From 51ab9303ec880c0890566a0055777f5419a442b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: shiminshen <smshen17@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 15:40:30 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] fix(webrtc): enforce embed allowed-domain policy on public
 signaling websocket (#388)
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The public WebRTC signaling WebSocket (`/public/signaling/{session_token}`)
validated only the session token and its expiry, not the embed token's
allowed-domain policy that the HTTP embed endpoints already enforce. A leaked
or replayed session token could therefore attach to the signaling path from
an arbitrary origin.

Validate the request origin against `embed_token.allowed_domains` (reusing the
existing `validate_origin` helper) before the signaling handoff, rejecting
disallowed origins with a 1008 close — mirroring the HTTP embed endpoints.

Closes #330

Co-authored-by: shiminshen <16914659+shiminshen@users.noreply.github.com>
---
 api/routes/webrtc_signaling.py            | 14 +++++
 api/tests/test_public_signaling_origin.py | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 api/tests/test_public_signaling_origin.py

diff --git a/api/routes/webrtc_signaling.py b/api/routes/webrtc_signaling.py
index f4be425f..f7b4eeb3 100644
--- a/api/routes/webrtc_signaling.py
+++ b/api/routes/webrtc_signaling.py
@@ -545,6 +545,20 @@ async def public_signaling_websocket(
         await websocket.close(code=1008, reason="Invalid embed token")
         return
 
+    # Enforce the embed token's allowed-domain policy on the public signaling
+    # path, mirroring the HTTP embed endpoints (issue #330). Without this a
+    # leaked or replayed session token could attach from an arbitrary origin.
+    from api.routes.public_embed import validate_origin
+
+    origin = websocket.headers.get("origin") or websocket.headers.get("referer", "")
+    if not validate_origin(origin, embed_token.allowed_domains or []):
+        logger.warning(
+            f"Domain validation failed for public signaling: {origin} "
+            f"not in {embed_token.allowed_domains}"
+        )
+        await websocket.close(code=1008, reason="Domain not allowed")
+        return
+
     # Create a minimal user object for compatibility with signaling manager
     # Use the embed token creator as the user
     user = await db_client.get_user_by_id(embed_token.created_by)
diff --git a/api/tests/test_public_signaling_origin.py b/api/tests/test_public_signaling_origin.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ad893c60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/api/tests/test_public_signaling_origin.py
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"""Tests for public WebRTC signaling allowed-domain enforcement.
+
+Regression for issue #330: the public signaling WebSocket
+(`/public/signaling/{session_token}`) must enforce the embed token's
+allowed-domain policy, mirroring the HTTP embed endpoints. Before the fix it
+validated only the session token and expiry, so a leaked or replayed session
+token could attach to the signaling path from an arbitrary origin.
+"""
+
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+
+
+class _FakeWebSocket:
+    """Minimal WebSocket double exposing handshake headers and close()."""
+
+    def __init__(self, origin: str):
+        self.headers = {"origin": origin}
+        self.close = AsyncMock()
+
+
+def _embed_session():
+    return SimpleNamespace(expires_at=None, embed_token_id=1, workflow_run_id=42)
+
+
+def _embed_token(allowed_domains):
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        allowed_domains=allowed_domains, created_by=7, workflow_id=3
+    )
+
+
+def _patch_deps():
+    """Patch db_client + signaling_manager for a valid, non-expired session."""
+    db = patch("api.routes.webrtc_signaling.db_client").start()
+    mgr = patch("api.routes.webrtc_signaling.signaling_manager").start()
+    db.get_embed_session_by_token = AsyncMock(return_value=_embed_session())
+    db.get_embed_token_by_id = AsyncMock(
+        return_value=_embed_token(["example.com"])
+    )
+    db.get_user_by_id = AsyncMock(return_value=SimpleNamespace(id=7))
+    mgr.handle_websocket = AsyncMock()
+    return db, mgr
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_public_signaling_rejects_disallowed_origin():
+    from api.routes.webrtc_signaling import public_signaling_websocket
+
+    ws = _FakeWebSocket("https://evil.example")
+    _db, mgr = _patch_deps()
+    try:
+        await public_signaling_websocket(ws, "emb_session_tok")
+    finally:
+        patch.stopall()
+
+    # Regression (issue #330): a valid session token presented from an origin
+    # outside the embed allowlist must be rejected before the signaling handoff.
+    ws.close.assert_awaited_once()
+    assert ws.close.await_args.kwargs.get("code") == 1008
+    mgr.handle_websocket.assert_not_called()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_public_signaling_accepts_allowed_origin():
+    from api.routes.webrtc_signaling import public_signaling_websocket
+
+    ws = _FakeWebSocket("https://example.com")
+    _db, mgr = _patch_deps()
+    try:
+        await public_signaling_websocket(ws, "emb_session_tok")
+    finally:
+        patch.stopall()
+
+    # An origin within the allowlist proceeds to the signaling handoff.
+    mgr.handle_websocket.assert_awaited_once()