N'Gokro in 1929 at the time of French colonization; the village was renamed Yamoussoukro, the suffix \"-kro\" meaning \"town\" in the native Baoule language; Abidjan's name supposedly comes from a misunderstanding; tradition states that an old man carrying branches met a European explorer who asked for the name of the nearest village; the man, not understanding and terrified by this unexpected encounter, fled shouting \"min-chan m'bidjan,\" which in the Ebrie language means: \"I return from cutting leaves\"; the explorer, thinking that his question had been answered, recorded the name of the locale as Abidjan; a different version has the first colonists asking native women the name of the place and getting a similar response"
       }
     },
     "Administrative divisions": {
@@ -469,16 +463,16 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate or Senat (99 seats; 66 members indirectly elected by the National Assembly and members of municipal, autonomous districts, and regional councils, and 33 members appointed by the president; members serve 5-year terms) National Assembly (255 seats; members directly elected in single- and multi-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate or Senat (99 seats; 66 members indirectly elected by the National Assembly and members of municipal, autonomous districts, and regional councils, and 33 members appointed by the president; members serve 5-year terms) ++ National Assembly (255 seats; members directly elected in single- and multi-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - first ever held on 25 March 2018 (next to be held in 2023) National Assembly - last held on 18 December 2016 (next to be held in 2021)"
+        "text": "Senate - first ever held on 25 March 2018 (next to be held in 2023) ++ National Assembly - last held on 18 December 2016 (next to be held in 2021)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent by party NA; seats by party - RHDP 50, independent 16; composition - men 80, women 19, percent of women 19.2% National Assembly - percent of vote by party - RHDP 50.3%, FPI 5.8%, UDPCI 1%, other 1.4%, independent 38.5%; seats by party - RHDP, 167, UDPCI 6, FPI 3, UPCI 3, independent 76; composition - men 228, women 27, percent of women 10.6%; note - total Parliament percent of women 13%"
+        "text": "++ Senate - percent by party NA; seats by party - RHDP 50, independent 16; composition - men 80, women 19, percent of women 19.2% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - RHDP 50.3%, FPI 5.8%, UDPCI 1%, other 1.4%, independent 38.5%; seats by party - RHDP, 167, UDPCI 6, FPI 3, UPCI 3, independent 76; composition - men 228, women 27, percent of women 10.6%; note - total Parliament percent of women 13%"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": ""
+        "text": "++"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -493,7 +487,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire or PDCI [Henri Konan BEDIE]Ivorian Popular Front or FPI [former pres. Laurent GBAGBO]Liberty and Democracy for the Republic or LIDER [Mamadou KOULIBALY]Movement of the Future Forces or MFA [Innocent Augustin ANAKY KOBENA]Rally of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace or RHDP [Alassane OUATTARA] (alliance includes MFA, PDCI, RDR, UDPCI, UPCI)Rally of the Republicans or RDR [Henriette DIABATE]Union for Cote d'Ivoire or UPCI [Gnamien KONAN]Union for Democracy and Peace in Cote d'Ivoire or UDPCI [Albert Toikeusse MABRI]"
+      "text": "Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire or PDCI [Henri Konan BEDIE] ++ Ivorian Popular Front or FPI [former pres. Laurent GBAGBO] ++ Liberty and Democracy for the Republic or LIDER [Mamadou KOULIBALY] ++ Movement of the Future Forces or MFA [Innocent Augustin ANAKY KOBENA] ++ Rally of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace or RHDP [Alassane OUATTARA] (alliance includes MFA, PDCI, RDR, UDPCI, UPCI) ++ Rally of the Republicans or RDR [Henriette DIABATE] ++ Union for Cote d'Ivoire or UPCI [Gnamien KONAN] ++ Union for Democracy and Peace in Cote d'Ivoire or UDPCI [Albert Toikeusse MABRI]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, ECOWAS, EITI (compliant country), Entente, FAO, FZ, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, Union Latina, UN Security Council (temporary), UNWTO, UPU, WADB (regional), WAEMU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -552,7 +546,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "For the last 5 years Cote d'Ivoire's growth rate has been among the highest in the world. Cote d'Ivoire is heavily dependent on agriculture and related activities, which engage roughly two-thirds of the population. Cote d'Ivoire is the world's largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a significant producer and exporter of coffee and palm oil. Consequently, the economy is highly sensitive to fluctuations in international prices for these products and to climatic conditions. Cocoa, oil, and coffee are the country's top export revenue earners, but the country has targeted agricultural processing of cocoa, cashews, mangoes, and other commodities as a high priority. Mining gold and exporting electricity are growing industries outside agriculture. Following the end of more than a decade of civil conflict in 2011, Cote d’Ivoire has experienced a boom in foreign investment and economic growth. In June 2012, the IMF and the World Bank announced $4.4 billion in debt relief for Cote d'Ivoire under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative."
+      "text": "For the last 5 years Cote d'Ivoire's growth rate has been among the highest in the world. Cote d'Ivoire is heavily dependent on agriculture and related activities, which engage roughly two-thirds of the population. Cote d'Ivoire is the world's largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a significant producer and exporter of coffee and palm oil. Consequently, the economy is highly sensitive to fluctuations in international prices for these products and to climatic conditions. Cocoa, oil, and coffee are the country's top export revenue earners, but the country has targeted agricultural processing of cocoa, cashews, mangoes, and other commodities as a high priority. Mining gold and exporting electricity are growing industries outside agriculture. ++ Following the end of more than a decade of civil conflict in 2011, Cote d'Ivoire has experienced a boom in foreign investment and economic growth. In June 2012, the IMF and the World Bank announced $4.4 billion in debt relief for Cote d'Ivoire under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$97.16 billion (2017 est.) / $90.12 billion (2016 est.) / $83.19 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -932,13 +926,13 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale), Cote Air Force (Force Aerienne Cote), Special Forces (Forces Speciale)other security services include the National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense), the National Police (under the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection), and the Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities) (2019)"
+      "text": "Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire (Forces Armees de Cote d'Ivoire, FACI; aka Republican Forces of Ivory Coast, FRCI): Army (Armee de Terre), Navy (Marine Nationale), Cote Air Force (Force Aerienne Cote), Special Forces (Forces Speciale) ++ other security services include the National Gendarmerie (under the Ministry of Defense), the National Police (under the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection), and the Coordination Center for Operational Decisions (a mix of police, gendarmerie, and FACI personnel for assisting police in providing security in some large cities) (2019)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "text": "1.1% of GDP (2019) / 1.4% of GDP (2018) / 1.3% of GDP (2017) / 1.7% of GDP (2016) / 1.7% of GDP (2015)"
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
-      "text": "the Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire have approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force) (2019 est.)"
+      "text": "the Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire have approximately 25,000 active troops (23,000 Army; 1,000 Navy; 1,000 Air Force) (2019 est.)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
       "text": "the FACI is mostly equipped with second-hand weapons and equipment of Russian origin; the leading suppliers since 2000 are Belarus, Bulgaria, and Romania (2019 est.)"
@@ -950,7 +944,7 @@
       "text": "18-25 years of age for compulsory and voluntary male and female military service; conscription is not enforced; voluntary recruitment of former rebels into the new national army is restricted to ages 22-29 (2012)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country’s political turmoil; currently, the FACI is focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in southern Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d’Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and built a joint terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2018the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2020)"
+      "text": "the military has mutinied several times since the late 1990s, most recently in 2017, and has had a large role in the country's political turmoil; currently, the FACI is focused on internal security and the growing threat posed by Islamic militants associated with the al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist group operating across the border in southern Burkina Faso; AQIM militants conducted significant attacks in the country in 2016 and 2020; Côte d'Ivoire since 2016 has stepped up border security and built a joint terrorism training center with France near Abidjan in 2018 ++ the UN maintained a 9,000-strong peacekeeping force in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) from 2004 until 2017 (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {

africa/ke.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Founding president and liberation struggle icon Jomo KENYATTA led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when Vice President Daniel Arap MOI took power in a constitutional succession. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982, after which time the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) changed the constitution to make itself the sole legal party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and external pressure for political liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud. President MOI stepped down in December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYATTA, the son of founding president Jomo KENYATTA, and assumed the presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. KIBAKI's reelection in December 2007 brought charges of vote rigging from Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) candidate Raila ODINGA and unleashed two months of violence in which approximately 1,100 people died. African Union-sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi ANNAN in late February 2008 resulted in a power-sharing accord bringing ODINGA into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing accord included a broad reform agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In August 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister. Uhuru KENYATTA won the first presidential election under the new constitution in March 2013, and was sworn into office the following month; he began a second term in November 2017 following a contentious, repeat election."
+      "text": "Founding president and liberation struggle icon Jomo KENYATTA led Kenya from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978, when Vice President Daniel Arap MOI took power in a constitutional succession. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 until 1982, after which time the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) changed the constitution to make itself the sole legal party in Kenya. MOI acceded to internal and external pressure for political liberalization in late 1991. The ethnically fractured opposition failed to dislodge KANU from power in elections in 1992 and 1997, which were marred by violence and fraud. President MOI stepped down in December 2002 following fair and peaceful elections. Mwai KIBAKI, running as the candidate of the multiethnic, united opposition group, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), defeated KANU candidate Uhuru KENYATTA, the son of founding president Jomo KENYATTA, and assumed the presidency following a campaign centered on an anticorruption platform. ++ KIBAKI's reelection in December 2007 brought charges of vote rigging from Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) candidate Raila ODINGA and unleashed two months of violence in which approximately 1,100 people died. African Union-sponsored mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi ANNAN in late February 2008 resulted in a power-sharing accord bringing ODINGA into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power sharing accord included a broad reform agenda, the centerpiece of which was constitutional reform. In August 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a national referendum. The new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also eliminated the position of prime minister. Uhuru KENYATTA won the first presidential election under the new constitution in March 2013, and was sworn into office the following month; he began a second term in November 2017 following a contentious, repeat election."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
       "text": "population heavily concentrated in the west along the shore of Lake Victoria; other areas of high density include the capital of Nairobi, and in the southeast along the Indian Ocean coast as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "recurring drought; flooding during rainy seasons\nvolcanism: limited volcanic activity; the Barrier (1,032 m) last erupted in 1921; South Island is the only other historically active volcano"
+      "text": "recurring drought; flooding during rainy seasons ++ volcanism: limited volcanic activity; the Barrier (1,032 m) last erupted in 1921; South Island is the only other historically active volcano"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "water pollution from urban and industrial wastes; water shortage and degraded water quality from increased use of pesticides and fertilizers; flooding; water hyacinth infestation in Lake Victoria; deforestation; soil erosion; desertification; poaching"
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 85.5% (Protestant 33.4%, Catholic 20.6%, Evangelical 20.4%, African Instituted Churches 7%, other Christian 4.1%), Muslim 10.9%, other 1.8%, none 1.6%, don't know/no answer 0.2% (2019 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. More than 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya’s persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at just over 3 children today.\nKenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya’s stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya shelters more than 300,000 Somali refugees as of April 2017."
+      "text": "Kenya has experienced dramatic population growth since the mid-20th century as a result of its high birth rate and its declining mortality rate. More than 40% of Kenyans are under the age of 15 because of sustained high fertility, early marriage and childbearing, and an unmet need for family planning. Kenya's persistent rapid population growth strains the labor market, social services, arable land, and natural resources. Although Kenya in 1967 was the first Sub-Saharan country to launch a nationwide family planning program, progress in reducing the birth rate has largely stalled since the late 1990s, when the government decreased its support for family planning to focus on the HIV epidemic. Government commitment and international technical support spurred Kenyan contraceptive use, decreasing the fertility rate (children per woman) from about 8 in the late 1970s to less than 5 children twenty years later, but it has plateaued at just over 3 children today. ++ Kenya is a source of emigrants and a host country for refugees. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kenyans pursued higher education in the UK because of colonial ties, but as British immigration rules tightened, the US, the then Soviet Union, and Canada became attractive study destinations. Kenya's stagnant economy and political problems during the 1980s and 1990s led to an outpouring of Kenyan students and professionals seeking permanent opportunities in the West and southern Africa. Nevertheless, Kenya's relative stability since its independence in 1963 has attracted hundreds of thousands of refugees escaping violent conflicts in neighboring countries; Kenya shelters more than 300,000 Somali refugees as of April 2017."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -264,14 +264,11 @@
       "text": "60.5% (2017)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 11% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 89% of population / rural: 60.4% of population / total: 68% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "39.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "32% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 11% of population / rural: 39.6% of population / total: 32% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -284,14 +281,11 @@
       "text": "1.4 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 21.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 78.8% of population / rural: 41.2% of population / total: 51.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "58.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "48.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 21.2% of population / rural: 58.8% of population / total: 48.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -418,7 +412,7 @@
         "text": "previous 1963, 1969; latest drafted 6 May 2010, passed by referendum 4 August 2010, promulgated 27 August 2010"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by either house of Parliament or by petition of at least one million eligible voters; passage of amendments by Parliament requires approval by at least two-thirds majority vote of both houses in each of two readings, approval in a referendum by majority of votes cast by at least 20% of eligible voters in at least one half of Kenya’s counties, and approval by the president; passage of amendments introduced by petition requires approval by a majority of county assemblies, approval by majority vote of both houses, and approval by the president"
+        "text": "proposed by either house of Parliament or by petition of at least one million eligible voters; passage of amendments by Parliament requires approval by at least two-thirds majority vote of both houses in each of two readings, approval in a referendum by majority of votes cast by at least 20% of eligible voters in at least one half of Kenya's counties, and approval by the president; passage of amendments introduced by petition requires approval by a majority of county assemblies, approval by majority vote of both houses, and approval by the president"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -463,13 +457,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (67 seats; 47 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 20 directly elected by proportional representation vote - 16 women, 2 representing youth, and 2 representing the disabled; members serve 5-year terms) National Assembly (349 seats; 290 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote, 47 women in single-seat constituencies elected by simple majority vote, and 12 members nominated by the National Assembly - 6 representing youth and 6 representing the disabled; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (67 seats; 47 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 20 directly elected by proportional representation vote - 16 women, 2 representing youth, and 2 representing the disabled; members serve 5-year terms) ++ National Assembly (349 seats; 290 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote, 47 women in single-seat constituencies elected by simple majority vote, and 12 members nominated by the National Assembly - 6 representing youth and 6 representing the disabled; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 8 August 2017 (next to be held in August 2022) National Assembly - last held on 8 August 2017 (next to be held in August 2022)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 8 August 2017 (next to be held in August 2022) ++ National Assembly - last held on 8 August 2017 (next to be held in August 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party/coalition - NA; seats by party/coalition - Jubilee Party 24; National Super Alliance 28, other 14, independent 1; composition - men 46, women 41, percent of women is 31.3% National Assembly - percent of vote by party/coalition - NA; seats by party/coalition - Jubilee Party 165, National Super Alliance 119, other 51, independent 13; composition - men 273, women 76, percent of women 21.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women is 23%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party/coalition - NA; seats by party/coalition - Jubilee Party 24; National Super Alliance 28, other 14, independent 1; composition - men 46, women 41, percent of women is 31.3% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party/coalition - NA; seats by party/coalition - Jubilee Party 165, National Super Alliance 119, other 51, independent 13; composition - men 273, women 76, percent of women 21.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women is 23%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -484,7 +478,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance Party of Kenya or APK [Kiraitu MURUNGI]Amani National Congress or ANC [Musalia MUDAVADI]Federal Party of Kenya or FPK [Cyrus JIRONGA]Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya or FORD-K [Moses WETANGULA]Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People or FORD-P [Henry OBWOCHA]Jubilee Party [Uhuru KENYATTA]Kenya African National Union or KANU [Gideon MOI]National Rainbow Coalition or NARC [Charity NGILU]Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya or ODM [Raila ODINGA]Wiper Democratic Movement-K or WDM-K (formerly Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya or ODM-K) [Kalonzo MUSYOKA]"
+      "text": "Alliance Party of Kenya or APK [Kiraitu MURUNGI] ++ Amani National Congress or ANC [Musalia MUDAVADI] ++ Federal Party of Kenya or FPK [Cyrus JIRONGA] ++ Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya or FORD-K [Moses WETANGULA] ++ Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People or FORD-P [Henry OBWOCHA] ++ Jubilee Party [Uhuru KENYATTA] ++ Kenya African National Union or KANU [Gideon MOI] ++ National Rainbow Coalition or NARC [Charity NGILU] ++ Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya or ODM [Raila ODINGA] ++ Wiper Democratic Movement-K or WDM-K (formerly Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya or ODM-K) [Kalonzo MUSYOKA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CD, COMESA, EAC, EADB, FAO, G-15, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -546,7 +540,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Kenya is the economic, financial, and transport hub of East Africa. Kenya’s real GDP growth has averaged over 5% for the last decade. Since 2014, Kenya has been ranked as a lower middle income country because its per capita GDP crossed a World Bank threshold. While Kenya has a growing entrepreneurial middle class and steady growth, its economic development has been impaired by weak governance and corruption. Although reliable numbers are hard to find, unemployment and under-employment are extremely high, and could be near 40% of the population. In 2013, the country adopted a devolved system of government with the creation of 47 counties, and is in the process of devolving state revenues and responsibilities to the counties. Agriculture remains the backbone of the Kenyan economy, contributing one-third of GDP. About 75% of Kenya’s population of roughly 48.5 million work at least part-time in the agricultural sector, including livestock and pastoral activities. Over 75% of agricultural output is from small-scale, rain-fed farming or livestock production. Tourism also holds a significant place in Kenya’s economy. In spite of political turmoil throughout the second half of 2017, tourism was up 20%, showcasing the strength of this sector. Kenya has long been a target of terrorist activity and has struggled with instability along its northeastern borders. Some high visibility terrorist attacks during 2013-2015 (e.g., at Nairobi’s Westgate Mall and Garissa University) affected the tourism industry severely, but the sector rebounded strongly in 2016-2017 and appears poised to continue growing. Inadequate infrastructure continues to hamper Kenya’s efforts to improve its annual growth so that it can meaningfully address poverty and unemployment. The KENYATTA administration has been successful in courting external investment for infrastructure development. International financial institutions and donors remain important to Kenya's growth and development, but Kenya has also successfully raised capital in the global bond market issuing its first sovereign bond offering in mid-2014, with a second occurring in February 2018. The first phase of a Chinese-financed and constructed standard gauge railway connecting Mombasa and Nairobi opened in May 2017. In 2016 the government was forced to take over three small and undercapitalized banks when underlying weaknesses were exposed. The government also enacted legislation that limits interest rates banks can charge on loans and set a rate that banks must pay their depositors. This measure led to a sharp shrinkage of credit in the economy. A prolonged election cycle in 2017 hurt the economy, drained government resources, and slowed GDP growth. Drought-like conditions in parts of the country pushed 2017 inflation above 8%, but the rate had fallen to 4.5% in February 2018. The economy, however, is well placed to resume its decade-long 5%-6% growth rate. While fiscal deficits continue to pose risks in the medium term, other economic indicators, including foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, current account deficits, remittances and FDI are positive. The credit and drought-related impediments were temporary. Now In his second term, President KENYATTA has pledged to make economic growth and development a centerpiece of his second administration, focusing on his \"Big Four\" initiatives of universal healthcare, food security, affordable housing, and expansion of manufacturing."
+      "text": "Kenya is the economic, financial, and transport hub of East Africa. Kenya's real GDP growth has averaged over 5% for the last decade. Since 2014, Kenya has been ranked as a lower middle income country because its per capita GDP crossed a World Bank threshold. While Kenya has a growing entrepreneurial middle class and steady growth, its economic development has been impaired by weak governance and corruption. Although reliable numbers are hard to find, unemployment and under-employment are extremely high, and could be near 40% of the population. In 2013, the country adopted a devolved system of government with the creation of 47 counties, and is in the process of devolving state revenues and responsibilities to the counties. ++ Agriculture remains the backbone of the Kenyan economy, contributing one-third of GDP. About 75% of Kenya's population of roughly 48.5 million work at least part-time in the agricultural sector, including livestock and pastoral activities. Over 75% of agricultural output is from small-scale, rain-fed farming or livestock production. Tourism also holds a significant place in Kenya's economy. In spite of political turmoil throughout the second half of 2017, tourism was up 20%, showcasing the strength of this sector. Kenya has long been a target of terrorist activity and has struggled with instability along its northeastern borders. Some high visibility terrorist attacks during 2013-2015 (e.g., at Nairobi's Westgate Mall and Garissa University) affected the tourism industry severely, but the sector rebounded strongly in 2016-2017 and appears poised to continue growing. ++ Inadequate infrastructure continues to hamper Kenya's efforts to improve its annual growth so that it can meaningfully address poverty and unemployment. The KENYATTA administration has been successful in courting external investment for infrastructure development. International financial institutions and donors remain important to Kenya's growth and development, but Kenya has also successfully raised capital in the global bond market issuing its first sovereign bond offering in mid-2014, with a second occurring in February 2018. The first phase of a Chinese-financed and constructed standard gauge railway connecting Mombasa and Nairobi opened in May 2017. ++ In 2016 the government was forced to take over three small and undercapitalized banks when underlying weaknesses were exposed. The government also enacted legislation that limits interest rates banks can charge on loans and set a rate that banks must pay their depositors. This measure led to a sharp shrinkage of credit in the economy. A prolonged election cycle in 2017 hurt the economy, drained government resources, and slowed GDP growth. Drought-like conditions in parts of the country pushed 2017 inflation above 8%, but the rate had fallen to 4.5% in February 2018. ++ The economy, however, is well placed to resume its decade-long 5%-6% growth rate. While fiscal deficits continue to pose risks in the medium term, other economic indicators, including foreign exchange reserves, interest rates, current account deficits, remittances and FDI are positive. The credit and drought-related impediments were temporary. Now In his second term, President KENYATTA has pledged to make economic growth and development a centerpiece of his second administration, focusing on his \"Big Four\" initiatives of universal healthcare, food security, affordable housing, and expansion of manufacturing."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$163.7 billion (2017 est.) / $156 billion (2016 est.) / $147.4 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/li.json

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 85.6%, Muslim 12.2%, Traditional 0.6%, other 0.2%, none 1.5% (2008 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Liberia’s high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa.\nNevertheless, Liberia’s high maternal mortality rate remains among the world’s worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia’s 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls.\nLiberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia’s 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Liberia hosted more than 125,000 Ivoirian refugees escaping post-election violence in 2010-11; as of mid-2017, about 12,000 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia as of October 2017 because of instability."
+      "text": "Liberia's high fertility rate of nearly 5 children per woman and large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – will sustain a high dependency ratio for many years to come. Significant progress has been made in preventing child deaths, despite a lack of health care workers and infrastructure. Infant and child mortality have dropped nearly 70% since 1990; the annual reduction rate of about 5.4% is the highest in Africa. ++ Nevertheless, Liberia's high maternal mortality rate remains among the world's worst; it reflects a high unmet need for family planning services, frequency of early childbearing, lack of quality obstetric care, high adolescent fertility, and a low proportion of births attended by a medical professional. Female mortality is also increased by the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGC), which is practiced by 10 of Liberia's 16 tribes and affects more than two-thirds of women and girls. FGC is an initiation ritual performed in rural bush schools, which teach traditional beliefs on marriage and motherhood and are an obstacle to formal classroom education for Liberian girls. ++ Liberia has been both a source and a destination for refugees. During Liberia's 14-year civil war (1989-2003), more than 250,000 people became refugees and another half million were internally displaced. Between 2004 and the cessation of refugee status for Liberians in June 2012, the UNHCR helped more than 155,000 Liberians to voluntarily repatriate, while others returned home on their own. Some Liberian refugees spent more than two decades living in other West African countries. Liberia hosted more than 125,000 Ivoirian refugees escaping post-election violence in 2010-11; as of mid-2017, about 12,000 Ivoirian refugees were still living in Liberia as of October 2017 because of instability."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -255,14 +255,11 @@
       "text": "31.2% (2016)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 6.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 93.8% of population / rural: 67.9% of population / total: 81% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "32.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "19% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 6.2% of population / rural: 32.1% of population / total: 19% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "0.8 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 35.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 64.1% of population / rural: 23.5% of population / total: 44.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "76.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "55.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 35.9% of population / rural: 76.5% of population / total: 55.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -437,13 +431,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of:The Liberian Senate (30 seats; members directly elected in 15 2-seat districts by simple majority vote to serve 9-year staggered terms; each district elects 1 senator and elects the second senator 3 years later, followed by a 6-year hiatus, after which the first Senate seat is up for election) House of Representatives (73 seats; members directly elected in single-seat districts by simple majority vote to serve 6-year terms; eligible for a second term)"
+        "text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of: The Liberian Senate (30 seats; members directly elected in 15 2-seat districts by simple majority vote to serve 9-year staggered terms; each district elects 1 senator and elects the second senator 3 years later, followed by a 6-year hiatus, after which the first Senate seat is up for election) ++ House of Representatives (73 seats; members directly elected in single-seat districts by simple majority vote to serve 6-year terms; eligible for a second term)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 20 December 2014 ; byelection to fill the senate seats vacated by WEAH and HOWARD-TAYLOR was held on 31 July 2018 (next general election to be held on 31 December 2020) House of Representatives - last held on 10 October 2017 (next to be held in October 2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 20 December 2014 ; byelection to fill the senate seats vacated by WEAH and HOWARD-TAYLOR was held on 31 July 2018 (next general election to be held on 31 December 2020) ++ House of Representatives - last held on 10 October 2017 (next to be held in October 2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - CDC 29.8%, UP 10.3%, LP 11.5%, NPP 6.1%, PUP 4.9%, ANC 4.2%, NDC 1.3%, other 7.6%, independent 24.3%; seats by party - UP 4, CDC 2, LP 2, ANC 1, NDC 1, NPP 1, PUP 1, independent 3; composition - men 27, women 3, percent of women 10% House of Representatives - percent of vote by party/coalition - Coalition for Democratic Change 15.6%, UP 14%, LP 8.7%, ANC 6.1%, PUP 5.9%, ALP 5.1%, MDR 3.4%, other 41.2%; seats by coalition/party - Coalition for Democratic Change 21, UP 20, PUP 5, LP 3, ALP 3, MDR 2, independent 13, other 6; composition - men 64, women 9, percent of women 12.3%; total Parliament percent of women 11.7%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - CDC 29.8%, UP 10.3%, LP 11.5%, NPP 6.1%, PUP 4.9%, ANC 4.2%, NDC 1.3%, other 7.6%, independent 24.3%; seats by party - UP 4, CDC 2, LP 2, ANC 1, NDC 1, NPP 1, PUP 1, independent 3; composition - men 27, women 3, percent of women 10% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party/coalition - Coalition for Democratic Change 15.6%, UP 14%, LP 8.7%, ANC 6.1%, PUP 5.9%, ALP 5.1%, MDR 3.4%, other 41.2%; seats by coalition/party - Coalition for Democratic Change 21, UP 20, PUP 5, LP 3, ALP 3, MDR 2, independent 13, other 6; composition - men 64, women 9, percent of women 12.3%; total Parliament percent of women 11.7%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -458,7 +452,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for Peace and Democracy or APD [Marcus S. G. DAHN]All Liberian Party or ALP [Benoi UREY]Alternative National Congress or ANC [Orishil GOULD]Coalition for Democratic Change [George WEAH] (includes CDC, NPP, and LPDP)Congress for Democratic Change or CDC [George WEAH]Liberia Destiny Party or LDP [Nathaniel BARNES]Liberia National Union or LINU [Nathaniel BLAMA]Liberia Transformation Party or LTP [Julius SUKU]Liberian People Democratic Party or LPDP [Alex J. TYLER]Liberian People's Party or LPPLiberty Party or LP [J. Fonati KOFFA]Movement for Democracy and Reconstruction or MDR [Prince Y. JOHNSON]Movement for Economic Empowerment [J. Mill JONES, Dr.]Movement for Progressive Change or MPC [Simeon FREEMAN]National Democratic Coalition or NDC [Dew MAYSON]National Democratic Party of Liberia or NDPL [D. Nyandeh SIEH]National Patriotic Party or NPP [Jewel HOWARD TAYLOR]National Reformist Party or NRP [Maximillian T. W. DIABE]National Union for Democratic Progress or NUDP [Victor BARNEY]People's Unification Party or PUP [Isobe GBORKORKOLLIE]Unity Party or UP [Varney SHERMAN]United People's Party [MacDonald WENTO]Victory for Change Party [Marcus R. JONES]"
+      "text": "Alliance for Peace and Democracy or APD [Marcus S. G. DAHN] ++ All Liberian Party or ALP [Benoi UREY] ++ Alternative National Congress or ANC [Orishil GOULD] ++ Coalition for Democratic Change [George WEAH] (includes CDC, NPP, and LPDP)Congress for Democratic Change or CDC [George WEAH] ++ Liberia Destiny Party or LDP [Nathaniel BARNES] ++ Liberia National Union or LINU [Nathaniel BLAMA] ++ Liberia Transformation Party or LTP [Julius SUKU] ++ Liberian People Democratic Party or LPDP [Alex J. TYLER] ++ Liberian People's Party or LPP ++ Liberty Party or LP [J. Fonati KOFFA] ++ Movement for Democracy and Reconstruction or MDR [Prince Y. JOHNSON] ++ Movement for Economic Empowerment [J. Mill JONES, Dr.] ++ Movement for Progressive Change or MPC [Simeon FREEMAN] ++ National Democratic Coalition or NDC [Dew MAYSON] ++ National Democratic Party of Liberia or NDPL [D. Nyandeh SIEH] ++ National Patriotic Party or NPP [Jewel HOWARD TAYLOR] ++ National Reformist Party or NRP [Maximillian T. W. DIABE] ++ National Union for Democratic Progress or NUDP [Victor BARNEY] ++ People's Unification Party or PUP [Isobe GBORKORKOLLIE] ++ Unity Party or UP [Varney SHERMAN] ++ United People's Party [MacDonald WENTO] ++ Victory for Change Party [Marcus R. JONES]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, ECOWAS, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO (correspondent), ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
@@ -520,7 +514,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Liberia is a low-income country that relies heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from the diaspora. It is richly endowed with water, mineral resources, forests, and a climate favorable to agriculture. Its principal exports are iron ore, rubber, diamonds, and gold. Palm oil and cocoa are emerging as new export products. The government has attempted to revive raw timber extraction and is encouraging oil exploration. In the 1990s and early 2000s, civil war and government mismanagement destroyed much of Liberia's economy, especially infrastructure in and around the capital. Much of the conflict was fueled by control over Liberia’s natural resources. With the conclusion of fighting and the installation of a democratically elected government in 2006, businesses that had fled the country began to return. The country achieved high growth during the period 2010-13 due to favorable world prices for its commodities. However, during the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis, the economy declined and many foreign-owned businesses departed with their capital and expertise. The epidemic forced the government to divert scarce resources to combat the spread of the virus, reducing funds available for needed public investment. The cost of addressing the Ebola epidemic coincided with decreased economic activity reducing government revenue, although higher donor support significantly offset this loss. During the same period, global commodities prices for key exports fell and have yet to recover to pre-Ebola levels. In 2017, gold was a key driver of growth, as a new mining project began its first full year of production; iron ore exports are also increased as Arcelor Mittal opened new mines at Mount Gangra. The completion of the rehabilitation of the Mount Coffee Hydroelectric Dam increased electricity production to support ongoing and future economic activity, although electricity tariffs remain high relative to other countries in the region and transmission infrastructure is limited. Presidential and legislative elections in October 2017 generated election-related spending pressures. Revitalizing the economy in the future will depend on economic diversification, increasing investment and trade, higher global commodity prices, sustained foreign aid and remittances, development of infrastructure and institutions, combating corruption, and maintaining political stability and security."
+      "text": "Liberia is a low-income country that relies heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from the diaspora. It is richly endowed with water, mineral resources, forests, and a climate favorable to agriculture. Its principal exports are iron ore, rubber, diamonds, and gold. Palm oil and cocoa are emerging as new export products. The government has attempted to revive raw timber extraction and is encouraging oil exploration. ++ In the 1990s and early 2000s, civil war and government mismanagement destroyed much of Liberia's economy, especially infrastructure in and around the capital. Much of the conflict was fueled by control over Liberia's natural resources. With the conclusion of fighting and the installation of a democratically elected government in 2006, businesses that had fled the country began to return. The country achieved high growth during the period 2010-13 due to favorable world prices for its commodities. However, during the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis, the economy declined and many foreign-owned businesses departed with their capital and expertise. The epidemic forced the government to divert scarce resources to combat the spread of the virus, reducing funds available for needed public investment. The cost of addressing the Ebola epidemic coincided with decreased economic activity reducing government revenue, although higher donor support significantly offset this loss. During the same period, global commodities prices for key exports fell and have yet to recover to pre-Ebola levels. ++ In 2017, gold was a key driver of growth, as a new mining project began its first full year of production; iron ore exports are also increased as Arcelor Mittal opened new mines at Mount Gangra. The completion of the rehabilitation of the Mount Coffee Hydroelectric Dam increased electricity production to support ongoing and future economic activity, although electricity tariffs remain high relative to other countries in the region and transmission infrastructure is limited. Presidential and legislative elections in October 2017 generated election-related spending pressures. ++ Revitalizing the economy in the future will depend on economic diversification, increasing investment and trade, higher global commodity prices, sustained foreign aid and remittances, development of infrastructure and institutions, combating corruption, and maintaining political stability and security."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$6.112 billion (2017 est.) / $5.965 billion (2016 est.) / $6.064 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/lt.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Paramount chief MOSHOESHOE I consolidated what would become Basutoland in the early 19th century and made himself king in 1822. Continuing encroachments by Dutch settlers from the neighboring Orange Free State caused the king to enter into an 1868 agreement with the UK by which Basutoland became a British protectorate, and after 1884, a crown colony. Upon independence in 1966, the country was renamed the Kingdom of Lesotho. The Basotho National Party ruled the country during its first two decades. King MOSHOESHOE II was exiled in 1990, but returned to Lesotho in 1992 and was reinstated in 1995 and subsequently succeeded by his son, King LETSIE III, in 1996. Constitutional government was restored in 1993 after seven years of military rule. In 1998, violent protests and a military mutiny following a contentious election prompted a brief but bloody intervention by South African and Botswana military forces under the aegis of the Southern African Development Community. Subsequent constitutional reforms restored relative political stability. Peaceful parliamentary elections were held in 2002, but the National Assembly elections in 2007 were hotly contested and aggrieved parties disputed how the electoral law was applied to award proportional seats in the Assembly. In 2012, competitive elections involving 18 parties saw Prime Minister Motsoahae Thomas THABANE form a coalition government - the first in the country's history - that ousted the 14-year incumbent, Pakalitha MOSISILI, who peacefully transferred power the following month. MOSISILI returned to power in snap elections in February 2015 after the collapse of THABANE’s coalition government and an alleged attempted military coup. In June 2017, THABANE returned to become prime minister."
+      "text": "Paramount chief MOSHOESHOE I consolidated what would become Basutoland in the early 19th century and made himself king in 1822. Continuing encroachments by Dutch settlers from the neighboring Orange Free State caused the king to enter into an 1868 agreement with the UK by which Basutoland became a British protectorate, and after 1884, a crown colony. Upon independence in 1966, the country was renamed the Kingdom of Lesotho. The Basotho National Party ruled the country during its first two decades. King MOSHOESHOE II was exiled in 1990, but returned to Lesotho in 1992 and was reinstated in 1995 and subsequently succeeded by his son, King LETSIE III, in 1996. Constitutional government was restored in 1993 after seven years of military rule. In 1998, violent protests and a military mutiny following a contentious election prompted a brief but bloody intervention by South African and Botswana military forces under the aegis of the Southern African Development Community. Subsequent constitutional reforms restored relative political stability. Peaceful parliamentary elections were held in 2002, but the National Assembly elections in 2007 were hotly contested and aggrieved parties disputed how the electoral law was applied to award proportional seats in the Assembly. In 2012, competitive elections involving 18 parties saw Prime Minister Motsoahae Thomas THABANE form a coalition government - the first in the country's history - that ousted the 14-year incumbent, Pakalitha MOSISILI, who peacefully transferred power the following month. MOSISILI returned to power in snap elections in February 2015 after the collapse of THABANE's coalition government and an alleged attempted military coup. In June 2017, THABANE returned to become prime minister."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 47.8% (Pentecostal 23.1%, Lesotho Evangelical 17.3%, Anglican 7.4%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, other Christian 9.1%, non-Christian 1.4%, none 2.3% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Lesotho faces great socioeconomic challenges. More than half of its population lives below the property line, and the country’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the second highest in the world. In addition, Lesotho is a small, mountainous, landlocked country with little arable land, leaving its population vulnerable to food shortages and reliant on remittances. Lesotho’s persistently high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been increasing during the last decade, according to the last two Demographic and Health Surveys. Despite these significant shortcomings, Lesotho has made good progress in education; it is on-track to achieve universal primary education and has one of the highest adult literacy rates in Africa.\nLesotho’s migration history is linked to its unique geography; it is surrounded by South Africa with which it shares linguistic and cultural traits. Lesotho at one time had more of its workforce employed outside its borders than any other country. Today remittances equal about 17% of its GDP. With few job options at home, a high rate of poverty, and higher wages available across the border, labor migration to South Africa replaced agriculture as the prevailing Basotho source of income decades ago. The majority of Basotho migrants were single men contracted to work as gold miners in South Africa. However, migration trends changed in the 1990s, and fewer men found mining jobs in South Africa because of declining gold prices, stricter immigration policies, and a preference for South African workers.\nAlthough men still dominate cross-border labor migration, more women are working in South Africa, mostly as domestics, because they are widows or their husbands are unemployed. Internal rural-urban flows have also become more frequent, with more women migrating within the country to take up jobs in the garment industry or moving to care for loved ones with HIV/AIDS. Lesotho’s small population of immigrants is increasingly composed of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants who are involved in the textile industry and small retail businesses."
+      "text": "Lesotho faces great socioeconomic challenges. More than half of its population lives below the property line, and the country's HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is the second highest in the world. In addition, Lesotho is a small, mountainous, landlocked country with little arable land, leaving its population vulnerable to food shortages and reliant on remittances. Lesotho's persistently high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been increasing during the last decade, according to the last two Demographic and Health Surveys. Despite these significant shortcomings, Lesotho has made good progress in education; it is on-track to achieve universal primary education and has one of the highest adult literacy rates in Africa. ++ Lesotho's migration history is linked to its unique geography; it is surrounded by South Africa with which it shares linguistic and cultural traits. Lesotho at one time had more of its workforce employed outside its borders than any other country. Today remittances equal about 17% of its GDP. With few job options at home, a high rate of poverty, and higher wages available across the border, labor migration to South Africa replaced agriculture as the prevailing Basotho source of income decades ago. The majority of Basotho migrants were single men contracted to work as gold miners in South Africa. However, migration trends changed in the 1990s, and fewer men found mining jobs in South Africa because of declining gold prices, stricter immigration policies, and a preference for South African workers. ++ Although men still dominate cross-border labor migration, more women are working in South Africa, mostly as domestics, because they are widows or their husbands are unemployed. Internal rural-urban flows have also become more frequent, with more women migrating within the country to take up jobs in the garment industry or moving to care for loved ones with HIV/AIDS. Lesotho's small population of immigrants is increasingly composed of Taiwanese and Chinese migrants who are involved in the textile industry and small retail businesses."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "64.9% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 93% of population / rural: 72.4% of population / total: 78.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "27.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "21.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 7% of population / rural: 27.6% of population / total: 21.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "0.07 physicians/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 11.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 88.6% of population / rural: 52.3% of population / total: 62.4% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "47.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "37.6% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 11.4% of population / rural: 47.7% of population / total: 37.6% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -442,13 +436,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (33 seats; 22 principal chiefs and 11 other senators nominated by the king with the advice of the Council of State, a 13-member body of key government and non-government officials; members serve 5-year terms) National Assembly (120 seats; 80 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 40 elected through proportional representation; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (33 seats; 22 principal chiefs and 11 other senators nominated by the king with the advice of the Council of State, a 13-member body of key government and non-government officials; members serve 5-year terms) ++ National Assembly (120 seats; 80 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 40 elected through proportional representation; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last nominated by the king 11 July 2017 (next NA) National Assembly - last held on 3 June 2017 (next to be held in 2022)"
+        "text": "Senate - last nominated by the king 11 July 2017 (next NA) ++ National Assembly - last held on 3 June 2017 (next to be held in 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of votes by party - NA, seats by party - NA; composition - men 25, women 8, percent of women 24.2% National Assembly - percent of votes by party - ABC 40.5%, DC 25.8%, LCD 9%, AD 7.3%, MEC 5.1%, BNP 4.1, PFD 2.3%, other 5.9%; seats by party - ABC 51, DC 30, LCD 11, AD 9, MEC 6, BNP 5, PFD 3, other 5; composition - men 95, women 27, percent of women 22.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 22.9%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of votes by party - NA, seats by party - NA; composition - men 25, women 8, percent of women 24.2% ++ National Assembly - percent of votes by party - ABC 40.5%, DC 25.8%, LCD 9%, AD 7.3%, MEC 5.1%, BNP 4.1, PFD 2.3%, other 5.9%; seats by party - ABC 51, DC 30, LCD 11, AD 9, MEC 6, BNP 5, PFD 3, other 5; composition - men 95, women 27, percent of women 22.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 22.9%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -463,7 +457,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "All Basotho Convention or ABC [Thomas Motsoahae THABANE]Alliance of Democrats or AD [Monyane MOLELEKI]Basotho Congress Party or BCP [Thulo MAHLAKENG]Basotho National Party or BNP [Thesele MASERIBANE]Democratic Congress or DC [Pakalitha MOSISILI]Democratic Party of Lesotho or DPL [Limpho TAU]Lesotho Congress for Democracy or LCD [Mothetjoa METSING]Movement of Economic Change or MEC [Selibe MOCHOBOROANE]National Independent Party or NIP [Kimetso MATHABA]Popular Front for Democracy of PFD [Lekhetho RAKUOANE]Reformed Congress of Lesotho or RCL [Keketso RANTSO]"
+      "text": "All Basotho Convention or ABC [Thomas Motsoahae THABANE] ++ Alliance of Democrats or AD [Monyane MOLELEKI] ++ Basotho Congress Party or BCP [Thulo MAHLAKENG] ++ Basotho National Party or BNP [Thesele MASERIBANE] ++ Democratic Congress or DC [Pakalitha MOSISILI] ++ Democratic Party of Lesotho or DPL [Limpho TAU] ++ Lesotho Congress for Democracy or LCD [Mothetjoa METSING] ++ Movement of Economic Change or MEC [Selibe MOCHOBOROANE] ++ National Independent Party or NIP [Kimetso MATHABA] ++ Popular Front for Democracy of PFD [Lekhetho RAKUOANE] ++ Reformed Congress of Lesotho or RCL [Keketso RANTSO]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CD, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, MIGA, NAM, OPCW, SACU, SADC, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -519,7 +513,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Small, mountainous, and completely landlocked by South Africa, Lesotho depends on a narrow economic base of textile manufacturing, agriculture, remittances, and regional customs revenue. About three-fourths of the people live in rural areas and engage in animal herding and subsistence agriculture, although Lesotho produces less than 20% of the nation's demand for food. Agriculture is vulnerable to weather and climate variability. Lesotho relies on South Africa for much of its economic activity; Lesotho imports 85% of the goods it consumes from South Africa, including most agricultural inputs. Households depend heavily on remittances from family members working in South Africa in mines, on farms, and as domestic workers, though mining employment has declined substantially since the 1990s. Lesotho is a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and revenues from SACU accounted for roughly 26% of total GDP in 2016; however, SACU revenues are volatile and expected to decline over the next 5 years. Lesotho also gains royalties from the South African Government for water transferred to South Africa from a dam and reservoir system in Lesotho. However, the government continues to strengthen its tax system to reduce dependency on customs duties and other transfers. The government maintains a large presence in the economy - government consumption accounted for about 26% of GDP in 2017. The government remains Lesotho's largest employer; in 2016, the government wage bill rose to 23% of GDP – the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lesotho's largest private employer is the textile and garment industry - approximately 36,000 Basotho, mainly women, work in factories producing garments for export to South Africa and the US. Diamond mining in Lesotho has grown in recent years and accounted for nearly 35% of total exports in 2015. Lesotho managed steady GDP growth at an average of 4.5% from 2010 to 2014, dropping to about 2.5% in 2015-16, but poverty remains widespread around 57% of the total population."
+      "text": "Small, mountainous, and completely landlocked by South Africa, Lesotho depends on a narrow economic base of textile manufacturing, agriculture, remittances, and regional customs revenue. About three-fourths of the people live in rural areas and engage in animal herding and subsistence agriculture, although Lesotho produces less than 20% of the nation's demand for food. Agriculture is vulnerable to weather and climate variability. ++ Lesotho relies on South Africa for much of its economic activity; Lesotho imports 85% of the goods it consumes from South Africa, including most agricultural inputs. Households depend heavily on remittances from family members working in South Africa in mines, on farms, and as domestic workers, though mining employment has declined substantially since the 1990s. Lesotho is a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), and revenues from SACU accounted for roughly 26% of total GDP in 2016; however, SACU revenues are volatile and expected to decline over the next 5 years. Lesotho also gains royalties from the South African Government for water transferred to South Africa from a dam and reservoir system in Lesotho. However, the government continues to strengthen its tax system to reduce dependency on customs duties and other transfers. ++ The government maintains a large presence in the economy - government consumption accounted for about 26% of GDP in 2017. The government remains Lesotho's largest employer; in 2016, the government wage bill rose to 23% of GDP – the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lesotho's largest private employer is the textile and garment industry - approximately 36,000 Basotho, mainly women, work in factories producing garments for export to South Africa and the US. Diamond mining in Lesotho has grown in recent years and accounted for nearly 35% of total exports in 2015. Lesotho managed steady GDP growth at an average of 4.5% from 2010 to 2014, dropping to about 2.5% in 2015-16, but poverty remains widespread around 57% of the total population."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$6.656 billion (2017 est.) / $6.762 billion (2016 est.) / $6.561 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/ly.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Berbers have inhabited central north Africa since ancient times, but the region has been settled and ruled by Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and Vandals. In the the 7th century, Islam spread through the region; in the mid-16th century, Ottoman rule began. The Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when they were defeated in World War II. Libya then passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. Following a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar al-QADHAFI assumed leadership and began to espouse his political system at home, which was a combination of socialism and Islam. During the 1970s, QADHAFI used oil revenues to promote his ideology outside Libya, supporting subversive and terrorist activities that included the downing of two airliners - one over Scotland, another in Northern Africa - and a discotheque bombing in Berlin. UN sanctions in 1992 isolated QADHAFI politically and economically following the attacks; sanctions were lifted in 2003 following Libyan acceptance of responsibility for the bombings and agreement to claimant compensation. QADHAFI also agreed to end Libya's program to develop weapons of mass destruction, and he made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations. Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011. QADHAFI's brutal crackdown on protesters spawned a civil war that triggered UN authorization of air and naval intervention by the international community. After months of seesaw fighting between government and opposition forces, the QADHAFI regime was toppled in mid-2011 and replaced by a transitional government known as the National Transitional Council (NTC). In 2012, the NTC handed power to an elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Voters chose a new parliament to replace the GNC in June 2014 - the House of Representatives (HoR), which relocated to the eastern city of Tobruk after fighting broke out in Tripoli and Benghazi in July 2014. In December 2015, the UN brokered an agreement among a broad array of Libyan political parties and social groups - known as the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Members of the Libyan Political Dialogue, including representatives of the HoR and GNC, signed the LPA in December 2015. The LPA called for the formation of an interim Government of National Accord or GNA, with a nine-member Presidency Council, the HoR, and an advisory High Council of State that most ex-GNC members joined. The LPA’s roadmap for a transition to a new constitution and elected government was subsequently endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2259, which also called upon member states to cease official contact with parallel institutions. In January 2016, the HoR voted to approve the LPA, including the Presidency Council, while voting against a controversial provision on security leadership positions and the Presidency Council’s proposed cabinet of ministers. In March 2016, the GNA Presidency Council seated itself in Tripoli. In 2016, the GNA twice announced a slate of ministers who operate in an acting capacity, but the HoR did not endorse the ministerial list. The HoR and defunct-GNC-affiliated political hardliners continued to oppose the GNA and hamper the LPA’s implementation. In September 2017, UN Special Representative Ghassan SALAME announced a new roadmap for national political reconciliation. SALAME’s plan called for amendments to the LPA, a national conference of Libyan leaders, and a constitutional referendum and general elections. In November 2018, the international partners supported SALAME’s recalibrated Action Plan for Libya that aimed to break the political deadlock by holding a National Conference in Libya in 2019 on a timeline for political transition.  The National Conference was delayed following a failure of the parties to implement an agreement mediated by SALAME in Abu Dhabi on February 27, and the subsequent military action by Khalifa HAFTAR’s Libyan National Army against GNA forces in Tripoli that began in April 2019. "
+      "text": "Berbers have inhabited central north Africa since ancient times, but the region has been settled and ruled by Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and Vandals. In the the 7th century, Islam spread through the region; in the mid-16th century, Ottoman rule began. The Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when they were defeated in World War II. Libya then passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. Following a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar al-QADHAFI assumed leadership and began to espouse his political system at home, which was a combination of socialism and Islam. During the 1970s, QADHAFI used oil revenues to promote his ideology outside Libya, supporting subversive and terrorist activities that included the downing of two airliners - one over Scotland, another in Northern Africa - and a discotheque bombing in Berlin. UN sanctions in 1992 isolated QADHAFI politically and economically following the attacks; sanctions were lifted in 2003 following Libyan acceptance of responsibility for the bombings and agreement to claimant compensation. QADHAFI also agreed to end Libya's program to develop weapons of mass destruction, and he made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations. ++ Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011. QADHAFI's brutal crackdown on protesters spawned a civil war that triggered UN authorization of air and naval intervention by the international community. After months of seesaw fighting between government and opposition forces, the QADHAFI regime was toppled in mid-2011 and replaced by a transitional government known as the National Transitional Council (NTC). In 2012, the NTC handed power to an elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Voters chose a new parliament to replace the GNC in June 2014 - the House of Representatives (HoR), which relocated to the eastern city of Tobruk after fighting broke out in Tripoli and Benghazi in July 2014. ++ In December 2015, the UN brokered an agreement among a broad array of Libyan political parties and social groups - known as the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Members of the Libyan Political Dialogue, including representatives of the HoR and GNC, signed the LPA in December 2015. The LPA called for the formation of an interim Government of National Accord or GNA, with a nine-member Presidency Council, the HoR, and an advisory High Council of State that most ex-GNC members joined. The LPA's roadmap for a transition to a new constitution and elected government was subsequently endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2259, which also called upon member states to cease official contact with parallel institutions. In January 2016, the HoR voted to approve the LPA, including the Presidency Council, while voting against a controversial provision on security leadership positions and the Presidency Council's proposed cabinet of ministers. In March 2016, the GNA Presidency Council seated itself in Tripoli. In 2016, the GNA twice announced a slate of ministers who operate in an acting capacity, but the HoR did not endorse the ministerial list. The HoR and defunct-GNC-affiliated political hardliners continued to oppose the GNA and hamper the LPA's implementation. In September 2017, UN Special Representative Ghassan SALAME announced a new roadmap for national political reconciliation. SALAME's plan called for amendments to the LPA, a national conference of Libyan leaders, and a constitutional referendum and general elections. In November 2018, the international partners supported SALAME's recalibrated Action Plan for Libya that aimed to break the political deadlock by holding a National Conference in Libya in 2019 on a timeline for political transition.  The National Conference was delayed following a failure of the parties to implement an agreement mediated by SALAME in Abu Dhabi on February 27, and the subsequent military action by Khalifa HAFTAR's Libyan National Army against GNA forces in Tripoli that began in April 2019. "
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Geography - note": {
-      "text": "note 1: more than 90% of the country is desert or semidesertnote 2: the volcano Waw an Namus lies in south central Libya in the middle of the Sahara; the caldera is an oasis - the name means \"oasis of mosquitoes\" - containing several small lakes surrounded by vegetation and hosting various insects and a large diversity of birds"
+      "text": "note 1: more than 90% of the country is desert or semidesert ++ note 2: the volcano Waw an Namus lies in south central Libya in the middle of the Sahara; the caldera is an oasis - the name means \"oasis of mosquitoes\" - containing several small lakes surrounded by vegetation and hosting various insects and a large diversity of birds"
     }
   },
   "People and Society": {
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.\nBy the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.\nWhile Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, more than 200,000 people were displaced internally as of August 2017 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south."
+      "text": "Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya's involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although Sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions. ++ By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya's 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward Sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market. ++ While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, more than 200,000 people were displaced internally as of August 2017 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country's south."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,8 +261,11 @@
       "text": "27.7% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 98.5% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 1.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Physicians density": {
@@ -272,8 +275,11 @@
       "text": "3.2 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -424,7 +430,7 @@
       "text": "NA; note - government is in transition"
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "NA"
+      "text": "NA ++"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AMU, AU, BDEAC, CAEU, COMESA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
@@ -480,7 +486,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices. The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011. Oil production in 2017 reached a five-year high, driving GDP growth, with daily average production rising to 879,000 barrels per day. However, oil production levels remain below the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day. The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. Low consumer confidence in the banking sector and the economy as a whole has driven a severe liquidity shortage."
+      "text": "Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices. The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011. Oil production in 2017 reached a five-year high, driving GDP growth, with daily average production rising to 879,000 barrels per day. However, oil production levels remain below the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day. ++ The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. Low consumer confidence in the banking sector and the economy as a whole has driven a severe liquidity shortage."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$61.97 billion (2017 est.) / $37.78 billion (2016 est.) / $40.8 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -866,7 +872,7 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "note - in transition; the Government of National Accord (GNA) has various ground, air, naval, and coast guard forces under its command; the forces are comprised of a mix of semi-regular military units, tribal militias, civilian volunteers, and foreign troops and mercenariesforces under Khalifa HAFTER, known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), also include various ground, air, and naval units comprised of semi-regular military personnel, tribal militias, and foreign troops and mercenaries (2019)"
+      "text": "note - in transition; the Government of National Accord (GNA) has various ground, air, naval, and coast guard forces under its command; the forces are comprised of a mix of semi-regular military units, tribal militias, civilian volunteers, and foreign troops and mercenaries ++ forces under Khalifa HAFTER, known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), also include various ground, air, and naval units comprised of semi-regular military personnel, tribal militias, and foreign troops and mercenaries (2019)"
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
       "text": "the sizes of the forces of both the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army are unknown (2020 est.)"
@@ -897,10 +903,10 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Libya is a destination and transit country for men and women from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia subjected to forced labor and forced prostitution; migrants who seek employment in Libya as laborers and domestic workers or who transit Libya en route to Europe are vulnerable to forced labor; private employers also exploit migrants from detention centers as forced laborers on farms and construction sites, returning them to detention when they are no longer needed; some Sub-Saharan women are reportedly forced to work in Libyan brothels, particularly in the country’s south; since 2013, militia groups and other informal armed groups, including some affiliated with the government, are reported to conscript Libyan children under the age of 18; large-scale violence driven by militias, civil unrest, and increased lawlessness increased in 2014, making it more difficult to obtain information on human trafficking"
+        "text": "Libya is a destination and transit country for men and women from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia subjected to forced labor and forced prostitution; migrants who seek employment in Libya as laborers and domestic workers or who transit Libya en route to Europe are vulnerable to forced labor; private employers also exploit migrants from detention centers as forced laborers on farms and construction sites, returning them to detention when they are no longer needed; some Sub-Saharan women are reportedly forced to work in Libyan brothels, particularly in the country's south; since 2013, militia groups and other informal armed groups, including some affiliated with the government, are reported to conscript Libyan children under the age of 18; large-scale violence driven by militias, civil unrest, and increased lawlessness increased in 2014, making it more difficult to obtain information on human trafficking"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 3 - the Libyan Government does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, the government’s capacity to address human trafficking was hampered by the ongoing power struggle and violence; the judicial system was not functioning, preventing any efforts to investigate, prosecute, or convict traffickers, complicit detention camp guards or government officials, or militias or armed groups that used child soldiers; the government failed to identify or provide protection to trafficking victims, including child conscripts, and continued to punish victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; no public anti-trafficking awareness campaigns were conducted (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 3 - the Libyan Government does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, the government's capacity to address human trafficking was hampered by the ongoing power struggle and violence; the judicial system was not functioning, preventing any efforts to investigate, prosecute, or convict traffickers, complicit detention camp guards or government officials, or militias or armed groups that used child soldiers; the government failed to identify or provide protection to trafficking victims, including child conscripts, and continued to punish victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; no public anti-trafficking awareness campaigns were conducted (2015)"
       }
     }
   }

africa/ma.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Madagascar was one of the last major habitable landmasses on earth settled by humans. While there is some evidence of human presence on the island in the millennia B.C., large-scale settlement began between A.D. 350 and 550 with settlers from present-day Indonesia. The island attracted Arab and Persian traders as early as the 7th century, and migrants from Africa arrived around A.D. 1000. Madagascar was a pirate stronghold during the late 17th and early 18th centuries, and served as a slave trading center into the 19th century. From the 16th to the late 19th century, a native Merina Kingdom dominated much of Madagascar. The island was conquered by the French in 1896 who made it a colony; independence was regained in 1960. During 1992-93, free presidential and National Assembly elections were held ending 17 years of single-party rule. In 1997, in the second presidential race, Didier RATSIRAKA, the leader during the 1970s and 1980s, returned to the presidency. The 2001 presidential election was contested between the followers of Didier RATSIRAKA and Marc RAVALOMANANA, nearly causing secession of half of the country. In 2002, the High Constitutional Court announced RAVALOMANANA the winner. RAVALOMANANA won a second term in 2006 but, following protests in 2009, handed over power to the military, which then conferred the presidency on the mayor of Antananarivo, Andry RAJOELINA, in what amounted to a coup d'etat. Following a lengthy mediation process led by the Southern African Development Community, Madagascar held UN-supported presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. Former de facto finance minister Hery RAJAONARIMAMPIANINA won a runoff election in December 2013 and was inaugurated in January 2014. In January 2019, RAJOELINA was declared the winner of a runoff election against RAVALOMANANA; both RATSIRAKA and RAJAONARIMAMPIANINA also ran in the first round of the election, which took place in November 2018."
+      "text": "Madagascar was one of the last major habitable landmasses on earth settled by humans. While there is some evidence of human presence on the island in the millennia B.C., large-scale settlement began between A.D. 350 and 550 with settlers from present-day Indonesia. The island attracted Arab and Persian traders as early as the 7th century, and migrants from Africa arrived around A.D. 1000. Madagascar was a pirate stronghold during the late 17th and early 18th centuries, and served as a slave trading center into the 19th century. From the 16th to the late 19th century, a native Merina Kingdom dominated much of Madagascar. The island was conquered by the French in 1896 who made it a colony; independence was regained in 1960. ++ During 1992-93, free presidential and National Assembly elections were held ending 17 years of single-party rule. In 1997, in the second presidential race, Didier RATSIRAKA, the leader during the 1970s and 1980s, returned to the presidency. The 2001 presidential election was contested between the followers of Didier RATSIRAKA and Marc RAVALOMANANA, nearly causing secession of half of the country. In 2002, the High Constitutional Court announced RAVALOMANANA the winner. RAVALOMANANA won a second term in 2006 but, following protests in 2009, handed over power to the military, which then conferred the presidency on the mayor of Antananarivo, Andry RAJOELINA, in what amounted to a coup d'etat. Following a lengthy mediation process led by the Southern African Development Community, Madagascar held UN-supported presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. Former de facto finance minister Hery RAJAONARIMAMPIANINA won a runoff election in December 2013 and was inaugurated in January 2014. In January 2019, RAJOELINA was declared the winner of a runoff election against RAVALOMANANA; both RATSIRAKA and RAJAONARIMAMPIANINA also ran in the first round of the election, which took place in November 2018."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
       "text": "most of population lives on the eastern half of the island; significant clustering is found in the central highlands and eastern coastline as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "periodic cyclones; drought; and locust infestation\nvolcanism: Madagascar's volcanoes have not erupted in historical times"
+      "text": "periodic cyclones; drought; and locust infestation ++ volcanism: Madagascar's volcanoes have not erupted in historical times"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "erosion and soil degredation results from deforestation and overgrazing; desertification; agricultural fires; surface water contaminated with raw sewage and other organic wastes; wildlife preservation (endangered species of flora and fauna unique to the island)"
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Geography - note": {
-      "text": "world's fourth-largest island; strategic location along Mozambique Channel; despite Madagascar’s close proximity to the African continent, ocean currents isolate the island resulting in high rates of endemic plant and animal species; approximately 90% of the flora and fauna on the island are found nowhere else"
+      "text": "world's fourth-largest island; strategic location along Mozambique Channel; despite Madagascar's close proximity to the African continent, ocean currents isolate the island resulting in high rates of endemic plant and animal species; approximately 90% of the flora and fauna on the island are found nowhere else"
     }
   },
   "People and Society": {
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
       "text": "Christian, indigenous, Muslim"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Madagascar’s youthful population – just over 60% are under the age of 25 – and high total fertility rate of more than 4 children per women ensures that the Malagasy population will continue its rapid growth trajectory for the foreseeable future. The population is predominantly rural and poor; chronic malnutrition is prevalent, and large families are the norm. Many young Malagasy girls are withdrawn from school, marry early (often pressured to do so by their parents), and soon begin having children. Early childbearing, coupled with Madagascar’s widespread poverty and lack of access to skilled health care providers during delivery, increases the risk of death and serious health problems for young mothers and their babies.\nChild marriage perpetuates gender inequality and is prevalent among the poor, the uneducated, and rural households – as of 2013, of Malagasy women aged 20 to 24, more than 40% were married and more than a third had given birth by the age of 18. Although the legal age for marriage is 18, parental consent is often given for earlier marriages or the law is flouted, especially in rural areas that make up nearly 65% of the country. Forms of arranged marriage whereby young girls are married to older men in exchange for oxen or money are traditional. If a union does not work out, a girl can be placed in another marriage, but the dowry paid to her family diminishes with each unsuccessful marriage.\nMadagascar’s population consists of 18 main ethnic groups, all of whom speak the same Malagasy language. Most Malagasy are multi-ethnic, however, reflecting the island’s diversity of settlers and historical contacts (see Background). Madagascar’s legacy of hierarchical societies practicing domestic slavery (most notably the Merina Kingdom of the 16th to the 19th century) is evident today in persistent class tension, with some ethnic groups maintaining a caste system. Slave descendants are vulnerable to unequal access to education and jobs, despite Madagascar’s constitutional guarantee of free compulsory primary education and its being party to several international conventions on human rights. Historical distinctions also remain between central highlanders and coastal people."
+      "text": "Madagascar's youthful population – just over 60% are under the age of 25 – and high total fertility rate of more than 4 children per women ensures that the Malagasy population will continue its rapid growth trajectory for the foreseeable future. The population is predominantly rural and poor; chronic malnutrition is prevalent, and large families are the norm. Many young Malagasy girls are withdrawn from school, marry early (often pressured to do so by their parents), and soon begin having children. Early childbearing, coupled with Madagascar's widespread poverty and lack of access to skilled health care providers during delivery, increases the risk of death and serious health problems for young mothers and their babies. ++ Child marriage perpetuates gender inequality and is prevalent among the poor, the uneducated, and rural households – as of 2013, of Malagasy women aged 20 to 24, more than 40% were married and more than a third had given birth by the age of 18. Although the legal age for marriage is 18, parental consent is often given for earlier marriages or the law is flouted, especially in rural areas that make up nearly 65% of the country. Forms of arranged marriage whereby young girls are married to older men in exchange for oxen or money are traditional. If a union does not work out, a girl can be placed in another marriage, but the dowry paid to her family diminishes with each unsuccessful marriage. ++ Madagascar's population consists of 18 main ethnic groups, all of whom speak the same Malagasy language. Most Malagasy are multi-ethnic, however, reflecting the island's diversity of settlers and historical contacts (see Background). Madagascar's legacy of hierarchical societies practicing domestic slavery (most notably the Merina Kingdom of the 16th to the 19th century) is evident today in persistent class tension, with some ethnic groups maintaining a caste system. Slave descendants are vulnerable to unequal access to education and jobs, despite Madagascar's constitutional guarantee of free compulsory primary education and its being party to several international conventions on human rights. Historical distinctions also remain between central highlanders and coastal people."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -259,14 +259,11 @@
       "text": "44.3% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 12.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 87.9% of population / rural: 36.3% of population / total: 55.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "63.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "44.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 12.1% of population / rural: 63.7% of population / total: 44.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -279,14 +276,11 @@
       "text": "0.2 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 57.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 42.5% of population / rural: 16.6% of population / total: 26.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "83.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "73.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 57.5% of population / rural: 83.4% of population / total: 73.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -413,7 +407,7 @@
         "text": "previous 1992; latest passed by referendum 17 November 2010, promulgated 11 December 2010"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic in consultation with the cabinet or supported by a least two thirds of both the Senate and National Assembly membership; passage requires at least three-fourths approval of both the Senate and National Assembly and approval in a referendum; constitutional articles, including the form and powers of government, the sovereignty of the state, and the autonomy of Madagascar’s collectivities, cannot be amended"
+        "text": "proposed by the president of the republic in consultation with the cabinet or supported by a least two thirds of both the Senate and National Assembly membership; passage requires at least three-fourths approval of both the Senate and National Assembly and approval in a referendum; constitutional articles, including the form and powers of government, the sovereignty of the state, and the autonomy of Madagascar's collectivities, cannot be amended"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -458,13 +452,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate or Antenimieran-Doholona (reestablished on 22 January 2016, following the December 2015 senatorial election) (63 seats; 42 members indirectly elected by an electoral college of municipal, communal, regional, and provincial leaders and 21 appointed by the president of the republic; members serve 5-year terms)National Assembly or Antenimierampirenena (151 seats; 87 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 64 directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed-list proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate or Antenimieran-Doholona (reestablished on 22 January 2016, following the December 2015 senatorial election) (63 seats; 42 members indirectly elected by an electoral college of municipal, communal, regional, and provincial leaders and 21 appointed by the president of the republic; members serve 5-year terms) ++ National Assembly or Antenimierampirenena (151 seats; 87 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 64 directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed-list proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held 29 December 2015 (next to be held in 2021)National Assembly - last held on 27 May 2019 (next to be held in 2024)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held 29 December 2015 (next to be held in 2021) ++ National Assembly - last held on 27 May 2019 (next to be held in 2024)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - HVM 34, TIM 3, MAPAR 2, LEADER-Fanilo 1, independent 2, appointed by the president 21; composition - men 51, women 12, percent of women 19%National Assembly - percent of vote by party -Independent Pro-HVM 18%, MAPAR 17%, MAPAR pro-HVM 16%, VPM-MMM 10%, VERTS 3%, LEADER FANILO 3%, HIARAKA ISIKA 3%, GPS/ARD 7%,  INDEPENDENT 9%, TAMBATRA 1%, TIM 13%;  composition - men 120, women 31, percent of women 20.5%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 20.1%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - HVM 34, TIM 3, MAPAR 2, LEADER-Fanilo 1, independent 2, appointed by the president 21; composition - men 51, women 12, percent of women 19% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party -Independent Pro-HVM 18%, MAPAR 17%, MAPAR pro-HVM 16%, VPM-MMM 10%, VERTS 3%, LEADER FANILO 3%, HIARAKA ISIKA 3%, GPS/ARD 7%,  INDEPENDENT 9%, TAMBATRA 1%, TIM 13%;  composition - men 120, women 31, percent of women 20.5%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 20.1%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -479,7 +473,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Economic liberalism and democratic action for national recovery or LEADER FANILO [Jean Max RAKOTOMAMONJY]FOMBA [Ny Rado RAFALIMANANA]Gideons fighting against poverty in Madagascar (Gedeona Miady amin'ny Fahantrana eto Madagascar) or GFFM [Andre Christian Dieu Donne MAILHOL]Green party or VERTS (Antoko Maintso) [Alexandre GEORGET]I Love Madagascar (Tiako I Madagasikara) or TIM [Marc RAVALOMANANA]Malagasy aware (Malagasy Tonga Saina) or MTS [Roland RATSIRAKA]Malagasy raising together (Malagasy Miara-Miainga) or MMM [Hajo ANDRIANAINARIVELO]New Force for Madagascar (Hery Vaovao ho an'ny Madagasikara) or HVM [Hery Martial RAJAONARIMAMPIANINA Rakotoarimanana]Total Refoundation of Madagascar (Refondation Totale de Madagascar) or RTM [Joseph Martin RANDRIAMAMPIONONA]Vanguard for the renovation of Madagascar (Avant-Garde pour la renovation de Madagascar) or AREMA [Didier RATSIRAKA]Young Malagasies Determined (Malagasy: Tanora malaGasy Vonona) or TGV [Andry RAJOELINA]and MAPAR [Andry RAJOELINA], and IRD (We are all with Andy Rajoelina) [Andry RAJOELINA]"
+      "text": "Economic liberalism and democratic action for national recovery or LEADER FANILO [Jean Max RAKOTOMAMONJY] ++ FOMBA [Ny Rado RAFALIMANANA] ++ Gideons fighting against poverty in Madagascar (Gedeona Miady amin'ny Fahantrana eto Madagascar) or GFFM [Andre Christian Dieu Donne MAILHOL] ++ Green party or VERTS (Antoko Maintso) [Alexandre GEORGET] ++ I Love Madagascar (Tiako I Madagasikara) or TIM [Marc RAVALOMANANA] ++ Malagasy aware (Malagasy Tonga Saina) or MTS [Roland RATSIRAKA] ++ Malagasy raising together (Malagasy Miara-Miainga) or MMM [Hajo ANDRIANAINARIVELO] ++ New Force for Madagascar (Hery Vaovao ho an'ny Madagasikara) or HVM [Hery Martial RAJAONARIMAMPIANINA Rakotoarimanana] ++ Total Refoundation of Madagascar (Refondation Totale de Madagascar) or RTM [Joseph Martin RANDRIAMAMPIONONA] ++ Vanguard for the renovation of Madagascar (Avant-Garde pour la renovation de Madagascar) or AREMA [Didier RATSIRAKA] ++ Young Malagasies Determined (Malagasy: Tanora malaGasy Vonona) or TGV [Andry RAJOELINA]and MAPAR [Andry RAJOELINA], and IRD (We are all with Andy Rajoelina) [Andry RAJOELINA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CD, COMESA, EITI (candidate country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, InOC, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -538,7 +532,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Madagascar is a mostly unregulated economy with many untapped natural resources, but no capital markets, a weak judicial system, poorly enforced contracts, and rampant government corruption. The country faces challenges to improve education, healthcare, and the environment to boost long-term economic growth. Agriculture, including fishing and forestry, is a mainstay of the economy, accounting for more than one-fourth of GDP and employing roughly 80% of the population. Deforestation and erosion, aggravated by bushfires, slash-and-burn clearing techniques, and the use of firewood as the primary source of fuel, are serious concerns to the agriculture dependent economy. After discarding socialist economic policies in the mid-1990s, Madagascar followed a World Bank- and IMF-led policy of privatization and liberalization until a 2009 coup d’état led many nations, including the United States, to suspend non-humanitarian aid until a democratically-elected president was inaugurated in 2014. The pre-coup strategy had placed the country on a slow and steady growth path from an extremely low starting point. Exports of apparel boomed after gaining duty-free access to the US market in 2000 under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); however, Madagascar's failure to comply with the requirements of the AGOA led to the termination of the country's duty-free access in January 2010, a sharp fall in textile production, a loss of more than 100,000 jobs, and a GDP drop of nearly 11%. Madagascar regained AGOA access in January 2015 and ensuing growth has been slow and fragile. Madagascar produces around 80% of the world’s vanilla and its reliance on this commodity for most of its foreign exchange is a significant source of vulnerability. Economic reforms have been modest and the country’s financial sector remains weak, limiting the use of monetary policy to control inflation. An ongoing IMF program aims to strengthen financial and investment management capacity."
+      "text": "Madagascar is a mostly unregulated economy with many untapped natural resources, but no capital markets, a weak judicial system, poorly enforced contracts, and rampant government corruption. The country faces challenges to improve education, healthcare, and the environment to boost long-term economic growth. Agriculture, including fishing and forestry, is a mainstay of the economy, accounting for more than one-fourth of GDP and employing roughly 80% of the population. Deforestation and erosion, aggravated by bushfires, slash-and-burn clearing techniques, and the use of firewood as the primary source of fuel, are serious concerns to the agriculture dependent economy. ++ After discarding socialist economic policies in the mid-1990s, Madagascar followed a World Bank- and IMF-led policy of privatization and liberalization until a 2009 coup d'état led many nations, including the United States, to suspend non-humanitarian aid until a democratically-elected president was inaugurated in 2014. The pre-coup strategy had placed the country on a slow and steady growth path from an extremely low starting point. Exports of apparel boomed after gaining duty-free access to the US market in 2000 under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); however, Madagascar's failure to comply with the requirements of the AGOA led to the termination of the country's duty-free access in January 2010, a sharp fall in textile production, a loss of more than 100,000 jobs, and a GDP drop of nearly 11%. ++ Madagascar regained AGOA access in January 2015 and ensuing growth has been slow and fragile. Madagascar produces around 80% of the world's vanilla and its reliance on this commodity for most of its foreign exchange is a significant source of vulnerability. Economic reforms have been modest and the country's financial sector remains weak, limiting the use of monetary policy to control inflation. An ongoing IMF program aims to strengthen financial and investment management capacity."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$39.85 billion (2017 est.) / $38.25 billion (2016 est.) / $36.72 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/mi.json

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 33.5% (includes Church of Central Africa Presbyterian 14.2%, Seventh Day Adventist/Baptist 9.4%, Pentecostal 7.6%, Anglican 2.3%), Roman Catholic 17.2%, other Christian 26.6%, Muslim 13.8%, traditionalist 1.1%, other 5.6%, none 2.1% (2018 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Malawi has made great improvements in maternal and child health, but has made less progress in reducing its high fertility rate. In both rural and urban areas, very high proportions of mothers are receiving prenatal care and skilled birth assistance, and most children are being vaccinated. Malawi’s fertility rate, however, has only declined slowly, decreasing from more than 7 children per woman in the 1980s to about 5.5 today. Nonetheless, Malawians prefer smaller families than in the past, and women are increasingly using contraceptives to prevent or space pregnancies. Rapid population growth and high population density is putting pressure on Malawi’s land, water, and forest resources. Reduced plot sizes and increasing vulnerability to climate change, further threaten the sustainability of Malawi’s agriculturally based economy and will worsen food shortages. About 80% of the population is employed in agriculture.\nHistorically, Malawians migrated abroad in search of work, primarily to South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe, but international migration became uncommon after the 1970s, and most migration in recent years has been internal. During the colonial period, Malawians regularly migrated to southern Africa as contract farm laborers, miners, and domestic servants. In the decade and a half after independence in 1964, the Malawian Government sought to transform its economy from one dependent on small-scale farms to one based on estate agriculture. The resulting demand for wage labor induced more than 300,000 Malawians to return home between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. In recent times, internal migration has generally been local, motivated more by marriage than economic reasons."
+      "text": "Malawi has made great improvements in maternal and child health, but has made less progress in reducing its high fertility rate. In both rural and urban areas, very high proportions of mothers are receiving prenatal care and skilled birth assistance, and most children are being vaccinated. Malawi's fertility rate, however, has only declined slowly, decreasing from more than 7 children per woman in the 1980s to about 5.5 today. Nonetheless, Malawians prefer smaller families than in the past, and women are increasingly using contraceptives to prevent or space pregnancies. Rapid population growth and high population density is putting pressure on Malawi's land, water, and forest resources. Reduced plot sizes and increasing vulnerability to climate change, further threaten the sustainability of Malawi's agriculturally based economy and will worsen food shortages. About 80% of the population is employed in agriculture. ++ Historically, Malawians migrated abroad in search of work, primarily to South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe, but international migration became uncommon after the 1970s, and most migration in recent years has been internal. During the colonial period, Malawians regularly migrated to southern Africa as contract farm laborers, miners, and domestic servants. In the decade and a half after independence in 1964, the Malawian Government sought to transform its economy from one dependent on small-scale farms to one based on estate agriculture. The resulting demand for wage labor induced more than 300,000 Malawians to return home between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. In recent times, internal migration has generally been local, motivated more by marriage than economic reasons."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "59.2% (2015/16)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 4.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 95.9% of population / rural: 87.3% of population / total: 88.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "12.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "11.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 4.1% of population / rural: 12.7% of population / total: 11.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "1.3 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 41.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 58.2% of population / rural: 35.9% of population / total: 39.6% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "64.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "60.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 41.8% of population / rural: 64.1% of population / total: 60.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -455,7 +449,7 @@
         "text": "president directly elected by simple majority popular vote for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 23 June 2020 (next to be held in 2025)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Lazarus CHAKWERA elected president; Lazarus CHAKWERA (MCP) 59.3%, Peter Mutharika (DPP) 39.9%, other 0.7%        "
+        "text": "Lazarus CHAKWERA elected president; Lazarus CHAKWERA (MCP) 59.3%, Peter Mutharika (DPP) 39.9%, other 0.7% ++        "
       }
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
@@ -481,7 +475,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Progressive Party or DPP [Peter MUTHARIKA]Malawi Congress Party or MCP [Lazarus CHAKWERA]Peoples Party or PP [Joyce BANDA]United Democratic Front or UDF [Atupele MULUZI]United Transformation Movement or UTM [Saulos CHILIMA]"
+      "text": "Democratic Progressive Party or DPP [Peter MUTHARIKA] ++ Malawi Congress Party or MCP [Lazarus CHAKWERA] ++ Peoples Party or PP [Joyce BANDA] ++ United Democratic Front or UDF [Atupele MULUZI] ++ United Transformation Movement or UTM [Saulos CHILIMA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CD, COMESA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINURSO, MONUSCO, NAM, OPCW, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -537,7 +531,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Landlocked Malawi ranks among the world's least developed countries. The country’s economic performance has historically been constrained by policy inconsistency, macroeconomic instability, poor infrastructure, rampant corruption, high population growth, and poor health and education outcomes that limit labor productivity. The economy is predominately agricultural with about 80% of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture accounts for about one-third of GDP and 80% of export revenues. The performance of the tobacco sector is key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half of exports, although Malawi is looking to diversify away from tobacco to other cash crops. The economy depends on substantial inflows of economic assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor nations. Donors halted direct budget support from 2013 to 2016 because of concerns about corruption and fiscal carelessness, but the World Bank resumed budget support in May 2017. In 2006, Malawi was approved for relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program but recent increases in domestic borrowing mean that debt servicing in 2016 exceeded the levels prior to HIPC debt relief. Heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with corn being the staple crop, Malawi’s economy was hit hard by the El Nino-driven drought in 2015 and 2016, and now faces threat from the fall armyworm. The drought also slowed economic activity, led to two consecutive years of declining economic growth, and contributed to high inflation rates. Depressed food prices over 2017 led to a significant drop in inflation (from an average of 21.7% in 2016 to 12.3% in 2017), with a similar drop in interest rates."
+      "text": "Landlocked Malawi ranks among the world's least developed countries. The country's economic performance has historically been constrained by policy inconsistency, macroeconomic instability, poor infrastructure, rampant corruption, high population growth, and poor health and education outcomes that limit labor productivity. The economy is predominately agricultural with about 80% of the population living in rural areas. Agriculture accounts for about one-third of GDP and 80% of export revenues. The performance of the tobacco sector is key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half of exports, although Malawi is looking to diversify away from tobacco to other cash crops. ++ The economy depends on substantial inflows of economic assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor nations. Donors halted direct budget support from 2013 to 2016 because of concerns about corruption and fiscal carelessness, but the World Bank resumed budget support in May 2017. In 2006, Malawi was approved for relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program but recent increases in domestic borrowing mean that debt servicing in 2016 exceeded the levels prior to HIPC debt relief. ++ Heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with corn being the staple crop, Malawi's economy was hit hard by the El Nino-driven drought in 2015 and 2016, and now faces threat from the fall armyworm. The drought also slowed economic activity, led to two consecutive years of declining economic growth, and contributed to high inflation rates. Depressed food prices over 2017 led to a significant drop in inflation (from an average of 21.7% in 2016 to 12.3% in 2017), with a similar drop in interest rates."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$22.42 billion (2017 est.) / $21.56 billion (2016 est.) / $21.08 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -900,7 +894,7 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Malawi Defense Force (MDF): Army (includes Air Wing, Marine Unit); note - a 2017 amendment to Malawi’s Defense Force Act established a separate Army, Air Force, and Maritime Force within the MDF, but these services have yet to develop independent budgets, chains of command, and training institutions (2019)"
+      "text": "Malawi Defense Force (MDF): Army (includes Air Wing, Marine Unit); note - a 2017 amendment to Malawi's Defense Force Act established a separate Army, Air Force, and Maritime Force within the MDF, but these services have yet to develop independent budgets, chains of command, and training institutions (2019)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "text": "0.9% of GDP (2019) / 0.9% of GDP (2018) / 0.8% of GDP (2017) / 0.6% of GDP (2016) / 0.6% of GDP (2015)"

africa/ml.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Present-day Mali is named for the Mali Empire that at its peak in the 14th century covered an area about twice the size of modern-day France and stretched to the west coast of Africa. In the late 19th century, France seized control of Mali. The Sudanese Republic and Senegal became independent of France in 1960 as the Mali Federation. When Senegal withdrew after only a few months, what formerly made up the Sudanese Republic was renamed Mali. Rule by dictatorship was brought to a close in 1991 by a military coup that ushered in a period of democratic rule. President Alpha Oumar KONARE won Mali's first two democratic presidential elections in 1992 and 1997. In keeping with Mali's two-term constitutional limit, he stepped down in 2002 and was succeeded by Amadou Toumani TOURE, who was elected to a second term in a 2007 election that was widely judged to be free and fair. Malian returnees from Libya in 2011 exacerbated tensions in northern Mali, and Tuareg ethnic militias rebelled in January 2012. Low- and mid-level soldiers, frustrated with the poor handling of the rebellion, overthrew TOURE on 22 March. Intensive mediation efforts led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) returned power to a civilian administration in April with the appointment of Interim President Dioncounda TRAORE. The post-coup chaos led to rebels expelling the Malian military from the country's three northern regions and allowed Islamic militants to set up strongholds. Hundreds of thousands of northern Malians fled the violence to southern Mali and neighboring countries, exacerbating regional food shortages in host communities. A French-led international military intervention to retake the three northern regions began in January 2013 and within a month, most of the north had been retaken. In a democratic presidential election conducted in July and August of 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar KEITA was elected president. The Malian Government and northern armed groups signed an internationally mediated peace accord in June 2015, however, the parties to the peace accord have made little progress in the accord's implementation, despite a June 2017 target for its completion. Furthermore, extremist groups outside the peace process made steady inroads into rural areas of central Mali following the consolidation of three major terrorist organizations in March 2017. In central and northern Mali, terrorist groups have exploited age-old ethnic rivalries between pastoralists and sedentary communities and inflicted serious losses on the Malian military. Intercommunal violence incidents such as targeted killings occur with increasing regularity. KEITA was reelected president in 2018 in an election that was deemed credible by international observers, despite some security and logistic shortfalls."
+      "text": "Present-day Mali is named for the Mali Empire that at its peak in the 14th century covered an area about twice the size of modern-day France and stretched to the west coast of Africa. In the late 19th century, France seized control of Mali. The Sudanese Republic and Senegal became independent of France in 1960 as the Mali Federation. When Senegal withdrew after only a few months, what formerly made up the Sudanese Republic was renamed Mali. Rule by dictatorship was brought to a close in 1991 by a military coup that ushered in a period of democratic rule. President Alpha Oumar KONARE won Mali's first two democratic presidential elections in 1992 and 1997. In keeping with Mali's two-term constitutional limit, he stepped down in 2002 and was succeeded by Amadou Toumani TOURE, who was elected to a second term in a 2007 election that was widely judged to be free and fair. Malian returnees from Libya in 2011 exacerbated tensions in northern Mali, and Tuareg ethnic militias rebelled in January 2012. Low- and mid-level soldiers, frustrated with the poor handling of the rebellion, overthrew TOURE on 22 March. Intensive mediation efforts led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) returned power to a civilian administration in April with the appointment of Interim President Dioncounda TRAORE. ++ The post-coup chaos led to rebels expelling the Malian military from the country's three northern regions and allowed Islamic militants to set up strongholds. Hundreds of thousands of northern Malians fled the violence to southern Mali and neighboring countries, exacerbating regional food shortages in host communities. A French-led international military intervention to retake the three northern regions began in January 2013 and within a month, most of the north had been retaken. In a democratic presidential election conducted in July and August of 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar KEITA was elected president. The Malian Government and northern armed groups signed an internationally mediated peace accord in June 2015, however, the parties to the peace accord have made little progress in the accord's implementation, despite a June 2017 target for its completion. Furthermore, extremist groups outside the peace process made steady inroads into rural areas of central Mali following the consolidation of three major terrorist organizations in March 2017. In central and northern Mali, terrorist groups have exploited age-old ethnic rivalries between pastoralists and sedentary communities and inflicted serious losses on the Malian military. Intercommunal violence incidents such as targeted killings occur with increasing regularity. KEITA was reelected president in 2018 in an election that was deemed credible by international observers, despite some security and logistic shortfalls. ++ ++"
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 93.9%, Christian 2.8%, animist .7%, none 2.5% (2018 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Mali’s total population is expected to double by 2035; its capital Bamako is one of the fastest-growing cities in Africa. A young age structure, a declining mortality rate, and a sustained high total fertility rate of 6 children per woman – the third highest in the world – ensure continued rapid population growth for the foreseeable future. Significant outmigration only marginally tempers this growth. Despite decreases, Mali’s infant, child, and maternal mortality rates remain among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa because of limited access to and adoption of family planning, early childbearing, short birth intervals, the prevalence of female genital cutting, infrequent use of skilled birth attendants, and a lack of emergency obstetrical and neonatal care.\nMali’s high total fertility rate has been virtually unchanged for decades, as a result of the ongoing preference for large families, early childbearing, the lack of female education and empowerment, poverty, and extremely low contraceptive use. Slowing Mali’s population growth by lowering its birth rate will be essential for poverty reduction, improving food security, and developing human capital and the economy.\nMali has a long history of seasonal migration and emigration driven by poverty, conflict, demographic pressure, unemployment, food insecurity, and droughts. Many Malians from rural areas migrate during the dry period to nearby villages and towns to do odd jobs or to adjoining countries to work in agriculture or mining. Pastoralists and nomads move seasonally to southern Mali or nearby coastal states. Others migrate long term to Mali’s urban areas, Cote d’Ivoire, other neighboring countries, and in smaller numbers to France, Mali’s former colonial ruler. Since the early 1990s, Mali’s role has grown as a transit country for regional migration flows and illegal migration to Europe. Human smugglers and traffickers exploit the same regional routes used for moving contraband drugs, arms, and cigarettes.\nBetween early 2012 and 2013, renewed fighting in northern Mali between government forces and Tuareg secessionists and their Islamist allies, a French-led international military intervention, as well as chronic food shortages, caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malians. Most of those displaced domestically sought shelter in urban areas of southern Mali, except for pastoralist and nomadic groups, who abandoned their traditional routes, gave away or sold their livestock, and dispersed into the deserts of northern Mali or crossed into neighboring countries. Almost all Malians who took refuge abroad (mostly Tuareg and Maure pastoralists) stayed in the region, largely in Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso."
+      "text": "Mali's total population is expected to double by 2035; its capital Bamako is one of the fastest-growing cities in Africa. A young age structure, a declining mortality rate, and a sustained high total fertility rate of 6 children per woman – the third highest in the world – ensure continued rapid population growth for the foreseeable future. Significant outmigration only marginally tempers this growth. Despite decreases, Mali's infant, child, and maternal mortality rates remain among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa because of limited access to and adoption of family planning, early childbearing, short birth intervals, the prevalence of female genital cutting, infrequent use of skilled birth attendants, and a lack of emergency obstetrical and neonatal care. ++ Mali's high total fertility rate has been virtually unchanged for decades, as a result of the ongoing preference for large families, early childbearing, the lack of female education and empowerment, poverty, and extremely low contraceptive use. Slowing Mali's population growth by lowering its birth rate will be essential for poverty reduction, improving food security, and developing human capital and the economy. ++ Mali has a long history of seasonal migration and emigration driven by poverty, conflict, demographic pressure, unemployment, food insecurity, and droughts. Many Malians from rural areas migrate during the dry period to nearby villages and towns to do odd jobs or to adjoining countries to work in agriculture or mining. Pastoralists and nomads move seasonally to southern Mali or nearby coastal states. Others migrate long term to Mali's urban areas, Cote d'Ivoire, other neighboring countries, and in smaller numbers to France, Mali's former colonial ruler. Since the early 1990s, Mali's role has grown as a transit country for regional migration flows and illegal migration to Europe. Human smugglers and traffickers exploit the same regional routes used for moving contraband drugs, arms, and cigarettes. ++ Between early 2012 and 2013, renewed fighting in northern Mali between government forces and Tuareg secessionists and their Islamist allies, a French-led international military intervention, as well as chronic food shortages, caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malians. Most of those displaced domestically sought shelter in urban areas of southern Mali, except for pastoralist and nomadic groups, who abandoned their traditional routes, gave away or sold their livestock, and dispersed into the deserts of northern Mali or crossed into neighboring countries. Almost all Malians who took refuge abroad (mostly Tuareg and Maure pastoralists) stayed in the region, largely in Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "17.2% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.1% of population / rural: 72.8% of population / total: 82.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "27.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "17.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.9% of population / rural: 27.2% of population / total: 17.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "0.1 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 17.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 82.5% of population / rural: 34.1% of population / total: 54.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "65.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "45.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 17.5% of population / rural: 65.9% of population / total: 45.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -460,7 +454,7 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "unicameral National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (147 seats; members directly elected in single and multi-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; 13 seats reserved for citizens living abroad; members serve 5-year terms)note - the National Assembly was dissolved on 18 August 2020 following a military coup and the resignation of President KEITA"
+        "text": "unicameral National Assembly or Assemblee Nationale (147 seats; members directly elected in single and multi-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; 13 seats reserved for citizens living abroad; members serve 5-year terms) ++ note - the National Assembly was dissolved on 18 August 2020 following a military coup and the resignation of President KEITA"
       },
       "elections": {
         "text": "last held on 30 March and 19 April 2020 (prior to the August 2020 coup, the next election was scheduled to be held in 2025)"
@@ -481,7 +475,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence or SADI [Oumar MARIKO]Alliance for Democracy in Mali-Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity, and Justice or ADEMA-PASJ [Tiemoko SANGARE]Alliance for Democracy and Progress or ADP-Maliba [Amadou THIAM]Alliance for the Solidarity of Mali-Convergence of Patriotic Forces or ASMA-CFP [Soumeylou Boubeye MAIGA]Alternative Forces for Renewal and Emergence or FARE [Modibo SIDIBE]Convergence for the Development of Mali or CODEM [Housseyni Amion GUINDO]Democratic Alliance for Peace or ADP-Maliba [Aliou Boubacar DIALLO]Economic and Social Development Party or PDES [Jamille BITTAR]Front for Democracy and the Republic or FDR (coalition of smaller opposition parties)National Congress for Democratic Initiative or CNID [Mountaga TALL]Party for National Renewal or PARENA [Tiebile DRAME]Patriotic Movement for Renewal or MPR [Choguel Kokalla MAIGA]Rally for Mali or RPM [Boucary TRETA]Union for Republic and Democracy or URD [Younoussi TOURE]"
+      "text": "African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence or SADI [Oumar MARIKO] ++ Alliance for Democracy in Mali-Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity, and Justice or ADEMA-PASJ [Tiemoko SANGARE] ++ Alliance for Democracy and Progress or ADP-Maliba [Amadou THIAM] ++ Alliance for the Solidarity of Mali-Convergence of Patriotic Forces or ASMA-CFP [Soumeylou Boubeye MAIGA] ++ Alternative Forces for Renewal and Emergence or FARE [Modibo SIDIBE] ++ Convergence for the Development of Mali or CODEM [Housseyni Amion GUINDO] ++ Democratic Alliance for Peace or ADP-Maliba [Aliou Boubacar DIALLO] ++ Economic and Social Development Party or PDES [Jamille BITTAR] ++ Front for Democracy and the Republic or FDR (coalition of smaller opposition parties) ++ National Congress for Democratic Initiative or CNID [Mountaga TALL] ++ Party for National Renewal or PARENA [Tiebile DRAME] ++ Patriotic Movement for Renewal or MPR [Choguel Kokalla MAIGA] ++ Rally for Mali or RPM [Boucary TRETA] ++ Union for Republic and Democracy or URD [Younoussi TOURE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CD, ECOWAS, EITI (compliant country), FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNWTO, UPU, WADB (regional), WAEMU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -540,7 +534,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Among the 25 poorest countries in the world, landlocked Mali depends on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue. The country's fiscal status fluctuates with gold and agricultural commodity prices and the harvest; cotton and gold exports make up around 80% of export earnings. Mali remains dependent on foreign aid. Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River; about 65% of Mali’s land area is desert or semidesert. About 10% of the population is nomadic and about 80% of the labor force is engaged in farming and fishing. Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. The government subsidizes the production of cereals to decrease the country’s dependence on imported foodstuffs and to reduce its vulnerability to food price shocks. Mali is developing its iron ore extraction industry to diversify foreign exchange earnings away from gold, but the pace will depend on global price trends. Although the political coup in 2012 slowed Mali’s growth, the economy has since bounced back, with GDP growth above 5% in 2014-17, although physical insecurity, high population growth, corruption, weak infrastructure, and low levels of human capital continue to constrain economic development. Higher rainfall helped to boost cotton output in 2017, and the country’s 2017 budget increased spending more than 10%, much of which was devoted to infrastructure and agriculture. Corruption and political turmoil are strong downside risks in 2018 and beyond."
+      "text": "Among the 25 poorest countries in the world, landlocked Mali depends on gold mining and agricultural exports for revenue. The country's fiscal status fluctuates with gold and agricultural commodity prices and the harvest; cotton and gold exports make up around 80% of export earnings. Mali remains dependent on foreign aid. ++ Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger River; about 65% of Mali's land area is desert or semidesert. About 10% of the population is nomadic and about 80% of the labor force is engaged in farming and fishing. Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. The government subsidizes the production of cereals to decrease the country's dependence on imported foodstuffs and to reduce its vulnerability to food price shocks. ++ Mali is developing its iron ore extraction industry to diversify foreign exchange earnings away from gold, but the pace will depend on global price trends. Although the political coup in 2012 slowed Mali's growth, the economy has since bounced back, with GDP growth above 5% in 2014-17, although physical insecurity, high population growth, corruption, weak infrastructure, and low levels of human capital continue to constrain economic development. Higher rainfall helped to boost cotton output in 2017, and the country's 2017 budget increased spending more than 10%, much of which was devoted to infrastructure and agriculture. Corruption and political turmoil are strong downside risks in 2018 and beyond."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$41.22 billion (2017 est.) / $39.1 billion (2016 est.) / $36.97 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -893,7 +887,7 @@
     "Military and security forces": {
       "text": "Malian Armed Forces (FAMa): Army (Armee de Terre), Republic of Mali Air Force (Force Aerienne de la Republique du Mali, FARM); National Gendarmerie; National Guard (Garde National du Mali) (2019)",
       "note": {
-        "text": "note(s): the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared between the MDAC and the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protectionthe Gendarmerie's primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areasthe National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; it has special units on camels (the Camel Corps) for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali"
+        "text": "note(s): the Gendarmerie and the National Guard are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs (Ministere De La Defense Et Des Anciens Combattants, MDAC), but operational control is shared between the MDAC and the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection ++ the Gendarmerie's primary mission is internal security and public order; its duties also include territorial defense, humanitarian operations, intelligence gathering, and protecting private property, mainly in rural areas ++ the National Guard is a military force responsible for providing security to government facilities and institutions, prison service, public order, humanitarian operations, some border security, and intelligence gathering; it has special units on camels (the Camel Corps) for patrolling the deserts and borders of northern Mali"
       }
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
@@ -909,7 +903,7 @@
       "text": "18 years of age for selective compulsory and voluntary military service (men and women); 2-year conscript service obligation (2014)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "prior to the August 2020 coup, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants since 2017, the FAMa, along with other government security and paramilitary forces, has conducted multiple major operations against militants in the eastern, central, and northern parts of the country; up to 4,000 troops reportedly have been deployed; the stated objectives for the most recent operation (Operation Maliko in early 2020) was to end terrorist activity and restore government authority in seven of the country’s 10 regions, including Mopti, Ségou, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Taoudénit, and Timbuktu Mali is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane  the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of March 2020, MINUSMA had around 15,500 military, police, and civilian personnel deployedthe European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) also has operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; as of August 2020, the mission included more than 600 personnel from 28 European countries (2020)"
+      "text": "prior to the August 2020 coup, the Malian military had intervened in the political arena at least five times since the country gained independence in 1960; two attempts failed (1976 and 1978), while three succeeded (1968, 1991, and 2012); the military collapsed in 2012 during the fighting against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants ++ since 2017, the FAMa, along with other government security and paramilitary forces, has conducted multiple major operations against militants in the eastern, central, and northern parts of the country; up to 4,000 troops reportedly have been deployed; the stated objectives for the most recent operation (Operation Maliko in early 2020) was to end terrorist activity and restore government authority in seven of the country's 10 regions, including Mopti, Ségou, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Taoudénit, and Timbuktu Mali is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane  ++ the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has operated in the country since 2013; the Mission's responsibilities include providing security, rebuilding Malian security forces, supporting national political dialogue, and assisting in the reestablishment of Malian government authority; as of March 2020, MINUSMA had around 15,500 military, police, and civilian personnel deployed ++ the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-M) also has operated in the country since 2013; the EUTM-M provides advice and training to the Malian Armed Forces and military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; as of August 2020, the mission included more than 600 personnel from 28 European countries (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {

africa/mo.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "In 788, about a century after the Arab conquest of North Africa, a series of Moroccan Muslim dynasties began to rule in Morocco. In the 16th century, the Sa'adi monarchy, particularly under Ahmad al-MANSUR (1578-1603), repelled foreign invaders and inaugurated a golden age. The Alaouite Dynasty, to which the current Moroccan royal family belongs, dates from the 17th century. In 1860, Spain occupied northern Morocco and ushered in a half-century of trade rivalry among European powers that saw Morocco's sovereignty steadily erode; in 1912, the French imposed a protectorate over the country. A protracted independence struggle with France ended successfully in 1956. The internationalized city of Tangier and most Spanish possessions were turned over to the new country that same year. Sultan MOHAMMED V, the current monarch's grandfather, organized the new state as a constitutional monarchy and in 1957 assumed the title of king. Since Spain's 1976 withdrawal from what is today called Western Sahara, Morocco has extended its de facto administrative control to roughly 75% of this territory; however, the UN does not recognize Morocco as the administering power for Western Sahara. The UN since 1991 has monitored a cease-fire between Morocco and the Polisario Front - an organization advocating the territory’s independence - and restarted negotiations over the status of the territory in December 2018. King MOHAMMED VI in early 2011 responded to the spread of pro-democracy protests in the region by implementing a reform program that included a new constitution, passed by popular referendum in July 2011, under which some new powers were extended to parliament and the prime minister, but ultimate authority remains in the hands of the monarch. In November 2011, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) - a moderate Islamist party - won the largest number of seats in parliamentary elections, becoming the first Islamist party to lead the Moroccan Government. In September 2015, Morocco held its first direct elections for regional councils, one of the reforms included in the 2011 constitution. The PJD again won the largest number of seats in nationwide parliamentary elections in October 2016."
+      "text": "In 788, about a century after the Arab conquest of North Africa, a series of Moroccan Muslim dynasties began to rule in Morocco. In the 16th century, the Sa'adi monarchy, particularly under Ahmad al-MANSUR (1578-1603), repelled foreign invaders and inaugurated a golden age. The Alaouite Dynasty, to which the current Moroccan royal family belongs, dates from the 17th century. In 1860, Spain occupied northern Morocco and ushered in a half-century of trade rivalry among European powers that saw Morocco's sovereignty steadily erode; in 1912, the French imposed a protectorate over the country. A protracted independence struggle with France ended successfully in 1956. The internationalized city of Tangier and most Spanish possessions were turned over to the new country that same year. Sultan MOHAMMED V, the current monarch's grandfather, organized the new state as a constitutional monarchy and in 1957 assumed the title of king. Since Spain's 1976 withdrawal from what is today called Western Sahara, Morocco has extended its de facto administrative control to roughly 75% of this territory; however, the UN does not recognize Morocco as the administering power for Western Sahara. The UN since 1991 has monitored a cease-fire between Morocco and the Polisario Front - an organization advocating the territory's independence - and restarted negotiations over the status of the territory in December 2018. ++ King MOHAMMED VI in early 2011 responded to the spread of pro-democracy protests in the region by implementing a reform program that included a new constitution, passed by popular referendum in July 2011, under which some new powers were extended to parliament and the prime minister, but ultimate authority remains in the hands of the monarch. In November 2011, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) - a moderate Islamist party - won the largest number of seats in parliamentary elections, becoming the first Islamist party to lead the Moroccan Government. In September 2015, Morocco held its first direct elections for regional councils, one of the reforms included in the 2011 constitution. The PJD again won the largest number of seats in nationwide parliamentary elections in October 2016."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 99% (official; virtually all Sunni, <0.1% Shia), other 1% (includes Christian, Jewish, and Baha'i); note - Jewish about 6,000 (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Morocco is undergoing a demographic transition. Its population is growing but at a declining rate, as people live longer and women have fewer children. Infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been reduced through better health care, nutrition, hygiene, and vaccination coverage, although disparities between urban and rural and rich and poor households persist. Morocco’s shrinking child cohort reflects the decline of its total fertility rate from 5 in mid-1980s to 2.2 in 2010, which is a result of increased female educational attainment, higher contraceptive use, delayed marriage, and the desire for smaller families. Young adults (persons aged 15-29) make up almost 26% of the total population and represent a potential economic asset if they can be gainfully employed. Currently, however, many youths are unemployed because Morocco’s job creation rate has not kept pace with the growth of its working-age population. Most youths who have jobs work in the informal sector with little security or benefits.\nDuring the second half of the 20th century, Morocco became one of the world’s top emigration countries, creating large, widely dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe. The Moroccan Government has encouraged emigration since its independence in 1956, both to secure remittances for funding national development and as an outlet to prevent unrest in rebellious (often Berber) areas. Although Moroccan labor migrants earlier targeted Algeria and France, the flood of Moroccan \"guest workers\" from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s spread widely across northwestern Europe to fill unskilled jobs in the booming manufacturing, mining, construction, and agriculture industries. Host societies and most Moroccan migrants expected this migration to be temporary, but deteriorating economic conditions in Morocco related to the 1973 oil crisis and tighter European immigration policies resulted in these stays becoming permanent.\nA wave of family migration followed in the 1970s and 1980s, with a growing number of second generation Moroccans opting to become naturalized citizens of their host countries. Spain and Italy emerged as new destination countries in the mid-1980s, but their introduction of visa restrictions in the early 1990s pushed Moroccans increasingly to migrate either legally by marrying Moroccans already in Europe or illegally to work in the underground economy. Women began to make up a growing share of these labor migrants. At the same time, some higher-skilled Moroccans went to the US and Quebec, Canada.\nIn the mid-1990s, Morocco developed into a transit country for asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan Africa and illegal labor migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia trying to reach Europe via southern Spain, Spain’s Canary Islands, or Spain’s North African enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla. Forcible expulsions by Moroccan and Spanish security forces have not deterred these illegal migrants or calmed Europe’s security concerns. Rabat remains unlikely to adopt an EU agreement to take back third-country nationals who have entered the EU illegally via Morocco. Thousands of other illegal migrants have chosen to stay in Morocco until they earn enough money for further travel or permanently as a \"second-best\" option. The launching of a regularization program in 2014 legalized the status of some migrants and granted them equal access to education, health care, and work, but xenophobia and racism remain obstacles."
+      "text": "Morocco is undergoing a demographic transition. Its population is growing but at a declining rate, as people live longer and women have fewer children. Infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have been reduced through better health care, nutrition, hygiene, and vaccination coverage, although disparities between urban and rural and rich and poor households persist. Morocco's shrinking child cohort reflects the decline of its total fertility rate from 5 in mid-1980s to 2.2 in 2010, which is a result of increased female educational attainment, higher contraceptive use, delayed marriage, and the desire for smaller families. Young adults (persons aged 15-29) make up almost 26% of the total population and represent a potential economic asset if they can be gainfully employed. Currently, however, many youths are unemployed because Morocco's job creation rate has not kept pace with the growth of its working-age population. Most youths who have jobs work in the informal sector with little security or benefits. ++ During the second half of the 20th century, Morocco became one of the world's top emigration countries, creating large, widely dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe. The Moroccan Government has encouraged emigration since its independence in 1956, both to secure remittances for funding national development and as an outlet to prevent unrest in rebellious (often Berber) areas. Although Moroccan labor migrants earlier targeted Algeria and France, the flood of Moroccan \"guest workers\" from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s spread widely across northwestern Europe to fill unskilled jobs in the booming manufacturing, mining, construction, and agriculture industries. Host societies and most Moroccan migrants expected this migration to be temporary, but deteriorating economic conditions in Morocco related to the 1973 oil crisis and tighter European immigration policies resulted in these stays becoming permanent. ++ A wave of family migration followed in the 1970s and 1980s, with a growing number of second generation Moroccans opting to become naturalized citizens of their host countries. Spain and Italy emerged as new destination countries in the mid-1980s, but their introduction of visa restrictions in the early 1990s pushed Moroccans increasingly to migrate either legally by marrying Moroccans already in Europe or illegally to work in the underground economy. Women began to make up a growing share of these labor migrants. At the same time, some higher-skilled Moroccans went to the US and Quebec, Canada. ++ In the mid-1990s, Morocco developed into a transit country for asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan Africa and illegal labor migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia trying to reach Europe via southern Spain, Spain's Canary Islands, or Spain's North African enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla. Forcible expulsions by Moroccan and Spanish security forces have not deterred these illegal migrants or calmed Europe's security concerns. Rabat remains unlikely to adopt an EU agreement to take back third-country nationals who have entered the EU illegally via Morocco. Thousands of other illegal migrants have chosen to stay in Morocco until they earn enough money for further travel or permanently as a \"second-best\" option. The launching of a regularization program in 2014 legalized the status of some migrants and granted them equal access to education, health care, and work, but xenophobia and racism remain obstacles."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -264,14 +264,11 @@
       "text": "70.8% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.3% of population / rural: 79.1% of population / total: 91% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "20.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.7% of population / rural: 20.9% of population / total: 9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -284,14 +281,11 @@
       "text": "1 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99.1% of population / rural: 81.1% of population / total: 92.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "18.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "7.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.9% of population / rural: 18.9% of population / total: 7.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -454,13 +448,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Chamber of Advisors (120 seats; members indirectly elected by an electoral college of local councils, professional organizations, and labor unions; members serve 6-year terms) Chamber of Representatives (395 seats; 305 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 90 directly elected in a single nationwide constituency by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms); note - in the national constituency, 60 seats are reserved for women and 30 reserved for those under age 40"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Chamber of Advisors (120 seats; members indirectly elected by an electoral college of local councils, professional organizations, and labor unions; members serve 6-year terms) ++ Chamber of Representatives (395 seats; 305 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 90 directly elected in a single nationwide constituency by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms); note - in the national constituency, 60 seats are reserved for women and 30 reserved for those under age 40"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Chamber of Advisors - last held on 2 October 2015 (next to be held in fall 2021) Chamber of Representatives - last held on 7 October 2016 (next to be held in fall 2021)"
+        "text": "Chamber of Advisors - last held on 2 October 2015 (next to be held in fall 2021) ++ Chamber of Representatives - last held on 7 October 2016 (next to be held in fall 2021)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Chamber of Advisors - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 106, women 14, percent of women 11.7% Chamber of Representatives - percent of vote by party NA; seats by party - PJD 125, PAM 102, PI 46, RNI 37, MP 27, USFP 20, UC 19, PPS 12, MDS 3, other 4; composition - men 314, women 81, percent of women 20.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 18.4%"
+        "text": "Chamber of Advisors - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 106, women 14, percent of women 11.7% ++ Chamber of Representatives - percent of vote by party NA; seats by party - PJD 125, PAM 102, PI 46, RNI 37, MP 27, USFP 20, UC 19, PPS 12, MDS 3, other 4; composition - men 314, women 81, percent of women 20.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 18.4%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -475,7 +469,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Action Party or PA [Mohammed EL IDRISSI]Amal (hope) Party [Mohamed BANI]An-Nahj Ad-Dimocrati or An-Nahj [Mustapha BRAHMA]Authenticity and Modernity Party or PAM [Ilyas al-OMARI]Constitutional Union Party or UC [Mohamed SAJID]Democratic and Social Movement or MDS [Abdessamad ARCHANE]Democratic Forces Front or FFD [Mustapha BENALI]Democratic Oath Party or SDDemocratic Socialist Vanguard Party or PADS [Abderrahman BENAMROU]Democratic Society Party [Zhour CHAKKAFI]Environment and Development Party or PED [Karim HRITAN]Green Left Party [Mohamed FARES]Istiqlal (Independence) Party or PI [Nizar BARAKA]Ittihadi National Congress or CNI [Abdesalam EL AZIZ]Labor Party or PTMoroccan Liberal Party or PML [Mohammed ZIANE]Moroccan Union for Democracy or UMD [Jamal MANDRI]National Rally of Independents or RNI [Aziz AKHANNOUCH]Neo-Democrats Party [Mohamed DARIF]Party of Development Reform or PRD [Abderrahmane EL KOHEN]Party of Justice and Development or PJD [Saad Eddine al-OTHMANI]Party of Liberty and Social Justice [Miloud MOUSSAOUI]Popular Movement or MP [Mohand LAENSER]Progress and Socialism Party or PPS [Nabil BENABDELLAH]Renaissance and Virtue Party [Mohamed KHALIDI]Renaissance Party [Said EL GHENNIOUI]Renewal and Equity Party or PRE [Chakir ACHEHABAR]Shoura (consultation) and Istiqlal Party [Ahmed BELGHAZI]Social Center Party or PCS [Lahcen MADIH]Socialist Party [Abdelmajid BOUZOUBAA]Socialist Union of Popular Forces or USFP [Driss LACHGAR]Unified Socialist Party or GSU [Nabila MOUNIB]Unity and Democracy Party [Ahmed FITRI]"
+      "text": "Action Party or PA [Mohammed EL IDRISSI] ++ Amal (hope) Party [Mohamed BANI] ++ An-Nahj Ad-Dimocrati or An-Nahj [Mustapha BRAHMA] ++ Authenticity and Modernity Party or PAM [Ilyas al-OMARI] ++ Constitutional Union Party or UC [Mohamed SAJID] ++ Democratic and Social Movement or MDS [Abdessamad ARCHANE] ++ Democratic Forces Front or FFD [Mustapha BENALI] ++ Democratic Oath Party or SD ++ Democratic Socialist Vanguard Party or PADS [Abderrahman BENAMROU] ++ Democratic Society Party [Zhour CHAKKAFI] ++ Environment and Development Party or PED [Karim HRITAN] ++ Green Left Party [Mohamed FARES] ++ Istiqlal (Independence) Party or PI [Nizar BARAKA] ++ Ittihadi National Congress or CNI [Abdesalam EL AZIZ] ++ Labor Party or PT ++ Moroccan Liberal Party or PML [Mohammed ZIANE] ++ Moroccan Union for Democracy or UMD [Jamal MANDRI] ++ National Rally of Independents or RNI [Aziz AKHANNOUCH] ++ Neo-Democrats Party [Mohamed DARIF] ++ Party of Development Reform or PRD [Abderrahmane EL KOHEN] ++ Party of Justice and Development or PJD [Saad Eddine al-OTHMANI] ++ Party of Liberty and Social Justice [Miloud MOUSSAOUI] ++ Popular Movement or MP [Mohand LAENSER] ++ Progress and Socialism Party or PPS [Nabil BENABDELLAH] ++ Renaissance and Virtue Party [Mohamed KHALIDI] ++ Renaissance Party [Said EL GHENNIOUI] ++ Renewal and Equity Party or PRE [Chakir ACHEHABAR] ++ Shoura (consultation) and Istiqlal Party [Ahmed BELGHAZI] ++ Social Center Party or PCS [Lahcen MADIH] ++ Socialist Party [Abdelmajid BOUZOUBAA] ++ Socialist Union of Popular Forces or USFP [Driss LACHGAR] ++ Unified Socialist Party or GSU [Nabila MOUNIB] ++ Unity and Democracy Party [Ahmed FITRI]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AMU, CAEU, CD, EBRD, FAO, G-11, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, MONUSCO, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OIF, OPCW, OSCE (partner), Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club (associate), PCA, SICA (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNOCI, UNSC (temporary), UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -537,7 +531,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Morocco has capitalized on its proximity to Europe and relatively low labor costs to work towards building a diverse, open, market-oriented economy. Key sectors of the economy include agriculture, tourism, aerospace, automotive, phosphates, textiles, apparel, and subcomponents. Morocco has increased investment in its port, transportation, and industrial infrastructure to position itself as a center and broker for business throughout Africa. Industrial development strategies and infrastructure improvements - most visibly illustrated by a new port and free trade zone near Tangier - are improving Morocco's competitiveness. In the 1980s, Morocco was a heavily indebted country before pursuing austerity measures and pro-market reforms, overseen by the IMF. Since taking the throne in 1999, King MOHAMMED VI has presided over a stable economy marked by steady growth, low inflation, and gradually falling unemployment, although poor harvests and economic difficulties in Europe contributed to an economic slowdown. To boost exports, Morocco entered into a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2006 and an Advanced Status agreement with the EU in 2008. In late 2014, Morocco eliminated subsidies for gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil, dramatically reducing outlays that weighed on the country’s budget and current account. Subsidies on butane gas and certain food products remain in place. Morocco also seeks to expand its renewable energy capacity with a goal of making renewable more than 50% of installed electricity generation capacity by 2030. Despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Key economic challenges for Morocco include reforming the education system and the judiciary."
+      "text": "Morocco has capitalized on its proximity to Europe and relatively low labor costs to work towards building a diverse, open, market-oriented economy. Key sectors of the economy include agriculture, tourism, aerospace, automotive, phosphates, textiles, apparel, and subcomponents. Morocco has increased investment in its port, transportation, and industrial infrastructure to position itself as a center and broker for business throughout Africa. Industrial development strategies and infrastructure improvements - most visibly illustrated by a new port and free trade zone near Tangier - are improving Morocco's competitiveness. ++ In the 1980s, Morocco was a heavily indebted country before pursuing austerity measures and pro-market reforms, overseen by the IMF. Since taking the throne in 1999, King MOHAMMED VI has presided over a stable economy marked by steady growth, low inflation, and gradually falling unemployment, although poor harvests and economic difficulties in Europe contributed to an economic slowdown. To boost exports, Morocco entered into a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2006 and an Advanced Status agreement with the EU in 2008. In late 2014, Morocco eliminated subsidies for gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil, dramatically reducing outlays that weighed on the country's budget and current account. Subsidies on butane gas and certain food products remain in place. Morocco also seeks to expand its renewable energy capacity with a goal of making renewable more than 50% of installed electricity generation capacity by 2030. ++ Despite Morocco's economic progress, the country suffers from high unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Key economic challenges for Morocco include reforming the education system and the judiciary."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$298.6 billion (2017 est.) / $286.8 billion (2016 est.) / $283.6 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/mp.json

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
       "text": "Hindu 48.5%, Roman Catholic 26.3%, Muslim 17.3%, other Christian 6.4%, other 0.6%, none 0.7%, unspecified 0.1% (2011 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Mauritius has transitioned from a country of high fertility and high mortality rates in the 1950s and mid-1960s to one with among the lowest population growth rates in the developing world today. After World War II, Mauritius’ population began to expand quickly due to increased fertility and a dramatic drop in mortality rates as a result of improved health care and the eradication of malaria. This period of heightened population growth – reaching about 3% a year – was followed by one of the world’s most rapid birth rate declines.\nThe total fertility rate fell from 6.2 children per women in 1963 to 3.2 in 1972 – largely the result of improved educational attainment, especially among young women, accompanied by later marriage and the adoption of family planning methods. The family planning programs’ success was due to support from the government and eventually the traditionally pronatalist religious communities, which both recognized that controlling population growth was necessary because of Mauritius’ small size and limited resources. Mauritius’ fertility rate has consistently been below replacement level since the late 1990s, a rate that is substantially lower than nearby countries in southern Africa.\nWith no indigenous population, Mauritius’ ethnic mix is a product of more than two centuries of European colonialism and continued international labor migration. Sugar production relied on slave labor mainly from Madagascar, Mozambique, and East Africa from the early 18th century until its abolition in 1835, when slaves were replaced with indentured Indians. Most of the influx of indentured labor – peaking between the late 1830s and early 1860 – settled permanently creating massive population growth of more than 7% a year and reshaping the island’s social and cultural composition. While Indians represented about 12% of Mauritius’ population in 1837, they and their descendants accounted for roughly two-thirds by the end of the 19th century. Most were Hindus, but the majority of the free Indian traders were Muslims.\nMauritius again turned to overseas labor when its success in clothing and textile exports led to a labor shortage in the mid-1980s. Clothing manufacturers brought in contract workers (increasingly women) from China, India, and, to a lesser extent Bangladesh and Madagascar, who worked longer hours for lower wages under poor conditions and were viewed as more productive than locals. Downturns in the sugar and textile industries in the mid-2000s and a lack of highly qualified domestic workers for Mauritius’ growing services sector led to the emigration of low-skilled workers and a reliance on skilled foreign labor. Since 2007, Mauritius has pursued a circular migration program to enable citizens to acquire new skills and savings abroad and then return home to start businesses and to invest in the country’s development."
+      "text": "Mauritius has transitioned from a country of high fertility and high mortality rates in the 1950s and mid-1960s to one with among the lowest population growth rates in the developing world today. After World War II, Mauritius' population began to expand quickly due to increased fertility and a dramatic drop in mortality rates as a result of improved health care and the eradication of malaria. This period of heightened population growth – reaching about 3% a year – was followed by one of the world's most rapid birth rate declines. ++ The total fertility rate fell from 6.2 children per women in 1963 to 3.2 in 1972 – largely the result of improved educational attainment, especially among young women, accompanied by later marriage and the adoption of family planning methods. The family planning programs' success was due to support from the government and eventually the traditionally pronatalist religious communities, which both recognized that controlling population growth was necessary because of Mauritius' small size and limited resources. Mauritius' fertility rate has consistently been below replacement level since the late 1990s, a rate that is substantially lower than nearby countries in southern Africa. ++ With no indigenous population, Mauritius' ethnic mix is a product of more than two centuries of European colonialism and continued international labor migration. Sugar production relied on slave labor mainly from Madagascar, Mozambique, and East Africa from the early 18th century until its abolition in 1835, when slaves were replaced with indentured Indians. Most of the influx of indentured labor – peaking between the late 1830s and early 1860 – settled permanently creating massive population growth of more than 7% a year and reshaping the island's social and cultural composition. While Indians represented about 12% of Mauritius' population in 1837, they and their descendants accounted for roughly two-thirds by the end of the 19th century. Most were Hindus, but the majority of the free Indian traders were Muslims. ++ Mauritius again turned to overseas labor when its success in clothing and textile exports led to a labor shortage in the mid-1980s. Clothing manufacturers brought in contract workers (increasingly women) from China, India, and, to a lesser extent Bangladesh and Madagascar, who worked longer hours for lower wages under poor conditions and were viewed as more productive than locals. Downturns in the sugar and textile industries in the mid-2000s and a lack of highly qualified domestic workers for Mauritius' growing services sector led to the emigration of low-skilled workers and a reliance on skilled foreign labor. Since 2007, Mauritius has pursued a circular migration program to enable citizens to acquire new skills and savings abroad and then return home to start businesses and to invest in the country's development."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -256,14 +256,11 @@
       "text": "63.8% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -276,14 +273,11 @@
       "text": "3.4 beds/1,000 population (2019)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99.9% of population / rural: 99.2% of population / total: 99.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.1% of population / rural: 0.8% of population / total: 0.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -456,7 +450,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance Lepep (Alliance of the People) [Pravind JUGNAUTH] (coalition includes MSM and ML)Labor Party (Parti Travailliste) or PTR or MLP [Navinchandra RAMGOOLAM]Mauritian Militant Movement (Mouvement Militant Mauricien) or MMM [Paul BERENGER]Mauritian Social Democratic Party (Parti Mauricien Social Democrate) or PMSD [Xavier Luc DUVAL]Mauritian Solidarity Front (Front Solidarite Mauricienne) or FSM [Cehl FAKEERMEEAH, aka Cehl MEEAH]Militant Socialist Movement (Mouvement Socialist Mauricien) or MSM [Pravind JUGNAUTH]Muvman Liberater or ML [Ivan COLLENDAVELLOO]Patriotic Movement (Mouvement Patriotic) [Alan GANOO]Rodrigues Peoples Organization (Organisation du Peuple Rodriguais) or OPR [Serge CLAIR]"
+      "text": "Alliance Lepep (Alliance of the People) [Pravind JUGNAUTH] (coalition includes MSM and ML) ++ Labor Party (Parti Travailliste) or PTR or MLP [Navinchandra RAMGOOLAM] ++ Mauritian Militant Movement (Mouvement Militant Mauricien) or MMM [Paul BERENGER] ++ Mauritian Social Democratic Party (Parti Mauricien Social Democrate) or PMSD [Xavier Luc DUVAL] ++ Mauritian Solidarity Front (Front Solidarite Mauricienne) or FSM [Cehl FAKEERMEEAH, aka Cehl MEEAH] ++ Militant Socialist Movement (Mouvement Socialist Mauricien) or MSM [Pravind JUGNAUTH] ++ Muvman Liberater or ML [Ivan COLLENDAVELLOO] ++ Patriotic Movement (Mouvement Patriotic) [Alan GANOO] ++ Rodrigues Peoples Organization (Organisation du Peuple Rodriguais) or OPR [Serge CLAIR]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AOSIS, AU, C, CD, COMESA, CPLP (associate), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, InOC, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, SAARC (observer), SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -515,7 +509,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Since independence in 1968, Mauritius has undergone a remarkable economic transformation from a low-income, agriculturally based economy to a diversified, upper middle-income economy with growing industrial, financial, and tourist sectors. Mauritius has achieved steady growth over the last several decades, resulting in more equitable income distribution, increased life expectancy, lowered infant mortality, and a much-improved infrastructure.   The economy currently depends on sugar, tourism, textiles and apparel, and financial services, but is expanding into fish processing, information and communications technology, education, and hospitality and property development. Sugarcane is grown on about 90% of the cultivated land area but sugar makes up only around 3-4% of national GDP. Authorities plan to emphasize services and innovation in the coming years. After several years of slow growth, government policies now seek to stimulate economic growth in five areas: serving as a gateway for international investment into Africa; increasing the use of renewable energy; developing smart cities; growing the ocean economy; and upgrading and modernizing infrastructure, including public transportation, the port, and the airport.   Mauritius has attracted more than 32,000 offshore entities, many aimed at commerce in India, South Africa, and China. The Mauritius International Financial Center is under scrutiny by international bodies promoting fair tax competition and Mauritius has been cooperating with the European Union and the United states in the automatic exchange of account information. Mauritius is also a member of the OECD/G20’s Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and is under pressure to review its Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements. The offshore sector is vulnerable to changes in the tax framework and authorities have been working on a Financial Services Sector Blueprint to enable Mauritius to transition to a jurisdiction of higher value added. Mauritius’ textile sector has taken advantage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, a preferential trade program that allows duty free access to the US market, with Mauritian exports to the US growing by 35.6 % from 2000 to 2014. However, lack of local labor as well as rising labor costs eroding the competitiveness of textile firms in Mauritius.   Mauritius' sound economic policies and prudent banking practices helped mitigate negative effects of the global financial crisis in 2008-09. GDP grew in the 3-4% per year range in 2010-17, and the country continues to expand its trade and investment outreach around the globe. Growth in the US and Europe fostered goods and services exports, including tourism, while lower oil prices kept inflation low. Mauritius continues to rank as one of the most business-friendly environments on the continent and passed a Business Facilitation Act to improve competitiveness and long-term growth prospects. A new National Economic Development Board was set up in 2017-2018 to spearhead efforts to promote exports and attract inward investment."
+      "text": "Since independence in 1968, Mauritius has undergone a remarkable economic transformation from a low-income, agriculturally based economy to a diversified, upper middle-income economy with growing industrial, financial, and tourist sectors. Mauritius has achieved steady growth over the last several decades, resulting in more equitable income distribution, increased life expectancy, lowered infant mortality, and a much-improved infrastructure. ++   ++ The economy currently depends on sugar, tourism, textiles and apparel, and financial services, but is expanding into fish processing, information and communications technology, education, and hospitality and property development. Sugarcane is grown on about 90% of the cultivated land area but sugar makes up only around 3-4% of national GDP. Authorities plan to emphasize services and innovation in the coming years. After several years of slow growth, government policies now seek to stimulate economic growth in five areas: serving as a gateway for international investment into Africa; increasing the use of renewable energy; developing smart cities; growing the ocean economy; and upgrading and modernizing infrastructure, including public transportation, the port, and the airport. ++   ++ Mauritius has attracted more than 32,000 offshore entities, many aimed at commerce in India, South Africa, and China. The Mauritius International Financial Center is under scrutiny by international bodies promoting fair tax competition and Mauritius has been cooperating with the European Union and the United states in the automatic exchange of account information. Mauritius is also a member of the OECD/G20's Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and is under pressure to review its Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements. The offshore sector is vulnerable to changes in the tax framework and authorities have been working on a Financial Services Sector Blueprint to enable Mauritius to transition to a jurisdiction of higher value added. Mauritius' textile sector has taken advantage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, a preferential trade program that allows duty free access to the US market, with Mauritian exports to the US growing by 35.6 % from 2000 to 2014. However, lack of local labor as well as rising labor costs eroding the competitiveness of textile firms in Mauritius. ++   ++ Mauritius' sound economic policies and prudent banking practices helped mitigate negative effects of the global financial crisis in 2008-09. GDP grew in the 3-4% per year range in 2010-17, and the country continues to expand its trade and investment outreach around the globe. Growth in the US and Europe fostered goods and services exports, including tourism, while lower oil prices kept inflation low. Mauritius continues to rank as one of the most business-friendly environments on the continent and passed a Business Facilitation Act to improve competitiveness and long-term growth prospects. A new National Economic Development Board was set up in 2017-2018 to spearhead efforts to promote exports and attract inward investment."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$28.27 billion (2017 est.) / $27.23 billion (2016 est.) / $26.23 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -878,7 +872,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Mauritius is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; Mauritian girls are induced or sold into prostitution, often by peers, family members, or businessmen offering other forms of employment; Mauritian adults have been identified as labor trafficking victims in the UK, Belgium, and Canada, while Mauritian women from Rodrigues Island are also subject to domestic servitude in Mauritius; Malagasy women transit Mauritius en route to the Middle East for jobs as domestic servants and subsequently are subjected to forced labor; Cambodian men are victims of forced labor on foreign fishing vessels in Mauritius’ territorial waters; other migrant workers from East and South Asia and Madagascar are also subject to forced labor in Mauritius’ manufacturing and construction sectors"
+        "text": "Mauritius is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; Mauritian girls are induced or sold into prostitution, often by peers, family members, or businessmen offering other forms of employment; Mauritian adults have been identified as labor trafficking victims in the UK, Belgium, and Canada, while Mauritian women from Rodrigues Island are also subject to domestic servitude in Mauritius; Malagasy women transit Mauritius en route to the Middle East for jobs as domestic servants and subsequently are subjected to forced labor; Cambodian men are victims of forced labor on foreign fishing vessels in Mauritius' territorial waters; other migrant workers from East and South Asia and Madagascar are also subject to forced labor in Mauritius' manufacturing and construction sectors"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Mauritius does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, the government made modest efforts to address child sex trafficking but none related to adult forced labor; law enforcement lacks an understanding of trafficking crimes outside of child sex trafficking, despite increasing evidence of other forms of human trafficking; authorities made no trafficking prosecutions or convictions and made modest efforts to assist a couple of child sex trafficking victims; officials sustained an extensive public awareness campaign to prevent child sex trafficking, but no efforts were made to raise awareness or reduce demand for forced adult or child labor (2015)"

africa/mr.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Berbers moved south into the area of today's Mauritania beginning in the 3rd century. Beginning in the 8th century, Mauritania experienced a slow but constant infiltration of Arabs and Arab influence from the north, pressing the Berbers, who resisted assimilation, to move farther south. One particular Arab group, the Bani Hassan, continued to migrate southward until, by the end of the 17th century, they dominated the entire country. Having finally been defeated, Berber groups turned to clericalism to regain a degree of ascendancy. At the bottom of the social structure were the slaves, subservient to both the Arabic warriors and Islamic Berber holy men. All of the social rivalries were fully exploited by the French as they colonized Mauritania in the late 19th century. Independent from France in 1960, Mauritania annexed the southern third of the former Spanish Sahara (now Western Sahara) in 1976 but relinquished it after three years of raids by the Polisario guerrilla front seeking independence for the territory. Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed TAYA seized power in a coup in 1984 and ruled Mauritania with a heavy hand for more than two decades. A series of presidential elections that he held were widely seen as flawed. A bloodless coup in August 2005 deposed President TAYA and ushered in a military council that oversaw a transition to democratic rule. Independent candidate Sidi Ould Cheikh ABDALLAHI was inaugurated in April 2007 as Mauritania's first freely and fairly elected president. His term ended prematurely in August 2008 when a military junta led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel AZIZ deposed him and installed a military council government. AZIZ was subsequently elected president in 2009 and reelected in 2014 to a second and final term. He was replaced in 2019 by Mohamed Cheikh El GHAZOUANI. The country continues to experience ethnic tensions among three major groups: Arabic-speaking descendants of slaves (Haratines), Arabic-speaking \"White Moors\" (Beydane), and members of Sub-Saharan ethnic groups mostly originating in the Senegal River valley (Halpulaar, Soninke, and Wolof). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a series of attacks in Mauritania between 2005 and 2011, murdering American and foreign tourists and aid workers, attacking diplomatic and government facilities, and ambushing Mauritanian soldiers and gendarmes. A successful strategy against terrorism that combines dialogue with the terrorists and military actions has prevented the country from further terrorist attacks since 2011. However, AQIM and similar groups remain active in neighboring Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel region and continue to pose a threat to Mauritanians and foreign visitors."
+      "text": "Berbers moved south into the area of today's Mauritania beginning in the 3rd century. Beginning in the 8th century, Mauritania experienced a slow but constant infiltration of Arabs and Arab influence from the north, pressing the Berbers, who resisted assimilation, to move farther south. One particular Arab group, the Bani Hassan, continued to migrate southward until, by the end of the 17th century, they dominated the entire country. Having finally been defeated, Berber groups turned to clericalism to regain a degree of ascendancy. At the bottom of the social structure were the slaves, subservient to both the Arabic warriors and Islamic Berber holy men. All of the social rivalries were fully exploited by the French as they colonized Mauritania in the late 19th century. Independent from France in 1960, Mauritania annexed the southern third of the former Spanish Sahara (now Western Sahara) in 1976 but relinquished it after three years of raids by the Polisario guerrilla front seeking independence for the territory. Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed TAYA seized power in a coup in 1984 and ruled Mauritania with a heavy hand for more than two decades. A series of presidential elections that he held were widely seen as flawed. A bloodless coup in August 2005 deposed President TAYA and ushered in a military council that oversaw a transition to democratic rule. Independent candidate Sidi Ould Cheikh ABDALLAHI was inaugurated in April 2007 as Mauritania's first freely and fairly elected president. His term ended prematurely in August 2008 when a military junta led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel AZIZ deposed him and installed a military council government. AZIZ was subsequently elected president in 2009 and reelected in 2014 to a second and final term. He was replaced in 2019 by Mohamed Cheikh El GHAZOUANI. The country continues to experience ethnic tensions among three major groups: Arabic-speaking descendants of slaves (Haratines), Arabic-speaking \"White Moors\" (Beydane), and members of Sub-Saharan ethnic groups mostly originating in the Senegal River valley (Halpulaar, Soninke, and Wolof). ++ Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a series of attacks in Mauritania between 2005 and 2011, murdering American and foreign tourists and aid workers, attacking diplomatic and government facilities, and ambushing Mauritanian soldiers and gendarmes. A successful strategy against terrorism that combines dialogue with the terrorists and military actions has prevented the country from further terrorist attacks since 2011. However, AQIM and similar groups remain active in neighboring Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel region and continue to pose a threat to Mauritanians and foreign visitors."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim (official) 100%"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "With a sustained total fertility rate of about 4 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting. The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals sujbected to forced labor and forced marriage, although many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide. Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012. Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn."
+      "text": "With a sustained total fertility rate of about 4 children per woman and almost 60% of the population under the age of 25, Mauritania's population is likely to continue growing for the foreseeable future. Mauritania's large youth cohort is vital to its development prospects, but available schooling does not adequately prepare students for the workplace. Girls continue to be underrepresented in the classroom, educational quality remains poor, and the dropout rate is high. The literacy rate is only about 50%, even though access to primary education has improved since the mid-2000s. Women's restricted access to education and discriminatory laws maintain gender inequality - worsened by early and forced marriages and female genital cutting. ++ The denial of education to black Moors also helps to perpetuate slavery. Although Mauritania abolished slavery in 1981 (the last country in the world to do so) and made it a criminal offense in 2007, the millenniums-old practice persists largely because anti-slavery laws are rarely enforced and the custom is so ingrained.  According to a 2018 nongovernmental organization's report, a little more than 2% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which includes individuals sujbected to forced labor and forced marriage, although many thousands of individuals who are legally free contend with discrimination, poor education, and a lack of identity papers and, therefore, live in de facto slavery.  The UN and international press outlets have claimed that up to 20% of Mauritania's population is enslaved, which would be the highest rate worldwide. ++ Drought, poverty, and unemployment have driven outmigration from Mauritania since the 1970s. Early flows were directed toward other West African countries, including Senegal, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gambia. The 1989 Mauritania-Senegal conflict forced thousands of black Mauritanians to take refuge in Senegal and pushed labor migrants toward the Gulf, Libya, and Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mauritania has accepted migrants from neighboring countries to fill labor shortages since its independence in 1960 and more recently has received refugees escaping civil wars, including tens of thousands of Tuaregs who fled Mali in 2012. ++ Mauritania was an important transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants moving illegally to North Africa and Europe. In the mid-2000s, as border patrols increased in the Strait of Gibraltar, security increased around Spain's North African enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla), and Moroccan border controls intensified, illegal migration flows shifted from the Western Mediterranean to Spain's Canary Islands. In 2006, departure points moved southward along the West African coast from Morocco and Western Sahara to Mauritania's two key ports (Nouadhibou and the capital Nouakchott), and illegal migration to the Canaries peaked at almost 32,000. The numbers fell dramatically in the following years because of joint patrolling off the West African coast by Frontex (the EU's border protection agency), Spain, Mauritania, and Senegal; the expansion of Spain's border surveillance system; and the 2008 European economic downturn."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "17.8% (2015)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.7% of population / rural: 68.4% of population / total: 84.4% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "31.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "15.6% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.3% of population / rural: 31.6% of population / total: 15.6% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "0.18 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 16.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 83.5% of population / rural: 25.2% of population / total: 56% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "74.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "44% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 16.5% of population / rural: 74.8% of population / total: 44% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -478,7 +472,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for Justice and Democracy/Movement for Renewal or AJD/MR [Ibrahima Moctar SARR]Burst of Youth for the Nation [Lalla Mint CHERIF]Coalition of Majority Parties or CPM (includes UPR, UDP)El Karama Party [Cheikhna Ould Mohamed Ould HAJBOU]El Vadila Party [Ethmane Ould Ahmed ABOULMAALY]National Forum for Democracy and Unity or FNDU [Mohamed Ould MAOLOUD] (coalition of hard-line opposition parties, includes RNRD-TAWASSOUL)National Rally for Reform and Development or RNRD-TAWASSOUL [Mohamed Mahmoud Ould SEYIDI]Party of Unity and Development or PUD [Mohamed BARO]Popular Progressive Alliance or APP [Messaoud Ould BOULKHEIR]Rally of Democratic Forces or RFD [Ahmed Ould DADDAH]Ravah Party [ Mohamed Ould VALL]Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal or PRDR [Mintata Mint HEDEID]Union for Democracy and Progress or UDP [Naha Mint MOUKNASS]Union of Progress Forces [Mohamed Ould MAOULOUD]Union for the Republic or UPR [Seyidna Ali Ould MOHAMED KHOUNA]"
+      "text": "Alliance for Justice and Democracy/Movement for Renewal or AJD/MR [Ibrahima Moctar SARR] ++ Burst of Youth for the Nation [Lalla Mint CHERIF] ++ Coalition of Majority Parties or CPM (includes UPR, UDP) ++ El Karama Party [Cheikhna Ould Mohamed Ould HAJBOU] ++ El Vadila Party [Ethmane Ould Ahmed ABOULMAALY] ++ National Forum for Democracy and Unity or FNDU [Mohamed Ould MAOLOUD] (coalition of hard-line opposition parties, includes RNRD-TAWASSOUL) ++ National Rally for Reform and Development or RNRD-TAWASSOUL [Mohamed Mahmoud Ould SEYIDI] ++ Party of Unity and Development or PUD [Mohamed BARO] ++ Popular Progressive Alliance or APP [Messaoud Ould BOULKHEIR] ++ Rally of Democratic Forces or RFD [Ahmed Ould DADDAH] ++ Ravah Party [ Mohamed Ould VALL] ++ Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal or PRDR [Mintata Mint HEDEID] ++ Union for Democracy and Progress or UDP [Naha Mint MOUKNASS] ++ Union of Progress Forces [Mohamed Ould MAOULOUD] ++ Union for the Republic or UPR [Seyidna Ali Ould MOHAMED KHOUNA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ABEDA, ACP, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AMU, AU, CAEU (candidate), EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO (pending member), ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, MIUSMA, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -505,7 +499,7 @@
         "text": "[222] 4525-2660 or [222] 2660-2663"
       },
       "embassy": {
-        "text": "Avenue Al Quds, Nouadhibou, Nouadhibou Road, Nouakchott  "
+        "text": "Avenue Al Quds, Nouadhibou, Nouadhibou Road, Nouakchott ++  "
       },
       "mailing address": {
         "text": "use embassy street address"
@@ -534,7 +528,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Mauritania's economy is dominated by extractive industries (oil and mines), fisheries, livestock, agriculture, and services. Half the population still depends on farming and raising livestock, even though many nomads and subsistence farmers were forced into the cities by recurrent droughts in the 1970s, 1980s, 2000s, and 2017. Recently, GDP growth has been driven largely by foreign investment in the mining and oil sectors. Mauritania's extensive mineral resources include iron ore, gold, copper, gypsum, and phosphate rock, and exploration is ongoing for tantalum, uranium, crude oil, and natural gas. Extractive commodities make up about three-quarters of Mauritania's total exports, subjecting the economy to price swings in world commodity markets. Mining is also a growing source of government revenue, rising from 13% to 30% of total revenue from 2006 to 2014. The nation's coastal waters are among the richest fishing areas in the world, and fishing accounts for about 15% of budget revenues, 45% of foreign currency earnings. Mauritania processes a total of 1,800,000 tons of fish per year, but overexploitation by foreign and national fleets threaten the sustainability of this key source of revenue. The economy is highly sensitive to international food and extractive commodity prices. Other risks to Mauritania's economy include its recurring droughts, dependence on foreign aid and investment, and insecurity in neighboring Mali, as well as significant shortages of infrastructure, institutional capacity, and human capital. In December 2017, Mauritania and the IMF agreed to a three year agreement under the Extended Credit Facility to foster economic growth, maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce poverty. Investment in agriculture and infrastructure are the largest components of the country’s public expenditures."
+      "text": "Mauritania's economy is dominated by extractive industries (oil and mines), fisheries, livestock, agriculture, and services. Half the population still depends on farming and raising livestock, even though many nomads and subsistence farmers were forced into the cities by recurrent droughts in the 1970s, 1980s, 2000s, and 2017. Recently, GDP growth has been driven largely by foreign investment in the mining and oil sectors. ++ Mauritania's extensive mineral resources include iron ore, gold, copper, gypsum, and phosphate rock, and exploration is ongoing for tantalum, uranium, crude oil, and natural gas. Extractive commodities make up about three-quarters of Mauritania's total exports, subjecting the economy to price swings in world commodity markets. Mining is also a growing source of government revenue, rising from 13% to 30% of total revenue from 2006 to 2014. The nation's coastal waters are among the richest fishing areas in the world, and fishing accounts for about 15% of budget revenues, 45% of foreign currency earnings. Mauritania processes a total of 1,800,000 tons of fish per year, but overexploitation by foreign and national fleets threaten the sustainability of this key source of revenue. ++ The economy is highly sensitive to international food and extractive commodity prices. Other risks to Mauritania's economy include its recurring droughts, dependence on foreign aid and investment, and insecurity in neighboring Mali, as well as significant shortages of infrastructure, institutional capacity, and human capital. In December 2017, Mauritania and the IMF agreed to a three year agreement under the Extended Credit Facility to foster economic growth, maintain macroeconomic stability, and reduce poverty. Investment in agriculture and infrastructure are the largest components of the country's public expenditures."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$17.28 billion (2017 est.) / $16.7 billion (2016 est.) / $16.4 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -923,7 +917,7 @@
       "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2012)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "since a spate of terrorist attacks in the 2000s, including a 2008 attack on a military base in the country’s north that resulted in the deaths of 12 soldiers, the Mauritanian Government has increased the defense budget and military equipment acquisitions, enhanced military training, heightened security cooperation with its neighbors and the international community, and built up the military’s special operations and civil-military affairs forcesMauritania is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger; it has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane (2020)"
+      "text": "since a spate of terrorist attacks in the 2000s, including a 2008 attack on a military base in the country's north that resulted in the deaths of 12 soldiers, the Mauritanian Government has increased the defense budget and military equipment acquisitions, enhanced military training, heightened security cooperation with its neighbors and the international community, and built up the military's special operations and civil-military affairs forces ++ Mauritania is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger; it has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/mz.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "In the first half of the second millennium A.D., northern Mozambican port towns were frequented by traders from Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Arabia, Persia, and India. The Portuguese were able to wrest much of the coastal trade from Arab Muslims in the centuries after 1500 and to set up their own colonies. Portugal did not relinquish Mozambique until 1975. Large-scale emigration, economic dependence on South Africa, a severe drought, and a prolonged civil war hindered the country's development until the mid-1990s. The ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) party formally abandoned Marxism in 1989, and a new constitution the following year provided for multiparty elections and a free market economy. A UN-negotiated peace agreement between FRELIMO and rebel Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) forces ended the fighting in 1992. In 2004, Mozambique underwent a delicate transition as Joaquim CHISSANO stepped down after 18 years in office. His elected successor, Armando GUEBUZA, served two terms and then passed executive power to Filipe NYUSI in 2015. RENAMO’s residual armed forces intermittently engaged in a low-level insurgency after 2012, but a late December 2016 ceasefire eventually led to the two sides signing a comprehensive peace deal in August 2019. Elections in October 2019, challenged by Western observers and civil society as being problematic, resulted in resounding wins for NYUSI and FRELIMO across the country. Since October 2017, violent extremists - who an official ISIS media outlet recognized as ISIS's network in Mozambique for the first time in June 2019 - have been conducting attacks against civilians and security services in the northern province of Cabo Delgado."
+      "text": "In the first half of the second millennium A.D., northern Mozambican port towns were frequented by traders from Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Arabia, Persia, and India. The Portuguese were able to wrest much of the coastal trade from Arab Muslims in the centuries after 1500 and to set up their own colonies. Portugal did not relinquish Mozambique until 1975. Large-scale emigration, economic dependence on South Africa, a severe drought, and a prolonged civil war hindered the country's development until the mid-1990s. The ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) party formally abandoned Marxism in 1989, and a new constitution the following year provided for multiparty elections and a free market economy. A UN-negotiated peace agreement between FRELIMO and rebel Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) forces ended the fighting in 1992. In 2004, Mozambique underwent a delicate transition as Joaquim CHISSANO stepped down after 18 years in office. His elected successor, Armando GUEBUZA, served two terms and then passed executive power to Filipe NYUSI in 2015. RENAMO's residual armed forces intermittently engaged in a low-level insurgency after 2012, but a late December 2016 ceasefire eventually led to the two sides signing a comprehensive peace deal in August 2019. Elections in October 2019, challenged by Western observers and civil society as being problematic, resulted in resounding wins for NYUSI and FRELIMO across the country. Since October 2017, violent extremists - who an official ISIS media outlet recognized as ISIS's network in Mozambique for the first time in June 2019 - have been conducting attacks against civilians and security services in the northern province of Cabo Delgado."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 27.2%, Muslim 18.9%, Zionist Christian 15.6%, Evangelical/Pentecostal 15.3%, Anglican 1.7%, other 4.8%, none 13.9%, unspecified 2.5% (2017 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15. Mozambique’s high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country’s birth rate is among the world’s highest, averaging around more than 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country’s high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth.\nMozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country’s southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment."
+      "text": "Mozambique is a poor, sparsely populated country with high fertility and mortality rates and a rapidly growing youthful population – 45% of the population is younger than 15. Mozambique's high poverty rate is sustained by natural disasters, disease, high population growth, low agricultural productivity, and the unequal distribution of wealth. The country's birth rate is among the world's highest, averaging around more than 5 children per woman (and higher in rural areas) for at least the last three decades. The sustained high level of fertility reflects gender inequality, low contraceptive use, early marriages and childbearing, and a lack of education, particularly among women. The high population growth rate is somewhat restrained by the country's high HIV/AIDS and overall mortality rates. Mozambique ranks among the worst in the world for HIV/AIDS prevalence, HIV/AIDS deaths, and life expectancy at birth. ++ Mozambique is predominantly a country of emigration, but internal, rural-urban migration has begun to grow. Mozambicans, primarily from the country's southern region, have been migrating to South Africa for work for more than a century. Additionally, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled to Malawi, South Africa, and other neighboring countries between 1979 and 1992 to escape from civil war. Labor migrants have usually been men from rural areas whose crops have failed or who are unemployed and have headed to South Africa to work as miners; multiple generations of the same family often become miners. Since the abolition of apartheid in South Africa in 1991, other job opportunities have opened to Mozambicans, including in the informal and manufacturing sectors, but mining remains their main source of employment."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "27.1% (2015)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 6.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 93.2% of population / rural: 58.3% of population / total: 70.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "41.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "29.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 6.8% of population / rural: 41.7% of population / total: 29.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "0.7 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 38.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 61.8% of population (2015 est.) / rural: 18.8% of population / total: 34.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "81.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "65.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 38.2% of population / rural: 81.2% of population / total: 65.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -443,7 +437,7 @@
     },
     "Executive branch": {
       "chief of state": {
-        "text": "President Filipe Jacinto NYUSI (since 15 January 2015, re-elected 15 Oct 2019)   (2019)"
+        "text": "President Filipe Jacinto NYUSI (since 15 January 2015, re-elected 15 Oct 2019) ++   (2019)"
       },
       "head of government": {
         "text": "President Filipe Jacinto NYUSI (since 15 January 2015); Prime Minister Carlos Agostinho DO ROSARIO (since 17 January 2015; reconfirmed DO ROSARIO 17 January 2020) (2020)"
@@ -481,7 +475,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Movement of Mozambique (Movimento Democratico de Mocambique) or MDM [Daviz SIMANGO]Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Liberatacao de Mocambique) or FRELIMO [Filipe NYUSI]Mozambican National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana) or RENAMO [Ossufo MOMADE]Optimistic Party for the Development of Mozambique or Podemos [Helder Mendonca]"
+      "text": "Democratic Movement of Mozambique (Movimento Democratico de Mocambique) or MDM [Daviz SIMANGO] ++ Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Liberatacao de Mocambique) or FRELIMO [Filipe NYUSI] ++ Mozambican National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana) or RENAMO [Ossufo MOMADE] ++ Optimistic Party for the Development of Mozambique or Podemos [Helder Mendonca]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CD, CPLP, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIC, OIF (observer), OPCW, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNISFA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -540,7 +534,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "At independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries. Socialist policies, economic mismanagement, and a brutal civil war from 1977 to 1992 further impoverished the country. In 1987, the government embarked on a series of macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilize the economy. These steps, combined with donor assistance and with political stability since the multi-party elections in 1994, propelled the country’s GDP, in purchasing power parity terms, from $4 billion in 1993 to about $37 billion in 2017. Fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax and reform of the customs service, have improved the government's revenue collection abilities. In spite of these gains, about half the population remains below the poverty line and subsistence agriculture continues to employ the vast majority of the country's work force. Mozambique's once substantial foreign debt was reduced through forgiveness and rescheduling under the IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced HIPC initiatives. However, in 2016, information surfaced revealing that the Mozambican Government was responsible for over $2 billion in government-backed loans secured between 2012-14 by state-owned defense and security companies without parliamentary approval or national budget inclusion; this prompted the IMF and international donors to halt direct budget support to the Government of Mozambique. An international audit was performed on Mozambique’s debt in 2016-17, but debt restructuring and resumption of donor support have yet to occur. Mozambique grew at an average annual rate of 6%-8% in the decade leading up to 2015, one of Africa's strongest performances, but the sizable external debt burden, donor withdrawal, elevated inflation, and currency depreciation contributed to slower growth in 2016-17. Two major International consortiums, led by American companies ExxonMobil and Anadarko, are seeking approval to develop massive natural gas deposits off the coast of Cabo Delgado province, in what has the potential to become the largest infrastructure project in Africa. . The government predicts sales of liquefied natural gas from these projects could generate several billion dollars in revenues annually sometime after 2022."
+      "text": "At independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of the world's poorest countries. Socialist policies, economic mismanagement, and a brutal civil war from 1977 to 1992 further impoverished the country. In 1987, the government embarked on a series of macroeconomic reforms designed to stabilize the economy. These steps, combined with donor assistance and with political stability since the multi-party elections in 1994, propelled the country's GDP, in purchasing power parity terms, from $4 billion in 1993 to about $37 billion in 2017. Fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax and reform of the customs service, have improved the government's revenue collection abilities. In spite of these gains, about half the population remains below the poverty line and subsistence agriculture continues to employ the vast majority of the country's work force. ++ Mozambique's once substantial foreign debt was reduced through forgiveness and rescheduling under the IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced HIPC initiatives. However, in 2016, information surfaced revealing that the Mozambican Government was responsible for over $2 billion in government-backed loans secured between 2012-14 by state-owned defense and security companies without parliamentary approval or national budget inclusion; this prompted the IMF and international donors to halt direct budget support to the Government of Mozambique. An international audit was performed on Mozambique's debt in 2016-17, but debt restructuring and resumption of donor support have yet to occur. ++ Mozambique grew at an average annual rate of 6%-8% in the decade leading up to 2015, one of Africa's strongest performances, but the sizable external debt burden, donor withdrawal, elevated inflation, and currency depreciation contributed to slower growth in 2016-17. ++ Two major International consortiums, led by American companies ExxonMobil and Anadarko, are seeking approval to develop massive natural gas deposits off the coast of Cabo Delgado province, in what has the potential to become the largest infrastructure project in Africa. . The government predicts sales of liquefied natural gas from these projects could generate several billion dollars in revenues annually sometime after 2022."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$37.09 billion (2017 est.) / $35.76 billion (2016 est.) / $34.46 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -923,7 +917,7 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique, FADM): Mozambique Army, Mozambique Navy (Marinha de Guerra de Mocambique, MGM), Mozambique Air Force (Forca Aerea de Mocambique, FAM)Ministry of Interior: National Police (PRM), the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC), Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR; police special forces), Border Security Force (2019)",
+      "text": "Armed Defense Forces of Mozambique (Forcas Armadas de Defesa de Mocambique, FADM): Mozambique Army, Mozambique Navy (Marinha de Guerra de Mocambique, MGM), Mozambique Air Force (Forca Aerea de Mocambique, FAM) ++ Ministry of Interior: National Police (PRM), the National Criminal Investigation Service (SERNIC), Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR; police special forces), Border Security Force (2019)",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: the FADM and Ministry of Interior forces are referred to collectively as the Defense and Security Forces (DFS)"
       }

africa/ng.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "In the late 19th century, the British and French agreed to partition the middle regions of the Niger River into British Nigeria and French Niger. In subsequent decades French administration spread until in 1922 Niger officially became a colony. Following independence from France in 1960, the country experienced single-party and military rule until 1991, when Gen. Ali SAIBOU was forced by public pressure to allow multiparty elections, which resulted in a democratic government in 1993. Political infighting brought the government to a standstill and in 1996 led to a coup by Col. Ibrahim BARE. In 1999, BARE was killed in a counter coup by military officers who restored democratic rule and held elections that brought Mamadou TANDJA to power in December of that year. TANDJA was reelected in 2004 and in 2009 spearheaded a constitutional amendment allowing him to extend his term as president. In February 2010, military officers led a coup that deposed TANDJA and suspended the constitution. ISSOUFOU Mahamadou was elected in April 2011 following the coup and reelected to a second term in early 2016. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world with minimal government services and insufficient funds to develop its resource base, and is ranked last in the world on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index. The largely agrarian and subsistence-based economy is frequently disrupted by extended droughts common to the Sahel region of Africa. The Nigerien Government continues its attempts to diversify the economy through increased oil production and mining projects. A Tuareg rebellion emerged in 2007 and ended in 2009. Niger is facing increased security concerns on its borders from various external threats including insecurity in Libya, spillover from the conflict in Mali, and violent extremism in northeastern Nigeria."
+      "text": "In the late 19th century, the British and French agreed to partition the middle regions of the Niger River into British Nigeria and French Niger. In subsequent decades French administration spread until in 1922 Niger officially became a colony. Following independence from France in 1960, the country experienced single-party and military rule until 1991, when Gen. Ali SAIBOU was forced by public pressure to allow multiparty elections, which resulted in a democratic government in 1993. Political infighting brought the government to a standstill and in 1996 led to a coup by Col. Ibrahim BARE. In 1999, BARE was killed in a counter coup by military officers who restored democratic rule and held elections that brought Mamadou TANDJA to power in December of that year. TANDJA was reelected in 2004 and in 2009 spearheaded a constitutional amendment allowing him to extend his term as president. In February 2010, military officers led a coup that deposed TANDJA and suspended the constitution. ISSOUFOU Mahamadou was elected in April 2011 following the coup and reelected to a second term in early 2016. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world with minimal government services and insufficient funds to develop its resource base, and is ranked last in the world on the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index. The largely agrarian and subsistence-based economy is frequently disrupted by extended droughts common to the Sahel region of Africa. The Nigerien Government continues its attempts to diversify the economy through increased oil production and mining projects. A Tuareg rebellion emerged in 2007 and ended in 2009. Niger is facing increased security concerns on its borders from various external threats including insecurity in Libya, spillover from the conflict in Mali, and violent extremism in northeastern Nigeria."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 99.3%, Christian 0.3%, animist 0.2%, none 0.1% (2012 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2016. A slight decline in fertility over the last few decades has stalled. This leveling off of the high fertility rate is in large part a product of the continued desire for large families. In Niger, the TFR is lower than the desired fertility rate, which makes it unlikely that contraceptive use will increase. The high TFR sustains rapid population growth and a large youth population – almost 70% of the populace is under the age of 25. Gender inequality, including a lack of educational opportunities for women and early marriage and childbirth, also contributes to high population growth.\nBecause of large family sizes, children are inheriting smaller and smaller parcels of land. The dependence of most Nigeriens on subsistence farming on increasingly small landholdings, coupled with declining rainfall and the resultant shrinkage of arable land, are all preventing food production from keeping up with population growth.\nFor more than half a century, Niger's lack of economic development has led to steady net outmigration. In the 1960s, Nigeriens mainly migrated to coastal West African countries to work on a seasonal basis. Some headed to Libya and Algeria in the 1970s to work in the booming oil industry until its decline in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the principal destinations for Nigerien labor migrants have been West African countries, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, while emigration to Europe and North America has remained modest. During the same period, Niger’s desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe.\nMore than 60,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger since violence between Malian government troops and armed rebels began in early 2012. Ongoing attacks by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, dating to 2013 in northern Nigeria and February 2015 in southeastern Niger, have pushed tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees and Nigerien returnees across the border to Niger and to displace thousands of locals in Niger’s already impoverished Diffa region."
+      "text": "Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2016. A slight decline in fertility over the last few decades has stalled. This leveling off of the high fertility rate is in large part a product of the continued desire for large families. In Niger, the TFR is lower than the desired fertility rate, which makes it unlikely that contraceptive use will increase. The high TFR sustains rapid population growth and a large youth population – almost 70% of the populace is under the age of 25. Gender inequality, including a lack of educational opportunities for women and early marriage and childbirth, also contributes to high population growth. ++ Because of large family sizes, children are inheriting smaller and smaller parcels of land. The dependence of most Nigeriens on subsistence farming on increasingly small landholdings, coupled with declining rainfall and the resultant shrinkage of arable land, are all preventing food production from keeping up with population growth. ++ For more than half a century, Niger's lack of economic development has led to steady net outmigration. In the 1960s, Nigeriens mainly migrated to coastal West African countries to work on a seasonal basis. Some headed to Libya and Algeria in the 1970s to work in the booming oil industry until its decline in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the principal destinations for Nigerien labor migrants have been West African countries, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, while emigration to Europe and North America has remained modest. During the same period, Niger's desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe. ++ More than 60,000 Malian refugees have fled to Niger since violence between Malian government troops and armed rebels began in early 2012. Ongoing attacks by the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency, dating to 2013 in northern Nigeria and February 2015 in southeastern Niger, have pushed tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees and Nigerien returnees across the border to Niger and to displace thousands of locals in Niger's already impoverished Diffa region."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -255,14 +255,11 @@
       "text": "11% (2017/18)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 4.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 95.7% of population / rural: 59.2% of population / total: 65.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "40.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "34.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 4.3% of population / rural: 40.8% of population / total: 34.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "0.4 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 23.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 76.6% of population / rural: 12.9% of population / total: 23.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "87.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "76.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 23.4% of population / rural: 87.1% of population / total: 76.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -478,7 +472,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance of Movements for the Emergence of Niger or AMEN AMIN [Omar Hamidou TCHIANA]Congress for the Republic or CPR-Inganci [Kassoum MOCTAR]Democratic Alliance for Niger or ADN-Fusaha [Habi Mahamadou SALISSOU]Democratic and Social Convention-Rahama or CDS-Rahama [Abdou LABO]National Movement for the Development of Society-Nassara or MNSD-Nassara [Seini OUMAROU]Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Progress-Zaman Lahiya or ANDP-Zaman Lahiya [Moussa Moumouni DJERMAKOYE]Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation or MODEN/FA Lumana [Hama AMADOU]Nigerien Movement for Democratic Renewal or MNRD-Hankuri [Mahamane OUSMANE]Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism or PNDS-Tarrayya [Mahamadou ISSOUFOU]Nigerien Patriotic Movement or MPN-Kishin Kassa [Ibrahim YACOUBA]Party for Socialism and Democracy in Niger or PSDN-AlheriPatriotic Movement for the Republic or MPR-Jamhuriya [Albade ABOUBA]Rally for Democracy and Progress-Jama'a or RDP-Jama'a [Hamid ALGABID]Social and Democratic Rally or RSD-Gaskiyya [Amadou CHEIFFOU]Social Democratic Party or PSD-Bassira [Mohamed BEN OMAR]Union for Democracy and the Republic-Tabbat or UDR-Tabbat [Amadou Boubacar CISSE]",
+      "text": "Alliance of Movements for the Emergence of Niger or AMEN AMIN [Omar Hamidou TCHIANA] ++ Congress for the Republic or CPR-Inganci [Kassoum MOCTAR] ++ Democratic Alliance for Niger or ADN-Fusaha [Habi Mahamadou SALISSOU] ++ Democratic and Social Convention-Rahama or CDS-Rahama [Abdou LABO] ++ National Movement for the Development of Society-Nassara or MNSD-Nassara [Seini OUMAROU] ++ Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Progress-Zaman Lahiya or ANDP-Zaman Lahiya [Moussa Moumouni DJERMAKOYE] ++ Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation or MODEN/FA Lumana [Hama AMADOU] ++ Nigerien Movement for Democratic Renewal or MNRD-Hankuri [Mahamane OUSMANE] ++ Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism or PNDS-Tarrayya [Mahamadou ISSOUFOU] ++ Nigerien Patriotic Movement or MPN-Kishin Kassa [Ibrahim YACOUBA] ++ Party for Socialism and Democracy in Niger or PSDN-Alheri ++ Patriotic Movement for the Republic or MPR-Jamhuriya [Albade ABOUBA] ++ Rally for Democracy and Progress-Jama'a or RDP-Jama'a [Hamid ALGABID] ++ Social and Democratic Rally or RSD-Gaskiyya [Amadou CHEIFFOU] ++ Social Democratic Party or PSD-Bassira [Mohamed BEN OMAR] ++ Union for Democracy and the Republic-Tabbat or UDR-Tabbat [Amadou Boubacar CISSE]",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: the SPLM and SPLM-DC are banned political parties"
       }
@@ -540,7 +534,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Niger is a landlocked, Sub-Saharan nation, whose economy centers on subsistence crops, livestock, and some of the world's largest uranium deposits. Agriculture contributes approximately 40% of GDP and provides livelihood for over 80% of the population. The UN ranked Niger as the second least developed country in the world in 2016 due to multiple factors such as food insecurity, lack of industry, high population growth, a weak educational sector, and few prospects for work outside of subsistence farming and herding. Since 2011 public debt has increased due to efforts to scale-up public investment, particularly that related to infrastructure, as well as due to increased security spending. The government relies on foreign donor resources for a large portion of its fiscal budget. The economy in recent years has been hurt by terrorist activity near its uranium mines and by instability in Mali and in the Diffa region of the country; concerns about security have resulted in increased support from regional and international partners on defense. Low uranium prices, demographics, and security expenditures may continue to put pressure on the government’s finances. The Government of Niger plans to exploit oil, gold, coal, and other mineral resources to sustain future growth. Although Niger has sizable reserves of oil, the prolonged drop in oil prices has reduced profitability. Food insecurity and drought remain perennial problems for Niger, and the government plans to invest more in irrigation. Niger’s three-year $131 million IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) agreement for the years 2012-15 was extended until the end of 2016. In February 2017, the IMF approved a new 3-year $134 million ECF. In June 2017, The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) granted Niger $1 billion over three years for IDA18, a program to boost the country’s development and alleviate poverty. A $437 million Millennium Challenge Account compact for Niger, commencing in FY18, will focus on large-scale irrigation infrastructure development and community-based, climate-resilient agriculture, while promoting sustainable increases in agricultural productivity and sales. Formal private sector investment needed for economic diversification and growth remains a challenge, given the country’s limited domestic markets, access to credit, and competitiveness. Although President ISSOUFOU is courting foreign investors, including those from the US, as of April 2017, there were no US firms operating in Niger. In November 2017, the National Assembly passed the 2018 Finance Law that was geared towards raising government revenues and moving away from international support."
+      "text": "Niger is a landlocked, Sub-Saharan nation, whose economy centers on subsistence crops, livestock, and some of the world's largest uranium deposits. Agriculture contributes approximately 40% of GDP and provides livelihood for over 80% of the population. The UN ranked Niger as the second least developed country in the world in 2016 due to multiple factors such as food insecurity, lack of industry, high population growth, a weak educational sector, and few prospects for work outside of subsistence farming and herding. ++ Since 2011 public debt has increased due to efforts to scale-up public investment, particularly that related to infrastructure, as well as due to increased security spending. The government relies on foreign donor resources for a large portion of its fiscal budget. The economy in recent years has been hurt by terrorist activity near its uranium mines and by instability in Mali and in the Diffa region of the country; concerns about security have resulted in increased support from regional and international partners on defense. Low uranium prices, demographics, and security expenditures may continue to put pressure on the government's finances. ++ The Government of Niger plans to exploit oil, gold, coal, and other mineral resources to sustain future growth. Although Niger has sizable reserves of oil, the prolonged drop in oil prices has reduced profitability. Food insecurity and drought remain perennial problems for Niger, and the government plans to invest more in irrigation. Niger's three-year $131 million IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF) agreement for the years 2012-15 was extended until the end of 2016. In February 2017, the IMF approved a new 3-year $134 million ECF. In June 2017, The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) granted Niger $1 billion over three years for IDA18, a program to boost the country's development and alleviate poverty. A $437 million Millennium Challenge Account compact for Niger, commencing in FY18, will focus on large-scale irrigation infrastructure development and community-based, climate-resilient agriculture, while promoting sustainable increases in agricultural productivity and sales. ++ Formal private sector investment needed for economic diversification and growth remains a challenge, given the country's limited domestic markets, access to credit, and competitiveness. Although President ISSOUFOU is courting foreign investors, including those from the US, as of April 2017, there were no US firms operating in Niger. In November 2017, the National Assembly passed the 2018 Finance Law that was geared towards raising government revenues and moving away from international support."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$21.86 billion (2017 est.) / $20.84 billion (2016 est.) / $19.87 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -919,7 +913,7 @@
       "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory or voluntary military service; enlistees must be Nigerien citizens and unmarried; 2-year service term; women may serve in health care (2017)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "as of September 2020, the FAN was conducting counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations against Islamic militants on two fronts; in the Diffa region, the Nigeria-based Boko Haram terrorist group has conducted dozens of attacks on security forces, army bases, and civilians; on Niger’s western border with Mali, the Islamic State-West Africa (ISWA) has conducted numerous attacks on security personnel; a series of ISWA attacks on FAN forces near the Malian border in December of 2019 and January of 2020 resulted in the deaths of more than 170 soldiersNiger is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Chad; it has committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation BarkhaneNiger also has about 1,000 troops committed to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically (2020)"
+      "text": "as of September 2020, the FAN was conducting counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations against Islamic militants on two fronts; in the Diffa region, the Nigeria-based Boko Haram terrorist group has conducted dozens of attacks on security forces, army bases, and civilians; on Niger's western border with Mali, the Islamic State-West Africa (ISWA) has conducted numerous attacks on security personnel; a series of ISWA attacks on FAN forces near the Malian border in December of 2019 and January of 2020 resulted in the deaths of more than 170 soldiers ++ Niger is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Chad; it has committed 1,100 troops and 200 gendarmes to the force; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane ++ Niger also has about 1,000 troops committed to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {

africa/ni.json

@@ -27,6 +27,957 @@
     },
     "Area - comparative": {
       "text": "about six times the size of Georgia; slightly more than twice the size of California"
+    },
+    "Land boundaries": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "4,477 km"
+      },
+      "border countries": {
+        "text": "Benin 809 km, Cameroon 1975 km, Chad 85 km, Niger 1608 km"
+      }
+    },
+    "Coastline": {
+      "text": "853 km"
+    },
+    "Maritime claims": {
+      "territorial sea": {
+        "text": "12 nm"
+      },
+      "exclusive economic zone": {
+        "text": "200 nm"
+      },
+      "continental shelf": {
+        "text": "200-m depth or to the depth of exploitation"
+      }
+    },
+    "Climate": {
+      "text": "varies; equatorial in south, tropical in center, arid in north"
+    },
+    "Terrain": {
+      "text": "southern lowlands merge into central hills and plateaus; mountains in southeast, plains in north"
+    },
+    "Elevation": {
+      "mean elevation": {
+        "text": "380 m"
+      },
+      "lowest point": {
+        "text": "Atlantic Ocean 0 m"
+      },
+      "highest point": {
+        "text": "Chappal Waddi 2,419 m"
+      }
+    },
+    "Natural resources": {
+      "text": "natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, arable land"
+    },
+    "Land use": {
+      "agricultural land": {
+        "text": "78% (2011 est.)"
+      },
+      "arable land / permanent crops / permanent pasture": {
+        "text": "37.3% (2011 est.) / 7.4% (2011 est.) / 33.3% (2011 est.)"
+      },
+      "forest": {
+        "text": "9.5% (2011 est.)"
+      },
+      "other": {
+        "text": "12.5% (2011 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Irrigated land": {
+      "text": "2,930 sq km (2012)"
+    },
+    "Population distribution": {
+      "text": "largest population of any African nation; significant population clusters are scattered throughout the country, with the highest density areas being in the south and southwest as shown in this population distribution map"
+    },
+    "Natural hazards": {
+      "text": "periodic droughts; flooding"
+    },
+    "Environment - current issues": {
+      "text": "serious overpopulation and rapid urbanization have led to numerous environmental problems; urban air and water pollution; rapid deforestation; soil degradation; loss of arable land; oil pollution - water, air, and soil have suffered serious damage from oil spills"
+    },
+    "Environment - international agreements": {
+      "party to": {
+        "text": "Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Marine Life Conservation, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Wetlands"
+      },
+      "signed, but not ratified": {
+        "text": "none of the selected agreements"
+      }
+    },
+    "Geography - note": {
+      "text": "the Niger River enters the country in the northwest and flows southward through tropical rain forests and swamps to its delta in the Gulf of Guinea"
+    }
+  },
+  "People and Society": {
+    "Population": {
+      "text": "214,028,302 (July 2020 est.)",
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: estimates for this country explicitly take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality, higher death rates, lower population growth rates, and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected"
+      }
+    },
+    "Nationality": {
+      "noun": {
+        "text": "Nigerian(s)"
+      },
+      "adjective": {
+        "text": "Nigerian"
+      }
+    },
+    "Ethnic groups": {
+      "text": "Hausa 30%, Yoruba 15.5%, Igbo (Ibo) 15.2%, Fulani 6%, Tiv 2.4%, Kanuri/Beriberi 2.4%, Ibibio 1.8%, Ijaw/Izon 1.8%, other 24.7% (2018 est.)",
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups"
+      }
+    },
+    "Languages": {
+      "text": "English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani, over 500 additional indigenous languages"
+    },
+    "Religions": {
+      "text": "Muslim 53.5%, Roman Catholic 10.6%, other Christian 35.3%, other .6% (2018 est.)"
+    },
+    "Demographic profile": {
+      "text": "Nigeria's population is projected to grow from more than 186 million people in 2016 to 392 million in 2050, becoming the world's fourth most populous country. Nigeria's sustained high population growth rate will continue for the foreseeable future because of population momentum and its high birth rate. Abuja has not successfully implemented family planning programs to reduce and space births because of a lack of political will, government financing, and the availability and affordability of services and products, as well as a cultural preference for large families. Increased educational attainment, especially among women, and improvements in health care are needed to encourage and to better enable parents to opt for smaller families. ++ Nigeria needs to harness the potential of its burgeoning youth population in order to boost economic development, reduce widespread poverty, and channel large numbers of unemployed youth into productive activities and away from ongoing religious and ethnic violence. While most movement of Nigerians is internal, significant emigration regionally and to the West provides an outlet for Nigerians looking for economic opportunities, seeking asylum, and increasingly pursuing higher education. Immigration largely of West Africans continues to be insufficient to offset emigration and the loss of highly skilled workers. Nigeria also is a major source, transit, and destination country for forced labor and sex trafficking."
+    },
+    "Age structure": {
+      "0-14 years": {
+        "text": "41.7% (male 45,571,738/female 43,674,769)"
+      },
+      "15-24 years": {
+        "text": "20.27% (male 22,022,660/female 21,358,753)"
+      },
+      "25-54 years": {
+        "text": "30.6% (male 32,808,913/female 32,686,474)"
+      },
+      "55-64 years": {
+        "text": "4.13% (male 4,327,847/female 4,514,264)"
+      },
+      "65 years and over": {
+        "text": "3.3% (male 3,329,083/female 3,733,801) (2020 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Dependency ratios": {
+      "total dependency ratio": {
+        "text": "86"
+      },
+      "youth dependency ratio": {
+        "text": "80.9"
+      },
+      "elderly dependency ratio": {
+        "text": "5.1"
+      },
+      "potential support ratio": {
+        "text": "19.6 (2020 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Median age": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "18.6 years"
+      },
+      "male": {
+        "text": "18.4 years"
+      },
+      "female": {
+        "text": "18.9 years (2020 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Population growth rate": {
+      "text": "2.53% (2020 est.)"
+    },
+    "Birth rate": {
+      "text": "34.6 births/1,000 population (2020 est.)"
+    },
+    "Death rate": {
+      "text": "9.1 deaths/1,000 population (2020 est.)"
+    },
+    "Net migration rate": {
+      "text": "-0.2 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2020 est.)"
+    },
+    "Population distribution": {
+      "text": "largest population of any African nation; significant population clusters are scattered throughout the country, with the highest density areas being in the south and southwest as shown in this population distribution map"
+    },
+    "Urbanization": {
+      "urban population": {
+        "text": "52% of total population (2020)"
+      },
+      "rate of urbanization": {
+        "text": "4.23% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Major urban areas - population": {
+      "text": "14.368 million Lagos, 3.999 million Kano, 3.552 million Ibadan, 3.278 million ABUJA (capital), 3.020 million Port Harcourt, 1.727 million Benin City (2020)"
+    },
+    "Sex ratio": {
+      "at birth": {
+        "text": "1.06 male(s)/female"
+      },
+      "0-14 years": {
+        "text": "1.04 male(s)/female"
+      },
+      "15-24 years": {
+        "text": "1.03 male(s)/female"
+      },
+      "25-54 years": {
+        "text": "1 male(s)/female"
+      },
+      "55-64 years": {
+        "text": "0.96 male(s)/female"
+      },
+      "65 years and over": {
+        "text": "0.89 male(s)/female"
+      },
+      "total population": {
+        "text": "1.02 male(s)/female (2020 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Mother's mean age at first birth": {
+      "text": "20.3 years (2013 est.)",
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: median age at first birth among women 25-29"
+      }
+    },
+    "Maternal mortality rate": {
+      "text": "917 deaths/100,000 live births (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Infant mortality rate": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "59.8 deaths/1,000 live births"
+      },
+      "male": {
+        "text": "65.4 deaths/1,000 live births"
+      },
+      "female": {
+        "text": "54 deaths/1,000 live births (2020 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Life expectancy at birth": {
+      "total population": {
+        "text": "60.4 years"
+      },
+      "male": {
+        "text": "58.6 years"
+      },
+      "female": {
+        "text": "62.3 years (2020 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Total fertility rate": {
+      "text": "4.72 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
+    },
+    "Contraceptive prevalence rate": {
+      "text": "16.6% (2018)"
+    },
+    "Drinking water source": {
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 92.6% of population / rural: 63.6% of population / total: 77.9% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 7.4% of population / rural: 36.4% of population / total: 22.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Current Health Expenditure": {
+      "text": "3.8% (2017)"
+    },
+    "Physicians density": {
+      "text": "0.45 physicians/1,000 population (2016)"
+    },
+    "Sanitation facility access": {
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 80.2% of population / rural: 39.5% of population / total: 59.7% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 19.8% of population / rural: 60.5% of population / total: 40.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
+      "text": "1.3% (2019 est.)"
+    },
+    "HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS": {
+      "text": "1.8 million (2019 est.)"
+    },
+    "HIV/AIDS - deaths": {
+      "text": "45,000 (2019 est.)"
+    },
+    "Major infectious diseases": {
+      "degree of risk": {
+        "text": "very high (2020)"
+      },
+      "food or waterborne diseases": {
+        "text": "bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, and typhoid fever"
+      },
+      "vectorborne diseases": {
+        "text": "malaria, dengue fever, and yellow fever"
+      },
+      "water contact disease": {
+        "text": "leptospirosis and schistosomiasis"
+      },
+      "animal contact diseases": {
+        "text": "rabies"
+      },
+      "respiratory diseases": {
+        "text": "meningococcal meningitis"
+      },
+      "aerosolized dust or soil contact diseases": {
+        "text": "Lassa fever"
+      },
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: on 7 October 2019, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a Travel Health Notice for a Yellow Fever outbreak in Nigeria; a large, ongoing outbreak of yellow fever in Nigeria began in September 2017; the outbreak is now spread throughout the country with the Nigerian Ministry of Health reporting cases of the disease in all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory; the CDC recommends travelers going to Nigeria should receive vaccination against yellow fever at least 10 days before travel and should take steps to prevent mosquito bites while there; those never vaccinated against yellow fever should avoid travel to Nigeria during the outbreak ++ note: widespread ongoing transmission of a respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is occurring throughout Nigeria; as of 10 November 2020, Nigeria has reported a total of 63,790 cases of COVID-19 or 309 cumulative cases of COVID-19 per 1 million population with 6 cumulative deaths per 1 million population; as of 19 March 2020, the Government of Nigeria has restricted entry into Nigeria for travelers from the following high incidence countries: China, Italy, Iran, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Japan, France, Germany, US, UK, Netherlands, and Switzerland"
+      }
+    },
+    "Obesity - adult prevalence rate": {
+      "text": "8.9% (2016)"
+    },
+    "Children under the age of 5 years underweight": {
+      "text": "21.8% (2018)"
+    },
+    "Education expenditures": {
+      "text": "NA"
+    },
+    "Literacy": {
+      "definition": {
+        "text": "age 15 and over can read and write"
+      },
+      "total population": {
+        "text": "62%"
+      },
+      "male": {
+        "text": "71.3%"
+      },
+      "female": {
+        "text": "52.7% (2018)"
+      }
+    },
+    "School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education)": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "9 years"
+      },
+      "male": {
+        "text": "9 years"
+      },
+      "female": {
+        "text": "8 years (2011)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Unemployment, youth ages 15-24": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "13.8%"
+      },
+      "male": {
+        "text": "NA"
+      },
+      "female": {
+        "text": "NA (2016 est.)"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "Government": {
+    "Country name": {
+      "conventional long form": {
+        "text": "Federal Republic of Nigeria"
+      },
+      "conventional short form": {
+        "text": "Nigeria"
+      },
+      "etymology": {
+        "text": "named for the Niger River that flows through the west of the country to the Atlantic Ocean; from a native term \"Ni Gir\" meaning \"River Gir\""
+      }
+    },
+    "Government type": {
+      "text": "federal presidential republic"
+    },
+    "Capital": {
+      "name": {
+        "text": "Abuja"
+      },
+      "geographic coordinates": {
+        "text": "9 05 N, 7 32 E"
+      },
+      "time difference": {
+        "text": "UTC+1 (6 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
+      },
+      "note": {
+        "text": "etymology: Abuja is a planned capital city, it replaced Lagos in 1991; situated in the center of the country, Abuja takes its name from a nearby town, now renamed Suleja"
+      }
+    },
+    "Administrative divisions": {
+      "text": "36 states and 1 territory*; Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Federal Capital Territory*, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara"
+    },
+    "Independence": {
+      "text": "1 October 1960 (from the UK)"
+    },
+    "National holiday": {
+      "text": "Independence Day (National Day), 1 October (1960)"
+    },
+    "Constitution": {
+      "history": {
+        "text": "several previous; latest adopted 5 May 1999, effective 29 May 1999"
+      },
+      "amendments": {
+        "text": "proposed by the National Assembly; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote of both houses and approval by the Houses of Assembly of at least two thirds of the states; amendments to constitutional articles on the creation of a new state, fundamental constitutional rights, or constitution-amending procedures requires at least four-fifths majority vote by both houses of the National Assembly and approval by the Houses of Assembly in at least two thirds of the states; passage of amendments limited to the creation of a new state require at least two-thirds majority vote by the proposing National Assembly house and approval by the Houses of Assembly in two thirds of the states; amended several times, last in 2018"
+      }
+    },
+    "Legal system": {
+      "text": "mixed legal system of English common law, Islamic law (in 12 northern states), and traditional law"
+    },
+    "International law organization participation": {
+      "text": "accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations; accepts ICCt jurisdiction"
+    },
+    "Citizenship": {
+      "citizenship by birth": {
+        "text": "no"
+      },
+      "citizenship by descent only": {
+        "text": "at least one parent must be a citizen of Nigeria"
+      },
+      "dual citizenship recognized": {
+        "text": "yes"
+      },
+      "residency requirement for naturalization": {
+        "text": "15 years"
+      }
+    },
+    "Suffrage": {
+      "text": "18 years of age; universal"
+    },
+    "Executive branch": {
+      "chief of state": {
+        "text": "President Maj. Gen. (ret.) Muhammadu BUHARI (since 29 May 2015); Vice President Oluyemi \"Yemi\" OSINBAJO (since 29 May 2015); note - the president is both chief of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces"
+      },
+      "head of government": {
+        "text": "President Maj.Gen. (ret.) Muhammadu BUHARI (since 29 May 2015); Vice President Oluyemi \"Yemi\" OSINBAJO (since 29 May 2015)"
+      },
+      "cabinet": {
+        "text": "Federal Executive Council appointed by the president but constrained constitutionally to include at least one member from each of the 36 states"
+      },
+      "elections/appointments": {
+        "text": "president directly elected by qualified majority popular vote and at least 25% of the votes cast in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states; president elected for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 23 February 2019 (next to be held in February 2023); note: the election was scheduled for 16 February 2019, but postponed on 16 February 2019"
+      },
+      "election results": {
+        "text": "Muhammadu BUHARI elected president; percent of vote - Muhammadu BUHARI (APC) 53%, Atiku ABUBAKER (PDP) 39%, other 8%"
+      }
+    },
+    "Legislative branch": {
+      "description": {
+        "text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of: Senate (109 seats - 3 each for the 36 states and 1 for Abuja-Federal Capital Territory; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms) ++ House of Representatives (360 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms)"
+      },
+      "elections": {
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 23 February 2019 (next to be held on 23 February 2023); note: election was scheduled for 16 February 2019 but was postponed on 15 February 2019 ++ House of Representatives - last held on 23 February 2019 (next to be held on 23 February 2023); note: election was scheduled for 16 February 2019 but was postponed on 15 February 2019"
+      },
+      "election results": {
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - APC 65, PDP 39, YPP 1, TBD 3; composition - men 103, women 6, percent of women 5.5% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - APC 217, PDP 115, other 20, TBD 8; composition - men 346, women 14, percent of women 3.9%; note - total National Assembly percent of women 4.3%"
+      }
+    },
+    "Judicial branch": {
+      "highest courts": {
+        "text": "Supreme Court (consists of the chief justice and 15 justices)"
+      },
+      "judge selection and term of office": {
+        "text": "judges appointed by the president upon the recommendation of the National Judicial Council, a 23-member independent body of federal and state judicial officials; judge appointments confirmed by the Senate; judges serve until age 70"
+      },
+      "subordinate courts": {
+        "text": "Court of Appeal; Federal High Court; High Court of the Federal Capital Territory; Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory; Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory; state court system similar in structure to federal system"
+      }
+    },
+    "Political parties and leaders": {
+      "text": "Accord Party or ACC [Mohammad Lawal MALADO] ++ All Progressives Congress or APC [Adams OSHIOMHOLE] ++ All Progressives Grand Alliance or APGA [Victor Ike OYE] ++ Democratic Peoples Party or DPP [Biodun OGUNBIYI] ++ Labor Party or LP [Alhai Abdulkadir ABDULSALAM] ++ Peoples Democratic Party or PDP [Uche SECONDUS] ++ Young Progressive Party or YPP [Kingsley MOGHALU]"
+    },
+    "International organization participation": {
+      "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CD, D-8, ECOWAS, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNITAR, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
+    },
+    "Diplomatic representation in the US": {
+      "chief of mission": {
+        "text": "Ambassador Sylvanus Adiewere NSOFOR (since 29 November 2017)"
+      },
+      "chancery": {
+        "text": "3519 International Court NW, Washington, DC 20008"
+      },
+      "telephone": {
+        "text": "[1] (202) 516-4277"
+      },
+      "FAX": {
+        "text": "[1] (202) 362-6541"
+      },
+      "consulate(s) general": {
+        "text": "Atlanta, New York"
+      }
+    },
+    "Diplomatic representation from the US": {
+      "chief of mission": {
+        "text": "Ambassador Mary Beth LEONARD (since 24 December 2019)"
+      },
+      "telephone": {
+        "text": "[234] (9) 461-4000"
+      },
+      "embassy": {
+        "text": "Plot 1075 Diplomatic Drive, Central District Area, Abuja"
+      },
+      "mailing address": {
+        "text": "P. O. Box 5760, Garki, Abuja"
+      },
+      "FAX": {
+        "text": "[234] (9) 461-4036"
+      },
+      "consulate(s)": {
+        "text": "Lagos"
+      }
+    },
+    "Flag description": {
+      "text": "three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and green; the color green represents the forests and abundant natural wealth of the country, white stands for peace and unity"
+    },
+    "National symbol(s)": {
+      "text": "eagle; national colors: green, white"
+    },
+    "National anthem": {
+      "name": {
+        "text": "Arise Oh Compatriots, Nigeria's Call Obey"
+      },
+      "lyrics/music": {
+        "text": "John A. ILECHUKWU, Eme Etim AKPAN, B.A. OGUNNAIKE, Sotu OMOIGUI and P.O. ADERIBIGBE/Benedict Elide ODIASE"
+      },
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: adopted 1978; lyrics are a mixture of the five top entries in a national contest"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "Economy": {
+    "Economy - overview": {
+      "text": "Nigeria is Sub Saharan Africa's largest economy and relies heavily on oil as its main source of foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. Following the 2008-09 global financial crises, the banking sector was effectively recapitalized and regulation enhanced. Since then, Nigeria's economic growth has been driven by growth in agriculture, telecommunications, and services. Economic diversification and strong growth have not translated into a significant decline in poverty levels; over 62% of Nigeria's over 180 million people still live in extreme poverty. ++ Despite its strong fundamentals, oil-rich Nigeria has been hobbled by inadequate power supply, lack of infrastructure, delays in the passage of legislative reforms, an inefficient property registration system, restrictive trade policies, an inconsistent regulatory environment, a slow and ineffective judicial system, unreliable dispute resolution mechanisms, insecurity, and pervasive corruption. Regulatory constraints and security risks have limited new investment in oil and natural gas, and Nigeria's oil production had been contracting every year since 2012 until a slight rebound in 2017. ++ President BUHARI, elected in March 2015, has established a cabinet of economic ministers that includes several technocrats, and he has announced plans to increase transparency, diversify the economy away from oil, and improve fiscal management, but has taken a primarily protectionist approach that favors domestic producers at the expense of consumers. President BUHARI ran on an anti-corruption platform, and has made some headway in alleviating corruption, such as implementation of a Treasury Single Account that allows the government to better manage its resources and a more transparent government payroll and personnel system that eliminated duplicate and \"ghost workers.\" The government also is working to develop stronger public-private partnerships for roads, agriculture, and power. ++ Nigeria entered recession in 2016 as a result of lower oil prices and production, exacerbated by militant attacks on oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger Delta region, coupled with detrimental economic policies, including foreign exchange restrictions. GDP growth turned positive in 2017 as oil prices recovered and output stabilized."
+    },
+    "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
+      "text": "$1.121 trillion (2017 est.) / $1.112 trillion (2016 est.) / $1.13 trillion (2015 est.)",
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: data are in 2017 dollars"
+      }
+    },
+    "GDP (official exchange rate)": {
+      "text": "$376.4 billion (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "GDP - real growth rate": {
+      "text": "0.8% (2017 est.) / -1.6% (2016 est.) / 2.7% (2015 est.)"
+    },
+    "GDP - per capita (PPP)": {
+      "text": "$5,900 (2017 est.) / $6,100 (2016 est.) / $6,300 (2015 est.)",
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: data are in 2017 dollars"
+      }
+    },
+    "Gross national saving": {
+      "text": "18.2% of GDP (2017 est.) / 16% of GDP (2016 est.) / 12.3% of GDP (2015 est.)"
+    },
+    "GDP - composition, by end use": {
+      "household consumption": {
+        "text": "80% (2017 est.)"
+      },
+      "government consumption": {
+        "text": "5.8% (2017 est.)"
+      },
+      "investment in fixed capital": {
+        "text": "14.8% (2017 est.)"
+      },
+      "investment in inventories": {
+        "text": "0.7% (2017 est.)"
+      },
+      "exports of goods and services": {
+        "text": "11.9% (2017 est.)"
+      },
+      "imports of goods and services": {
+        "text": "-13.2% (2017 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "GDP - composition, by sector of origin": {
+      "agriculture": {
+        "text": "21.1% (2016 est.)"
+      },
+      "industry": {
+        "text": "22.5% (2016 est.)"
+      },
+      "services": {
+        "text": "56.4% (2017 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Agriculture - products": {
+      "text": "cocoa, peanuts, cotton, palm oil, corn, rice, sorghum, millet, cassava (manioc, tapioca), yams, rubber; cattle, sheep, goats, pigs; timber; fish"
+    },
+    "Industries": {
+      "text": "crude oil, coal, tin, columbite; rubber products, wood; hides and skins, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food products, footwear, chemicals, fertilizer, printing, ceramics, steel"
+    },
+    "Industrial production growth rate": {
+      "text": "2.2% (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Labor force": {
+      "text": "60.08 million (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Labor force - by occupation": {
+      "agriculture": {
+        "text": "70%"
+      },
+      "industry": {
+        "text": "10%"
+      },
+      "services": {
+        "text": "20% (1999 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Unemployment rate": {
+      "text": "16.5% (2017 est.) / 13.9% (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Population below poverty line": {
+      "text": "70% (2010 est.)"
+    },
+    "Household income or consumption by percentage share": {
+      "lowest 10%": {
+        "text": "1.8%"
+      },
+      "highest 10%": {
+        "text": "38.2% (2010 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Budget": {
+      "revenues": {
+        "text": "12.92 billion (2017 est.)"
+      },
+      "expenditures": {
+        "text": "19.54 billion (2017 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Taxes and other revenues": {
+      "text": "3.4% (of GDP) (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)": {
+      "text": "-1.8% (of GDP) (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Public debt": {
+      "text": "21.8% of GDP (2017 est.) / 19.6% of GDP (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Fiscal year": {
+      "text": "calendar year"
+    },
+    "Inflation rate (consumer prices)": {
+      "text": "16.5% (2017 est.) / 15.7% (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Current account balance": {
+      "text": "$10.38 billion (2017 est.) / $2.714 billion (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Exports": {
+      "text": "$1.146 billion (2017 est.) / $34.7 billion (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Exports - partners": {
+      "text": "India 30.6%, US 12.1%, Spain 6.6%, China 5.6%, France 5.5%, Netherlands 4.4%, Indonesia 4.4% (2017)"
+    },
+    "Exports - commodities": {
+      "text": "petroleum and petroleum products 95%, cocoa, rubber (2012 est.)"
+    },
+    "Imports": {
+      "text": "$32.67 billion (2017 est.) / $35.24 billion (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Imports - commodities": {
+      "text": "machinery, chemicals, transport equipment, manufactured goods, food and live animals"
+    },
+    "Imports - partners": {
+      "text": "China 21.1%, Belgium 8.7%, US 8.4%, South Korea 7.5%, UK 4.4% (2017)"
+    },
+    "Reserves of foreign exchange and gold": {
+      "text": "$38.77 billion (31 December 2017 est.) / $25.84 billion (31 December 2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Debt - external": {
+      "text": "$40.96 billion (31 December 2017 est.) / $31.41 billion (31 December 2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Exchange rates": {
+      "text": "nairas (NGN) per US dollar - / 323.5 (2017 est.) / 253 (2016 est.) / 253 (2015 est.) / 192.73 (2014 est.) / 158.55 (2013 est.)"
+    }
+  },
+  "Energy": {
+    "Electricity access": {
+      "population without electricity": {
+        "text": "77 million (2017)"
+      },
+      "electrification - total population": {
+        "text": "59.3% (2016)"
+      },
+      "electrification - urban areas": {
+        "text": "86% (2016)"
+      },
+      "electrification - rural areas": {
+        "text": "41.1% (2016)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Electricity - production": {
+      "text": "29.35 billion kWh (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Electricity - consumption": {
+      "text": "24.72 billion kWh (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Electricity - exports": {
+      "text": "0 kWh (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Electricity - imports": {
+      "text": "0 kWh (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Electricity - installed generating capacity": {
+      "text": "10.52 million kW (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Electricity - from fossil fuels": {
+      "text": "80% of total installed capacity (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Electricity - from nuclear fuels": {
+      "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Electricity - from hydroelectric plants": {
+      "text": "19% of total installed capacity (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Electricity - from other renewable sources": {
+      "text": "0% of total installed capacity (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Crude oil - production": {
+      "text": "1.989 million bbl/day (2018 est.)"
+    },
+    "Crude oil - exports": {
+      "text": "2.096 million bbl/day (2015 est.)"
+    },
+    "Crude oil - imports": {
+      "text": "0 bbl/day (2015 est.)"
+    },
+    "Crude oil - proved reserves": {
+      "text": "37.45 billion bbl (1 January 2018 est.)"
+    },
+    "Refined petroleum products - production": {
+      "text": "35,010 bbl/day (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Refined petroleum products - consumption": {
+      "text": "325,000 bbl/day (2016 est.)"
+    },
+    "Refined petroleum products - exports": {
+      "text": "2,332 bbl/day (2015 est.)"
+    },
+    "Refined petroleum products - imports": {
+      "text": "223,400 bbl/day (2015 est.)"
+    },
+    "Natural gas - production": {
+      "text": "44.48 billion cu m (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Natural gas - consumption": {
+      "text": "17.24 billion cu m (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Natural gas - exports": {
+      "text": "27.21 billion cu m (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Natural gas - imports": {
+      "text": "0 cu m (2017 est.)"
+    },
+    "Natural gas - proved reserves": {
+      "text": "5.475 trillion cu m (1 January 2018 est.)"
+    },
+    "Carbon dioxide emissions from consumption of energy": {
+      "text": "104 million Mt (2017 est.)"
+    }
+  },
+  "Communications": {
+    "Telephones - fixed lines": {
+      "total subscriptions": {
+        "text": "146,075"
+      },
+      "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
+        "text": "less than 1 (2019 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Telephones - mobile cellular": {
+      "total subscriptions": {
+        "text": "184,013,243"
+      },
+      "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
+        "text": "88.18 (2019 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Telecommunication systems": {
+      "general assessment": {
+        "text": "one of the larger telecom markets in Africa; most Internet connections are via mobile networks; foreign investment presence, particularly China; market competition; LTE-A technologies available but GSM technology dominate; mobile penetration rate of 123% and 173 million subscribers; unified licensing regime; government committed to expanding broadband penetration; in Q1 2018, the Nigerian Communications Commission approved seven licenses to telecom companies to deploy fiber optic cable in the six geopolitical zones and Lagos; operators invest in base stations to take care of network congestion (2020)"
+      },
+      "domestic": {
+        "text": "fixed-line subscribership remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular services growing rapidly, in part responding to the shortcomings of the fixed-line network; multiple cellular providers operate nationally with subscribership base over 88 per 100 persons (2019)"
+      },
+      "international": {
+        "text": "country code - 234; landing point for the SAT-3/WASC, NCSCS,  MainOne, Glo-1 & 2, ACE, and Equiano fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to Europe and South and West Africa; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) (2019)"
+      },
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: the COVID-19 outbreak is negatively impacting telecommunications production and supply chains globally; consumer spending on telecom devices and services has also slowed due to the pandemic's effect on economies worldwide; overall progress towards improvements in all facets of the telecom industry - mobile, fixed-line, broadband, submarine cable and satellite - has moderated"
+      }
+    },
+    "Broadcast media": {
+      "text": "nearly 70 federal government-controlled national and regional TV stations; all 36 states operate TV stations; several private TV stations operational; cable and satellite TV subscription services are available; network of federal government-controlled national, regional, and state radio stations; roughly 40 state government-owned radio stations typically carry their own programs except for news broadcasts; about 20 private radio stations; transmissions of international broadcasters are available; digital broadcasting migration process completed in three states in 2018 (2019)"
+    },
+    "Internet country code": {
+      "text": ".ng"
+    },
+    "Internet users": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "85,450,052"
+      },
+      "percent of population": {
+        "text": "42% (July 2018 est.)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Broadband - fixed subscriptions": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "73,965"
+      },
+      "subscriptions per 100 inhabitants": {
+        "text": "less than 1 (2018 est.)"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "Transportation": {
+    "National air transport system": {
+      "number of registered air carriers": {
+        "text": "13 (2020)"
+      },
+      "inventory of registered aircraft operated by air carriers": {
+        "text": "104"
+      },
+      "annual passenger traffic on registered air carriers": {
+        "text": "8,169,192 (2018)"
+      },
+      "annual freight traffic on registered air carriers": {
+        "text": "19.42 million mt-km (2018)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Civil aircraft registration country code prefix": {
+      "text": "5N (2016)"
+    },
+    "Airports": {
+      "text": "54 (2013)"
+    },
+    "Airports - with paved runways": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "40 (2017)"
+      },
+      "over 3,047 m": {
+        "text": "10 (2017)"
+      },
+      "2,438 to 3,047 m": {
+        "text": "12 (2017)"
+      },
+      "1,524 to 2,437 m": {
+        "text": "9 (2017)"
+      },
+      "914 to 1,523 m": {
+        "text": "6 (2017)"
+      },
+      "under 914 m": {
+        "text": "3 (2017)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Airports - with unpaved runways": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "14 (2013)"
+      },
+      "1,524 to 2,437 m": {
+        "text": "2 (2013)"
+      },
+      "914 to 1,523 m": {
+        "text": "9 (2013)"
+      },
+      "under 914 m": {
+        "text": "3 (2013)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Heliports": {
+      "text": "5 (2013)"
+    },
+    "Pipelines": {
+      "text": "124 km condensate, 4045 km gas, 164 km liquid petroleum gas, 4441 km oil, 3940 km refined products (2013)"
+    },
+    "Railways": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "3,798 km (2014)"
+      },
+      "standard gauge": {
+        "text": "293 km 1.435-m gauge (2014)"
+      },
+      "narrow gauge": {
+        "text": "3,505 km 1.067-m gauge (2014)"
+      },
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: as of the end of 2018, there were only six operational locomotives in Nigeria primarily used for passenger service; the majority of the rail lines are in a severe state of disrepair and need to be replaced"
+      }
+    },
+    "Roadways": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "195,000 km (2017)"
+      },
+      "paved": {
+        "text": "60,000 km (2017)"
+      },
+      "unpaved": {
+        "text": "135,000 km (2017)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Waterways": {
+      "text": "8,600 km (Niger and Benue Rivers and smaller rivers and creeks) (2011)"
+    },
+    "Merchant marine": {
+      "total": {
+        "text": "677"
+      },
+      "by type": {
+        "text": "general cargo 15, oil tanker 105, other 557 (2019)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Ports and terminals": {
+      "major seaport(s)": {
+        "text": "Bonny Inshore Terminal, Calabar, Lagos"
+      },
+      "LNG terminal(s) (export)": {
+        "text": "Bonny Island"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "Military and Security": {
+    "Military and security forces": {
+      "text": "Nigerian Armed Forces: Army, Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force; Ministry of Interior: Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC, a paramilitary agency commissioned to assist the military in the management of threats to internal security, including attacks and natural disasters) (2020)"
+    },
+    "Military expenditures": {
+      "text": "0.5% of GDP (2019) / 0.5% of GDP (2018) / 0.4% of GDP (2017) / 0.4% of GDP (2016) / 0.4% of GDP (2015)"
+    },
+    "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
+      "text": "size estimates for the Nigerian Armed Forces vary; approximately 135,000 active personnel (100,000 Army; 20,000 Navy/Coast Guard; 15,000 Air Force); est. 80,000 Security and Civil Defense Corps (2019 est.)"
+    },
+    "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
+      "text": "the Nigerian Armed Forces' inventory consists of a wide variety of imported weapons systems of Chinese, European, Middle Eastern, Russian (including Soviet-era), and US origin; since 2010, the leading suppliers include China, France, Italy, Russia, South Korea, Ukraine, and the US; Nigeria has been the largest arms importer in sub-Saharan Africa since 2014; Nigeria is also developing a defense-industry capacity, including small arms, armored personnel vehicle, and small-scale naval production (2019)"
+    },
+    "Military deployments": {
+      "text": "200 Ghana (ECOMIG); MNJTF (1 brigade or approximately 3,000 troops committed; note - the national MNJTF troop contingents are deployed within their own country territories, although cross‐border operations are conducted periodically) (2020)"
+    },
+    "Military service age and obligation": {
+      "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription (2012)"
+    },
+    "Maritime threats": {
+      "text": "the International Maritime Bureau reports the territorial and offshore waters in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea as very high risk for piracy and armed robbery of ships; in 2018, 48 commercial vessels were boarded or attacked compared with 33 attacks in 2017; in 2018, 29 ships were boarded eight of which were underway, 12 were fired upon, and 78 crew members were abducted; Nigerian pirates have extended the range of their attacks to as far away as Cote d'Ivoire and as far as 170 nm offshore; the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued a Maritime Advisory (2019-010-Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom) effective 19 July 2019, which states in part \"Piracy, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom (KFR) continue to serve as significant threats to U.S. flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). ...According to the Office of Naval Intelligence's “Weekly Piracy Reports” 72 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea occurred in the GoG region this year as of July 9, 2019. Attacks, kidnappings for ransom (KFR), and boardings to steal valuables from the ships and crews are the most common types of incidents with approximately 75 percent of all incidents taking place off Nigeria. During the first six months of 2019, there were 15 kidnapping and 3 hijackings in the GoG.\""
+    },
+    "Military - note": {
+      "text": "the Nigerian Armed Forces are used primarily for internal security operations; in the northeast, the military is conducting counterinsurgency/counter-terrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) terrorist groups, while in the northwest, it faces threats from criminal gangs, bandits, and militants associated with ongoing herder-farmer violence, as well as BH and ISWA terrorists; the military also focuses on the Niger Delta region to protect the oil industry against militants and criminal activity, although the levels of violence there have decreased in recent years (2020)"
+    }
+  },
+  "Terrorism": {
+    "Terrorist group(s)": {
+      "text": "Boko Haram; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – West Africa; Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) (2020)",
+      "note": {
+        "text": "note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "Transnational Issues": {
+    "Disputes - international": {
+      "text": "Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including June 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately cedes sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phaseout of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries; location of Benin-Niger-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved"
+    },
+    "Refugees and internally displaced persons": {
+      "refugees (country of origin)": {
+        "text": "44,524 (Cameroon) (2019)"
+      },
+      "IDPs": {
+        "text": "3,214,506 (northeast Nigeria; Boko Haram attacks and counterinsurgency efforts in northern Nigeria; communal violence between Christians and Muslims in the middle belt region, political violence; flooding; forced evictions; cattle rustling; competition for resources) (2020)"
+      }
+    },
+    "Illicit drugs": {
+      "text": "a transit point for heroin and cocaine intended for European, East Asian, and North American markets; consumer of amphetamines; safe haven for Nigerian narcotraffickers operating worldwide; major money-laundering center; massive corruption and criminal activity; Nigeria has improved some anti-money-laundering controls, resulting in its removal from the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF's) Noncooperative Countries and Territories List in June 2006; Nigeria's anti-money-laundering regime continues to be monitored by FATF"
     }
   }
 }

africa/od.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "British explorer Samuel BAKER established the colony of Equatoria in 1870, in the name of the Ottoman Khedive of Egypt who claimed the territory. Headquartered in Gondokoro (near modern day Juba), Equatoria in theory composed most of what is now South Sudan. After being cut off from colonial administration during the Mahdist War from 1885-1898, Equatoria was made a state under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1899. It was largely left to itself over the following decades, but Christian missionaries converted much of the population and facilitated the spread of English, rather than Arabic. Equatoria was ruled by British colonial administrators separately from what is now Sudan until the two colonies were combined at the 1947 Juba Conference, as part of British plans to prepare the region for independence. When Sudan gained its independence in 1956, it was with the understanding that the southerners would be able to participate fully in the political system. When the Arab Khartoum government reneged on its promises, a mutiny began that led to two prolonged periods of conflict (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) in which perhaps 2.5 million people died - mostly civilians - due to starvation and drought. Ongoing peace talks finally resulted in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005. As part of this agreement, the south was granted a six-year period of autonomy to be followed by a referendum on final status. The result of this referendum, held in January 2011, was a vote of 98% in favor of secession.Since independence on 9 July 2011, South Sudan has struggled with good governance and nation building and has attempted to control opposition forces operating in its territory. Economic conditions have deteriorated since January 2012 when the government decided to shut down oil production following bilateral disagreements with Sudan. In December 2013, conflict between government and opposition forces killed tens of thousands and led to a dire humanitarian crisis with millions of South Sudanese displaced and food insecure. The warring parties signed a peace agreement in August 2015 that created a transitional government of national unity in April 2016. However, in July 2016, fighting broke out in Juba between the two principal signatories, plunging the country back into conflict. A \"revitalized\" peace agreement was signed in September 2018 ending the fighting. Under the agreement, the government and various rebel groups agreed that the sides would form a unified national army and create a transitional government by May 2019. The agreement was extended until November 2019 and then subsequently to February 2020. However, implementation has been stalled, in part by a failure to agree on the country's internal political boundaries."
+      "text": "British explorer Samuel BAKER established the colony of Equatoria in 1870, in the name of the Ottoman Khedive of Egypt who claimed the territory. Headquartered in Gondokoro (near modern day Juba), Equatoria in theory composed most of what is now South Sudan. After being cut off from colonial administration during the Mahdist War from 1885-1898, Equatoria was made a state under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1899. It was largely left to itself over the following decades, but Christian missionaries converted much of the population and facilitated the spread of English, rather than Arabic. Equatoria was ruled by British colonial administrators separately from what is now Sudan until the two colonies were combined at the 1947 Juba Conference, as part of British plans to prepare the region for independence. When Sudan gained its independence in 1956, it was with the understanding that the southerners would be able to participate fully in the political system. When the Arab Khartoum government reneged on its promises, a mutiny began that led to two prolonged periods of conflict (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) in which perhaps 2.5 million people died - mostly civilians - due to starvation and drought. Ongoing peace talks finally resulted in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005. As part of this agreement, the south was granted a six-year period of autonomy to be followed by a referendum on final status. The result of this referendum, held in January 2011, was a vote of 98% in favor of secession. ++ Since independence on 9 July 2011, South Sudan has struggled with good governance and nation building and has attempted to control opposition forces operating in its territory. Economic conditions have deteriorated since January 2012 when the government decided to shut down oil production following bilateral disagreements with Sudan. In December 2013, conflict between government and opposition forces killed tens of thousands and led to a dire humanitarian crisis with millions of South Sudanese displaced and food insecure. The warring parties signed a peace agreement in August 2015 that created a transitional government of national unity in April 2016. However, in July 2016, fighting broke out in Juba between the two principal signatories, plunging the country back into conflict. A \"revitalized\" peace agreement was signed in September 2018 ending the fighting. Under the agreement, the government and various rebel groups agreed that the sides would form a unified national army and create a transitional government by May 2019. The agreement was extended until November 2019 and then subsequently to February 2020. However, implementation has been stalled, in part by a failure to agree on the country's internal political boundaries."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
       "text": "animist, Christian, Muslim"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "South Sudan, independent from Sudan since July 2011 after decades of civil war, is one of the world’s poorest countries and ranks among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories. Problems are exacerbated by ongoing tensions with Sudan over oil revenues and land borders, fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and inter-communal violence. Most of the population lives off of farming, while smaller numbers rely on animal husbandry; more than 80% of the populace lives in rural areas. The maternal mortality rate is among the world’s highest for a variety of reasons, including a shortage of health care workers, facilities, and supplies; poor roads and a lack of transport; and cultural beliefs that prevent women from seeking obstetric care. Most women marry and start having children early, giving birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants, who are unable to handle complications.\nEducational attainment is extremely poor due to the lack of schools, qualified teachers, and materials. Less than a third of the population is literate (the rate is even lower among women), and half live below the poverty line. Teachers and students are also struggling with the switch from Arabic to English as the language of instruction. Many adults missed out on schooling because of warfare and displacement.\nAlmost 2 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the current conflict began in December 2013. Another 1.96 million South Sudanese are internally displaced as of August 2017. Despite South Sudan’s instability and lack of infrastructure and social services, more than 240,000 people have fled to South Sudan to escape fighting in Sudan."
+      "text": "South Sudan, independent from Sudan since July 2011 after decades of civil war, is one of the world's poorest countries and ranks among the lowest in many socioeconomic categories. Problems are exacerbated by ongoing tensions with Sudan over oil revenues and land borders, fighting between government forces and rebel groups, and inter-communal violence. Most of the population lives off of farming, while smaller numbers rely on animal husbandry; more than 80% of the populace lives in rural areas. The maternal mortality rate is among the world's highest for a variety of reasons, including a shortage of health care workers, facilities, and supplies; poor roads and a lack of transport; and cultural beliefs that prevent women from seeking obstetric care. Most women marry and start having children early, giving birth at home with the assistance of traditional birth attendants, who are unable to handle complications. ++ Educational attainment is extremely poor due to the lack of schools, qualified teachers, and materials. Less than a third of the population is literate (the rate is even lower among women), and half live below the poverty line. Teachers and students are also struggling with the switch from Arabic to English as the language of instruction. Many adults missed out on schooling because of warfare and displacement. ++ Almost 2 million South Sudanese have sought refuge in neighboring countries since the current conflict began in December 2013. Another 1.96 million South Sudanese are internally displaced as of August 2017. Despite South Sudan's instability and lack of infrastructure and social services, more than 240,000 people have fled to South Sudan to escape fighting in Sudan."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -238,28 +238,22 @@
       "text": "4% (2010)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 14.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 85.2% of population / rural: 71.7% of population / total: 74.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "28.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "25.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 14.8% of population / rural: 28.3% of population / total: 25.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
       "text": "9.8% (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 45.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 54.1% of population / rural: 10.7% of population / total: 19.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "89.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "80.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 45.9% of population / rural: 89.3% of population / total: 80.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -408,13 +402,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral National Legislature consists of:Council of States, established by presidential decree in August 2011 (50 seats; 20 former members of the Council of States and 30 appointed representatives) Transitional National Legislative Assembly, established on 4 August 2016, in accordance with the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (400 seats; 170 members elected in April 2010, 96 members of the former National Assembly, 66 members appointed after independence, and 68 members added as a result of the 2016 Agreement); the TNLA will be expanded to 550 members after the transitional government forms"
+        "text": "bicameral National Legislature consists of: Council of States, established by presidential decree in August 2011 (50 seats; 20 former members of the Council of States and 30 appointed representatives) ++ Transitional National Legislative Assembly, established on 4 August 2016, in accordance with the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (400 seats; 170 members elected in April 2010, 96 members of the former National Assembly, 66 members appointed after independence, and 68 members added as a result of the 2016 Agreement); the TNLA will be expanded to 550 members after the transitional government forms"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Council of States - established and members appointed 1 August 2011 National Legislative Assembly - last held 11-15 April 2010 but did not take office until July 2011; current parliamentary term extended until 2021)"
+        "text": "Council of States - established and members appointed 1 August 2011 ++ National Legislative Assembly - last held 11-15 April 2010 but did not take office until July 2011; current parliamentary term extended until 2021)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Council of States - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - SPLM 20, unknown 30; composition - men 44, women 6, percent of women 12% National Legislative Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - SPLM 251, DCP 10, independent 6, unknown 133; composition - men 291, women 109, percent of women 27.3%; note - total National Legislature percent of women 25.6%"
+        "text": "Council of States - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - SPLM 20, unknown 30; composition - men 44, women 6, percent of women 12% ++ National Legislative Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - SPLM 251, DCP 10, independent 6, unknown 133; composition - men 291, women 109, percent of women 27.3%; note - total National Legislature percent of women 25.6%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -429,7 +423,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Change or DC [Onyoti Adigo NYIKWEC] (formerly Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Democratic Movement or SPLM-DC)Sudan People's Liberation Movement or SPLM [Salva KIIR Mayardit]Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition or SPLM-IO [Riek MACHAR Teny Dhurgon]"
+      "text": "Democratic Change or DC [Onyoti Adigo NYIKWEC] (formerly Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Democratic Movement or SPLM-DC) ++ Sudan People's Liberation Movement or SPLM [Salva KIIR Mayardit] ++ Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition or SPLM-IO [Riek MACHAR Teny Dhurgon]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "AU, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOM, IPU, ITU, MIGA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WMO"
@@ -482,7 +476,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Industry and infrastructure in landlocked South Sudan are severely underdeveloped and poverty is widespread, following several decades of civil war with Sudan. Continued fighting within the new nation is disrupting what remains of the economy. The vast majority of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture and humanitarian assistance. Property rights are insecure and price signals are weak, because markets are not well-organized. South Sudan has little infrastructure – about 10,000 kilometers of roads, but just 2% of them paved. Electricity is produced mostly by costly diesel generators, and indoor plumbing and potable water are scarce, so less than 2% of the population has access to electricity. About 90% of consumed goods, capital, and services are imported from neighboring countries – mainly Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Chinese investment plays a growing role in the infrastructure and energy sectors. Nevertheless, South Sudan does have abundant natural resources. South Sudan holds one of the richest agricultural areas in Africa, with fertile soils and abundant water supplies. Currently the region supports 10-20 million head of cattle. At independence in 2011, South Sudan produced nearly three-fourths of former Sudan's total oil output of nearly a half million barrels per day. The Government of South Sudan relies on oil for the vast majority of its budget revenues, although oil production has fallen sharply since independence. South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with 98% of the government’s annual operating budget and 80% of its gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil. Oil is exported through a pipeline that runs to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The economy of South Sudan will remain linked to Sudan for some time, given the existing oil infrastructure. The outbreak of conflict in December 2013, combined with falling crude oil production and prices, meant that GDP fell significantly between 2014 and 2017. Since the second half of 2017 oil production has risen, and is currently about 130,000 barrels per day. Poverty and food insecurity has risen due to displacement of people caused by the conflict. With famine spreading, 66% of the population in South Sudan is living on less than about $2 a day, up from 50.6% in 2009, according to the World Bank. About 80% of the population lives in rural areas, with agriculture, forestry and fishing providing the livelihood for a majority of the households. Much of rural sector activity is focused on low-input, low-output subsistence agriculture. South Sudan is burdened by considerable debt because of increased military spending and high levels of government corruption. Economic mismanagement is prevalent. Civil servants, including police and the military, are not paid on time, creating incentives to engage in looting and banditry. South Sudan has received more than $11 billion in foreign aid since 2005, largely from the US, the UK, and the EU. Inflation peaked at over 800% per year in October 2016 but dropped to 118% in 2017. The government has funded its expenditures by borrowing from the central bank and foreign sources, using forward sales of oil as collateral. The central bank’s decision to adopt a managed floating exchange rate regime in December 2015 triggered a 97% depreciation of the currency and spawned a growing black market. Long-term challenges include rooting out public sector corruption, improving agricultural productivity, alleviating poverty and unemployment, improving fiscal transparency - particularly in regard to oil revenues, taming inflation, improving government revenues, and creating a rules-based business environment."
+      "text": "Industry and infrastructure in landlocked South Sudan are severely underdeveloped and poverty is widespread, following several decades of civil war with Sudan. Continued fighting within the new nation is disrupting what remains of the economy. The vast majority of the population is dependent on subsistence agriculture and humanitarian assistance. Property rights are insecure and price signals are weak, because markets are not well-organized. ++ South Sudan has little infrastructure – about 10,000 kilometers of roads, but just 2% of them paved. Electricity is produced mostly by costly diesel generators, and indoor plumbing and potable water are scarce, so less than 2% of the population has access to electricity. About 90% of consumed goods, capital, and services are imported from neighboring countries – mainly Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Chinese investment plays a growing role in the infrastructure and energy sectors. ++ Nevertheless, South Sudan does have abundant natural resources. South Sudan holds one of the richest agricultural areas in Africa, with fertile soils and abundant water supplies. Currently the region supports 10-20 million head of cattle. At independence in 2011, South Sudan produced nearly three-fourths of former Sudan's total oil output of nearly a half million barrels per day. The Government of South Sudan relies on oil for the vast majority of its budget revenues, although oil production has fallen sharply since independence. South Sudan is one of the most oil-dependent countries in the world, with 98% of the government's annual operating budget and 80% of its gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil. Oil is exported through a pipeline that runs to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The economy of South Sudan will remain linked to Sudan for some time, given the existing oil infrastructure. The outbreak of conflict in December 2013, combined with falling crude oil production and prices, meant that GDP fell significantly between 2014 and 2017. Since the second half of 2017 oil production has risen, and is currently about 130,000 barrels per day. ++ Poverty and food insecurity has risen due to displacement of people caused by the conflict. With famine spreading, 66% of the population in South Sudan is living on less than about $2 a day, up from 50.6% in 2009, according to the World Bank. About 80% of the population lives in rural areas, with agriculture, forestry and fishing providing the livelihood for a majority of the households. Much of rural sector activity is focused on low-input, low-output subsistence agriculture. ++ South Sudan is burdened by considerable debt because of increased military spending and high levels of government corruption. Economic mismanagement is prevalent. Civil servants, including police and the military, are not paid on time, creating incentives to engage in looting and banditry. South Sudan has received more than $11 billion in foreign aid since 2005, largely from the US, the UK, and the EU. Inflation peaked at over 800% per year in October 2016 but dropped to 118% in 2017. The government has funded its expenditures by borrowing from the central bank and foreign sources, using forward sales of oil as collateral. The central bank's decision to adopt a managed floating exchange rate regime in December 2015 triggered a 97% depreciation of the currency and spawned a growing black market. ++ Long-term challenges include rooting out public sector corruption, improving agricultural productivity, alleviating poverty and unemployment, improving fiscal transparency - particularly in regard to oil revenues, taming inflation, improving government revenues, and creating a rules-based business environment."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$20.01 billion (2017 est.) / $21.1 billion (2016 est.) / $24.52 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -783,13 +777,13 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF): Ground Force, Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Presidential Guard (2019)"
+      "text": "South Sudan People's Defence Force (SSPDF): Ground Force, Air Force, Air Defense Forces, Presidential Guard (2019)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "text": "3.5% of GDP (2019) / 3.7% of GDP (2018) / 2.4% of GDP (2017) / 4.6% of GDP (2016) / 10% of GDP (2015)"
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
-      "text": "the South Sudan People’s Defense Force (SSPDF) has an estimated 190,000 active personnel, including ground, air, and riverine forces (2019)"
+      "text": "the South Sudan People's Defense Force (SSPDF) has an estimated 190,000 active personnel, including ground, air, and riverine forces (2019)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
       "text": "the SSPDF inventory is primarily of Soviet origin; South Sudan was under a UN arms embargo through May 2020; from 2010 to 2015, Russian and the United Arab Emirates were the leading suppliers of arms and equipment (2020)"
@@ -798,7 +792,7 @@
       "text": "18 is the legal minimum age for compulsory and voluntary military service; the Government of South Sudan signed agreements in March 2012 and August 2015 that included the demobilization of all child soldiers within the armed forces and opposition, but the recruitment of child soldiers by the warring parties continues; as of the end of 2018, UNICEF estimated that more than 19,000 child soldiers had been used in the country's civil war since it began in December 2013 (2018)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "under the September 2018 peace agreement, all armed groups in South Sudan were to assemble at designated sites where fighters could be either disarmed and demobilized, or integrated into unified military and police forces; the unified forces were then to be retrained and deployed prior to the formation of a national unity government; all fighters were ordered to these sites in July 2019; some progress toward merging the various armed forces into a national army has been made; for example, in May 2020, South Sudan announced that it was graduating some unified forces at various training centers across the country, and in June the SSPDF incorporated some senior officers from the main opposition force, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army - in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) into its rank structure; nevertheless, progress has been slow, and as of August 2020 armed clashes continued to occur between government forces and armed militant groupsthe United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has operated in the country since 2011 with the objectives of consolidating peace and security and helping establish conditions for the successful economic and political development of South Sudan; UNMISS had more than 18,000 personnel deployed in the country as of May 2020United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; UNISFA had about 4,000 personnel deployed as of March 2020 (2020)"
+      "text": "under the September 2018 peace agreement, all armed groups in South Sudan were to assemble at designated sites where fighters could be either disarmed and demobilized, or integrated into unified military and police forces; the unified forces were then to be retrained and deployed prior to the formation of a national unity government; all fighters were ordered to these sites in July 2019; some progress toward merging the various armed forces into a national army has been made; for example, in May 2020, South Sudan announced that it was graduating some unified forces at various training centers across the country, and in June the SSPDF incorporated some senior officers from the main opposition force, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army - in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) into its rank structure; nevertheless, progress has been slow, and as of August 2020 armed clashes continued to occur between government forces and armed militant groups ++ the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has operated in the country since 2011 with the objectives of consolidating peace and security and helping establish conditions for the successful economic and political development of South Sudan; UNMISS had more than 18,000 personnel deployed in the country as of May 2020 ++ United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; UNISFA had about 4,000 personnel deployed as of March 2020 (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
@@ -818,7 +812,7 @@
         "text": "South Sudan is a source and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; South Sudanese women and girls, particularly those who are internally displaced, orphaned, refugees, or from rural areas, are vulnerable to forced labor and sexual exploitation, often in urban centers; children may be victims of forced labor in construction, market vending, shoe shining, car washing, rock breaking, brick making, delivery cart pulling, and begging; girls are also forced into marriages and subsequently subjected to sexual slavery or domestic servitude; women and girls migrate willingly from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to South Sudan with the promise of legitimate jobs and are forced into the sex trade; inter-ethnic abductions and abductions by criminal groups continue, with abductees subsequently forced into domestic servitude, herding, or sex trafficking; in 2014, the recruitment and use of child soldiers increased significantly within government security forces and was also prevalent among opposition forces"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 3 – South Sudan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; despite the government’s formal recommitment to an action plan to eliminate the recruitment and use of child soldiers by 2016, the practice expanded during 2014, and the government did not hold any officers criminally responsible; government officials reportedly are complicit in trafficking offenses but these activities continue to go uninvestigated; authorities reportedly identified five trafficking victims but did not transfer them to care facilities; law enforcement continued to arrest and imprison individuals for prostitution, including trafficking victims; no known steps were taken to address the exploitation of South Sudanese nationals working abroad or foreign workers in South Sudan (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 3 – South Sudan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; despite the government's formal recommitment to an action plan to eliminate the recruitment and use of child soldiers by 2016, the practice expanded during 2014, and the government did not hold any officers criminally responsible; government officials reportedly are complicit in trafficking offenses but these activities continue to go uninvestigated; authorities reportedly identified five trafficking victims but did not transfer them to care facilities; law enforcement continued to arrest and imprison individuals for prostitution, including trafficking victims; no known steps were taken to address the exploitation of South Sudanese nationals working abroad or foreign workers in South Sudan (2015)"
       }
     }
   }

africa/pu.json

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 45.1%, Christian 22.1%, animist 14.9%, none 2%, unspecified 15.9% (2008 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Guinea-Bissau’s young and growing population is sustained by high fertility; approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Its large reproductive-age population and total fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman offsets the country’s high infant and maternal mortality rates. The latter is among the world’s highest because of the prevalence of early childbearing, a lack of birth spacing, the high percentage of births outside of health care facilities, and a shortage of medicines and supplies.\nGuinea-Bissau’s history of political instability, a civil war, and several coups (the latest in 2012) have resulted in a fragile state with a weak economy, high unemployment, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and thriving drug and child trafficking. With the country lacking educational infrastructure, school funding and materials, and qualified teachers, and with the cultural emphasis placed on religious education, parents frequently send boys to study in residential Koranic schools (daaras) in Senegal and The Gambia. They often are extremely deprived and are forced into street begging or agricultural work by marabouts (Muslim religious teachers), who enrich themselves at the expense of the children. Boys who leave their marabouts often end up on the streets of Dakar or other large Senegalese towns and are vulnerable to even worse abuse.\nSome young men lacking in education and job prospects become involved in the flourishing international drug trade. Local drug use and associated violent crime are growing."
+      "text": "Guinea-Bissau's young and growing population is sustained by high fertility; approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Its large reproductive-age population and total fertility rate of more than 4 children per woman offsets the country's high infant and maternal mortality rates. The latter is among the world's highest because of the prevalence of early childbearing, a lack of birth spacing, the high percentage of births outside of health care facilities, and a shortage of medicines and supplies. ++ Guinea-Bissau's history of political instability, a civil war, and several coups (the latest in 2012) have resulted in a fragile state with a weak economy, high unemployment, rampant corruption, widespread poverty, and thriving drug and child trafficking. With the country lacking educational infrastructure, school funding and materials, and qualified teachers, and with the cultural emphasis placed on religious education, parents frequently send boys to study in residential Koranic schools (daaras) in Senegal and The Gambia. They often are extremely deprived and are forced into street begging or agricultural work by marabouts (Muslim religious teachers), who enrich themselves at the expense of the children. Boys who leave their marabouts often end up on the streets of Dakar or other large Senegalese towns and are vulnerable to even worse abuse. ++ Some young men lacking in education and job prospects become involved in the flourishing international drug trade. Local drug use and associated violent crime are growing."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -252,14 +252,11 @@
       "text": "16% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 8.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 91.2% of population / rural: 60.3% of population / total: 73.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "39.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "26.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 8.5% of population / rural: 39.7% of population / total: 26.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -272,14 +269,11 @@
       "text": "1 beds/1,000 population (2009)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 33.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 66.5% of population / rural: 13.4% of population / total: 36.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "86.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "63.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 33.5% of population / rural: 86.6% of population / total: 63.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -384,7 +378,7 @@
         "text": "promulgated 16 May 1984; note - constitution suspended following military coup in April 2012 and restored in 2014"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the National People’s Assembly if supported by at least one third of its members, by the Council of State (a presidential consultant body), or by the government; passage requires approval by at least two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly; constitutional articles on the republican and secular form of government and national sovereignty cannot be amended; amended 1991, 1993, 1996"
+        "text": "proposed by the National People's Assembly if supported by at least one third of its members, by the Council of State (a presidential consultant body), or by the government; passage requires approval by at least two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly; constitutional articles on the republican and secular form of government and national sovereignty cannot be amended; amended 1991, 1993, 1996"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -450,7 +444,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde or PAIGC [Domingos SIMOES PEREIRA]Democratic Convergence Party or PCD [Vicente FERNANDES]Movement for Democratic Alternation Group of 15 or MADEM-G15 [Braima CAMARA]National People’s Assembly – Democratic Party of Guinea Bissau or APU-PDGB [Nuno Gomes NABIAM]New Democracy Party or PND [Mamadu Iaia DJALO]Party for Social Renewal or PRS [Alberto NAMBEIA]Republican Party for Independence and Development or PRID [Aristides GOMES]Union for Change or UM [Agnelo REGALA]"
+      "text": "African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde or PAIGC [Domingos SIMOES PEREIRA] ++ Democratic Convergence Party or PCD [Vicente FERNANDES] ++ Movement for Democratic Alternation Group of 15 or MADEM-G15 [Braima CAMARA] ++ National People's Assembly – Democratic Party of Guinea Bissau or APU-PDGB [Nuno Gomes NABIAM] ++ New Democracy Party or PND [Mamadu Iaia DJALO] ++ Party for Social Renewal or PRS [Alberto NAMBEIA] ++ Republican Party for Independence and Development or PRID [Aristides GOMES] ++ Union for Change or UM [Agnelo REGALA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AOSIS, AU, CPLP, ECOWAS, FAO, FZ, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WADB (regional), WAEMU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -484,7 +478,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Guinea-Bissau is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture, cashew nut exports, and foreign assistance. Two out of three Bissau-Guineans remain below the absolute poverty line. The legal economy is based on cashews and fishing. Illegal logging and trafficking in narcotics also play significant roles. The combination of limited economic prospects, weak institutions, and favorable geography have made this West African country a way station for drugs bound for Europe. Guinea-Bissau has substantial potential for development of mineral resources, including phosphates, bauxite, and mineral sands. Offshore oil and gas exploration has begun. The country’s climate and soil make it feasible to grow a wide range of cash crops, fruit, vegetables, and tubers; however, cashews generate more than 80% of export receipts and are the main source of income for many rural communities. The government was deposed in August 2015, and since then, a political stalemate has resulted in weak governance and reduced donor support. The country is participating in a three-year, IMF extended credit facility program that was suspended because of a planned bank bailout. The program was renewed in 2017, but the major donors of direct budget support (the EU, World Bank, and African Development Bank) have halted their programs indefinitely. Diversification of the economy remains a key policy goal, but Guinea-Bissau’s poor infrastructure and business climate will constrain this effort."
+      "text": "Guinea-Bissau is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture, cashew nut exports, and foreign assistance. Two out of three Bissau-Guineans remain below the absolute poverty line. The legal economy is based on cashews and fishing. Illegal logging and trafficking in narcotics also play significant roles. The combination of limited economic prospects, weak institutions, and favorable geography have made this West African country a way station for drugs bound for Europe. ++ Guinea-Bissau has substantial potential for development of mineral resources, including phosphates, bauxite, and mineral sands. Offshore oil and gas exploration has begun. The country's climate and soil make it feasible to grow a wide range of cash crops, fruit, vegetables, and tubers; however, cashews generate more than 80% of export receipts and are the main source of income for many rural communities. ++ The government was deposed in August 2015, and since then, a political stalemate has resulted in weak governance and reduced donor support. ++ The country is participating in a three-year, IMF extended credit facility program that was suspended because of a planned bank bailout. The program was renewed in 2017, but the major donors of direct budget support (the EU, World Bank, and African Development Bank) have halted their programs indefinitely. Diversification of the economy remains a key policy goal, but Guinea-Bissau's poor infrastructure and business climate will constrain this effort."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$3.171 billion (2017 est.) / $2.994 billion (2016 est.) / $2.817 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/rw.json

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
       "text": "one of Africa's most densely populated countries; large concentrations tend to be in the central regions and along the shore of Lake Kivu in the west as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "periodic droughts; the volcanic Virunga Mountains are in the northwest along the border with Democratic Republic of the Congo\nvolcanism: Visoke (3,711 m), located on the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is the country's only historically active volcano"
+      "text": "periodic droughts; the volcanic Virunga Mountains are in the northwest along the border with Democratic Republic of the Congo ++ volcanism: Visoke (3,711 m), located on the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is the country's only historically active volcano"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation results from uncontrolled cutting of trees for fuel; overgrazing; land degradation; soil erosion; a decline in soil fertility (soil exhaustion); wetland degradation and loss of biodiversity; widespread poaching"
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 49.5% (includes Adventist 11.8% and other Protestant 37.7%), Roman Catholic 43.7%, Muslim 2%, other 0.9% (includes Jehovah's Witness), none 2.5%, unspecified 1.3% (2012 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Rwanda’s fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government’s commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda’s birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families’ ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government’s efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation.\nThe UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR’s decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts almost 160,000 refugees as of 2017; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo."
+      "text": "Rwanda's fertility rate declined sharply during the last decade, as a result of the government's commitment to family planning, the increased use of contraceptives, and a downward trend in ideal family size. Increases in educational attainment, particularly among girls, and exposure to social media also contributed to the reduction in the birth rate. The average number of births per woman decreased from a 5.6 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2016. Despite these significant strides in reducing fertility, Rwanda's birth rate remains very high and will continue to for an extended period of time because of its large population entering reproductive age. Because Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, its persistent high population growth and increasingly small agricultural landholdings will put additional strain on families' ability to raise foodstuffs and access potable water. These conditions will also hinder the government's efforts to reduce poverty and prevent environmental degradation. ++ The UNHCR recommended that effective 30 June 2013 countries invoke a cessation of refugee status for those Rwandans who fled their homeland between 1959 and 1998, including the 1994 genocide, on the grounds that the conditions that drove them to seek protection abroad no longer exist. The UNHCR's decision is controversial because many Rwandan refugees still fear persecution if they return home, concerns that are supported by the number of Rwandans granted asylum since 1998 and by the number exempted from the cessation. Rwandan refugees can still seek an exemption or local integration, but host countries are anxious to send the refugees back to Rwanda and are likely to avoid options that enable them to stay. Conversely, Rwanda itself hosts almost 160,000 refugees as of 2017; virtually all of them fleeing conflict in neighboring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "53.2% (2014/15)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 92% of population / rural: 76.9% of population / total: 79.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "23.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "20.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 8% of population / rural: 23.1% of population / total: 20.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "0.14 physicians/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 11.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 88.4% of population / rural: 79.4% of population / total: 80.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "20.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "19.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 11.6% of population / rural: 20.6% of population / total: 19.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -451,13 +445,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate or Senat (26 seats; 12 members indirectly elected by local councils, 8 appointed by the president, 4 appointed by the Political Organizations Forum - a body of registered political parties, and 2 selected by institutions of higher learning; members serve 8-year terms) Chamber of Deputies or Chambre des Deputes (80 seats; 53 members directly elected by proportional representation vote, 24 women selected by special interest groups, and 3 selected by youth and disability organizations; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate or Senat (26 seats; 12 members indirectly elected by local councils, 8 appointed by the president, 4 appointed by the Political Organizations Forum - a body of registered political parties, and 2 selected by institutions of higher learning; members serve 8-year terms) ++ Chamber of Deputies or Chambre des Deputes (80 seats; 53 members directly elected by proportional representation vote, 24 women selected by special interest groups, and 3 selected by youth and disability organizations; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 16-18 September 2019 (next to be held in 2027) Chamber of Deputies - last held on 3 September 2018 (next to be held in September 2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 16-18 September 2019 (next to be held in 2027) ++ Chamber of Deputies - last held on 3 September 2018 (next to be held in September 2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 16, women 10, percent of women 38.5%Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Rwandan Patriotic Front Coalition 40, PSD 5, PL 4, other 4 indirectly elected 27; composition - men 26, women 54, percent of women 67.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 60.4%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 16, women 10, percent of women 38.5% ++ Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Rwandan Patriotic Front Coalition 40, PSD 5, PL 4, other 4 indirectly elected 27; composition - men 26, women 54, percent of women 67.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 60.4%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -468,14 +462,14 @@
         "text": "Supreme Court judges nominated by the president after consultation with the Cabinet and the Superior Council of the Judiciary (SCJ), a 27-member body of judges, other judicial officials, and legal professionals) and approved by the Senate; chief and deputy chief justices appointed for 8-year nonrenewable terms; tenure of judges NA; High Court president and vice president appointed by the president of the republic upon approval by the Senate; judges appointed by the Supreme Court chief justice upon approval of the SCJ; judge tenure NA"
       },
       "subordinate courts": {
-        "text": "High Court of the Republic; commercial courts including the High Commercial Court; intermediate courts; primary courts; and military specialized courts"
+        "text": "High Court of the Republic; commercial courts including the High Commercial Court; intermediate courts; primary courts; and military specialized courts ++"
       },
       "note": {
         "text": " "
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Green Party of Rwanda or DGPR [Frank HABINEZA]Liberal Party or PL [Donatille MUKABALISA]Party for Progress and Concord or PPC [Dr. Alivera MUKABARAMBA]Party Imberakuri or PS-Imberakuri [Christine MUKABUNANI]Rwandan Patriotic Front or RPF [Paul KAGAME]Rwandan Patriotic Front Coalition (includes RPF, PPC) [Paul KAGAME]Social Democratic Party or PSD [Vincent BIRUTA]"
+      "text": "Democratic Green Party of Rwanda or DGPR [Frank HABINEZA] ++ Liberal Party or PL [Donatille MUKABALISA] ++ Party for Progress and Concord or PPC [Dr. Alivera MUKABARAMBA] ++ Party Imberakuri or PS-Imberakuri [Christine MUKABUNANI] ++ Rwandan Patriotic Front or RPF [Paul KAGAME] ++ Rwandan Patriotic Front Coalition (includes RPF, PPC) [Paul KAGAME] ++ Social Democratic Party or PSD [Vincent BIRUTA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CEPGL, COMESA, EAC, EADB, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -531,7 +525,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Rwanda is a rural, agrarian country with agriculture accounting for about 63% of export earnings, and with some mineral and agro-processing. Population density is high but, with the exception of the capital Kigali, is not concentrated in large cities – its 12 million people are spread out on a small amount of land (smaller than the state of Maryland). Tourism, minerals, coffee, and tea are Rwanda's main sources of foreign exchange. Despite Rwanda's fertile ecosystem, food production often does not keep pace with demand, requiring food imports. Energy shortages, instability in neighboring states, and lack of adequate transportation linkages to other countries continue to handicap private sector growth. The 1994 genocide decimated Rwanda's fragile economic base, severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and temporarily stalled the country's ability to attract private and external investment. However, Rwanda has made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy well beyond pre-1994 levels. GDP has rebounded with an average annual growth of 6%-8% since 2003 and inflation has been reduced to single digits. In 2015, 39% of the population lived below the poverty line, according to government statistics, compared to 57% in 2006. The government has embraced an expansionary fiscal policy to reduce poverty by improving education, infrastructure, and foreign and domestic investment. Rwanda consistently ranks well for ease of doing business and transparency. The Rwandan Government is seeking to become a regional leader in information and communication technologies and aims to reach middle-income status by 2020 by leveraging the service industry. In 2012, Rwanda completed the first modern Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kigali. The SEZ seeks to attract investment in all sectors, but specifically in agribusiness, information and communications, trade and logistics, mining, and construction. In 2016, the government launched an online system to give investors information about public land and its suitability for agricultural development."
+      "text": "Rwanda is a rural, agrarian country with agriculture accounting for about 63% of export earnings, and with some mineral and agro-processing. Population density is high but, with the exception of the capital Kigali, is not concentrated in large cities – its 12 million people are spread out on a small amount of land (smaller than the state of Maryland). Tourism, minerals, coffee, and tea are Rwanda's main sources of foreign exchange. Despite Rwanda's fertile ecosystem, food production often does not keep pace with demand, requiring food imports. Energy shortages, instability in neighboring states, and lack of adequate transportation linkages to other countries continue to handicap private sector growth. ++ The 1994 genocide decimated Rwanda's fragile economic base, severely impoverished the population, particularly women, and temporarily stalled the country's ability to attract private and external investment. However, Rwanda has made substantial progress in stabilizing and rehabilitating its economy well beyond pre-1994 levels. GDP has rebounded with an average annual growth of 6%-8% since 2003 and inflation has been reduced to single digits. In 2015, 39% of the population lived below the poverty line, according to government statistics, compared to 57% in 2006. ++ The government has embraced an expansionary fiscal policy to reduce poverty by improving education, infrastructure, and foreign and domestic investment. Rwanda consistently ranks well for ease of doing business and transparency. ++ The Rwandan Government is seeking to become a regional leader in information and communication technologies and aims to reach middle-income status by 2020 by leveraging the service industry. In 2012, Rwanda completed the first modern Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kigali. The SEZ seeks to attract investment in all sectors, but specifically in agribusiness, information and communications, trade and logistics, mining, and construction. In 2016, the government launched an online system to give investors information about public land and its suitability for agricultural development."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$24.68 billion (2017 est.) / $23.26 billion (2016 est.) / $21.94 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/se.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Seychelles was uninhabited prior to being discovered by Europeans early in the 16th century. A lengthy struggle between France and Great Britain for the islands ended in 1814, when they were ceded to the latter. During colonial rule, a plantation-based economy developed that relied on imported labor, primarily from European colonies in Africa. Independence came in 1976. Following a coup d’etat in 1977, the country was a socialist one-party state until adopting a new constitution and holding free elections in 1993. President France-Albert RENE, who had served since 1977, was reelected in 2001, but stepped down in 2004. Vice President James Alix MICHEL took over the presidency and in 2006 was elected to a new five-year term; he was reelected in 2011 and again in 2015. In 2016, James MICHEL resigned and handed over the presidency to his vice-president, Danny FAURE."
+      "text": "Seychelles was uninhabited prior to being discovered by Europeans early in the 16th century. A lengthy struggle between France and Great Britain for the islands ended in 1814, when they were ceded to the latter. During colonial rule, a plantation-based economy developed that relied on imported labor, primarily from European colonies in Africa. Independence came in 1976. Following a coup d'etat in 1977, the country was a socialist one-party state until adopting a new constitution and holding free elections in 1993. President France-Albert RENE, who had served since 1977, was reelected in 2001, but stepped down in 2004. Vice President James Alix MICHEL took over the presidency and in 2006 was elected to a new five-year term; he was reelected in 2011 and again in 2015. In 2016, James MICHEL resigned and handed over the presidency to his vice-president, Danny FAURE."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 76.2%, Protestant 10.5% (Anglican 6.1%, Pentecostal Assembly 1.5%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.2%, other Protestant 1.7%), other Christian 2.4%, Hindu 2.4%, Muslim 1.6%, other non-Christian 1.1%, unspecified 4.8%, none 0.9% (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Seychelles has no indigenous population and was first permanently settled by a small group of French planters, African slaves, and South Indians in 1770. Seychelles’ modern population is composed of the descendants of French and later British settlers, Africans, and Indian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern traders and is concentrated on three of its 155 islands – the vast majority on Mahe and lesser numbers on Praslin and La Digue. Seychelles’ population grew rapidly during the second half of the 20th century, largely due to natural increase, but the pace has slowed because of fertility decline. The total fertility rate dropped sharply from 4.0 children per woman in 1980 to 1.9 in 2015, mainly as a result of a family planning program, free education and health care, and increased female labor force participation. Life expectancy has increased steadily, but women on average live 9 years longer than men, a difference that is higher than that typical of developed countries.\nThe combination of reduced fertility and increased longevity has resulted in an aging population, which will put pressure on the government’s provision of pensions and health care. Seychelles’ sustained investment in social welfare services, such as free primary health care and education up to the post-secondary level, have enabled the country to achieve a high human development index score – among the highest in Africa. Despite some of its health and education indicators being nearly on par with Western countries, Seychelles has a high level of income inequality.\nAn increasing number of migrant workers – mainly young men – have been coming to Seychelles in recent years to work in the construction and tourism industries. As of 2011, foreign workers made up nearly a quarter of the workforce. Indians are the largest non-Seychellois population – representing half of the country’s foreigners – followed by Malagasy."
+      "text": "Seychelles has no indigenous population and was first permanently settled by a small group of French planters, African slaves, and South Indians in 1770. Seychelles' modern population is composed of the descendants of French and later British settlers, Africans, and Indian, Chinese, and Middle Eastern traders and is concentrated on three of its 155 islands – the vast majority on Mahe and lesser numbers on Praslin and La Digue. Seychelles' population grew rapidly during the second half of the 20th century, largely due to natural increase, but the pace has slowed because of fertility decline. The total fertility rate dropped sharply from 4.0 children per woman in 1980 to 1.9 in 2015, mainly as a result of a family planning program, free education and health care, and increased female labor force participation. Life expectancy has increased steadily, but women on average live 9 years longer than men, a difference that is higher than that typical of developed countries. ++ The combination of reduced fertility and increased longevity has resulted in an aging population, which will put pressure on the government's provision of pensions and health care. Seychelles' sustained investment in social welfare services, such as free primary health care and education up to the post-secondary level, have enabled the country to achieve a high human development index score – among the highest in Africa. Despite some of its health and education indicators being nearly on par with Western countries, Seychelles has a high level of income inequality. ++ An increasing number of migrant workers – mainly young men – have been coming to Seychelles in recent years to work in the construction and tourism industries. As of 2011, foreign workers made up nearly a quarter of the workforce. Indians are the largest non-Seychellois population – representing half of the country's foreigners – followed by Malagasy."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -244,8 +244,11 @@
       "text": "1.83 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 96.2% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 3.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -258,8 +261,11 @@
       "text": "3.6 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -366,7 +372,7 @@
         "text": "previous 1970, 1979; latest drafted May 1993, approved by referendum 18 June 1993, effective 23 June 1993"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the National Assembly; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote by the National Assembly; passage of amendments affecting the country’s sovereignty, symbols and languages, the supremacy of the constitution, fundamental rights and freedoms, amendment procedures, and dissolution of the Assembly also requires approval by at least 60% of voters in a referendum; amended several times, last in 2017"
+        "text": "proposed by the National Assembly; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote by the National Assembly; passage of amendments affecting the country's sovereignty, symbols and languages, the supremacy of the constitution, fundamental rights and freedoms, amendment procedures, and dissolution of the Assembly also requires approval by at least 60% of voters in a referendum; amended several times, last in 2017"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -432,7 +438,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Lafors Seselwa Demokratik  or LSD [Martin AGLAE]One Seychelles [Alain St. ANGE]Seselwa (Seychelles) United Party or SUP [Robert ERNESTA] (formerly the New Democratic Party or NDP)Seychelles National Party or SNP [Wavel RAMKALAWAN] (formerly the United Opposition or UO)Seychelles Party for Social Justice and Democracy or SPSD [Alexia AMESBURY]Seychelles Patriotic Movement or SPM [Vincent LARUER]Seychelloise Alliance (Lalyans Seselwa) [Patrick PILLAY]Seychellois Democratic Alliance (Linyon Demokratik Seselwa) or LDS [Roger MANCIENNE] (includes SNP, SPSD, and SUP)United Seychelles or US [Vincent MERITON] (formerly People's Party (Parti Lepep) or PL; (formerly SPPF)"
+      "text": "Lafors Seselwa Demokratik  or LSD [Martin AGLAE] ++ One Seychelles [Alain St. ANGE] ++ Seselwa (Seychelles) United Party or SUP [Robert ERNESTA] (formerly the New Democratic Party or NDP) ++ Seychelles National Party or SNP [Wavel RAMKALAWAN] (formerly the United Opposition or UO) ++ Seychelles Party for Social Justice and Democracy or SPSD [Alexia AMESBURY] ++ Seychelles Patriotic Movement or SPM [Vincent LARUER] ++ Seychelloise Alliance (Lalyans Seselwa) [Patrick PILLAY] ++ Seychellois Democratic Alliance (Linyon Demokratik Seselwa) or LDS [Roger MANCIENNE] (includes SNP, SPSD, and SUP) ++ United Seychelles or US [Vincent MERITON] (formerly People's Party (Parti Lepep) or PL; (formerly SPPF)"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AOSIS, AU, C, CD, COMESA, EITI (candidate country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, InOC, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
@@ -477,7 +483,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Since independence in 1976, per capita output in this Indian Ocean archipelago has expanded to roughly seven times the pre-independence, near-subsistence level, moving the island into the high income group of countries. Growth has been led by the tourism sector, which directly employs about 26% of the labor force and directly and indirectly accounts for more than 55% of GDP, and by tuna fishing. In recent years, the government has encouraged foreign investment to upgrade hotels and tourism industry services. At the same time, the government has moved to reduce the dependence on tourism by promoting the development of the offshore financial, information, and communication sectors and renewable energy. In 2008, having depleted its foreign exchange reserves, Seychelles defaulted on interest payments due on a $230 million Eurobond, requested assistance from the IMF, and immediately enacted a number of significant structural reforms, including liberalization of the exchange rate, reform of the public sector to include layoffs, and the sale of some state assets. In December 2013, the IMF declared that Seychelles had successfully transitioned to a market-based economy with full employment and a fiscal surplus. However, state-owned enterprises still play a prominent role in the economy. Effective 1 January 2017, Seychelles was no longer eligible for trade benefits under the US African Growth and Opportunities Act after having gained developed country status. Seychelles grew at 5% in 2017 because of a strong tourism sector and low commodity prices. The Seychellois Government met the IMF’s performance criteria for 2017 but recognizes a need to make additional progress to reduce high income inequality, represented by a Gini coefficient of 46.8. As a very small open economy dependent on tourism, Seychelles remains vulnerable to developments such as economic downturns in countries that supply tourists, natural disasters, and changes in local climatic conditions and ocean temperature. One of the main challenges facing the government is implementing strategies that will increase Seychelles' long-term resilience to climate change without weakening economic growth."
+      "text": "Since independence in 1976, per capita output in this Indian Ocean archipelago has expanded to roughly seven times the pre-independence, near-subsistence level, moving the island into the high income group of countries. Growth has been led by the tourism sector, which directly employs about 26% of the labor force and directly and indirectly accounts for more than 55% of GDP, and by tuna fishing. In recent years, the government has encouraged foreign investment to upgrade hotels and tourism industry services. At the same time, the government has moved to reduce the dependence on tourism by promoting the development of the offshore financial, information, and communication sectors and renewable energy. ++ In 2008, having depleted its foreign exchange reserves, Seychelles defaulted on interest payments due on a $230 million Eurobond, requested assistance from the IMF, and immediately enacted a number of significant structural reforms, including liberalization of the exchange rate, reform of the public sector to include layoffs, and the sale of some state assets. In December 2013, the IMF declared that Seychelles had successfully transitioned to a market-based economy with full employment and a fiscal surplus. However, state-owned enterprises still play a prominent role in the economy. Effective 1 January 2017, Seychelles was no longer eligible for trade benefits under the US African Growth and Opportunities Act after having gained developed country status. Seychelles grew at 5% in 2017 because of a strong tourism sector and low commodity prices. The Seychellois Government met the IMF's performance criteria for 2017 but recognizes a need to make additional progress to reduce high income inequality, represented by a Gini coefficient of 46.8. ++ As a very small open economy dependent on tourism, Seychelles remains vulnerable to developments such as economic downturns in countries that supply tourists, natural disasters, and changes in local climatic conditions and ocean temperature. One of the main challenges facing the government is implementing strategies that will increase Seychelles' long-term resilience to climate change without weakening economic growth."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$2.75 billion (2017 est.) / $2.612 billion (2016 est.) / $2.499 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -828,13 +834,13 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Seychelles People’s Defence Forces (SPDF): Army (includes infantry, Special Forces (Tazar), and Presidential Security Unit), Coast Guard, and Air Force (2019)"
+      "text": "Seychelles People's Defence Forces (SPDF): Army (includes infantry, Special Forces (Tazar), and Presidential Security Unit), Coast Guard, and Air Force (2019)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "text": "1.3% of GDP (2019) / 1.44% of GDP (2018) / 1.57% of GDP (2017) / 1.29% of GDP (2016) / 1.21% of GDP (2015)"
     },
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
-      "text": "the Seychelles People’s Defence Forces (SPDF) is comprised of about 500 personnel (200 Land Forces; 200 Coast Guard; 100 Air Force) (2019)"
+      "text": "the Seychelles People's Defence Forces (SPDF) is comprised of about 500 personnel (200 Land Forces; 200 Coast Guard; 100 Air Force) (2019)"
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
       "text": "the SPDF's inventory primarily consists of Soviet-era equipment delivered in the 1970s and 1980s; since 2010, China and India are the leading suppliers of newer equipment (mostly donations of patrol boats and aircraft) (2019 est.)"

africa/sg.json

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 95.9% (most adhere to one of the four main Sufi brotherhoods), Christian 4.1% (mostly Roman Catholic) (2016 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Senegal has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Senegal’s high total fertility rate of almost 4.5 children per woman continues to bolster the country’s large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Fertility remains high because of the continued desire for large families, the low use of family planning, and early childbearing. Because of the country’s high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Senegalese youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged.\nSenegal historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West African migrants more often use Senegal as a transit point to North Africa – and sometimes illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand black Mauritanian refugees since they were expelled from their homeland during its 1989 border conflict with Senegal. The country’s economic crisis in the 1970s stimulated emigration; departures accelerated in the 1990s. Destinations shifted from neighboring countries, which were experiencing economic decline, civil wars, and increasing xenophobia, to Libya and Mauritania because of their booming oil industries and to developed countries (most notably former colonial ruler France, as well as Italy and Spain). The latter became attractive in the 1990s because of job opportunities and their periodic regularization programs (legalizing the status of illegal migrants).\nAdditionally, about 16,000 Senegalese refugees still remain in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau as a result of more than 30 years of fighting between government forces and rebel separatists in southern Senegal’s Casamance region."
+      "text": "Senegal has a large and growing youth population but has not been successful in developing its potential human capital. Senegal's high total fertility rate of almost 4.5 children per woman continues to bolster the country's large youth cohort – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25. Fertility remains high because of the continued desire for large families, the low use of family planning, and early childbearing. Because of the country's high illiteracy rate (more than 40%), high unemployment (even among university graduates), and widespread poverty, Senegalese youths face dim prospects; women are especially disadvantaged. ++ Senegal historically was a destination country for economic migrants, but in recent years West African migrants more often use Senegal as a transit point to North Africa – and sometimes illegally onward to Europe. The country also has been host to several thousand black Mauritanian refugees since they were expelled from their homeland during its 1989 border conflict with Senegal. The country's economic crisis in the 1970s stimulated emigration; departures accelerated in the 1990s. Destinations shifted from neighboring countries, which were experiencing economic decline, civil wars, and increasing xenophobia, to Libya and Mauritania because of their booming oil industries and to developed countries (most notably former colonial ruler France, as well as Italy and Spain). The latter became attractive in the 1990s because of job opportunities and their periodic regularization programs (legalizing the status of illegal migrants). ++ Additionally, about 16,000 Senegalese refugees still remain in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau as a result of more than 30 years of fighting between government forces and rebel separatists in southern Senegal's Casamance region."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -264,14 +264,11 @@
       "text": "27.8% (2017)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 6.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 92.3% of population / rural: 74.5% of population / total: 83.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "25.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "16.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 6.7% of population / rural: 25.5% of population / total: 16.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -284,14 +281,11 @@
       "text": "0.3 beds/1,000 population (2008)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 8.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 91.2% of population / rural: 48.5% of population / total: 68.4% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "51.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "31.6% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 8.8% of population / rural: 51.5% of population / total: 31.6% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -487,7 +481,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for the Republic-Yakaar or APR-Yakaar [Macky SALL]Alliance of Forces of Progress or AFP [Moustapha NIASSE]Alliance for Citizenship and Labor or ACT [Abdoul MBAYE]And-Jef/African Party for Democracy and Socialism or AJ/PADS [Mamadou DIOP Decriox]Benno Bokk Yakaar or BBY (United in Hope) [Macky SALL] (coalition includes AFP, APR, BGC, LD-MPT, PIT, PS, and UNP)Bokk Gis Gis coalition [Pape DIOP]Citizen Movement for National Reform or MCRN-Bes Du Nakk [Mansour Sy DJAMIL]Democratic League-Labor Party Movement or LD-MPT [Abdoulaye BATHILY]Dare the Future movement [Aissata Tall SALL]Front for Socialism and Democracy/Benno Jubel or FSD/BJ [Cheikh Abdoulaye Bamba DIEYE]Gainde Centrist Bloc or BGC [Jean-Paul DIAS]General Alliance for the Interests of the Republic or AGIR [Thierno BOCOUM]Grand Party or GP [Malick GAKOU]Independence and Labor Party or PIT [Magatte THIAM]Madicke 2019 coalition [Madicke NIANG]National Union for the People or UNP [Souleymane Ndene NDIAYE]Only Senegal movement [Pierre Goudiaby ATEPA]Party for Truth and Development or PVD [Cheikh Ahmadou Kara MBAKE]Party of Unity and Rally or PUR [El Hadji SALL]Patriotic Convergence Kaddu Askan Wi or CP-Kaddu Askan Wi [Abdoulaye BALDE]Patriots of Senegal for Ethics, Work and Fraternity or (PASTEF) [Ousmane SONKO]Rewmi Party [Idrissa SECK]Senegalese Democratic Party or PDS [Abdoulaye WADE]Socialist Party or PS [Ousmane Tanor DIENG]Tekki Movement [Mamadou Lamine DIALLO]"
+      "text": "Alliance for the Republic-Yakaar or APR-Yakaar [Macky SALL] ++ Alliance of Forces of Progress or AFP [Moustapha NIASSE] ++ Alliance for Citizenship and Labor or ACT [Abdoul MBAYE] ++ And-Jef/African Party for Democracy and Socialism or AJ/PADS [Mamadou DIOP Decriox] ++ Benno Bokk Yakaar or BBY (United in Hope) [Macky SALL] (coalition includes AFP, APR, BGC, LD-MPT, PIT, PS, and UNP) ++ Bokk Gis Gis coalition [Pape DIOP] ++ Citizen Movement for National Reform or MCRN-Bes Du Nakk [Mansour Sy DJAMIL] ++ Democratic League-Labor Party Movement or LD-MPT [Abdoulaye BATHILY] ++ Dare the Future movement [Aissata Tall SALL] ++ Front for Socialism and Democracy/Benno Jubel or FSD/BJ [Cheikh Abdoulaye Bamba DIEYE] ++ Gainde Centrist Bloc or BGC [Jean-Paul DIAS] ++ General Alliance for the Interests of the Republic or AGIR [Thierno BOCOUM] ++ Grand Party or GP [Malick GAKOU] ++ Independence and Labor Party or PIT [Magatte THIAM] ++ Madicke 2019 coalition [Madicke NIANG] ++ National Union for the People or UNP [Souleymane Ndene NDIAYE] ++ Only Senegal movement [Pierre Goudiaby ATEPA] ++ Party for Truth and Development or PVD [Cheikh Ahmadou Kara MBAKE] ++ Party of Unity and Rally or PUR [El Hadji SALL] ++ Patriotic Convergence Kaddu Askan Wi or CP-Kaddu Askan Wi [Abdoulaye BALDE] ++ Patriots of Senegal for Ethics, Work and Fraternity or (PASTEF) [Ousmane SONKO] ++ Rewmi Party [Idrissa SECK] ++ Senegalese Democratic Party or PDS [Abdoulaye WADE] ++ Socialist Party or PS [Ousmane Tanor DIENG] ++ Tekki Movement [Mamadou Lamine DIALLO]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CD, CPLP (associate), ECOWAS, EITI (candidate country), FAO, FZ, G-15, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WADB (regional), WAEMU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -549,7 +543,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Senegal’s economy is driven by mining, construction, tourism, fisheries and agriculture, which are the primary sources of employment in rural areas. The country's key export industries include phosphate mining, fertilizer production, agricultural products and commercial fishing and Senegal is also working on oil exploration projects. It relies heavily on donor assistance, remittances and foreign direct investment. Senegal reached a growth rate of 7% in 2017, due in part to strong performance in agriculture despite erratic rainfall. President Macky SALL, who was elected in March 2012 under a reformist policy agenda, inherited an economy with high energy costs, a challenging business environment, and a culture of overspending. President SALL unveiled an ambitious economic plan, the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP), which aims to implement priority economic reforms and investment projects to increase economic growth while preserving macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and a challenging business climate are among the perennial challenges that may slow the implementation of this plan. Senegal receives technical support from the IMF under a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to assist with implementation of the ESP. The PSI implementation continues to be satisfactory as concluded by the IMF’s fifth review in December 2017. Financial markets have signaled confidence in Senegal through successful Eurobond issuances in 2014, 2017, and 2018. The government is focusing on 19 projects under the ESP to continue The government’s goal under the ESP is structural transformation of the economy. Key projects include the Thiès-Touba Highway, the new international airport opened in December 2017, and upgrades to energy infrastructure. The cost of electricity is a chief constraint for Senegal’s development. Electricity prices in Senegal are among the highest in the world. Power Africa, a US presidential initiative led by USAID, supports Senegal’s plans to improve reliability and increase generating capacity."
+      "text": "Senegal's economy is driven by mining, construction, tourism, fisheries and agriculture, which are the primary sources of employment in rural areas. The country's key export industries include phosphate mining, fertilizer production, agricultural products and commercial fishing and Senegal is also working on oil exploration projects. It relies heavily on donor assistance, remittances and foreign direct investment. Senegal reached a growth rate of 7% in 2017, due in part to strong performance in agriculture despite erratic rainfall. ++ President Macky SALL, who was elected in March 2012 under a reformist policy agenda, inherited an economy with high energy costs, a challenging business environment, and a culture of overspending. President SALL unveiled an ambitious economic plan, the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP), which aims to implement priority economic reforms and investment projects to increase economic growth while preserving macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and a challenging business climate are among the perennial challenges that may slow the implementation of this plan. ++ Senegal receives technical support from the IMF under a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to assist with implementation of the ESP. The PSI implementation continues to be satisfactory as concluded by the IMF's fifth review in December 2017. Financial markets have signaled confidence in Senegal through successful Eurobond issuances in 2014, 2017, and 2018. ++ The government is focusing on 19 projects under the ESP to continue The government's goal under the ESP is structural transformation of the economy. Key projects include the Thiès-Touba Highway, the new international airport opened in December 2017, and upgrades to energy infrastructure. The cost of electricity is a chief constraint for Senegal's development. Electricity prices in Senegal are among the highest in the world. Power Africa, a US presidential initiative led by USAID, supports Senegal's plans to improve reliability and increase generating capacity."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$54.8 billion (2017 est.) / $51.15 billion (2016 est.) / $48.15 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/sh.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Saint Helena is a British Overseas Territory consisting of Saint Helena and Ascension Islands, and the island group of Tristan da Cunha. Saint Helena: Uninhabited when first discovered by the Portuguese in 1502, Saint Helena was garrisoned by the British during the 17th century. It acquired fame as the place of Napoleon BONAPARTE's exile from 1815 until his death in 1821, but its importance as a port of call declined after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. During the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa, several thousand Boer prisoners were confined on the island between 1900 and 1903.; Saint Helena is one of the most remote populated places in the world. The British Government committed to building an airport on Saint Helena in 2005. After more than a decade of delays and construction, a commercial air service to South Africa via Namibia was inaugurated in October of 2017. The weekly service to Saint Helena from Johannesburg via Windhoek in Namibia takes just over six hours (including the refueling stop in Windhoek) and replaces the mail ship that had made a five-day journey to the island every three weeks.; Ascension Island: This barren and uninhabited island was discovered and named by the Portuguese in 1503. The British garrisoned the island in 1815 to prevent a rescue of Napoleon from Saint Helena. It served as a provisioning station for the Royal Navy's West Africa Squadron on anti-slavery patrol. The island remained under Admiralty control until 1922, when it became a dependency of Saint Helena. During World War II, the UK permitted the US to construct an airfield on Ascension in support of transatlantic flights to Africa and anti-submarine operations in the South Atlantic. In the 1960s the island became an important space tracking station for the US. In 1982, Ascension was an essential staging area for British forces during the Falklands War. It remains a critical refueling point in the air-bridge from the UK to the South Atlantic.; The island hosts one of four dedicated ground antennas that assist in the operation of the Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation system (the others are on Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory), Kwajalein (Marshall Islands), and at Cape Canaveral, Florida (US)). NASA and the US Air Force also operate a Meter-Class Autonomous Telescope (MCAT) on Ascension as part of the deep space surveillance system for tracking orbital debris, which can be a hazard to spacecraft and astronauts. Tristan da Cunha: The island group consists of Tristan da Cunha, Nightingale, Inaccessible, and Gough Islands. Tristan da Cunha, named after its Portuguese discoverer (1506), was garrisoned by the British in 1816 to prevent any attempt to rescue Napoleon from Saint Helena. Gough and Inaccessible Islands have been designated World Heritage Sites. South Africa leases a site for a meteorological station on Gough Island."
+      "text": "Saint Helena is a British Overseas Territory consisting of Saint Helena and Ascension Islands, and the island group of Tristan da Cunha. ++ Saint Helena: Uninhabited when first discovered by the Portuguese in 1502, Saint Helena was garrisoned by the British during the 17th century. It acquired fame as the place of Napoleon BONAPARTE's exile from 1815 until his death in 1821, but its importance as a port of call declined after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. During the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa, several thousand Boer prisoners were confined on the island between 1900 and 1903.; ++ Saint Helena is one of the most remote populated places in the world. The British Government committed to building an airport on Saint Helena in 2005. After more than a decade of delays and construction, a commercial air service to South Africa via Namibia was inaugurated in October of 2017. The weekly service to Saint Helena from Johannesburg via Windhoek in Namibia takes just over six hours (including the refueling stop in Windhoek) and replaces the mail ship that had made a five-day journey to the island every three weeks.; ++ Ascension Island: This barren and uninhabited island was discovered and named by the Portuguese in 1503. The British garrisoned the island in 1815 to prevent a rescue of Napoleon from Saint Helena. It served as a provisioning station for the Royal Navy's West Africa Squadron on anti-slavery patrol. The island remained under Admiralty control until 1922, when it became a dependency of Saint Helena. During World War II, the UK permitted the US to construct an airfield on Ascension in support of transatlantic flights to Africa and anti-submarine operations in the South Atlantic. In the 1960s the island became an important space tracking station for the US. In 1982, Ascension was an essential staging area for British forces during the Falklands War. It remains a critical refueling point in the air-bridge from the UK to the South Atlantic.; ++ The island hosts one of four dedicated ground antennas that assist in the operation of the Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation system (the others are on Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory), Kwajalein (Marshall Islands), and at Cape Canaveral, Florida (US)). NASA and the US Air Force also operate a Meter-Class Autonomous Telescope (MCAT) on Ascension as part of the deep space surveillance system for tracking orbital debris, which can be a hazard to spacecraft and astronauts. ++ Tristan da Cunha: The island group consists of Tristan da Cunha, Nightingale, Inaccessible, and Gough Islands. Tristan da Cunha, named after its Portuguese discoverer (1506), was garrisoned by the British in 1816 to prevent any attempt to rescue Napoleon from Saint Helena. Gough and Inaccessible Islands have been designated World Heritage Sites. South Africa leases a site for a meteorological station on Gough Island."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
       "text": "islands in the South Atlantic Ocean, about midway between South America and Africa; Ascension Island lies 1,300 km (800 mi) northwest of Saint Helena; Tristan da Cunha lies 4,300 km (2,700 mi) southwest of Saint Helena"
     },
     "Geographic coordinates": {
-      "text": "Saint Helena: 15 57 S, 5 42 W; Ascension Island: 7 57 S, 14 22 W; Tristan da Cunha island group: 37 15 S, 12 30 W"
+      "text": "Saint Helena: 15 57 S, 5 42 W; ++ Ascension Island: 7 57 S, 14 22 W; ++ Tristan da Cunha island group: 37 15 S, 12 30 W"
     },
     "Map references": {
       "text": "Africa"
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
     },
     "Coastline": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "Saint Helena: 60 km Ascension Island: NA Tristan da Cunha (island only): 34 km"
+        "text": "Saint Helena: 60 km ++ Ascension Island: NA ++ Tristan da Cunha (island only): 34 km"
       }
     },
     "Maritime claims": {
@@ -48,10 +48,10 @@
       }
     },
     "Climate": {
-      "text": "Saint Helena: tropical marine; mild, tempered by trade winds; Ascension Island: tropical marine; mild, semi-arid; Tristan da Cunha: temperate marine; mild, tempered by trade winds (tends to be cooler than Saint Helena)"
+      "text": "Saint Helena: tropical marine; mild, tempered by trade winds; ++ Ascension Island: tropical marine; mild, semi-arid; ++ Tristan da Cunha: temperate marine; mild, tempered by trade winds (tends to be cooler than Saint Helena)"
     },
     "Terrain": {
-      "text": "the islands of this group are of volcanic origin associated with the Atlantic Mid-Ocean Ridge\nSaint Helena: rugged, volcanic; small scattered plateaus and plains; Ascension: surface covered by lava flows and cinder cones of 44 dormant volcanoes; terrain rises to the east; Tristan da Cunha: sheer cliffs line the coastline of the nearly circular island; the flanks of the central volcanic peak are deeply dissected; narrow coastal plain lies between The Peak and the coastal cliffs"
+      "text": "the islands of this group are of volcanic origin associated with the Atlantic Mid-Ocean Ridge ++ Saint Helena: rugged, volcanic; small scattered plateaus and plains; ++ Ascension: surface covered by lava flows and cinder cones of 44 dormant volcanoes; terrain rises to the east; ++ Tristan da Cunha: sheer cliffs line the coastline of the nearly circular island; the flanks of the central volcanic peak are deeply dissected; narrow coastal plain lies between The Peak and the coastal cliffs"
     },
     "Elevation": {
       "lowest point": {
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
       "text": "Saint Helena - population is concentrated in and around the capital Jamestown in the northwest, with another significant cluster in the interior Longwood area; Ascension - largest settlement, and location of most of the population, is Georgetown; Tristan da Cunha - most of the nearly 300 inhabitants live in the northern coastal town of Edinburgh of the Seven Seas"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "active volcanism on Tristan da Cunha\nvolcanism: the island volcanoes of Tristan da Cunha (2,060 m) and Nightingale Island (365 m) experience volcanic activity; Tristan da Cunha erupted in 1962 and Nightingale in 2004"
+      "text": "active volcanism on Tristan da Cunha ++ volcanism: the island volcanoes of Tristan da Cunha (2,060 m) and Nightingale Island (365 m) experience volcanic activity; Tristan da Cunha erupted in 1962 and Nightingale in 2004"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "development threatens unique biota on Saint Helena"
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "The vast majority of the population of Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha live on Saint Helena. Ascension has no indigenous or permanent residents and is inhabited only by persons contracted to work on the island (mainly with the UK and US military or in the space and communications industries) or their dependents, while Tristan da Cunha – the main island in a small archipelago – has fewer than 300 residents. The population of Saint Helena consists of the descendants of 17th century British sailors and settlers from the East India Company, African slaves, and indentured servants and laborers from India, Indonesia, and China. Most of the population of Ascension are Saint Helenians, Britons, and Americans, while that of Tristan da Cunha descends from shipwrecked sailors and Saint Helenians.\nChange in Saint Helena’s population size is driven by net outward migration. Since the 1980s, Saint Helena’s population steadily has shrunk and aged as the birth rate has decreased and many working-age residents left for better opportunities elsewhere. The restoration of British citizenship in 2002 accelerated family emigration; from 1998 to 2008 alone, population declined by about 20%.\nIn the last few years, population has experienced some temporary growth, as foreigners and returning Saint Helenians, have come to build an international airport, but numbers are beginning to fade as the project reaches completion and workers depart. In the long term, once the airport is fully operational, increased access to the remote island has the potential to boost tourism and fishing, provide more jobs for Saint Helenians domestically, and could encourage some ex-patriots to return home. In the meantime, however, Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha have to contend with the needs of an aging population. The elderly population of the islands has risen from an estimated 9.4% in 1998 to 20.4% in 2016."
+      "text": "The vast majority of the population of Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha live on Saint Helena. Ascension has no indigenous or permanent residents and is inhabited only by persons contracted to work on the island (mainly with the UK and US military or in the space and communications industries) or their dependents, while Tristan da Cunha – the main island in a small archipelago – has fewer than 300 residents. The population of Saint Helena consists of the descendants of 17th century British sailors and settlers from the East India Company, African slaves, and indentured servants and laborers from India, Indonesia, and China. Most of the population of Ascension are Saint Helenians, Britons, and Americans, while that of Tristan da Cunha descends from shipwrecked sailors and Saint Helenians. ++ Change in Saint Helena's population size is driven by net outward migration. Since the 1980s, Saint Helena's population steadily has shrunk and aged as the birth rate has decreased and many working-age residents left for better opportunities elsewhere. The restoration of British citizenship in 2002 accelerated family emigration; from 1998 to 2008 alone, population declined by about 20%. ++ In the last few years, population has experienced some temporary growth, as foreigners and returning Saint Helenians, have come to build an international airport, but numbers are beginning to fade as the project reaches completion and workers depart. In the long term, once the airport is fully operational, increased access to the remote island has the potential to boost tourism and fishing, provide more jobs for Saint Helenians domestically, and could encourage some ex-patriots to return home. In the meantime, however, Saint Helena, Ascension, and Tristan da Cunha have to contend with the needs of an aging population. The elderly population of the islands has risen from an estimated 9.4% in 1998 to 20.4% in 2016."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -230,13 +230,19 @@
       "text": "1.6 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {

africa/sl.json

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 78.6%, Christian 20.8%, other 0.3%, unspecified 0.2% (2013 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Sierra Leone’s youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 5 children per woman, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone’s population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world’s highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting.\nSierra Leone’s large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country’s 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay.\nSierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone’s civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country’s civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently. As of 2015, less than 1,000 Liberians still reside in Sierra Leone."
+      "text": "Sierra Leone's youthful and growing population is driven by its high total fertility rate (TFR) of almost 5 children per woman, which has declined little over the last two decades. Its elevated TFR is sustained by the continued desire for large families, the low level of contraceptive use, and the early start of childbearing. Despite its high TFR, Sierra Leone's population growth is somewhat tempered by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are among the world's highest and are a result of poverty, a lack of potable water and sanitation, poor nutrition, limited access to quality health care services, and the prevalence of female genital cutting. ++ Sierra Leone's large youth cohort – about 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – continues to struggle with high levels of unemployment, which was one of the major causes of the country's 1991-2002 civil war and remains a threat to stability today. Its estimated 60% youth unemployment rate is attributed to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay. ++ Sierra Leone has been a source of and destination for refugees. Sierra Leone's civil war internally displaced as many as 2 million people, or almost half the population, and forced almost another half million to seek refuge in neighboring countries (370,000 Sierra Leoneans fled to Guinea and 120,000 to Liberia). The UNHCR has helped almost 180,000 Sierra Leoneans to return home, while more than 90,000 others have repatriated on their own. Of the more than 65,000 Liberians who took refuge in Sierra Leone during their country's civil war (1989-2003), about 50,000 have been voluntarily repatriated by the UNHCR and others have returned home independently. As of 2015, less than 1,000 Liberians still reside in Sierra Leone."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -264,14 +264,11 @@
       "text": "21.2% (2019)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 10.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 89.5% of population / rural: 55.7% of population / total: 69.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "44.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "30.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 10.5% of population / rural: 44.3% of population / total: 30.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "0.03 physicians/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 25.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 74.3% of population / rural: 31.9% of population / total: 49.6% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "68.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "50.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 25.7% of population / rural: 68.1% of population / total: 50.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -470,7 +464,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "All People's Congress or APC [Ernest Bai KOROMA]Coalition for Change or C4C [Tamba R. SANDY]National Grand Coalition or NGC [Dr. Dennis BRIGHT]Sierra Leone People's Party or SLPP [Dr. Prince HARDING]numerous other parties"
+      "text": "All People's Congress or APC [Ernest Bai KOROMA] ++ Coalition for Change or C4C [Tamba R. SANDY] ++ National Grand Coalition or NGC [Dr. Dennis BRIGHT] ++ Sierra Leone People's Party or SLPP [Dr. Prince HARDING] ++ numerous other parties"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, ECOWAS, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO (pending member), ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -526,7 +520,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Sierra Leone is extremely poor and nearly half of the working-age population engages in subsistence agriculture. The country possesses substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources, but it is still recovering from a civil war that destroyed most institutions before ending in the early 2000s. In recent years, economic growth has been driven by mining - particularly iron ore. The country’s principal exports are iron ore, diamonds, and rutile, and the economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices. Until 2014, the government had relied on external assistance to support its budget, but it was gradually becoming more independent. The Ebola outbreak of 2014 and 2015, combined with falling global commodities prices, caused a significant contraction of economic activity in all areas. While the World Health Organization declared an end to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone in November 2015, low commodity prices in 2015-2016 contributed to the country’s biggest fiscal shortfall since 2001. In 2017, increased iron ore exports, together with the end of the Ebola epidemic, supported a resumption of economic growth. Continued economic growth will depend on rising commodities prices and increased efforts to diversify the sources of growth. Non-mining activities will remain constrained by inadequate infrastructure, such as power and roads, even though power sector projects may provide some additional electricity capacity in the near term. Pervasive corruption and undeveloped human capital will continue to deter foreign investors. Sustained international donor support in the near future will partially offset these fiscal constraints."
+      "text": "Sierra Leone is extremely poor and nearly half of the working-age population engages in subsistence agriculture. The country possesses substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources, but it is still recovering from a civil war that destroyed most institutions before ending in the early 2000s. ++ In recent years, economic growth has been driven by mining - particularly iron ore. The country's principal exports are iron ore, diamonds, and rutile, and the economy is vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices. Until 2014, the government had relied on external assistance to support its budget, but it was gradually becoming more independent. The Ebola outbreak of 2014 and 2015, combined with falling global commodities prices, caused a significant contraction of economic activity in all areas. While the World Health Organization declared an end to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone in November 2015, low commodity prices in 2015-2016 contributed to the country's biggest fiscal shortfall since 2001. In 2017, increased iron ore exports, together with the end of the Ebola epidemic, supported a resumption of economic growth. ++ Continued economic growth will depend on rising commodities prices and increased efforts to diversify the sources of growth. Non-mining activities will remain constrained by inadequate infrastructure, such as power and roads, even though power sector projects may provide some additional electricity capacity in the near term. Pervasive corruption and undeveloped human capital will continue to deter foreign investors. Sustained international donor support in the near future will partially offset these fiscal constraints."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$11.55 billion (2017 est.) / $11.14 billion (2016 est.) / $10.48 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/so.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Several powerful Somali states dominated the Indian Ocean trade from the 13th century onward. In the late 19th century, the area that would become Somalia was colonized by Britain in the north and Italy in the south. Britain withdrew from British Somaliland in 1960 to allow its protectorate to join with Italian Somaliland and form the new nation of Somalia. In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed SIAD Barre ushered in an authoritarian socialist rule characterized by the persecution, jailing, and torture of political opponents and dissidents. After the regime's collapse early in 1991, Somalia descended into turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy. In May 1991, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland that now includes the administrative regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool. Although not recognized by any government, this entity has maintained a stable existence and continues efforts to establish a constitutional democracy, including holding municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections. The regions of Bari, Nugaal, and northern Mudug comprise a neighboring semi-autonomous state of Puntland, which has been self-governing since 1998 but does not aim at independence; it has also made strides toward reconstructing a legitimate, representative government but has suffered some civil strife. Puntland disputes its border with Somaliland as it also claims the regions of Sool and Sanaag, and portions of Togdheer. Beginning in 1993, a two-year UN humanitarian effort (primarily in south-central Somalia) was able to alleviate famine conditions, but when the UN withdrew in 1995, having suffered significant casualties, order still had not been restored. In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Djibouti resulted in the formation of an interim government, known as the Transitional National Government (TNG). When the TNG failed to establish adequate security or governing institutions, the Government of Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), led a subsequent peace process that concluded in October 2004 with the election of Abdullahi YUSUF Ahmed as President of a second interim government, known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic. The TFG included a 275-member parliamentary body, known as the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). President YUSUF resigned late in 2008 while UN-sponsored talks between the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) were underway in Djibouti. In January 2009, following the creation of a TFG-ARS unity government, Ethiopian military forces, which had entered Somalia in December 2006 to support the TFG in the face of advances by the opposition Islamic Courts Union (ICU), withdrew from the country. The TFP was doubled in size to 550 seats with the addition of 200 ARS and 75 civil society members of parliament. The expanded parliament elected Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed, the former ICU and ARS chairman as president in January 2009. The creation of the TFG was based on the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which outlined a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government following national elections. In 2009, the TFP amended the TFC to extend TFG's mandate until 2011 and in 2011 Somali principals agreed to institute political transition by August 2012. The transition process ended in September 2012 when clan elders replaced the TFP by appointing 275 members to a new parliament who subsequently elected a new president."
+      "text": "Several powerful Somali states dominated the Indian Ocean trade from the 13th century onward. In the late 19th century, the area that would become Somalia was colonized by Britain in the north and Italy in the south. Britain withdrew from British Somaliland in 1960 to allow its protectorate to join with Italian Somaliland and form the new nation of Somalia. In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed SIAD Barre ushered in an authoritarian socialist rule characterized by the persecution, jailing, and torture of political opponents and dissidents. After the regime's collapse early in 1991, Somalia descended into turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy. In May 1991, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland that now includes the administrative regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool. Although not recognized by any government, this entity has maintained a stable existence and continues efforts to establish a constitutional democracy, including holding municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections. The regions of Bari, Nugaal, and northern Mudug comprise a neighboring semi-autonomous state of Puntland, which has been self-governing since 1998 but does not aim at independence; it has also made strides toward reconstructing a legitimate, representative government but has suffered some civil strife. Puntland disputes its border with Somaliland as it also claims the regions of Sool and Sanaag, and portions of Togdheer. Beginning in 1993, a two-year UN humanitarian effort (primarily in south-central Somalia) was able to alleviate famine conditions, but when the UN withdrew in 1995, having suffered significant casualties, order still had not been restored. ++ In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Djibouti resulted in the formation of an interim government, known as the Transitional National Government (TNG). When the TNG failed to establish adequate security or governing institutions, the Government of Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), led a subsequent peace process that concluded in October 2004 with the election of Abdullahi YUSUF Ahmed as President of a second interim government, known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic. The TFG included a 275-member parliamentary body, known as the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). President YUSUF resigned late in 2008 while UN-sponsored talks between the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) were underway in Djibouti. In January 2009, following the creation of a TFG-ARS unity government, Ethiopian military forces, which had entered Somalia in December 2006 to support the TFG in the face of advances by the opposition Islamic Courts Union (ICU), withdrew from the country. The TFP was doubled in size to 550 seats with the addition of 200 ARS and 75 civil society members of parliament. The expanded parliament elected Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed, the former ICU and ARS chairman as president in January 2009. The creation of the TFG was based on the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which outlined a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government following national elections. In 2009, the TFP amended the TFC to extend TFG's mandate until 2011 and in 2011 Somali principals agreed to institute political transition by August 2012. The transition process ended in September 2012 when clan elders replaced the TFP by appointing 275 members to a new parliament who subsequently elected a new president."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Sunni Muslim (Islam) (official, according to the 2012 Transitional Federal Charter)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia’s high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia’s population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world’s highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s.\nA lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia’s large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world’s lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world’s highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services.\nDuring the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world’s third highest source country for refugees, after Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors.\nAs of 2016, more than 1.1 million Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while more than 1.1 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, nearly 40,000 Somali refugees have returned home from Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp – still houses to approximately 260,000 Somalis. The flow sped up rapidly after the Kenyan Government in May 2016 announced its intention to close the camp, worsening security and humanitarian conditions in receiving communities in south-central Somalia. Despite the conflict in Yemen, thousands of Somalis and other refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond (often Saudi Arabia). Bossaso in Puntland overtook Obock, Djibouti, as the primary departure point in mid-2014."
+      "text": "Somalia scores very low for most humanitarian indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation. Despite civil war and famine raising its mortality rate, Somalia's high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population growth, with each generation being larger than the prior one. More than 60% of Somalia's population is younger than 25, and the fertility rate is among the world's highest at almost 6 children per woman – a rate that has decreased little since the 1970s. ++ A lack of educational and job opportunities is a major source of tension for Somalia's large youth cohort, making them vulnerable to recruitment by extremist and pirate groups. Somalia has one of the world's lowest primary school enrollment rates – just over 40% of children are in school – and one of world's highest youth unemployment rates. Life expectancy is low as a result of high infant and maternal mortality rates, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition, and inadequate health services. ++ During the two decades of conflict that followed the fall of the SIAD regime in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. Today Somalia is the world's third highest source country for refugees, after Syria and Afghanistan. Insecurity, drought, floods, food shortages, and a lack of economic opportunities are the driving factors. ++ As of 2016, more than 1.1 million Somali refugees were hosted in the region, mainly in Kenya, Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, while more than 1.1 million Somalis were internally displaced. Since the implementation of a tripartite voluntary repatriation agreement among Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR in 2013, nearly 40,000 Somali refugees have returned home from Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp – still houses to approximately 260,000 Somalis. The flow sped up rapidly after the Kenyan Government in May 2016 announced its intention to close the camp, worsening security and humanitarian conditions in receiving communities in south-central Somalia. Despite the conflict in Yemen, thousands of Somalis and other refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen and beyond (often Saudi Arabia). Bossaso in Puntland overtook Obock, Djibouti, as the primary departure point in mid-2014."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -249,14 +249,11 @@
       "text": "5.51 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.1% of population / rural: 72.5% of population / total: 83.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "27.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "16.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.9% of population / rural: 27.5% of population / total: 16.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Physicians density": {
@@ -266,14 +263,11 @@
       "text": "0.9 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 13.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 86.2% of population / rural: 27.1% of population / total: 53.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "72.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "46.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 13.8% of population / rural: 72.9% of population / total: 46.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -364,7 +358,7 @@
         "text": "previous 1961, 1979; latest drafted 12 June 2012, approved 1 August 2012 (provisional)"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the federal government, by members of the state governments, the Federal Parliament, or by public petition; proposals require review by a joint committee of Parliament with inclusion of public comments and state legislatures’ comments; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote in both houses of Parliament and approval by a majority of votes cast in a referendum; constitutional clauses on Islamic principles, the federal system, human rights and freedoms, powers and authorities of the government branches, and inclusion of women in national institutions cannot be amended"
+        "text": "proposed by the federal government, by members of the state governments, the Federal Parliament, or by public petition; proposals require review by a joint committee of Parliament with inclusion of public comments and state legislatures' comments; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote in both houses of Parliament and approval by a majority of votes cast in a referendum; constitutional clauses on Islamic principles, the federal system, human rights and freedoms, powers and authorities of the government branches, and inclusion of women in national institutions cannot be amended"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -409,13 +403,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Federal Parliament to consist of:Upper House (54 seats; senators indirectly elected by state assemblies to serve 4-year terms)House of the People (275 seats; members indirectly elected by electoral colleges, each consisting of 51 delegates selected by the 136 Traditional Elders in consultation with sub-clan elders; members serve 4-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Federal Parliament to consist of: Upper House (54 seats; senators indirectly elected by state assemblies to serve 4-year terms) ++ House of the People (275 seats; members indirectly elected by electoral colleges, each consisting of 51 delegates selected by the 136 Traditional Elders in consultation with sub-clan elders; members serve 4-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Upper House - first held on 10 October 2016 (next to be held in November 2020)House of the People - first held 23 October - 10 November 2016 (next to be held in November 2020)"
+        "text": "Upper House - first held on 10 October 2016 (next to be held in November 2020) ++ House of the People - first held 23 October - 10 November 2016 (next to be held in November 2020)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Upper House - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 41, women 13, percent of women 24.1%House of the People - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 208, women 67, percent of women 24.4%; note - total Parliament percent of women 24.3%"
+        "text": "Upper House - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 41, women 13, percent of women 24.1% ++ House of the People - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 208, women 67, percent of women 24.4%; note - total Parliament percent of women 24.3%"
       },
       "note": {
         "text": "note: the inaugural House of the People was appointed in September 2012 by clan elders; in 2016 and 2017, the Federal Parliament became bicameral with elections scheduled for 10 October 2016 for the Upper House and 23 October to 10 November 2016 for the House of the People; while the elections were delayed, they were eventually held in most regions despite voting irregularities; on 27 December 2016, 41 Upper House senators and 242 House of the People members were sworn in"
@@ -433,7 +427,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Cosmopolitan Democratic Party [Yarow Sharef ADEN]Daljir Party or DP [Hassan MOALIM]Democratic Green Party of Somalia or DGPS [Abdullahi Y. MAHAMOUD]Democratic Party of Somalia or DPS [Maslah Mohamed SIAD]Green Leaf for Democracy or GLEDHiil QaranJustice and Communist Party [Mohamed NUR]Justice and Development of Democracy and Self-Respectfulness Party or CAHDI [Abdirahman Abdigani IBRAHIM Bile]Justice Party [SAKARIYE Haji]Liberal Party of SomaliaNational Democratic Party [Abdirashid ALI]National Unity Party (Xisbiga MIdnimo-Quaran) [Abdurahman BAADIYOW]Peace and Development Party or PDPSomali Green Party (local chapter of Federation of Green Parties of Africa)Somali National Party or SNP [Mohammed Ameen Saeed AHMED]Somali People's Party [Salad JEELE]Somali Society Unity Party [Yasin MAALIM]Tayo or TPP [Mohamed Abdullahi MOHAMED]Tiir Party [Fadhil Sheik MOHAMUD]Union for Peace and Development or UPD [HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud]United and Democratic Party [FAUZIA Haji]United Somali ParliamentariansUnited Somali Republican Party [Ali TIMA-JLIC]inactive: Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia; reportedly inactive since 2009"
+      "text": "Cosmopolitan Democratic Party [Yarow Sharef ADEN] ++ Daljir Party or DP [Hassan MOALIM] ++ Democratic Green Party of Somalia or DGPS [Abdullahi Y. MAHAMOUD] ++ Democratic Party of Somalia or DPS [Maslah Mohamed SIAD] ++ Green Leaf for Democracy or GLED ++ Hiil Qaran ++ Justice and Communist Party [Mohamed NUR] ++ Justice and Development of Democracy and Self-Respectfulness Party or CAHDI [Abdirahman Abdigani IBRAHIM Bile] ++ Justice Party [SAKARIYE Haji] ++ Liberal Party of Somalia ++ National Democratic Party [Abdirashid ALI] ++ National Unity Party (Xisbiga MIdnimo-Quaran) [Abdurahman BAADIYOW] ++ Peace and Development Party or PDP ++ Somali Green Party (local chapter of Federation of Green Parties of Africa) ++ Somali National Party or SNP [Mohammed Ameen Saeed AHMED] ++ Somali People's Party [Salad JEELE] ++ Somali Society Unity Party [Yasin MAALIM] ++ Tayo or TPP [Mohamed Abdullahi MOHAMED] ++ Tiir Party [Fadhil Sheik MOHAMUD] ++ Union for Peace and Development or UPD [HASSAN SHEIKH Mohamud] ++ United and Democratic Party [FAUZIA Haji] ++ United Somali Parliamentarians ++ United Somali Republican Party [Ali TIMA-JLIC] ++ inactive: Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia; reportedly inactive since 2009"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AU, CAEU (candidate), FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ITSO, ITU, LAS, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OPCW (signatory), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UPU, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO"
@@ -460,7 +454,7 @@
         "text": "Mogadishu, (reopened October 2019 on the grounds of the Mogadishu Airport)"
       },
       "mailing address": {
-        "text": "P.O. Box 606 Village Market00621 Nairobi, Kenya"
+        "text": "P.O. Box 606 Village Market ++ 00621 Nairobi, Kenya"
       },
       "FAX": {
         "text": "254 20 363-6157"
@@ -489,7 +483,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Somalia's government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue and external debt – mostly in arrears – was estimated at about 77% of GDP in 2017. Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Economic activity is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in 2017 because of growth in the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sector. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal. In recent years, Somalia's capital city, Mogadishu, has witnessed the development of the city's first gas stations, supermarkets, and airline flights to Turkey since the collapse of central authority in 1991. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Formalized economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu and a few regional capitals, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia continues to threaten these services’ ability to operate in Western nations. In 2017, Somalia elected a new president and collected a record amount of foreign aid and investment, a positive sign for economic recovery."
+      "text": "Despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Somalia's government lacks the ability to collect domestic revenue and external debt – mostly in arrears – was estimated at about 77% of GDP in 2017. ++ Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population. Economic activity is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in 2017 because of growth in the agriculture, construction and telecommunications sector. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and the machinery sold as scrap metal. ++ In recent years, Somalia's capital city, Mogadishu, has witnessed the development of the city's first gas stations, supermarkets, and airline flights to Turkey since the collapse of central authority in 1991. Mogadishu's main market offers a variety of goods from food to electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias. Formalized economic growth has yet to expand outside of Mogadishu and a few regional capitals, and within the city, security concerns dominate business. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually, although international concerns over the money transfers into Somalia continues to threaten these services' ability to operate in Western nations. In 2017, Somalia elected a new president and collected a record amount of foreign aid and investment, a positive sign for economic recovery."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$20.44 billion (2017 est.) / $19.98 billion (2016 est.) / $19.14 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -857,7 +851,7 @@
       "text": "the International Maritime Bureau continues to report the territorial and offshore waters in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean as a region of significant risk for piracy and armed robbery against ships; during 2018, two vessels were attacked compared with five in 2017; Operation Ocean Shield, the NATO naval task force established in 2009 to combat Somali piracy, concluded its operations in December 2016 as a result of the drop in reported incidents over the last few years; additional anti-piracy measures on the part of ship operators, including the use of on-board armed security teams, have reduced piracy incidents in that body of water; Somali pirates tend to be heavily armed with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades; the use of \"mother ships\" from which skiffs can be launched to attack vessels allows these pirates to extend the range of their operations hundreds of nautical miles offshore"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "Somali military forces are heavily engaged in operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, including joint operations with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); AMISOM has operated in the country with the approval of the United Nations (UN) since 2007; AMISOM's peacekeeping mission includes assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; as of early 2020, AMISOM had about 19,000 military troops and about 1,000 police personnel from six African countries deployed in Somalia  UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the Federal Government of Somalia to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international communitythe UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible for providing logistical field support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army, and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOMthe European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali militarythe US and Turkey maintain separate unilateral military training missions in Somalia (2020)"
+      "text": "Somali military forces are heavily engaged in operations against the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, including joint operations with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); AMISOM has operated in the country with the approval of the United Nations (UN) since 2007; AMISOM's peacekeeping mission includes assisting Somali forces in providing security for a stable political process, enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; as of early 2020, AMISOM had about 19,000 military troops and about 1,000 police personnel from six African countries deployed in Somalia  ++ UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is mandated by the Security Council to work with the Federal Government of Somalia to support national reconciliation, provide advice on peace-building and state-building, monitor the human rights situation, and help coordinate the efforts of the international community ++ the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible for providing logistical field support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army, and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM ++ the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) has operated in the country since 2010; the EUTM provides advice and training to the Somali military ++ the US and Turkey maintain separate unilateral military training missions in Somalia (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {

africa/su.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The region along the Nile River south of Egypt has long been referred to as Nubia. It was the site of the Kingdom of Kerma, which flourished for about a millennium (ca. 2500-1500 B.C.) until absorbed into the New Kingdom of Egypt. By the 11th century B.C., a Kingdom of Kush emerged and regained the region's independence from Egypt; it lasted in various forms until the middle of the fourth century A.D. After the fall of Kush, the Nubians formed three Christian kingdoms of Nobatia, Makuria, and Alodia, the latter two endured until around 1500. Between the 14th and 15th centuries much of Sudan was settled by Arab nomads, and between the 16th–19th centuries it underwent extensive Islamization. Egyptian occupation early in the 19th century was overthrown by a native Mahdist Sudan state (1885-99) that was crushed by the British who then set up an Anglo-Egyptian Sudan - nominally a condominium, but in effect a British colony.Following independence from Anglo-Egyptian co-rule in 1956, military regimes favoring Islamic-oriented governments have dominated national politics. Sudan was embroiled in two prolonged civil wars during most of the remainder of the 20th century. These conflicts were rooted in northern economic, political, and social domination of largely non-Muslim, non-Arab southern Sudanese. The first civil war ended in 1972 but another broke out in 1983. Peace talks gained momentum in 2002-04 with the signing of several accords. The final North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005, granted the southern rebels autonomy for six years followed by a referendum on independence for Southern Sudan. The referendum was held in January 2011 and indicated overwhelming support for independence. South Sudan became independent on 9 July 2011. Sudan and South Sudan have yet to fully implement security and economic agreements signed in September 2012 relating to the normalization of relations between the two countries. The final disposition of the contested Abyei region has also to be decided. The 30-year reign of President Umar Hassan Ahmad al-BASHIR ended in his ouster in April 2019, and a Sovereignty Council, a joint civilian-military-executive body, holds power as of November 2019. Following South Sudan's independence, conflict broke out between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states (together known as the Two Areas), resulting in a humanitarian crisis affecting more than a million people. A earlier conflict that broke out in the western region of Darfur in 2003, displaced nearly 2 million people and caused thousands of deaths.  While some repatriation has taken place, about 1.83 million IDPs remain in Sudan as of May 2019. Fighting in both the Two Areas and Darfur between government forces and opposition has largely subsided, however the civilian populations are affected by low-level violence including inter-tribal conflict and banditry, largely a result of weak rule of law. The UN and the African Union have jointly commanded a Darfur peacekeeping operation (UNAMID) since 2007, but are slowly drawing down as the situation in Darfur becomes more stable. Sudan also has faced refugee influxes from neighboring countries, primarily Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Armed conflict, poor transport infrastructure, and denial of access by both the government and armed opposition have impeded the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations. However, Sudan's new transitional government has stated its priority to allow greater humanitarian access, as the food security and humanitarian situation in Sudan worsens and as it appeals to the West for greater engagement."
+      "text": "The region along the Nile River south of Egypt has long been referred to as Nubia. It was the site of the Kingdom of Kerma, which flourished for about a millennium (ca. 2500-1500 B.C.) until absorbed into the New Kingdom of Egypt. By the 11th century B.C., a Kingdom of Kush emerged and regained the region's independence from Egypt; it lasted in various forms until the middle of the fourth century A.D. After the fall of Kush, the Nubians formed three Christian kingdoms of Nobatia, Makuria, and Alodia, the latter two endured until around 1500. Between the 14th and 15th centuries much of Sudan was settled by Arab nomads, and between the 16th–19th centuries it underwent extensive Islamization. Egyptian occupation early in the 19th century was overthrown by a native Mahdist Sudan state (1885-99) that was crushed by the British who then set up an Anglo-Egyptian Sudan - nominally a condominium, but in effect a British colony. ++ Following independence from Anglo-Egyptian co-rule in 1956, military regimes favoring Islamic-oriented governments have dominated national politics. Sudan was embroiled in two prolonged civil wars during most of the remainder of the 20th century. These conflicts were rooted in northern economic, political, and social domination of largely non-Muslim, non-Arab southern Sudanese. The first civil war ended in 1972 but another broke out in 1983. Peace talks gained momentum in 2002-04 with the signing of several accords. The final North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005, granted the southern rebels autonomy for six years followed by a referendum on independence for Southern Sudan. The referendum was held in January 2011 and indicated overwhelming support for independence. South Sudan became independent on 9 July 2011. Sudan and South Sudan have yet to fully implement security and economic agreements signed in September 2012 relating to the normalization of relations between the two countries. The final disposition of the contested Abyei region has also to be decided. The 30-year reign of President Umar Hassan Ahmad al-BASHIR ended in his ouster in April 2019, and a Sovereignty Council, a joint civilian-military-executive body, holds power as of November 2019. ++ Following South Sudan's independence, conflict broke out between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states (together known as the Two Areas), resulting in a humanitarian crisis affecting more than a million people. A earlier conflict that broke out in the western region of Darfur in 2003, displaced nearly 2 million people and caused thousands of deaths.  While some repatriation has taken place, about 1.83 million IDPs remain in Sudan as of May 2019. Fighting in both the Two Areas and Darfur between government forces and opposition has largely subsided, however the civilian populations are affected by low-level violence including inter-tribal conflict and banditry, largely a result of weak rule of law. The UN and the African Union have jointly commanded a Darfur peacekeeping operation (UNAMID) since 2007, but are slowly drawing down as the situation in Darfur becomes more stable. Sudan also has faced refugee influxes from neighboring countries, primarily Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Armed conflict, poor transport infrastructure, and denial of access by both the government and armed opposition have impeded the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations. However, Sudan's new transitional government has stated its priority to allow greater humanitarian access, as the food security and humanitarian situation in Sudan worsens and as it appeals to the West for greater engagement."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
       "text": "dust storms and periodic persistent droughts"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
-      "text": "water pollution; inadequate supplies of potable water; water scarcity and periodic drought; wildlife populations threatened by excessive hunting; soil erosion; desertification; deforestation; loss of biodiversity  "
+      "text": "water pollution; inadequate supplies of potable water; water scarcity and periodic drought; wildlife populations threatened by excessive hunting; soil erosion; desertification; deforestation; loss of biodiversity ++  "
     },
     "Environment - international agreements": {
       "party to": {
@@ -255,14 +255,11 @@
       "text": "12.2% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99% of population / rural: 80.7% of population / total: 87% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "19.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "13% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1% of population / rural: 19.3% of population / total: 13% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "0.7 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 27.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 72.1% of population / rural: 30.6% of population / total: 44.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "69.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "55.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 27.9% of population / rural: 69.4% of population / total: 55.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -452,10 +446,10 @@
         "text": "according to the August 2019 Constitutional Decree, which established Sudan's transitional government, the Transitional Legislative Council (TLC) will serve as the national legislature during the transitional period until elections can be held in 2022; as of early December 2019, the TLC had not been established"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Council of State - last held 1 June 2015 National Assembly - last held on 13-15 April 2015 note - elections for an as yet defined new legislature to be held in 2022 at the expiry of the Transnational Legislative Council"
+        "text": "Council of State - last held 1 June 2015 ++ National Assembly - last held on 13-15 April 2015 ++ note - elections for an as yet defined new legislature to be held in 2022 at the expiry of the Transnational Legislative Council"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Council of State - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 35, women 19, percent of women 35.2%National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NCP 323, DUP 25, Democratic Unionist Party 15, other 44, independent 19; composition - men 296 women 130, percent of women 30.5%; note - total National Legislature percent of women 31%"
+        "text": "Council of State - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 35, women 19, percent of women 35.2% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NCP 323, DUP 25, Democratic Unionist Party 15, other 44, independent 19; composition - men 296 women 130, percent of women 30.5%; note - total National Legislature percent of women 31%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -470,7 +464,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Unionist Party or DUP [Jalal al-DIGAIR]Democratic Unionist Party [Muhammad Uthman al-MIRGHANI]Federal Umma Party [Dr. Ahmed Babikir NAHAR]Muslim Brotherhood or MBNational Congress Party or NCP (in November 2019, Sudan's transitional government approved a law to \"dismantle\" the regime of former President Omar al-Bashir, including the dissolution of his political party, the NCP) National Umma Party or NUP [Saddiq al-MAHDI]Popular Congress Party or PCP [Hassan al-TURABI]Reform Movement Now [Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin al-ATABANI]Sudan National Front [Ali Mahmud HASANAYN]Sudanese Communist Party or SCP [Mohammed Moktar Al-KHATEEB]Sudanese Congress Party or SCoP [Ibrahim Al-SHEIKH]Umma Party for Reform and DevelopmentUnionist Movement Party or UMP"
+      "text": "Democratic Unionist Party or DUP [Jalal al-DIGAIR] ++ Democratic Unionist Party [Muhammad Uthman al-MIRGHANI] ++ Federal Umma Party [Dr. Ahmed Babikir NAHAR] ++ Muslim Brotherhood or MB ++ National Congress Party or NCP (in November 2019, Sudan's transitional government approved a law to \"dismantle\" the regime of former President Omar al-Bashir, including the dissolution of his political party, the NCP) ++ National Umma Party or NUP [Saddiq al-MAHDI] ++ Popular Congress Party or PCP [Hassan al-TURABI] ++ Reform Movement Now [Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin al-ATABANI]Sudan National Front [Ali Mahmud HASANAYN] ++ Sudanese Communist Party or SCP [Mohammed Moktar Al-KHATEEB] ++ Sudanese Congress Party or SCoP [Ibrahim Al-SHEIKH] ++ Umma Party for Reform and Development ++ Unionist Movement Party or UMP"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ABEDA, ACP, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AU, CAEU, COMESA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAS, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
@@ -526,7 +520,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Sudan has experienced protracted social conflict and the loss of three quarters of its oil production due to the secession of South Sudan. The oil sector had driven much of Sudan's GDP growth since 1999. For nearly a decade, the economy boomed on the back of rising oil production, high oil prices, and significant inflows of foreign direct investment. Since the economic shock of South Sudan's secession, Sudan has struggled to stabilize its economy and make up for the loss of foreign exchange earnings. The interruption of oil production in South Sudan in 2012 for over a year and the consequent loss of oil transit fees further exacerbated the fragile state of Sudan’s economy. Ongoing conflicts in Southern Kordofan, Darfur, and the Blue Nile states, lack of basic infrastructure in large areas, and reliance by much of the population on subsistence agriculture, keep close to half of the population at or below the poverty line. Sudan was subject to comprehensive US sanctions, which were lifted in October 2017. Sudan is attempting to develop non-oil sources of revenues, such as gold mining and agriculture, while carrying out an austerity program to reduce expenditures. The world’s largest exporter of gum Arabic, Sudan produces 75-80% of the world’s total output. Agriculture continues to employ 80% of the work force. Sudan introduced a new currency, still called the Sudanese pound, following South Sudan's secession, but the value of the currency has fallen since its introduction. Khartoum formally devalued the currency in June 2012, when it passed austerity measures that included gradually repealing fuel subsidies. Sudan also faces high inflation, which reached 47% on an annual basis in November 2012 but fell to about 35% per year in 2017. (2017)"
+      "text": "Sudan has experienced protracted social conflict and the loss of three quarters of its oil production due to the secession of South Sudan. The oil sector had driven much of Sudan's GDP growth since 1999. For nearly a decade, the economy boomed on the back of rising oil production, high oil prices, and significant inflows of foreign direct investment. Since the economic shock of South Sudan's secession, Sudan has struggled to stabilize its economy and make up for the loss of foreign exchange earnings. The interruption of oil production in South Sudan in 2012 for over a year and the consequent loss of oil transit fees further exacerbated the fragile state of Sudan's economy. Ongoing conflicts in Southern Kordofan, Darfur, and the Blue Nile states, lack of basic infrastructure in large areas, and reliance by much of the population on subsistence agriculture, keep close to half of the population at or below the poverty line. ++ Sudan was subject to comprehensive US sanctions, which were lifted in October 2017. Sudan is attempting to develop non-oil sources of revenues, such as gold mining and agriculture, while carrying out an austerity program to reduce expenditures. The world's largest exporter of gum Arabic, Sudan produces 75-80% of the world's total output. Agriculture continues to employ 80% of the work force. ++ Sudan introduced a new currency, still called the Sudanese pound, following South Sudan's secession, but the value of the currency has fallen since its introduction. Khartoum formally devalued the currency in June 2012, when it passed austerity measures that included gradually repealing fuel subsidies. Sudan also faces high inflation, which reached 47% on an annual basis in November 2012 but fell to about 35% per year in 2017. (2017)"
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$177.4 billion (2017 est.) / $174.9 billion (2016 est.) / $169.8 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -923,7 +917,7 @@
     "Military and security service personnel strengths": {
       "text": "size assessments for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) vary widely, ranging from about 100,000 to more than 200,000 active personnel, including approximately 1,500 Navy and 3,000 Air Force; est. 30-40,000 paramilitary Rapid Support Forces; est. 20,000 Reserve Department (formerly the paramilitary Popular Defense Forces) (2019)",
       "note": {
-        "text": "note: in August 2020, Sudan and the major rebel group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) signed an agreement to integrate the group's fighters into the Sudanese Army by the end of 2023"
+        "text": "note: in August 2020, Sudan and the major rebel group Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) signed an agreement to integrate the group's fighters into the Sudanese Army by the end of 2023"
       }
     },
     "Military equipment inventories and acquisitions": {
@@ -936,7 +930,7 @@
       "text": "18-33 years of age for male and female compulsory or voluntary military service; 1-2 year service obligation (2013)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; UNISFA had about 4,000 personnel deployed as of January 2020in addition, the United Nations African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has operated in the war-torn Darfur region since 2007; UNAMID is a joint African Union-UN peacekeeping force with the mission of bringing stability to Darfur, including protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and promoting mediation efforts, while peace talks on a final settlement continue; as of March 2020, UNAMID had about 6,500 personnel deployed (2020)"
+      "text": "United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; UNISFA had about 4,000 personnel deployed as of January 2020 ++ in addition, the United Nations African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has operated in the war-torn Darfur region since 2007; UNAMID is a joint African Union-UN peacekeeping force with the mission of bringing stability to Darfur, including protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and promoting mediation efforts, while peace talks on a final settlement continue; as of March 2020, UNAMID had about 6,500 personnel deployed (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {

africa/to.json

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 43.7%, folk 35.6%, Muslim 14%, Hindu <.1%, Buddhist <.1%, Jewish <.1%, other .5%, none 6.2% (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Togo’s population is estimated to have grown to four times its size between 1960 and 2010. With nearly 60% of its populace under the age of 25 and a high annual growth rate attributed largely to high fertility, Togo’s population is likely to continue to expand for the foreseeable future. Reducing fertility, boosting job creation, and improving education will be essential to reducing the country’s high poverty rate. In 2008, Togo eliminated primary school enrollment fees, leading to higher enrollment but increased pressure on limited classroom space, teachers, and materials. Togo has a good chance of achieving universal primary education, but educational quality, the underrepresentation of girls, and the low rate of enrollment in secondary and tertiary schools remain concerns.\nTogo is both a country of emigration and asylum. In the early 1990s, southern Togo suffered from the economic decline of the phosphate sector and ethnic and political repression at the hands of dictator Gnassingbe EYADEMA and his northern, Kabye-dominated administration. The turmoil led 300,000 to 350,000 predominantly southern Togolese to flee to Benin and Ghana, with most not returning home until relative stability was restored in 1997. In 2005, another outflow of 40,000 Togolese to Benin and Ghana occurred when violence broke out between the opposition and security forces over the disputed election of EYADEMA’s son Faure GNASSINGBE to the presidency. About half of the refugees reluctantly returned home in 2006, many still fearing for their safety. Despite ethnic tensions and periods of political unrest, Togo in September 2017 was home to more than 9,600 refugees from Ghana."
+      "text": "Togo's population is estimated to have grown to four times its size between 1960 and 2010. With nearly 60% of its populace under the age of 25 and a high annual growth rate attributed largely to high fertility, Togo's population is likely to continue to expand for the foreseeable future. Reducing fertility, boosting job creation, and improving education will be essential to reducing the country's high poverty rate. In 2008, Togo eliminated primary school enrollment fees, leading to higher enrollment but increased pressure on limited classroom space, teachers, and materials. Togo has a good chance of achieving universal primary education, but educational quality, the underrepresentation of girls, and the low rate of enrollment in secondary and tertiary schools remain concerns. ++ Togo is both a country of emigration and asylum. In the early 1990s, southern Togo suffered from the economic decline of the phosphate sector and ethnic and political repression at the hands of dictator Gnassingbe EYADEMA and his northern, Kabye-dominated administration. The turmoil led 300,000 to 350,000 predominantly southern Togolese to flee to Benin and Ghana, with most not returning home until relative stability was restored in 1997. In 2005, another outflow of 40,000 Togolese to Benin and Ghana occurred when violence broke out between the opposition and security forces over the disputed election of EYADEMA's son Faure GNASSINGBE to the presidency. About half of the refugees reluctantly returned home in 2006, many still fearing for their safety. Despite ethnic tensions and periods of political unrest, Togo in September 2017 was home to more than 9,600 refugees from Ghana."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -264,14 +264,11 @@
       "text": "23.9% (2017)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 7.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 92.3% of population / rural: 56% of population / total: 70.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "44% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "29.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 7.7% of population / rural: 44% of population / total: 29.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -284,14 +281,11 @@
       "text": "0.7 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 19.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 80.4% of population (2015 est.) / rural: 16.2% of population / total: 41.6% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "83.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "57.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 19.6% of population / rural: 83.8% of population / total: 57.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -487,7 +481,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Action Committee for Renewal or CAR [Yaovi AGBOYIBO]Alliance of Democrats for Integral Development or ADDI [Tchaboure GOGUE]Democratic Convention of African Peoples or CDPA [Brigitte ADJAMAGBO-JOHNSON]Democratic Forces for the Republic or FDR [Dodji APEVON]National Alliance for Change or ANC [Jean-Pierre FABRE]New Togolese Commitment [Gerry TAAMA]Pan-African National Party or PNP [Tikpi ATCHADAM]Pan-African Patriotic Convergence or CPP [Edem KODJO]Patriotic Movement for Democracy and Development or MPDD [Agbeyome KODJO] Socialist Pact for Renewal or PSR [Abi TCHESSA]The Togolese Party [Nathaniel OLYMPIO]Union of Forces for Change or UFC [Gilchrist OLYMPIO]Union for the Republic or UNIR [Faure GNASSINGBE]"
+      "text": "Action Committee for Renewal or CAR [Yaovi AGBOYIBO] ++ Alliance of Democrats for Integral Development or ADDI [Tchaboure GOGUE] ++ Democratic Convention of African Peoples or CDPA [Brigitte ADJAMAGBO-JOHNSON] ++ Democratic Forces for the Republic or FDR [Dodji APEVON] ++ National Alliance for Change or ANC [Jean-Pierre FABRE] ++ New Togolese Commitment [Gerry TAAMA] ++ Pan-African National Party or PNP [Tikpi ATCHADAM] ++ Pan-African Patriotic Convergence or CPP [Edem KODJO] ++ Patriotic Movement for Democracy and Development or MPDD [Agbeyome KODJO] ++ Socialist Pact for Renewal or PSR [Abi TCHESSA] ++ The Togolese Party [Nathaniel OLYMPIO] ++ Union of Forces for Change or UFC [Gilchrist OLYMPIO] ++ Union for the Republic or UNIR [Faure GNASSINGBE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, ECOWAS, EITI (compliant country), Entente, FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSMA, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WADB (regional), WAEMU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -546,7 +540,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Togo has enjoyed a period of steady economic growth fueled by political stability and a concerted effort by the government to modernize the country’s commercial infrastructure, but discontent with President Faure GNASSINGBE has led to a rapid rise in protests, creating downside risks. The country completed an ambitious large-scale infrastructure improvement program, including new principal roads, a new airport terminal, and a new seaport. The economy depends heavily on both commercial and subsistence agriculture, providing employment for around 60% of the labor force. Some basic foodstuffs must still be imported. Cocoa, coffee, and cotton and other agricultural products generate about 20% of export earnings with cotton being the most important cash crop. Togo is among the world's largest producers of phosphate and seeks to develop its carbonate phosphate reserves, which provide more than 20% of export earnings. Supported by the World Bank and the IMF, the government's decade-long effort to implement economic reform measures, encourage foreign investment, and bring revenues in line with expenditures has moved slowly. Togo completed its IMF Extended Credit Facility in 2011 and reached a Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief completion point in 2010 at which 95% of the country's debt was forgiven. Togo continues to work with the IMF on structural reforms, and in January 2017, the IMF signed an Extended Credit Facility arrangement consisting of a three-year $238 million loan package. Progress depends on follow through on privatization, increased transparency in government financial operations, progress toward legislative elections, and continued support from foreign donors. Togo’s 2017 economic growth probably remained steady at 5.0%, largely driven by infusions of foreign aid, infrastructure investment in its port and mineral industry, and improvements in the business climate. Foreign direct investment inflows have slowed in recent years."
+      "text": "Togo has enjoyed a period of steady economic growth fueled by political stability and a concerted effort by the government to modernize the country's commercial infrastructure, but discontent with President Faure GNASSINGBE has led to a rapid rise in protests, creating downside risks. The country completed an ambitious large-scale infrastructure improvement program, including new principal roads, a new airport terminal, and a new seaport. The economy depends heavily on both commercial and subsistence agriculture, providing employment for around 60% of the labor force. Some basic foodstuffs must still be imported. Cocoa, coffee, and cotton and other agricultural products generate about 20% of export earnings with cotton being the most important cash crop. Togo is among the world's largest producers of phosphate and seeks to develop its carbonate phosphate reserves, which provide more than 20% of export earnings. ++ Supported by the World Bank and the IMF, the government's decade-long effort to implement economic reform measures, encourage foreign investment, and bring revenues in line with expenditures has moved slowly. Togo completed its IMF Extended Credit Facility in 2011 and reached a Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief completion point in 2010 at which 95% of the country's debt was forgiven. Togo continues to work with the IMF on structural reforms, and in January 2017, the IMF signed an Extended Credit Facility arrangement consisting of a three-year $238 million loan package. Progress depends on follow through on privatization, increased transparency in government financial operations, progress toward legislative elections, and continued support from foreign donors. ++ Togo's 2017 economic growth probably remained steady at 5.0%, largely driven by infusions of foreign aid, infrastructure investment in its port and mineral industry, and improvements in the business climate. Foreign direct investment inflows have slowed in recent years."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$12.97 billion (2017 est.) / $12.42 billion (2016 est.) / $11.82 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -914,7 +908,7 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Togolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Togolaise, FAT): Togolese Army (l'Armee de Terre), Togolese Navy (Forces Naval Togolaises), Togolese Air Force (Armee de l’Air), National Gendarmerie (2020)"
+      "text": "Togolese Armed Forces (Forces Armees Togolaise, FAT): Togolese Army (l'Armee de Terre), Togolese Navy (Forces Naval Togolaises), Togolese Air Force (Armee de l'Air), National Gendarmerie (2020)"
     },
     "Military expenditures": {
       "text": "3.1% of GDP (2019) / 2% of GDP (2018) / 1.9% of GDP (2017) / 1.9% of GDP (2016) / 1.7% of GDP (2015)"

africa/tp.json

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
       "text": "Catholic 55.7%, Adventist 4.1%, Assembly of God 3.4%, New Apostolic 2.9%, Mana 2.3%, Universal Kingdom of God 2%, Jehovah's Witness 1.2%, other 6.2%, none 21.2%, unspecified 1% (2012 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Sao Tome and Principe’s youthful age structure – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – and high fertility rate ensure future population growth. Although Sao Tome has a net negative international migration rate, emigration is not a sufficient safety valve to reduce already high levels of unemployment and poverty. While literacy and primary school attendance have improved in recent years, Sao Tome still struggles to improve its educational quality and to increase its secondary school completion rate. Despite some improvements in education and access to healthcare, Sao Tome and Principe has much to do to decrease its high poverty rate, create jobs, and increase its economic growth.\nThe population of Sao Tome and Principe descends primarily from the islands’ colonial Portuguese settlers, who first arrived in the late 15th century, and the much larger number of African slaves brought in for sugar production and the slave trade. For about 100 years after the abolition of slavery in 1876, the population was further shaped by the widespread use of imported unskilled contract laborers from Portugal’s other African colonies, who worked on coffee and cocoa plantations. In the first decades after abolition, most workers were brought from Angola under a system similar to slavery. While Angolan laborers were technically free, they were forced or coerced into long contracts that were automatically renewed and extended to their children. Other contract workers from Mozambique and famine-stricken Cape Verde first arrived in the early 20th century under short-term contracts and had the option of repatriation, although some chose to remain in Sao Tome and Principe.\nToday’s Sao Tomean population consists of mesticos (creole descendants of the European immigrants and African slaves that first inhabited the islands), forros (descendants of freed African slaves), angolares (descendants of runaway African slaves that formed a community in the south of Sao Tome Island and today are fishermen), servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), tongas (locally born children of contract laborers), and lesser numbers of Europeans and Asians."
+      "text": "Sao Tome and Principe's youthful age structure – more than 60% of the population is under the age of 25 – and high fertility rate ensure future population growth. Although Sao Tome has a net negative international migration rate, emigration is not a sufficient safety valve to reduce already high levels of unemployment and poverty. While literacy and primary school attendance have improved in recent years, Sao Tome still struggles to improve its educational quality and to increase its secondary school completion rate. Despite some improvements in education and access to healthcare, Sao Tome and Principe has much to do to decrease its high poverty rate, create jobs, and increase its economic growth. ++ The population of Sao Tome and Principe descends primarily from the islands' colonial Portuguese settlers, who first arrived in the late 15th century, and the much larger number of African slaves brought in for sugar production and the slave trade. For about 100 years after the abolition of slavery in 1876, the population was further shaped by the widespread use of imported unskilled contract laborers from Portugal's other African colonies, who worked on coffee and cocoa plantations. In the first decades after abolition, most workers were brought from Angola under a system similar to slavery. While Angolan laborers were technically free, they were forced or coerced into long contracts that were automatically renewed and extended to their children. Other contract workers from Mozambique and famine-stricken Cape Verde first arrived in the early 20th century under short-term contracts and had the option of repatriation, although some chose to remain in Sao Tome and Principe. ++ Today's Sao Tomean population consists of mesticos (creole descendants of the European immigrants and African slaves that first inhabited the islands), forros (descendants of freed African slaves), angolares (descendants of runaway African slaves that formed a community in the south of Sao Tome Island and today are fishermen), servicais (contract laborers from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde), tongas (locally born children of contract laborers), and lesser numbers of Europeans and Asians."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -256,14 +256,11 @@
       "text": "40.6% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 88.4% of population / total: 96.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "11.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "3.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 11.6% of population / total: 3.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -276,14 +273,11 @@
       "text": "2.9 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 45.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 54.4% of population / rural: 35.3% of population / total: 49.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "64.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "50.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 45.6% of population / rural: 64.7% of population / total: 50.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -470,7 +464,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Force for Democratic Change Movement or MDFM [Fradique Bandeira Melo DE MENEZES]Independent Democratic Action or ADI [vacant]Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe-Social Democratic Party or MLSTP-PSD [Aurelio MARTINS]Party for Democratic Convergence-Reflection Group or PCD-GR [Leonel Mario D'ALVA]other small parties"
+      "text": "Force for Democratic Change Movement or MDFM [Fradique Bandeira Melo DE MENEZES] ++ Independent Democratic Action or ADI [vacant] ++ Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe-Social Democratic Party or MLSTP-PSD [Aurelio MARTINS] ++ Party for Democratic Convergence-Reflection Group or PCD-GR [Leonel Mario D'ALVA] ++ other small parties"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AOSIS, AU, CD, CEMAC, CPLP, EITI (candidate country), FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), IPU, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"
@@ -515,7 +509,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The economy of São Tomé and Príncipe is small, based mainly on agricultural production, and, since independence in 1975, increasingly dependent on the export of cocoa beans. Cocoa production has substantially declined in recent years because of drought and mismanagement. Sao Tome depends heavily on imports of food, fuels, most manufactured goods, and consumer goods, and changes in commodity prices affect the country’s inflation rate. Maintaining control of inflation, fiscal discipline, and increasing flows of foreign direct investment into the nascent oil sector are major economic problems facing the country. In recent years the government has attempted to reduce price controls and subsidies. In 2017, several business-related laws were enacted that aim to improve the business climate. São Tomé and Príncipe has had difficulty servicing its external debt and has relied heavily on concessional aid and debt rescheduling. In April 2011, the country completed a Threshold Country Program with The Millennium Challenge Corporation to help increase tax revenues, reform customs, and improve the business environment. In 2016, Sao Tome and Portugal signed a five-year cooperation agreement worth approximately $64 million, some of which will be provided as loans. In 2017, China and São Tomé signed a mutual cooperation agreement in areas such as infrastructure, health, and agriculture worth approximately $146 million over five years. Considerable potential exists for development of tourism, and the government has taken steps to expand tourist facilities in recent years. Potential also exists for the development of petroleum resources in São Tomé and Príncipe's territorial waters in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, some of which are being jointly developed in a 60-40 split with Nigeria, but production is at least several years off. Volatile aid and investment inflows have limited growth, and poverty remains high. Restricteded capacity at the main port increases the periodic risk of shortages of consumer goods. Contract enforcement in the country’s judicial system is difficult. The IMF in late 2016 expressed concern about vulnerabilities in the country’s banking sector, although the country plans some austerity measures in line with IMF recommendations under their three year extended credit facility. Deforestation, coastal erosion, poor waste management, and misuse of natural resources also are challenging issues."
+      "text": "The economy of São Tomé and Príncipe is small, based mainly on agricultural production, and, since independence in 1975, increasingly dependent on the export of cocoa beans. Cocoa production has substantially declined in recent years because of drought and mismanagement. Sao Tome depends heavily on imports of food, fuels, most manufactured goods, and consumer goods, and changes in commodity prices affect the country's inflation rate. Maintaining control of inflation, fiscal discipline, and increasing flows of foreign direct investment into the nascent oil sector are major economic problems facing the country. In recent years the government has attempted to reduce price controls and subsidies. In 2017, several business-related laws were enacted that aim to improve the business climate. ++ São Tomé and Príncipe has had difficulty servicing its external debt and has relied heavily on concessional aid and debt rescheduling. In April 2011, the country completed a Threshold Country Program with The Millennium Challenge Corporation to help increase tax revenues, reform customs, and improve the business environment. In 2016, Sao Tome and Portugal signed a five-year cooperation agreement worth approximately $64 million, some of which will be provided as loans. In 2017, China and São Tomé signed a mutual cooperation agreement in areas such as infrastructure, health, and agriculture worth approximately $146 million over five years. ++ Considerable potential exists for development of tourism, and the government has taken steps to expand tourist facilities in recent years. Potential also exists for the development of petroleum resources in São Tomé and Príncipe's territorial waters in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, some of which are being jointly developed in a 60-40 split with Nigeria, but production is at least several years off. ++ Volatile aid and investment inflows have limited growth, and poverty remains high. Restricteded capacity at the main port increases the periodic risk of shortages of consumer goods. Contract enforcement in the country's judicial system is difficult. The IMF in late 2016 expressed concern about vulnerabilities in the country's banking sector, although the country plans some austerity measures in line with IMF recommendations under their three year extended credit facility. Deforestation, coastal erosion, poor waste management, and misuse of natural resources also are challenging issues."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$686 million (2017 est.) / $660.4 million (2016 est.) / $633.9 million (2015 est.)",

africa/ts.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Tunisia has been the nexus of many different colonizations including those of the Phoenicians (as early as the 12 century B.C.), the Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, various Arab and Berber kingdoms, and the Ottomans (16th to late 19th centuries). Rivalry between French and Italian interests in Tunisia culminated in a French invasion in 1881 and the creation of a protectorate. Agitation for independence in the decades following World War I was finally successful in convincing the French to recognize Tunisia as an independent state in 1956. The country's first president, Habib BOURGUIBA, established a strict one-party state. He dominated the country for 31 years, repressing Islamic fundamentalism and establishing rights for women unmatched by any other Arab nation. In November 1987, BOURGUIBA was removed from office and replaced by Zine el Abidine BEN ALI in a bloodless coup. Street protests that began in Tunis in December 2010 over high unemployment, corruption, widespread poverty, and high food prices escalated in January 2011, culminating in rioting that led to hundreds of deaths. On 14 January 2011, the same day BEN ALI dismissed the government, he fled the country, and by late January 2011, a \"national unity government\" was formed. Elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held in late October 2011, and in December, it elected human rights activist Moncef MARZOUKI as interim president. The Assembly began drafting a new constitution in February 2012 and, after several iterations and a months-long political crisis that stalled the transition, ratified the document in January 2014. Parliamentary and presidential elections for a permanent government were held at the end of 2014. Beji CAID ESSEBSI was elected as the first president under the country's new constitution. Following ESSEBSI’s death in office in July 2019, Tunisia moved its scheduled presidential election forward two months and after two rounds of voting, Kais SAIED was sworn in as president in October 2019. Tunisia also held legislative elections on schedule in October 2019. SAIED's term, as well as that of Tunisia's 217-member parliament, expires in 2024."
+      "text": "Tunisia has been the nexus of many different colonizations including those of the Phoenicians (as early as the 12 century B.C.), the Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, various Arab and Berber kingdoms, and the Ottomans (16th to late 19th centuries). Rivalry between French and Italian interests in Tunisia culminated in a French invasion in 1881 and the creation of a protectorate. Agitation for independence in the decades following World War I was finally successful in convincing the French to recognize Tunisia as an independent state in 1956. The country's first president, Habib BOURGUIBA, established a strict one-party state. He dominated the country for 31 years, repressing Islamic fundamentalism and establishing rights for women unmatched by any other Arab nation. In November 1987, BOURGUIBA was removed from office and replaced by Zine el Abidine BEN ALI in a bloodless coup. Street protests that began in Tunis in December 2010 over high unemployment, corruption, widespread poverty, and high food prices escalated in January 2011, culminating in rioting that led to hundreds of deaths. On 14 January 2011, the same day BEN ALI dismissed the government, he fled the country, and by late January 2011, a \"national unity government\" was formed. Elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held in late October 2011, and in December, it elected human rights activist Moncef MARZOUKI as interim president. The Assembly began drafting a new constitution in February 2012 and, after several iterations and a months-long political crisis that stalled the transition, ratified the document in January 2014. Parliamentary and presidential elections for a permanent government were held at the end of 2014. Beji CAID ESSEBSI was elected as the first president under the country's new constitution. Following ESSEBSI's death in office in July 2019, Tunisia moved its scheduled presidential election forward two months and after two rounds of voting, Kais SAIED was sworn in as president in October 2019. Tunisia also held legislative elections on schedule in October 2019. SAIED's term, as well as that of Tunisia's 217-member parliament, expires in 2024."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim (official; Sunni) 99.1%, other (includes Christian, Jewish, Shia Muslim, and Baha'i) 1%"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "The Tunisian Government took steps in the 1960s to decrease population growth and gender inequality in order to improve socioeconomic development. Through its introduction of a national family planning program (the first in Africa) and by raising the legal age of marriage, Tunisia rapidly reduced its total fertility rate from about 7 children per woman in 1960 to 2 today. Unlike many of its North African and Middle Eastern neighbors, Tunisia will soon be shifting from being a youth-bulge country to having a transitional age structure, characterized by lower fertility and mortality rates, a slower population growth rate, a rising median age, and a longer average life expectancy.\nCurrently, the sizable young working-age population is straining Tunisia’s labor market and education and health care systems. Persistent high unemployment among Tunisia’s growing workforce, particularly its increasing number of university graduates and women, was a key factor in the uprisings that led to the overthrow of the BEN ALI regime in 2011. In the near term, Tunisia’s large number of jobless young, working-age adults; deficiencies in primary and secondary education; and the ongoing lack of job creation and skills mismatches could contribute to future unrest. In the longer term, a sustained low fertility rate will shrink future youth cohorts and alleviate demographic pressure on Tunisia’s labor market, but employment and education hurdles will still need to be addressed.\nTunisia has a history of labor emigration. In the 1960s, workers migrated to European countries to escape poor economic conditions and to fill Europe’s need for low-skilled labor in construction and manufacturing. The Tunisian Government signed bilateral labor agreements with France, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, and the Netherlands, with the expectation that Tunisian workers would eventually return home. At the same time, growing numbers of Tunisians headed to Libya, often illegally, to work in the expanding oil industry. In the mid-1970s, with European countries beginning to restrict immigration and Tunisian-Libyan tensions brewing, Tunisian economic migrants turned toward the Gulf countries. After mass expulsions from Libya in 1983, Tunisian migrants increasingly sought family reunification in Europe or moved illegally to southern Europe, while Tunisia itself developed into a transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants heading to Europe.\nFollowing the ousting of BEN ALI in 2011, the illegal migration of unemployed Tunisian youths to Italy and onward to France soared into the tens of thousands. Thousands more Tunisian and foreign workers escaping civil war in Libya flooded into Tunisia and joined the exodus. A readmission agreement signed by Italy and Tunisia in April 2011 helped stem the outflow, leaving Tunisia and international organizations to repatriate, resettle, or accommodate some 1 million Libyans and third-country nationals."
+      "text": "The Tunisian Government took steps in the 1960s to decrease population growth and gender inequality in order to improve socioeconomic development. Through its introduction of a national family planning program (the first in Africa) and by raising the legal age of marriage, Tunisia rapidly reduced its total fertility rate from about 7 children per woman in 1960 to 2 today. Unlike many of its North African and Middle Eastern neighbors, Tunisia will soon be shifting from being a youth-bulge country to having a transitional age structure, characterized by lower fertility and mortality rates, a slower population growth rate, a rising median age, and a longer average life expectancy. ++ Currently, the sizable young working-age population is straining Tunisia's labor market and education and health care systems. Persistent high unemployment among Tunisia's growing workforce, particularly its increasing number of university graduates and women, was a key factor in the uprisings that led to the overthrow of the BEN ALI regime in 2011. In the near term, Tunisia's large number of jobless young, working-age adults; deficiencies in primary and secondary education; and the ongoing lack of job creation and skills mismatches could contribute to future unrest. In the longer term, a sustained low fertility rate will shrink future youth cohorts and alleviate demographic pressure on Tunisia's labor market, but employment and education hurdles will still need to be addressed. ++ Tunisia has a history of labor emigration. In the 1960s, workers migrated to European countries to escape poor economic conditions and to fill Europe's need for low-skilled labor in construction and manufacturing. The Tunisian Government signed bilateral labor agreements with France, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, and the Netherlands, with the expectation that Tunisian workers would eventually return home. At the same time, growing numbers of Tunisians headed to Libya, often illegally, to work in the expanding oil industry. In the mid-1970s, with European countries beginning to restrict immigration and Tunisian-Libyan tensions brewing, Tunisian economic migrants turned toward the Gulf countries. After mass expulsions from Libya in 1983, Tunisian migrants increasingly sought family reunification in Europe or moved illegally to southern Europe, while Tunisia itself developed into a transit point for Sub-Saharan migrants heading to Europe. ++ Following the ousting of BEN ALI in 2011, the illegal migration of unemployed Tunisian youths to Italy and onward to France soared into the tens of thousands. Thousands more Tunisian and foreign workers escaping civil war in Libya flooded into Tunisia and joined the exodus. A readmission agreement signed by Italy and Tunisia in April 2011 helped stem the outflow, leaving Tunisia and international organizations to repatriate, resettle, or accommodate some 1 million Libyans and third-country nationals."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "50.7% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 94.3% of population / total: 98.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "5.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 5.7% of population / total: 1.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "2.2 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.6% of population / rural: 92.4% of population / total: 95.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "7.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "4.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.4% of population / rural: 7.6% of population / total: 4.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -432,7 +426,7 @@
         "text": "president directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term (eligible for a second term); last held on 15 September 2019 with a runoff on 13 October 2019 (next to be held in 2024); following legislative elections, the prime minister is selected by the winning party or winning coalition and appointed by the president"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "first round - Kais SAIED (independent) 18.4%, Nabil KAROUI (Heart of Tunisia) 15.6%, Abdelfattah MOUROU (Nahda Movement) 12.9%, Abdelkrim ZBIDI(independent) 10.7%,Youssef CHAHED (Long Live Tunisia) 7.4%, Safi SAID (independent) 7.1%, Lotfi MRAIHI (Republican People's Union) 6.6%, other 21.3%; runoff - Kais SAIED elected president; Kais SAIED 72.7%, Nabil KAROUI 27.3%            "
+        "text": "first round - Kais SAIED (independent) 18.4%, Nabil KAROUI (Heart of Tunisia) 15.6%, Abdelfattah MOUROU (Nahda Movement) 12.9%, Abdelkrim ZBIDI(independent) 10.7%,Youssef CHAHED (Long Live Tunisia) 7.4%, Safi SAID (independent) 7.1%, Lotfi MRAIHI (Republican People's Union) 6.6%, other 21.3%; runoff - Kais SAIED elected president; Kais SAIED 72.7%, Nabil KAROUI 27.3% ++   ++   ++   ++   ++   ++  "
       }
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
@@ -461,7 +455,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Afek Tounes [Yassine BRAHIM]Al Badil Al-Tounisi (The Tunisian Alternative) [Mehdi JOMAA]Call for Tunisia Party (Nidaa Tounes) [Hafedh CAID ESSEBSI]Congress for the Republic Party or CPR [Imed DAIMI]Current of Love [Hachemi HAMDI] (formerly the Popular Petition party)Democratic Alliance Party [Mohamed HAMDI]Democratic Current [Mohamed ABBOU]Democratic Patriots' Unified Party [Zied LAKHDHAR]Dignity Coalition [Seifeddine MAKHIOUF]Free Destourian Party [Abir MOUSSI]Free Patriotic Union (Union patriotique libre) or UPL  [Slim RIAHI]Green Tunisia Party [Abdelkader ZITOUNI]Heart of Tunisia (Qalb Tounes)Irada MovementLong Live Tunisia (Tahya Tounes) [Youssef CHAHED]Machrou Tounes (Tunisia Project) [Mohsen MARZOUK]Movement of Socialist Democrats or MDS [Ahmed KHASKHOUSSI]Ennahda Movement (The Renaissance) [Rachid GHANNOUCHI]National Destourian Initiative or El Moubadra [Kamel MORJANE]Party of the Democratic Arab Vanguard [Ahmed JEDDICK, Kheireddine SOUABNI]People's Movement [Zouheir MAGHZAOUI]Popular Front (coalition includes Democratic Patriots' Unified Party, Workers' Party, Green Tunisia, Tunisian Ba'ath Movement, Party of the Democratic Arab Vanguard)Republican Party [Maya JRIBI]Tunisian Ba'ath Movement [OMAR Othman BELHADJ]Tunisia First (Tunis Awlan) [Ridha BELHAJ]Workers' Party [Hamma HAMMAMI]"
+      "text": "Afek Tounes [Yassine BRAHIM]Al Badil Al-Tounisi (The Tunisian Alternative) [Mehdi JOMAA] ++ Call for Tunisia Party (Nidaa Tounes) [Hafedh CAID ESSEBSI] ++ Congress for the Republic Party or CPR [Imed DAIMI] ++ Current of Love [Hachemi HAMDI] (formerly the Popular Petition party) ++ Democratic Alliance Party [Mohamed HAMDI] ++ Democratic Current [Mohamed ABBOU] ++ Democratic Patriots' Unified Party [Zied LAKHDHAR] ++ Dignity Coalition [Seifeddine MAKHIOUF] ++ Free Destourian Party [Abir MOUSSI] ++ Free Patriotic Union (Union patriotique libre) or UPL  [Slim RIAHI] ++ Green Tunisia Party [Abdelkader ZITOUNI] ++ Heart of Tunisia (Qalb Tounes) ++ Irada Movement ++ Long Live Tunisia (Tahya Tounes) [Youssef CHAHED] ++ Machrou Tounes (Tunisia Project) [Mohsen MARZOUK] ++ Movement of Socialist Democrats or MDS [Ahmed KHASKHOUSSI] ++ Ennahda Movement (The Renaissance) [Rachid GHANNOUCHI] ++ National Destourian Initiative or El Moubadra [Kamel MORJANE] ++ Party of the Democratic Arab Vanguard [Ahmed JEDDICK, Kheireddine SOUABNI] ++ People's Movement [Zouheir MAGHZAOUI] ++ Popular Front (coalition includes Democratic Patriots' Unified Party, Workers' Party, Green Tunisia, Tunisian Ba'ath Movement, Party of the Democratic Arab Vanguard) ++ Republican Party [Maya JRIBI] ++ Tunisian Ba'ath Movement [OMAR Othman BELHADJ] ++ Tunisia First (Tunis Awlan) [Ridha BELHAJ] ++ Workers' Party [Hamma HAMMAMI]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ABEDA, AfDB, AFESD, AMF, AMU, AU, BSEC (observer), CAEU, CD, EBRD, FAO, G-11, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, MONUSCO, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OIF, OPCW, OSCE (partner), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -520,7 +514,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Tunisia's economy – structurally designed to favor vested interests – faced an array of challenges exposed by the 2008 global financial crisis that helped precipitate the 2011 Arab Spring revolution. After the revolution and a series of terrorist attacks, including on the country’s tourism sector, barriers to economic inclusion continued to add to slow economic growth and high unemployment. Following an ill-fated experiment with socialist economic policies in the 1960s, Tunisia focused on bolstering exports, foreign investment, and tourism, all of which have become central to the country's economy. Key exports now include textiles and apparel, food products, petroleum products, chemicals, and phosphates, with about 80% of exports bound for Tunisia's main economic partner, the EU. Tunisia's strategy, coupled with investments in education and infrastructure, fueled decades of 4-5% annual GDP growth and improved living standards. Former President Zine el Abidine BEN ALI (1987-2011) continued these policies, but as his reign wore on cronyism and corruption stymied economic performance, unemployment rose, and the informal economy grew. Tunisia’s economy became less and less inclusive. These grievances contributed to the January 2011 overthrow of BEN ALI, further depressing Tunisia's economy as tourism and investment declined sharply. Tunisia’s government remains under pressure to boost economic growth quickly to mitigate chronic socio-economic challenges, especially high levels of youth unemployment, which has persisted since the 2011 revolution. Successive terrorist attacks against the tourism sector and worker strikes in the phosphate sector, which combined account for nearly 15% of GDP, slowed growth from 2015 to 2017. Tunis is seeking increased foreign investment and working with the IMF through an Extended Fund Facility agreement to fix fiscal deficiencies."
+      "text": "Tunisia's economy – structurally designed to favor vested interests – faced an array of challenges exposed by the 2008 global financial crisis that helped precipitate the 2011 Arab Spring revolution. After the revolution and a series of terrorist attacks, including on the country's tourism sector, barriers to economic inclusion continued to add to slow economic growth and high unemployment. ++ Following an ill-fated experiment with socialist economic policies in the 1960s, Tunisia focused on bolstering exports, foreign investment, and tourism, all of which have become central to the country's economy. Key exports now include textiles and apparel, food products, petroleum products, chemicals, and phosphates, with about 80% of exports bound for Tunisia's main economic partner, the EU. Tunisia's strategy, coupled with investments in education and infrastructure, fueled decades of 4-5% annual GDP growth and improved living standards. Former President Zine el Abidine BEN ALI (1987-2011) continued these policies, but as his reign wore on cronyism and corruption stymied economic performance, unemployment rose, and the informal economy grew. Tunisia's economy became less and less inclusive. These grievances contributed to the January 2011 overthrow of BEN ALI, further depressing Tunisia's economy as tourism and investment declined sharply. ++ Tunisia's government remains under pressure to boost economic growth quickly to mitigate chronic socio-economic challenges, especially high levels of youth unemployment, which has persisted since the 2011 revolution. Successive terrorist attacks against the tourism sector and worker strikes in the phosphate sector, which combined account for nearly 15% of GDP, slowed growth from 2015 to 2017. Tunis is seeking increased foreign investment and working with the IMF through an Extended Fund Facility agreement to fix fiscal deficiencies."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$137.7 billion (2017 est.) / $135 billion (2016 est.) / $133.5 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -914,7 +908,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Tunisia is a source, destination, and possible transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; Tunisia’s increased number of street children, rural children working to support their families, and migrants who have fled unrest in neighboring countries are vulnerable to human trafficking; organized gangs force street children to serve as thieves, beggars, and drug transporters; Tunisian women have been forced into prostitution domestically and elsewhere in the region under false promises of legitimate work; East and West African women may be subjected to forced labor as domestic workers"
+        "text": "Tunisia is a source, destination, and possible transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; Tunisia's increased number of street children, rural children working to support their families, and migrants who have fled unrest in neighboring countries are vulnerable to human trafficking; organized gangs force street children to serve as thieves, beggars, and drug transporters; Tunisian women have been forced into prostitution domestically and elsewhere in the region under false promises of legitimate work; East and West African women may be subjected to forced labor as domestic workers"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Tunisia does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, Tunisia was granted a waiver from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented would constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; in early 2015, the government drafted a national anti-trafficking action plan outlining proposals to raise awareness and enact draft anti-trafficking legislation; authorities did not provide data on the prosecution and conviction of offenders but reportedly identified 24 victims, as opposed to none in 2013, and operated facilities specifically dedicated to trafficking victims, regardless of nationality and gender; the government did not fully implement its national victim referral mechanism; some unidentified victims were not protected from punishment for unlawful acts directly resulting from being trafficked (2015)"

africa/tz.json

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
       "text": "the largest and most populous East African country; population distribution is extremely uneven, but greater population clusters occur in the northern half of country and along the east coast as shown in this population distribution map"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "flooding on the central plateau during the rainy season; drought\nvolcanism: limited volcanic activity; Ol Doinyo Lengai (2,962 m) has emitted lava in recent years; other historically active volcanoes include Kieyo and Meru"
+      "text": "flooding on the central plateau during the rainy season; drought ++ volcanism: limited volcanic activity; Ol Doinyo Lengai (2,962 m) has emitted lava in recent years; other historically active volcanoes include Kieyo and Meru"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "water polution; improper management of liquid waste; indoor air pollution caused by the burning of fuel wood or charcoal for cooking and heating is a large environmental health issue; soil degradation; deforestation; desertification; destruction of coral reefs threatens marine habitats; wildlife threatened by illegal hunting and trade, especially for ivory; loss of biodiversity; solid waste disposal"
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; almost a third of the population is urban. Tanzania’s youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is under 25 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.8 children per woman. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country’s nearly 3% annual growth. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality\nFor Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa’s largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania."
+      "text": "Tanzania has the largest population in East Africa and the lowest population density; almost a third of the population is urban. Tanzania's youthful population – about two-thirds of the population is under 25 – is growing rapidly because of the high total fertility rate of 4.8 children per woman. Progress in reducing the birth rate has stalled, sustaining the country's nearly 3% annual growth. The maternal mortality rate has improved since 2000, yet it remains very high because of early and frequent pregnancies, inadequate maternal health services, and a lack of skilled birth attendants – problems that are worse among poor and rural women. Tanzania has made strides in reducing under-5 and infant mortality rates, but a recent drop in immunization threatens to undermine gains in child health. Malaria is a leading killer of children under 5, while HIV is the main source of adult mortality ++ For Tanzania, most migration is internal, rural to urban movement, while some temporary labor migration from towns to plantations takes place seasonally for harvests. Tanzania was Africa's largest refugee-hosting country for decades, hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Great Lakes region, primarily Burundi, over the last fifty years. However, the assisted repatriation and naturalization of tens of thousands of Burundian refugees between 2002 and 2014 dramatically reduced the refugee population. Tanzania is increasingly a transit country for illegal migrants from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region who are heading to southern Africa for security reasons and/or economic opportunities. Some of these migrants choose to settle in Tanzania."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -270,14 +270,11 @@
       "text": "38.4% (2015/16)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 7.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 92.3% of population / rural: 56.2% of population / total: 68.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "43.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "31.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 7.7% of population / rural: 43.8% of population / total: 31.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -290,14 +287,11 @@
       "text": "0.7 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 17.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 82.1% of population / rural: 29.5% of population / total: 46.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "70.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "53.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 17.9% of population / rural: 70.5% of population / total: 53.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -478,7 +472,7 @@
         "text": "Tanzania National Assembly and Zanzibar House of Representatives - elections last held on 25 October 2015 (next National Assembly election to be held in October 2020; next Zanzibar election either October 2020 or March 2021); note the Zanzibar Electoral Commission annulled the 2015 election; repoll held on 20 March 2016"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "National Assembly - percent of vote by party - CCM 55%, Chadema 31.8%, CUF 8.6%, other 4.6%; seats by party - CCM 253, Chadema 70, CUF 42, other 2; composition as of September 2018 - men 245, women 145, percent of women 37.2%Zanzibar House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - NA"
+        "text": "National Assembly - percent of vote by party - CCM 55%, Chadema 31.8%, CUF 8.6%, other 4.6%; seats by party - CCM 253, Chadema 70, CUF 42, other 2; composition as of September 2018 - men 245, women 145, percent of women 37.2% ++ Zanzibar House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - NA"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -493,7 +487,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for Change and Transparency (Wazalendo) or ACT [Zitto KABWE]Alliance for Democratic Change or ADC [Miraji ABDALLAH] Civic United Front (Chama Cha Wananchi) or CUF [Ibrahim LIPUMBA]National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi or NCCR-M [James Francis MBATIA]National League for DemocracyParty of Democracy and Development (Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo) or Chadema [Freeman MBOWE]Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) or CCM [John MAGUFULI]Tanzania Labor Party or TLP [Augustine MREMA]United Democratic Party or UDP [John Momose CHEYO]",
+      "text": "Alliance for Change and Transparency (Wazalendo) or ACT [Zitto KABWE] ++ Alliance for Democratic Change or ADC [Miraji ABDALLAH] ++ Civic United Front (Chama Cha Wananchi) or CUF [Ibrahim LIPUMBA] ++ National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi or NCCR-M [James Francis MBATIA] ++ National League for Democracy ++ Party of Democracy and Development (Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo) or Chadema [Freeman MBOWE] ++ Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) or CCM [John MAGUFULI] ++ Tanzania Labor Party or TLP [Augustine MREMA] ++ United Democratic Party or UDP [John Momose CHEYO]",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: in March 2014, four opposition parties (CUF, CHADEMA, NCCR-Mageuzi, and NLD) united to form Coalition for the People's Constitution (Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi) or UKAWA; during local elections held in October, 2014, UKAWA entered one candidate representing the three parties united in the coalition"
       }
@@ -552,7 +546,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Tanzania has achieved high growth rates based on its vast natural resource wealth and tourism with GDP growth in 2009-17 averaging 6%-7% per year. Dar es Salaam used fiscal stimulus measures and easier monetary policies to lessen the impact of the global recession and in general, benefited from low oil prices. Tanzania has largely completed its transition to a market economy, though the government retains a presence in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, energy, and mining. The economy depends on agriculture, which accounts for slightly less than one-quarter of GDP and employs about 65% of the work force, although gold production in recent years has increased to about 35% of exports. All land in Tanzania is owned by the government, which can lease land for up to 99 years. Proposed reforms to allow for land ownership, particularly foreign land ownership, remain unpopular. The financial sector in Tanzania has expanded in recent years and foreign-owned banks account for about 48% of the banking industry's total assets. Competition among foreign commercial banks has resulted in significant improvements in the efficiency and quality of financial services, though interest rates are still relatively high, reflecting high fraud risk. Banking reforms have helped increase private-sector growth and investment. The World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral donors have provided funds to rehabilitate Tanzania's aging infrastructure, including rail and port, which provide important trade links for inland countries. In 2013, Tanzania completed the world's largest Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC) grant, worth $698 million, but in late 2015, the MCC Board of Directors deferred a decision to renew Tanzania’s eligibility because of irregularities in voting in Zanzibar and concerns over the government's use of a controversial cybercrime bill. The new government elected in 2015 has developed an ambitious development agenda focused on creating a better business environment through improved infrastructure, access to financing, and education progress, but implementing budgets remains challenging for the government. Recent policy moves by President MAGUFULI are aimed at protecting domestic industry and have caused concern among foreign investors."
+      "text": "Tanzania has achieved high growth rates based on its vast natural resource wealth and tourism with GDP growth in 2009-17 averaging 6%-7% per year. Dar es Salaam used fiscal stimulus measures and easier monetary policies to lessen the impact of the global recession and in general, benefited from low oil prices. Tanzania has largely completed its transition to a market economy, though the government retains a presence in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, energy, and mining. ++ The economy depends on agriculture, which accounts for slightly less than one-quarter of GDP and employs about 65% of the work force, although gold production in recent years has increased to about 35% of exports. All land in Tanzania is owned by the government, which can lease land for up to 99 years. Proposed reforms to allow for land ownership, particularly foreign land ownership, remain unpopular. ++ The financial sector in Tanzania has expanded in recent years and foreign-owned banks account for about 48% of the banking industry's total assets. Competition among foreign commercial banks has resulted in significant improvements in the efficiency and quality of financial services, though interest rates are still relatively high, reflecting high fraud risk. Banking reforms have helped increase private-sector growth and investment. ++ The World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral donors have provided funds to rehabilitate Tanzania's aging infrastructure, including rail and port, which provide important trade links for inland countries. In 2013, Tanzania completed the world's largest Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC) grant, worth $698 million, but in late 2015, the MCC Board of Directors deferred a decision to renew Tanzania's eligibility because of irregularities in voting in Zanzibar and concerns over the government's use of a controversial cybercrime bill. ++ The new government elected in 2015 has developed an ambitious development agenda focused on creating a better business environment through improved infrastructure, access to financing, and education progress, but implementing budgets remains challenging for the government. Recent policy moves by President MAGUFULI are aimed at protecting domestic industry and have caused concern among foreign investors."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$162.5 billion (2017 est.) / $153.3 billion (2016 est.) / $143.3 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -984,7 +978,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Tanzania is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; the exploitation of young girls in domestic servitude continues to be Tanzania’s largest human trafficking problem; Tanzanian boys are subject to forced labor mainly on farms but also in mines and quarries, in the informal commercial sector, in factories, in the sex trade, and possibly on small fishing boats; Tanzanian children and adults are subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sex trafficking in other African countries, the Middle East, Europe, and the US; internal trafficking is more prevalent than transnational trafficking and is usually facilitated by friends, family members, or intermediaries with false offers of education or legitimate jobs; trafficking victims from Burundi, Kenya, South Asia, and Yemen are forced to work in Tanzania’s agricultural, mining, and domestic service sectors or may be sex trafficked"
+        "text": "Tanzania is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; the exploitation of young girls in domestic servitude continues to be Tanzania's largest human trafficking problem; Tanzanian boys are subject to forced labor mainly on farms but also in mines and quarries, in the informal commercial sector, in factories, in the sex trade, and possibly on small fishing boats; Tanzanian children and adults are subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sex trafficking in other African countries, the Middle East, Europe, and the US; internal trafficking is more prevalent than transnational trafficking and is usually facilitated by friends, family members, or intermediaries with false offers of education or legitimate jobs; trafficking victims from Burundi, Kenya, South Asia, and Yemen are forced to work in Tanzania's agricultural, mining, and domestic service sectors or may be sex trafficked"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Tanzania does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, Tanzania was granted a waiver from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; the government adopted a three-year national action plan and implementing regulations for the 2008 anti-trafficking law; authorities somewhat increased their number of trafficking investigations and prosecutions and convicted one offender, but the penalty was a fine in lieu of prison, which was inadequate given the severity of the crime; the government did not operate any shelters for victims and relied on NGOs to provide protective services (2015)"

africa/ug.json

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 45.1% (Anglican 32.0%, Pentecostal/Born Again/Evangelical 11.1%, Seventh Day Adventist 1.7%, Baptist .3%), Roman Catholic 39.3%, Muslim 13.7%, other 1.6%, none 0.2% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Uganda has one of the youngest and most rapidly growing populations in the world; its total fertility rate is among the world’s highest at 5.8 children per woman. Except in urban areas, actual fertility exceeds women’s desired fertility by one or two children, which is indicative of the widespread unmet need for contraception, lack of government support for family planning, and a cultural preference for large families. High numbers of births, short birth intervals, and the early age of childbearing contribute to Uganda’s high maternal mortality rate. Gender inequities also make fertility reduction difficult; women on average are less-educated, participate less in paid employment, and often have little say in decisions over childbearing and their own reproductive health. However, even if the birth rate were significantly reduced, Uganda’s large pool of women entering reproductive age ensures rapid population growth for decades to come.\nUnchecked, population increase will further strain the availability of arable land and natural resources and overwhelm the country’s limited means for providing food, employment, education, health care, housing, and basic services. The country’s north and northeast lag even further behind developmentally than the rest of the country as a result of long-term conflict (the Ugandan Bush War 1981-1986 and more than 20 years of fighting between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Ugandan Government forces), ongoing inter-communal violence, and periodic natural disasters.\nUganda has been both a source of refugees and migrants and a host country for refugees. In 1972, then President Idi AMIN, in his drive to return Uganda to Ugandans, expelled the South Asian population that composed a large share of the country’s business people and bankers. Since the 1970s, thousands of Ugandans have emigrated, mainly to southern Africa or the West, for security reasons, to escape poverty, to search for jobs, and for access to natural resources. The emigration of Ugandan doctors and nurses due to low wages is a particular concern given the country’s shortage of skilled health care workers. Africans escaping conflicts in neighboring states have found refuge in Uganda since the 1950s; the country currently struggles to host tens of thousands from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and other nearby countries."
+      "text": "Uganda has one of the youngest and most rapidly growing populations in the world; its total fertility rate is among the world's highest at 5.8 children per woman. Except in urban areas, actual fertility exceeds women's desired fertility by one or two children, which is indicative of the widespread unmet need for contraception, lack of government support for family planning, and a cultural preference for large families. High numbers of births, short birth intervals, and the early age of childbearing contribute to Uganda's high maternal mortality rate. Gender inequities also make fertility reduction difficult; women on average are less-educated, participate less in paid employment, and often have little say in decisions over childbearing and their own reproductive health. However, even if the birth rate were significantly reduced, Uganda's large pool of women entering reproductive age ensures rapid population growth for decades to come. ++ Unchecked, population increase will further strain the availability of arable land and natural resources and overwhelm the country's limited means for providing food, employment, education, health care, housing, and basic services. The country's north and northeast lag even further behind developmentally than the rest of the country as a result of long-term conflict (the Ugandan Bush War 1981-1986 and more than 20 years of fighting between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Ugandan Government forces), ongoing inter-communal violence, and periodic natural disasters. ++ Uganda has been both a source of refugees and migrants and a host country for refugees. In 1972, then President Idi AMIN, in his drive to return Uganda to Ugandans, expelled the South Asian population that composed a large share of the country's business people and bankers. Since the 1970s, thousands of Ugandans have emigrated, mainly to southern Africa or the West, for security reasons, to escape poverty, to search for jobs, and for access to natural resources. The emigration of Ugandan doctors and nurses due to low wages is a particular concern given the country's shortage of skilled health care workers. Africans escaping conflicts in neighboring states have found refuge in Uganda since the 1950s; the country currently struggles to host tens of thousands from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and other nearby countries."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -255,14 +255,11 @@
       "text": "41.8% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 7.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 92.9% of population / rural: 77.2% of population / total: 80.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "22.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "19.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 7.1% of population / rural: 22.8% of population / total: 19.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -275,14 +272,11 @@
       "text": "0.5 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 32.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 67.8% of population / rural: 26.6% of population / total: 36.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "73.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "63.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 32.2% of population / rural: 73.4% of population / total: 63.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -466,7 +460,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for National Transformation or ANT [Ms. Alice ALASO, acting national coordinator]; note - Mugisha MUNTU resigned his position as ANT national coordinator in late June 2020 to run in the 2021 presidential electionDemocratic Party or DP [Norbert MAO]Forum for Democratic Change or FDC [Patrick Oboi AMURIAT]Justice Forum or JEEMA [Asuman BASALIRWA]National Resistance Movement or NRM [Yoweri MUSEVENI]Uganda People's Congress or UPC [James AKENA]"
+      "text": "Alliance for National Transformation or ANT [Ms. Alice ALASO, acting national coordinator]; note - Mugisha MUNTU resigned his position as ANT national coordinator in late June 2020 to run in the 2021 presidential election ++ Democratic Party or DP [Norbert MAO] ++ Forum for Democratic Change or FDC [Patrick Oboi AMURIAT] ++ Justice Forum or JEEMA [Asuman BASALIRWA] ++ National Resistance Movement or NRM [Yoweri MUSEVENI] ++ Uganda People's Congress or UPC [James AKENA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, COMESA, EAC, EADB, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IGAD, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -522,7 +516,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall, substantial reserves of recoverable oil, and small deposits of copper, gold, and other minerals. Agriculture is one of the most important sectors of the economy, employing 72% of the work force. The country’s export market suffered a major slump following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan, but has recovered lately, largely due to record coffee harvests, which account for 16% of exports, and increasing gold exports, which account for 10% of exports. Uganda has a small industrial sector that is dependent on imported inputs such as refined oil and heavy equipment. Overall, productivity is hampered by a number of supply-side constraints, including insufficient infrastructure, lack of modern technology in agriculture, and corruption. Uganda’s economic growth has slowed since 2016 as government spending and public debt has grown. Uganda’s budget is dominated by energy and road infrastructure spending, while Uganda relies on donor support for long-term drivers of growth, including agriculture, health, and education. The largest infrastructure projects are externally financed through concessional loans, but at inflated costs. As a result, debt servicing for these loans is expected to rise. Oil revenues and taxes are expected to become a larger source of government funding as oil production starts in the next three to 10 years. Over the next three to five years, foreign investors are planning to invest $9 billion in production facilities projects, $4 billion in an export pipeline, as well as in a $2-3 billion refinery to produce petroleum products for the domestic and East African Community markets. Furthermore, the government is looking to build several hundred million dollars’ worth of highway projects to the oil region. Uganda faces many economic challenges. Instability in South Sudan has led to a sharp increase in Sudanese refugees and is disrupting Uganda's main export market. Additional economic risks include: poor economic management, endemic corruption, and the government’s failure to invest adequately in the health, education, and economic opportunities for a burgeoning young population. Uganda has one of the lowest electrification rates in Africa - only 22% of Ugandans have access to electricity, dropping to 10% in rural areas."
+      "text": "Uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall, substantial reserves of recoverable oil, and small deposits of copper, gold, and other minerals. Agriculture is one of the most important sectors of the economy, employing 72% of the work force. The country's export market suffered a major slump following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan, but has recovered lately, largely due to record coffee harvests, which account for 16% of exports, and increasing gold exports, which account for 10% of exports. Uganda has a small industrial sector that is dependent on imported inputs such as refined oil and heavy equipment. Overall, productivity is hampered by a number of supply-side constraints, including insufficient infrastructure, lack of modern technology in agriculture, and corruption. ++ Uganda's economic growth has slowed since 2016 as government spending and public debt has grown. Uganda's budget is dominated by energy and road infrastructure spending, while Uganda relies on donor support for long-term drivers of growth, including agriculture, health, and education. The largest infrastructure projects are externally financed through concessional loans, but at inflated costs. As a result, debt servicing for these loans is expected to rise. ++ Oil revenues and taxes are expected to become a larger source of government funding as oil production starts in the next three to 10 years. Over the next three to five years, foreign investors are planning to invest $9 billion in production facilities projects, $4 billion in an export pipeline, as well as in a $2-3 billion refinery to produce petroleum products for the domestic and East African Community markets. Furthermore, the government is looking to build several hundred million dollars' worth of highway projects to the oil region. ++ Uganda faces many economic challenges. Instability in South Sudan has led to a sharp increase in Sudanese refugees and is disrupting Uganda's main export market. Additional economic risks include: poor economic management, endemic corruption, and the government's failure to invest adequately in the health, education, and economic opportunities for a burgeoning young population. Uganda has one of the lowest electrification rates in Africa - only 22% of Ugandans have access to electricity, dropping to 10% in rural areas."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$89.19 billion (2017 est.) / $85.07 billion (2016 est.) / $83.14 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -774,7 +768,7 @@
     },
     "Telecommunication systems": {
       "general assessment": {
-        "text": "in recent years, telecommunications infrastructure has developed through private partnerships; as of 2018, fixed fiber backbone infrastructure is available in over half of Uganda’s districts; mobile phone companies now provide 4G networks across all major cities and national parks, while offering 3G coverage in second-tier cities and most rural areas with road access; between 2016 and 2018, commercial Internet services dropped in price from $300/Mbps to $80/Mbps; consumers rely on mobile infrastructure to provide voice and broadband services as fixed-line infrastructure is poor; 5G migration is a few years off; govt. commissions broadband satellite services for rural areas (2020)"
+        "text": "in recent years, telecommunications infrastructure has developed through private partnerships; as of 2018, fixed fiber backbone infrastructure is available in over half of Uganda's districts; mobile phone companies now provide 4G networks across all major cities and national parks, while offering 3G coverage in second-tier cities and most rural areas with road access; between 2016 and 2018, commercial Internet services dropped in price from $300/Mbps to $80/Mbps; consumers rely on mobile infrastructure to provide voice and broadband services as fixed-line infrastructure is poor; 5G migration is a few years off; govt. commissions broadband satellite services for rural areas (2020)"
       },
       "domestic": {
         "text": "fixed-line 1 per 100 and mobile- cellular systems teledensity about 57 per 100 persons; intercity traffic by wire, microwave radio relay, and radiotelephone communication stations (2019)"

africa/uv.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Various ethnic groups settled and established kingdoms in the area of today's Burkina Faso from medieval times onward. In the late 19th century, several European states attempted to move into the region, but it was the French who established a protectorate of Upper Volta in 1896. Independent from France in 1960, the country changed its name to Burkina Faso in 1984. Repeated military coups during the 1970s and 1980s were followed by multiparty elections in the early 1990s. Former President Blaise COMPAORE (1987-2014) resigned in late October 2014 following popular protests against his efforts to amend the constitution's two-term presidential limit. An interim administration organized presidential and legislative elections - held in November 2015 - where Roch Marc Christian KABORE was elected president. The country experienced terrorist attacks in its capital in 2016, 2017, and 2018, while additional attacks in the country's northern and eastern regions resulted in more than 1,800 deaths and over 500,000 internally displaced persons in 2019. The Government of Burkina Faso has made numerous arrests of terrorist suspects, augmented the size of its special terrorism detachment Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT) in the country’s north, and joined the newly-created G5 Sahel Joint Force to fight terrorism and criminal trafficking groups with regional neighbors Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Burkina Faso's high population growth, recurring drought, pervasive and perennial food insecurity, and limited natural resources result in poor economic prospects for the majority of its citizens. (2019)"
+      "text": "Various ethnic groups settled and established kingdoms in the area of today's Burkina Faso from medieval times onward. In the late 19th century, several European states attempted to move into the region, but it was the French who established a protectorate of Upper Volta in 1896. Independent from France in 1960, the country changed its name to Burkina Faso in 1984. Repeated military coups during the 1970s and 1980s were followed by multiparty elections in the early 1990s. Former President Blaise COMPAORE (1987-2014) resigned in late October 2014 following popular protests against his efforts to amend the constitution's two-term presidential limit. An interim administration organized presidential and legislative elections - held in November 2015 - where Roch Marc Christian KABORE was elected president. The country experienced terrorist attacks in its capital in 2016, 2017, and 2018, while additional attacks in the country's northern and eastern regions resulted in more than 1,800 deaths and over 500,000 internally displaced persons in 2019. The Government of Burkina Faso has made numerous arrests of terrorist suspects, augmented the size of its special terrorism detachment Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT) in the country's north, and joined the newly-created G5 Sahel Joint Force to fight terrorism and criminal trafficking groups with regional neighbors Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Burkina Faso's high population growth, recurring drought, pervasive and perennial food insecurity, and limited natural resources result in poor economic prospects for the majority of its citizens. (2019)"
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim 61.5%, Roman Catholic 23.3%, traditional/animist 7.8%, Protestant 6.5%, other/no answer 0.2%, none 0.7% (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country’s limited arable land. More than 65% of the population is under the age of 25, and the population is growing at 3% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of almost 6 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today’s large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso’s large working-age population. Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d’Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d’Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,500 Malians as of May 2017. (2018)"
+      "text": "Burkina Faso has a young age structure – the result of declining mortality combined with steady high fertility – and continues to experience rapid population growth, which is putting increasing pressure on the country's limited arable land. More than 65% of the population is under the age of 25, and the population is growing at 3% annually. Mortality rates, especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of almost 6 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today's large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso's large working-age population. ++ Migration has traditionally been a way of life for Burkinabe, with seasonal migration being replaced by stints of up to two years abroad. Cote d'Ivoire remains the top destination, although it has experienced periods of internal conflict. Under French colonization, Burkina Faso became a main labor source for agricultural and factory work in Cote d'Ivoire. Burkinabe also migrated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal for work between the world wars. Burkina Faso attracts migrants from Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali, who often share common ethnic backgrounds with the Burkinabe. Despite its food shortages and high poverty rate, Burkina Faso has become a destination for refugees in recent years and hosts about 33,500 Malians as of May 2017. (2018)"
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "32.5% (2018/19)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 4.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 94.9% of population / rural: 67.9% of population / total: 75.6% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "32.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "24.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 4.5% of population / rural: 32.1% of population / total: 24.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "0.4 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 11.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 88.2% of population / rural: 30.2% of population / total: 46.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "69.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "53.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 11.8% of population / rural: 69.8% of population / total: 53.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -481,7 +475,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "African Democratic Rally/Alliance for Democracy and Federation or ADF/RDA [Gilbert Noel OUEDRAOGO]African People’s Movement or MAP [Victorien TOUGOUMA]Congress for Democracy and Progress or CDP [Eddie KOMBOIGO]Le Faso Autrement [Ablasse OUEDRAOGO]New Alliance of the Faso or NAFA [Mahamoudou DICKO]New Time for Democracy or NTD [Vincent DABILGOU]Organization for Democracy and Work or ODT [Anatole BONKOUNGOU]Party for Development and Change or PDC [Aziz SEREME]Party for Democracy and Progress-Socialist Party or PDP-PS [Drabo TORO]Party for Democracy and Socialism/Metba or PDS/Metba [Philippe OUEDRAOGO]Party for National Renaissance or PAREN [Michel BERE]People's Movement for Progress or MPP [Simon COMPAORE]Rally for Democracy and Socialism or RDS [Francois OUEDRAOGO]Rally for the Development of Burkina or RDB [Celestin Saidou COMPAORE]Rally of Ecologists of Burkina Faso or RDEB [Adama SERE]Soleil d’Avenir [Abdoulaye SOMA]Union for a New Burkina or UBN [Diemdioda DICKO]Union for Progress and Change or UPC [Zephirin DIABRE]Union for Rebirth - Sankarist Party or UNIR-MS [Benewende Stanislas SANKARA]Union for the Republic or UPR [Toussaint Abel COULIBALY]Youth Alliance for the Republic and Independence or AJIR [Adama KANAZOE]"
+      "text": "African Democratic Rally/Alliance for Democracy and Federation or ADF/RDA [Gilbert Noel OUEDRAOGO] ++ African People's Movement or MAP [Victorien TOUGOUMA] ++ Congress for Democracy and Progress or CDP [Eddie KOMBOIGO] ++ Le Faso Autrement [Ablasse OUEDRAOGO] ++ New Alliance of the Faso or NAFA [Mahamoudou DICKO] ++ New Time for Democracy or NTD [Vincent DABILGOU] ++ Organization for Democracy and Work or ODT [Anatole BONKOUNGOU] ++ Party for Development and Change or PDC [Aziz SEREME] ++ Party for Democracy and Progress-Socialist Party or PDP-PS [Drabo TORO] ++ Party for Democracy and Socialism/Metba or PDS/Metba [Philippe OUEDRAOGO] ++ Party for National Renaissance or PAREN [Michel BERE] ++ People's Movement for Progress or MPP [Simon COMPAORE] ++ Rally for Democracy and Socialism or RDS [Francois OUEDRAOGO] ++ Rally for the Development of Burkina or RDB [Celestin Saidou COMPAORE] ++ Rally of Ecologists of Burkina Faso or RDEB [Adama SERE] ++ Soleil d'Avenir [Abdoulaye SOMA] ++ Union for a New Burkina or UBN [Diemdioda DICKO] ++ Union for Progress and Change or UPC [Zephirin DIABRE] ++ Union for Rebirth - Sankarist Party or UNIR-MS [Benewende Stanislas SANKARA] ++ Union for the Republic or UPR [Toussaint Abel COULIBALY] ++ Youth Alliance for the Republic and Independence or AJIR [Adama KANAZOE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, CD, ECOWAS, EITI (compliant country), Entente, FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OIC, OIF, OPCW, PCA, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNITAR, UNWTO, UPU, WADB (regional), WAEMU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -540,7 +534,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Burkina Faso is a poor, landlocked country that depends on adequate rainfall. Irregular patterns of rainfall, poor soil, and the lack of adequate communications and other infrastructure contribute to the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. About 80% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and cotton is the main cash crop. The country has few natural resources and a weak industrial base. Cotton and gold are Burkina Faso’s key exports - gold has accounted for about three-quarters of the country’s total export revenues. Burkina Faso’s economic growth and revenue depends largely on production levels and global prices for the two commodities. The country has seen an upswing in gold exploration, production, and exports. In 2016, the government adopted a new development strategy, set forth in the 2016-2020 National Plan for Economic and Social Development, that aims to reduce poverty, build human capital, and to satisfy basic needs. A new three-year IMF program (2018-2020), approved in 2018, will allow the government to reduce the budget deficit and preserve critical spending on social services and priority public investments. While the end of the political crisis has allowed Burkina Faso’s economy to resume positive growth, the country’s fragile security situation could put these gains at risk. Political insecurity in neighboring Mali, unreliable energy supplies, and poor transportation links pose long-term challenges."
+      "text": "Burkina Faso is a poor, landlocked country that depends on adequate rainfall. Irregular patterns of rainfall, poor soil, and the lack of adequate communications and other infrastructure contribute to the economy's vulnerability to external shocks. About 80% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and cotton is the main cash crop. The country has few natural resources and a weak industrial base. ++ Cotton and gold are Burkina Faso's key exports - gold has accounted for about three-quarters of the country's total export revenues. Burkina Faso's economic growth and revenue depends largely on production levels and global prices for the two commodities. The country has seen an upswing in gold exploration, production, and exports. ++ In 2016, the government adopted a new development strategy, set forth in the 2016-2020 National Plan for Economic and Social Development, that aims to reduce poverty, build human capital, and to satisfy basic needs. A new three-year IMF program (2018-2020), approved in 2018, will allow the government to reduce the budget deficit and preserve critical spending on social services and priority public investments. ++ While the end of the political crisis has allowed Burkina Faso's economy to resume positive growth, the country's fragile security situation could put these gains at risk. Political insecurity in neighboring Mali, unreliable energy supplies, and poor transportation links pose long-term challenges."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$35.85 billion (2017 est.) / $33.69 billion (2016 est.) / $31.81 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -892,7 +886,7 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military and security forces": {
-      "text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF): Army of Burkina Faso (L’Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso, FABF), National Gendarmerie, National Fire Brigade (Brigade Nationale des Sapeurs-Pompiers, BNSP) (2019)",
+      "text": "Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FABF): Army of Burkina Faso (L'Armee de Terre, LAT), Air Force of Burkina Faso (Force Aerienne de Burkina Faso, FABF), National Gendarmerie, National Fire Brigade (Brigade Nationale des Sapeurs-Pompiers, BNSP) (2019)",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: the National Gendarmerie officially reports to the Ministry of Defense, but usually operates in support of the Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Justice; Gendarmerie troops are typically integrated with Army forces in anti-terrorism operations; for example, Gendarmerie, Army, and police forces were combined to form a task force known as the Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT) to address terrorist activities along the country's northern border in 2013"
       }
@@ -913,7 +907,7 @@
       "text": "18 years of age for voluntary military service; no conscription; women may serve in supporting roles (2013)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "since at least 2016, the Armed Forces of Burkina Faso have been actively engaged in combat operations with terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and ISIS; military operations have occurred in the Centre‐Est, Centre‐Nord, Est, Nord, and Sahel administrative regionsBurkina Faso is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries (2020)"
+      "text": "since at least 2016, the Armed Forces of Burkina Faso have been actively engaged in combat operations with terrorist groups linked to al-Qa'ida and ISIS; military operations have occurred in the Centre‐Est, Centre‐Nord, Est, Nord, and Sahel administrative regions ++ Burkina Faso is part of a five-nation anti-jihadist task force known as the G5 Sahel Group, set up in 2014 with Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; it has committed 550 troops and 100 gendarmes to the force; the G5 force is backed by the UN, US, and France; G5 troops periodically conduct joint operations with French forces deployed to the Sahel under Operation Barkhane; in early 2020, G5 Sahel military chiefs of staff agreed to allow defense forces from each of the states to pursue terrorist fighters up to 100 km into neighboring countries (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Terrorism": {

africa/wa.json

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 80% to 90% (at least 50% Lutheran), indigenous beliefs 10% to 20%"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Planning officials view Namibia’s reduced population growth rate as sustainable based on the country’s economic growth over the past decade. Prior to independence in 1990, Namibia’s relatively small population grew at about 3% annually, but declining fertility and the impact of HIV/AIDS slowed this growth to 1.4% by 2011, rebounding to close to 2% by 2016. Namibia’s fertility rate has fallen over the last two decades – from about 4.5 children per woman in 1996 to 3.4 in 2016 – due to increased contraceptive use, higher educational attainment among women, and greater female participation in the labor force. The average age at first birth has stayed fairly constant, but the age at first marriage continues to increase, indicating a rising incidence of premarital childbearing.\nThe majority of Namibians are rural dwellers (about 55%) and live in the better-watered north and northeast parts of the country. Migration, historically male-dominated, generally flows from northern communal areas – non-agricultural lands where blacks were sequestered under the apartheid system – to agricultural, mining, and manufacturing centers in the center and south. After independence from South Africa, restrictions on internal movement eased, and rural-urban migration increased, bolstering urban growth.\nSome Namibians – usually persons who are better-educated, more affluent, and from urban areas – continue to legally migrate to South Africa temporarily to visit family and friends and, much less frequently, to pursue tertiary education or better economic opportunities. Namibians concentrated along the country’s other borders make unauthorized visits to Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Botswana, to visit family and to trade agricultural goods. Few Namibians express interest in permanently settling in other countries; they prefer the safety of their homeland, have a strong national identity, and enjoy a well-supplied retail sector. Although Namibia is receptive to foreign investment and cross-border trade, intolerance toward non-citizens is widespread."
+      "text": "Planning officials view Namibia's reduced population growth rate as sustainable based on the country's economic growth over the past decade. Prior to independence in 1990, Namibia's relatively small population grew at about 3% annually, but declining fertility and the impact of HIV/AIDS slowed this growth to 1.4% by 2011, rebounding to close to 2% by 2016. Namibia's fertility rate has fallen over the last two decades – from about 4.5 children per woman in 1996 to 3.4 in 2016 – due to increased contraceptive use, higher educational attainment among women, and greater female participation in the labor force. The average age at first birth has stayed fairly constant, but the age at first marriage continues to increase, indicating a rising incidence of premarital childbearing. ++ The majority of Namibians are rural dwellers (about 55%) and live in the better-watered north and northeast parts of the country. Migration, historically male-dominated, generally flows from northern communal areas – non-agricultural lands where blacks were sequestered under the apartheid system – to agricultural, mining, and manufacturing centers in the center and south. After independence from South Africa, restrictions on internal movement eased, and rural-urban migration increased, bolstering urban growth. ++ Some Namibians – usually persons who are better-educated, more affluent, and from urban areas – continue to legally migrate to South Africa temporarily to visit family and friends and, much less frequently, to pursue tertiary education or better economic opportunities. Namibians concentrated along the country's other borders make unauthorized visits to Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, or Botswana, to visit family and to trade agricultural goods. Few Namibians express interest in permanently settling in other countries; they prefer the safety of their homeland, have a strong national identity, and enjoy a well-supplied retail sector. Although Namibia is receptive to foreign investment and cross-border trade, intolerance toward non-citizens is widespread."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -267,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "56.1% (2013)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.9% of population / rural: 80.8% of population / total: 89.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "19.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "10.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.1% of population / rural: 19.2% of population / total: 10.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -287,14 +284,11 @@
       "text": "2.7 beds/1,000 population (2009)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 27.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 72.9% of population / rural: 22% of population / total: 46.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "78% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "53.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 27.1% of population / rural: 78% of population / total: 53.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -455,13 +449,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:National Council (42 seats); members indirectly elected 3 each by the 14 regional councils to serve 5-year terms); note - the Council primarily reviews legislation passed and referred by the National Assembly National Assembly (104 seats; 96 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed list, proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms and 8 nonvoting members appointed by the president)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: National Council (42 seats); members indirectly elected 3 each by the 14 regional councils to serve 5-year terms); note - the Council primarily reviews legislation passed and referred by the National Assembly ++ National Assembly (104 seats; 96 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by closed list, proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms and 8 nonvoting members appointed by the president)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "National Council - elections for regional councils to determine members of the National Council held on 27 November 2015 (next to be held on 27 November 2020) National Assembly - last held on 27 November 2019 (next to be held in 2024)"
+        "text": "National Council - elections for regional councils to determine members of the National Council held on 27 November 2015 (next to be held on 27 November 2020) ++ National Assembly - last held on 27 November 2019 (next to be held in 2024)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "National Council - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - SWAPO 40, NUDO 1, DPM 1; composition - men 32, women 10, percent of women 23.8% National Assembly - percent of vote by party - SWAPO 65.5%, PDM 16.6%, LPM 4.7%, NUDO 1.9%, APP 1.8%, UDF 1.8%, RP 1.8%, NEFF 1.7%, RDP 1.1%, CDV .7%, SWANU .6%, other 1.8%; seats by party - SWAPO 63, PDM 16, LPM 4, NUDO 2, APP 2, UDF 2, RP 2, NEFF 2, RDP 1, CDV 1, SWANU 1; composition - NA"
+        "text": "National Council - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - SWAPO 40, NUDO 1, DPM 1; composition - men 32, women 10, percent of women 23.8% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - SWAPO 65.5%, PDM 16.6%, LPM 4.7%, NUDO 1.9%, APP 1.8%, UDF 1.8%, RP 1.8%, NEFF 1.7%, RDP 1.1%, CDV .7%, SWANU .6%, other 1.8%; seats by party - SWAPO 63, PDM 16, LPM 4, NUDO 2, APP 2, UDF 2, RP 2, NEFF 2, RDP 1, CDV 1, SWANU 1; composition - NA"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -476,7 +470,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "All People's Party or APP [Ignatius SHIXWAMENI]Christian Democratic Voice or CDV [Gothard KANDUME]Landless People's Movement or LPM [Bernadus SWARTBOOI]National Unity Democratic Organization or NUDO [Estes MUINJANGUE]Namibian Economic Freedom Fighters or NEFF [Epafras MUKWIILONGO]Popular Democratic Movement or PDM (formerly DTA) [McHenry VENAANI]Rally for Democracy and Progress or RDP [Mike KAVEKOTORA]Republican Party or RP [Henk MUDGE]South West Africa National Union or SWANU [Tangeni IIYAMBO]South West Africa People's Organization or SWAPO [Hage GEINGOB]United Democratic Front or UDF [Apius AUCHAB]United People's Movement or UPM [Jan J. VAN WYK]Workers' Revolutionary Party or WRP (formerly CPN) [MPs Salmon FLEERMUYS and Benson KAAPALA]"
+      "text": "All People's Party or APP [Ignatius SHIXWAMENI] ++ Christian Democratic Voice or CDV [Gothard KANDUME] ++ Landless People's Movement or LPM [Bernadus SWARTBOOI] ++ National Unity Democratic Organization or NUDO [Estes MUINJANGUE] ++ Namibian Economic Freedom Fighters or NEFF [Epafras MUKWIILONGO] ++ Popular Democratic Movement or PDM (formerly DTA) [McHenry VENAANI] ++ Rally for Democracy and Progress or RDP [Mike KAVEKOTORA] ++ Republican Party or RP [Henk MUDGE] ++ South West Africa National Union or SWANU [Tangeni IIYAMBO] ++ South West Africa People's Organization or SWAPO [Hage GEINGOB] ++ United Democratic Front or UDF [Apius AUCHAB] ++ United People's Movement or UPM [Jan J. VAN WYK] ++ Workers' Revolutionary Party or WRP (formerly CPN) [MPs Salmon FLEERMUYS and Benson KAAPALA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, CD, CPLP (associate observer), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, SACU, SADC, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -532,7 +526,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Namibia’s economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and processing of minerals for export. Mining accounts for about 12.5% of GDP, but provides more than 50% of foreign exchange earnings. Rich alluvial diamond deposits make Namibia a primary source for gem-quality diamonds. Marine diamond mining is increasingly important as the terrestrial diamond supply has dwindled. The rising cost of mining diamonds, especially from the sea, combined with increased diamond production in Russia and China, has reduced profit margins. Namibian authorities have emphasized the need to add value to raw materials, do more in-country manufacturing, and exploit the services market, especially in the logistics and transportation sectors. Namibia is one of the world’s largest producers of uranium. The Chinese-owned Husab uranium mine began producing uranium ore in 2017, and is expected to reach full production in August 2018 and produce 15 million pounds of uranium a year. Namibia also produces large quantities of zinc and is a smaller producer of gold and copper. Namibia's economy remains vulnerable to world commodity price fluctuations and drought. Namibia normally imports about 50% of its cereal requirements; in drought years, food shortages are problematic in rural areas. A high per capita GDP, relative to the region, obscures one of the world's most unequal income distributions; the current government has prioritized exploring wealth redistribution schemes while trying to maintain a pro-business environment. GDP growth in 2017 slowed to about 1%, however, due to contractions in both the construction and mining sectors, as well as an ongoing drought. Growth is expected to recover modestly in 2018. A five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation compact ended in September 2014. As an upper middle income country, Namibia is ineligible for a second compact. The Namibian economy is closely linked to South Africa with the Namibian dollar pegged one-to-one to the South African rand. Namibia receives 30%-40% of its revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); volatility in the size of Namibia's annual SACU allotment and global mineral prices complicates budget planning."
+      "text": "Namibia's economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and processing of minerals for export. Mining accounts for about 12.5% of GDP, but provides more than 50% of foreign exchange earnings. Rich alluvial diamond deposits make Namibia a primary source for gem-quality diamonds. Marine diamond mining is increasingly important as the terrestrial diamond supply has dwindled. The rising cost of mining diamonds, especially from the sea, combined with increased diamond production in Russia and China, has reduced profit margins. Namibian authorities have emphasized the need to add value to raw materials, do more in-country manufacturing, and exploit the services market, especially in the logistics and transportation sectors. ++ Namibia is one of the world's largest producers of uranium. The Chinese-owned Husab uranium mine began producing uranium ore in 2017, and is expected to reach full production in August 2018 and produce 15 million pounds of uranium a year. Namibia also produces large quantities of zinc and is a smaller producer of gold and copper. Namibia's economy remains vulnerable to world commodity price fluctuations and drought. ++ Namibia normally imports about 50% of its cereal requirements; in drought years, food shortages are problematic in rural areas. A high per capita GDP, relative to the region, obscures one of the world's most unequal income distributions; the current government has prioritized exploring wealth redistribution schemes while trying to maintain a pro-business environment. GDP growth in 2017 slowed to about 1%, however, due to contractions in both the construction and mining sectors, as well as an ongoing drought. Growth is expected to recover modestly in 2018. ++ A five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation compact ended in September 2014. As an upper middle income country, Namibia is ineligible for a second compact. The Namibian economy is closely linked to South Africa with the Namibian dollar pegged one-to-one to the South African rand. Namibia receives 30%-40% of its revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); volatility in the size of Namibia's annual SACU allotment and global mineral prices complicates budget planning."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$26.6 billion (2017 est.) / $26.81 billion (2016 est.) / $26.62 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -935,7 +929,7 @@
         "text": "Namibia is a country of origin and destination for children and, to a lesser extent, women subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; victims, lured by promises of legitimate jobs, are forced to work in urban centers and on commercial farms; traffickers exploit Namibian children, as well as children from Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, for forced labor in agriculture, cattle herding, domestic service, fishing, and street vending; children are also forced into prostitution, often catering to tourists from southern Africa and Europe; San and Zemba children are particularly vulnerable; foreign adults and Namibian adults and children are reportedly subjected to forced labor in Chinese-owned retail, construction, and fishing operations"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Namibia does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; Namibia was granted a waiver from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented would constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; in 2015, the Child Care and Protection Bill passed, criminalizing child trafficking; the government’s first sex trafficking prosecution remained pending; no new prosecutions were initiated and no trafficking offenders have ever been convicted; accusations of forced labor at Chinese construction and mining companies continue to go uninvestigated; authorities failed to fully implement victim identification and referral processes, which led to the deportation of possible victims (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Namibia does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; Namibia was granted a waiver from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented would constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; in 2015, the Child Care and Protection Bill passed, criminalizing child trafficking; the government's first sex trafficking prosecution remained pending; no new prosecutions were initiated and no trafficking offenders have ever been convicted; accusations of forced labor at Chinese construction and mining companies continue to go uninvestigated; authorities failed to fully implement victim identification and referral processes, which led to the deportation of possible victims (2015)"
       }
     }
   }

africa/wi.json

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
       "text": "Muslim"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Western Sahara is a non-self governing territory; approximately 75% is under Moroccan control. It was inhabited almost entirely by Sahrawi pastoral nomads until the mid-20th century. Their traditional vast migratory ranges, based on following unpredictable rainfall, did not coincide with colonial and later international borders. Since the 1930s, most Sahrawis have been compelled to adopt a sedentary lifestyle and to live in urban settings as a result of fighting, the presence of minefields, job opportunities in the phosphate industry, prolonged drought, the closure of Western Sahara’s border with Mauritania from 1979-2002, and the construction of the defensive berm separating Moroccan- and Polisario-controlled (Sahrawi liberalization movement) areas. Morocco supported rapid urbanization to facilitate surveillance and security.\nToday more than 80% of Western Sahara’s population lives in urban areas; more than 40% live in the administrative center Laayoune. Moroccan immigration has altered the composition and dramatically increased the size of Western Sahara’s population. Morocco maintains a large military presence in Western Sahara and has encouraged its citizens to settle there, offering bonuses, pay raises, and food subsidies to civil servants and a tax exemption, in order to integrate Western Sahara into the Moroccan Kingdom and, Sahrawis contend, to marginalize the native population.\nWestern Saharan Sahrawis have been migrating to Europe, principally to former colonial ruler Spain, since the 1950s. Many who moved to refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also have migrated to Spain and Italy, usually alternating between living in cities abroad with periods back at the camps. The Polisario claims that the population of the Tindouf camps is about 155,000, but this figure may include thousands of Arabs and Tuaregs from neighboring countries. Because international organizations have been unable to conduct an independent census in Tindouf, the UNHCR bases its aid on a figure of 90,000 refugees. Western Saharan coastal towns emerged as key migration transit points (for reaching Spain’s Canary Islands) in the mid-1990s, when Spain’s and Italy’s tightening of visa restrictions and EU pressure on Morocco and other North African countries to control illegal migration pushed Sub-Saharan African migrants to shift their routes to the south."
+      "text": "Western Sahara is a non-self governing territory; approximately 75% is under Moroccan control. It was inhabited almost entirely by Sahrawi pastoral nomads until the mid-20th century. Their traditional vast migratory ranges, based on following unpredictable rainfall, did not coincide with colonial and later international borders. Since the 1930s, most Sahrawis have been compelled to adopt a sedentary lifestyle and to live in urban settings as a result of fighting, the presence of minefields, job opportunities in the phosphate industry, prolonged drought, the closure of Western Sahara's border with Mauritania from 1979-2002, and the construction of the defensive berm separating Moroccan- and Polisario-controlled (Sahrawi liberalization movement) areas. Morocco supported rapid urbanization to facilitate surveillance and security. ++ Today more than 80% of Western Sahara's population lives in urban areas; more than 40% live in the administrative center Laayoune. Moroccan immigration has altered the composition and dramatically increased the size of Western Sahara's population. Morocco maintains a large military presence in Western Sahara and has encouraged its citizens to settle there, offering bonuses, pay raises, and food subsidies to civil servants and a tax exemption, in order to integrate Western Sahara into the Moroccan Kingdom and, Sahrawis contend, to marginalize the native population. ++ Western Saharan Sahrawis have been migrating to Europe, principally to former colonial ruler Spain, since the 1950s. Many who moved to refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also have migrated to Spain and Italy, usually alternating between living in cities abroad with periods back at the camps. The Polisario claims that the population of the Tindouf camps is about 155,000, but this figure may include thousands of Arabs and Tuaregs from neighboring countries. Because international organizations have been unable to conduct an independent census in Tindouf, the UNHCR bases its aid on a figure of 90,000 refugees. Western Saharan coastal towns emerged as key migration transit points (for reaching Spain's Canary Islands) in the mid-1990s, when Spain's and Italy's tightening of visa restrictions and EU pressure on Morocco and other North African countries to control illegal migration pushed Sub-Saharan African migrants to shift their routes to the south."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Western Sahara has a small market-based economy whose main industries are fishing, phosphate mining, tourism, and pastoral nomadism. The territory's arid desert climate makes sedentary agriculture difficult, and much of its food is imported. The Moroccan Government administers Western Sahara's economy and is a key source of employment, infrastructure development, and social spending in the territory. Western Sahara's unresolved legal status makes the exploitation of its natural resources a contentious issue between Morocco and the Polisario. Morocco and the EU in December 2013 finalized a four-year agreement allowing European vessels to fish off the coast of Morocco, including disputed waters off the coast of Western Sahara. As of April 2018, Moroccan and EU authorities were negotiating an amendment to renew the agreement. Oil has never been found in Western Sahara in commercially significant quantities, but Morocco and the Polisario have quarreled over rights to authorize and benefit from oil exploration in the territory. Western Sahara's main long-term economic challenge is the development of a more diverse set of industries capable of providing greater employment and income to the territory. However, following King MOHAMMED VI’s November 2015 visit to Western Sahara, the Government of Morocco announced a series of investments aimed at spurring economic activity in the region, while the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises announced a $609 million investment initiative in the region in March 2015."
+      "text": "Western Sahara has a small market-based economy whose main industries are fishing, phosphate mining, tourism, and pastoral nomadism. The territory's arid desert climate makes sedentary agriculture difficult, and much of its food is imported. The Moroccan Government administers Western Sahara's economy and is a key source of employment, infrastructure development, and social spending in the territory. ++ Western Sahara's unresolved legal status makes the exploitation of its natural resources a contentious issue between Morocco and the Polisario. Morocco and the EU in December 2013 finalized a four-year agreement allowing European vessels to fish off the coast of Morocco, including disputed waters off the coast of Western Sahara. As of April 2018, Moroccan and EU authorities were negotiating an amendment to renew the agreement. ++ Oil has never been found in Western Sahara in commercially significant quantities, but Morocco and the Polisario have quarreled over rights to authorize and benefit from oil exploration in the territory. Western Sahara's main long-term economic challenge is the development of a more diverse set of industries capable of providing greater employment and income to the territory. However, following King MOHAMMED VI's November 2015 visit to Western Sahara, the Government of Morocco announced a series of investments aimed at spurring economic activity in the region, while the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises announced a $609 million investment initiative in the region in March 2015."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$906.5 million (2007 est.)"
@@ -540,12 +540,12 @@
   },
   "Military and Security": {
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has operated in the Western Sahara since 1991 in accordance with settlement proposals accepted in 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO); the Mission's responsibilities include monitoring the ceasefire, reducing the threat of mines and unexploded ordnance, and providing logistic support to the UNHCR-led Confidence Building Measures pending an agreement to resume those activities, which were suspended in June 2014; as of November 2019, MINURSO had about 460 personnel deployed  "
+      "text": "the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has operated in the Western Sahara since 1991 in accordance with settlement proposals accepted in 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO); the Mission's responsibilities include monitoring the ceasefire, reducing the threat of mines and unexploded ordnance, and providing logistic support to the UNHCR-led Confidence Building Measures pending an agreement to resume those activities, which were suspended in June 2014; as of November 2019, MINURSO had about 460 personnel deployed ++  "
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
     "Disputes - international": {
-      "text": "many neighboring states reject Moroccan administration of Western Sahara; several states have extended diplomatic relations to the \"Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic\" represented by the Polisario Front in exile in Algeria, while others support Morocco’s proposal to grant the territory autonomy as part of Morocco, although no state recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara; an estimated 100,000 Sahrawi refugees continue to be sheltered in camps in Tindouf, Algeria, which has hosted Sahrawi refugees since the 1980s"
+      "text": "++ many neighboring states reject Moroccan administration of Western Sahara; several states have extended diplomatic relations to the \"Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic\" represented by the Polisario Front in exile in Algeria, while others support Morocco's proposal to grant the territory autonomy as part of Morocco, although no state recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara; an estimated 100,000 Sahrawi refugees continue to be sheltered in camps in Tindouf, Algeria, which has hosted Sahrawi refugees since the 1980s"
     }
   }
 }

africa/wz.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Autonomy for Eswatini was guaranteed by the British in the late 19th century; independence was granted in 1968. A new constitution came into effect in 2006, which included provisions for a more independent parliament and judiciary, but the legal status of political parties remains unclear. King MSWATI III renamed the country from Swaziland to Eswatini in April 2018. Despite its classification as a lower-middle income country, Eswatini suffers from severe poverty and high unemployment. Eswatini has the world's highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, although recent years have shown marked declines in new infections.        "
+      "text": "Autonomy for Eswatini was guaranteed by the British in the late 19th century; independence was granted in 1968. A new constitution came into effect in 2006, which included provisions for a more independent parliament and judiciary, but the legal status of political parties remains unclear. King MSWATI III renamed the country from Swaziland to Eswatini in April 2018. Despite its classification as a lower-middle income country, Eswatini suffers from severe poverty and high unemployment. Eswatini has the world's highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, although recent years have shown marked declines in new infections.   ++   ++   ++  "
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Christian 90% (Zionist - a blend of Christianity and indigenous ancestral worship - 40%, Roman Catholic 20%, other 30% - includes Anglican, Methodist, Mormon, Jehovah's Witness), Muslim 2%, other 8% (includes Baha'i, Buddhist, Hindu, indigenous, Jewish) (2015 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Eswatini, a small, predominantly rural, landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, suffers from severe poverty and the world’s highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. A weak and deteriorating economy, high unemployment, rapid population growth, and an uneven distribution of resources all combine to worsen already persistent poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Erratic weather (frequent droughts and intermittent heavy rains and flooding), overuse of small plots, the overgrazing of cattle, and outdated agricultural practices reduce crop yields and further degrade the environment, exacerbating Eswatini's poverty and subsistence problems. Eswatini's extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – more than 28% of adults have the disease – compounds these issues. Agricultural production has declined due to HIV/AIDS, as the illness causes households to lose manpower and to sell livestock and other assets to pay for medicine and funerals.\nSwazis, mainly men from the country’s rural south, have been migrating to South Africa to work in coal, and later gold, mines since the late 19th century. Although the number of miners abroad has never been high in absolute terms because of Eswatini's small population, the outflow has had important social and economic repercussions. The peak of mining employment in South Africa occurred during the 1980s. Cross-border movement has accelerated since the 1990s, as increasing unemployment has pushed more Swazis to look for work in South Africa (creating a \"brain drain\" in the health and educational sectors); southern Swazi men have continued to pursue mining, although the industry has downsized. Women now make up an increasing share of migrants and dominate cross-border trading in handicrafts, using the proceeds to purchase goods back in Eswatini. Much of today’s migration, however, is not work-related but focuses on visits to family and friends, tourism, and shopping."
+      "text": "Eswatini, a small, predominantly rural, landlocked country surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, suffers from severe poverty and the world's highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. A weak and deteriorating economy, high unemployment, rapid population growth, and an uneven distribution of resources all combine to worsen already persistent poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas. Erratic weather (frequent droughts and intermittent heavy rains and flooding), overuse of small plots, the overgrazing of cattle, and outdated agricultural practices reduce crop yields and further degrade the environment, exacerbating Eswatini's poverty and subsistence problems. Eswatini's extremely high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate – more than 28% of adults have the disease – compounds these issues. Agricultural production has declined due to HIV/AIDS, as the illness causes households to lose manpower and to sell livestock and other assets to pay for medicine and funerals. ++ Swazis, mainly men from the country's rural south, have been migrating to South Africa to work in coal, and later gold, mines since the late 19th century. Although the number of miners abroad has never been high in absolute terms because of Eswatini's small population, the outflow has had important social and economic repercussions. The peak of mining employment in South Africa occurred during the 1980s. Cross-border movement has accelerated since the 1990s, as increasing unemployment has pushed more Swazis to look for work in South Africa (creating a \"brain drain\" in the health and educational sectors); southern Swazi men have continued to pursue mining, although the industry has downsized. Women now make up an increasing share of migrants and dominate cross-border trading in handicrafts, using the proceeds to purchase goods back in Eswatini. Much of today's migration, however, is not work-related but focuses on visits to family and friends, tourism, and shopping."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -252,14 +252,11 @@
       "text": "66.1% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 96.8% of population / rural: 72.3% of population / total: 78.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "27.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "21.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 3.2% of population / rural: 27.7% of population / total: 21.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -272,14 +269,11 @@
       "text": "2.1 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 6.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 93.5% of population / rural: 82.4% of population / total: 85% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "17.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "15% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 6.5% of population / rural: 17.6% of population / total: 15% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -448,13 +442,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament (Libandla) consists of: Senate (30 seats; 20 members appointed by the monarch and 10 indirectly elected by simple majority vote by the House of Assembly; members serve 5-year terms)House of Assembly (73 seats; 59 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies or tinkhundla by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed, 10 members appointed by the monarch, 4 women elected by the members if representation of elected women is less than 30%; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament (Libandla) consists of: Senate (30 seats; 20 members appointed by the monarch and 10 indirectly elected by simple majority vote by the House of Assembly; members serve 5-year terms) ++ House of Assembly (73 seats; 59 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies or tinkhundla by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed, 10 members appointed by the monarch, 4 women elected by the members if representation of elected women is less than 30%; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 23 October 2018 (next to be held - 31 October 2023)House of Assembly - last held on 21 September 2018 (next to be held in 2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 23 October 2018 (next to be held - 31 October 2023) ++ House of Assembly - last held on 21 September 2018 (next to be held in 2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of seats by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 20, women 10, percent of women 33.3% House of Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - independent 59; composition - men 60, women 5, percent of women 7.7%; note - total Parliament percent of women 15.8%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of seats by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 20, women 10, percent of women 33.3% ++ House of Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - independent 59; composition - men 60, women 5, percent of women 7.7%; note - total Parliament percent of women 15.8%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -469,7 +463,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "political parties exist, but conditions for their operations, particularly in elections, are undefined, legally unclear, or culturally restricted; the following are considered political associations:African United Democratic Party or AUDP [Sibusiso DLAMINI]Ngwane National Liberatory Congress or NNLC [Dr. Alvit DLAMINI]People's United Democratic Movement or PUDEMO [Mario MASUKU]Swazi Democratic Party or SWADEPA [Jan SITHOLE]"
+      "text": "political parties exist, but conditions for their operations, particularly in elections, are undefined, legally unclear, or culturally restricted; the following are considered political associations: African United Democratic Party or AUDP [Sibusiso DLAMINI] ++ Ngwane National Liberatory Congress or NNLC [Dr. Alvit DLAMINI] ++ People's United Democratic Movement or PUDEMO [Mario MASUKU] ++ Swazi Democratic Party or SWADEPA [Jan SITHOLE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, COMESA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PCA, SACU, SADC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -525,7 +519,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "A small, landlocked kingdom, Eswatini is bordered in the north, west and south by the Republic of South Africa and by Mozambique in the east. Eswatini depends on South Africa for a majority of its exports and imports. Eswatini's currency is pegged to the South African rand, effectively relinquishing Eswatini's monetary policy to South Africa. The government is dependent on customs duties from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) for almost half of its revenue. Eswatini is a lower middle income country. As of 2017, more than one-quarter of the adult population was infected by HIV/AIDS; Eswatini has the world’s highest HIV prevalence rate, a financial strain and source of economic instability. The manufacturing sector diversified in the 1980s and 1990s, but manufacturing has grown little in the last decade. Sugar and soft drink concentrate are the largest foreign exchange earners, although a drought in 2015-16 decreased sugar production and exports. Overgrazing, soil depletion, drought, and floods are persistent problems. Mining has declined in importance in recent years. Coal, gold, diamond, and quarry stone mines are small scale, and the only iron ore mine closed in 2014. With an estimated 28% unemployment rate, Eswatini's need to increase the number and size of small and medium enterprises and to attract foreign direct investment is acute. Eswatini's national development strategy, which expires in 2022, prioritizes increases in infrastructure, agriculture production, and economic diversification, while aiming to reduce poverty and government spending. Eswatini's revenue from SACU receipts are likely to continue to decline as South Africa pushes for a new distribution scheme, making it harder for the government to maintain fiscal balance without introducing new sources of revenue."
+      "text": "A small, landlocked kingdom, Eswatini is bordered in the north, west and south by the Republic of South Africa and by Mozambique in the east. Eswatini depends on South Africa for a majority of its exports and imports. Eswatini's currency is pegged to the South African rand, effectively relinquishing Eswatini's monetary policy to South Africa. The government is dependent on customs duties from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) for almost half of its revenue. Eswatini is a lower middle income country. As of 2017, more than one-quarter of the adult population was infected by HIV/AIDS; Eswatini has the world's highest HIV prevalence rate, a financial strain and source of economic instability. ++ The manufacturing sector diversified in the 1980s and 1990s, but manufacturing has grown little in the last decade. Sugar and soft drink concentrate are the largest foreign exchange earners, although a drought in 2015-16 decreased sugar production and exports. Overgrazing, soil depletion, drought, and floods are persistent problems. Mining has declined in importance in recent years. Coal, gold, diamond, and quarry stone mines are small scale, and the only iron ore mine closed in 2014. With an estimated 28% unemployment rate, Eswatini's need to increase the number and size of small and medium enterprises and to attract foreign direct investment is acute. ++ Eswatini's national development strategy, which expires in 2022, prioritizes increases in infrastructure, agriculture production, and economic diversification, while aiming to reduce poverty and government spending. Eswatini's revenue from SACU receipts are likely to continue to decline as South Africa pushes for a new distribution scheme, making it harder for the government to maintain fiscal balance without introducing new sources of revenue."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$11.6 billion (2017 est.) / $11.41 billion (2016 est.) / $11.26 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/za.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Multiple waves of Bantu-speaking groups moved into and through what is now Zambia over the past thousand years. In the 1880s, the British began securing mineral and other economic concessions from various local leaders and the territory that is now Zambia eventually came under the control of the former British South Africa Company and was incorporated as the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia in 1911. Administrative control was taken over by the UK in 1924. During the 1920s and 1930s, advances in mining spurred development and immigration. The name was changed to Zambia upon independence in 1964. In the 1980s and 1990s, declining copper prices, economic mismanagement, and a prolonged drought hurt the economy. Elections in 1991 brought an end to one-party rule and propelled the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) to government. The subsequent vote in 1996, however, saw increasing harassment of opposition parties and abuse of state media and other resources. The election in 2001 was marked by administrative problems, with three parties filing a legal petition challenging the election of ruling party candidate Levy MWANAWASA. MWANAWASA was reelected in 2006 in an election that was deemed free and fair. Upon his death in August 2008, he was succeeded by his vice president, Rupiah BANDA, who won a special presidential byelection later that year. The MMD and BANDA lost to the Patriotic Front (PF) and Michael SATA in the 2011 general elections. SATA, however, presided over a period of haphazard economic management and attempted to silence opposition to PF policies. SATA died in October 2014 and was succeeded by his vice president, Guy SCOTT, who served as interim president until January 2015, when Edgar LUNGU won the presidential byelection and completed SATA's term. LUNGU then won a full term in August 2016 presidential elections."
+      "text": "Multiple waves of Bantu-speaking groups moved into and through what is now Zambia over the past thousand years. In the 1880s, the British began securing mineral and other economic concessions from various local leaders and the territory that is now Zambia eventually came under the control of the former British South Africa Company and was incorporated as the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia in 1911. Administrative control was taken over by the UK in 1924. During the 1920s and 1930s, advances in mining spurred development and immigration. ++ The name was changed to Zambia upon independence in 1964. In the 1980s and 1990s, declining copper prices, economic mismanagement, and a prolonged drought hurt the economy. Elections in 1991 brought an end to one-party rule and propelled the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) to government. The subsequent vote in 1996, however, saw increasing harassment of opposition parties and abuse of state media and other resources. The election in 2001 was marked by administrative problems, with three parties filing a legal petition challenging the election of ruling party candidate Levy MWANAWASA. MWANAWASA was reelected in 2006 in an election that was deemed free and fair. Upon his death in August 2008, he was succeeded by his vice president, Rupiah BANDA, who won a special presidential byelection later that year. The MMD and BANDA lost to the Patriotic Front (PF) and Michael SATA in the 2011 general elections. SATA, however, presided over a period of haphazard economic management and attempted to silence opposition to PF policies. SATA died in October 2014 and was succeeded by his vice president, Guy SCOTT, who served as interim president until January 2015, when Edgar LUNGU won the presidential byelection and completed SATA's term. LUNGU then won a full term in August 2016 presidential elections."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 75.3%, Roman Catholic 20.2%, other 2.7% (includes Muslim Buddhist, Hindu, and Baha'i), none 1.8% (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Zambia’s poor, youthful population consists primarily of Bantu-speaking people representing nearly 70 different ethnicities. Zambia’s high fertility rate continues to drive rapid population growth, averaging almost 3 percent annually between 2000 and 2010. The country’s total fertility rate has fallen by less than 1.5 children per woman during the last 30 years and still averages among the world’s highest, almost 6 children per woman, largely because of the country’s lack of access to family planning services, education for girls, and employment for women. Zambia also exhibits wide fertility disparities based on rural or urban location, education, and income. Poor, uneducated women from rural areas are more likely to marry young, to give birth early, and to have more children, viewing children as a sign of prestige and recognizing that not all of their children will live to adulthood. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Zambia and contributes to its low life expectancy.\nZambian emigration is low compared to many other African countries and is comprised predominantly of the well-educated. The small amount of brain drain, however, has a major impact in Zambia because of its limited human capital and lack of educational infrastructure for developing skilled professionals in key fields. For example, Zambia has few schools for training doctors, nurses, and other health care workers. Its spending on education is low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries."
+      "text": "Zambia's poor, youthful population consists primarily of Bantu-speaking people representing nearly 70 different ethnicities. Zambia's high fertility rate continues to drive rapid population growth, averaging almost 3 percent annually between 2000 and 2010. The country's total fertility rate has fallen by less than 1.5 children per woman during the last 30 years and still averages among the world's highest, almost 6 children per woman, largely because of the country's lack of access to family planning services, education for girls, and employment for women. Zambia also exhibits wide fertility disparities based on rural or urban location, education, and income. Poor, uneducated women from rural areas are more likely to marry young, to give birth early, and to have more children, viewing children as a sign of prestige and recognizing that not all of their children will live to adulthood. HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Zambia and contributes to its low life expectancy. ++ Zambian emigration is low compared to many other African countries and is comprised predominantly of the well-educated. The small amount of brain drain, however, has a major impact in Zambia because of its limited human capital and lack of educational infrastructure for developing skilled professionals in key fields. For example, Zambia has few schools for training doctors, nurses, and other health care workers. Its spending on education is low compared to other Sub-Saharan countries."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "49.5% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 10.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 89.5% of population / rural: 50.9% of population / total: 67.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "49.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "32.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 10.5% of population / rural: 49.1% of population / total: 32.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "2 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 31.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 69.6% of population / rural: 24.8% of population / total: 44.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "75.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "55.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 31.4% of population / rural: 75.2% of population / total: 55.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -464,7 +458,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance for Democracy and Development or ADD [Charles MILUPI]Forum for Democracy and Development or FDD [Edith NAWAKWI]Movement for Multiparty Democracy or MMD [Felix MUTATI]National Democratic Congress or NDC [Chishimba KAMBWILI]Patriotic Front or PF [Edgar LUNGU]United Party for National Development or UPND [Hakainde HICHILEMA]"
+      "text": "Alliance for Democracy and Development or ADD [Charles MILUPI] ++ Forum for Democracy and Development or FDD [Edith NAWAKWI] ++ Movement for Multiparty Democracy or MMD [Felix MUTATI] ++ National Democratic Congress or NDC [Chishimba KAMBWILI] ++ Patriotic Front or PF [Edgar LUNGU] ++ United Party for National Development or UPND [Hakainde HICHILEMA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, C, COMESA, EITI (compliant country), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, MONUSCO, NAM, OPCW, PCA, SADC, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -520,7 +514,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Zambia had one of the world’s fastest growing economies for the ten years up to 2014, with real GDP growth averaging roughly 6.7% per annum, though growth slowed during the period 2015 to 2017, due to falling copper prices, reduced power generation, and depreciation of the kwacha. Zambia’s lack of economic diversification and dependency on copper as its sole major export makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in the world commodities market and prices turned downward in 2015 due to declining demand from China; Zambia was overtaken by the Democratic Republic of Congo as Africa’s largest copper producer. GDP growth picked up in 2017 as mineral prices rose. Despite recent strong economic growth and its status as a lower middle-income country, widespread and extreme rural poverty and high unemployment levels remain significant problems, made worse by a high birth rate, a relatively high HIV/AIDS burden, by market-distorting agricultural and energy policies, and growing government debt. Zambia raised $7 billion from international investors by issuing separate sovereign bonds in 2012, 2014, and 2015. Concurrently, it issued over $4 billion in domestic debt and agreed to Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, significantly increasing the country’s public debt burden to more than 60% of GDP. The government has considered refinancing $3 billion worth of Eurobonds and significant Chinese loans to cut debt servicing costs."
+      "text": "Zambia had one of the world's fastest growing economies for the ten years up to 2014, with real GDP growth averaging roughly 6.7% per annum, though growth slowed during the period 2015 to 2017, due to falling copper prices, reduced power generation, and depreciation of the kwacha. Zambia's lack of economic diversification and dependency on copper as its sole major export makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in the world commodities market and prices turned downward in 2015 due to declining demand from China; Zambia was overtaken by the Democratic Republic of Congo as Africa's largest copper producer. GDP growth picked up in 2017 as mineral prices rose. ++ Despite recent strong economic growth and its status as a lower middle-income country, widespread and extreme rural poverty and high unemployment levels remain significant problems, made worse by a high birth rate, a relatively high HIV/AIDS burden, by market-distorting agricultural and energy policies, and growing government debt. Zambia raised $7 billion from international investors by issuing separate sovereign bonds in 2012, 2014, and 2015. Concurrently, it issued over $4 billion in domestic debt and agreed to Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, significantly increasing the country's public debt burden to more than 60% of GDP. The government has considered refinancing $3 billion worth of Eurobonds and significant Chinese loans to cut debt servicing costs."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$68.93 billion (2017 est.) / $66.66 billion (2016 est.) / $64.25 billion (2015 est.)",

africa/zi.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "A series of trading states developed in the area of Zimbabwe prior to the arrival of the first European explorers; the largest of these was the Kingdom of Zimbabwe (ca. 1220-1450). In the 1880s, European colonists arrived with the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which obtained mining rights and established company rule over the area. The southern portion of BSAC holdings were annexed by the UK in 1923 and became the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. A 1961 constitution was formulated that favored whites in power. In 1965 the government unilaterally declared its independence, but the UK did not recognize the act and demanded more complete voting rights for the black African majority in the country (then called Rhodesia). UN sanctions and a guerrilla uprising finally led to free elections in 1979 and independence (as Zimbabwe) in 1980. Robert MUGABE, the nation's first prime minister, was the country's only ruler (as president since 1987) from independence until his resignation in November 2017. His chaotic land redistribution campaign, which began in 1997 and intensified after 2000, caused an exodus of white farmers, crippled the economy, and ushered in widespread shortages of basic commodities. Ignoring international condemnation, MUGABE rigged the 2002 presidential election to ensure his reelection. In 2005, the capital city of Harare embarked on Operation Restore Order, ostensibly an urban rationalization program, which resulted in the destruction of the homes or businesses of 700,000 mostly poor supporters of the opposition. MUGABE in 2007 instituted price controls on all basic commodities causing panic buying and leaving store shelves empty for months. General elections in both 2008 and 2013 were severely flawed and widely condemned, but allowed MUGABE to remain president. As a prerequisite to holding the 2013 election, Zimbabwe enacted a new constitution by referendum, although many provisions in the new constitution have yet to be codified in law. In November 2017, Vice President Emmerson MNANGAGWA took over following a military intervention that forced MUGABE to resign. MNANGAGWA was inaugurated president days later, promising to hold presidential elections in 2018. In July 2018, MNANGAGWA won the presidential election after a close contest with Movement for Democratic Change Alliance candidate Nelson CHAMISA. MNANGAGWA has since resorted to the government's longstanding practice of violently disrupting protests or opposition rallies. Official inflation rates soared in 2019, approaching 500% by the end of the year. MUGABE died in September 2019."
+      "text": "A series of trading states developed in the area of Zimbabwe prior to the arrival of the first European explorers; the largest of these was the Kingdom of Zimbabwe (ca. 1220-1450). In the 1880s, European colonists arrived with the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which obtained mining rights and established company rule over the area. The southern portion of BSAC holdings were annexed by the UK in 1923 and became the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. A 1961 constitution was formulated that favored whites in power. In 1965 the government unilaterally declared its independence, but the UK did not recognize the act and demanded more complete voting rights for the black African majority in the country (then called Rhodesia). UN sanctions and a guerrilla uprising finally led to free elections in 1979 and independence (as Zimbabwe) in 1980. Robert MUGABE, the nation's first prime minister, was the country's only ruler (as president since 1987) from independence until his resignation in November 2017. His chaotic land redistribution campaign, which began in 1997 and intensified after 2000, caused an exodus of white farmers, crippled the economy, and ushered in widespread shortages of basic commodities. Ignoring international condemnation, MUGABE rigged the 2002 presidential election to ensure his reelection. ++ In 2005, the capital city of Harare embarked on Operation Restore Order, ostensibly an urban rationalization program, which resulted in the destruction of the homes or businesses of 700,000 mostly poor supporters of the opposition. MUGABE in 2007 instituted price controls on all basic commodities causing panic buying and leaving store shelves empty for months. General elections in both 2008 and 2013 were severely flawed and widely condemned, but allowed MUGABE to remain president. As a prerequisite to holding the 2013 election, Zimbabwe enacted a new constitution by referendum, although many provisions in the new constitution have yet to be codified in law. In November 2017, Vice President Emmerson MNANGAGWA took over following a military intervention that forced MUGABE to resign. MNANGAGWA was inaugurated president days later, promising to hold presidential elections in 2018. In July 2018, MNANGAGWA won the presidential election after a close contest with Movement for Democratic Change Alliance candidate Nelson CHAMISA. MNANGAGWA has since resorted to the government's longstanding practice of violently disrupting protests or opposition rallies. Official inflation rates soared in 2019, approaching 500% by the end of the year. MUGABE died in September 2019."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
       "text": "Protestant 74.8% (includes Apostolic 37.5%, Pentecostal 21.8%, other 15.5%), Roman Catholic 7.3%, other Christian 5.3%, traditional 1.5%, Muslim 0.5%, other 0.1%, none 10.5% (2015 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Zimbabwe’s progress in reproductive, maternal, and child health has stagnated in recent years. According to a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, contraceptive use, the number of births attended by skilled practitioners, and child mortality have either stalled or somewhat deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Zimbabwe’s total fertility rate has remained fairly stable at about 4 children per woman for the last two decades, although an uptick in the urban birth rate in recent years has caused a slight rise in the country’s overall fertility rate. Zimbabwe’s HIV prevalence rate dropped from approximately 29% to 15% since 1997 but remains among the world’s highest and continues to suppress the country’s life expectancy rate. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS information and prevention programs and personal experience with those suffering or dying from the disease have helped to change sexual behavior and reduce the epidemic.\nHistorically, the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s migration has been internal – a rural-urban flow. In terms of international migration, over the last 40 years Zimbabwe has gradually shifted from being a destination country to one of emigration and, to a lesser degree, one of transit (for East African illegal migrants traveling to South Africa). As a British colony, Zimbabwe attracted significant numbers of permanent immigrants from the UK and other European countries, as well as temporary economic migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Although Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century to work as miners, the first major exodus from the country occurred in the years before and after independence in 1980. The outward migration was politically and racially influenced; a large share of the white population of European origin chose to leave rather than live under a new black-majority government.\nIn the 1990s and 2000s, economic mismanagement and hyperinflation sparked a second, more diverse wave of emigration. This massive out migration – primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US – has created a variety of challenges, including brain drain, illegal migration, and human smuggling and trafficking. Several factors have pushed highly skilled workers to go abroad, including unemployment, lower wages, a lack of resources, and few opportunities for career growth."
+      "text": "Zimbabwe's progress in reproductive, maternal, and child health has stagnated in recent years. According to a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey, contraceptive use, the number of births attended by skilled practitioners, and child mortality have either stalled or somewhat deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Zimbabwe's total fertility rate has remained fairly stable at about 4 children per woman for the last two decades, although an uptick in the urban birth rate in recent years has caused a slight rise in the country's overall fertility rate. Zimbabwe's HIV prevalence rate dropped from approximately 29% to 15% since 1997 but remains among the world's highest and continues to suppress the country's life expectancy rate. The proliferation of HIV/AIDS information and prevention programs and personal experience with those suffering or dying from the disease have helped to change sexual behavior and reduce the epidemic. ++ Historically, the vast majority of Zimbabwe's migration has been internal – a rural-urban flow. In terms of international migration, over the last 40 years Zimbabwe has gradually shifted from being a destination country to one of emigration and, to a lesser degree, one of transit (for East African illegal migrants traveling to South Africa). As a British colony, Zimbabwe attracted significant numbers of permanent immigrants from the UK and other European countries, as well as temporary economic migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Although Zimbabweans have migrated to South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century to work as miners, the first major exodus from the country occurred in the years before and after independence in 1980. The outward migration was politically and racially influenced; a large share of the white population of European origin chose to leave rather than live under a new black-majority government. ++ In the 1990s and 2000s, economic mismanagement and hyperinflation sparked a second, more diverse wave of emigration. This massive out migration – primarily to other southern African countries, the UK, and the US – has created a variety of challenges, including brain drain, illegal migration, and human smuggling and trafficking. Several factors have pushed highly skilled workers to go abroad, including unemployment, lower wages, a lack of resources, and few opportunities for career growth."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "66.8% (2015)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98% of population / rural: 67.4% of population / total: 77.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "32.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "22.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2% of population / rural: 32.6% of population / total: 22.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "1.7 beds/1,000 population (2011)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 96.1% of population / rural: 49% of population / total: 64.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "51% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "35.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 3.9% of population / rural: 51% of population / total: 35.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -451,13 +445,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (80 seats; 60 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies - 6 seats in each of the 10 provinces - by proportional representation vote, 16 indirectly elected by the regional governing councils, 2 reserved for the National Council Chiefs, and 2 reserved for members with disabilities; members serve 5-year terms)National Assembly (270 seats; 210 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 60 seats reserved for women directly elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (80 seats; 60 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies - 6 seats in each of the 10 provinces - by proportional representation vote, 16 indirectly elected by the regional governing councils, 2 reserved for the National Council Chiefs, and 2 reserved for members with disabilities; members serve 5-year terms) ++ National Assembly (270 seats; 210 members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 60 seats reserved for women directly elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held for elected member on 30 July 2018 (next to be held in 2023) National Assembly - last held on 30 July 2018 (next to be held in 2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held for elected member on 30 July 2018 (next to be held in 2023) ++ National Assembly - last held on 30 July 2018 (next to be held in 2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - ZANU-PF 34, MDC Alliance 25, Chiefs 18, people with disabilities 2, MDC-T 1; composition - men 45, women 35, percent of women 43.8% National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - ZANU-PF 179, MDC Alliance 88, MDC-T 1, NPF 1, independent 1; composition - men 185, women 25, percent of women 31.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 34.3%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - ZANU-PF 34, MDC Alliance 25, Chiefs 18, people with disabilities 2, MDC-T 1; composition - men 45, women 35, percent of women 43.8% ++ National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - ZANU-PF 179, MDC Alliance 88, MDC-T 1, NPF 1, independent 1; composition - men 185, women 25, percent of women 31.5%; note - total Parliament percent of women 34.3%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -472,7 +466,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "MDC Alliance [Thokozane KHUPEIS] (acting)Movement for Democratic Change - MDC-T [Thokozani KHUPE]National People's Party or NPP [Joyce MUJURU] (formerly Zimbabwe People First or ZimPF)National Patriotic Front or NPF [Ambrose MUTINHIRI]Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front or ZANU-PF [Emmerson Dambudzo MNANGAGWA]Zimbabwe African Peoples Union or ZAPU [Isaac MABUKA]"
+      "text": "MDC Alliance [Thokozane KHUPEIS] (acting) ++ Movement for Democratic Change - MDC-T [Thokozani KHUPE] ++ National People's Party or NPP [Joyce MUJURU] (formerly Zimbabwe People First or ZimPF) ++ National Patriotic Front or NPF [Ambrose MUTINHIRI] ++ Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front or ZANU-PF [Emmerson Dambudzo MNANGAGWA] ++ Zimbabwe African Peoples Union or ZAPU [Isaac MABUKA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AfDB, AU, COMESA, FAO, G-15, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OPCW, PCA, SADC, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -528,7 +522,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Zimbabwe's economy depends heavily on its mining and agriculture sectors. Following a contraction from 1998 to 2008, the economy recorded real growth of more than 10% per year in the period 2010-13, before falling below 3% in the period 2014-17, due to poor harvests, low diamond revenues, and decreased investment. Lower mineral prices, infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, a poor investment climate, a large public and external debt burden, and extremely high government wage expenses impede the country’s economic performance. Until early 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) routinely printed money to fund the budget deficit, causing hyperinflation. Adoption of a multi-currency basket in early 2009 - which allowed currencies such as the Botswana pula, the South Africa rand, and the US dollar to be used locally - reduced inflation below 10% per year. In January 2015, as part of the government’s effort to boost trade and attract foreign investment, the RBZ announced that the Chinese renmimbi, Indian rupee, Australian dollar, and Japanese yen would be accepted as legal tender in Zimbabwe, though transactions were predominantly carried out in US dollars and South African rand until 2016, when the rand’s devaluation and instability led to near-exclusive use of the US dollar. The government in November 2016 began releasing bond notes, a parallel currency legal only in Zimbabwe which the government claims will have a one-to-one exchange ratio with the US dollar, to ease cash shortages. Bond notes began trading at a discount of up to 10% in the black market by the end of 2016. Zimbabwe’s government entered a second Staff Monitored Program with the IMF in 2014 and undertook other measures to reengage with international financial institutions. Zimbabwe repaid roughly $108 million in arrears to the IMF in October 2016, but financial observers note that Zimbabwe is unlikely to gain new financing because the government has not disclosed how it plans to repay more than $1.7 billion in arrears to the World Bank and African Development Bank. International financial institutions want Zimbabwe to implement significant fiscal and structural reforms before granting new loans. Foreign and domestic investment continues to be hindered by the lack of land tenure and titling, the inability to repatriate dividends to investors overseas, and the lack of clarity regarding the government’s Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act."
+      "text": "Zimbabwe's economy depends heavily on its mining and agriculture sectors. Following a contraction from 1998 to 2008, the economy recorded real growth of more than 10% per year in the period 2010-13, before falling below 3% in the period 2014-17, due to poor harvests, low diamond revenues, and decreased investment. Lower mineral prices, infrastructure and regulatory deficiencies, a poor investment climate, a large public and external debt burden, and extremely high government wage expenses impede the country's economic performance. ++ Until early 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) routinely printed money to fund the budget deficit, causing hyperinflation. Adoption of a multi-currency basket in early 2009 - which allowed currencies such as the Botswana pula, the South Africa rand, and the US dollar to be used locally - reduced inflation below 10% per year. In January 2015, as part of the government's effort to boost trade and attract foreign investment, the RBZ announced that the Chinese renmimbi, Indian rupee, Australian dollar, and Japanese yen would be accepted as legal tender in Zimbabwe, though transactions were predominantly carried out in US dollars and South African rand until 2016, when the rand's devaluation and instability led to near-exclusive use of the US dollar. The government in November 2016 began releasing bond notes, a parallel currency legal only in Zimbabwe which the government claims will have a one-to-one exchange ratio with the US dollar, to ease cash shortages. Bond notes began trading at a discount of up to 10% in the black market by the end of 2016. ++ Zimbabwe's government entered a second Staff Monitored Program with the IMF in 2014 and undertook other measures to reengage with international financial institutions. Zimbabwe repaid roughly $108 million in arrears to the IMF in October 2016, but financial observers note that Zimbabwe is unlikely to gain new financing because the government has not disclosed how it plans to repay more than $1.7 billion in arrears to the World Bank and African Development Bank. International financial institutions want Zimbabwe to implement significant fiscal and structural reforms before granting new loans. Foreign and domestic investment continues to be hindered by the lack of land tenure and titling, the inability to repatriate dividends to investors overseas, and the lack of clarity regarding the government's Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$34.27 billion (2017 est.) / $33.04 billion (2016 est.) / $32.82 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -918,7 +912,7 @@
       "text": "18-22 years of age for voluntary military service (18-24 for officer cadets; 18-30 for technical/specialist personnel); no conscription; women are eligible to serve (2019)"
     },
     "Military - note": {
-      "text": "the ZDF was formed after independence from the former Rhodesian Army and the two guerrilla forces that opposed it during the Rhodesian Civil War (aka \"Bush War\") of the 1970s, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA); internal security is a key current responsibility, and the military continues to play an active role in the country’s politics since the coup of 2017 (2020)"
+      "text": "the ZDF was formed after independence from the former Rhodesian Army and the two guerrilla forces that opposed it during the Rhodesian Civil War (aka \"Bush War\") of the 1970s, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA); internal security is a key current responsibility, and the military continues to play an active role in the country's politics since the coup of 2017 (2020)"
     }
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
@@ -941,7 +935,7 @@
         "text": "Zimbabwe is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; Zimbabwean women and girls from towns bordering South Africa, Mozambique, and Zambia are subjected to forced labor, including domestic servitude, and prostitution catering to long-distance truck drivers; Zimbabwean men, women, and children experience forced labor in agriculture and domestic servitude in rural areas; family members may recruit children and other relatives from rural areas with promises of work or education in cities and towns where they end up in domestic servitude and sex trafficking; Zimbabwean women and men are lured into exploitative labor situations in South Africa and other neighboring countries"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 3 - Zimbabwe does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government passed an anti-trafficking law in 2014 defining trafficking in persons as a crime of transportation and failing to capture the key element of the international definition of human trafficking – the purpose of exploitation – which prevents the law from being comprehensive or consistent with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol that Zimbabwe acceded to in 2013; the government did not report on anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts during 2014, and corruption in law enforcement and the judiciary remain a concern; authorities made minimal efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims, relying on NGOs to identify and assist victims; Zimbabwe’s 2014 anti-trafficking law required the opening of 10 centers for trafficking victims, but none were established during the year; five existing shelters for vulnerable children and orphans may have accommodated child victims; in January 2015, an inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committee was established, but it is unclear if the committee ever met or initiated any activities (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 3 - Zimbabwe does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; the government passed an anti-trafficking law in 2014 defining trafficking in persons as a crime of transportation and failing to capture the key element of the international definition of human trafficking – the purpose of exploitation – which prevents the law from being comprehensive or consistent with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol that Zimbabwe acceded to in 2013; the government did not report on anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts during 2014, and corruption in law enforcement and the judiciary remain a concern; authorities made minimal efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims, relying on NGOs to identify and assist victims; Zimbabwe's 2014 anti-trafficking law required the opening of 10 centers for trafficking victims, but none were established during the year; five existing shelters for vulnerable children and orphans may have accommodated child victims; in January 2015, an inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committee was established, but it is unclear if the committee ever met or initiated any activities (2015)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

antarctica/ay.json

@@ -74,13 +74,13 @@
       "text": "the discovery of a large Antarctic ozone hole in the earth's stratosphere (the ozone layer) - first announced in 1985 - spurred the signing of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, an international agreement phasing out the use of ozone-depleting chemicals; the ozone layer prevents most harmful wavelengths of ultra-violet (UV) light from passing through the earth's atmosphere; ozone depletion has been shown to harm a variety of Antarctic marine plants and animals (plankton); in 2016, a gradual trend toward \"healing\" of the ozone hole was reported; since the 1990s, satellites have shown accelerating ice loss driven by ocean change; although considerable uncertainty remains, scientists are increasing our understanding and ability to model potential impacts of ice loss"
     },
     "Geography - note": {
-      "text": "the coldest, windiest, highest (on average), and driest continent; during summer, more solar radiation reaches the surface at the South Pole than is received at the Equator in an equivalent period mostly uninhabitable, 98% of the land area is covered by the Antarctic ice sheet, the largest single mass of ice on earth covering an area of 14 million sq km (5.4 million sq mi) and containing 26.5 million cu km (6.4 million cu mi) of ice (this is almost 62% of all of the world's fresh water); if all this ice were converted to liquid water, one estimate is that it would be sufficient to raise the height of the world's oceans by 58 m (190 ft)"
+      "text": "the coldest, windiest, highest (on average), and driest continent; during summer, more solar radiation reaches the surface at the South Pole than is received at the Equator in an equivalent period ++ mostly uninhabitable, 98% of the land area is covered by the Antarctic ice sheet, the largest single mass of ice on earth covering an area of 14 million sq km (5.4 million sq mi) and containing 26.5 million cu km (6.4 million cu mi) of ice (this is almost 62% of all of the world's fresh water); if all this ice were converted to liquid water, one estimate is that it would be sufficient to raise the height of the world's oceans by 58 m (190 ft)"
     }
   },
   "People and Society": {
     "Population": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "no indigenous inhabitants, but there are both permanent and summer-only staffed research stations note: 53 countries have signed the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; 30 of those operate through their National Antarctic Program a number of seasonal-only (summer) and year-round research stations on the continent and its nearby islands south of 60 degrees south latitude (the region covered by the Antarctic Treaty); the population engaging in and supporting science or managing and protecting the Antarctic region varies from approximately 4,400 in summer to 1,100 in winter; in addition, approximately 1,000 personnel, including ship's crew and scientists doing onboard research, are present in the waters of the treaty region as of 2017, peak summer (December-February) maximum capacity in scientific stations - 4,877 total; Argentina 601, Australia 243, Belarus 12, Belgium 40, Brazil 66, Bulgaria 22, Chile 433, China 166, Czechia 20, Ecuador 34, Finland 17, France 90, France and Italy jointly 80, Germany 104, India 113, Italy 120, Japan 130, South Korea 130, Netherlands 10, NZ 86, Norway 70, Peru 30, Poland 40, Russia 335, South Africa 80, Spain 98, Sweden 20, Ukraine 24, UK 196, US 1,399, Uruguay 68 (2017) winter (June-August) maximum capacity in scientific station - 1,036 total; Argentina 221, Australia 52, Brazil 15, Chile 114, China 32, France 24, France and Italy jointly 13, Germany 9, India 48, Japan 40, Netherlands 10, South Korea 25, NZ 11, Norway 7, Poland 16, Russia 125, South Africa 15, Ukraine 12, UK 44, US 215, Uruguay 8 (2017) research stations operated within the Antarctic Treaty area (south of 60 degrees south latitude) by National Antarctic Programs year-round stations - approximately 40 total; Argentina 6, Australia 3, Brazil 1, Chile 6, China 2, France 1, France and Italy jointly 1, Germany 1, India 2, Japan 1, Netherlands 1, South Korea 2, NZ 1, Norway 1, Poland 1, Russia 5, South Africa 1, Ukraine 1, UK 2, US 3, Uruguay 2 (2017) a range of seasonal-only (summer) stations, camps, and refuges - Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, China, Czechia, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, UK, US, and Uruguay (2017) in addition, during the austral summer some nations have numerous occupied locations such as tent camps, summer-long temporary facilities, and mobile traverses in support of research"
+        "text": "no indigenous inhabitants, but there are both permanent and summer-only staffed research stations ++ note: 53 countries have signed the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; 30 of those operate through their National Antarctic Program a number of seasonal-only (summer) and year-round research stations on the continent and its nearby islands south of 60 degrees south latitude (the region covered by the Antarctic Treaty); the population engaging in and supporting science or managing and protecting the Antarctic region varies from approximately 4,400 in summer to 1,100 in winter; in addition, approximately 1,000 personnel, including ship's crew and scientists doing onboard research, are present in the waters of the treaty region ++ as of 2017, peak summer (December-February) maximum capacity in scientific stations - 4,877 total; Argentina 601, Australia 243, Belarus 12, Belgium 40, Brazil 66, Bulgaria 22, Chile 433, China 166, Czechia 20, Ecuador 34, Finland 17, France 90, France and Italy jointly 80, Germany 104, India 113, Italy 120, Japan 130, South Korea 130, Netherlands 10, NZ 86, Norway 70, Peru 30, Poland 40, Russia 335, South Africa 80, Spain 98, Sweden 20, Ukraine 24, UK 196, US 1,399, Uruguay 68 (2017) ++ winter (June-August) maximum capacity in scientific station - 1,036 total; Argentina 221, Australia 52, Brazil 15, Chile 114, China 32, France 24, France and Italy jointly 13, Germany 9, India 48, Japan 40, Netherlands 10, South Korea 25, NZ 11, Norway 7, Poland 16, Russia 125, South Africa 15, Ukraine 12, UK 44, US 215, Uruguay 8 (2017) ++ research stations operated within the Antarctic Treaty area (south of 60 degrees south latitude) by National Antarctic Programs year-round stations - approximately 40 total; Argentina 6, Australia 3, Brazil 1, Chile 6, China 2, France 1, France and Italy jointly 1, Germany 1, India 2, Japan 1, Netherlands 1, South Korea 2, NZ 1, Norway 1, Poland 1, Russia 5, South Africa 1, Ukraine 1, UK 2, US 3, Uruguay 2 (2017) ++ a range of seasonal-only (summer) stations, camps, and refuges - Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, China, Czechia, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, UK, US, and Uruguay (2017) ++ in addition, during the austral summer some nations have numerous occupied locations such as tent camps, summer-long temporary facilities, and mobile traverses in support of research"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Scientific undertakings rather than commercial pursuits are the predominant human activity in Antarctica. Offshore fishing and tourism, both based abroad, account for Antarctica's limited economic activity. Antarctic Fisheries, within the area covered by the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources currently target Patagonian toothfish, Antarctic toothfish, mackerel icefish and Antarctic krill. The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) manages these fisheries using the ecosystem-based and precautionary approach.  The Commission’s objective is conservation of Antarctic marine living resources and it regulates the fisheries based on the level of information available, and maintaining existing ecological relationships.  While Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has declined in the Convention area since 1990, it remains a concern A total of 51,707  tourists visited the Antarctic Treaty area in the 2017-2018  Antarctic summer, 17 percent greater than the 43,915 visitors in 2016-2017. These estimates were provided to the Antarctic Treaty by the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators and do not include passengers on overflights. Nearly all of the tourists were passengers on commercial ships and several yachts that make trips during the summer."
+      "text": "Scientific undertakings rather than commercial pursuits are the predominant human activity in Antarctica. Offshore fishing and tourism, both based abroad, account for Antarctica's limited economic activity. ++ Antarctic Fisheries, within the area covered by the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources currently target Patagonian toothfish, Antarctic toothfish, mackerel icefish and Antarctic krill. The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) manages these fisheries using the ecosystem-based and precautionary approach.  The Commission's objective is conservation of Antarctic marine living resources and it regulates the fisheries based on the level of information available, and maintaining existing ecological relationships.  While Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has declined in the Convention area since 1990, it remains a concern ++ A total of 51,707  tourists visited the Antarctic Treaty area in the 2017-2018  Antarctic summer, 17 percent greater than the 43,915 visitors in 2016-2017. These estimates were provided to the Antarctic Treaty by the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators and do not include passengers on overflights. Nearly all of the tourists were passengers on commercial ships and several yachts that make trips during the summer."
     }
   },
   "Energy": {

antarctica/fs.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "In February 2007, the Iles Eparses became an integral part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF). The Southern Lands are now divided into five administrative districts, two of which are archipelagos, Iles Crozet and Iles Kerguelen; the third is a district composed of two volcanic islands, Ile Saint-Paul and Ile Amsterdam; the fourth, Iles Eparses, consists of five scattered tropical islands around Madagascar. They contain no permanent inhabitants and are visited only by researchers studying the native fauna, scientists at the various scientific stations, fishermen, and military personnel. The fifth district is the Antarctic portion, which consists of \"Adelie Land,\" a thin slice of the Antarctic continent discovered and claimed by the French in 1840.\nIle Amsterdam: Discovered but not named in 1522 by the Spanish, the island subsequently received the appellation of Nieuw Amsterdam from a Dutchman; it was claimed by France in 1843. A short-lived attempt at cattle farming began in 1871. A French meteorological station established on the island in 1949 is still in use.; Ile Saint Paul: Claimed by France since 1893, the island was a fishing industry center from 1843 to 1914. In 1928, a spiny lobster cannery was established, but when the company went bankrupt in 1931, seven workers were abandoned. Only two survived until 1934 when rescue finally arrived.; Iles Crozet: A large archipelago formed from the Crozet Plateau, Iles Crozet is divided into two main groups: L'Occidental (the West), which includes Ile aux Cochons, Ilots des Apotres, Ile des Pingouins, and the reefs Brisants de l'Heroine; and L'Oriental (the East), which includes Ile d'Est and Ile de la Possession (the largest island of the Crozets). Discovered and claimed by France in 1772, the islands were used for seal hunting and as a base for whaling. Originally administered as a dependency of Madagascar, they became part of the TAAF in 1955.; Iles Kerguelen: This island group, discovered in 1772, consists of one large island (Ile Kerguelen) and about 300 smaller islands. A permanent group of 50 to 100 scientists resides at the main base at Port-aux-Francais.; Adelie Land: The only non-insular district of the TAAF is the Antarctic claim known as \"Adelie Land.\" The US Government does not recognize it as a French dependency.; Bassas da India: A French possession since 1897, this atoll is a volcanic rock surrounded by reefs and is awash at high tide.; Europa Island: This heavily wooded island has been a French possession since 1897; it is the site of a small military garrison that staffs a weather station.; Glorioso Islands: A French possession since 1892, the Glorioso Islands are composed of two lushly vegetated coral islands (Ile Glorieuse and Ile du Lys) and three rock islets. A military garrison operates a weather and radio station on Ile Glorieuse.; Juan de Nova Island: Named after a famous 15th-century Spanish navigator and explorer, the island has been a French possession since 1897. It has been exploited for its guano and phosphate. Presently a small military garrison oversees a meteorological station.; Tromelin Island: First explored by the French in 1776, the island came under the jurisdiction of Reunion in 1814. At present, it serves as a sea turtle sanctuary and is the site of an important meteorological station."
+      "text": "In February 2007, the Iles Eparses became an integral part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF). The Southern Lands are now divided into five administrative districts, two of which are archipelagos, Iles Crozet and Iles Kerguelen; the third is a district composed of two volcanic islands, Ile Saint-Paul and Ile Amsterdam; the fourth, Iles Eparses, consists of five scattered tropical islands around Madagascar. They contain no permanent inhabitants and are visited only by researchers studying the native fauna, scientists at the various scientific stations, fishermen, and military personnel. The fifth district is the Antarctic portion, which consists of \"Adelie Land,\" a thin slice of the Antarctic continent discovered and claimed by the French in 1840. ++ Ile Amsterdam: Discovered but not named in 1522 by the Spanish, the island subsequently received the appellation of Nieuw Amsterdam from a Dutchman; it was claimed by France in 1843. A short-lived attempt at cattle farming began in 1871. A French meteorological station established on the island in 1949 is still in use.; ++ Ile Saint Paul: Claimed by France since 1893, the island was a fishing industry center from 1843 to 1914. In 1928, a spiny lobster cannery was established, but when the company went bankrupt in 1931, seven workers were abandoned. Only two survived until 1934 when rescue finally arrived.; ++ Iles Crozet: A large archipelago formed from the Crozet Plateau, Iles Crozet is divided into two main groups: L'Occidental (the West), which includes Ile aux Cochons, Ilots des Apotres, Ile des Pingouins, and the reefs Brisants de l'Heroine; and L'Oriental (the East), which includes Ile d'Est and Ile de la Possession (the largest island of the Crozets). Discovered and claimed by France in 1772, the islands were used for seal hunting and as a base for whaling. Originally administered as a dependency of Madagascar, they became part of the TAAF in 1955.; ++ Iles Kerguelen: This island group, discovered in 1772, consists of one large island (Ile Kerguelen) and about 300 smaller islands. A permanent group of 50 to 100 scientists resides at the main base at Port-aux-Francais.; ++ Adelie Land: The only non-insular district of the TAAF is the Antarctic claim known as \"Adelie Land.\" The US Government does not recognize it as a French dependency.; ++ Bassas da India: A French possession since 1897, this atoll is a volcanic rock surrounded by reefs and is awash at high tide.; ++ Europa Island: This heavily wooded island has been a French possession since 1897; it is the site of a small military garrison that staffs a weather station.; ++ Glorioso Islands: A French possession since 1892, the Glorioso Islands are composed of two lushly vegetated coral islands (Ile Glorieuse and Ile du Lys) and three rock islets. A military garrison operates a weather and radio station on Ile Glorieuse.; ++ Juan de Nova Island: Named after a famous 15th-century Spanish navigator and explorer, the island has been a French possession since 1897. It has been exploited for its guano and phosphate. Presently a small military garrison oversees a meteorological station.; ++ Tromelin Island: First explored by the French in 1776, the island came under the jurisdiction of Reunion in 1814. At present, it serves as a sea turtle sanctuary and is the site of an important meteorological station."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -9,25 +9,25 @@
       "text": "southeast and east of Africa, islands in the southern Indian Ocean, some near Madagascar and others about equidistant between Africa, Antarctica, and Australia; note - French Southern and Antarctic Lands include Ile Amsterdam, Ile Saint-Paul, Iles Crozet, Iles Kerguelen, Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island, and Tromelin Island in the southern Indian Ocean, along with the French-claimed sector of Antarctica, \"Adelie Land\"; the US does not recognize the French claim to \"Adelie Land\""
     },
     "Geographic coordinates": {
-      "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): 37 50 S, 77 32 E; Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): 38 72 S, 77 53 E; Iles Crozet: 46 25 S, 51 00 E; Iles Kerguelen: 49 15 S, 69 35 E; Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): 21 30 S, 39 50 E; Europa Island (Iles Eparses): 22 20 S, 40 22 E; Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): 11 30 S, 47 20 E; Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): 17 03 S, 42 45 E; Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): 15 52 S, 54 25 E"
+      "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): 37 50 S, 77 32 E; ++ Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): 38 72 S, 77 53 E; ++ Iles Crozet: 46 25 S, 51 00 E; ++ Iles Kerguelen: 49 15 S, 69 35 E; ++ Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): 21 30 S, 39 50 E; ++ Europa Island (Iles Eparses): 22 20 S, 40 22 E; ++ Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): 11 30 S, 47 20 E; ++ Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): 17 03 S, 42 45 E; ++ Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): 15 52 S, 54 25 E"
     },
     "Map references": {
       "text": "Antarctic RegionAfrica"
     },
     "Area": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): total - 55 sq km; land - 55 sq km; water - 0 sq km Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): total - 7 sq km; land - 7 sq km; water - 0 sq km Iles Crozet: total - 352 sq km; land - 352 sq km; water - 0 sq km Iles Kerguelen: total - 7,215 sq km; land - 7,215 sq km; water - 0 sq km Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): total - 80 sq km; land - 0.2 sq km; water - 79.8 sq km (lagoon) Europa Island (Iles Eparses): total - 28 sq km; land - 28 sq km; water - 0 sq km Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): total - 5 sq km; land - 5 sq km; water - 0 sq km Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): total - 4.4 sq km; land - 4.4 sq km; water - 0 sq km Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): total - 1 sq km; land - 1 sq km; water - 0 sq km note: excludes \"Adelie Land\" claim of about 500,000 sq km in Antarctica that is not recognized by the US"
+        "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): total - 55 sq km; land - 55 sq km; water - 0 sq km ++ Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): total - 7 sq km; land - 7 sq km; water - 0 sq km ++ Iles Crozet: total - 352 sq km; land - 352 sq km; water - 0 sq km ++ Iles Kerguelen: total - 7,215 sq km; land - 7,215 sq km; water - 0 sq km ++ Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): total - 80 sq km; land - 0.2 sq km; water - 79.8 sq km (lagoon) ++ Europa Island (Iles Eparses): total - 28 sq km; land - 28 sq km; water - 0 sq km ++ Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): total - 5 sq km; land - 5 sq km; water - 0 sq km ++ Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): total - 4.4 sq km; land - 4.4 sq km; water - 0 sq km ++ Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): total - 1 sq km; land - 1 sq km; water - 0 sq km ++ note: excludes \"Adelie Land\" claim of about 500,000 sq km in Antarctica that is not recognized by the US"
       }
     },
     "Area - comparative": {
-      "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): less than one-half the size of Washington, DC; Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): more than 10 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Iles Crozet: about twice the size of Washington, DC; Iles Kerguelen: slightly larger than Delaware; Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): land area about one-third the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Europa Island (Iles Eparses): about one-sixth the size of Washington, DC; Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): about seven times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): about 1.7 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
+      "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): less than one-half the size of Washington, DC; ++ Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): more than 10 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Iles Crozet: about twice the size of Washington, DC; ++ Iles Kerguelen: slightly larger than Delaware; ++ Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): land area about one-third the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Europa Island (Iles Eparses): about one-sixth the size of Washington, DC; ++ Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): about seven times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): about 1.7 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
     },
     "Land boundaries": {
       "text": "0 km"
     },
     "Coastline": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): 28 km Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): Iles Kerguelen: 2,800 km Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): 35.2 km Europa Island (Iles Eparses): 22.2 km Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): 35.2 km Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): 24.1 km Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): 3.7 km"
+        "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): 28 km ++ Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): ++ Iles Kerguelen: 2,800 km ++ Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): 35.2 km ++ Europa Island (Iles Eparses): 22.2 km ++ Glorioso Islands (Iles Eparses): 35.2 km ++ Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): 24.1 km ++ Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): 3.7 km"
       }
     },
     "Maritime claims": {
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@
       }
     },
     "Climate": {
-      "text": "Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul: oceanic with persistent westerly winds and high humidity; Iles Crozet: windy, cold, wet, and cloudy; Iles Kerguelen: oceanic, cold, overcast, windy; Iles Eparses: tropical"
+      "text": "Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul: oceanic with persistent westerly winds and high humidity; ++ Iles Crozet: windy, cold, wet, and cloudy; ++ Iles Kerguelen: oceanic, cold, overcast, windy; ++ Iles Eparses: tropical"
     },
     "Terrain": {
-      "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): a volcanic island with steep coastal cliffs; the center floor of the volcano is a large plateau; Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): triangular in shape, the island is the top of a volcano, rocky with steep cliffs on the eastern side; has active thermal springs; Iles Crozet: a large archipelago formed from the Crozet Plateau is divided into two groups of islands; Iles Kerguelen: the interior of the large island of Ile Kerguelen is composed of high mountains, hills, valleys, and plains with peninsulas stretching off its coasts; Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): atoll, awash at high tide; shallow (15 m) lagoon; Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island: low, flat, and sandy; Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): low, flat, sandy; likely volcanic seamount"
+      "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): a volcanic island with steep coastal cliffs; the center floor of the volcano is a large plateau; ++ Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): triangular in shape, the island is the top of a volcano, rocky with steep cliffs on the eastern side; has active thermal springs; ++ Iles Crozet: a large archipelago formed from the Crozet Plateau is divided into two groups of islands; ++ Iles Kerguelen: the interior of the large island of Ile Kerguelen is composed of high mountains, hills, valleys, and plains with peninsulas stretching off its coasts; ++ Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): atoll, awash at high tide; shallow (15 m) lagoon; ++ Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island: low, flat, and sandy; ++ Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): low, flat, sandy; likely volcanic seamount"
     },
     "Elevation": {
       "lowest point": {
@@ -62,20 +62,20 @@
       }
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "Ile Amsterdam and Ile Saint-Paul are inactive volcanoes; Iles Eparses subject to periodic cyclones; Bassas da India is a maritime hazard since it is under water for a period of three hours prior to and following the high tide and surrounded by reefs\nvolcanism: Reunion Island - Piton de la Fournaise (2,632 m), which has erupted many times in recent years including 2010, 2015, and 2017, is one of the world's most active volcanoes; although rare, eruptions outside the volcano's caldera could threaten nearby cities"
+      "text": "Ile Amsterdam and Ile Saint-Paul are inactive volcanoes; Iles Eparses subject to periodic cyclones; Bassas da India is a maritime hazard since it is under water for a period of three hours prior to and following the high tide and surrounded by reefs ++ volcanism: Reunion Island - Piton de la Fournaise (2,632 m), which has erupted many times in recent years including 2010, 2015, and 2017, is one of the world's most active volcanoes; although rare, eruptions outside the volcano's caldera could threaten nearby cities"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "introduction of foreign species on Iles Crozet has caused severe damage to the original ecosystem; overfishing of Patagonian toothfish around Iles Crozet and Iles Kerguelen"
     },
     "Geography - note": {
-      "text": "islands' component is widely scattered across remote locations in the southern Indian Ocean\nBassas da India (Iles Eparses): atoll is a circular reef atop a long-extinct, submerged volcano; Europa Island and Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): wildlife sanctuary for seabirds and sea turtles; Glorioso Island (Iles Eparses): islands and rocks are surrounded by an extensive reef system; Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): climatologically important location for forecasting cyclones in the western Indian Ocean; wildlife sanctuary (seabirds, tortoises)"
+      "text": "islands' component is widely scattered across remote locations in the southern Indian Ocean ++ Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): atoll is a circular reef atop a long-extinct, submerged volcano; ++ Europa Island and Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): wildlife sanctuary for seabirds and sea turtles; ++ Glorioso Island (Iles Eparses): islands and rocks are surrounded by an extensive reef system; ++ Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): climatologically important location for forecasting cyclones in the western Indian Ocean; wildlife sanctuary (seabirds, tortoises)"
     }
   },
   "People and Society": {
     "Population": {
       "text": "no indigenous inhabitants",
       "note": {
-        "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): uninhabited but has a meteorological stationIle Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): uninhabited but is frequently visited by fishermen and has a scientific research cabin for short stays Iles Crozet: uninhabited except for 18 to 30 people staffing the Alfred Faure research station on Ile del la Possession Iles Kerguelen: 50 to 100 scientists are located at the main base at Port-aux-Francais on Ile Kerguelen Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): uninhabitable Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): a small French military garrison and a few meteorologists on each possession; visited by scientists Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): uninhabited, except for visits by scientists"
+        "text": "Ile Amsterdam (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): uninhabited but has a meteorological station ++ Ile Saint-Paul (Ile Amsterdam et Ile Saint-Paul): uninhabited but is frequently visited by fishermen and has a scientific research cabin for short stays ++ Iles Crozet: uninhabited except for 18 to 30 people staffing the Alfred Faure research station on Ile del la Possession ++ Iles Kerguelen: 50 to 100 scientists are located at the main base at Port-aux-Francais on Ile Kerguelen ++ Bassas da India (Iles Eparses): uninhabitable ++ Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): a small French military garrison and a few meteorologists on each possession; visited by scientists ++ Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): uninhabited, except for visits by scientists"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
     "Disputes - international": {
-      "text": "French claim to \"Adelie Land\" in Antarctica is not recognized by the US; Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): ; claimed by Madagascar; the vegetated drying cays of Banc du Geyser, which were claimed by Madagascar in 1976, also fall within the EEZ claims of the Comoros and France (Glorioso Islands); ; Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): ; claimed by Mauritius"
+      "text": "French claim to \"Adelie Land\" in Antarctica is not recognized by the US; ++ Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island (Iles Eparses): ; claimed by Madagascar; the vegetated drying cays of Banc du Geyser, which were claimed by Madagascar in 1976, also fall within the EEZ claims of the Comoros and France (Glorioso Islands); ; ++ Tromelin Island (Iles Eparses): ; claimed by Mauritius"
     }
   }
 }

australia-oceania/aq.json

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
       "text": "0 sq km (2012)"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "cyclones common from December to March\nvolcanism: limited volcanic activity on the Ofu and Olosega Islands; neither has erupted since the 19th century"
+      "text": "cyclones common from December to March ++ volcanism: limited volcanic activity on the Ofu and Olosega Islands; neither has erupted since the 19th century"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "limited supply of drinking water; pollution; waste disposal; coastal and stream alteration; soil erosion"
@@ -216,13 +216,19 @@
       "text": "2.35 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 99% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -295,7 +301,7 @@
     },
     "Citizenship": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "see United StatesNote: in accordance with US Code Title 8, Section 1408, persons born in American Samoa are US nationals but not US citizens"
+        "text": "see United States ++ Note: in accordance with US Code Title 8, Section 1408, persons born in American Samoa are US nationals but not US citizens"
       }
     },
     "Suffrage": {
@@ -320,13 +326,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Legislature or Fono consists of:Senate (18 seats; members indirectly selected by regional governing councils to serve 4-year terms)House of Representatives (21 seats; 20 members directly elected by simple majority vote and 1 decided by public meeting on Swains Island; members serve 2-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Legislature or Fono consists of: Senate (18 seats; members indirectly selected by regional governing councils to serve 4-year terms) ++ House of Representatives (21 seats; 20 members directly elected by simple majority vote and 1 decided by public meeting on Swains Island; members serve 2-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 8 November 2016 (next to be held in November 2020)House of Representatives - last held on 6 November 2018 (next to be held in November 2020)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 8 November 2016 (next to be held in November 2020) ++ House of Representatives - last held on 6 November 2018 (next to be held in November 2020)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - independent 18; composition - men 17, women 1, percent of women 9.5%House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 14, women 7, percent of women 33.3%; note - total percent of women in Legislature 20.5%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - independent 18; composition - men 17, women 1, percent of women 9.5% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 14, women 7, percent of women 33.3%; note - total percent of women in Legislature 20.5%"
       },
       "note": {
         "text": "note: American Samoa elects 1 member by simple majority vote to serve a 2-year term as a delegate to the US House of Representatives; the delegate can vote when serving on a committee and when the House meets as the Committee of the Whole House, but not when legislation is submitted for a “full floor” House vote; election of delegate last held on 6 November 2018 (next to be held in November 2020)"
@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Party [Fagafaga Daniel LANGKILDE, chairman]Republican Party [William SWORD, chairman]"
+      "text": "Democratic Party [Fagafaga Daniel LANGKILDE, chairman] ++ Republican Party [William SWORD, chairman]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "AOSIS (observer), Interpol (subbureau), IOC, PIF (observer), SPC"
@@ -377,7 +383,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "American Samoa s a traditional Polynesian economy in which more than 90% of the land is communally owned. Economic activity is strongly linked to the US with which American Samoa conducts most of its commerce. Tuna fishing and processing are the backbone of the private sector with processed fish products as the primary exports. The fish processing business accounted for 15.5% of employment in 2015. In late September 2009, an earthquake and the resulting tsunami devastated American Samoa and nearby Samoa, disrupting transportation and power generation, and resulting in about 200 deaths. The US Federal Emergency Management Agency oversaw a relief program of nearly $25 million. Transfers from the US Government add substantially to American Samoa's economic well-being. Attempts by the government to develop a larger and broader economy are restrained by Samoa's remote location, its limited transportation, and its devastating hurricanes. Tourism has some potential as a source of income and jobs."
+      "text": "American Samoa s a traditional Polynesian economy in which more than 90% of the land is communally owned. Economic activity is strongly linked to the US with which American Samoa conducts most of its commerce. Tuna fishing and processing are the backbone of the private sector with processed fish products as the primary exports. The fish processing business accounted for 15.5% of employment in 2015. ++ In late September 2009, an earthquake and the resulting tsunami devastated American Samoa and nearby Samoa, disrupting transportation and power generation, and resulting in about 200 deaths. The US Federal Emergency Management Agency oversaw a relief program of nearly $25 million. Transfers from the US Government add substantially to American Samoa's economic well-being. ++ Attempts by the government to develop a larger and broader economy are restrained by Samoa's remote location, its limited transportation, and its devastating hurricanes. Tourism has some potential as a source of income and jobs."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$658 million (2016 est.) / $674.9 million (2015 est.) / $666.9 million (2014 est.)",

australia-oceania/as.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Prehistoric settlers arrived on the continent from Southeast Asia at least 40,000 years before the first Europeans began exploration in the 17th century. No formal territorial claims were made until 1770, when Capt. James COOK took possession of the east coast in the name of Great Britain (all of Australia was claimed as British territory in 1829 with the creation of the colony of Western Australia). Six colonies were created in the late 18th and 19th centuries; they federated and became the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. The new country took advantage of its natural resources to rapidly develop agricultural and manufacturing industries and to make a major contribution to the Allied effort in World Wars I and II. In recent decades, Australia has become an internationally competitive, advanced market economy due in large part to economic reforms adopted in the 1980s and its location in one of the fastest growing regions of the world economy. Long-term concerns include an aging population, pressure on infrastructure, and environmental issues such as floods, droughts, and bushfires. Australia is the driest inhabited continent on earth, making it particularly vulnerable to the challenges of climate change. Australia is home to 10% of the world's biodiversity, and a great number of its flora and fauna exist nowhere else in the world."
+      "text": "Prehistoric settlers arrived on the continent from Southeast Asia at least 40,000 years before the first Europeans began exploration in the 17th century. No formal territorial claims were made until 1770, when Capt. James COOK took possession of the east coast in the name of Great Britain (all of Australia was claimed as British territory in 1829 with the creation of the colony of Western Australia). Six colonies were created in the late 18th and 19th centuries; they federated and became the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. The new country took advantage of its natural resources to rapidly develop agricultural and manufacturing industries and to make a major contribution to the Allied effort in World Wars I and II. ++ In recent decades, Australia has become an internationally competitive, advanced market economy due in large part to economic reforms adopted in the 1980s and its location in one of the fastest growing regions of the world economy. Long-term concerns include an aging population, pressure on infrastructure, and environmental issues such as floods, droughts, and bushfires. Australia is the driest inhabited continent on earth, making it particularly vulnerable to the challenges of climate change. Australia is home to 10% of the world's biodiversity, and a great number of its flora and fauna exist nowhere else in the world."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
       "text": "population is primarily located on the periphery, with the highest concentration of people residing in the east and southeast; a secondary population center is located in and around Perth in the west; of the States and Territories, New South Wales has, by far, the largest population; the interior, or \"outback\", has a very sparse population"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "cyclones along the coast; severe droughts; forest fires\nvolcanism: volcanic activity on Heard and McDonald Islands"
+      "text": "cyclones along the coast; severe droughts; forest fires ++ volcanism: volcanic activity on Heard and McDonald Islands"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "soil erosion from overgrazing, deforestation, industrial development, urbanization, and poor farming practices; limited natural freshwater resources; soil salinity rising due to the use of poor quality water; drought, desertification; clearing for agricultural purposes threatens the natural habitat of many unique animal and plant species; disruption of the fragile ecosystem has resulted in significant floral extinctions; the Great Barrier Reef off the northeast coast, the largest coral reef in the world, is threatened by increased shipping and its popularity as a tourist site; overfishing, pollution, and invasive species are also problems"
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
     },
     "Geography - note": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "note 1: world's smallest continent but sixth-largest country; the largest country in Oceania, the largest country entirely in the Southern Hemisphere, and the largest country without land borders; the only continent without glaciers; the invigorating sea breeze known as the \"Fremantle Doctor\" affects the city of Perth on the west coast and is one of the most consistent winds in the worldnote 2: the Great Dividing Range that runs along eastern Australia is that continent’s longest mountain range and the third-longest land-based range in the world; the term \"Great Dividing Range\" refers to the fact that the mountains form a watershed crest from which all of the rivers of eastern Australia flow – east, west, north, and south"
+        "text": "note 1: world's smallest continent but sixth-largest country; the largest country in Oceania, the largest country entirely in the Southern Hemisphere, and the largest country without land borders; the only continent without glaciers; the invigorating sea breeze known as the \"Fremantle Doctor\" affects the city of Perth on the west coast and is one of the most consistent winds in the world ++ note 2: the Great Dividing Range that runs along eastern Australia is that continent's longest mountain range and the third-longest land-based range in the world; the term \"Great Dividing Range\" refers to the fact that the mountains form a watershed crest from which all of the rivers of eastern Australia flow – east, west, north, and south"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -270,14 +270,11 @@
       }
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -290,8 +287,11 @@
       "text": "3.8 beds/1,000 population (2016)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@
         "text": "+1hr, begins first Sunday in October; ends first Sunday in April"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "note: Australia has four time zones, including Lord Howe Island (UTC+10:30)etymolgy: the name is claimed to derive from either Kambera or Camberry, which are names corrupted from the original native designation for the area \"Nganbra\" or \"Nganbira\""
+        "text": "note: Australia has four time zones, including Lord Howe Island (UTC+10:30) ++ etymolgy: the name is claimed to derive from either Kambera or Camberry, which are names corrupted from the original native designation for the area \"Nganbra\" or \"Nganbira\" ++ ++"
       }
     },
     "Administrative divisions": {
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@
         "text": "approved in a series of referenda from 1898 through 1900 and became law 9 July 1900, effective 1 January 1901"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by Parliament; passage requires approval of a referendum bill by absolute majority vote in both houses of Parliament, approval in a referendum by a majority of voters in at least four states and in the territories, and Royal Assent; proposals that would reduce a state’s representation in either house or change a state’s boundaries require that state’s approval prior to Royal Assent; amended several times, last in 1977"
+        "text": "proposed by Parliament; passage requires approval of a referendum bill by absolute majority vote in both houses of Parliament, approval in a referendum by a majority of voters in at least four states and in the territories, and Royal Assent; proposals that would reduce a state's representation in either house or change a state's boundaries require that state's approval prior to Royal Assent; amended several times, last in 1977"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -423,13 +423,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Federal Parliament consists of:Senate (76 seats; 12 members from each of the 6 states and 2 each from the 2 mainland territories; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote; members serve 6-year terms with one-half of state membership renewed every 3 years and territory membership renewed every 3 years)House of Representatives (151 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by majority preferential vote; members serve terms of up to 3 years)"
+        "text": "bicameral Federal Parliament consists of: Senate (76 seats; 12 members from each of the 6 states and 2 each from the 2 mainland territories; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote; members serve 6-year terms with one-half of state membership renewed every 3 years and territory membership renewed every 3 years) ++ House of Representatives (151 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by majority preferential vote; members serve terms of up to 3 years)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 18 May 2019 (next to be held in 2022)House of Representatives - last held on 18 May 2019 (next to be held in 2022)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 18 May 2019 (next to be held in 2022) ++ House of Representatives - last held on 18 May 2019 (next to be held in 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - Liberal/National coalition 37.99%, ALP 28.79%, The Greens 10.19%, One Nation 5.4%, Centre Alliance .19%, Lambie Network .21%, other 17.23%; seats by party - Liberal/National coalition 35, ALP 26, The Greens 9, One Nation 2, Centre Alliance 2, Lambie Network 1, independents 1House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - Liberal/National coalition 41.4%, ALP 33.3%, The Greens 10.4%, Katter's Australian Party .49%, Centre Alliance .33%, independents 3.37%, other 10.63%; seats by party - Liberal/National Coalition 77, ALP 68, The Greens 1, Katter's Australian Party 1, Centre Alliance 1, independent 3"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - Liberal/National coalition 37.99%, ALP 28.79%, The Greens 10.19%, One Nation 5.4%, Centre Alliance .19%, Lambie Network .21%, other 17.23%; seats by party - Liberal/National coalition 35, ALP 26, The Greens 9, One Nation 2, Centre Alliance 2, Lambie Network 1, independents 1 ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - Liberal/National coalition 41.4%, ALP 33.3%, The Greens 10.4%, Katter's Australian Party .49%, Centre Alliance .33%, independents 3.37%, other 10.63%; seats by party - Liberal/National Coalition 77, ALP 68, The Greens 1, Katter's Australian Party 1, Centre Alliance 1, independent 3"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Australian Greens Party [Adam BANDT]Australian Labor Party or ALP [Anthony ALBANESE]Country Liberal Party or CLP [Gary HIGGINS]Liberal National Party of Queensland or LNP [Deborah FRECKLINGTON]Liberal Party of Australia [Scott MORRISON]The Nationals [Michael MCCORMACK]Centre Alliance [Nick XENOPHON] Pauline Hanson’s One Nation [Pauline HANSON]"
+      "text": "Australian Greens Party [Adam BANDT] ++ Australian Labor Party or ALP [Anthony ALBANESE] ++ Country Liberal Party or CLP [Gary HIGGINS] ++ Liberal National Party of Queensland or LNP [Deborah FRECKLINGTON] ++ Liberal Party of Australia [Scott MORRISON] ++ The Nationals [Michael MCCORMACK] ++ Centre Alliance [Nick XENOPHON] ++ Pauline Hanson's One Nation [Pauline HANSON]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ADB, ANZUS, APEC, ARF, ASEAN (dialogue partner), Australia Group, BIS, C, CD, CP, EAS, EBRD, EITI (implementing country), FAO, FATF, G-20, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NEA, NSG, OECD, OPCW, OSCE (partner), Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club, PCA, PIF, SAARC (observer), SICA (observer), Sparteca, SPC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNMISS, UNMIT, UNRWA, UNTSO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC"
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Australia is an open market with minimal restrictions on imports of goods and services. The process of opening up has increased productivity, stimulated growth, and made the economy more flexible and dynamic. Australia plays an active role in the WTO, APEC, the G20, and other trade forums. Australia’s free trade agreement (FTA) with China entered into force in 2015, adding to existing FTAs with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and the US, and a regional FTA with ASEAN and New Zealand. Australia continues to negotiate bilateral agreements with Indonesia, as well as larger agreements with its Pacific neighbors and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and an Asia-wide Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that includes the 10 ASEAN countries and China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and India. Australia is a significant exporter of natural resources, energy, and food. Australia's abundant and diverse natural resources attract high levels of foreign investment and include extensive reserves of coal, iron, copper, gold, natural gas, uranium, and renewable energy sources. A series of major investments, such as the US$40 billion Gorgon Liquid Natural Gas Project, will significantly expand the resources sector. For nearly two decades up till 2017, Australia had benefited from a dramatic surge in its terms of trade. As export prices increased faster than import prices, the economy experienced continuous growth, low unemployment, contained inflation, very low public debt, and a strong and stable financial system. Australia entered 2018 facing a range of growth constraints, principally driven by the sharp fall in global prices of key export commodities. Demand for resources and energy from Asia and especially China is growing at a slower pace and sharp drops in export prices have impacted growth."
+      "text": "Australia is an open market with minimal restrictions on imports of goods and services. The process of opening up has increased productivity, stimulated growth, and made the economy more flexible and dynamic. Australia plays an active role in the WTO, APEC, the G20, and other trade forums. Australia's free trade agreement (FTA) with China entered into force in 2015, adding to existing FTAs with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and the US, and a regional FTA with ASEAN and New Zealand. Australia continues to negotiate bilateral agreements with Indonesia, as well as larger agreements with its Pacific neighbors and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and an Asia-wide Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that includes the 10 ASEAN countries and China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and India. ++ Australia is a significant exporter of natural resources, energy, and food. Australia's abundant and diverse natural resources attract high levels of foreign investment and include extensive reserves of coal, iron, copper, gold, natural gas, uranium, and renewable energy sources. A series of major investments, such as the US$40 billion Gorgon Liquid Natural Gas Project, will significantly expand the resources sector. ++ For nearly two decades up till 2017, Australia had benefited from a dramatic surge in its terms of trade. As export prices increased faster than import prices, the economy experienced continuous growth, low unemployment, contained inflation, very low public debt, and a strong and stable financial system. Australia entered 2018 facing a range of growth constraints, principally driven by the sharp fall in global prices of key export commodities. Demand for resources and energy from Asia and especially China is growing at a slower pace and sharp drops in export prices have impacted growth."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$1.248 trillion (2017 est.) / $1.221 trillion (2016 est.) / $1.19 trillion (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/bp.json

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
       "text": "most of the population lives along the coastal regions; about one in five live in urban areas, and of these some two-thirds reside in Honiara, the largest town and chief port"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "tropical cyclones, but rarely destructive; geologically active region with frequent earthquakes, tremors, and volcanic activity; tsunamis\nvolcanism: Tinakula (851 m) has frequent eruption activity, while an eruption of Savo (485 m) could affect the capital Honiara on nearby Guadalcanal"
+      "text": "tropical cyclones, but rarely destructive; geologically active region with frequent earthquakes, tremors, and volcanic activity; tsunamis ++ volcanism: Tinakula (851 m) has frequent eruption activity, while an eruption of Savo (485 m) could affect the capital Honiara on nearby Guadalcanal"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation; soil erosion; many of the surrounding coral reefs are dead or dying; effects of climate change and rising sea levels"
@@ -253,14 +253,11 @@
       "text": "29.3% (2015)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 95% of population / rural: 67.1% of population / total: 73.6% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "32.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "26.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 5% of population / rural: 32.9% of population / total: 26.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -273,14 +270,11 @@
       "text": "1.4 beds/1,000 population (2012)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 4.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 95.6% of population / rural: 22% of population / total: 39.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "78% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "60.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 4.4% of population / rural: 78% of population / total: 60.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -442,7 +436,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Alliance Party or DAP [Steve ABANA]Kadere Party of Solomon Islands or KPSI [Peter BOYERS]People's Alliance Party or PAP [Nathaniel WAENA]Solomon Islands People First Party or SIPFP [Dr. Jimmie RODGERS]Solomon Islands Party for Rural Advancement or SIPRA [Manasseh MAELANGA]United Democratic Party or UDP [Sir Thomas Ko CHAN]",
+      "text": "Democratic Alliance Party or DAP [Steve ABANA] ++ Kadere Party of Solomon Islands or KPSI [Peter BOYERS] ++ People's Alliance Party or PAP [Nathaniel WAENA] ++ Solomon Islands People First Party or SIPFP [Dr. Jimmie RODGERS] ++ Solomon Islands Party for Rural Advancement or SIPRA [Manasseh MAELANGA] ++ United Democratic Party or UDP [Sir Thomas Ko CHAN]",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: in general, Solomon Islands politics is characterized by fluid coalitions"
       }
@@ -855,7 +849,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "the Solomon Islands is a source and destination country for local adults and children and Southeast Asian men and women subjected to forced labor and forced prostitution; women from China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are recruited for legitimate work and upon arrival are forced into prostitution; men from Indonesia and Malaysia recruited to work in the Solomon Islands’ mining and logging industries may be subjected to forced labor; local children are forced into prostitution near foreign logging camps, on fishing vessels, at hotels, and entertainment venues; some local children are also sold by their parents for marriage to foreign workers or put up for \"informal adoption\" to pay off debts and then find themselves forced into domestic servitude or forced prostitution"
+        "text": "the Solomon Islands is a source and destination country for local adults and children and Southeast Asian men and women subjected to forced labor and forced prostitution; women from China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are recruited for legitimate work and upon arrival are forced into prostitution; men from Indonesia and Malaysia recruited to work in the Solomon Islands' mining and logging industries may be subjected to forced labor; local children are forced into prostitution near foreign logging camps, on fishing vessels, at hotels, and entertainment venues; some local children are also sold by their parents for marriage to foreign workers or put up for \"informal adoption\" to pay off debts and then find themselves forced into domestic servitude or forced prostitution"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – the Solomon Islands does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, the Solomon Islands was granted a waiver from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; the government gazetted implementing regulations for the 2012 immigration act prohibiting transnational trafficking, but the penalties are not sufficiently stringent because they allow the option of paying a fine; a new draft law to address these weaknesses awaits parliamentary review; no new trafficking investigations were conducted, even after labor inspections at logging and fishing companies, no existing cases led to prosecutions or convictions, and no funding was allocated for national anti-trafficking efforts; authorities did not identify or protect any victims and lack any procedures or shelters to do so; civil society and religious organizations provide most of the limited services available; a lack of understanding of the crime of trafficking remains a serious challenge (2015)"

australia-oceania/cq.json

@@ -216,13 +216,19 @@
       "text": "2.7 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 97.7% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 2.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -323,13 +329,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Northern Marianas Commonwealth Legislature consists of:Senate (9 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms) House of Representatives (20 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 2-year terms)the Northern Mariana Islands directly elects 1 delegate to the US House of Representatives by simple majority vote to serve a 2-year term"
+        "text": "bicameral Northern Marianas Commonwealth Legislature consists of: Senate (9 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms) ++ House of Representatives (20 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 2-year terms) ++ the Northern Mariana Islands directly elects 1 delegate to the US House of Representatives by simple majority vote to serve a 2-year term"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "CNMI Senate - last held on 8 November 2016 (next to be held in November 2020) CNMI House of Representatives - last held on 13 November 2018 (next to be held in November 2020)Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands delegate to the US House of Representatives  - last held on 13 November 2018 (next to be held in November 2020)"
+        "text": "CNMI Senate - last held on 8 November 2016 (next to be held in November 2020) ++ CNMI House of Representatives - last held on 13 November 2018 (next to be held in November 2020) ++ Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands delegate to the US House of Representatives  - last held on 13 November 2018 (next to be held in November 2020)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "CNMI Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Republican Party 6, independent 3; composition - men 8, women 1, percent of women 11.1% CNMI House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Republican Party 13, independent 7; composition - men 17, women 3, percent of women 15%; note - total CNMI Legislature percent of women 13.8%delegate to US House of Representatives - seat won by Democratic Party; composition - 1 man"
+        "text": "CNMI Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Republican Party 6, independent 3; composition - men 8, women 1, percent of women 11.1% ++ CNMI House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Republican Party 13, independent 7; composition - men 17, women 3, percent of women 15%; note - total CNMI Legislature percent of women 13.8% ++ delegate to US House of Representatives - seat won by Democratic Party; composition - 1 man"
       },
       "note": {
         "text": "note: the Northern Mariana Islands delegate to the US House of Representatives can vote when serving on a committee and when the House meets as the \"Committee of the Whole House\" but not when legislation is submitted for a “full floor” House vote"
@@ -347,7 +353,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Party [Daniel QUITUGUA]Republican Party [James ADA]"
+      "text": "Democratic Party [Daniel QUITUGUA] ++ Republican Party [James ADA]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "PIF (observer), SPC, UPU"
@@ -372,7 +378,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The economy of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands(CNMI) has been on the rebound in the last few years, mainly on the strength of its tourism industry. In 2016, the CNMI’s real GDP increased 28.6% over the previous year, following two years of relatively rapid growth in 2014 and 2015. Chinese and Korean tourists have supplanted Japanese tourists in the last few years. The Commonwealth is making a concerted effort to broaden its tourism by extending casino gambling from the small Islands of Tinian and Rota to the main Island of Saipan, its political and commercial center. Investment is concentrated on hotels and casinos in Saipan, the CNMI’s largest island and home to about 90% of its population. Federal grants have also contributed to economic growth and stability. In 2016, federal grants amounted to $101.4 billion which made up 26% of the CNMI government’s total revenues. A small agriculture sector consists of cattle ranches and small farms producing coconuts, breadfruit, tomatoes, and melons. Legislation is pending in the US Congress to extend the transition period to allow foreign workers to work in the CNMI on temporary visas."
+      "text": "The economy of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands(CNMI) has been on the rebound in the last few years, mainly on the strength of its tourism industry. In 2016, the CNMI's real GDP increased 28.6% over the previous year, following two years of relatively rapid growth in 2014 and 2015. Chinese and Korean tourists have supplanted Japanese tourists in the last few years. The Commonwealth is making a concerted effort to broaden its tourism by extending casino gambling from the small Islands of Tinian and Rota to the main Island of Saipan, its political and commercial center. Investment is concentrated on hotels and casinos in Saipan, the CNMI's largest island and home to about 90% of its population. ++ Federal grants have also contributed to economic growth and stability. In 2016, federal grants amounted to $101.4 billion which made up 26% of the CNMI government's total revenues. A small agriculture sector consists of cattle ranches and small farms producing coconuts, breadfruit, tomatoes, and melons. ++ Legislation is pending in the US Congress to extend the transition period to allow foreign workers to work in the CNMI on temporary visas."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$1.242 billion (2016 est.) / $933 million (2015 est.) / $845 million (2014 est.)",

australia-oceania/cw.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The Cook Islands, named after Captain James Cook who landed in 1773, became a British protectorate in 1888 and was later annexed by proclamation in 1900. The Cook Islands was first included within the boundaries of New Zealand in 1901, and in 1965, residents chose self-government in free association with New Zealand. The Cook Islands’ economy relies on tourism, fisheries, and foreign aid. More recently a growing offshore financial sector exposed the country to vulnerabilities which the government has addressed with legislation and regulations for the oversight of all banks and financial institutions, and with enforcement measures. The Cook Islands continues to face challenges with the emigration of skilled workers, government deficits, inadequate infrastructure, and natural resource depletion. The Cook Islands is expected to graduate to the high-income threshold set by the World Bank, which will limit the country’s access to Official Development Assistance under OECD guidelines."
+      "text": "The Cook Islands, named after Captain James Cook who landed in 1773, became a British protectorate in 1888 and was later annexed by proclamation in 1900. The Cook Islands was first included within the boundaries of New Zealand in 1901, and in 1965, residents chose self-government in free association with New Zealand. The Cook Islands' economy relies on tourism, fisheries, and foreign aid. More recently a growing offshore financial sector exposed the country to vulnerabilities which the government has addressed with legislation and regulations for the oversight of all banks and financial institutions, and with enforcement measures. The Cook Islands continues to face challenges with the emigration of skilled workers, government deficits, inadequate infrastructure, and natural resource depletion. The Cook Islands is expected to graduate to the high-income threshold set by the World Bank, which will limit the country's access to Official Development Assistance under OECD guidelines."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -224,8 +224,11 @@
       "text": "2.12 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -235,8 +238,11 @@
       "text": "1.41 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 97.6% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 2.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -326,7 +332,7 @@
         "text": "4 August 1965 (Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964)"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by Parliament; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote by the Parliament membership in each of several readings and assent of the chief of state’s representative; passage of amendments relating to the chief of state also requires two-thirds majority approval in a referendum; amended many times, last in 2004"
+        "text": "proposed by Parliament; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote by the Parliament membership in each of several readings and assent of the chief of state's representative; passage of amendments relating to the chief of state also requires two-thirds majority approval in a referendum; amended many times, last in 2004"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -375,7 +381,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Cook Islands Party or CIP [Henry PUNA]Democratic Party or Demo [Tina BROWNE]One Cook Islands Movement [Teina BISHOP]"
+      "text": "Cook Islands Party or CIP [Henry PUNA] ++ Democratic Party or Demo [Tina BROWNE] ++ One Cook Islands Movement [Teina BISHOP]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, ADB, AOSIS, FAO, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IFAD, IFRCS, IMO, IMSO, IOC, ITUC (NGOs), OPCW, PIF, Sparteca, SPC, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO"

australia-oceania/fj.json

@@ -250,14 +250,11 @@
       "text": "2.31 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.8% of population / rural: 88.7% of population / total: 93.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "11.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "6.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.2% of population / rural: 11.3% of population / total: 6.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -270,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "2 beds/1,000 population (2016)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 94% of population / rural: 89% of population / total: 98% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "11% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 6% of population / rural: 11% of population / total: 2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -441,7 +435,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "FijiFirst [Veroqe \"Frank\" BAINIMARAMA]Fiji Labor Party or FLP [Mahendra CHAUDHRY]Fiji United Freedon Party or FUFP [Jagath KARUNARATNE]National Federation Party or NFP [Biman PRASAD] (primarily Indian)Peoples Democratic Party or PDP [Lynda TABUYA]Social Democratic Liberal Party or SODELPAUnity Fiji [Adi QORO]"
+      "text": "FijiFirst [Veroqe \"Frank\" BAINIMARAMA] ++ Fiji Labor Party or FLP [Mahendra CHAUDHRY] ++ Fiji United Freedon Party or FUFP [Jagath KARUNARATNE] ++ National Federation Party or NFP [Biman PRASAD] (primarily Indian) ++ Peoples Democratic Party or PDP [Lynda TABUYA] ++ Social Democratic Liberal Party or SODELPA ++ Unity Fiji [Adi QORO]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, ADB, AOSIS, C, CP, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, OPCW, PCA, PIF, Sparteca (suspended), SPC, UN, UNCTAD, UNDOF, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -497,7 +491,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Fiji, endowed with forest, mineral, and fish resources, is one of the most developed and connected of the Pacific island economies. Earnings from the tourism industry, with an estimated 842,884 tourists visiting in 2017, and remittances from Fijian’s working abroad are the country’s largest foreign exchange earners. Bottled water exports to the US is Fiji’s largest domestic export. Fiji's sugar sector remains a significant industry and a major export, but crops and one of the sugar mills suffered damage during Cyclone Winston in 2016. Fiji’s trade imbalance continues to widen with increased imports and sluggish performance of domestic exports. The return to parliamentary democracy and successful elections in September 2014 improved investor confidence, but increasing bureaucratic regulation, new taxes, and lack of consultation with relevant stakeholders brought four consecutive years of decline for Fiji on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business index. Private sector investment in 2017 approached 20% of GDP, compared to 13% in 2013."
+      "text": "Fiji, endowed with forest, mineral, and fish resources, is one of the most developed and connected of the Pacific island economies. Earnings from the tourism industry, with an estimated 842,884 tourists visiting in 2017, and remittances from Fijian's working abroad are the country's largest foreign exchange earners. ++ Bottled water exports to the US is Fiji's largest domestic export. Fiji's sugar sector remains a significant industry and a major export, but crops and one of the sugar mills suffered damage during Cyclone Winston in 2016. Fiji's trade imbalance continues to widen with increased imports and sluggish performance of domestic exports. ++ The return to parliamentary democracy and successful elections in September 2014 improved investor confidence, but increasing bureaucratic regulation, new taxes, and lack of consultation with relevant stakeholders brought four consecutive years of decline for Fiji on the World Bank Ease of Doing Business index. Private sector investment in 2017 approached 20% of GDP, compared to 13% in 2013."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$8.629 billion (2017 est.) / $8.376 billion (2016 est.) / $8.321 billion (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/fm.json

@@ -241,8 +241,11 @@
       "text": "2.29 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 21.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 78.6% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 21.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -252,8 +255,11 @@
       "text": "3.2 beds/1,000 population (2009)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 11.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 88.3% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 11.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -332,7 +338,7 @@
         "text": "UTC+11 (16 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "note 1: Micronesia has two time zones note 2: Palikir became the new capital of the country in 1989, three years after independence; Kolonia, the former capital, remains the site for many foreign embassies; it also serves as the Pohnpei state capital"
+        "text": "note 1: Micronesia has two time zones ++ note 2: Palikir became the new capital of the country in 1989, three years after independence; Kolonia, the former capital, remains the site for many foreign embassies; it also serves as the Pohnpei state capital"
       }
     },
     "Administrative divisions": {
@@ -474,7 +480,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Economic activity consists largely of subsistence farming and fishing, and government, which employs two-thirds of the adult working population and receives funding largely - 58% in 2013 – from Compact of Free Association assistance provided by the US. The islands have few commercially valuable mineral deposits. The potential for tourism is limited by isolation, lack of adequate facilities, and limited internal air and water transportation. Under the terms of the original Compact, the US provided $1.3 billion in grants and aid from 1986 to 2001. The US and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) negotiated a second (amended) Compact agreement in 2002-03 that took effect in 2004. The amended Compact runs for a 20-year period to 2023; during which the US will provide roughly $2.1 billion to the FSM. The amended Compact also develops a trust fund for the FSM that will provide a comparable income stream beyond 2024 when Compact grants end. The country's medium-term economic outlook appears fragile because of dependence on US assistance and lackluster performance of its small and stagnant private sector."
+      "text": "Economic activity consists largely of subsistence farming and fishing, and government, which employs two-thirds of the adult working population and receives funding largely - 58% in 2013 – from Compact of Free Association assistance provided by the US. The islands have few commercially valuable mineral deposits. The potential for tourism is limited by isolation, lack of adequate facilities, and limited internal air and water transportation. ++ Under the terms of the original Compact, the US provided $1.3 billion in grants and aid from 1986 to 2001. The US and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) negotiated a second (amended) Compact agreement in 2002-03 that took effect in 2004. The amended Compact runs for a 20-year period to 2023; during which the US will provide roughly $2.1 billion to the FSM. The amended Compact also develops a trust fund for the FSM that will provide a comparable income stream beyond 2024 when Compact grants end. ++ The country's medium-term economic outlook appears fragile because of dependence on US assistance and lackluster performance of its small and stagnant private sector."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$348 million (2017 est.) / $341.1 million (2016 est.) / $331.4 million (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/fp.json

@@ -227,16 +227,22 @@
       "text": "1.83 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.13 physicians/1,000 population (2009)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 96.9% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 3.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -356,13 +362,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "unicameral Assembly of French Polynesia or Assemblée de la Polynésie française (57 seats; elections held in 2 rounds; in the second round, 38 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by a closed-list proportional representation vote; the party receiving the most votes gets an additional 19 seats; members serve 5-year terms) French Polynesia indirectly elects 2 senators to the French Senate via an electoral college by absolute majority vote for 6-year terms with one-half the membership renewed every 3 years and directly elects 3 deputies to the French National Assembly by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for 5-year terms"
+        "text": "unicameral Assembly of French Polynesia or Assemblée de la Polynésie française (57 seats; elections held in 2 rounds; in the second round, 38 members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by a closed-list proportional representation vote; the party receiving the most votes gets an additional 19 seats; members serve 5-year terms) ++ ++ ++ French Polynesia indirectly elects 2 senators to the French Senate via an electoral college by absolute majority vote for 6-year terms with one-half the membership renewed every 3 years and directly elects 3 deputies to the French National Assembly by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for 5-year terms"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Assembly of French Polynesia - last held on 22 April 2018 and 6 May 2018 (next to be held in 2023)French Senate - last held in September 2017 (next to be held in September 2020)French National Assembly - last held in 2 rounds on 3 and 17 June 2017 (next to be held in 2022)"
+        "text": "Assembly of French Polynesia - last held on 22 April 2018 and 6 May 2018 (next to be held in 2023) ++ French Senate - last held in September 2017 (next to be held in September 2020) ++ French National Assembly - last held in 2 rounds on 3 and 17 June 2017 (next to be held in 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Assembly of French Polynesia - percent of vote by party - Tapura Huiraatira 45.1%, Popular Rally 29.3%, Tavini Huiraatira 25.6%; seats by party - Tapura Huiraatira 38, Popular Rally 11, Tavini Huiraatira 8; composition - men 27, women 30, percent of women 52.6%French Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Popular Rally 1, People's Servant Party 1; composition - men 246, women 102, percent of women 29.3%French National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Tapura Huiractura 2, Tavini Huiraatura 1; composition - men 353, women 224, percent of women 38.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women 20%"
+        "text": "Assembly of French Polynesia - percent of vote by party - Tapura Huiraatira 45.1%, Popular Rally 29.3%, Tavini Huiraatira 25.6%; seats by party - Tapura Huiraatira 38, Popular Rally 11, Tavini Huiraatira 8; composition - men 27, women 30, percent of women 52.6% ++ French Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Popular Rally 1, People's Servant Party 1; composition - men 246, women 102, percent of women 29.3% ++ French National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - Tapura Huiractura 2, Tavini Huiraatura 1; composition - men 353, women 224, percent of women 38.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women 20%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -377,7 +383,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "A Tia Porinetia [Teva ROHFRITSCH]Alliance for a New Democracy or ADN (includes The New Star [Philip SCHYLE], This Country is Yours [Nicole BOUTEAU])New Fatherland Party (Ai'a Api) [Emile VERNAUDON]Our Home alliancePeople's Servant Party (Tavini Huiraatira) [Oscar TEMARU]Popular Rally (Tahoeraa Huiraatira) [Gaston FLOSSE]Tapura Huiraatira [Edouard FRITICH]Tavini Huiraatira [James CHANCELOR]Union for Democracy alliance or UPD [Oscar TEMARU]"
+      "text": "A Tia Porinetia [Teva ROHFRITSCH] ++ Alliance for a New Democracy or ADN (includes The New Star [Philip SCHYLE], This Country is Yours [Nicole BOUTEAU]) ++ New Fatherland Party (Ai'a Api) [Emile VERNAUDON] ++ Our Home alliance ++ People's Servant Party (Tavini Huiraatira) [Oscar TEMARU] ++ Popular Rally (Tahoeraa Huiraatira) [Gaston FLOSSE] ++ Tapura Huiraatira [Edouard FRITICH] ++ Tavini Huiraatira [James CHANCELOR] ++ Union for Democracy alliance or UPD [Oscar TEMARU]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ITUC (NGOs), PIF (associate member), SPC, UPU, WMO"
@@ -416,7 +422,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Since 1962, when France stationed military personnel in the region, French Polynesia has changed from a subsistence agricultural economy to one in which a high proportion of the work force is either employed by the military or supports the tourist industry. With the halt of French nuclear testing in 1996, the military contribution to the economy fell sharply. After growing at an average yearly rate of 4.2% from 1997-2007, the economic and financial crisis in 2008 marked French Polynesia’s entry into recession. However, since 2014, French Polynesia has shown signs of recovery. Business turnover reached 1.8% year-on-year in September 2016, tourism increased 1.8% in 2015, and GDP grew 2.0% in 2015. French Polynesia’s tourism-dominated service sector accounted for 85% of total value added for the economy in 2012. Tourism employs 17% of the workforce. Pearl farming is the second biggest industry, accounting for 54% of exports in 2015; however, the output has decreased to 12.5 tons – the lowest level since 2008. A small manufacturing sector predominantly processes commodities from French Polynesia’s primary sector - 8% of total economy in 2012 - including agriculture and fishing. France has agreed to finance infrastructure, marine businesses, and cultural and ecological sites at roughly $80 million per year between 2015 and 2020. Japan, the US, and China are French Polynesia’s three largest trade partners."
+      "text": "Since 1962, when France stationed military personnel in the region, French Polynesia has changed from a subsistence agricultural economy to one in which a high proportion of the work force is either employed by the military or supports the tourist industry. With the halt of French nuclear testing in 1996, the military contribution to the economy fell sharply. ++ After growing at an average yearly rate of 4.2% from 1997-2007, the economic and financial crisis in 2008 marked French Polynesia's entry into recession. However, since 2014, French Polynesia has shown signs of recovery. Business turnover reached 1.8% year-on-year in September 2016, tourism increased 1.8% in 2015, and GDP grew 2.0% in 2015. ++ French Polynesia's tourism-dominated service sector accounted for 85% of total value added for the economy in 2012. Tourism employs 17% of the workforce. Pearl farming is the second biggest industry, accounting for 54% of exports in 2015; however, the output has decreased to 12.5 tons – the lowest level since 2008. A small manufacturing sector predominantly processes commodities from French Polynesia's primary sector - 8% of total economy in 2012 - including agriculture and fishing. ++ France has agreed to finance infrastructure, marine businesses, and cultural and ecological sites at roughly $80 million per year between 2015 and 2020. Japan, the US, and China are French Polynesia's three largest trade partners."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$5.49 billion (2015 est.) / $5.383 billion (2014 est.) / $6.963 billion (2010 est.)"

australia-oceania/gq.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "Spain ceded Guam to the US in 1898. Captured by the Japanese in 1941, it was retaken by the US three years later. The military installations on the island are some of the most strategically important US bases in the Pacific; they also constitute the island’s most important source of income and economic stability."
+      "text": "Spain ceded Guam to the US in 1898. Captured by the Japanese in 1941, it was retaken by the US three years later. The military installations on the island are some of the most strategically important US bases in the Pacific; they also constitute the island's most important source of income and economic stability."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -227,19 +227,19 @@
       "text": "2.84 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 10.2% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 89.8% of population (2015 est.) / rural: 89.8% of population (2015 est.) / total: 89.8% of population (2015 est.)"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "10.2% of population (2015 est.)"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "10.2% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 10.2% of population (2015 est.) / rural: 10.2% of population (2015 est.) / total: 10.2% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Party [Joaquin \"Kin\" PEREZ]Republican Party [Jerry CRISOSTOMO]"
+      "text": "Democratic Party [Joaquin \"Kin\" PEREZ] ++ Republican Party [Jerry CRISOSTOMO]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "AOSIS (observer), IOC, PIF (observer), SPC, UPU"
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "US national defense spending is the main driver of Guam’s economy, followed closely by tourism and other services. Guam serves as a forward US base for the Western Pacific and is home to thousands of American military personnel. Total federal spending (defense and non-defense) amounted to $1.988 billion in 2016, or 34.2 of Guam’s GDP. Of that total, federal grants and cover-over payments amounted to $3444.1 million in 2016, or 35.8% of Guam’s total revenues for the fiscal year. In 2016, Guam’s economy grew 0.3%. Despite slow growth, Guam’s economy has been stable over the last decade. National defense spending cushions the island’s economy against fluctuations in tourism. Service exports, mainly spending by foreign tourists in Guam, amounted to over $1 billion for the first time in 2016, or 17.8% of GDP."
+      "text": "US national defense spending is the main driver of Guam's economy, followed closely by tourism and other services. Guam serves as a forward US base for the Western Pacific and is home to thousands of American military personnel. Total federal spending (defense and non-defense) amounted to $1.988 billion in 2016, or 34.2 of Guam's GDP. Of that total, federal grants and cover-over payments amounted to $3444.1 million in 2016, or 35.8% of Guam's total revenues for the fiscal year. In 2016, Guam's economy grew 0.3%. Despite slow growth, Guam's economy has been stable over the last decade. National defense spending cushions the island's economy against fluctuations in tourism. Service exports, mainly spending by foreign tourists in Guam, amounted to over $1 billion for the first time in 2016, or 17.8% of GDP."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$5.793 billion (2016 est.) / $5.697 billion (2015 est.) / $5.531 billion (2014 est.)"

australia-oceania/kr.json

@@ -250,8 +250,11 @@
       "text": "2.25 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 28.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 71.6% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 28.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -264,8 +267,11 @@
       "text": "1.9 beds/1,000 population (2016)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 38.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 61.1% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 38.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -358,7 +364,7 @@
         "text": "UTC+12 (17 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "note: Kiribati has three time zones: the Gilbert Islands group at UTC+12, the Phoenix Islands at UTC+13, and the Line Islands at UTC+14etymology: in Kiribati creation mythology, \"tarawa\" was what the spider Nareau named the land to distinguish it from \"karawa\" (the sky) and \"marawa\" (the ocean)"
+        "text": "note: Kiribati has three time zones: the Gilbert Islands group at UTC+12, the Phoenix Islands at UTC+13, and the Line Islands at UTC+14 ++ etymology: in Kiribati creation mythology, \"tarawa\" was what the spider Nareau named the land to distinguish it from \"karawa\" (the sky) and \"marawa\" (the ocean)"
       }
     },
     "Administrative divisions": {
@@ -441,7 +447,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Boutokaan Kiribati Moa Party (BKM) [Tessie LAMBOURNE]Boutokaan Te Koaua Party or BTK or Pillars of Truth [Anote TONG]Kamaeuraoan Te I-Kiribati Party or KTK [Tetaua TAITAI]Maurin Kiribati Pati or MKP [Rimeta BENIAMINA]Tobwaan Kiribati Party or TKP [Taneti MAAMAU]",
+      "text": "Boutokaan Kiribati Moa Party (BKM) [Tessie LAMBOURNE] ++ Boutokaan Te Koaua Party or BTK or Pillars of Truth [Anote TONG] ++ Kamaeuraoan Te I-Kiribati Party or KTK [Tetaua TAITAI] ++ Maurin Kiribati Pati or MKP [Rimeta BENIAMINA] ++ Tobwaan Kiribati Party or TKP [Taneti MAAMAU]",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: there is no tradition of formally organized political parties in Kiribati; they more closely resemble factions or interest groups because they have no party headquarters, formal platforms, or party structures"
       }
@@ -489,7 +495,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "A remote country of 33 scattered coral atolls, Kiribati has few natural resources and is one of the least developed Pacific Island countries. Commercially viable phosphate deposits were exhausted by the time of independence from the United Kingdom in 1979. Earnings from fishing licenses and seafarer remittances are important sources of income. Although the number of seafarers employed declined due to changes in global shipping demands, remittances are expected to improve with more overseas temporary and seasonal work opportunities for Kiribati nationals. Economic development is constrained by a shortage of skilled workers, weak infrastructure, and remoteness from international markets. The public sector dominates economic activity, with ongoing capital projects in infrastructure including road rehabilitation, water and sanitation projects, and renovations to the international airport, spurring some growth. Public debt increased from 23% of GDP at the end of 2015 to 25.8% in 2016. Kiribati is dependent on foreign aid, which was estimated to have contributed over 32.7% in 2016 to the government’s finances. The country’s sovereign fund, the Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund (RERF), which is held offshore, had an estimated balance of $855.5 million in late July 2016. The RERF seeks to avoid exchange rate risk by holding investments in more than 20 currencies, including the Australian dollar, US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Euro. Drawdowns from the RERF helped finance the government’s annual budget."
+      "text": "A remote country of 33 scattered coral atolls, Kiribati has few natural resources and is one of the least developed Pacific Island countries. Commercially viable phosphate deposits were exhausted by the time of independence from the United Kingdom in 1979. Earnings from fishing licenses and seafarer remittances are important sources of income. Although the number of seafarers employed declined due to changes in global shipping demands, remittances are expected to improve with more overseas temporary and seasonal work opportunities for Kiribati nationals. ++ Economic development is constrained by a shortage of skilled workers, weak infrastructure, and remoteness from international markets. The public sector dominates economic activity, with ongoing capital projects in infrastructure including road rehabilitation, water and sanitation projects, and renovations to the international airport, spurring some growth. Public debt increased from 23% of GDP at the end of 2015 to 25.8% in 2016. ++ Kiribati is dependent on foreign aid, which was estimated to have contributed over 32.7% in 2016 to the government's finances. The country's sovereign fund, the Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund (RERF), which is held offshore, had an estimated balance of $855.5 million in late July 2016. The RERF seeks to avoid exchange rate risk by holding investments in more than 20 currencies, including the Australian dollar, US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Euro. Drawdowns from the RERF helped finance the government's annual budget."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$227 million (2017 est.) / $220.2 million (2016 est.) / $217.7 million (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/nc.json

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
       "text": "most of the populace lives in the southern part of the main island, in and around the capital of Noumea"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "cyclones, most frequent from November to March\nvolcanism: Matthew and Hunter Islands are historically active"
+      "text": "cyclones, most frequent from November to March ++ volcanism: Matthew and Hunter Islands are historically active"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "preservation of coral reefs; prevention of invasive species; limiting erosion caused by nickel mining and forest fires"
@@ -230,16 +230,22 @@
       "text": "1.88 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.22 physicians/1,000 population (2009)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 100% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -376,13 +382,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "unicameral Territorial Congress or Congrès du Territoire (54 seats; members indirectly selected proportionally by the partisan makeup of the 3 Provincial Assemblies or Assemblés Provinciales; members of the 3 Provincial Assemblies directly elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms); note - the Customary Senate is the assembly of the various traditional councils of the Kanaks, the indigenous population, which rules on laws affecting the indigenous populationNew Caledonia indirectly elects 2 members to the French Senate by an electoral colleges for a 6-year term with one seat renewed every 3 years and directly elects 2 members to the French National Assembly by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term"
+        "text": "unicameral Territorial Congress or Congrès du Territoire (54 seats; members indirectly selected proportionally by the partisan makeup of the 3 Provincial Assemblies or Assemblés Provinciales; members of the 3 Provincial Assemblies directly elected by proportional representation vote; members serve 5-year terms); note - the Customary Senate is the assembly of the various traditional councils of the Kanaks, the indigenous population, which rules on laws affecting the indigenous population ++ New Caledonia indirectly elects 2 members to the French Senate by an electoral colleges for a 6-year term with one seat renewed every 3 years and directly elects 2 members to the French National Assembly by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 5-year term"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Territorial Congress - last held on 12 May 2019 (next to be held in May 2024)French Senate - election last held on 24 September 2017 (next to be held not later than 2019)French National Assembly - election last held on 11 and 18 June 2017 (next to be held by June 2022)"
+        "text": "Territorial Congress - last held on 12 May 2019 (next to be held in May 2024) ++ French Senate - election last held on 24 September 2017 (next to be held not later than 2019) ++ French National Assembly - election last held on 11 and 18 June 2017 (next to be held by June 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Territorial Congress - percent of vote by party - N/A; seats by party -Future With Confidence 18, UNI 9, UC 9, CE 7, FLNKS 6, Oceanic Awakening 3, PT 1, LKS 1 (Anti-Independence 28, Pro-Independence 26); composition - men 30, women 24, percent of women 44.4% French Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - UMP 2French National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - CE 2"
+        "text": "Territorial Congress - percent of vote by party - N/A; seats by party -Future With Confidence 18, UNI 9, UC 9, CE 7, FLNKS 6, Oceanic Awakening 3, PT 1, LKS 1 (Anti-Independence 28, Pro-Independence 26); composition - men 30, women 24, percent of women 44.4% ++ French Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - UMP 2 ++ French National Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - CE 2"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -397,7 +403,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Build Our Rainbow NationCaledonia Together or CE [Philippe GERMAIN]Caledonian Union or UC [Daniel GOA]Future Together (l'Avenir Ensemble) [Harold MARTIN]Kanak Socialist Front for National Liberation or FLNKS (alliance includes PALIKA, UNI, UC, and UPM) [Victor TUTUGORO]Labor Party (Parti Travailliste) or PT [Louis Kotra UREGEI]National Union for Independence (Union Nationale pour l'Independance) or UNIParty of Kanak Liberation (Parti de Liberation Kanak) or PALIKA [Paul NEAOUTYINE]Socialist Kanak Liberation or LKS [Nidoish NAISSELINE]The Republicans (formerly The Rally or UMP) [interim leader Thierry SANTA]Union for Caledonia in France"
+      "text": "Build Our Rainbow Nation ++ Caledonia Together or CE [Philippe GERMAIN] ++ Caledonian Union or UC [Daniel GOA] ++ Future Together (l'Avenir Ensemble) [Harold MARTIN] ++ Kanak Socialist Front for National Liberation or FLNKS (alliance includes PALIKA, UNI, UC, and UPM) [Victor TUTUGORO] ++ Labor Party (Parti Travailliste) or PT [Louis Kotra UREGEI] ++ National Union for Independence (Union Nationale pour l'Independance) or UNI ++ Party of Kanak Liberation (Parti de Liberation Kanak) or PALIKA [Paul NEAOUTYINE] ++ Socialist Kanak Liberation or LKS [Nidoish NAISSELINE] ++ The Republicans (formerly The Rally or UMP) [interim leader Thierry SANTA] ++ Union for Caledonia in France"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ITUC (NGOs), PIF (associate member), SPC, UPU, WFTU (NGOs), WMO"
@@ -430,7 +436,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "New Caledonia has 11% of the world's nickel reserves, representing the second largest reserves on the planet. Only a small amount of the land is suitable for cultivation, and food accounts for about 20% of imports. In addition to nickel, substantial financial support from France - equal to more than 15% of GDP - and tourism are keys to the health of the economy. With the gradual increase in the production of two new nickel plants in 2015, average production of metallurgical goods stood at a record level of 94 thousand tons. However, the sector is exposed to the high volatility of nickel prices, which have been in decline since 2016. In 2017, one of the three major mining firms on the island, Vale, put its operations up for sale, triggering concerns of layoffs ahead of the 2018 independence referendum."
+      "text": "New Caledonia has 11% of the world's nickel reserves, representing the second largest reserves on the planet. Only a small amount of the land is suitable for cultivation, and food accounts for about 20% of imports. In addition to nickel, substantial financial support from France - equal to more than 15% of GDP - and tourism are keys to the health of the economy. ++ With the gradual increase in the production of two new nickel plants in 2015, average production of metallurgical goods stood at a record level of 94 thousand tons. However, the sector is exposed to the high volatility of nickel prices, which have been in decline since 2016. In 2017, one of the three major mining firms on the island, Vale, put its operations up for sale, triggering concerns of layoffs ahead of the 2018 independence referendum."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$11.11 billion (2017 est.) / $10.89 billion (2016 est.) / $10.77 billion (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/ne.json

@@ -166,16 +166,22 @@
       "text": "NA"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 98.2% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 1.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
       "text": "8.6% (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 96.8% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 3.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -254,7 +260,7 @@
         "text": "several previous (New Zealand colonial statutes); latest 19 October 1974 (Niue Constitution Act 1974)"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the Assembly; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly membership in each of three readings and approval by the majority of votes in a referendum; passage of amendments to a number of sections, including Niue’s self-governing status, British nationality and New Zealand citizenship, external affairs and defense, economic and administrative assistance by New Zealand, and amendment procedures, requires at least two-thirds majority vote by the Assembly and at least two thirds of votes in a referendum; amended 1992, 2007"
+        "text": "proposed by the Assembly; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly membership in each of three readings and approval by the majority of votes in a referendum; passage of amendments to a number of sections, including Niue's self-governing status, British nationality and New Zealand citizenship, external affairs and defense, economic and administrative assistance by New Zealand, and amendment procedures, requires at least two-thirds majority vote by the Assembly and at least two thirds of votes in a referendum; amended 1992, 2007"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -306,7 +312,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance of Independents or AINiue People's Action Party or NPP [Young VIVIAN]"
+      "text": "Alliance of Independents or AI ++ Niue People's Action Party or NPP [Young VIVIAN]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, FAO, IFAD, OPCW, PIF, Sparteca, SPC, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO"
@@ -339,7 +345,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The economy suffers from the typical Pacific island problems of geographic isolation, few resources, and a small population. The agricultural sector consists mainly of subsistence gardening, although some cash crops are grown for export. Industry consists primarily of small factories for processing passion fruit, lime oil, honey, and coconut cream. The sale of postage stamps to foreign collectors is an important source of revenue. Government expenditures regularly exceed revenues, and the shortfall is made up by critically needed grants from New Zealand that are used to pay wages to public employees. Economic aid allocation from New Zealand in FY13/14 was US$10.1 million. Niue has cut government expenditures by reducing the public service by almost half. The island in recent years has suffered a serious loss of population because of emigration to New Zealand. Efforts to increase GDP include the promotion of tourism and financial services, although the International Banking Repeal Act of 2002 resulted in the termination of all offshore banking licenses."
+      "text": "The economy suffers from the typical Pacific island problems of geographic isolation, few resources, and a small population. The agricultural sector consists mainly of subsistence gardening, although some cash crops are grown for export. Industry consists primarily of small factories for processing passion fruit, lime oil, honey, and coconut cream. The sale of postage stamps to foreign collectors is an important source of revenue. ++ Government expenditures regularly exceed revenues, and the shortfall is made up by critically needed grants from New Zealand that are used to pay wages to public employees. Economic aid allocation from New Zealand in FY13/14 was US$10.1 million. Niue has cut government expenditures by reducing the public service by almost half. ++ The island in recent years has suffered a serious loss of population because of emigration to New Zealand. Efforts to increase GDP include the promotion of tourism and financial services, although the International Banking Repeal Act of 2002 resulted in the termination of all offshore banking licenses."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$10.01 million (2003 est.)"

australia-oceania/nf.json

@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Norfolk Island Labor Party [Mike KELLY]Norfolk Liberals [John BROWN]"
+      "text": "Norfolk Island Labor Party [Mike KELLY] ++ Norfolk Liberals [John BROWN]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "UPU"

australia-oceania/nh.json

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
       "text": "three-quarters of the population lives in rural areas; the urban populace lives primarily in two cities, Port-Vila and Lugenville; three largest islands - Espiritu Santo, Malakula, and Efate - accomodate over half of the populace"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "tropical cyclones (January to April); volcanic eruption on Aoba (Ambae) island began on 27 November 2005, volcanism also causes minor earthquakes; tsunamis\nvolcanism: significant volcanic activity with multiple eruptions in recent years; Yasur (361 m), one of the world's most active volcanoes, has experienced continuous activity in recent centuries; other historically active volcanoes include Aoba, Ambrym, Epi, Gaua, Kuwae, Lopevi, Suretamatai, and Traitor's Head"
+      "text": "tropical cyclones (January to April); volcanic eruption on Aoba (Ambae) island began on 27 November 2005, volcanism also causes minor earthquakes; tsunamis ++ volcanism: significant volcanic activity with multiple eruptions in recent years; Yasur (361 m), one of the world's most active volcanoes, has experienced continuous activity in recent centuries; other historically active volcanoes include Aoba, Ambrym, Epi, Gaua, Kuwae, Lopevi, Suretamatai, and Traitor's Head"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "population growth; water pollution, most of the population does not have access to a reliable supply of potable water; inadequate sanitation; deforestation"
@@ -253,14 +253,11 @@
       "text": "49% (2013)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 89.7% of population / total: 92.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "10.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "7.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 10.3% of population / total: 7.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -270,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "0.17 physicians/1,000 population (2016)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 8.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 91.6% of population / rural: 60.9% of population / total: 68.6% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "39.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "31.4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 8.4% of population / rural: 39.1% of population / total: 31.4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -445,7 +439,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Greens Confederation or GC [Moana CARCASSES Kalosil]Iauko Group or IG [Tony NARI]Land and Justice Party (Graon mo Jastis Pati) or GJP [Ralph REGENVANU]Melanesian Progressive Party or MPP [Barak SOPE]Nagriamel movement or NAG [Frankie STEVENS]Natatok Indigenous People's Democratic Party or (NATATOK) or NIPDP [Alfred Roland CARLOT]National United Party or NUP [Ham LINI]People's Progressive Party or PPP [Sato KILMAN]People's Service Party or PSP [Don KEN]Reunification of Movement for Change or RMC [Charlot SALWAI]Rural Development Party or RDP [Jay NGWELE, spokesman]Union of Moderate Parties or UMP [Serge VOHOR]Vanua'aku Pati (Our Land Party) or VP [Edward NATAPEI]Vanuatu Democratic Party [Maxime Carlot KORMAN]Vanuatu First or Vanuatu [Russel NARI]Vanuatu Liberal Movement or VLM [Gaetan PIKIOUNE]Vanuatu Liberal Democratic Party or VLDP [Tapangararua WILLIE]Vanuatu National Party or VNP [Issac HAMARILIU]Vanuatu National Development Party or VNDP [Robert Bohn SIKOL]Vanuatu Republican Party or VRP [Marcellino PIPITE]"
+      "text": "Greens Confederation or GC [Moana CARCASSES Kalosil] ++ Iauko Group or IG [Tony NARI] ++ Land and Justice Party (Graon mo Jastis Pati) or GJP [Ralph REGENVANU] ++ Melanesian Progressive Party or MPP [Barak SOPE] ++ Nagriamel movement or NAG [Frankie STEVENS] ++ Natatok Indigenous People's Democratic Party or (NATATOK) or NIPDP [Alfred Roland CARLOT] ++ National United Party or NUP [Ham LINI] ++ People's Progressive Party or PPP [Sato KILMAN] ++ People's Service Party or PSP [Don KEN] ++ Reunification of Movement for Change or RMC [Charlot SALWAI] ++ Rural Development Party or RDP [Jay NGWELE, spokesman] ++ Union of Moderate Parties or UMP [Serge VOHOR] ++ Vanua'aku Pati (Our Land Party) or VP [Edward NATAPEI] ++ Vanuatu Democratic Party [Maxime Carlot KORMAN] ++ Vanuatu First or Vanuatu [Russel NARI] ++ Vanuatu Liberal Movement or VLM [Gaetan PIKIOUNE] ++ Vanuatu Liberal Democratic Party or VLDP [Tapangararua WILLIE] ++ Vanuatu National Party or VNP [Issac HAMARILIU] ++ Vanuatu National Development Party or VNDP [Robert Bohn SIKOL] ++ Vanuatu Republican Party or VRP [Marcellino PIPITE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, ADB, AOSIS, C, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, IOC, IOM, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OAS (observer), OIF, OPCW, PIF, Sparteca, SPC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -481,7 +475,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "This South Pacific island economy is based primarily on small-scale agriculture, which provides a living for about two thirds of the population. Fishing, offshore financial services, and tourism, with more than 330,000 visitors in 2017, are other mainstays of the economy. Tourism has struggled after Efate, the most populous and most popular island for tourists, was damaged by Tropical Cyclone Pam in 2015. Ongoing infrastructure difficulties at Port Vila’s Bauerfield Airport have caused air travel disruptions, further hampering tourism numbers. Australia and New Zealand are the main source of tourists and foreign aid. A small light industry sector caters to the local market. Tax revenues come mainly from import duties. Mineral deposits are negligible; the country has no known petroleum deposits. Economic development is hindered by dependence on relatively few commodity exports, vulnerability to natural disasters, and long distances from main markets and between constituent islands. In response to foreign concerns, the government has promised to tighten regulation of its offshore financial center. Since 2002, the government has stepped up efforts to boost tourism through improved air connections, resort development, and cruise ship facilities. Agriculture, especially livestock farming, is a second target for growth."
+      "text": "This South Pacific island economy is based primarily on small-scale agriculture, which provides a living for about two thirds of the population. Fishing, offshore financial services, and tourism, with more than 330,000 visitors in 2017, are other mainstays of the economy. Tourism has struggled after Efate, the most populous and most popular island for tourists, was damaged by Tropical Cyclone Pam in 2015. Ongoing infrastructure difficulties at Port Vila's Bauerfield Airport have caused air travel disruptions, further hampering tourism numbers. Australia and New Zealand are the main source of tourists and foreign aid. A small light industry sector caters to the local market. Tax revenues come mainly from import duties. Mineral deposits are negligible; the country has no known petroleum deposits. ++ Economic development is hindered by dependence on relatively few commodity exports, vulnerability to natural disasters, and long distances from main markets and between constituent islands. In response to foreign concerns, the government has promised to tighten regulation of its offshore financial center. ++ Since 2002, the government has stepped up efforts to boost tourism through improved air connections, resort development, and cruise ship facilities. Agriculture, especially livestock farming, is a second target for growth."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$772 million (2017 est.) / $740.9 million (2016 est.) / $716.1 million (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/nr.json

@@ -224,11 +224,11 @@
       "text": "2.68 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -241,11 +241,11 @@
       "text": "5 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 96.3% of population / total: 96.3% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "3.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 3.7% of population / total: 3.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Party [Kennan ADEANG]Nauru First (Naoero Amo) PartyNauru Party (informal)",
+      "text": "Democratic Party [Kennan ADEANG] ++ Nauru First (Naoero Amo) Party ++ Nauru Party (informal)",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: loose multiparty system"
       }
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Revenues of this tiny island - a coral atoll with a land area of 21 square kilometers - traditionally have come from exports of phosphates. Few other resources exist, with most necessities being imported, mainly from Australia, its former occupier and later major source of support. Primary reserves of phosphates were exhausted and mining ceased in 2006, but mining of a deeper layer of \"secondary phosphate\" in the interior of the island began the following year. The secondary phosphate deposits may last another 30 years. Earnings from Nauru’s export of phosphate remains an important source of income. Few comprehensive statistics on the Nauru economy exist; estimates of Nauru's GDP vary widely. The rehabilitation of mined land and the replacement of income from phosphates are serious long-term problems. In anticipation of the exhaustion of Nauru's phosphate deposits, substantial amounts of phosphate income were invested in trust funds to help cushion the transition and provide for Nauru's economic future. Although revenue sources for government are limited, the opening of the Australian Regional Processing Center for asylum seekers since 2012 has sparked growth in the economy. Revenue derived from fishing licenses under the \"vessel day scheme\" has also boosted government income. Housing, hospitals, and other capital plant are deteriorating. The cost to Australia of keeping the Nauruan government and economy afloat continues to climb."
+      "text": "Revenues of this tiny island - a coral atoll with a land area of 21 square kilometers - traditionally have come from exports of phosphates. Few other resources exist, with most necessities being imported, mainly from Australia, its former occupier and later major source of support. Primary reserves of phosphates were exhausted and mining ceased in 2006, but mining of a deeper layer of \"secondary phosphate\" in the interior of the island began the following year. The secondary phosphate deposits may last another 30 years. Earnings from Nauru's export of phosphate remains an important source of income. Few comprehensive statistics on the Nauru economy exist; estimates of Nauru's GDP vary widely. ++ The rehabilitation of mined land and the replacement of income from phosphates are serious long-term problems. In anticipation of the exhaustion of Nauru's phosphate deposits, substantial amounts of phosphate income were invested in trust funds to help cushion the transition and provide for Nauru's economic future. ++ Although revenue sources for government are limited, the opening of the Australian Regional Processing Center for asylum seekers since 2012 has sparked growth in the economy. Revenue derived from fishing licenses under the \"vessel day scheme\" has also boosted government income. Housing, hospitals, and other capital plant are deteriorating. The cost to Australia of keeping the Nauruan government and economy afloat continues to climb."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$160 million (2017 est.) / $153.9 million (2016 est.) / $139.4 million (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/nz.json

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
       "text": "over three-quarters of New Zealanders, including the indigenous Maori, live on the North Island, primarily in urban areas"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "earthquakes are common, though usually not severe; volcanic activity\nvolcanism: significant volcanism on North Island; Ruapehu (2,797 m), which last erupted in 2007, has a history of large eruptions in the past century; Taranaki has the potential to produce dangerous avalanches and lahars; other historically active volcanoes include Okataina, Raoul Island, Tongariro, and White Island; see note 2 under \"Geography - note\""
+      "text": "earthquakes are common, though usually not severe; volcanic activity ++ volcanism: significant volcanism on North Island; Ruapehu (2,797 m), which last erupted in 2007, has a history of large eruptions in the past century; Taranaki has the potential to produce dangerous avalanches and lahars; other historically active volcanoes include Okataina, Raoul Island, Tongariro, and White Island; see note 2 under \"Geography - note\""
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "water quality and availability; rapid urbanisation; deforestation; soil erosion and degradation; native flora and fauna hard-hit by invasive species; negative effects of climate change"
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
     },
     "Geography - note": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "note 1: consists of two main islands and a number of smaller islands; South Island, the larger main island, is the 12th largest island in the world and is divided along its length by the Southern Alps; North Island is the 14th largest island in the world and is not as mountainous, but it is marked by volcanism note 2: New Zealand lies along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire note 3: almost 90% of the population lives in cities and over three-quarters on North Island; Wellington is the southernmost national capital in the world"
+        "text": "note 1: consists of two main islands and a number of smaller islands; South Island, the larger main island, is the 12th largest island in the world and is divided along its length by the Southern Alps; North Island is the 14th largest island in the world and is not as mountainous, but it is marked by volcanism ++ note 2: New Zealand lies along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire ++ note 3: almost 90% of the population lives in cities and over three-quarters on North Island; Wellington is the southernmost national capital in the world"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -273,14 +273,11 @@
       }
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -293,14 +290,11 @@
       "text": "2.7 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -373,7 +367,7 @@
         "text": "+1hr, begins last Sunday in September; ends first Sunday in April"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "note: New Zealand has two time zones: New Zealand standard time (UTC+12) and Chatham Islands time (45 minutes in advance of New Zealand standard time; UTC+12:45)etymology: named in 1840 after Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington and victorious general at the Battle of Waterloo"
+        "text": "note: New Zealand has two time zones: New Zealand standard time (UTC+12) and Chatham Islands time (45 minutes in advance of New Zealand standard time; UTC+12:45) ++ etymology: named in 1840 after Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington and victorious general at the Battle of Waterloo"
       }
     },
     "Administrative divisions": {
@@ -456,7 +450,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "ACT New Zealand [David SEYMOUR]Green Party [James SHAW]Mana Movement [Hone HARAWIRA] (formerly Mana Party)Maori Party [Che WILSON and Kaapua SMITH]New Zealand First Party or NZ First [Winston PETERS]New Zealand Labor Party [Jacinda ARDERN]New Zealand National Party [Judith COLLINS]United Future New Zealand [Damian LIGHT]"
+      "text": "ACT New Zealand [David SEYMOUR] ++ Green Party [James SHAW] ++ Mana Movement [Hone HARAWIRA] (formerly Mana Party) ++ Maori Party [Che WILSON and Kaapua SMITH] ++ New Zealand First Party or NZ First [Winston PETERS] ++ New Zealand Labor Party [Jacinda ARDERN] ++ New Zealand National Party [Judith COLLINS] ++ United Future New Zealand [Damian LIGHT]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ADB, ANZUS, APEC, ARF, ASEAN (dialogue partner), Australia Group, BIS, C, CD, CP, EAS, EBRD, FAO, FATF, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NSG, OECD, OPCW, Pacific Alliance (observer), Paris Club (associate), PCA, PIF, SICA (observer), Sparteca, SPC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMISS, UNTSO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -518,7 +512,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Over the past 40 years, the government has transformed New Zealand from an agrarian economy, dependent on concessionary British market access, to a more industrialized, free market economy that can compete globally. This dynamic growth has boosted real incomes, but left behind some at the bottom of the ladder and broadened and deepened the technological capabilities of the industrial sector. Per capita income rose for 10 consecutive years until 2007 in purchasing power parity terms, but fell in 2008-09. Debt-driven consumer spending drove robust growth in the first half of the decade, fueling a large balance of payments deficit that posed a challenge for policymakers. Inflationary pressures caused the central bank to raise its key rate steadily from January 2004 until it was among the highest in the OECD in 2007 and 2008. The higher rate attracted international capital inflows, which strengthened the currency and housing market while aggravating the current account deficit. Rising house prices, especially in Auckland, have become a political issue in recent years, as well as a policy challenge in 2016 and 2017, as the ability to afford housing has declined for many. Expanding New Zealand’s network of free trade agreements remains a top foreign policy priority. New Zealand was an early promoter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and was the second country to ratify the agreement in May 2017. Following the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP in January 2017, on 10 November 2017 the remaining 11 countries agreed on the core elements of a modified agreement, which they renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In November 2016, New Zealand opened negotiations to upgrade its FTA with China; China is one of New Zealand’s most important trading partners."
+      "text": "Over the past 40 years, the government has transformed New Zealand from an agrarian economy, dependent on concessionary British market access, to a more industrialized, free market economy that can compete globally. This dynamic growth has boosted real incomes, but left behind some at the bottom of the ladder and broadened and deepened the technological capabilities of the industrial sector. ++ Per capita income rose for 10 consecutive years until 2007 in purchasing power parity terms, but fell in 2008-09. Debt-driven consumer spending drove robust growth in the first half of the decade, fueling a large balance of payments deficit that posed a challenge for policymakers. Inflationary pressures caused the central bank to raise its key rate steadily from January 2004 until it was among the highest in the OECD in 2007 and 2008. The higher rate attracted international capital inflows, which strengthened the currency and housing market while aggravating the current account deficit. Rising house prices, especially in Auckland, have become a political issue in recent years, as well as a policy challenge in 2016 and 2017, as the ability to afford housing has declined for many. ++ Expanding New Zealand's network of free trade agreements remains a top foreign policy priority. New Zealand was an early promoter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and was the second country to ratify the agreement in May 2017. Following the United States' withdrawal from the TPP in January 2017, on 10 November 2017 the remaining 11 countries agreed on the core elements of a modified agreement, which they renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In November 2016, New Zealand opened negotiations to upgrade its FTA with China; China is one of New Zealand's most important trading partners."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$189 billion (2017 est.) / $183.4 billion (2016 est.) / $176.1 billion (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/ps.json

@@ -230,14 +230,11 @@
       "text": "1.7 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -250,14 +247,11 @@
       "text": "4.8 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -350,7 +344,7 @@
         "text": "UTC+9 (14 hours ahead of Washington, DC, during Standard Time)"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "etymology: the Palauan meaning is \"place of fermented 'mud'\" ('mud' being the native name for the keyhole angelfish); the site of the new capitol (established in 2006) had been a large hill overlooking the ocean, Ngerulmud, on which women would communally gather to offer fermented angelfish to the godsnote: Ngerulmud, on Babeldaob Island, is the smallest national capital on earth by population, with only a few hundred people; the name is pronounced en-jer-al-mud; Koror, on Koror Island, with over 11,000 residents is by far the largest settlement in Palau; it served as the country's capital from independence in 1994 to 2006"
+        "text": "etymology: the Palauan meaning is \"place of fermented 'mud'\" ('mud' being the native name for the keyhole angelfish); the site of the new capitol (established in 2006) had been a large hill overlooking the ocean, Ngerulmud, on which women would communally gather to offer fermented angelfish to the gods ++ note: Ngerulmud, on Babeldaob Island, is the smallest national capital on earth by population, with only a few hundred people; the name is pronounced en-jer-al-mud; Koror, on Koror Island, with over 11,000 residents is by far the largest settlement in Palau; it served as the country's capital from independence in 1994 to 2006"
       }
     },
     "Administrative divisions": {
@@ -412,13 +406,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral National Congress or Olbiil Era Kelulau consists of:Senate (13 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by majority vote to serve 4-year terms)House of Delegates (16 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral National Congress or Olbiil Era Kelulau consists of: Senate (13 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by majority vote to serve 4-year terms) ++ House of Delegates (16 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 1 November 2016 (next to be held on 3 November 2020)House of Delegates - last held on 1 November 2016 (next to be held on 3 November 2020)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 1 November 2016 (next to be held on 3 November 2020) ++ House of Delegates - last held on 1 November 2016 (next to be held on 3 November 2020)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote - NA; seats - independent 13; composition - men 11, women 2, percent of women 15.4%House of Delegates - percent of vote - NA; seats - independent 16; composition - men 14, women 2, percent of women 12.5%; note - total National Congress percent of women 13.8%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote - NA; seats - independent 13; composition - men 11, women 2, percent of women 15.4% ++ House of Delegates - percent of vote - NA; seats - independent 16; composition - men 14, women 2, percent of women 12.5%; note - total National Congress percent of women 13.8%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -492,7 +486,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The economy is dominated by tourism, fishing, and subsistence agriculture. Government is a major employer of the work force relying on financial assistance from the US under the Compact of Free Association (Compact) with the US that took effect after the end of the UN trusteeship on 1 October 1994. The US provided Palau with roughly $700 million in aid for the first 15 years following commencement of the Compact in 1994 in return for unrestricted access to its land and waterways for strategic purposes. The population enjoys a per capita income roughly double that of the Philippines and much of Micronesia. Business and leisure tourist arrivals reached a record 167,966 in 2015, a 14.4% increase over the previous year, but fell to 138,408 in 2016. Long-run prospects for tourism have been bolstered by the expansion of air travel in the Pacific, the rising prosperity of industrial East Asia, and the willingness of foreigners to finance infrastructure development. Proximity to Guam, the region's major destination for tourists from East Asia, and a regionally competitive tourist infrastructure enhance Palau's advantage as a destination."
+      "text": "The economy is dominated by tourism, fishing, and subsistence agriculture. Government is a major employer of the work force relying on financial assistance from the US under the Compact of Free Association (Compact) with the US that took effect after the end of the UN trusteeship on 1 October 1994. The US provided Palau with roughly $700 million in aid for the first 15 years following commencement of the Compact in 1994 in return for unrestricted access to its land and waterways for strategic purposes. The population enjoys a per capita income roughly double that of the Philippines and much of Micronesia. ++ Business and leisure tourist arrivals reached a record 167,966 in 2015, a 14.4% increase over the previous year, but fell to 138,408 in 2016. Long-run prospects for tourism have been bolstered by the expansion of air travel in the Pacific, the rising prosperity of industrial East Asia, and the willingness of foreigners to finance infrastructure development. Proximity to Guam, the region's major destination for tourists from East Asia, and a regionally competitive tourist infrastructure enhance Palau's advantage as a destination."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$264 million (2017 est.) / $274.2 million (2016 est.) / $274.1 million (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/rm.json

@@ -233,14 +233,11 @@
       "text": "2.86 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99.8% of population / rural: 99.7% of population / total: 99.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.2% of population / rural: 0.3% of population / total: 0.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -253,14 +250,11 @@
       "text": "2.7 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 15.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 96.3% of population / rural: 65.4% of population / total: 89.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "34.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "10.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 15.5% of population / rural: 34.6% of population / total: 10.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -429,7 +423,7 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral National Parliament consists of:Council of Iroij, a 12-member group of tribal leaders advises the Presidential Cabinet and reviews legislation affecting customary law or any traditional practice); members appointed to serve 1-year termsNitijela (33 seats; members in 19 single- and 5 multi-seat constituencies directly elected by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms); note - legislative power resides in the Nitijela"
+        "text": "bicameral National Parliament consists of: Council of Iroij, a 12-member group of tribal leaders advises the Presidential Cabinet and reviews legislation affecting customary law or any traditional practice); members appointed to serve 1-year terms ++ Nitijela (33 seats; members in 19 single- and 5 multi-seat constituencies directly elected by simple majority vote to serve 4-year terms); note - legislative power resides in the Nitijela"
       },
       "elections": {
         "text": "last held on 18 November 2019 (next to be held by November 2023)"
@@ -512,7 +506,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "US assistance and lease payments for the use of Kwajalein Atoll as a US military base are the mainstay of this small island country. Agricultural production, primarily subsistence, is concentrated on small farms; the most important commercial crops are coconuts and breadfruit. Industry is limited to handicrafts, tuna processing, and copra. Tourism holds some potential. The islands and atolls have few natural resources, and imports exceed exports. The Marshall Islands received roughly $1 billion in aid from the US during the period 1986-2001 under the original Compact of Free Association (Compact). In 2002 and 2003, the US and the Marshall Islands renegotiated the Compact's financial package for a 20-year period, 2004 to 2024. Under the amended Compact, the Marshall Islands will receive roughly $1.5 billion in direct US assistance. Under the amended Compact, the US and Marshall Islands are also jointly funding a Trust Fund for the people of the Marshall Islands that will provide an income stream beyond 2024, when direct Compact aid ends."
+      "text": "US assistance and lease payments for the use of Kwajalein Atoll as a US military base are the mainstay of this small island country. Agricultural production, primarily subsistence, is concentrated on small farms; the most important commercial crops are coconuts and breadfruit. Industry is limited to handicrafts, tuna processing, and copra. Tourism holds some potential. The islands and atolls have few natural resources, and imports exceed exports. ++ The Marshall Islands received roughly $1 billion in aid from the US during the period 1986-2001 under the original Compact of Free Association (Compact). In 2002 and 2003, the US and the Marshall Islands renegotiated the Compact's financial package for a 20-year period, 2004 to 2024. Under the amended Compact, the Marshall Islands will receive roughly $1.5 billion in direct US assistance. Under the amended Compact, the US and Marshall Islands are also jointly funding a Trust Fund for the people of the Marshall Islands that will provide an income stream beyond 2024, when direct Compact aid ends."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$196 million (2017 est.) / $191.3 million (2016 est.) / $184.6 million (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/tl.json

@@ -158,22 +158,22 @@
       "text": "NA"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Physicians density": {
       "text": "2.72 physicians/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Tokelau's small size (three villages), isolation, and lack of resources greatly restrain economic development and confine agriculture to the subsistence level. The principal sources of revenue are from sales of copra, postage stamps, souvenir coins, and handicrafts. Money is also remitted to families from relatives in New Zealand. The people rely heavily on aid from New Zealand - about $15 million annually in FY12/13 and FY13/14 - to maintain public services. New Zealand's support amounts to 80% of Tokelau's recurrent government budget. An international trust fund, currently worth nearly $32 million, was established in 2004 by New Zealand to provide Tokelau an independent source of revenue."
+      "text": "Tokelau's small size (three villages), isolation, and lack of resources greatly restrain economic development and confine agriculture to the subsistence level. The principal sources of revenue are from sales of copra, postage stamps, souvenir coins, and handicrafts. Money is also remitted to families from relatives in New Zealand. ++ The people rely heavily on aid from New Zealand - about $15 million annually in FY12/13 and FY13/14 - to maintain public services. New Zealand's support amounts to 80% of Tokelau's recurrent government budget. An international trust fund, currently worth nearly $32 million, was established in 2004 by New Zealand to provide Tokelau an independent source of revenue."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$1.5 million (1993 est.)"

australia-oceania/tn.json

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
       "text": "over two-thirds of the population lives on the island of Tongatapu; only 45 of the nation's 171 islands are occupied"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "cyclones (October to April); earthquakes and volcanic activity on Fonuafo'ou\nvolcanism: moderate volcanic activity; Fonualei (180 m) has shown frequent activity in recent years, while Niuafo'ou (260 m), which last erupted in 1985, has forced evacuations; other historically active volcanoes include Late and Tofua"
+      "text": "cyclones (October to April); earthquakes and volcanic activity on Fonuafo'ou ++ volcanism: moderate volcanic activity; Fonualei (180 m) has shown frequent activity in recent years, while Niuafo'ou (260 m), which last erupted in 1985, has forced evacuations; other historically active volcanoes include Late and Tofua"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation from land being cleared for agriculture and settlement; soil exhaustion; water pollution due to salinization, sewage, and toxic chemicals from farming activities; coral reefs and marine populations threatened"
@@ -253,14 +253,11 @@
       "text": "34.1% (2012)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -273,14 +270,11 @@
       "text": "2.6 beds/1,000 population (2010)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 96.6% of population / rural: 93.6% of population / total: 94.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "6.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "5.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 3.4% of population / rural: 6.4% of population / total: 5.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -451,7 +445,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands [Samuela 'Akilisi POHIVA]People's Democratic Party or PDP [Tesina FUKO]Sustainable Nation-Building Party [Sione FONUA]Tonga Democratic Labor PartyTonga Human Rights and Democracy Movement or THRDM"
+      "text": "Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands [Samuela 'Akilisi POHIVA] ++ People's Democratic Party or PDP [Tesina FUKO] ++ Sustainable Nation-Building Party [Sione FONUA] ++ Tonga Democratic Labor Party ++ Tonga Human Rights and Democracy Movement or THRDM"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, ADB, AOSIS, C, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IPU, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), OPCW, PIF, Sparteca, SPC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -496,7 +490,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Tonga has a small, open island economy and is the last constitutional monarchy among the Pacific Island countries. It has a narrow export base in agricultural goods. Squash, vanilla beans, and yams are the main crops. Agricultural exports, including fish, make up two-thirds of total exports. Tourism is the second-largest source of hard currency earnings following remittances. Tonga had 53,800 visitors in 2015. The country must import a high proportion of its food, mainly from New Zealand. The country remains dependent on external aid and remittances from overseas Tongans to offset its trade deficit. The government is emphasizing the development of the private sector, encouraging investment, and is committing increased funds for health care and education. Tonga's English-speaking and educated workforce offers a viable labor market, and the tropical climate provides fertile soil. Renewable energy and deep-sea mining also offer opportunities for investment. Tonga has a reasonably sound basic infrastructure and well developed social services. But the government faces high unemployment among the young, moderate inflation, pressures for democratic reform, and rising civil service expenditures."
+      "text": "Tonga has a small, open island economy and is the last constitutional monarchy among the Pacific Island countries. It has a narrow export base in agricultural goods. Squash, vanilla beans, and yams are the main crops. Agricultural exports, including fish, make up two-thirds of total exports. Tourism is the second-largest source of hard currency earnings following remittances. Tonga had 53,800 visitors in 2015. The country must import a high proportion of its food, mainly from New Zealand. ++ The country remains dependent on external aid and remittances from overseas Tongans to offset its trade deficit. The government is emphasizing the development of the private sector, encouraging investment, and is committing increased funds for health care and education. Tonga's English-speaking and educated workforce offers a viable labor market, and the tropical climate provides fertile soil. Renewable energy and deep-sea mining also offer opportunities for investment. ++ Tonga has a reasonably sound basic infrastructure and well developed social services. But the government faces high unemployment among the young, moderate inflation, pressures for democratic reform, and rising civil service expenditures."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$591 million (2017 est.) / $576.6 million (2016 est.) / $553.6 million (2015 est.)",
@@ -852,7 +846,7 @@
   },
   "Transnational Issues": {
     "Disputes - international": {
-      "text": "maritime boundary dispute with Fiji  "
+      "text": "maritime boundary dispute with Fiji ++  "
     }
   }
 }

australia-oceania/tv.json

@@ -227,14 +227,11 @@
       "text": "2.88 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 98.8% of population / total: 99% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "1.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 1.2% of population / total: 1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -244,14 +241,11 @@
       "text": "0.91 physicians/1,000 population (2014)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 9.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 91.8% of population / rural: 91% of population / total: 91.5% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "8.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 9.2% of population / rural: 9% of population / total: 8.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -430,7 +424,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Tuvalu consists of a densely populated, scattered group of nine coral atolls with poor soil. Only eight of the atolls are inhabited. It is one of the smallest countries in the world, with its highest point at 4.6 meters above sea level. The country is isolated, almost entirely dependent on imports, particularly of food and fuel, and vulnerable to climate change and rising sea levels, which pose significant challenges to development. The public sector dominates economic activity. Tuvalu has few natural resources, except for its fisheries. Earnings from fish exports and fishing licenses for Tuvalu’s territorial waters are a significant source of government revenue. In 2013, revenue from fishing licenses doubled and totaled more than 45% of GDP. Official aid from foreign development partners has also increased. Tuvalu has substantial assets abroad. The Tuvalu Trust Fund, an international trust fund established in 1987 by development partners, has grown to $104 million (A$141 million) in 2014 and is an important cushion for meeting shortfalls in the government's budget. While remittances are another substantial source of income, the value of remittances has declined since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, but has stabilized at nearly $4 million per year. The financial impact of climate change and the cost of climate related adaptation projects is one of many concerns for the nation."
+      "text": "Tuvalu consists of a densely populated, scattered group of nine coral atolls with poor soil. Only eight of the atolls are inhabited. It is one of the smallest countries in the world, with its highest point at 4.6 meters above sea level. The country is isolated, almost entirely dependent on imports, particularly of food and fuel, and vulnerable to climate change and rising sea levels, which pose significant challenges to development. ++ The public sector dominates economic activity. Tuvalu has few natural resources, except for its fisheries. Earnings from fish exports and fishing licenses for Tuvalu's territorial waters are a significant source of government revenue. In 2013, revenue from fishing licenses doubled and totaled more than 45% of GDP. ++ Official aid from foreign development partners has also increased. Tuvalu has substantial assets abroad. The Tuvalu Trust Fund, an international trust fund established in 1987 by development partners, has grown to $104 million (A$141 million) in 2014 and is an important cushion for meeting shortfalls in the government's budget. While remittances are another substantial source of income, the value of remittances has declined since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, but has stabilized at nearly $4 million per year. The financial impact of climate change and the cost of climate related adaptation projects is one of many concerns for the nation."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$42 million (2017 est.) / $40.68 million (2016 est.) / $39.48 million (2015 est.)",

australia-oceania/um.json

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "All of the following US Pacific island territories except Midway Atoll constitute the Pacific Remote Islands National Wildlife Refuge (NWR) Complex and as such are managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the US Department of the Interior. Midway Atoll NWR has been included in a Refuge Complex with the Hawaiian Islands NWR and also designated as part of Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument. These remote refuges are the most widespread collection of marine- and terrestrial-life protected areas on the planet under a single country's jurisdiction. They sustain many endemic species including corals, fish, shellfish, marine mammals, seabirds, water birds, land birds, insects, and vegetation not found elsewhere.\nBaker Island: The US took possession of the island in 1857. Its guano deposits were mined by US and British companies during the second half of the 19th century. In 1935, a short-lived attempt at colonization began on this island but was disrupted by World War II and thereafter abandoned. The island was established as a NWR in 1974.; Howland Island: Discovered by the US early in the 19th century, the uninhabited atoll was officially claimed by the US in 1857. Both US and British companies mined for guano deposits until about 1890. In 1935, a short-lived attempt at colonization began on this island, similar to the effort on nearby Baker Island, but was disrupted by World War II and thereafter abandoned. The famed American aviatrix Amelia EARHART disappeared while seeking out Howland Island as a refueling stop during her 1937 round-the-world flight; Earhart Light, a day beacon near the middle of the west coast, was named in her memory. The island was established as a NWR in 1974.; Jarvis Island: First discovered by the British in 1821, the uninhabited island was annexed by the US in 1858 but abandoned in 1879 after tons of guano had been removed. The UK annexed the island in 1889 but never carried out plans for further exploitation. The US occupied and reclaimed the island in 1935. It was abandoned in 1942 during World War II. The island was established as a NWR in 1974.; Johnston Atoll: Both the US and the Kingdom of Hawaii annexed Johnston Atoll in 1858, but it was the US that mined the guano deposits until the late 1880s. Johnston and Sand Islands were designated wildlife refuges in 1926. The US Navy took over the atoll in 1934. Subsequently, the US Air Force assumed control in 1948. The site was used for high-altitude nuclear tests in the 1950s and 1960s. Until late in 2000 the atoll was maintained as a storage and disposal site for chemical weapons. Munitions destruction, cleanup, and closure of the facility were completed by May 2005. The Fish and Wildlife Service and the US Air Force are currently discussing future management options; in the interim, Johnston Atoll and the three-mile Naval Defensive Sea around it remain under the jurisdiction and administrative control of the US Air Force.; Kingman Reef: The US annexed the reef in 1922. Its sheltered lagoon served as a way station for flying boats on Hawaii-to-American Samoa flights during the late 1930s. There are no terrestrial plants on the reef, which is frequently awash, but it does support abundant and diverse marine fauna and flora. In 2001, the waters surrounding the reef out to 12 nm were designated a NWR.; Midway Islands: The US took formal possession of the islands in 1867. The laying of the transpacific cable, which passed through the islands, brought the first residents in 1903. Between 1935 and 1947, Midway was used as a refueling stop for transpacific flights. The US naval victory over a Japanese fleet off Midway in 1942 was one of the turning points of World War II. The islands continued to serve as a naval station until closed in 1993. Today the islands are a NWR and are the site of the world's largest Laysan albatross colony.; Palmyra Atoll: The Kingdom of Hawaii claimed the atoll in 1862, and the US included it among the Hawaiian Islands when it annexed the archipelago in 1898. The Hawaii Statehood Act of 1959 did not include Palmyra Atoll, which is now partly privately owned by the Nature Conservancy with the rest owned by the Federal government and managed by the US Fish and Wildlife Service. These organizations are managing the atoll as a wildlife refuge. The lagoons and surrounding waters within the 12-nm US territorial seas were transferred to the US Fish and Wildlife Service and designated a NWR in January 2001."
+      "text": "All of the following US Pacific island territories except Midway Atoll constitute the Pacific Remote Islands National Wildlife Refuge (NWR) Complex and as such are managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the US Department of the Interior. Midway Atoll NWR has been included in a Refuge Complex with the Hawaiian Islands NWR and also designated as part of Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument. These remote refuges are the most widespread collection of marine- and terrestrial-life protected areas on the planet under a single country's jurisdiction. They sustain many endemic species including corals, fish, shellfish, marine mammals, seabirds, water birds, land birds, insects, and vegetation not found elsewhere. ++ Baker Island: The US took possession of the island in 1857. Its guano deposits were mined by US and British companies during the second half of the 19th century. In 1935, a short-lived attempt at colonization began on this island but was disrupted by World War II and thereafter abandoned. The island was established as a NWR in 1974.; ++ Howland Island: Discovered by the US early in the 19th century, the uninhabited atoll was officially claimed by the US in 1857. Both US and British companies mined for guano deposits until about 1890. In 1935, a short-lived attempt at colonization began on this island, similar to the effort on nearby Baker Island, but was disrupted by World War II and thereafter abandoned. The famed American aviatrix Amelia EARHART disappeared while seeking out Howland Island as a refueling stop during her 1937 round-the-world flight; Earhart Light, a day beacon near the middle of the west coast, was named in her memory. The island was established as a NWR in 1974.; ++ Jarvis Island: First discovered by the British in 1821, the uninhabited island was annexed by the US in 1858 but abandoned in 1879 after tons of guano had been removed. The UK annexed the island in 1889 but never carried out plans for further exploitation. The US occupied and reclaimed the island in 1935. It was abandoned in 1942 during World War II. The island was established as a NWR in 1974.; ++ Johnston Atoll: Both the US and the Kingdom of Hawaii annexed Johnston Atoll in 1858, but it was the US that mined the guano deposits until the late 1880s. Johnston and Sand Islands were designated wildlife refuges in 1926. The US Navy took over the atoll in 1934. Subsequently, the US Air Force assumed control in 1948. The site was used for high-altitude nuclear tests in the 1950s and 1960s. Until late in 2000 the atoll was maintained as a storage and disposal site for chemical weapons. Munitions destruction, cleanup, and closure of the facility were completed by May 2005. The Fish and Wildlife Service and the US Air Force are currently discussing future management options; in the interim, Johnston Atoll and the three-mile Naval Defensive Sea around it remain under the jurisdiction and administrative control of the US Air Force.; ++ Kingman Reef: The US annexed the reef in 1922. Its sheltered lagoon served as a way station for flying boats on Hawaii-to-American Samoa flights during the late 1930s. There are no terrestrial plants on the reef, which is frequently awash, but it does support abundant and diverse marine fauna and flora. In 2001, the waters surrounding the reef out to 12 nm were designated a NWR.; ++ Midway Islands: The US took formal possession of the islands in 1867. The laying of the transpacific cable, which passed through the islands, brought the first residents in 1903. Between 1935 and 1947, Midway was used as a refueling stop for transpacific flights. The US naval victory over a Japanese fleet off Midway in 1942 was one of the turning points of World War II. The islands continued to serve as a naval station until closed in 1993. Today the islands are a NWR and are the site of the world's largest Laysan albatross colony.; ++ Palmyra Atoll: The Kingdom of Hawaii claimed the atoll in 1862, and the US included it among the Hawaiian Islands when it annexed the archipelago in 1898. The Hawaii Statehood Act of 1959 did not include Palmyra Atoll, which is now partly privately owned by the Nature Conservancy with the rest owned by the Federal government and managed by the US Fish and Wildlife Service. These organizations are managing the atoll as a wildlife refuge. The lagoons and surrounding waters within the 12-nm US territorial seas were transferred to the US Fish and Wildlife Service and designated a NWR in January 2001."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
     "Location": {
-      "text": "Oceania\nBaker Island: atoll in the North Pacific Ocean 3,390 km southwest of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and Australia; Howland Island: island in the North Pacific Ocean 3,360 km southwest of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and Australia; Jarvis Island: island in the South Pacific Ocean 2,415 km south of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and Cook Islands; Johnston Atoll: atoll in the North Pacific Ocean 1,330 km southwest of Honolulu, about one-third of the way from Hawaii to the Marshall Islands; Kingman Reef: reef in the North Pacific Ocean 1,720 km south of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and American Samoa; Midway Islands: atoll in the North Pacific Ocean 2,335 km northwest of Honolulu near the end of the Hawaiian Archipelago, about one-third of the way from Honolulu to Tokyo; Palmyra Atoll: atoll in the North Pacific Ocean 1,780 km south of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and American Samoa"
+      "text": "Oceania ++ Baker Island: atoll in the North Pacific Ocean 3,390 km southwest of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and Australia; ++ Howland Island: island in the North Pacific Ocean 3,360 km southwest of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and Australia; ++ Jarvis Island: island in the South Pacific Ocean 2,415 km south of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and Cook Islands; ++ Johnston Atoll: atoll in the North Pacific Ocean 1,330 km southwest of Honolulu, about one-third of the way from Hawaii to the Marshall Islands; ++ Kingman Reef: reef in the North Pacific Ocean 1,720 km south of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and American Samoa; ++ Midway Islands: atoll in the North Pacific Ocean 2,335 km northwest of Honolulu near the end of the Hawaiian Archipelago, about one-third of the way from Honolulu to Tokyo; ++ Palmyra Atoll: atoll in the North Pacific Ocean 1,780 km south of Honolulu, about halfway between Hawaii and American Samoa"
     },
     "Geographic coordinates": {
-      "text": "Baker Island: 0 13 N, 176 28 W; Howland Island: 0 48 N, 176 38 W; Jarvis Island: 0 23 S, 160 01 W; Johnston Atoll: 16 45 N, 169 31 W; Kingman Reef: 6 23 N, 162 25 W; Midway Islands: 28 12 N, 177 22 W; Palmyra Atoll: 5 53 N, 162 05 W"
+      "text": "Baker Island: 0 13 N, 176 28 W; ++ Howland Island: 0 48 N, 176 38 W; ++ Jarvis Island: 0 23 S, 160 01 W; ++ Johnston Atoll: 16 45 N, 169 31 W; ++ Kingman Reef: 6 23 N, 162 25 W; ++ Midway Islands: 28 12 N, 177 22 W; ++ Palmyra Atoll: 5 53 N, 162 05 W"
     },
     "Map references": {
       "text": "Oceania"
@@ -19,18 +19,18 @@
         "text": "6,959.41 sq km (emergent land - 22.41 sq km; submerged - 6,937 sq km)"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "Baker Island: total - 129.1 sq km; emergent land - 2.1 sq km; submerged - 127 sq km Howland Island: total - 138.6 sq km; emergent land - 2.6 sq km; submerged - 136 sq km Jarvis Island: total - 152 sq km; emergent land - 5 sq km; submerged - 147 sq km Johnston Atoll: total - 276.6 sq km; emergent land - 2.6 sq km; submerged - 274 sq km Kingman Reef: total - 1,958.01 sq km; emergent land - 0.01 sq km; submerged - 1,958 sq km Midway Islands: total - 2,355.2 sq km; emergent land - 6.2 sq km; submerged - 2,349 sq km Palmyra Atoll: total - 1,949.9 sq km; emergent land - 3.9 sq km; submerged - 1,946 sq km"
+        "text": "Baker Island: total - 129.1 sq km; emergent land - 2.1 sq km; submerged - 127 sq km ++ Howland Island: total - 138.6 sq km; emergent land - 2.6 sq km; submerged - 136 sq km ++ Jarvis Island: total - 152 sq km; emergent land - 5 sq km; submerged - 147 sq km ++ Johnston Atoll: total - 276.6 sq km; emergent land - 2.6 sq km; submerged - 274 sq km ++ Kingman Reef: total - 1,958.01 sq km; emergent land - 0.01 sq km; submerged - 1,958 sq km ++ Midway Islands: total - 2,355.2 sq km; emergent land - 6.2 sq km; submerged - 2,349 sq km ++ Palmyra Atoll: total - 1,949.9 sq km; emergent land - 3.9 sq km; submerged - 1,946 sq km"
       }
     },
     "Area - comparative": {
-      "text": "Baker Island: about 2.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Howland Island: about three times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Jarvis Island: about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Johnston Atoll: about 4.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Kingman Reef: a little more than 1.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Midway Islands: about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; Palmyra Atoll: about 20 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
+      "text": "Baker Island: about 2.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Howland Island: about three times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Jarvis Island: about eight times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Johnston Atoll: about 4.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Kingman Reef: a little more than 1.5 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Midway Islands: about nine times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC; ++ Palmyra Atoll: about 20 times the size of the National Mall in Washington, DC"
     },
     "Land boundaries": {
       "text": "0 km"
     },
     "Coastline": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "Baker Island: 4.8 km Howland Island: 6.4 km Jarvis Island: 8 km Johnston Atoll: 34 km Kingman Reef: 3 km Midway Islands: 15 km Palmyra Atoll: 14.5 km"
+        "text": "Baker Island: 4.8 km ++ Howland Island: 6.4 km ++ Jarvis Island: 8 km ++ Johnston Atoll: 34 km ++ Kingman Reef: 3 km ++ Midway Islands: 15 km ++ Palmyra Atoll: 14.5 km"
       }
     },
     "Maritime claims": {
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Climate": {
-      "text": "Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands: equatorial; scant rainfall, constant wind, burning sun; Johnston Atoll and Kingman Reef: tropical, but generally dry; consistent northeast trade winds with little seasonal temperature variation; Midway Islands: subtropical with cool, moist winters (December to February) and warm, dry summers (May to October); moderated by prevailing easterly winds; most of the 107 cm of annual rainfall occurs during the winter; Palmyra Atoll: equatorial, hot; located within the low pressure area of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) where the northeast and southeast trade winds meet, it is extremely wet with between 400-500 cm of rainfall each year"
+      "text": "Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands: equatorial; scant rainfall, constant wind, burning sun; ++ Johnston Atoll and Kingman Reef: tropical, but generally dry; consistent northeast trade winds with little seasonal temperature variation; ++ Midway Islands: subtropical with cool, moist winters (December to February) and warm, dry summers (May to October); moderated by prevailing easterly winds; most of the 107 cm of annual rainfall occurs during the winter; ++ Palmyra Atoll: equatorial, hot; located within the low pressure area of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) where the northeast and southeast trade winds meet, it is extremely wet with between 400-500 cm of rainfall each year"
     },
     "Terrain": {
       "text": "low and nearly flat sandy coral islands with narrow fringing reefs that have developed at the top of submerged volcanic mountains, which in most cases rise steeply from the ocean floor"
@@ -73,20 +73,20 @@
       }
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands: the narrow fringing reef surrounding the island poses a maritime hazard; Kingman Reef: wet or awash most of the time, maximum elevation of less than 2 m makes Kingman Reef a maritime hazard; Midway Islands, Johnston, and Palmyra Atolls: NA"
+      "text": "Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands: the narrow fringing reef surrounding the island poses a maritime hazard; ++ Kingman Reef: wet or awash most of the time, maximum elevation of less than 2 m makes Kingman Reef a maritime hazard; ++ Midway Islands, Johnston, and Palmyra Atolls: NA"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
-      "text": "Baker Island: no natural freshwater resources; feral cats, introduced in 1937 during a short-lived colonization effort, ravaged the avian population and were eradicated in 1965Howland Island: no natural freshwater resources; the island habitat has suffered from invasive exotic species; black rats, introduced in 1854, were eradicated by feral cats within a year of their introduction in 1937; the cats preyed on the bird population and were eliminated by 1985Jarvis Island: no natural freshwater resources; feral cats, introduced in the 1930s during a short-lived colonization venture, were not completely removed until 1990Johnston Atoll: no natural freshwater resources; the seven decades under US military administration (1934-2004) left the atoll environmentally degraded and required large-scale remediation efforts; a swarm of Anoplolepis (crazy) ants invaded the island in 2010 damaging native wildlife; eradication has been largely, but not completely, successfulMidway Islands:  many exotic species introduced, 75% of the roughly 200 plant species on the island are non-native; plastic pollution harms wildlife, via entanglement, ingestion, and toxic contamination Kingman Reef: nonePalmyra Atoll: black rats, believed to have been introduced to the atoll during the US military occupation of the 1940s, severely degraded the ecosystem outcompeting native species (seabirds, crabs); following a successful rat removal project in 2011, native flora and fauna have begun to recover"
+      "text": "Baker Island: no natural freshwater resources; feral cats, introduced in 1937 during a short-lived colonization effort, ravaged the avian population and were eradicated in 1965 ++ ++ Howland Island: no natural freshwater resources; the island habitat has suffered from invasive exotic species; black rats, introduced in 1854, were eradicated by feral cats within a year of their introduction in 1937; the cats preyed on the bird population and were eliminated by 1985 ++ Jarvis Island: no natural freshwater resources; feral cats, introduced in the 1930s during a short-lived colonization venture, were not completely removed until 1990 ++ ++ Johnston Atoll: no natural freshwater resources; the seven decades under US military administration (1934-2004) left the atoll environmentally degraded and required large-scale remediation efforts; a swarm of Anoplolepis (crazy) ants invaded the island in 2010 damaging native wildlife; eradication has been largely, but not completely, successful ++ ++ Midway Islands:  many exotic species introduced, 75% of the roughly 200 plant species on the island are non-native; plastic pollution harms wildlife, via entanglement, ingestion, and toxic contamination ++ Kingman Reef: none ++ Palmyra Atoll: black rats, believed to have been introduced to the atoll during the US military occupation of the 1940s, severely degraded the ecosystem outcompeting native species (seabirds, crabs); following a successful rat removal project in 2011, native flora and fauna have begun to recover"
     },
     "Geography - note": {
-      "text": "Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands: scattered vegetation consisting of grasses, prostrate vines, and low growing shrubs; primarily a nesting, roosting, and foraging habitat for seabirds, shorebirds, and marine wildlife; closed to the public; Johnston Atoll: Johnston Island and Sand Island are natural islands, which have been expanded by coral dredging; North Island (Akau) and East Island (Hikina) are manmade islands formed from coral dredging; the egg-shaped reef is 34 km in circumference; closed to the public; Kingman Reef: barren coral atoll with deep interior lagoon; closed to the public; Midway Islands: a coral atoll managed as a National Wildlife Refuge and open to the public for wildlife-related recreation in the form of wildlife observation and photography; Palmyra Atoll: the high rainfall and resulting lush vegetation make the environment of this atoll unique among the US Pacific Island territories; supports a large undisturbed stand of Pisonia beach forest"
+      "text": "Baker, Howland, and Jarvis Islands: scattered vegetation consisting of grasses, prostrate vines, and low growing shrubs; primarily a nesting, roosting, and foraging habitat for seabirds, shorebirds, and marine wildlife; closed to the public; ++ Johnston Atoll: Johnston Island and Sand Island are natural islands, which have been expanded by coral dredging; North Island (Akau) and East Island (Hikina) are manmade islands formed from coral dredging; the egg-shaped reef is 34 km in circumference; closed to the public; ++ Kingman Reef: barren coral atoll with deep interior lagoon; closed to the public; ++ Midway Islands: a coral atoll managed as a National Wildlife Refuge and open to the public for wildlife-related recreation in the form of wildlife observation and photography; ++ Palmyra Atoll: the high rainfall and resulting lush vegetation make the environment of this atoll unique among the US Pacific Island territories; supports a large undisturbed stand of Pisonia beach forest"
     }
   },
   "People and Society": {
     "Population": {
       "text": "no indigenous inhabitants",
       "note": {
-        "text": "note: public entry is only by special-use permit from US Fish and Wildlife Service and generally restricted to scientists and educators; visited annually by US Fish and Wildlife Service Jarvis Island: Millersville settlement on western side of island occasionally used as a weather station from 1935 until World War II, when it was abandoned; reoccupied in 1957 during the International Geophysical Year by scientists who left in 1958; currently unoccupied Johnston Atoll: in previous years, an average of 1,100 US military and civilian contractor personnel were present; as of May 2005, all US Government personnel had left the island Midway Islands: approximately 40 people make up the staff of US Fish and Wildlife Service and their services contractor living at the atoll Palmyra Atoll: four to 20 Nature Conservancy, US Fish and Wildlife staff, and researchers"
+        "text": "note: public entry is only by special-use permit from US Fish and Wildlife Service and generally restricted to scientists and educators; visited annually by US Fish and Wildlife Service ++ Jarvis Island: Millersville settlement on western side of island occasionally used as a weather station from 1935 until World War II, when it was abandoned; reoccupied in 1957 during the International Geophysical Year by scientists who left in 1958; currently unoccupied ++ Johnston Atoll: in previous years, an average of 1,100 US military and civilian contractor personnel were present; as of May 2005, all US Government personnel had left the island ++ Midway Islands: approximately 40 people make up the staff of US Fish and Wildlife Service and their services contractor living at the atoll ++ Palmyra Atoll: four to 20 Nature Conservancy, US Fish and Wildlife staff, and researchers"
       }
     }
   },

australia-oceania/wf.json

@@ -213,19 +213,19 @@
       "text": "1.71 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017)"
       }
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -337,13 +337,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "unicameral Territorial Assembly or Assemblee Territoriale (20 seats - Wallis 13, Futuna 7; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms)Wallis and Futuna indirectly elects 1 senator to the French Senate by an electoral college by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 6-year term, and directly elects 1 deputy to the French National Assembly by absolute majority vote for a 5-year term"
+        "text": "unicameral Territorial Assembly or Assemblee Territoriale (20 seats - Wallis 13, Futuna 7; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by party-list proportional representation vote to serve 5-year terms) ++ Wallis and Futuna indirectly elects 1 senator to the French Senate by an electoral college by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 6-year term, and directly elects 1 deputy to the French National Assembly by absolute majority vote for a 5-year term"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Territorial Assembly - last held on 26 March 2017 (next to be held in March 2022)French Senate - last held on 28 September 2014 (next to be held by September 2020)French National Assembly - last held on 11 June 2017 (next to be held in June 2022)"
+        "text": "Territorial Assembly - last held on 26 March 2017 (next to be held in March 2022) ++ French Senate - last held on 28 September 2014 (next to be held by September 2020) ++ French National Assembly - last held on 11 June 2017 (next to be held in June 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Territorial Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - 2 members are elected from the list Fia gaue fakatahi kihe kaha'u e lelei and 1 each from 18 other lists; composition - men 14, women 6, percent of women 30% French Senate - LR 1French National Assembly - independent 1"
+        "text": "Territorial Assembly - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - 2 members are elected from the list Fia gaue fakatahi kihe kaha'u e lelei and 1 each from 18 other lists; composition - men 14, women 6, percent of women 30% ++ French Senate - LR 1 ++ French National Assembly - independent 1"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Left Radical Party or PRG [Guillaume LACROIX] (formerly Radical Socialist Party or PRS and the Left Radical Movement or MRG)Lua Kae Tahi (Giscardians) (leader NA)Rally for Wallis and Futuna-The Republicans (Rassemblement pour Wallis and Futuna) or RPWF-LR [Clovis LOGOLOGOFOLAU]Socialist Party or PSTaumu'a Lelei [Soane Muni UHILA]Union Pour la Democratie Francaise or UDF"
+      "text": "Left Radical Party or PRG [Guillaume LACROIX] (formerly Radical Socialist Party or PRS and the Left Radical Movement or MRG) ++ Lua Kae Tahi (Giscardians) (leader NA) ++ Rally for Wallis and Futuna-The Republicans (Rassemblement pour Wallis and Futuna) or RPWF-LR [Clovis LOGOLOGOFOLAU] ++ Socialist Party or PS ++ Taumu'a Lelei [Soane Muni UHILA] ++ Union Pour la Democratie Francaise or UDF"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "PIF (observer), SPC, UPU"
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The economy is limited to traditional subsistence agriculture, with about 80% of labor force earnings coming from agriculture (coconuts and vegetables), livestock (mostly pigs), and fishing. However, roughly 70% of the labor force is employed in the public sector, although only about a third of the population is in salaried employment. Revenues come from French Government subsidies, licensing of fishing rights to Japan and South Korea, import taxes, and remittances from expatriate workers in New Caledonia. France directly finances the public sector and health-care and education services. It also provides funding for key development projects in a range of areas, including infrastructure, economic development, environmental management, and health-care facilities. A key concern for Wallis and Futuna is an aging population with consequent economic development issues. Very few people aged 18-30 live on the islands due to the limited formal employment opportunities. Improving job creation is a current priority for the territorial government."
+      "text": "The economy is limited to traditional subsistence agriculture, with about 80% of labor force earnings coming from agriculture (coconuts and vegetables), livestock (mostly pigs), and fishing. However, roughly 70% of the labor force is employed in the public sector, although only about a third of the population is in salaried employment. ++ Revenues come from French Government subsidies, licensing of fishing rights to Japan and South Korea, import taxes, and remittances from expatriate workers in New Caledonia. France directly finances the public sector and health-care and education services. It also provides funding for key development projects in a range of areas, including infrastructure, economic development, environmental management, and health-care facilities. ++ A key concern for Wallis and Futuna is an aging population with consequent economic development issues. Very few people aged 18-30 live on the islands due to the limited formal employment opportunities. Improving job creation is a current priority for the territorial government."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$60 million (2004 est.)"

australia-oceania/ws.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "New Zealand occupied the German protectorate of Western Samoa at the outbreak of World War I in 1914. It continued to administer the islands as a mandate and then as a trust territory until 1962, when the islands became the first Polynesian nation to reestablish independence in the 20th century. The country dropped the \"Western\" from its name in 1997.In the late 2000s, Samoa began making efforts to more closely align with Australia and New Zealand. In 2009, Samoa changed its driving orientation to the left side of the road, in line with other Commonwealth countries. In 2011, Samoa jumped forward one day - skipping December 30 - by moving to the west of the International Date Line so that it was one hour ahead of New Zealand and three hours ahead of the east coast of Australia, rather than 23 and 21 hours behind, respectively."
+      "text": "New Zealand occupied the German protectorate of Western Samoa at the outbreak of World War I in 1914. It continued to administer the islands as a mandate and then as a trust territory until 1962, when the islands became the first Polynesian nation to reestablish independence in the 20th century. The country dropped the \"Western\" from its name in 1997. ++ In the late 2000s, Samoa began making efforts to more closely align with Australia and New Zealand. In 2009, Samoa changed its driving orientation to the left side of the road, in line with other Commonwealth countries. In 2011, Samoa jumped forward one day - skipping December 30 - by moving to the west of the International Date Line so that it was one hour ahead of New Zealand and three hours ahead of the east coast of Australia, rather than 23 and 21 hours behind, respectively."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
       "text": "about three-quarters of the population lives on the island of Upolu"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "occasional cyclones; active volcanism\nvolcanism: Savai'I Island (1,858 m), which last erupted in 1911, is historically active"
+      "text": "occasional cyclones; active volcanism ++ volcanism: Savai'I Island (1,858 m), which last erupted in 1911, is historically active"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "soil erosion, deforestation, invasive species, overfishing"
@@ -253,14 +253,11 @@
       "text": "26.9% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 96.8% of population / total: 97.4% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "3.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "2.6% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 3.2% of population / total: 2.6% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -270,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "0.34 physicians/1,000 population (2016)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.5% of population / rural: 98.1% of population / total: 98.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "1.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.5% of population / rural: 1.9% of population / total: 1.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -418,10 +412,10 @@
     },
     "Executive branch": {
       "chief of state": {
-        "text": "TUIMALEALI'IFANO Va’aletoa Sualauvi II (since 21 July 2017)"
+        "text": "TUIMALEALI'IFANO Va'aletoa Sualauvi II (since 21 July 2017)"
       },
       "head of government": {
-        "text": "Prime Minister TUILA'EPA Lupesoliai Sailele Malielegaoi (since 23 November 1998); Deputy Prime Minister FIAME Naomi Mata’afa (since 2016)"
+        "text": "Prime Minister TUILA'EPA Lupesoliai Sailele Malielegaoi (since 23 November 1998); Deputy Prime Minister FIAME Naomi Mata'afa (since 2016)"
       },
       "cabinet": {
         "text": "Cabinet appointed by the chief of state on the prime minister's advice"
@@ -430,7 +424,7 @@
         "text": "chief of state indirectly elected by the Legislative Assembly to serve a 5-year term (2- term limit); election last held on 4 July 2017 (next to be held in 2022); following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party is usually appointed prime minister by the chief of state, approved by the Legislative Assembly"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "TUIMALEALI'IFANO Va’aletoa Sualauvi unanimously elected by the Legislative Assembly on 5 July 2017"
+        "text": "TUIMALEALI'IFANO Va'aletoa Sualauvi unanimously elected by the Legislative Assembly on 5 July 2017"
       }
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
@@ -518,7 +512,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The economy of Samoa has traditionally been dependent on development aid, family remittances from overseas, tourism, agriculture, and fishing. It has a nominal GDP of $844 million. Agriculture, including fishing, furnishes 90% of exports, featuring fish, coconut oil, nonu products, and taro. The manufacturing sector mainly processes agricultural products. Industry accounts for nearly 22% of GDP while employing less than 6% of the work force. The service sector accounts for nearly two-thirds of GDP and employs approximately 50% of the labor force. Tourism is an expanding sector accounting for 25% of GDP; 132,000 tourists visited the islands in 2013. The country is vulnerable to devastating storms. In September 2009, an earthquake and the resulting tsunami severely damaged Samoa and nearby American Samoa, disrupting transportation and power generation, and resulting in about 200 deaths. In December 2012, extensive flooding and wind damage from Tropical Cyclone Evan killed four people, displaced over 6,000, and damaged or destroyed an estimated 1,500 homes on Samoa's Upolu Island. The Samoan Government has called for deregulation of the country's financial sector, encouragement of investment, and continued fiscal discipline, while at the same time protecting the environment. Foreign reserves are relatively healthy and inflation is low, but external debt is approximately 45% of GDP. Samoa became the 155th member of the WTO in May 2012, and graduated from least developed country status in January 2014."
+      "text": "The economy of Samoa has traditionally been dependent on development aid, family remittances from overseas, tourism, agriculture, and fishing. It has a nominal GDP of $844 million. Agriculture, including fishing, furnishes 90% of exports, featuring fish, coconut oil, nonu products, and taro. The manufacturing sector mainly processes agricultural products. Industry accounts for nearly 22% of GDP while employing less than 6% of the work force. The service sector accounts for nearly two-thirds of GDP and employs approximately 50% of the labor force. Tourism is an expanding sector accounting for 25% of GDP; 132,000 tourists visited the islands in 2013. ++ The country is vulnerable to devastating storms. In September 2009, an earthquake and the resulting tsunami severely damaged Samoa and nearby American Samoa, disrupting transportation and power generation, and resulting in about 200 deaths. In December 2012, extensive flooding and wind damage from Tropical Cyclone Evan killed four people, displaced over 6,000, and damaged or destroyed an estimated 1,500 homes on Samoa's Upolu Island. ++ The Samoan Government has called for deregulation of the country's financial sector, encouragement of investment, and continued fiscal discipline, while at the same time protecting the environment. Foreign reserves are relatively healthy and inflation is low, but external debt is approximately 45% of GDP. Samoa became the 155th member of the WTO in May 2012, and graduated from least developed country status in January 2014."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$1.137 billion (2017 est.) / $1.11 billion (2016 est.) / $1.036 billion (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/aa.json

@@ -230,25 +230,19 @@
       "text": "1.83 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.1% of population / rural: 98.1% of population / total: 98.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "1.9% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1.9% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.9% of population / rural: 1.9% of population / total: 1.9% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.7% of population / rural: 97.7% of population / total: 97.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "2.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "2.3% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.3% of population / rural: 2.3% of population / total: 2.3% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -395,7 +389,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Aruban People's Party or AVP [Michiel \"Mike\" EMAN]Democratic Electoral Network or RED [L.R. CROES]People's Electoral Movement Party or MEP [Evelyn WEVER-CROES]Pueblo Orguyoso y Respeta or POR [O.E. ODUBER]Real Democracy or PDR [Andin BIKKER]"
+      "text": "Aruban People's Party or AVP [Michiel \"Mike\" EMAN] ++ Democratic Electoral Network or RED [L.R. CROES] ++ People's Electoral Movement Party or MEP [Evelyn WEVER-CROES] ++ Pueblo Orguyoso y Respeta or POR [O.E. ODUBER] ++ Real Democracy or PDR [Andin BIKKER]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "Caricom (observer), FATF, ILO, IMF, Interpol, IOC, ITUC (NGOs), UNESCO (associate), UNWTO (associate), UPU"
@@ -429,7 +423,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Tourism, petroleum bunkering, hospitality, and financial and business services are the mainstays of the small open Aruban economy. Tourism accounts for a majority of economic activity; as of 2017, over 2 million tourists visited Aruba annually, with the large majority (80-85%) of those from the US. The rapid growth of the tourism sector has resulted in a substantial expansion of other activities. Construction continues to boom, especially in the hospitality sector. Aruba is heavily dependent on imports and is making efforts to expand exports to improve its trade balance. Almost all consumer and capital goods are imported, with the US, the Netherlands, and Panama being the major suppliers. In 2016, Citgo Petroleum Corporation, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela SA, and the Government of Aruba signed an agreement to restart Valero Energy Corp.'s former 235,000-b/d refinery. Tourism and related industries have continued to grow, and the Aruban Government is working to attract more diverse industries. Aruba's banking sector continues to be a strong sector; unemployment has significantly decreased."
+      "text": "Tourism, petroleum bunkering, hospitality, and financial and business services are the mainstays of the small open Aruban economy. ++ Tourism accounts for a majority of economic activity; as of 2017, over 2 million tourists visited Aruba annually, with the large majority (80-85%) of those from the US. The rapid growth of the tourism sector has resulted in a substantial expansion of other activities. Construction continues to boom, especially in the hospitality sector. ++ Aruba is heavily dependent on imports and is making efforts to expand exports to improve its trade balance. Almost all consumer and capital goods are imported, with the US, the Netherlands, and Panama being the major suppliers. ++ In 2016, Citgo Petroleum Corporation, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela SA, and the Government of Aruba signed an agreement to restart Valero Energy Corp.'s former 235,000-b/d refinery. Tourism and related industries have continued to grow, and the Aruban Government is working to attract more diverse industries. Aruba's banking sector continues to be a strong sector; unemployment has significantly decreased."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$4.158 billion (2017 est.) / $4.107 billion (2016 est.) / $4.112 billion (2015 est.)"

central-america-n-caribbean/ac.json

@@ -247,8 +247,11 @@
       "text": "1.97 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 96.7% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 3.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -261,8 +264,11 @@
       "text": "2.9 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 8.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 91.7% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 8.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -391,13 +397,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (17 seats; members appointed by the governor general)House of Representatives (18 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (17 seats; members appointed by the governor general) ++ House of Representatives (18 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last appointed on 26 March 2018 (next NA)House of Representatives - last held on 21 March 2018 (next to be held in March 2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last appointed on 26 March 2018 (next NA) ++ House of Representatives - last held on 21 March 2018 (next to be held in March 2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate -  composition - men 8, women 9, percent of women 52.9%House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - ABLP 59.4%, UPP 37.2%, BPM 1.4%, other 1.9% ; seats by party - ABLP 15, UPP 1, BPM 1; composition - men 16, women 2, percent of women 11.1%; note - total Parliament percent of women 31.4%"
+        "text": "Senate -  composition - men 8, women 9, percent of women 52.9% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - ABLP 59.4%, UPP 37.2%, BPM 1.4%, other 1.9% ; seats by party - ABLP 15, UPP 1, BPM 1; composition - men 16, women 2, percent of women 11.1%; note - total Parliament percent of women 31.4%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -412,7 +418,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement or ACLMAntigua Labor Party or ABLP [Gaston BROWNE]Antigua Barbuda True Labor Party or ABTLP [Sharlene SAMUEL]Barbuda People's Movement or BPM [Trevor WALKER]Barbuda People's Movement for Change [Arthur NIBBS]Barbudans for a Better Barbuda [Ordrick SAMUEL]Democratic National Alliance or DNA [Joanne MASSIAH]Go Green for Life [Owen GEORGE]Progressive Labor Movement or PLMUnited National Democratic Party or UNDPUnited Progressive Party or UPP [Harold LOVELL] (a coalition of ACLM, PLM, UNDP)"
+      "text": "Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement or ACLM ++ Antigua Labor Party or ABLP [Gaston BROWNE] ++ Antigua Barbuda True Labor Party or ABTLP [Sharlene SAMUEL] ++ Barbuda People's Movement or BPM [Trevor WALKER] ++ Barbuda People's Movement for Change [Arthur NIBBS] ++ Barbudans for a Better Barbuda [Ordrick SAMUEL] ++ Democratic National Alliance or DNA [Joanne MASSIAH] ++ Go Green for Life [Owen GEORGE] ++ Progressive Labor Movement or PLM ++ United National Democratic Party or UNDP ++ United Progressive Party or UPP [Harold LOVELL] (a coalition of ACLM, PLM, UNDP)"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, C, Caricom, CDB, CELAC, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO (subscriber), ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM (observer), OAS, OECS, OPANAL, OPCW, Petrocaribe, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UPU, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -457,7 +463,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Tourism continues to dominate Antigua and Barbuda's economy, accounting for nearly 60% of GDP and 40% of investment. The dual-island nation's agricultural production is focused on the domestic market and constrained by a limited water supply and a labor shortage stemming from the lure of higher wages in tourism and construction. Manufacturing comprises enclave-type assembly for export with major products being bedding, handicrafts, and electronic components. Like other countries in the region, Antigua's economy was severely hit by effects of the global economic recession in 2009. The country suffered from the collapse of its largest private sector employer, a steep decline in tourism, a rise in debt, and a sharp economic contraction between 2009 and 2011. Antigua has not yet returned to its pre-crisis growth levels. Barbuda suffered significant damages after hurricanes Irma and Maria passed through the Caribbean in 2017. Prospects for economic growth in the medium term will continue to depend on tourist arrivals from the US, Canada, and Europe and could be disrupted by potential damage from natural disasters. The new government, elected in 2014 and led by Prime Minister Gaston Browne, continues to face significant fiscal challenges. The government places some hope in a new Citizenship by Investment Program, to both reduce public debt levels and spur growth, and a resolution of a WTO dispute with the US."
+      "text": "Tourism continues to dominate Antigua and Barbuda's economy, accounting for nearly 60% of GDP and 40% of investment. The dual-island nation's agricultural production is focused on the domestic market and constrained by a limited water supply and a labor shortage stemming from the lure of higher wages in tourism and construction. Manufacturing comprises enclave-type assembly for export with major products being bedding, handicrafts, and electronic components. ++ Like other countries in the region, Antigua's economy was severely hit by effects of the global economic recession in 2009. The country suffered from the collapse of its largest private sector employer, a steep decline in tourism, a rise in debt, and a sharp economic contraction between 2009 and 2011. Antigua has not yet returned to its pre-crisis growth levels. Barbuda suffered significant damages after hurricanes Irma and Maria passed through the Caribbean in 2017. ++ Prospects for economic growth in the medium term will continue to depend on tourist arrivals from the US, Canada, and Europe and could be disrupted by potential damage from natural disasters. The new government, elected in 2014 and led by Prime Minister Gaston Browne, continues to face significant fiscal challenges. The government places some hope in a new Citizenship by Investment Program, to both reduce public debt levels and spur growth, and a resolution of a WTO dispute with the US."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$2.398 billion (2017 est.) / $2.334 billion (2016 est.) / $2.215 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -826,7 +832,7 @@
         "text": "Antigua and Barbuda is a destination and transit country for adults and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor; forced prostitution has been reported in bars, taverns, and brothels, while forced labor occurs in domestic service and the retail sector"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Antigua and Barbuda does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; the government made no discernible progress in convicting traffickers in 2014 but charged two individuals in separate cases; efforts to convict traffickers have been impeded by a 2014 ruling that found the 2010 anti-trafficking act was unconstitutional because jurisdiction rests with the Magistrate’s Court rather than the High Court; no new prosecutions, convictions, or punishments were recorded in 2014; credible sources have raised concerns about trafficking-related complicity among some off-duty police officers, which could hinder investigations or victims willingness to report offenses; prevention efforts were sustained, but progress in protecting victims was uneven; seven victims were assisted, which was an increase over 2013 (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Antigua and Barbuda does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; the government made no discernible progress in convicting traffickers in 2014 but charged two individuals in separate cases; efforts to convict traffickers have been impeded by a 2014 ruling that found the 2010 anti-trafficking act was unconstitutional because jurisdiction rests with the Magistrate's Court rather than the High Court; no new prosecutions, convictions, or punishments were recorded in 2014; credible sources have raised concerns about trafficking-related complicity among some off-duty police officers, which could hinder investigations or victims willingness to report offenses; prevention efforts were sustained, but progress in protecting victims was uneven; seven victims were assisted, which was an increase over 2013 (2015)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

central-america-n-caribbean/av.json

@@ -216,19 +216,19 @@
       "text": "1.74 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.5% of population / total: 97.5% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "2.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.5% of population / total: 2.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99.1% of population / total: 99.1% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.9% of population / total: 0.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Anguilla Democratic Party or ADPAnguilla National Alliance or ANAAnguilla Progressive Movement or APM [Dr. Ellis WEBSTER]; prior to 2019, it was known as the Anguilla United Movement or AUMAnguilla United Front or AUF [Victor BANKS] (alliance includes ADP, ANA)Democracy, Opportunity, Vision, and Empowerment Party or DOVE [Sutcliffe HODGE]"
+      "text": "Anguilla Democratic Party or ADP ++ Anguilla National Alliance or ANA ++ Anguilla Progressive Movement or APM [Dr. Ellis WEBSTER]; prior to 2019, it was known as the Anguilla United Movement or AUM ++ Anguilla United Front or AUF [Victor BANKS] (alliance includes ADP, ANA) ++ Democracy, Opportunity, Vision, and Empowerment Party or DOVE [Sutcliffe HODGE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "Caricom (associate), CDB, Interpol (subbureau), OECS, UNESCO (associate), UPU"

central-america-n-caribbean/bb.json

@@ -241,8 +241,11 @@
       "text": "59.2% (2012)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 98.5% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 1.5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -255,8 +258,11 @@
       "text": "6 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 99.2% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 0.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -399,13 +405,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (21 seats; members appointed by the governor general - 12 on the advice of the Prime Minister, 2 on the advice of the opposition leader, and 7 at the discretion of the governor general) House of Assembly (30 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (21 seats; members appointed by the governor general - 12 on the advice of the Prime Minister, 2 on the advice of the opposition leader, and 7 at the discretion of the governor general) ++ House of Assembly (30 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last appointments on 5 June 2018 (next appointments NA)House of Assembly - last held on 24 May 2018 (next to be held in 2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last appointments on 5 June 2018 (next appointments NA) ++ House of Assembly - last held on 24 May 2018 (next to be held in 2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - appointed; composition - men 16, women 5, percent of women 23.8% House of Assembly - percent of vote by party - BLP 74.6%, DLP 22.6%, other 2.8%; seats by party - BLP 30; composition - men 24, women 6, percent of women 20%; note - total Parliament percent of women 21.6%"
+        "text": "Senate - appointed; composition - men 16, women 5, percent of women 23.8% ++ House of Assembly - percent of vote by party - BLP 74.6%, DLP 22.6%, other 2.8%; seats by party - BLP 30; composition - men 24, women 6, percent of women 20%; note - total Parliament percent of women 21.6%"
       },
       "note": {
         "text": "note: tradition dictates that the election is held within 5 years of the last election, but constitutionally it is 5 years from the first seating of Parliament plus a 90-day grace period"
@@ -423,7 +429,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Bajan Free Party [Alex MITCHELL]Barbados Integrity Movement [Neil HOLDER]Barbados Labor Party or BLP [Mia MOTTLEY]Democratic Labor Party or DLP [Freundel STUART]People’s Democratic Congress [Mark ADAMSON]People's Empowerment Party or PEP [David COMISSIONG]Solutions Barbados [Grenville PHILLIPS II]United Progressive Party or UPP [Lynette EASTMOND]"
+      "text": "Bajan Free Party [Alex MITCHELL] ++ Barbados Integrity Movement [Neil HOLDER] ++ Barbados Labor Party or BLP [Mia MOTTLEY] ++ Democratic Labor Party or DLP [Freundel STUART] ++ People's Democratic Congress [Mark ADAMSON] ++ People's Empowerment Party or PEP [David COMISSIONG] ++ Solutions Barbados [Grenville PHILLIPS II] ++ United Progressive Party or UPP [Lynette EASTMOND]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, C, Caricom, CDB, CELAC, FAO, G-77, IADB, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAES, MIGA, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"

central-america-n-caribbean/bf.json

@@ -244,8 +244,11 @@
       "text": "1.92 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 98.9% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 1.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -258,8 +261,11 @@
       "text": "3 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 98.2% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 1.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -380,13 +386,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (16 seats; members appointed by the governor general upon the advice of the prime minister and the opposition leader to serve 5-year terms)House of Assembly (39 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (16 seats; members appointed by the governor general upon the advice of the prime minister and the opposition leader to serve 5-year terms) ++ House of Assembly (39 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last appointments on 24 May 2017 (next appointments in 2022)House of Assembly - last held on 10 May 2017 (next to be held by May 2022)"
+        "text": "Senate - last appointments on 24 May 2017 (next appointments in 2022) ++ House of Assembly - last held on 10 May 2017 (next to be held by May 2022)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - appointed; composition - men 9, women 7, percent of women 43.8%House of Assembly - percent of vote by party - FNM 57%, PLP 36.9%, other 6.1%; seats by party - FNM 35, PLP 4; composition - men 34, women 5, percent of women 12.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women 21.8%"
+        "text": "Senate - appointed; composition - men 9, women 7, percent of women 43.8% ++ House of Assembly - percent of vote by party - FNM 57%, PLP 36.9%, other 6.1%; seats by party - FNM 35, PLP 4; composition - men 34, women 5, percent of women 12.8%; note - total Parliament percent of women 21.8%"
       },
       "note": {
         "text": "note: the government may dissolve the parliament and call elections at any time"
@@ -407,7 +413,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Democratic National Alliance or DNA [Christopher MORTIMER, interim leader]Free National Movement or FNM [Hubert MINNIS]Progressive Liberal Party or PLP [Philip \"Brave\" DAVIS]"
+      "text": "Democratic National Alliance or DNA [Christopher MORTIMER, interim leader] ++ Free National Movement or FNM [Hubert MINNIS] ++ Progressive Liberal Party or PLP [Philip \"Brave\" DAVIS]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, C, Caricom, CDB, CELAC, FAO, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, LAES, MIGA, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, Petrocaribe, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (observer)"

central-america-n-caribbean/bh.json

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 40.1%, Protestant 31.5% (includes Pentecostal 8.4%, Seventh Day Adventist 5.4%, Anglican 4.7%, Mennonite 3.7%, Baptist 3.6%, Methodist 2.9%, Nazarene 2.8%), Jehovah's Witness 1.7%, other 10.5% (includes Baha'i, Buddhist, Hindu, Mormon, Muslim, Rastafarian, Salvation Army), unspecified 0.6%, none 15.5% (2010 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Migration continues to transform Belize's population. About 16% of Belizeans live abroad, while immigrants constitute approximately 15% of Belize's population. Belizeans seeking job and educational opportunities have preferred to emigrate to the United States rather than former colonizer Great Britain because of the United States' closer proximity and stronger trade ties with Belize. Belizeans also emigrate to Canada, Mexico, and English-speaking Caribbean countries. The emigration of a large share of Creoles (Afro-Belizeans) and the influx of Central American immigrants, mainly Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans, has changed Belize's ethnic composition. Mestizos have become the largest ethnic group, and Belize now has more native Spanish speakers than English or Creole speakers, despite English being the official language. In addition, Central American immigrants are establishing new communities in rural areas, which contrasts with the urbanization trend seen in neighboring countries. Recently, Chinese, European, and North American immigrants have become more frequent.\nImmigration accounts for an increasing share of Belize's population growth rate, which is steadily falling due to fertility decline. Belize's declining birth rate and its increased life expectancy are creating an aging population. As the elderly population grows and nuclear families replace extended households, Belize's government will be challenged to balance a rising demand for pensions, social services, and healthcare for its senior citizens with the need to reduce poverty and social inequality and to improve sanitation."
+      "text": "Migration continues to transform Belize's population. About 16% of Belizeans live abroad, while immigrants constitute approximately 15% of Belize's population. Belizeans seeking job and educational opportunities have preferred to emigrate to the United States rather than former colonizer Great Britain because of the United States' closer proximity and stronger trade ties with Belize. Belizeans also emigrate to Canada, Mexico, and English-speaking Caribbean countries. The emigration of a large share of Creoles (Afro-Belizeans) and the influx of Central American immigrants, mainly Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans, has changed Belize's ethnic composition. Mestizos have become the largest ethnic group, and Belize now has more native Spanish speakers than English or Creole speakers, despite English being the official language. In addition, Central American immigrants are establishing new communities in rural areas, which contrasts with the urbanization trend seen in neighboring countries. Recently, Chinese, European, and North American immigrants have become more frequent. ++ Immigration accounts for an increasing share of Belize's population growth rate, which is steadily falling due to fertility decline. Belize's declining birth rate and its increased life expectancy are creating an aging population. As the elderly population grows and nuclear families replace extended households, Belize's government will be challenged to balance a rising demand for pensions, social services, and healthcare for its senior citizens with the need to reduce poverty and social inequality and to improve sanitation."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "51.4% (2015/16)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 98.6% of population / total: 99.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "1.4% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 1.4% of population / total: 0.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "1 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.8% of population / rural: 95.3% of population / total: 96.9% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "4.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "3.1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.2% of population / rural: 4.7% of population / total: 3.1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -417,13 +411,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of:Senate (14 seats, including the president); members appointed by the governor general - 6 on the advice of the prime minister, 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and 1 each on the advice of the Belize Council of Churches and Evangelical Association of Churches, the Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Belize Better Business Bureau, non-governmental organizations in good standing, and the National Trade Union Congress and the Civil Society Steering Committee; Senate president elected from among the Senate members or from outside the Senate; term of appointment NAHouse of Representatives (31 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral National Assembly consists of: Senate (14 seats, including the president); members appointed by the governor general - 6 on the advice of the prime minister, 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and 1 each on the advice of the Belize Council of Churches and Evangelical Association of Churches, the Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Belize Better Business Bureau, non-governmental organizations in good standing, and the National Trade Union Congress and the Civil Society Steering Committee; Senate president elected from among the Senate members or from outside the Senate; term of appointment NA ++ House of Representatives (31 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate -  last appointed 13 November 2015 (next appointments on 11 November 2020)House of Representatives - last held on 4 November 2015 (next to be held on 11 November 2020)"
+        "text": "Senate -  last appointed 13 November 2015 (next appointments on 11 November 2020) ++ House of Representatives - last held on 4 November 2015 (next to be held on 11 November 2020)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - composition as of December 2019 - men 11, women 3, percent of women 21.4%House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - UDP 50%, PUP 47.3%, other 2.7%; seats by party - UDP 19, PUP 12; composition - men 29, women 2; percent of women 6.5%; note - total National Assembly percent of women as of June 2019 - 11.1%"
+        "text": "Senate - composition as of December 2019 - men 11, women 3, percent of women 21.4% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - UDP 50%, PUP 47.3%, other 2.7%; seats by party - UDP 19, PUP 12; composition - men 29, women 2; percent of women 6.5%; note - total National Assembly percent of women as of June 2019 - 11.1%"
       },
       "note": {
         "text": " "
@@ -441,7 +435,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Belize Progressive Party or BPP [Patrick ROGERS] (formed in 2015 from a merger of the People's National Party, elements of the Vision Inspired by the People, and other smaller political groups)People's United Party or PUP [Johnny BRICENO]United Democratic Party or UDP [Dean Oliver BARROW]Vision Inspired by the People or VIP [Hubert ENRIQUEZ]"
+      "text": "Belize Progressive Party or BPP [Patrick ROGERS] (formed in 2015 from a merger of the People's National Party, elements of the Vision Inspired by the People, and other smaller political groups) ++ People's United Party or PUP [Johnny BRICENO] ++ United Democratic Party or UDP [Dean Oliver BARROW] ++ Vision Inspired by the People or VIP [Hubert ENRIQUEZ]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, C, Caricom, CD, CDB, CELAC, FAO, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ITU, LAES, MIGA, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, PCA, Petrocaribe, SICA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -468,7 +462,7 @@
     },
     "Diplomatic representation from the US": {
       "chief of mission": {
-        "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d’Affaires Keith R. GILGES (since 24 July 2018)"
+        "text": "Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Keith R. GILGES (since 24 July 2018)"
       },
       "telephone": {
         "text": "[011] (501) 822-4011"
@@ -506,7 +500,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Tourism is the number one foreign exchange earner in this small economy, followed by exports of sugar, bananas, citrus, marine products, and crude oil. The government's expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, initiated in September 1998, led to GDP growth averaging nearly 4% in 1999-2007, but GPD growth has averaged only 2.1% from 2007-2016, with 2.5% growth estimated for 2017. Belize’s dependence on energy imports makes it susceptible to energy price shocks. Although Belize has the third highest per capita income in Central America, the average income figure masks a huge income disparity between rich and poor, and a key government objective remains reducing poverty and inequality with the help of international donors. High unemployment, a growing trade deficit and heavy foreign debt burden continue to be major concerns. Belize faces continued pressure from rising sovereign debt, and a growing trade imbalance."
+      "text": "Tourism is the number one foreign exchange earner in this small economy, followed by exports of sugar, bananas, citrus, marine products, and crude oil. ++ The government's expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, initiated in September 1998, led to GDP growth averaging nearly 4% in 1999-2007, but GPD growth has averaged only 2.1% from 2007-2016, with 2.5% growth estimated for 2017. Belize's dependence on energy imports makes it susceptible to energy price shocks. ++ Although Belize has the third highest per capita income in Central America, the average income figure masks a huge income disparity between rich and poor, and a key government objective remains reducing poverty and inequality with the help of international donors. High unemployment, a growing trade deficit and heavy foreign debt burden continue to be major concerns. Belize faces continued pressure from rising sovereign debt, and a growing trade imbalance."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$3.218 billion (2017 est.) / $3.194 billion (2016 est.) / $3.21 billion (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/cj.json

@@ -219,19 +219,19 @@
       "text": "1.83 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.4% of population / total: 97.4% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "2.6% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.6% of population / total: 2.6% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 4.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 95.6% of population / total: 95.6% of population"
       },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "4.4% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 4.4% of population / total: 4.4% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "People's Progressive Movement or PPM [Alden MCLAUGHLIN]Cayman Democratic Party or CDP [McKeeva BUSH]"
+      "text": "People's Progressive Movement or PPM [Alden MCLAUGHLIN] ++ Cayman Democratic Party or CDP [McKeeva BUSH]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "Caricom (associate), CDB, Interpol (subbureau), IOC, UNESCO (associate), UPU"
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "With no direct taxation, the islands are a thriving offshore financial center. More than 65,000 companies were registered in the Cayman Islands as of 2017, including more than 280 banks, 700 insurers, and 10,500 mutual funds. A stock exchange was opened in 1997. Nearly 90% of the islands' food and consumer goods must be imported. The Caymanians enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of Switzerland. Tourism is also a mainstay, accounting for about 70% of GDP and 75% of foreign currency earnings. The tourist industry is aimed at the luxury market and caters mainly to visitors from North America. Total tourist arrivals exceeded 2.1 million in 2016, with more than three-quarters from the US."
+      "text": "With no direct taxation, the islands are a thriving offshore financial center. More than 65,000 companies were registered in the Cayman Islands as of 2017, including more than 280 banks, 700 insurers, and 10,500 mutual funds. A stock exchange was opened in 1997. Nearly 90% of the islands' food and consumer goods must be imported. The Caymanians enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of Switzerland. ++ Tourism is also a mainstay, accounting for about 70% of GDP and 75% of foreign currency earnings. The tourist industry is aimed at the luxury market and caters mainly to visitors from North America. Total tourist arrivals exceeded 2.1 million in 2016, with more than three-quarters from the US."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$2.507 billion (2014 est.) / $2.465 billion (2013 est.) / $2.435 billion (2012 est.)"

central-america-n-caribbean/cs.json

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
       "text": "roughly half of the nation's population resides in urban areas; the capital of San Jose is the largest city and home to approximately one-fifth of the population"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "occasional earthquakes, hurricanes along Atlantic coast; frequent flooding of lowlands at onset of rainy season and landslides; active volcanoes\nvolcanism: Arenal (1,670 m), which erupted in 2010, is the most active volcano in Costa Rica; a 1968 eruption destroyed the town of Tabacon; Irazu (3,432 m), situated just east of San Jose, has the potential to spew ash over the capital city as it did between 1963 and 1965; other historically active volcanoes include Miravalles, Poas, Rincon de la Vieja, and Turrialba"
+      "text": "occasional earthquakes, hurricanes along Atlantic coast; frequent flooding of lowlands at onset of rainy season and landslides; active volcanoes ++ volcanism: Arenal (1,670 m), which erupted in 2010, is the most active volcano in Costa Rica; a 1968 eruption destroyed the town of Tabacon; Irazu (3,432 m), situated just east of San Jose, has the potential to spew ash over the capital city as it did between 1963 and 1965; other historically active volcanoes include Miravalles, Poas, Rincon de la Vieja, and Turrialba"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation and land use change, largely a result of the clearing of land for cattle ranching and agriculture; soil erosion; coastal marine pollution; fisheries protection; solid waste management; air pollution"
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 71.8%, Evangelical and Pentecostal 12.3%, other Protestant 2.6%, Jehovah's Witness 0.5%, other 2.4%, none 10.4% (2016 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Costa Rica's political stability, high standard of living, and well-developed social benefits system set it apart from its Central American neighbors. Through the government's sustained social spending - almost 20% of GDP annually - Costa Rica has made tremendous progress toward achieving its goal of providing universal access to education, healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and electricity. Since the 1970s, expansion of these services has led to a rapid decline in infant mortality, an increase in life expectancy at birth, and a sharp decrease in the birth rate. The average number of children born per women has fallen from about 7 in the 1960s to 3.5 in the early 1980s to below replacement level today. Costa Rica's poverty rate is lower than in most Latin American countries, but it has stalled at around 20% for almost two decades.\nCosta Rica is a popular regional immigration destination because of its job opportunities and social programs. Almost 9% of the population is foreign-born, with Nicaraguans comprising nearly three-quarters of the foreign population. Many Nicaraguans who perform unskilled seasonal labor enter Costa Rica illegally or overstay their visas, which continues to be a source of tension. Less than 3% of Costa Rica's population lives abroad. The overwhelming majority of expatriates have settled in the United States after completing a university degree or in order to work in a highly skilled field."
+      "text": "Costa Rica's political stability, high standard of living, and well-developed social benefits system set it apart from its Central American neighbors. Through the government's sustained social spending - almost 20% of GDP annually - Costa Rica has made tremendous progress toward achieving its goal of providing universal access to education, healthcare, clean water, sanitation, and electricity. Since the 1970s, expansion of these services has led to a rapid decline in infant mortality, an increase in life expectancy at birth, and a sharp decrease in the birth rate. The average number of children born per women has fallen from about 7 in the 1960s to 3.5 in the early 1980s to below replacement level today. Costa Rica's poverty rate is lower than in most Latin American countries, but it has stalled at around 20% for almost two decades. ++ Costa Rica is a popular regional immigration destination because of its job opportunities and social programs. Almost 9% of the population is foreign-born, with Nicaraguans comprising nearly three-quarters of the foreign population. Many Nicaraguans who perform unskilled seasonal labor enter Costa Rica illegally or overstay their visas, which continues to be a source of tension. Less than 3% of Costa Rica's population lives abroad. The overwhelming majority of expatriates have settled in the United States after completing a university degree or in order to work in a highly skilled field."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -258,14 +258,11 @@
       "text": "70.9% (2018)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 100% of population / total: 100% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "0% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 0% of population / total: 0% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -278,14 +275,11 @@
       "text": "1.1 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.4% of population / rural: 95.8% of population / total: 97.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "4.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "2.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.6% of population / rural: 4.2% of population / total: 2.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -466,7 +460,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Accessibility Without Exclusion or PASE [Oscar Andres LOPEZ Arias]Broad Front (Frente Amplio) or PFA [Ana Patricia MORA Castellanos]Christian Democratic Alliance or ADC [Mario REDONDO Poveda]Citizen Action Party or PAC [Marta Eugenia SOLANO Arias]Costa Rican Renewal Party or PRC [Justo OROZCO Alvarez]Libertarian Movement Party or ML [Victor Danilo CUBERO Corrales]National Integration Party or PIN [Walter MUNOZ Cespedes]National Liberation Party or PLN [Jorge Julio PATTONI Saenz]National Restoration Party or PRN [Carlos Luis AVENDANO Calvo]New Generation or PNG [Sergio MENA]Patriotic Alliance [Jorge ARAYA Westover]Social Christian Republican Party or PRS [Dragos DOLANESCU Valenciano]Social Christian Unity Party or PUSC [Pedro MUNOZ Fonseca]"
+      "text": "Accessibility Without Exclusion or PASE [Oscar Andres LOPEZ Arias] ++ Broad Front (Frente Amplio) or PFA [Ana Patricia MORA Castellanos] ++ Christian Democratic Alliance or ADC [Mario REDONDO Poveda] ++ Citizen Action Party or PAC [Marta Eugenia SOLANO Arias] ++ Costa Rican Renewal Party or PRC [Justo OROZCO Alvarez] ++ Libertarian Movement Party or ML [Victor Danilo CUBERO Corrales] ++ National Integration Party or PIN [Walter MUNOZ Cespedes] ++ National Liberation Party or PLN [Jorge Julio PATTONI Saenz] ++ National Restoration Party or PRN [Carlos Luis AVENDANO Calvo] ++ New Generation or PNG [Sergio MENA] ++ Patriotic Alliance [Jorge ARAYA Westover] ++ Social Christian Republican Party or PRS [Dragos DOLANESCU Valenciano] ++ Social Christian Unity Party or PUSC [Pedro MUNOZ Fonseca]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "BCIE, CACM, CD, CELAC, FAO, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAES, LAIA (observer), MIGA, NAM (observer), OAS, OIF (observer), OPANAL, OPCW, Pacific Alliance (observer), PCA, SICA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -531,7 +525,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Since 2010, Costa Rica has enjoyed strong and stable economic growth - 3.8% in 2017. Exports of bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef are the backbone of its commodity exports. Various industrial and processed agricultural products have broadened exports in recent years, as have high value-added goods, including medical devices. Costa Rica's impressive biodiversity also makes it a key destination for ecotourism. Foreign investors remain attracted by the country's political stability and relatively high education levels, as well as the incentives offered in the free-trade zones; Costa Rica has attracted one of the highest levels of foreign direct investment per capita in Latin America. The US-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which became effective for Costa Rica in 2009, helped increase foreign direct investment in key sectors of the economy, including insurance and telecommunication. However, poor infrastructure, high energy costs, a complex bureaucracy, weak investor protection, and uncertainty of contract enforcement impede greater investment. Costa Rica’s economy also faces challenges due to a rising fiscal deficit, rising public debt, and relatively low levels of domestic revenue. Poverty has remained around 20-25% for nearly 20 years, and the government’s strong social safety net has eroded due to increased constraints on its expenditures. Costa Rica’s credit rating was downgraded from stable to negative in 2015 and again in 2017, upping pressure on lending rates - which could hurt small business, on the budget deficit - which could hurt infrastructure development, and on the rate of return on investment - which could soften foreign direct investment (FDI). Unlike the rest of Central America, Costa Rica is not highly dependent on remittances - which represented just 1 % of GDP in 2016, but instead relies on FDI - which accounted for 5.1% of GDP."
+      "text": "Since 2010, Costa Rica has enjoyed strong and stable economic growth - 3.8% in 2017. Exports of bananas, coffee, sugar, and beef are the backbone of its commodity exports. Various industrial and processed agricultural products have broadened exports in recent years, as have high value-added goods, including medical devices. Costa Rica's impressive biodiversity also makes it a key destination for ecotourism. ++ Foreign investors remain attracted by the country's political stability and relatively high education levels, as well as the incentives offered in the free-trade zones; Costa Rica has attracted one of the highest levels of foreign direct investment per capita in Latin America. The US-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which became effective for Costa Rica in 2009, helped increase foreign direct investment in key sectors of the economy, including insurance and telecommunication. However, poor infrastructure, high energy costs, a complex bureaucracy, weak investor protection, and uncertainty of contract enforcement impede greater investment. ++ Costa Rica's economy also faces challenges due to a rising fiscal deficit, rising public debt, and relatively low levels of domestic revenue. Poverty has remained around 20-25% for nearly 20 years, and the government's strong social safety net has eroded due to increased constraints on its expenditures. Costa Rica's credit rating was downgraded from stable to negative in 2015 and again in 2017, upping pressure on lending rates - which could hurt small business, on the budget deficit - which could hurt infrastructure development, and on the rate of return on investment - which could soften foreign direct investment (FDI). Unlike the rest of Central America, Costa Rica is not highly dependent on remittances - which represented just 1 % of GDP in 2016, but instead relies on FDI - which accounted for 5.1% of GDP."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$83.94 billion (2017 est.) / $81.27 billion (2016 est.) / $77.96 billion (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/cu.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The native Amerindian population of Cuba began to decline after the European discovery of the island by Christopher COLUMBUS in 1492 and following its development as a Spanish colony during the next several centuries. Large numbers of African slaves were imported to work the coffee and sugar plantations, and Havana became the launching point for the annual treasure fleets bound for Spain from Mexico and Peru. Spanish rule eventually provoked an independence movement and occasional rebellions were harshly suppressed. US intervention during the Spanish-American War in 1898 assisted the Cubans in overthrowing Spanish rule. The Treaty of Paris established Cuban independence from Spain in 1898 and, following three-and-a-half years of subsequent US military rule, Cuba became an independent republic in 1902 after which the island experienced a string of governments mostly dominated by the military and corrupt politicians. Fidel CASTRO led a rebel army to victory in 1959; his authoritarian rule held the subsequent regime together for nearly five decades. He stepped down as president in February 2008 in favor of his younger brother Raul CASTRO. Cuba's communist revolution, with Soviet support, was exported throughout Latin America and Africa during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Miguel DIAZ-CANEL Bermudez, hand-picked by Raul CASTRO to succeed him, was approved as president by the National Assembly and took office on 19 April 2018. The country faced a severe economic downturn in 1990 following the withdrawal of former Soviet subsidies worth $4-6 billion annually. Cuba traditionally and consistently portrays the US embargo, in place since 1961, as the source of its difficulties. As a result of efforts begun in December 2014 to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Cuban Government, which were severed in January 1961, the US and Cuba reopened embassies in their respective countries in July 2015. The embargo remains in place, and the relationship between the US and Cuba remains tense.  Illicit migration of Cuban nationals to the US via maritime and overland routes has been a longstanding challenge. On 12 January 2017, the US and Cuba signed a Joint Statement ending the so-called \"wet-foot, dry-foot\" policy – by which Cuban nationals who reached US soil were permitted to stay. Illicit Cuban migration by sea has since dropped significantly, but land border crossings continue. In FY 2018, the US Coast Guard interdicted 312 Cuban nationals at sea. Also in FY 2018, 7,249 Cuban migrants presented themselves at various land border ports of entry throughout the US."
+      "text": "The native Amerindian population of Cuba began to decline after the European discovery of the island by Christopher COLUMBUS in 1492 and following its development as a Spanish colony during the next several centuries. Large numbers of African slaves were imported to work the coffee and sugar plantations, and Havana became the launching point for the annual treasure fleets bound for Spain from Mexico and Peru. Spanish rule eventually provoked an independence movement and occasional rebellions were harshly suppressed. US intervention during the Spanish-American War in 1898 assisted the Cubans in overthrowing Spanish rule. The Treaty of Paris established Cuban independence from Spain in 1898 and, following three-and-a-half years of subsequent US military rule, Cuba became an independent republic in 1902 after which the island experienced a string of governments mostly dominated by the military and corrupt politicians. Fidel CASTRO led a rebel army to victory in 1959; his authoritarian rule held the subsequent regime together for nearly five decades. He stepped down as president in February 2008 in favor of his younger brother Raul CASTRO. Cuba's communist revolution, with Soviet support, was exported throughout Latin America and Africa during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Miguel DIAZ-CANEL Bermudez, hand-picked by Raul CASTRO to succeed him, was approved as president by the National Assembly and took office on 19 April 2018. ++ The country faced a severe economic downturn in 1990 following the withdrawal of former Soviet subsidies worth $4-6 billion annually. Cuba traditionally and consistently portrays the US embargo, in place since 1961, as the source of its difficulties. As a result of efforts begun in December 2014 to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Cuban Government, which were severed in January 1961, the US and Cuba reopened embassies in their respective countries in July 2015. The embargo remains in place, and the relationship between the US and Cuba remains tense.  ++ Illicit migration of Cuban nationals to the US via maritime and overland routes has been a longstanding challenge. On 12 January 2017, the US and Cuba signed a Joint Statement ending the so-called \"wet-foot, dry-foot\" policy – by which Cuban nationals who reached US soil were permitted to stay. Illicit Cuban migration by sea has since dropped significantly, but land border crossings continue. In FY 2018, the US Coast Guard interdicted 312 Cuban nationals at sea. Also in FY 2018, 7,249 Cuban migrants presented themselves at various land border ports of entry throughout the US."
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "73.7% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.2% of population / rural: 94.5% of population / total: 97.4% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "5.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "2.6% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.8% of population / rural: 5.5% of population / total: 2.6% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "5.3 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.9% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 96.1% of population / rural: 94.8% of population / total: 95.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "5.2% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "4.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 3.9% of population / rural: 5.2% of population / total: 4.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -409,7 +403,7 @@
         "text": "several previous; latest drafted 14 July 2018, approved by the National Assembly 22 December 2018, approved by referendum 24 February 2019"
       },
       "amendments": {
-        "text": "proposed by the National Assembly of People’s Power; passage requires approval of at least two-thirds majority of the National Assembly membership; amendments to constitutional articles on the authorities of the National Assembly, Council of State, or any rights and duties in the constitution also require approval in a referendum; constitutional articles on the Cuban political, social, and economic system cannot be amended"
+        "text": "proposed by the National Assembly of People's Power; passage requires approval of at least two-thirds majority of the National Assembly membership; amendments to constitutional articles on the authorities of the National Assembly, Council of State, or any rights and duties in the constitution also require approval in a referendum; constitutional articles on the Cuban political, social, and economic system cannot be amended"
       }
     },
     "Legal system": {
@@ -534,7 +528,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The government continues to balance the need for loosening its socialist economic system against a desire for firm political control. In April 2011, the government held the first Cuban Communist Party Congress in almost 13 years, during which leaders approved a plan for wide-ranging economic changes. Since then, the government has slowly and incrementally implemented limited economic reforms, including allowing Cubans to buy electronic appliances and cell phones, stay in hotels, and buy and sell used cars. The government has cut state sector jobs as part of the reform process, and it has opened up some retail services to \"self-employment,\" leading to the rise of so-called \"cuentapropistas\" or entrepreneurs. More than 500,000 Cuban workers are currently registered as self-employed. The Cuban regime has updated its economic model to include permitting the private ownership and sale of real estate and new vehicles, allowing private farmers to sell agricultural goods directly to hotels, allowing the creation of non-agricultural cooperatives, adopting a new foreign investment law, and launching a \"Special Development Zone\" around the Mariel port. Since 2016, Cuba has attributed slowed economic growth in part to problems with petroleum product deliveries from Venezuela. Since late 2000, Venezuela provided petroleum products to Cuba on preferential terms, supplying at times nearly 100,000 barrels per day. Cuba paid for the oil, in part, with the services of Cuban personnel in Venezuela, including some 30,000 medical professionals."
+      "text": "The government continues to balance the need for loosening its socialist economic system against a desire for firm political control. In April 2011, the government held the first Cuban Communist Party Congress in almost 13 years, during which leaders approved a plan for wide-ranging economic changes. Since then, the government has slowly and incrementally implemented limited economic reforms, including allowing Cubans to buy electronic appliances and cell phones, stay in hotels, and buy and sell used cars. The government has cut state sector jobs as part of the reform process, and it has opened up some retail services to \"self-employment,\" leading to the rise of so-called \"cuentapropistas\" or entrepreneurs. More than 500,000 Cuban workers are currently registered as self-employed. ++ The Cuban regime has updated its economic model to include permitting the private ownership and sale of real estate and new vehicles, allowing private farmers to sell agricultural goods directly to hotels, allowing the creation of non-agricultural cooperatives, adopting a new foreign investment law, and launching a \"Special Development Zone\" around the Mariel port. ++ Since 2016, Cuba has attributed slowed economic growth in part to problems with petroleum product deliveries from Venezuela. Since late 2000, Venezuela provided petroleum products to Cuba on preferential terms, supplying at times nearly 100,000 barrels per day. Cuba paid for the oil, in part, with the services of Cuban personnel in Venezuela, including some 30,000 medical professionals."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$137 billion (2017 est.) / $134.8 billion (2016 est.) / $134.2 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -947,7 +941,7 @@
         "text": "Cuba is a source country for adults and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor; child sex trafficking and child sex tourism occur in Cuba, while some Cubans are forced into prostitution in South America and the Caribbean; allegations have been made that some Cubans have been forced or coerced to work at Cuban medical missions abroad; assessing the scope of trafficking within Cuba is difficult because of the lack of information"
       },
       "tier rating": {
-        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List - Cuba does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; Cuba’s penal code does not criminalize all forms of human trafficking, but the government reported that it is in the process of amending its criminal code to comply with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, to which it acceded in 2013; the government in 2014 prosecuted and convicted 13 sex traffickers and provided services to the victims in those cases but does not have shelters specifically for trafficking victims; the government did not recognize forced labor as a problem and took no action to address it; state media produced newspaper articles and TV and radio programs to raise public awareness about sex trafficking (2015)"
+        "text": "Tier 2 Watch List - Cuba does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; Cuba's penal code does not criminalize all forms of human trafficking, but the government reported that it is in the process of amending its criminal code to comply with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, to which it acceded in 2013; the government in 2014 prosecuted and convicted 13 sex traffickers and provided services to the victims in those cases but does not have shelters specifically for trafficking victims; the government did not recognize forced labor as a problem and took no action to address it; state media produced newspaper articles and TV and radio programs to raise public awareness about sex trafficking (2015)"
       }
     },
     "Illicit drugs": {

central-america-n-caribbean/do.json

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
       "text": "population is mosly clustered along the coast, with roughly a third living in the parish of St. George, in or around the capital of Roseau; the volcanic interior is sparsely populated"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "flash floods are a constant threat; destructive hurricanes can be expected during the late summer months\nvolcanism: Dominica was the last island to be formed in the Caribbean some 26 million years ago, it lies in the middle of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends from the island of Saba in the north to Grenada in the south; of the 16 volcanoes that make up this arc, five are located on Dominica, more than any other island in the Caribbean: Morne aux Diables (861 m), Morne Diablotins (1,430 m), Morne Trois Pitons (1,387 m), Watt Mountain (1,224 m), which last erupted in 1997, and Morne Plat Pays (940 m); the two best known volcanic features on Dominica, the Valley of Desolation and the Boiling Lake thermal areas, lie on the flanks of Watt Mountain and both are popular tourist destinations"
+      "text": "flash floods are a constant threat; destructive hurricanes can be expected during the late summer months ++ volcanism: Dominica was the last island to be formed in the Caribbean some 26 million years ago, it lies in the middle of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends from the island of Saba in the north to Grenada in the south; of the 16 volcanoes that make up this arc, five are located on Dominica, more than any other island in the Caribbean: Morne aux Diables (861 m), Morne Diablotins (1,430 m), Morne Trois Pitons (1,387 m), Watt Mountain (1,224 m), which last erupted in 1997, and Morne Plat Pays (940 m); the two best known volcanic features on Dominica, the Valley of Desolation and the Boiling Lake thermal areas, lie on the flanks of Watt Mountain and both are popular tourist destinations"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "water shortages a continuing concern; pollution from agrochemicals and from untreated sewage; forests endangered by the expansion of farming; soil erosion; pollution of the coastal zone by agricultural and industrial chemicals, and untreated sewage"
@@ -224,8 +224,11 @@
       "text": "2.02 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 4.3% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 95.7% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 4.3% of population"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -365,7 +368,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Dominica Freedom Party or DFP [Judith PESTAINA]Dominica Labor Party or DLP [Roosevelt SKERRIT]Dominica United Workers Party or UWP [Lennox LINTON]"
+      "text": "Dominica Freedom Party or DFP [Judith PESTAINA] ++ Dominica Labor Party or DLP [Roosevelt SKERRIT] ++ Dominica United Workers Party or UWP [Lennox LINTON]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, C, Caricom, CD, CDB, CELAC, Commonwealth of Nations, ECCU, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, ISO (correspondent), ITU, ITUC (NGOs), MIGA, NAM, OAS, OECS, OIF, OPANAL, OPCW, Petrocaribe, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -410,7 +413,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The Dominican economy was dependent on agriculture - primarily bananas - in years past, but increasingly has been driven by tourism, as the government seeks to promote Dominica as an \"ecotourism\" destination. However, Hurricane Maria, which passed through the island in September 2017, destroyed much of the country’s agricultural sector and caused damage to all of the country’s transportation and physical infrastructure. Before Hurricane Maria, the government had attempted to foster an offshore financial industry and planned to sign agreements with the private sector to develop geothermal energy resources. At a time when government finances are fragile, the government’s focus has been to get the country back in shape to service cruise ships. The economy contracted in 2015 and recovered to positive growth in 2016 due to a recovery of agriculture and tourism. Dominica suffers from high debt levels, which increased from 67% of GDP in 2010 to 77% in 2016. Dominica is one of five countries in the East Caribbean that have citizenship by investment programs whereby foreigners can obtain passports for a fee and revenue from this contribute to government budgets."
+      "text": "The Dominican economy was dependent on agriculture - primarily bananas - in years past, but increasingly has been driven by tourism, as the government seeks to promote Dominica as an \"ecotourism\" destination. However, Hurricane Maria, which passed through the island in September 2017, destroyed much of the country's agricultural sector and caused damage to all of the country's transportation and physical infrastructure. Before Hurricane Maria, the government had attempted to foster an offshore financial industry and planned to sign agreements with the private sector to develop geothermal energy resources. At a time when government finances are fragile, the government's focus has been to get the country back in shape to service cruise ships. The economy contracted in 2015 and recovered to positive growth in 2016 due to a recovery of agriculture and tourism. Dominica suffers from high debt levels, which increased from 67% of GDP in 2010 to 77% in 2016. Dominica is one of five countries in the East Caribbean that have citizenship by investment programs whereby foreigners can obtain passports for a fee and revenue from this contribute to government budgets."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$783 million (2017 est.) / $821.5 million (2016 est.) / $800.4 million (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/dr.json

@@ -267,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "69.5% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.7% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.3% of population / rural: 92% of population / total: 96.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "3.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.7% of population / rural: 8% of population / total: 3.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -287,14 +284,11 @@
       "text": "1.6 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 13.8% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 96.3% of population / rural: 89.5% of population / total: 95% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "3.7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "5% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 13.8% of population / rural: 3.7% of population / total: 5% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -457,13 +451,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral National Congress or Congreso Nacional consists of:Senate or Senado (32 seats; note - electoral system changes by the Central Election Commission are being challenged by the ruling party and opposition) House of Representatives or Camara de Diputados (190 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral National Congress or Congreso Nacional consists of: Senate or Senado (32 seats; note - electoral system changes by the Central Election Commission are being challenged by the ruling party and opposition) ++ House of Representatives or Camara de Diputados (190 seats; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote; members serve 4-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 15 May 2016 (rescheduled from 17 May to 5 July 2020 due to COVID-19 pandemic) House of Representatives - last held on 15 May 2016 (rescheduled from 17 May to 5 July 2020 due to COVID-19 pandemic)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 15 May 2016 (rescheduled from 17 May to 5 July 2020 due to COVID-19 pandemic) ++ House of Representatives - last held on 15 May 2016 (rescheduled from 17 May to 5 July 2020 due to COVID-19 pandemic)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PLD 26, PRM 2, BIS 1, PLRD 1, PRD 1, PRSC 1; composition as of 2018 - men 29, women 3, percent of women 9.4% House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PLD 106, PRM 42, PRSC 18, PRD 16, PLRD 3, other 5; composition as of 2018 - men 139, women 51, percent of women 26.8%; note - total National Congress percent of women 24.3%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PLD 26, PRM 2, BIS 1, PLRD 1, PRD 1, PRSC 1; composition as of 2018 - men 29, women 3, percent of women 9.4% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - PLD 106, PRM 42, PRSC 18, PRD 16, PLRD 3, other 5; composition as of 2018 - men 139, women 51, percent of women 26.8%; note - total National Congress percent of women 24.3%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -478,7 +472,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Dominican Liberation Party or PLD [Leonel FERNANDEZ Reyna]Dominican Revolutionary Party or PRD [Miguel VARGAS Maldonado]Institutional Social Democratic Bloc or BISLiberal Reformist Party or PRL (formerly the Liberal Party of the Dominican Republic or PLRD)Modern Revolutionary Party or PRM [Jose Ignacio PALIZA]National Progressive Front or FNP [Vinicio CASTILLO, Pelegrin CASTILLO]Social Christian Reformist Party or PRSC [Federico ANTUN]"
+      "text": "Dominican Liberation Party or PLD [Leonel FERNANDEZ Reyna] ++ Dominican Revolutionary Party or PRD [Miguel VARGAS Maldonado] ++ Institutional Social Democratic Bloc or BIS ++ Liberal Reformist Party or PRL (formerly the Liberal Party of the Dominican Republic or PLRD) ++ Modern Revolutionary Party or PRM [Jose Ignacio PALIZA] ++ National Progressive Front or FNP [Vinicio CASTILLO, Pelegrin CASTILLO] ++ Social Christian Reformist Party or PRSC [Federico ANTUN]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, BCIE, Caricom (observer), CD, CELAC, FAO, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAES, LAIA, MIGA, MINUSMA, NAM, OAS, OIF (observer), OPANAL, OPCW, Pacific Alliance (observer), PCA, Petrocaribe, SICA (associated member), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -540,7 +534,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The Dominican Republic was for most of its history primarily an exporter of sugar, coffee, and tobacco, but over the last three decades the economy has become more diversified as the service sector has overtaken agriculture as the economy's largest employer, due to growth in construction, tourism, and free trade zones. The mining sector has also played a greater role in the export market since late 2012 with the commencement of the extraction phase of the Pueblo Viejo Gold and Silver mine, one of the largest gold mines in the world. For the last 20 years, the Dominican Republic has been one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America. The economy rebounded from the global recession in 2010-16, and the fiscal situation is improving. A tax reform package passed in November 2012, a reduction in government spending, and lower energy costs helped to narrow the central government budget deficit from 6.6% of GDP in 2012 to 2.6% in 2016, and public debt is declining. Marked income inequality, high unemployment, and underemployment remain important long-term challenges; the poorest half of the population receives less than one-fifth of GDP, while the richest 10% enjoys nearly 40% of GDP. The economy is highly dependent upon the US, the destination for approximately half of exports and the source of 40% of imports. Remittances from the US amount to about 7% of GDP, equivalent to about a third of exports and two-thirds of tourism receipts. The Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement came into force in March 2007, boosting investment and manufacturing exports."
+      "text": "The Dominican Republic was for most of its history primarily an exporter of sugar, coffee, and tobacco, but over the last three decades the economy has become more diversified as the service sector has overtaken agriculture as the economy's largest employer, due to growth in construction, tourism, and free trade zones. The mining sector has also played a greater role in the export market since late 2012 with the commencement of the extraction phase of the Pueblo Viejo Gold and Silver mine, one of the largest gold mines in the world. ++ For the last 20 years, the Dominican Republic has been one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America. The economy rebounded from the global recession in 2010-16, and the fiscal situation is improving. A tax reform package passed in November 2012, a reduction in government spending, and lower energy costs helped to narrow the central government budget deficit from 6.6% of GDP in 2012 to 2.6% in 2016, and public debt is declining. Marked income inequality, high unemployment, and underemployment remain important long-term challenges; the poorest half of the population receives less than one-fifth of GDP, while the richest 10% enjoys nearly 40% of GDP. ++ The economy is highly dependent upon the US, the destination for approximately half of exports and the source of 40% of imports. Remittances from the US amount to about 7% of GDP, equivalent to about a third of exports and two-thirds of tourism receipts. The Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement came into force in March 2007, boosting investment and manufacturing exports."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$173 billion (2017 est.) / $165.4 billion (2016 est.) / $155.2 billion (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/es.json

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
       "text": "athough it is the smallest country in land area in Central America, El Salvador has a population that is 18 times larger than Belize; at least 20% of the population lives abroad; high population density country-wide, with particular concentration around the capital of San Salvador"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "known as the Land of Volcanoes; frequent and sometimes destructive earthquakes and volcanic activity; extremely susceptible to hurricanes\nvolcanism: significant volcanic activity; San Salvador (1,893 m), which last erupted in 1917, has the potential to cause major harm to the country's capital, which lies just below the volcano's slopes; San Miguel (2,130 m), which last erupted in 2002, is one of the most active volcanoes in the country; other historically active volcanoes include Conchaguita, Ilopango, Izalco, and Santa Ana"
+      "text": "known as the Land of Volcanoes; frequent and sometimes destructive earthquakes and volcanic activity; extremely susceptible to hurricanes ++ volcanism: significant volcanic activity; San Salvador (1,893 m), which last erupted in 1917, has the potential to cause major harm to the country's capital, which lies just below the volcano's slopes; San Miguel (2,130 m), which last erupted in 2002, is one of the most active volcanoes in the country; other historically active volcanoes include Conchaguita, Ilopango, Izalco, and Santa Ana"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation; soil erosion; water pollution; contamination of soils from disposal of toxic wastes"
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 50%, Protestant 36%, other 2%, none 12% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "El Salvador is the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America. It is well into its demographic transition, experiencing slower population growth, a decline in its number of youths, and the gradual aging of its population. The increased use of family planning has substantially lowered El Salvador's fertility rate, from approximately 6 children per woman in the 1970s to replacement level today. A 2008 national family planning survey showed that female sterilization remained the most common contraception method in El Salvador - its sterilization rate is among the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean - but that the use of injectable contraceptives is growing. Fertility differences between rich and poor and urban and rural women are narrowing.\nSalvadorans fled during the 1979 to 1992 civil war mainly to the United States but also to Canada and to neighboring Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Emigration to the United States increased again in the 1990s and 2000s as a result of deteriorating economic conditions, natural disasters (Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and earthquakes in 2001), and family reunification. At least 20% of El Salvador's population lives abroad. The remittances they send home account for close to 20% of GDP, are the second largest source of external income after exports, and have helped reduce poverty."
+      "text": "El Salvador is the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America. It is well into its demographic transition, experiencing slower population growth, a decline in its number of youths, and the gradual aging of its population. The increased use of family planning has substantially lowered El Salvador's fertility rate, from approximately 6 children per woman in the 1970s to replacement level today. A 2008 national family planning survey showed that female sterilization remained the most common contraception method in El Salvador - its sterilization rate is among the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean - but that the use of injectable contraceptives is growing. Fertility differences between rich and poor and urban and rural women are narrowing. ++ Salvadorans fled during the 1979 to 1992 civil war mainly to the United States but also to Canada and to neighboring Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Emigration to the United States increased again in the 1990s and 2000s as a result of deteriorating economic conditions, natural disasters (Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and earthquakes in 2001), and family reunification. At least 20% of El Salvador's population lives abroad. The remittances they send home account for close to 20% of GDP, are the second largest source of external income after exports, and have helped reduce poverty."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -261,14 +261,11 @@
       "text": "71.9% (2014)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 92.2% of population / total: 97.4% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "7.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "2.6% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 7.8% of population / total: 2.6% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -281,14 +278,11 @@
       "text": "1.2 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0.2% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99.8% of population / rural: 94.7% of population / total: 98.3% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "5.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1.7% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0.2% of population / rural: 5.3% of population / total: 1.7% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -472,7 +466,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Christian Democratic Party or PDC [Rodolfo Antonio PARKER Soto]Democratic Change (Cambio Democratico) or CD [Douglas AVILES] (formerly United Democratic Center or CDU)Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front or FMLN [Medardo GONZALEZ]Great Alliance for National Unity or GANA [Jose Andres ROVIRA Caneles]National Coalition Party or PCN [Manuel RODRIGUEZ]Nationalist Republican Alliance or ARENA [Mauricio INTERIANO]Nuevas Ideas [Federico Gerardo ANLIKER]"
+      "text": "Christian Democratic Party or PDC [Rodolfo Antonio PARKER Soto] ++ Democratic Change (Cambio Democratico) or CD [Douglas AVILES] (formerly United Democratic Center or CDU) ++ Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front or FMLN [Medardo GONZALEZ] ++ Great Alliance for National Unity or GANA [Jose Andres ROVIRA Caneles] ++ National Coalition Party or PCN [Manuel RODRIGUEZ] ++ Nationalist Republican Alliance or ARENA [Mauricio INTERIANO] ++ Nuevas Ideas [Federico Gerardo ANLIKER]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "BCIE, CACM, CD, CELAC, FAO, G-11, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (national committees), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO (correspondent), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAES, LAIA (observer), MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSTAH, NAM (observer), OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, Pacific Alliance (observer), PCA, Petrocaribe, SICA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNIFIL, Union Latina, UNISFA, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -537,7 +531,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The smallest country in Central America geographically, El Salvador has the fourth largest economy in the region. With the global recession, real GDP contracted in 2009 and economic growth has since remained low, averaging less than 2% from 2010 to 2014, but recovered somewhat in 2015-17 with an average annual growth rate of 2.4%. Remittances accounted for approximately 18% of GDP in 2017 and were received by about a third of all households. In 2006, El Salvador was the first country to ratify the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, which has bolstered the export of processed foods, sugar, and ethanol, and supported investment in the apparel sector amid increased Asian competition. In September 2015, El Salvador kicked off a five-year $277 million second compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation - a US Government agency aimed at stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty - to improve El Salvador's competitiveness and productivity in international markets. The Salvadoran Government maintained fiscal discipline during reconstruction and rebuilding following earthquakes in 2001 and hurricanes in 1998 and 2005, but El Salvador's public debt, estimated at 59.3% of GDP in 2017, has been growing over the last several years."
+      "text": "The smallest country in Central America geographically, El Salvador has the fourth largest economy in the region. With the global recession, real GDP contracted in 2009 and economic growth has since remained low, averaging less than 2% from 2010 to 2014, but recovered somewhat in 2015-17 with an average annual growth rate of 2.4%. Remittances accounted for approximately 18% of GDP in 2017 and were received by about a third of all households. ++ In 2006, El Salvador was the first country to ratify the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, which has bolstered the export of processed foods, sugar, and ethanol, and supported investment in the apparel sector amid increased Asian competition. In September 2015, El Salvador kicked off a five-year $277 million second compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation - a US Government agency aimed at stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty - to improve El Salvador's competitiveness and productivity in international markets. ++ The Salvadoran Government maintained fiscal discipline during reconstruction and rebuilding following earthquakes in 2001 and hurricanes in 1998 and 2005, but El Salvador's public debt, estimated at 59.3% of GDP in 2017, has been growing over the last several years."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$51.17 billion (2017 est.) / $50.01 billion (2016 est.) / $48.75 billion (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/gj.json

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
       "text": "approximately one-third of the population is found in the capital of St. George's; the island's population is concentrated along the coast"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "lies on edge of hurricane belt; hurricane season lasts from June to November\nvolcanism: Mount Saint Catherine (840 m) lies on the island of Grenada; Kick 'em Jenny, an active submarine volcano (seamount) on the Caribbean Sea floor, lies about 8 km north of the island of Grenada; these two volcanoes are at the southern end of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends up to the Netherlands dependency of Saba in the north"
+      "text": "lies on edge of hurricane belt; hurricane season lasts from June to November ++ volcanism: Mount Saint Catherine (840 m) lies on the island of Grenada; Kick 'em Jenny, an active submarine volcano (seamount) on the Caribbean Sea floor, lies about 8 km north of the island of Grenada; these two volcanoes are at the southern end of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends up to the Netherlands dependency of Saba in the north"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation causing habitat destruction and species loss; coastal erosion and contamination; pollution and sedimentation; inadequate solid waste management"
@@ -238,8 +238,11 @@
       "text": "1.96 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 3.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 96.8% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 3.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -252,8 +255,11 @@
       "text": "3.6 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "total": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 6.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "total: 93.7% of population"
+      },
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "total: 6.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -382,13 +388,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (13 seats; members appointed by the governor general - 10 on the advice of the prime minister and 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition party; members serve 5-year terms) House of Representatives (15 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (13 seats; members appointed by the governor general - 10 on the advice of the prime minister and 3 on the advice of the leader of the opposition party; members serve 5-year terms) ++ House of Representatives (15 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last appointments on 27 April 2018 (next no later than2023) House of Representatives - last held on 13 March 2018 (next no later than 2023)"
+        "text": "Senate - last appointments on 27 April 2018 (next no later than2023) ++ House of Representatives - last held on 13 March 2018 (next no later than 2023)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 11, women 2 percent of women 15.4% House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NNP 58.9%, NDC 40.5%; other 0.6% seats by party - NNP 15; composition - men 8, women 7, percent of women 46.7%; note - total Parliament percent of women 32.1%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 11, women 2 percent of women 15.4% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - NNP 58.9%, NDC 40.5%; other 0.6% seats by party - NNP 15; composition - men 8, women 7, percent of women 46.7%; note - total Parliament percent of women 32.1%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -403,7 +409,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "National Democratic Congress or NDC [Nazim BURKE]New National Party or NNP [Keith MITCHELL]"
+      "text": "National Democratic Congress or NDC [Nazim BURKE] ++ New National Party or NNP [Keith MITCHELL]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, C, Caricom, CDB, CELAC, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, ITU, ITUC, LAES, MIGA, NAM, OAS, OECS, OPANAL, OPCW, Petrocaribe, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WTO"
@@ -462,7 +468,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Grenada relies on tourism and revenue generated by St. George’s University - a private university offering degrees in medicine, veterinary medicine, public health, the health sciences, nursing, arts and sciences, and business - as its main source of foreign exchange. In the past two years the country expanded its sources of revenue, including from selling passports under its citizenship by investment program. These projects produced a resurgence in the construction and manufacturing sectors of the economy. In 2017, Grenada experienced its fifth consecutive year of growth and the government successfully marked the completion of its five-year structural adjustment program that included among other things austerity measures, increased tax revenue and debt restructuring. Public debt-to-GDP was reduced from 100% of GDP in 2013 to 71.8% in 2017."
+      "text": "Grenada relies on tourism and revenue generated by St. George's University - a private university offering degrees in medicine, veterinary medicine, public health, the health sciences, nursing, arts and sciences, and business - as its main source of foreign exchange. In the past two years the country expanded its sources of revenue, including from selling passports under its citizenship by investment program. These projects produced a resurgence in the construction and manufacturing sectors of the economy. ++ In 2017, Grenada experienced its fifth consecutive year of growth and the government successfully marked the completion of its five-year structural adjustment program that included among other things austerity measures, increased tax revenue and debt restructuring. Public debt-to-GDP was reduced from 100% of GDP in 2013 to 71.8% in 2017."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$1.634 billion (2017 est.) / $1.555 billion (2016 est.) / $1.5 billion (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/gt.json

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
       "text": "the vast majority of the populace resides in the southern half of the country, particularly in the mountainous regions; more than half of the population lives in rural areas"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "numerous volcanoes in mountains, with occasional violent earthquakes; Caribbean coast extremely susceptible to hurricanes and other tropical storms\nvolcanism: significant volcanic activity in the Sierra Madre range; Santa Maria (3,772 m) has been deemed a Decade Volcano by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to its explosive history and close proximity to human populations; Pacaya (2,552 m), which erupted in May 2010 causing an ashfall on Guatemala City and prompting evacuations, is one of the country's most active volcanoes with frequent eruptions since 1965; other historically active volcanoes include Acatenango, Almolonga, Atitlan, Fuego, and Tacana; see note 2 under \"Geography - note\""
+      "text": "numerous volcanoes in mountains, with occasional violent earthquakes; Caribbean coast extremely susceptible to hurricanes and other tropical storms ++ volcanism: significant volcanic activity in the Sierra Madre range; Santa Maria (3,772 m) has been deemed a Decade Volcano by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to its explosive history and close proximity to human populations; Pacaya (2,552 m), which erupted in May 2010 causing an ashfall on Guatemala City and prompting evacuations, is one of the country's most active volcanoes with frequent eruptions since 1965; other historically active volcanoes include Acatenango, Almolonga, Atitlan, Fuego, and Tacana; see note 2 under \"Geography - note\""
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "deforestation in the Peten rainforest; soil erosion; water pollution"
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
     },
     "Geography - note": {
       "note": {
-        "text": "note 1: despite having both eastern and western coastlines (Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean respectively), there are no natural harbors on the west coast note 2: Guatemala is one of the countries along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire"
+        "text": "note 1: despite having both eastern and western coastlines (Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean respectively), there are no natural harbors on the west coast ++ note 2: Guatemala is one of the countries along the Ring of Fire, a belt of active volcanoes and earthquake epicenters bordering the Pacific Ocean; up to 90% of the world's earthquakes and some 75% of the world's volcanoes occur within the Ring of Fire"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic, Protestant, indigenous Maya"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Guatemala is a predominantly poor country that struggles in several areas of health and development, including infant, child, and maternal mortality, malnutrition, literacy, and contraceptive awareness and use. The country's large indigenous population is disproportionately affected. Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America and has the highest fertility rate in Latin America. It also has the highest population growth rate in Latin America, which is likely to continue because of its large reproductive-age population and high birth rate. Almost half of Guatemala's population is under age 19, making it the youngest population in Latin America. Guatemala's total fertility rate has slowly declined during the last few decades due in part to limited government-funded health programs. However, the birth rate is still more close to three children per woman and is markedly higher among its rural and indigenous populations.\nGuatemalans have a history of emigrating legally and illegally to Mexico, the United States, and Canada because of a lack of economic opportunity, political instability, and natural disasters. Emigration, primarily to the United States, escalated during the 1960 to 1996 civil war and accelerated after a peace agreement was signed. Thousands of Guatemalans who fled to Mexico returned after the war, but labor migration to southern Mexico continues."
+      "text": "Guatemala is a predominantly poor country that struggles in several areas of health and development, including infant, child, and maternal mortality, malnutrition, literacy, and contraceptive awareness and use. The country's large indigenous population is disproportionately affected. Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America and has the highest fertility rate in Latin America. It also has the highest population growth rate in Latin America, which is likely to continue because of its large reproductive-age population and high birth rate. Almost half of Guatemala's population is under age 19, making it the youngest population in Latin America. Guatemala's total fertility rate has slowly declined during the last few decades due in part to limited government-funded health programs. However, the birth rate is still more close to three children per woman and is markedly higher among its rural and indigenous populations. ++ Guatemalans have a history of emigrating legally and illegally to Mexico, the United States, and Canada because of a lack of economic opportunity, political instability, and natural disasters. Emigration, primarily to the United States, escalated during the 1960 to 1996 civil war and accelerated after a peace agreement was signed. Thousands of Guatemalans who fled to Mexico returned after the war, but labor migration to southern Mexico continues."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -266,14 +266,11 @@
       "text": "60.6% (2014/15)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 2.1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 97.9% of population / rural: 92.2% of population / total: 95.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "7.8% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "4.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 2.1% of population / rural: 7.8% of population / total: 4.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -286,14 +283,11 @@
       "text": "0.4 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 8.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 91.4% of population / rural: 61.7% of population / total: 76.7% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "38.3% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "23.3% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 8.6% of population / rural: 38.3% of population / total: 23.3% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -480,7 +474,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Bienestar Nacional or BIEN [Alfonso PORTILLO and Evelyn MORATAYA]Citizen Alliance or ACCitizen Prosperity or PC [Dami Anita Elizabeth KRISTENSON Sales]Commitment, Renewal, and Order or CREO [Roberto GONZALEZ Diaz-Duran]Convergence [Sandra MORAN]Encounter for Guatemala or EG [Nineth MONTENEGRO Cottom]Everyone Together for Guatemala or TODOS [Felipe ALEJOS]Force or FUERZA [Mauricio RADFORD]Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity or URNG-MAIZ or URNG [Gregorio CHAY Laynez]Humanist Party of Guatemala or PHG [Edmond MULET]Movement for the Liberation of Peoples or MLP [Thelma CABRERA]Movimiento Semilla or SEMILLA [Thelma ALDANA]National Advancement Party or PAN [Harald JOHANNESSEN]National Convergence Front or FCN-NACION or FCN [Jimmy MORALES]National Unity for Hope or UNE [Sandra TORRES]Nationalist Change Union or UCN [Mario ESTRADA]Patriotic Party or PPPODEMOS [Jose Raul VIRGIL Arias]Political Movement Winaq or Winaq [Sonia GUTIERREZ Raguay]Reform Movement or MRRenewed Democratic Liberty or LIDER (dissolved mid-February 2016)TODOS [Felipe ALEJOS]Unionista Party or PU [Alvaro ARZU Escobar]Value or VALOR [Zury RIOS]Vamos por una Guatemala Diferente or VAMOS [Alejandro GIAMMATTEI]Victory or VICTORIA [Amilcar RIVERA]Vision with Values or VIVA [Armando Damian CASTILLO Alvarado]",
+      "text": "Bienestar Nacional or BIEN [Alfonso PORTILLO and Evelyn MORATAYA] ++ Citizen Alliance or AC ++ Citizen Prosperity or PC [Dami Anita Elizabeth KRISTENSON Sales] ++ Commitment, Renewal, and Order or CREO [Roberto GONZALEZ Diaz-Duran] ++ Convergence [Sandra MORAN] ++ Encounter for Guatemala or EG [Nineth MONTENEGRO Cottom] ++ Everyone Together for Guatemala or TODOS [Felipe ALEJOS] ++ Force or FUERZA [Mauricio RADFORD] ++ Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity or URNG-MAIZ or URNG [Gregorio CHAY Laynez] ++ Humanist Party of Guatemala or PHG [Edmond MULET] ++ Movement for the Liberation of Peoples or MLP [Thelma CABRERA] ++ Movimiento Semilla or SEMILLA [Thelma ALDANA] ++ National Advancement Party or PAN [Harald JOHANNESSEN] ++ National Convergence Front or FCN-NACION or FCN [Jimmy MORALES] ++ National Unity for Hope or UNE [Sandra TORRES] ++ Nationalist Change Union or UCN [Mario ESTRADA] ++ Patriotic Party or PP ++ PODEMOS [Jose Raul VIRGIL Arias] ++ Political Movement Winaq or Winaq [Sonia GUTIERREZ Raguay] ++ Reform Movement or MR ++ Renewed Democratic Liberty or LIDER (dissolved mid-February 2016) ++ TODOS [Felipe ALEJOS] ++ Unionista Party or PU [Alvaro ARZU Escobar] ++ Value or VALOR [Zury RIOS] ++ Vamos por una Guatemala Diferente or VAMOS [Alejandro GIAMMATTEI] ++ Victory or VICTORIA [Amilcar RIVERA] ++ Vision with Values or VIVA [Armando Damian CASTILLO Alvarado]",
       "note": {
         "text": "note: parties represented in the last election, but have since dissolved - FCN (2017), LIDER (2016), and PP (2017)"
       }
@@ -548,7 +542,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America with a GDP per capita roughly half the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. The agricultural sector accounts for 13.5% of GDP and 31% of the labor force; key agricultural exports include sugar, coffee, bananas, and vegetables. Guatemala is the top remittance recipient in Central America as a result of Guatemala's large expatriate community in the US. These inflows are a primary source of foreign income, equivalent to two-thirds of the country's exports and about a tenth of its GDP. The 1996 peace accords, which ended 36 years of civil war, removed a major obstacle to foreign investment, and Guatemala has since pursued important reforms and macroeconomic stabilization. The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) entered into force in July 2006, spurring increased investment and diversification of exports, with the largest increases in ethanol and non-traditional agricultural exports. While CAFTA-DR has helped improve the investment climate, concerns over security, the lack of skilled workers, and poor infrastructure continue to hamper foreign direct investment. The distribution of income remains highly unequal with the richest 20% of the population accounting for more than 51% of Guatemala's overall consumption. More than half of the population is below the national poverty line, and 23% of the population lives in extreme poverty. Poverty among indigenous groups, which make up more than 40% of the population, averages 79%, with 40% of the indigenous population living in extreme poverty. Nearly one-half of Guatemala's children under age five are chronically malnourished, one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world."
+      "text": "Guatemala is the most populous country in Central America with a GDP per capita roughly half the average for Latin America and the Caribbean. The agricultural sector accounts for 13.5% of GDP and 31% of the labor force; key agricultural exports include sugar, coffee, bananas, and vegetables. Guatemala is the top remittance recipient in Central America as a result of Guatemala's large expatriate community in the US. These inflows are a primary source of foreign income, equivalent to two-thirds of the country's exports and about a tenth of its GDP. ++ The 1996 peace accords, which ended 36 years of civil war, removed a major obstacle to foreign investment, and Guatemala has since pursued important reforms and macroeconomic stabilization. The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) entered into force in July 2006, spurring increased investment and diversification of exports, with the largest increases in ethanol and non-traditional agricultural exports. While CAFTA-DR has helped improve the investment climate, concerns over security, the lack of skilled workers, and poor infrastructure continue to hamper foreign direct investment. ++ The distribution of income remains highly unequal with the richest 20% of the population accounting for more than 51% of Guatemala's overall consumption. More than half of the population is below the national poverty line, and 23% of the population lives in extreme poverty. Poverty among indigenous groups, which make up more than 40% of the population, averages 79%, with 40% of the indigenous population living in extreme poverty. Nearly one-half of Guatemala's children under age five are chronically malnourished, one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$138.1 billion (2017 est.) / $134.4 billion (2016 est.) / $130.4 billion (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/ha.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "Introduction": {
     "Background": {
-      "text": "The native Taino - who inhabited the island of Hispaniola when Christopher COLUMBUS first landed on it in 1492 - were virtually wiped out by Spanish settlers within 25 years. In the early 17th century, the French established a presence on Hispaniola. In 1697, Spain ceded to the French the western third of the island, which later became Haiti. The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of the wealthiest in the Caribbean but relied heavily on the forced labor of enslaved Africans and environmentally degrading practices. In the late 18th century, Toussaint L'OUVERTURE led a revolution of Haiti's nearly half a million slaves that ended France's rule on the island. After a prolonged struggle, and under the leadership of Jean-Jacques DESSALINES, Haiti became the first country in the world led by former slaves after declaring its independence in 1804, but it was forced to pay an indemnity to France for more than a century and was shunned by other countries for nearly 40 years. After the US occupied Haiti from 1915-1934, Francois \"Papa Doc\" DUVALIER and then his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” DUVALIER led repressive and corrupt regimes that ruled Haiti from 1957-1971 and 1971-1986, respectively. A massive magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010 with an epicenter about 25 km (15 mi) west of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Estimates are that over 300,000 people were killed and some 1.5 million left homeless. The earthquake was assessed as the worst in this region over the last 200 years. On 4 October 2016, Hurricane Matthew made landfall in Haiti, resulting in over 500 deaths and causing extensive damage to crops, houses, livestock, and infrastructure. Currently the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti continues to experience bouts of political instability.    "
+      "text": "The native Taino - who inhabited the island of Hispaniola when Christopher COLUMBUS first landed on it in 1492 - were virtually wiped out by Spanish settlers within 25 years. In the early 17th century, the French established a presence on Hispaniola. In 1697, Spain ceded to the French the western third of the island, which later became Haiti. The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of the wealthiest in the Caribbean but relied heavily on the forced labor of enslaved Africans and environmentally degrading practices. In the late 18th century, Toussaint L'OUVERTURE led a revolution of Haiti's nearly half a million slaves that ended France's rule on the island. After a prolonged struggle, and under the leadership of Jean-Jacques DESSALINES, Haiti became the first country in the world led by former slaves after declaring its independence in 1804, but it was forced to pay an indemnity to France for more than a century and was shunned by other countries for nearly 40 years. After the US occupied Haiti from 1915-1934, Francois \"Papa Doc\" DUVALIER and then his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” DUVALIER led repressive and corrupt regimes that ruled Haiti from 1957-1971 and 1971-1986, respectively. A massive magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010 with an epicenter about 25 km (15 mi) west of the capital, Port-au-Prince. Estimates are that over 300,000 people were killed and some 1.5 million left homeless. The earthquake was assessed as the worst in this region over the last 200 years. On 4 October 2016, Hurricane Matthew made landfall in Haiti, resulting in over 500 deaths and causing extensive damage to crops, houses, livestock, and infrastructure. Currently the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti continues to experience bouts of political instability.   ++  "
     }
   },
   "Geography": {
@@ -267,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "34.3% (2016/17)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 8.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 91.5% of population / rural: 55.4% of population / total: 75% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "44.6% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "25% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 8.5% of population / rural: 44.6% of population / total: 25% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -287,14 +284,11 @@
       "text": "0.7 beds/1,000 population (2013)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 19.4% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 80.6% of population / rural: 40% of population / total: 62.1% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "60% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "37.9% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 19.4% of population / rural: 60% of population / total: 37.9% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -438,13 +432,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral legislature or le Corps l'egislatif ou le Parlement consists of:le S'enat or Senate (30 seats, 29 filled as of June 2019; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 6-year terms with one-third of the membership renewed every 2 years) la Chambre de deput'es or Chamber of Deputies (119 seats; 116 filled as of June 2019; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 4-year terms); note - when the 2 chambers meet collectively it is known as L'Assembl'ee nationale or the National Assembly and is convened for specific purposes spelled out in the constitution"
+        "text": "bicameral legislature or le Corps l'egislatif ou le Parlement consists of: le S'enat or Senate (30 seats, 29 filled as of June 2019; members directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 6-year terms with one-third of the membership renewed every 2 years) ++ la Chambre de deput'es or Chamber of Deputies (119 seats; 116 filled as of June 2019; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed; members serve 4-year terms); note - when the 2 chambers meet collectively it is known as L'Assembl'ee nationale or the National Assembly and is convened for specific purposes spelled out in the constitution"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last held on 20 November 2016 with runoff on 29 January 2017 (next scheduled for 27 October 2019) Chamber of Deputies - last held on 9 August 2015 with runoff on 25 October 2015 and 20 November 2016 (next scheduled for 27 October 2019)"
+        "text": "Senate - last held on 20 November 2016 with runoff on 29 January 2017 (next scheduled for 27 October 2019) ++ Chamber of Deputies - last held on 9 August 2015 with runoff on 25 October 2015 and 20 November 2016 (next scheduled for 27 October 2019)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 27, women 1, percent of women 3.6% Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 115, women 3, percent of women 2.5%; note - total legislature percent of women 2.7%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 27, women 1, percent of women 3.6% ++ Chamber of Deputies - percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 115, women 3, percent of women 2.5%; note - total legislature percent of women 2.7%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -462,7 +456,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alternative League for Haitian Progress and Empowerment or LAPEH [Jude CELESTIN]Christian Movement for a New Haiti or MCNH [Luc MESADIEU]Christian National Movement for the Reconstruction of Haiti or UNCRH [Chavannes JEUNE]Convention for Democratic Unity or KID [Evans PAUL]Cooperative Action to Rebuild Haiti or KONBA [Jean William JEANTY]December 16 Platform or Platfom 16 Desanm [Dr. Gerard BLOT]Democratic Alliance Party or ALYANS [Evans PAUL] (coalition includes KID and PPRH)Democratic Centers' National Council or CONACED [Osner FEVRY]Dessalinian Patriotic and Popular Movement or MOPOD [Jean Andre VICTOR]Effort and Solidarity to Create an Alternative for the People or ESKAMP [Joseph JASME]Fanmi Lavalas or FL [Jean-Bertrand ARISTIDE]For Us All or PONT [Jean-Marie CHERESTAL]Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats or FHSD [Edmonde Supplice BEAUZILE]Grouping of Citizens for Hope or RESPE [Charles-Henri BAKER]Haitians for Haiti [Yvon NEPTUNE]Haitian Tet Kale Party or PHTK [Ann Valerie Timothee MILFORT]Haiti in Action or AAA [Youri LATORTUE]Independent Movement for National Reconstruction or MIRN [Luc FLEURINORD]Konbit Pou refe Ayiti or KONBITLavni Organization or LAVNI [Yves CRISTALIN]Liberal Party of Haiti or PLH [Jean Andre VICTOR]Love Haiti or Renmen Ayiti [Jean-Henry CEANT, Camille LEBLANC]Mobilization for National Development or MDN [Hubert de RONCERAY]New Christian Movement for a New Haiti or MOCHRENA [Luc MESADIEU]Organization for the Advancement of Haiti and Haitians or OLAHHParty for the Integral Advancement of the Haitian People or PAIPHPatriotic Unity or IP [Marie Denise CLAUDE]Peasant's Response or Repons Peyizan [Michel MARTELLY]Platform Alternative for Progress and Democracy or ALTENATIV [Victor BENOIT and Evans PAUL]Platform of Haitian Patriots or PLAPH [Dejean BELISAIRE, Himmler REBU]Platform Pitit Desaline or PPD [Jean-Charles MOISE]PontPopular Party for the Renewal of Haiti or PPRH [Claude ROMAIN]PPG18Rally of Progressive National Democrats or RDNP [Mirlande MANIGAT]Renmen Ayiti or RA [Jean-Henry CEANT]Reseau National Bouclier or BouclierRespect or RESPEStrength in Unity or Ansanm Nou Fo [Leslie VOLTAIRE]Struggling People's Organization or OPL [Jacques-Edouard ALEXIS]Truth (Verite)Union [Chavannes JEUNE]Unity or Inite [Levaillant LOUIS-JEUNE]Vigilance or Veye Yo [Lavarice GAUDIN]"
+      "text": "Alternative League for Haitian Progress and Empowerment or LAPEH [Jude CELESTIN] ++ Christian Movement for a New Haiti or MCNH [Luc MESADIEU] ++ Christian National Movement for the Reconstruction of Haiti or UNCRH [Chavannes JEUNE] ++ Convention for Democratic Unity or KID [Evans PAUL] ++ Cooperative Action to Rebuild Haiti or KONBA [Jean William JEANTY] ++ December 16 Platform or Platfom 16 Desanm [Dr. Gerard BLOT] ++ Democratic Alliance Party or ALYANS [Evans PAUL] (coalition includes KID and PPRH) ++ Democratic Centers' National Council or CONACED [Osner FEVRY] ++ Dessalinian Patriotic and Popular Movement or MOPOD [Jean Andre VICTOR] ++ Effort and Solidarity to Create an Alternative for the People or ESKAMP [Joseph JASME] ++ Fanmi Lavalas or FL [Jean-Bertrand ARISTIDE] ++ For Us All or PONT [Jean-Marie CHERESTAL] ++ Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats or FHSD [Edmonde Supplice BEAUZILE] ++ Grouping of Citizens for Hope or RESPE [Charles-Henri BAKER] ++ Haitians for Haiti [Yvon NEPTUNE] ++ Haitian Tet Kale Party or PHTK [Ann Valerie Timothee MILFORT] ++ Haiti in Action or AAA [Youri LATORTUE] ++ Independent Movement for National Reconstruction or MIRN [Luc FLEURINORD] ++ Konbit Pou refe Ayiti or KONBIT ++ Lavni Organization or LAVNI [Yves CRISTALIN] ++ Liberal Party of Haiti or PLH [Jean Andre VICTOR] ++ Love Haiti or Renmen Ayiti [Jean-Henry CEANT, Camille LEBLANC] ++ Mobilization for National Development or MDN [Hubert de RONCERAY] ++ New Christian Movement for a New Haiti or MOCHRENA [Luc MESADIEU] ++ Organization for the Advancement of Haiti and Haitians or OLAHH ++ Party for the Integral Advancement of the Haitian People or PAIPH ++ Patriotic Unity or IP [Marie Denise CLAUDE] ++ Peasant's Response or Repons Peyizan [Michel MARTELLY] ++ Platform Alternative for Progress and Democracy or ALTENATIV [Victor BENOIT and Evans PAUL] ++ Platform of Haitian Patriots or PLAPH [Dejean BELISAIRE, Himmler REBU] ++ Platform Pitit Desaline or PPD [Jean-Charles MOISE] ++ Pont ++ Popular Party for the Renewal of Haiti or PPRH [Claude ROMAIN] ++ PPG18 ++ Rally of Progressive National Democrats or RDNP [Mirlande MANIGAT] ++ Renmen Ayiti or RA [Jean-Henry CEANT] ++ Reseau National Bouclier or Bouclier ++ Respect or RESPE ++ Strength in Unity or Ansanm Nou Fo [Leslie VOLTAIRE] ++ Struggling People's Organization or OPL [Jacques-Edouard ALEXIS] ++ Truth (Verite) ++ Union [Chavannes JEUNE] ++ Unity or Inite [Levaillant LOUIS-JEUNE] ++ Vigilance or Veye Yo [Lavarice GAUDIN]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, Caricom, CD, CDB, CELAC, FAO, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAES, MIGA, NAM, OAS, OIF, OPANAL, OPCW, PCA, Petrocaribe, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -521,7 +515,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Haiti is a free market economy with low labor costs and tariff-free access to the US for many of its exports. Two-fifths of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small-scale subsistence farming, which remains vulnerable to damage from frequent natural disasters. Poverty, corruption, vulnerability to natural disasters, and low levels of education for much of the population represent some of the most serious impediments to Haiti’s economic growth. Remittances are the primary source of foreign exchange, equivalent to more than a quarter of GDP, and nearly double the combined value of Haitian exports and foreign direct investment. Currently the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with close to 60% of the population living under the national poverty line, Haiti’s GDP growth rose to 5.5% in 2011 as the Haitian economy began recovering from the devastating January 2010 earthquake that destroyed much of its capital city, Port-au-Prince, and neighboring areas. However, growth slowed to below 2% in 2015 and 2016 as political uncertainty, drought conditions, decreasing foreign aid, and the depreciation of the national currency took a toll on investment and economic growth. Hurricane Matthew, the fiercest Caribbean storm in nearly a decade, made landfall in Haiti on 4 October 2016, with 140 mile-per-hour winds, creating a new humanitarian emergency. An estimated 2.1 million people were affected by the category 4 storm, which caused extensive damage to crops, houses, livestock, and infrastructure across Haiti’s southern peninsula. US economic engagement under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the 2008 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE II) have contributed to an increase in apparel exports and investment by providing duty-free access to the US. The Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 extended the CBTPA and HOPE II until 2020, while the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 extended trade benefits provided to Haiti in the HOPE and HELP Acts through September 2025. Apparel sector exports in 2016 reached approximately $850 million and account for over 90% of Haitian exports and more than 10% of the GDP. Investment in Haiti is hampered by the difficulty of doing business and weak infrastructure, including access to electricity. Haiti's outstanding external debt was cancelled by donor countries following the 2010 earthquake, but has since risen to $2.6 billion as of December 2017, the majority of which is owed to Venezuela under the PetroCaribe program. Although the government has increased its revenue collection, it continues to rely on formal international economic assistance for fiscal sustainability, with over 20% of its annual budget coming from foreign aid or direct budget support."
+      "text": "Haiti is a free market economy with low labor costs and tariff-free access to the US for many of its exports. Two-fifths of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small-scale subsistence farming, which remains vulnerable to damage from frequent natural disasters. Poverty, corruption, vulnerability to natural disasters, and low levels of education for much of the population represent some of the most serious impediments to Haiti's economic growth. Remittances are the primary source of foreign exchange, equivalent to more than a quarter of GDP, and nearly double the combined value of Haitian exports and foreign direct investment. ++ Currently the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with close to 60% of the population living under the national poverty line, Haiti's GDP growth rose to 5.5% in 2011 as the Haitian economy began recovering from the devastating January 2010 earthquake that destroyed much of its capital city, Port-au-Prince, and neighboring areas. However, growth slowed to below 2% in 2015 and 2016 as political uncertainty, drought conditions, decreasing foreign aid, and the depreciation of the national currency took a toll on investment and economic growth. Hurricane Matthew, the fiercest Caribbean storm in nearly a decade, made landfall in Haiti on 4 October 2016, with 140 mile-per-hour winds, creating a new humanitarian emergency. An estimated 2.1 million people were affected by the category 4 storm, which caused extensive damage to crops, houses, livestock, and infrastructure across Haiti's southern peninsula. ++ US economic engagement under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the 2008 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE II) have contributed to an increase in apparel exports and investment by providing duty-free access to the US. The Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act of 2010 extended the CBTPA and HOPE II until 2020, while the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 extended trade benefits provided to Haiti in the HOPE and HELP Acts through September 2025. Apparel sector exports in 2016 reached approximately $850 million and account for over 90% of Haitian exports and more than 10% of the GDP. ++ Investment in Haiti is hampered by the difficulty of doing business and weak infrastructure, including access to electricity. Haiti's outstanding external debt was cancelled by donor countries following the 2010 earthquake, but has since risen to $2.6 billion as of December 2017, the majority of which is owed to Venezuela under the PetroCaribe program. Although the government has increased its revenue collection, it continues to rely on formal international economic assistance for fiscal sustainability, with over 20% of its annual budget coming from foreign aid or direct budget support."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$19.97 billion (2017 est.) / $19.74 billion (2016 est.) / $19.46 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -901,7 +895,7 @@
     },
     "Trafficking in persons": {
       "current situation": {
-        "text": "Haiti is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; most of Haiti’s trafficking cases involve children in domestic servitude vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse; dismissed and runaway child domestic servants often end up in prostitution, begging, or street crime; other exploited populations included low-income Haitians, child laborers, and women and children living in IDP camps dating to the 2010 earthquake; Haitian adults are vulnerable to fraudulent labor recruitment abroad and, along with children, may be subjected to forced labor in the Dominican Republic, elsewhere in the Caribbean, South America, and the US; Dominicans are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in Haiti"
+        "text": "Haiti is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking; most of Haiti's trafficking cases involve children in domestic servitude vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse; dismissed and runaway child domestic servants often end up in prostitution, begging, or street crime; other exploited populations included low-income Haitians, child laborers, and women and children living in IDP camps dating to the 2010 earthquake; Haitian adults are vulnerable to fraudulent labor recruitment abroad and, along with children, may be subjected to forced labor in the Dominican Republic, elsewhere in the Caribbean, South America, and the US; Dominicans are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in Haiti"
       },
       "tier rating": {
         "text": "Tier 2 Watch List – Haiti does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, Haiti was granted a waiver from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3 because its government has a written plan that, if implemented would constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; in 2014, Haiti developed a national anti-trafficking action plan and enacted a law prohibiting all forms of human trafficking, although judicial corruption hampered its implementation; progress was made in investigating and prosecuting suspected traffickers, but no convictions were made; the government sustained limited efforts to identify and refer victims to protective services, which were provided mostly by NGOs without government support; campaigns to raise awareness about child labor and child trafficking continued (2015)"

central-america-n-caribbean/ho.json

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
       "text": "Roman Catholic 46%, Protestant 41%, atheist 1%, other 2%, none 9% (2014 est.)"
     },
     "Demographic profile": {
-      "text": "Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and has one of the world's highest murder rates. More than half of the population lives in poverty and per capita income is one of the lowest in the region. Poverty rates are higher among rural and indigenous people and in the south, west, and along the eastern border than in the north and central areas where most of Honduras' industries and infrastructure are concentrated. The increased productivity needed to break Honduras' persistent high poverty rate depends, in part, on further improvements in educational attainment. Although primary-school enrollment is near 100%, educational quality is poor, the drop-out rate and grade repetition remain high, and teacher and school accountability is low.\nHonduras' population growth rate has slowed since the 1990s, but it remains high at nearly 2% annually because the birth rate averages approximately three children per woman and more among rural, indigenous, and poor women. Consequently, Honduras' young adult population - ages 15 to 29 - is projected to continue growing rapidly for the next three decades and then stabilize or slowly shrink. Population growth and limited job prospects outside of agriculture will continue to drive emigration. Remittances represent about a fifth of GDP."
+      "text": "Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America and has one of the world's highest murder rates. More than half of the population lives in poverty and per capita income is one of the lowest in the region. Poverty rates are higher among rural and indigenous people and in the south, west, and along the eastern border than in the north and central areas where most of Honduras' industries and infrastructure are concentrated. The increased productivity needed to break Honduras' persistent high poverty rate depends, in part, on further improvements in educational attainment. Although primary-school enrollment is near 100%, educational quality is poor, the drop-out rate and grade repetition remain high, and teacher and school accountability is low. ++ Honduras' population growth rate has slowed since the 1990s, but it remains high at nearly 2% annually because the birth rate averages approximately three children per woman and more among rural, indigenous, and poor women. Consequently, Honduras' young adult population - ages 15 to 29 - is projected to continue growing rapidly for the next three decades and then stabilize or slowly shrink. Population growth and limited job prospects outside of agriculture will continue to drive emigration. Remittances represent about a fifth of GDP."
     },
     "Age structure": {
       "0-14 years": {
@@ -267,14 +267,11 @@
       "text": "73.2% (2011/12)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 0% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 100% of population / rural: 88.9% of population / total: 94.8% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "11.1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "5.2% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 0% of population / rural: 11.1% of population / total: 5.2% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -287,14 +284,11 @@
       "text": "0.6 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 4.6% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 95.4% of population / rural: 83.5% of population / total: 90.2% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "16.5% of population (2015 est.)"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "9.8% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 4.6% of population / rural: 16.5% of population (2015 est.) / total: 9.8% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -478,7 +472,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Alliance against the Dictatorship or Alianza de Oposicion conta la Dictadura [Salvador NASRALLA] (electoral coalition) Anti-Corruption Party or PAC [Marlene ALVARENGA] Christian Democratic Party or DC [Lucas AGUILERA] Democratic Unification Party or UD [Alfonso DIAZ] Freedom and Refoundation Party or LIBRE [Jose Manuel ZELAYA Rosales] Honduran Patriotic Alliance or AP [Romeo VASQUEZ Velasquez] Liberal Party or PL [Luis Orlando ZELAYA Medrano] National Party of Honduras or PNH [Reinaldo SANCHEZ Rivera] Innovation and Unity Party or PINU [Guillermo VALLE]"
+      "text": "Alliance against the Dictatorship or Alianza de Oposicion conta la Dictadura [Salvador NASRALLA] (electoral coalition) ++ Anti-Corruption Party or PAC [Marlene ALVARENGA] ++ Christian Democratic Party or DC [Lucas AGUILERA] ++ Democratic Unification Party or UD [Alfonso DIAZ] ++ Freedom and Refoundation Party or LIBRE [Jose Manuel ZELAYA Rosales] ++ Honduran Patriotic Alliance or AP [Romeo VASQUEZ Velasquez] ++ Liberal Party or PL [Luis Orlando ZELAYA Medrano] ++ National Party of Honduras or PNH [Reinaldo SANCHEZ Rivera] ++ Innovation and Unity Party or PINU [Guillermo VALLE]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "BCIE, CACM, CD, CELAC, EITI (candidate country), FAO, G-11, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC (suspended), IOM, IPU, ISO (subscriber), ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAES, LAIA (observer), MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSTAH, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, Pacific Alliance (observer), PCA, Petrocaribe, SICA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, Union Latina, UNWTO, UPU, WCO (suspended), WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -543,7 +537,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Honduras, the second poorest country in Central America, suffers from extraordinarily unequal distribution of income, as well as high underemployment. While historically dependent on the export of bananas and coffee, Honduras has diversified its export base to include apparel and automobile wire harnessing. Honduras’s economy depends heavily on US trade and remittances. The US-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement came into force in 2006 and has helped foster foreign direct investment, but physical and political insecurity, as well as crime and perceptions of corruption, may deter potential investors; about 15% of foreign direct investment is from US firms. The economy registered modest economic growth of 3.1%-4.0% from 2010 to 2017, insufficient to improve living standards for the nearly 65% of the population in poverty. In 2017, Honduras faced rising public debt, but its economy has performed better than expected due to low oil prices and improved investor confidence. Honduras signed a three-year standby arrangement with the IMF in December 2014, aimed at easing Honduras’s poor fiscal position."
+      "text": "Honduras, the second poorest country in Central America, suffers from extraordinarily unequal distribution of income, as well as high underemployment. While historically dependent on the export of bananas and coffee, Honduras has diversified its export base to include apparel and automobile wire harnessing. ++ Honduras's economy depends heavily on US trade and remittances. The US-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement came into force in 2006 and has helped foster foreign direct investment, but physical and political insecurity, as well as crime and perceptions of corruption, may deter potential investors; about 15% of foreign direct investment is from US firms. ++ The economy registered modest economic growth of 3.1%-4.0% from 2010 to 2017, insufficient to improve living standards for the nearly 65% of the population in poverty. In 2017, Honduras faced rising public debt, but its economy has performed better than expected due to low oil prices and improved investor confidence. Honduras signed a three-year standby arrangement with the IMF in December 2014, aimed at easing Honduras's poor fiscal position."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$46.3 billion (2017 est.) / $44.18 billion (2016 est.) / $42.58 billion (2015 est.)",
@@ -890,7 +884,7 @@
         "text": "164 km 1.067-m gauge (2014)"
       },
       "note": {
-        "text": "115 km 1.057-m gauge420 km 0.914-m gauge"
+        "text": "115 km 1.057-m gauge ++ 420 km 0.914-m gauge"
       }
     },
     "Roadways": {

central-america-n-caribbean/jm.json

@@ -256,14 +256,11 @@
       "text": "2.07 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.5% of population / rural: 93% of population / total: 96% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "7% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "4% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.5% of population / rural: 7% of population / total: 4% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "Current Health Expenditure": {
@@ -276,14 +273,11 @@
       "text": "1.7 beds/1,000 population (2017)"
     },
     "Sanitation facility access": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1.5% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 98.5% of population / rural: 99.5% of population / total: 99% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "0.5% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1% of population (2017 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1.5% of population / rural: 0.5% of population / total: 1% of population (2017 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -429,13 +423,13 @@
     },
     "Legislative branch": {
       "description": {
-        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of:Senate (21 seats; members appointed by the governor general on the recommendation of the prime minister and the opposition leader - 13 seats allocated to the ruling party and 8 to the opposition party; members serve 5-year terms or until Parliament is dissolved)House of Representatives (63 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms or until Parliament is dissolved)"
+        "text": "bicameral Parliament consists of: Senate (21 seats; members appointed by the governor general on the recommendation of the prime minister and the opposition leader - 13 seats allocated to the ruling party and 8 to the opposition party; members serve 5-year terms or until Parliament is dissolved) ++ House of Representatives (63 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 5-year terms or until Parliament is dissolved)"
       },
       "elections": {
-        "text": "Senate - last full slate of appointments on 10 March 2016 (next full slate early on 3 September 2020, following dissolution in mid-August)House of Representatives - last held on 3 September 2020 (next to be held in 2025)"
+        "text": "Senate - last full slate of appointments on 10 March 2016 (next full slate early on 3 September 2020, following dissolution in mid-August) ++ House of Representatives - last held on 3 September 2020 (next to be held in 2025)"
       },
       "election results": {
-        "text": "Senate - percent by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 16, women 5, percent of women 23.8%House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - JLP 57%, PNP 42.8%, independent 0.2%; seats by party - JLP 48, PNP 15; composition - men 45, women 18; percent of women 28.6%; note - total Parliament percent of women 27.4%"
+        "text": "Senate - percent by party - NA; seats by party - NA; composition - men 16, women 5, percent of women 23.8% ++ House of Representatives - percent of vote by party - JLP 57%, PNP 42.8%, independent 0.2%; seats by party - JLP 48, PNP 15; composition - men 45, women 18; percent of women 28.6%; note - total Parliament percent of women 27.4%"
       }
     },
     "Judicial branch": {
@@ -450,7 +444,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Jamaica Labor Party or JLP [Andrew Michael HOLNESS]People's National Party or PNP [Dr. Peter David PHILLIPS]National Democratic Movement or NDM [Peter TOWNSEND]"
+      "text": "Jamaica Labor Party or JLP [Andrew Michael HOLNESS] ++ People's National Party or PNP [Dr. Peter David PHILLIPS] ++ National Democratic Movement or NDM [Peter TOWNSEND]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "ACP, AOSIS, C, Caricom, CDB, CELAC, FAO, G-15, G-77, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC (NGOs), ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITSO, ITU, LAES, MIGA, NAM, OAS, OPANAL, OPCW, Petrocaribe, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO"
@@ -512,7 +506,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "The Jamaican economy is heavily dependent on services, which accounts for more than 70% of GDP. The country derives most of its foreign exchange from tourism, remittances, and bauxite/alumina. Earnings from remittances and tourism each account for 14% and 20% of GDP, while bauxite/alumina exports have declined to less than 5% of GDP. Jamaica's economy has grown on average less than 1% a year for the last three decades and many impediments remain to growth: a bloated public sector which crowds out spending on important projects; high crime and corruption; red-tape; and a high debt-to-GDP ratio. Jamaica, however, has made steady progress in reducing its debt-to-GDP ratio from a high of almost 150% in 2012 to less than 110% in 2017, in close collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The current IMF Stand-By Agreement requires Jamaica to produce an annual primary surplus of 7%, in an attempt to reduce its debt burden below 60% by 2025. Economic growth reached 1.6% in 2016, but declined to 0.9% in 2017 after intense rainfall, demonstrating the vulnerability of the economy to weather-related events. The HOLNESS administration therefore faces the difficult prospect of maintaining fiscal discipline to reduce the debt load while simultaneously implementing growth inducing policies and attacking a serious crime problem. High unemployment exacerbates the crime problem, including gang violence fueled by advanced fee fraud (lottery scamming) and the drug trade."
+      "text": "The Jamaican economy is heavily dependent on services, which accounts for more than 70% of GDP. The country derives most of its foreign exchange from tourism, remittances, and bauxite/alumina. Earnings from remittances and tourism each account for 14% and 20% of GDP, while bauxite/alumina exports have declined to less than 5% of GDP. ++ Jamaica's economy has grown on average less than 1% a year for the last three decades and many impediments remain to growth: a bloated public sector which crowds out spending on important projects; high crime and corruption; red-tape; and a high debt-to-GDP ratio. Jamaica, however, has made steady progress in reducing its debt-to-GDP ratio from a high of almost 150% in 2012 to less than 110% in 2017, in close collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The current IMF Stand-By Agreement requires Jamaica to produce an annual primary surplus of 7%, in an attempt to reduce its debt burden below 60% by 2025. ++ Economic growth reached 1.6% in 2016, but declined to 0.9% in 2017 after intense rainfall, demonstrating the vulnerability of the economy to weather-related events. The HOLNESS administration therefore faces the difficult prospect of maintaining fiscal discipline to reduce the debt load while simultaneously implementing growth inducing policies and attacking a serious crime problem. High unemployment exacerbates the crime problem, including gang violence fueled by advanced fee fraud (lottery scamming) and the drug trade."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$26.06 billion (2017 est.) / $25.89 billion (2016 est.) / $25.51 billion (2015 est.)",

central-america-n-caribbean/mh.json

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
       "text": "only the northern half of the island is populated, the southern portion is uninhabitable due to volcanic activity"
     },
     "Natural hazards": {
-      "text": "volcanic eruptions; severe hurricanes (June to November)\nvolcanism: Soufriere Hills volcano (915 m), has erupted continuously since 1995; a massive eruption in 1997 destroyed most of the capital, Plymouth, and resulted in approximately half of the island becoming uninhabitable; the island of Montserrat is part of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends from Saba in the north to Grenada in the south"
+      "text": "volcanic eruptions; severe hurricanes (June to November) ++ volcanism: Soufriere Hills volcano (915 m), has erupted continuously since 1995; a massive eruption in 1997 destroyed most of the capital, Plymouth, and resulted in approximately half of the island becoming uninhabitable; the island of Montserrat is part of the volcanic island arc of the Lesser Antilles that extends from Saba in the north to Grenada in the south"
     },
     "Environment - current issues": {
       "text": "land erosion occurs on slopes that have been cleared for cultivation"
@@ -213,14 +213,11 @@
       "text": "1.36 children born/woman (2020 est.)"
     },
     "Drinking water source": {
-      "urban": {
-        "text": "unimproved: 1% of population"
+      "improved": {
+        "text": "urban: 99% of population / rural: 99% of population / total: 99% of population"
       },
-      "rural": {
-        "text": "1% of population"
-      },
-      "total": {
-        "text": "1% of population (2015 est.)"
+      "unimproved": {
+        "text": "urban: 1% of population / rural: 1% of population / total: 1% of population (2015 est.)"
       }
     },
     "HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate": {
@@ -344,7 +341,7 @@
       }
     },
     "Political parties and leaders": {
-      "text": "Movement for Change and Prosperity or MCAP [Easton Taylor FARRELL]People's Democratic Movement or PDM [Donaldson ROMERO]"
+      "text": "Movement for Change and Prosperity or MCAP [Easton Taylor FARRELL] ++ People's Democratic Movement or PDM [Donaldson ROMERO]"
     },
     "International organization participation": {
       "text": "Caricom, CDB, Interpol (subbureau), OECS, UPU"
@@ -368,7 +365,7 @@
   },
   "Economy": {
     "Economy - overview": {
-      "text": "Severe volcanic activity, which began in July 1995, has put a damper on this small, open economy. A catastrophic eruption in June 1997 closed the airport and seaports, causing further economic and social dislocation. Two-thirds of the 12,000 inhabitants fled the island. Some began to return in 1998 but lack of housing limited the number. The agriculture sector continued to be affected by the lack of suitable land for farming and the destruction of crops. Prospects for the economy depend largely on developments in relation to the volcanic activity and on public sector construction activity. Half of the island remains uninhabitable. In January 2013, the EU announced the disbursement of a $55.2 million aid package to Montserrat in order to boost the country's economic recovery, with a specific focus on public finance management, public sector reform, and prudent economic management. Montserrat is tied to the EU through the UK. Although the UK is leaving the EU, Montserrat’s aid will not be affected as Montserrat maintains a direct agreement with the EU regarding aid."
+      "text": "Severe volcanic activity, which began in July 1995, has put a damper on this small, open economy. A catastrophic eruption in June 1997 closed the airport and seaports, causing further economic and social dislocation. Two-thirds of the 12,000 inhabitants fled the island. Some began to return in 1998 but lack of housing limited the number. The agriculture sector continued to be affected by the lack of suitable land for farming and the destruction of crops. ++ Prospects for the economy depend largely on developments in relation to the volcanic activity and on public sector construction activity. Half of the island remains uninhabitable. In January 2013, the EU announced the disbursement of a $55.2 million aid package to Montserrat in order to boost the country's economic recovery, with a specific focus on public finance management, public sector reform, and prudent economic management. Montserrat is tied to the EU through the UK. Although the UK is leaving the EU, Montserrat's aid will not be affected as Montserrat maintains a direct agreement with the EU regarding aid."
     },
     "GDP (purchasing power parity)": {
       "text": "$167.4 million (2011 est.) / $155.9 million (2010 est.) / $162.7 million (2009 est.)"