mirror of
https://github.com/Harshit-Dhanwalkar/AsciiCam.git
synced 2026-06-24 11:08:06 +02:00
Merge pull request #1 from orbisai0security/fix-integer-overflow-malloc-edge-detect
fix: multiple allocation calls use arithmetic expres... in edge_detect.c
This commit is contained in:
commit
90976c577e
2 changed files with 94 additions and 1 deletions
|
|
@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ static void do_edge_boost(uint8_t *gray, int w, int h, void *ctx) {
|
|||
int strength = ctx ? *(int *)ctx : 128;
|
||||
|
||||
// Unsharp mask: sharpened = original + (original - blurred) * strength
|
||||
uint8_t *tmp = malloc(w * h);
|
||||
if (h <= 0 || w <= 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
uint8_t *tmp = calloc((size_t)w, (size_t)h);
|
||||
if (!tmp)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
91
tests/test_invariant_edge_detect.c
Normal file
91
tests/test_invariant_edge_detect.c
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
|
|||
#include <check.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
#include <limits.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* Include the production code under test */
|
||||
#include "C/filters/edge_detect.h"
|
||||
|
||||
START_TEST(test_edge_detect_no_overflow)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Invariant: edge_detect must never corrupt heap or crash due to
|
||||
integer overflow in dimension-based allocations. If dimensions
|
||||
would overflow size_t/uint32_t, the function must either reject
|
||||
them safely or handle them without heap corruption. */
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct { uint32_t w; uint32_t h; } dims;
|
||||
|
||||
dims payloads[] = {
|
||||
/* Exact exploit: w*h overflows 32-bit (65536*65536 = 0 mod 2^32) */
|
||||
{ 65536, 65536 },
|
||||
/* Boundary: just over 16-bit max, product overflows uint16_t */
|
||||
{ 65535, 65535 },
|
||||
/* Valid small input: should succeed without issues */
|
||||
{ 64, 48 },
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
int num_payloads = sizeof(payloads) / sizeof(payloads[0]);
|
||||
|
||||
for (int i = 0; i < num_payloads; i++) {
|
||||
uint32_t w = payloads[i].w;
|
||||
uint32_t h = payloads[i].h;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Allocate a dummy input buffer; for overflow cases this may be
|
||||
small or NULL — the function must not crash/corrupt heap */
|
||||
size_t safe_size = (size_t)w * (size_t)h;
|
||||
uint8_t *input = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Only allocate if size is reasonable to avoid OOM in test */
|
||||
if (safe_size > 0 && safe_size <= (1024 * 1024 * 16)) {
|
||||
input = calloc(safe_size, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Call the real production function; it must not crash.
|
||||
We accept NULL return or error code for adversarial inputs. */
|
||||
uint8_t *result = edge_detect(input, w, h);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Invariant: if dimensions would overflow 32-bit multiplication,
|
||||
the function must not return a valid pointer (it should fail
|
||||
safely), OR if it does return a pointer it must be correctly
|
||||
sized. We assert no silent heap corruption occurred. */
|
||||
if ((uint64_t)w * (uint64_t)h > (uint64_t)UINT32_MAX) {
|
||||
/* For overflow inputs, result must be NULL (safe rejection) */
|
||||
ck_assert_msg(result == NULL,
|
||||
"edge_detect must reject overflowing dimensions safely");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
free(result);
|
||||
free(input);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
END_TEST
|
||||
|
||||
Suite *security_suite(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
Suite *s;
|
||||
TCase *tc_core;
|
||||
|
||||
s = suite_create("Security");
|
||||
tc_core = tcase_create("Core");
|
||||
|
||||
tcase_add_test(tc_core, test_edge_detect_no_overflow);
|
||||
suite_add_tcase(s, tc_core);
|
||||
|
||||
return s;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int main(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int number_failed;
|
||||
Suite *s;
|
||||
SRunner *sr;
|
||||
|
||||
s = security_suite();
|
||||
sr = srunner_create(s);
|
||||
|
||||
srunner_run_all(sr, CK_NORMAL);
|
||||
number_failed = srunner_ntests_failed(sr);
|
||||
srunner_free(sr);
|
||||
|
||||
return (number_failed == 0) ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue